Consti2 - Case Digest

8/10/2019 Consti2 - Case Digest

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I.INTRODUCTION

FRANCISCO VS.HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES[415 SCRA 44; G.R. No. 160261; 10 Nov 2003]

Facts:

Impeachment proceedings were filed against Supreme Court Chief Justice

Hilario Davide. The justiciable controversy poised in front of the Court wasthe constitutionality of the subsequent filing of a second complaint tocontrovert the rules of impeachment provided for by law.

Issue:

Whether or Not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against ChiefJustice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls withinthe one year bar provided in the Constitution and whether the resolutionthereof is a political question has resulted in a political crisis.

Held:

In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficientto address all the issues which this controversy spawns that this Courtunequivocally pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared resort toextra-constitutional methods of resolving it is neither necessary nor legallypermissible. Both its resolution and protection of the public interest lie inadherence to, not departure from, the Constitution.In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court isever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation ofpowers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of governmentby no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each ofthat part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.

At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which hasbeen carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts ofeach of these three branches must be given effect without destroying theirindispensable co-equality. There exists no constitutional basis for thecontention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedingswould upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is tobe interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeatanother." Both are integral components of the calibrated system ofindependence and interdependence that insures that no branch ofgovernment act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.

When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the

constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to

show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that hesustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a resultof its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefiniteway. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to bedenied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he isabout to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statuteor act complained of. In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of apublic right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of

personal interest.

In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim thatpublic funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected toany improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through theenforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. Before he can invoke thepower of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he hassufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised bytaxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of theenforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that hehas merely a general interest common to all members of the public.

At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not ataxpayer's suit should be entertained. This Court opts to grant standing tomost of the petitioners, given their allegation that any impending transmittalto the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of theChief Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.

As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any officialaction which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator. Indeed, amember of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolatethe prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in hisoffice.

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The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinarymeaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote ofat least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary! toinitiate impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete theline on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachmentproceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does.

To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body caninitiate impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1) says "The House ofRepresentatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases ofimpeachment," This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to theprinciple of reddendo singula singulis by equating "impeachment cases" with"impeachment proceeding."


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Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing andreferral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the HouseCommittee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members ofthe House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, themeaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachmentcomplaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not befiled against the same official within a one year period.

The Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolvedon the merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedingsinitiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposedone-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdictionwhere it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedlypolitical questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert

judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the government.

No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in anylegal system which recognizes equality of all men before the law as essentialto the law's moral authority and that of its agents to secure respect for andobedience to its commands. Perhaps, there is no other government branchor instrumentality that is most zealous in protecting that principle of legalequality other than the Supreme Court which has discerned its real meaningand ramifications through its application to numerous cases especially of thehigh-profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is notabove the law and neither is any other member of this Court. But justbecause he is the Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have less inlaw than anybody else. The law is solicitous of every individual's rightsirrespective of his station in life.

Thus, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which wereapproved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 areunconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint againstChief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of

Article XI of the Constitution.

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS.GSIS[267 SCRA 408; G.R. No. 122156; 3 Feb 1997]

Facts:

The controversy arose when respondent Government Service InsuranceSystem (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the PhilippineGovernment under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided tosell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding sharesof respondent Manila Hotel Corporation. In a close bidding held on 18September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince

Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of theMHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, aMalaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for thesame number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid ofpetitioner.

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategicpartner and the execution of the necessary contracts, matched the bid price

of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad.

On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS hasdisregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of theMHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with RenongBerhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus.

In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with theFilipino nation and has practically become a historical monument whichreflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture .It is a proud legacy ofan earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacrednessof independence and its power and capacity to release the full potential ofthe Filipino people.To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of thenational patrimony.

6Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of

the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which isowned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlledcorporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of thetourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy.

Issue:

Whether or Not the sale of Manila Hotel to Renong Berhad is violative of theConstitutional provision of Filipino First policy and is therefore null and void.

Held:

The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just anycommodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization.The Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a significant role as anauthentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history and culture. This isthe plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of thePhilippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of theConstitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of thenation, will continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the Constitution. Itwas thus ordered that GSIS accepts the matching bid of petitioