MT 1

PORTFOLIO DE MAQUETACIÓNAlba Celeste Miranzo

alba.miranzo@gmail.com

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ECFR RIGA PAPERS - Views from the European Eastern Partnership CountriesDiseño y maquetación desde cero de la publicación de cabecera y la colección de ensayos.12+28 páginas.

1. Publicación de cabecera de Carl Bildt.

• It was not predestined that Russia should end up in confrontation with the EU; the beginning of the relationship promised something very different. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 1997 laid out lines for cooperation that seemed to indicate a rosy future. But as Russia’s domestic situation changed, the two sides grew fur-ther apart. Russia’s permanent insistence on being treated as “an equal” implied a growing, though hidden, disagreement regarding the values upon which EU enlar-gement is based.

• The war in Georgia in 2008 see-med at the time like a mere “dip” in relations between Europe and Russia, but in fact, it presaged the decisive split that we see today. Medvedev’s presidency warmed relations, but also made the EU overlook the signs that should have sowed alarm. Then Putin’s third term changed things fundamen-tally. The Kremlin began to actively try to stop the efforts of the EU’s Eastern Partners to move closer to Europe. Now Russia has chan-ged from a “strategic partner” to a “strategic problem”. Russia wants “new rules” and threatens that the alternative is “no rules at all”. The problems that we are facing are deep and multi-layered, and will be here for a long time. But even so, what happens to Ukraine now will play an important and possi-bly decisive role not just in Russia’s relationship with Europe but in the future of the continent itself.

AyearandahalfafterthedramaticEasternPartnership(EaP)summitinVilniuslaunchedachainofeventsthatalso led to thefirstviolentchangeofborders inEuropesincetheSecondWorldWar,theEuropeanUnionisstilltrying to extract the lessons of what happened. If theEU’sfuturepoliciesaretobewelldevisedandeffective,itisundoubtedlyessentialthatEuropelearnsthecorrectlessonsfromthepast.

But for all the soul-searching that has gone on in thedebate, a closer examination of the history of theEU-Russia relationship is likely to lead to somewhatsurprising conclusions. While European policies haveremained more or less the same over years and evendecades,Russia’sviewoftheEUhaswobbled,repeatedlychanged, and ultimately crystallised into an aggressiveandconfrontationalstance.Itisamatterfordebateastowhetherthiscouldhavebeenpredicted,butitisnotlikelythatmuchcouldhavebeendonetopreventit.

But it was not predestined that Russia should end upin confrontation with the EU. The beginning of therelationship – at which I happened to be present –promised something very different. On midsummer’seve, 1994, on the island of Corfu in Greece, we signedthe treaties of accession of Sweden, Finland, Austria,andNorway to the EU. At the very same occasion, thefar-reaching Partnership and Cooperation Agreement(PCA)betweenRussia and theEUwas signed. I vividlyremember the dinner that evening with the 16 leadersoftheEUandtheaccessioncountriesaswellasRussianPresidentBorisYeltsin.Theatmospherewaswarm,open,andtrulyforward-looking.PresidentYeltsinwasveryclearinhisvisionofaRussiathatwouldreform,democratise,and integrate with the rest of Europe. There was noreasontodoubthisseriousnesswhenhepromisedtodo“everything possible to support European integration”.1AndtheEUleadersresponded.IrememberthatFrance’sPresidentFrançoisMitterrandwentsofarinholdingout

1-ExcerptsofYeltsin’sspeechonthatoccasioncanbefoundat“AthensNewsAgencyBulletin”,HellenicResourcesNetwork,25June1994,availa-bleathttp://www.hri.org/news/greek/ana/1994/94-06-25.ana.txt.

ECFR Riga Series Carl Bildt

Russia, the European Union, and the Eastern Partnership

We would like to thank the Permanent Representation of the Republic of Latvia to the European Union for the production of

these EaP summit papers.

3-SeeStephenSestanovich,“Couldithavebeenotherwise?”,TheAmeri-canInterest,14April2015,availableathttp://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/04/14/could-it-have-been-otherwise/. 3

Byofferingthecountriesintheneighbourhoodtheopportunitytoparticipatein“everythingbutinstitutions”,itsoughttofacilitatethedevelopmentofa“ringoffriends”aroundtheEU.Anotherkeyobjectivewas topreventanewdividing line fromopeningup between the new members of the EU and countries withwhichtheyhadpreviouslycloselycooperated.Russiawasmostcertainlyalsomadethisofferatthetime,butearlyon,itdeclaredthatitdidnotwanttobepartofthisapproach.Itsrejectionwaslessaboutrefusingthedetailsofcooperationandintegration,butmoreaboutnotwantingtobetreatedinthesameframeworkaswhatitconsideredlessernations,andaboutawishtoestablishmoredirectandequalrelationswiththeEU.

This stance is more important than it may seem. Instead ofmerely representing a big country’s demand for red-carpettreatment,itquietlybutclearlyquestionsthefundamentalvaluesuponwhichEUenlargementisbased.WhenMoscowaskstobetreatedas“anequal”,iteffectivelymeansthatitdoesnotwanttojoinEuropebyacceptingEUprinciplesofbehaviour,butthatitwantstobeanequalpartnerwithwhomEuropeshouldnegotiatethese principles in the first instance. At the time, Russia hadnotyet clearly spelled thisout,but theattitudewasevermorepresentinRussia’svisionoftheworldandbegantocomplicateits attitudes towards Western organisations. As described byStephenSestanovich inhis analysis ofRussia-NATOrelations,thesamedilemmasalsopreventedNATOmembershipfromeverbecoming a realistic prospect for Russia: “How one felt aboutRussia being amember depended on how it became one. […]Wasmembershipamatterofgeopoliticalentitlement,orwasitsomethingtobeearned?WasRussiatobeaskedtojoinbecauseofitspowerorbecauseithonestlyembracedNATO’sgoals?”3

Inreality,theWestoftentriedtobendoverbackwardstointegrateits former adversary alongwith its former allies intoWesternnetworksof institutions.Butit isalsotruethattheWestneverconsidereddoingthisonthebasisofprinciplesotherthanthoseofliberaldemocracy.Itcannotbeblamedforthat:afterall,whatwouldthoseotherprincipleshavelookedlike?Thus,contrarytoMoscow’sclaims,theWestdidtrytotreatMoscowasanequal,asamemberoftheWesternfamily,sharingthesameworldview.And it is regrettable that Russia’s domestic developmentsgradually laid the foundations foranautocraticregime,which,as it was consolidated, took Russia further and further awayfromanychanceoftrulyqualifyingformembershipofWesterninstitutions,andthusfurtherfromactuallybecomingamemberoftheWesternfamily.Andthefrustrationofapermanentunder-qualifierslowlystartedtotarnishRussia’swholeviewoftheWest.

2-See“AgreementonpartnershipandcooperationestablishingapartnershipbetweentheEuropeanCommunitiesandtheirMemberStates,ofonepart,andtheRussianFederation,oftheotherpart-Protocol1ontheestablishmentofacoalandsteelcon-tactgroup-Protocol2onmutualadministrativeassistanceforthecorrectapplicationofcustomslegislation-FinalAct-Exchangesofletters-Minutesofsigning”,EuropeanCommissionDGTrade,availableathttp://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2003/no-vember/tradoc_114138.pdf.

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theprospectthatRussiacouldbecomeamemberoftheEUthatGermany’sChancellorHelmutKohl,whohadanevenstrongerbelief in the necessity of embracing Russia, had to somewhatrestrainhisFrenchcounterpart.

Under the PCA, an elaborate structure of cooperation andintegration was set up – much more extensive than the EUhad originally envisaged, becauseMoscowwanted to bemoreambitious.2 At thehighest level, therewere tobe twosummitmeetings every year between Russia and the EU – today, noothercountryorentityintheworldholdsmorethanoneofthesesummitswiththeEUeveryyear,althoughasimilararrangementdidpreviouslyexistwiththeUnitedStates.Andatlowerlevels,anetworkofdifferentcommitteesandcouncilswasforeseentocoverdifferentareas.

Things did notwork out entirely as intended. The two annualsummitscontinueduntil themostrecentandquitetense32ndsummitwasheldmorethanayearago.Thesemeetingsprovidedthe opportunity for comprehensive dialogue at the highestlevel.Butmanyof the otherworking structuresnever actuallymaterialised; the Russian side insisted on dealing with allissuesatthehighest level.However, inthoseearlydays, itwasprobablymostlyMoscow’sownhabits,experiences,andinternalinstitutionalarrangementsthatmadeithardforittoengagefully.Moscowhadbeenadominantpower inadifferentworld,so itwasinexperiencedwhenitcametohorizontalrelationshipsandtodealingwithmultilateralstructuresascomplexastheEU.Butitdidnotdisputeeitherthestructure,or,moreimportantly,thevalues-relatedfoundationsoftherelationshipthatweredetailedinthePCA.

To cooperate “as equals”

ThePCAenteredintoforcein1997.Thenextformalstepintherelationshipwastakenintheearlyyearsofthenewcentury,bywhichtimetheYeltsinerahadgivenwaytoVladimirPutin’sfirstpresidency,andatatimewhentheupcomingenlargementoftheEUtotakeinthecountriesofCentralEuropemadeitnecessarytorevisittheseissues.

The answer was the launch of the European NeighbourhoodPolicy (ENP) by the Prodi Commission led by former ItalianPrimeMinisterRomanoProdi.Thepolicy’saimwasambitious.

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ECFR RIGA SERIESVIEWS FROM EAP COUNTRIES

1. Summary

• Since its abrupt U-turn in policy in 2013, Armenia has sacrificed its Association Agreement with the European Union in favour of joining the Russian-led Customs Union, thereby deepening the country’s already pronounced over-dependence on Russia.

• That surprise move also had several negative repercussions, ranging from a new perception of the Armenian government as insincere and incompetent, to a weakening of the course of reform and the political marginalisation of pro-European reformers within the Armenian government.

• Even so, despite Armenian membership of the Eurasian Economic Union, there is a pronounced degree of sincerity and political will in both Brussels and Yerevan to salvage relations between the EU and Armenia.

• Thus, the outlook for Armenia’s position within the Eastern Partnership (EaP) and the future of the Armenian relationship with the EU has two main impediments: (1) a combination of Armenian indecision and an absence of strategic priorities, and (2) hesitation in the face of a possible reassertion of Russian pressure on Armenia, resulting in even less room for manoeuvre and fewer options for Armenia

1. Introduction

Clearly, Ukraine remains the primary theatre of operations for Russia’s strategy of retrenchment within its “near abroad” or former Soviet space. As Russia seeks to define and defend its own sphere of influence among the former Soviet states, European engagement is now seen as an unacceptable challenge, equivalent to the perception of NATO expansion as a direct threat to Russian interests. Within this context, Russian policy consists of three primary objectives:

• To undermine the implementation of the EU’s Association

ECFR Riga Series

Food-for-thought paper: ARMENIAViews from EAP

Countries

Riga and beyond: what future for the Eastern Partnership?

Richard Giragosian

6

Agreements with Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine;

• To divide and destabilise the EaP by weakening the top-tier states (Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine) and restraining the remaining states (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Belarus);

• To consolidate Russian power and influence throughout its “near abroad” by leveraging a combination of hard power, or “hybrid war” in Ukraine, and soft power targeting the internal vulnerability of the other EaP member states.

2. Lessons Learned

Looking back, there were three significant “lessons learned” from the case of Armenia:

• First, there was an unwarranted degree of confidence and complacency over Association Agreement negotiations with the EaP states, failing to foresee a strong Russian reaction and floundering in building a deeper and stronger pro-European constituency in EaP states.

• There was also a pronounced lack of a proper communications strategy to more effectively define and defend European values in general, and the benefits of the Association Agreements in particular, for the ordinary citizen and consumer within the EaP states, thereby increasing the efficacy of a Russian “soft power” assault.

• Third, there was an incomplete investment in civil society as an anchor to internal reform and as an empowered policy partner between the EU and EaP member governments, thereby failing to focus on internal weakness and vulnerability to externally driven pressure.

3. Opportunities for Armenia

In the face of marginal economic gains and mounting costs, Armenia is increasingly aware of the “opportunity costs” of both joining the Eurasian Economic Union and being dangerously over-dependent on Russia. The new trend, therefore, is one of worry and wariness, seeing the limits of its alignment with Russia and seizing a second chance to forge a relationship with the EU. This is bolstered by two factors: a new challenge to the asymmetry of the Armenian-Russian relationship, whereby Armenia may still be largely pro-Russian, yet much less pro-Putin, and a need for greater external legitimacy, driven by the weakness of the Armenian government’s domestic position as a political transition begins.

We would like to thank the Permanent Representation of the Republic of Latvia to the European Union for the production of

these EaP summit papers.

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4. The Outlook for Armenia

Clearly, in light of the current reality, the EU needs to now explore alternative measures to engage and empower embattled Armenia, but based on a more realistic recognition of the limits and liabilities of Armenia as a partner. And the challenge for Yerevan will centre on the country’s capacity and its leaders’ determination to withstand a fresh onslaught of Russian pressure and coercion. Thus, for both Armenia and the EU, there is a daunting combination of the fragility and vulnerability of EaP countries with a resurgent Russia intent on pursuing confrontation over cooperation. Yet for Armenia the Riga Summit is the starting point, not the “end state”, for salvaging a relationship and regaining a degree of trust and confidence.

Richard Giragosian is the Founding Director of the Regional Studies Center (RSC), an independent think tank in Yerevan, Armenia. He previously served as a Professional Staff Member in the U.S. Congress and was a guest lecturer for the U.S. Army’s Special Forces.

2. Colección de ensayos.

6

Informe de becarios TinkerDiseño y maquetación desde cero del reporte fotográfico de los beca-rios Tinker de 2017. 20 páginas.

Tinker Field Research Endowment ReportGrantee Photos 2017

Center for Latin American Studies, University of Chicago

Phot

ogra

phy:

Ste

ven

Schw

artz

(de

tail)

, 20

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Tinker Field Research Endowment Report, Grantee Photos 2017

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Cacao on the TransAmazon Highway

Kerry Lepain

Grove of cacao trees in Uruara, Brazil, at Km 147 of the Transa-mazon Highway

Seu Ivan Dantas and his family arriving as pioneers on the Transamazon in the early 1970s.

Batch of high quality cacao beans drying at the Cacauway / Cooptrans Cooperative.

Tinker Field Research Endowment Report, Grantee Photos 2017

2

Center for Latin American Studies, University of Chicago

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Center for Latin American Studies, University of Chicago

3

Concept / Action: Artistic Strategies in Brazil and Mexico in the late 20th Century São Paulo, Brazil &

Mexico City, Mexico

Museo Suomaya, from the neighboring Museo Jumex in Polanco. Mexico City.

Maggie Borowitz

View from MAC-USP, overlooking parque Ibirapuera. São Paulo.

(Left) Succulents in the Jardin Botanico del Bosque de Chapultepec.

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The New Great GameDiseño y maquetación desde cero de la publicación. 14 páginas.

Andrew Puddephatt, José Ignacio Torreblanca

and Nika Prislan*1

Executive Summary101,36,18. These figures represent the huge challenges facing Europe today, stemming from the digital sphere but affecting almost every other. 101 is the number of start-ups valued at over $1 billion in the USA, 36 in China and just 18 in Europe.As digital radically redefines and redistributes economic and political power on an international scale, we enter into a new game with new rules. In response to a recognition that Europe must engage in digital developments to ensure its continuing importance in the global arena, the European Council on Fo-reign Relations launched ‘Europe’s Digital Power’, a project aimed at highlighting the challenges confronting Europe and finding the solutions.

The digital revolution has ushered in a new era in which power, and the means of acquiring and retaining it, has been dras-tically redefined. As digital inexorably transforms every facet of communication and organisation, it dramatically reconfi-gures the political and the socioeconomic spheres. Traditional actors vying for power in this uncharted territory continue to employ traditional Great Game geo-political and geo-econo-mic strategies in the digital world.

This scramble to master an entity with no centralised gover-nance nor international standards or policies for access and

1*We would like to thank BBVA, Cellnex, Telefonica and all the participants at the Madrid Brainstorming sessions which took place on the 9th of December 2015 for their input. We would also like to thank Carla Hobbs for helping to draft an earlier version. A shorter version of this non-paper is available at: http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/Connectivi-ty_Wars.pdf

The New Great Game

#101.36.18 usage is redefining the very nature of the internet. Initially concei-ved of as an open model and developed in the libertarian tradition, it is increasingly dominated by a desire to assert national sove-reignty, the creation of firewalls, information wars, surveillance, and cyberattacks. States increasingly try to subordinate the inter-net and digital domains for nationally strategic purposes while a handful of economic actors swell with unrivalled market capitali-sations.

Europe is conspicuously absent in the battle, looking on as the internet is increasingly carved up and distributed. A fragmented internal market, inconsistent and reactionary regulation, and po-litical disengagement are some of the many obstacles to Europe becoming a player in the digital world. It is essential that Europe now enters the fray to challenge attempts to impose antiquated machinations of geo-political and geo-economic control, and en-sure its open society values govern the digital realm.

Two major challenges for Europe consist in accessing the digital market and in ensuring that the market remains open and gover-ned by diverse stakeholders. Market access hinges on the EU’s ability to effectively create a Digital Single Market in which di-gitisation is uniform across member states and an entrepreneu-rial environment is fostered with the attendant venture capital. In terms of internet governance, the EU must take an active role in shaping the structures and standards that are to oversee digital architecture. This must be cautiously carried out to avert a poten-tial transatlantic rift of which there are already hints, spurred by cyber security and industrial disagreements.

In order to achieve this, Europe must build a virtuous alliance between the private and public sectors, engage its political elites, develop a strategic relationship with the USA, and must create and promote its own vision of the internet based on its open so-ciety values. Europe, traditionally a strong soft power actor, is uniquely placed to prosper in the digital world, a world in which soft power mechanisms excel. It is essential that Europe rapidly takes advantage of this, and acts to limit the outdated Great Game geo-political and geoeconomic manoeuvrings that are fundamen-tally undermining the internet infrastructure. It is the New Great Game and Europe, with its twenty-first century vision, need not only play but change the rules of the game itself.

4

A. Puddephatt, J.I. Torreblanca & N. Prislan

101

36 1

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Thus ‘The Great Game’ continues much as it did before. The phrase itself originated in the nineteenth century, used to describe the intense conflict between the Russian and British Empires over the fate of Asia. Russia’s ambitions to radically expand its sphere of influence provoked British fears that such an expansion into Central Asia threatened its hold on India. This gave birth to the Great Game period, a century of complex geopolitical maneu-verings between two of the great powers vying to maintain and further expand their empires. Henceforth, the phrase is generally applied to describe the geopo-litical chess games played by nations or regions in the pursuit of power and in-fluence in a certain area. Accordingly, the geopolitical jostling for control over the digital ambit can be referred to as ‘Great Game’ machinations.

Meanwhile, a different battle of the geo-economic variety is being waged. With some countries and regions poi-sed to reap the monetary benefits of the digital revolution and others tipped to sustain major losses, the distribution of global power is expected to alter as the cards are reshuffled along economic li-nes. Meanwhile, a small number of glo-bal tech companies with market capita-lisations larger than many medium-sized states, dominate the digital market, and threaten to stifle competition by virtue of their technical aptitude, capacity to fund research & development and increasing ability to shape the digital ecosystem in their favour. Market logic continues to govern in this ecosystem, from battles between regulators and tax smart global companies to the battles waged by entire economic sectors and professions in dan-ger of disappearing.

The digital revolutionThe digital revolution is the most trans-formative force of our time, effecting seis-mic changes on politics, economics and social relations. It heralds the transforma-tion of communication and the reconfi-guring of organisational structures. It is a set of tools and an environment, an actor and a site. Its very nature will profound-ly reshape how governments operate and relate to citizens, how industries develop and relate with consumers and how indi-viduals relate with one another.

Digital developments offer a co-lossal opportunity for governments, eco-nomic actors and individuals to advance their goals but also represent a threat for those who fail to embrace this new wave of innovation. History dictates that revo-lutions reorder politics and society, em-powering some actors and institutions at the expense of others. The Mongols were overtaken by the advent of gunpowder and the Chinese failed to keep up with the first Industrial Revolution. The digital revolution will be no different and repre-sents disruption and turmoil as much as progress.

The major powers now appreciate the significance of the internet as a site of geopolitical competition, collaboration and confrontation. From being seen by its libertarian developers as existing out-side of politics and for the benefit of all, it is now steeped in politics of the most traditional kind. These struggles are being waged across a number of fronts: from in-tellectual property theft to DDOS attacks, and from weaponised viruses to demands to establish a global regulatory body for the internet. If politics is both a norma-tive dispute about which values should prevail in a community and a negotiation about “who gets what, how and when”, it is undeniable that the digital revolution has become politicised, both at home and globally.

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The new great game

the application of digital developments to traditional occupations will have a pro-found impact on the power and economic relations that have so far underpinned the current wave of globalisation. In enabling global manufacturing firms to reabsorb global supply chains and relocate them in countries where consumers are located, it fundamentally undermines sweatshop countries banking on cheap labour and raw materials.

For developing economies strug-gling to catch up on manufacturing and job creation, the impact could be devas-tating: countries such as India and China are already expressing concern about how the introduction of robots in manufac-turing industries may, by making skilled workers redundant, trump the emergence of a middle class and block the country’s progress to the upper tier of per capita income. This particularly threatens Chi-nese aspirations to match the US as a su-perpower, as it is uncertain as to whether the Chinese will succeed in transforming their manufacturing industry into a 4.0 one. Meanwhile, Narendra Modi, India’s tech-savvy Prime Minister, has voiced similar fears and accordingly launched a ‘Digital India’ campaign in 2015.

This offers an immense opportu-nity for countries theoretically bound to be the losers of the twenty-first century, a century presumed to be entirely Asian. Due to its capacity to innovate, and to fund innovation, the US stands to gain the most, and so is poised to remain the dominant superpower for the foreseeable future. For all the talk about American decline, the US is leading the digital revo-lution on the economic front with its fir-ms being able to create much more value than any others. Only two decades ago, seven of the world’s top ten companies in terms of market capitalisation were Japa-nese and just three were US based. Now in 2015, the top ten are all US companies,

Geoeconomic winners and losersFor many major industries such as trans-port or hospitality, the cards have already been shuffled by sharing networks like Über or Airbnb who do not own the as-sets their businesses are based on. Or take the print media or telecoms companies, overwhelmed by new digital media out-lets and communications platforms such as Facebook, Google, Skype or Whatsapp.

These highly disruptive changes pale in comparison with the impact digi-tal will have on manufacturing. Coined by the German government, ‘Industry 4.0’, involves the application of increasingly sophisticated technology to production processes, generating hyper-connected, decentralised and streamlined products. Simply put, this means that industrial production machinery no longer simply ‘processes’ the product, but that the pro-duct communicates with the machinery and instructs it. Industry 4.0 will span everything from artificial intelligence to the internet of things and wearable health technology.

The social and political impact of these changes on industrial societies will be dramatic as the workforce is radically reshaped. While the future may see the creation of high-end digital and “persua-sion-based” jobs (in marketing and sales, for example) it may also witness the ero-sion of middle ranking jobs, particularly in transportation, logistics, manufactu-ring as well as office and administrative support, and their substitution by low paid and low fulfilment jobs, with the ensuing socio-political consequences as societies become more dual and unequal.

Meanwhile, in so far as the US ca-pacity to exploit non-conventional energy (shale oil and gas) has led to energy inde-pendence and is already reshaping global power and economic relations, particu-larly those of the US with the Middle East,

101 36 18

Europe’s digital power #1013618 is an ongoing research project by ECFR supported by BBVA,

Telefonica and Cellnex.

Research in progress. This non-paper is to serve as the basis of a series of initial discussions – it is not to be cited or circulated

without the permission of the authors.

design & layout: Alberto Miranzo (ECFR)

The New Great Game

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PCL: Revista autoproducida de ciencia socialDiseño, maquetación y autoedición de los contenidos (artículos y ensayos propios), usando de referencia estética la revista La Vanguardia Dossier. 32 páginas.

Zine de ciencia social Núm. 1 - octubre 2015

Política contralírica 1 | 5

Las éticas económicas de las religiones

Alba Celeste Miranzo, 2015

universales (más el judaísmo) que realizó en sus últimos años de vida.

Fernand Braudel (1902–1986), el segundo au-tor, es un historiador francés, perteneciente a la Escuela Historiográfica de los Annales, fun-dada por su maestro, Lucien Febvre, y Marc Bloch. Esta escuela tiene una aproximación al estudio de la Historia que trata de buscar los elementos estructurales y las tendencias secu-lares para explican los diversos ensamblajes de la civilización en el más largo plazo. Es por ello que la religión y la ética que de sus preceptos

se desprendan pueden adquirir una relevancia fundamental.

Hans Küng (1920–), por último, escribe desde el campo de la teo-logía, en el que ha sido tres veces catedrático en la Universidad de Tubinga, Alemania. La relevan-cia y oportunidad de este autor procede de su innovadora aplica-ción de una metodología histó-rico-sistemática al estudio de las religiones, desde la que identifica

las constelaciones de convicciones, valores y modos de proceder (paradigmas) que las com-ponen, y que ayudan a explicar sus distintos

La ética económica de una religión, teorizada por Max Weber, con-siste en el conjunto de «estímulos prácticos para la acción funda-mentados en las implicaciones psicológicas y pragmáticas de las

religiones» (Weber, 1920/1983:194). De ello se derivaría que determinadas estructuras sociales, políticos o económicas serían faci-litadas o posibilitadas por el ethos de las reli-giones que en sus sociedades predominan.

En este artículo se pone en relación la obra de tres autores (Max Weber, Fernand Braudel y Hans Küng) que trabajan las éticas económicas desde tres disciplinas distintas.

Weber (1864–1920) estudia estos fenómenos desde el enfoque de la sociología, disciplina de la que es uno de sus máximos representantes. En su corpus, merece especial atención La ética protestante y el espíritu del capitalismo, su obra más célebre, que quedaría después enmarcada en un estudio sociológico de las éticas económicas de las cinco religiones

una ética econó-mica es el conjunto de estímulos prác-ticos para la acción fundamentados en las implicacio-nes psicológicas y pragmáticas de las religiones

EL CAMBISTA Y SU MUJER (detalle)Quentin Massys (1514)

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las éticas económicas de las religioneslas éticas económicas de las religiones

Política contralírica 1 | 76 | Política contralírica 1

Las teodiceas de la felicidad proceden de la búsqueda racional del ser humano de sentirse ‘con derecho a su felicidad’. Así, los más felices son los que más se lo merecen.

devenires históricos y sus estados actua-les, a la vez que orientan la acción futura.

La aproximación teórica a estos tres au-tores se ha complementado con un breve estudio de caso para cada uno de ellos, respondiendo a temáticas similares para maximizar la comparabilidad entre ellos. Para Max Weber, se ha analizado más a fondo el papel de la ética protestante en el auge del capitalismo. Para Braudel se ha es-cogido el ascenso de la sociedad industrial en la civilización europea. Por último, des-marcándose de los otros dos autores pero no alejándose de la órbita de la religión cristiana, para Hans Küng se pondrá el én-fasis en su propuesta de una ética ecuméni-ca mundial en el paradigma posmoderno.

Finalmente, este artículo pondrá en relación lo obser-vado en las investigaciones de cada uno de los autores y sus respectivas disciplinas y ex-traerá conclusiones generales.

En conjunto, se ha seleccio-nado este objeto de estudio porque la religión y, en gene-ral, los factores que pongan en relación aspectos microso-ciales (como la ética) con ma-crosociales (las articulaciones políticas, sociales y econó-

micas de las sociedades), corresponden a perspectivas marginales en los análisis politológicos y de las relaciones internacio-nales. De tal modo, se busca aportar una dimensión complementaria y fundamental al análisis de fenómenos macrosociales.

Asimismo, constituye también un dato relevante en dicha elección el hecho de que Max Weber y, en menor medida, Fernand Braudel y Hans Küng, son in-vestigadores cuyas obras han alcanzado

más felices son los que más se lo merecen –y, en sentido inverso, los desfavorecidos también son merecedores de su situación–.

En segundo lugar, las teodiceas del sufrimiento glorificaban la desdicha, la carencia y la au-to-mortificación, pues se basan en la espe-ranza de redención de los fieles, a quienes se les prometía la felicidad futura en un plano terreno (durante su vida, con un salvador o en la siguiente vida) o ultraterreno.

Las teodiceas del sufrimiento, a su vez, podían tener un com-ponente de resentimiento (la creencia de que al injusto que le va bien en el mundo le espe-ra una eternidad en el infierno) (Weber, 1922/2012:354) o no tenerlo, y consistir más bien en una profecía según la cual el creyente inte-riorizaba que tenía una misión que cumplir con respecto a su dios. Weber distingue dos tipos de profecías: las ejemplares – que pres-cribían una vida que diera ejemplo de cómo buscar la salvación, normalmente a través de la vida contemplativa– y las de misión, en las cuales el creyente, un instrumento de Dios, debía cumplir una serie de deberes con respecto al mundo (que normalmente se asocian a un ascetismo activo, y que obli-gan al individuo a adoptar una ética racio-nal y sistemática de acuerdo a los preceptos religiosos). (Weber, 1922/2012: 364-5).

La ética protestante y el espíritu del capitalismo

La ética del protestantismo ascético1, des-

1 El ascetismo, en la teoría weberiana, se asocia a la regulación personal de la vida a través de la disciplina, la abstinencia y el cálculo en la toma de decisiones; basados en la creencia de que se sirve a Dios a través de las acciones individuales. (Jones, 1997:760). Se identifica

una excelencia que los erige en clásicos de la sociología, la historia y la teología.

LAS ÉTICAS ECONÓMICAS EN LA OBRA DE MAX WEBER.

Como se ha mencionado anteriormente, la base de este artículo procede del con-cepto de ética económica acuñado por este autor. En esta sección, previa al estudio de caso de la ética protestante, se analizan al-gunas cuestiones en torno a este término.

En primer lugar, es destacable que We-ber concibe que la ética económica que juega un papel decisivo en las configura-ciones sociales y económicas es la de los estratos sociales dominantes (Petschen, 2003: 326), que influyen de forma deci-siva sobre ella (Weber, 1922/2012: 346).

Sin embargo, esto no significa que la ética religiosa haya sido un instrumento de le-gitimación de los intereses de estas capas sociales. Weber, que descarta las hipótesis de materialismo histórico (para el cual la religión –y, por consiguiente, su ética eco-nómica– es parte de una superestructura ideológica determinada por la infraes-tructura material), analiza las implicacio-nes psicológicas de la ética religiosa en los individuos (Weber, 1922/2012: 348).

Así, el autor encuentra dos modelos bási-cos y dos derivados en que afecta la religión a la acción práctica individual. Primera-mente, Max Weber distingue de entre las religiones a aquellas en las que existen teodi-ceas de la felicidad y aquellas que responden a teodiceas del sufrimiento. Aquellas proceden de la búsqueda racional del ser humano de sentirse con derecho a su ‘felicidad’ (en tér-minos absolutos y en relación a los demás y sus distintas suertes). Así, el sentimiento de culpa de los estratos dominantes actuaría generando esta teodicea según la cual los

de la teoría de Max Weber, parece haber-se correspondido con este último modelo. A la racionalización de su modo de vida resultante de ello se añadía el hecho [que tiene en común con el judaísmo] de que no existían dispensadores de gracia, como sí existen en la religión católica (la Iglesia po-día conceder y racionar redención del pe-

cado bajo la forma de confesión y penitencia). En consecuencia, la presión para racionalizar aún más su ética era extraordinaria. (Weber, 1922/2012: 243-4)2.

El cristiano protestante, que se encontraba solo ante Dios, sin mediadores, buscaba la señal de redención –la certitudo salu-tis-, de que formaba parte de la aristocracia de salvación, y la encontró en la riqueza per-

sonal (Weber, 1922/2012:256-8; Jones, 1997:761). La realización de ésta se arti-culaba en torno a unos preceptos éticos tomados como fines en sí mismos. Tales máximas son resumidas por Max Weber a través de un discurso de Benjamin Franklin [históricamente desvirtuado] donde afirma que el tiempo es dinero, que el crédito es dinero, que el dinero es fértil y reproductivo, que hay que ser un buen pagador para seguir recibiendo dinero, que ganar dinero es progresar en la vida, que ‘perder el tiempo’ es perder dinero y que el ahorro y la inversión son futuras fortunas (We-ber, 1920/1983: 34-5; comillas añadidas).

como protestantismo ascético al calvinismo y a algunas sectas protestantes (p.ej.: anabaptistas o cuáqueros)2 Mientras que en las religiones con un centro interno de la fe (como el protestantismo ascético o el judaísmo) la sistematización de la razón es un resultado microsocial esperable; el resultado microsocial esperable de las religiones con cen-tro externo de la fe es sumisión a la autoridad y obediencia a las instituciones que dispensan redención–y no la fe–. (Weber, 1922/2012: 245)

El cristiano protestante, solo ante Dios sin mediadores, buscaba señales de redención, y las encontró en la riqueza personal

Política contralírica 1 | 3130 | Política contralírica 1

grado muy bajo de control efec-tivo sobre las bases, y una capa-cidad de decisión sobre la activa-ción de las mismas nula en casos de esfuerzo bélico anticomunista y limitada en el resto de casos (lo que quería decir que Estados Unidos era capaz de arrastrar a España a una guerra interna-cional sin consultar siquiera)4. Además, Españ a tampoco con-siguió la garantía de defensa que deseaba de los Estados Unidos.

La ayuda económica estuvo condicionada por compromi-sos muy duros: estabilizar su mo-neda, equilibrar sus presupuestos, mantener la estabilidad financiera, fomentar la competitividad y la pro-ductividad y desarrollar el comercio internacional5. Además, en una cláusula secreta se estableció que la ayuda económica que recibi-ría a cambio iría principalmen-te dirigida a la construcción de infraestructuras de transporte, a aumentar el material militar y a la construcción y manteni-miento de las bases militares 6.

En suma, aunque Estados Uni-dos tuvo un rol fundamental en la consolidación del régi-men de Franco, el film de Ber-langa, el plan Marshall y los Acuerdos de 1953 dejan cla-ro que los americanos no ve-nían a traer regalos a nadie.

4 Calduch, R. (1993) ‘La política exterior española (I): Las relaciones exteriores durante el franquismo’. Di-námica de la Sociedad Internacional. Madrid: Ceura, pp. 25-6.5 Piñeiro, M.R., op. cit. p. 176.6 Piñeiro, M.R., op. cit. p. 179.

do el caso de Villar del Río, la visita suponga quedarse decep-cionados y con las manos vacías.

Segundo, podría verse también un paralelismo entre la película y lo que fueron los Acuerdos de 1953 entre ambos países, que, si bien supusieron un hito en la normalización de relaciones de España con el resto del mundo –con respecto al cual España esta-ba casi totalmente aislada–, tam-bién expresaban una relación muy desigual entre las partes, donde España tenía casi todo que dar y poco que recibir a cambio.

En este acuerdo triple, las respon-sabilidades estadounidenses a menudo se mostraban de forma ambigua, sucinta y no cuantifica-da2, y se le concedía la facultad de someter [uno de ellos al menos] a consulta o cancelación3. Sin em-bargo, los compromisos de Espa-ña quedaban detallados y sella-dos por 10 años prorrogables en la conjunción de convenios pú-blicos y notas y cláusulas secre-tas que supusieron os acuerdos.

En cuanto a su contenido, en cuanto a las bases militares, Es-paña esperaba recibir ayuda económica y técnica de Estados Unidos y, con ella, preparar unas bases militares bajo mando espa-ñol [real] que pudieran utilizar los estadounidenses. Sin embar-go, lo que consiguieron fue un

2 Piñeiro, M.R. (2006). ‘Los convenios hispano-norteamericanos de 1953’. Historia Actual Online, núm. 11 (Oto-ño), p. 179-80.3 Piñeiro, M.R., op. cit. p. 178.

Oh, Francis Frank, tell me more about organic democracy.

Visita oficial de Eisenhower a España en 1959 agEncia EFE

«Sólo un gran necio lla-maría diabólica a la nueva ciencia política:

no posee los atributos que son propios de los ángeles caídos. Tampoco es maquia-vélica, porque la enseñanza de Maquiavelo era grácil, sutil y colorida. Tampoco es neroniana. No obstante, se puede decir de ella que toca la lira mientras Roma arde. Se la excusa por dos moti-vos: no sabe que toca la lira y no sabe que Roma arde»

Leo Strauss

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CarteleríaMaquetación a partir de esquema base. Diseño de carteles para el Centro de Estudios Latinoamericanos de U. Chicago. 3 muestras.

Alba Celeste Miranzo, 2019alba.miranzo@gmail.com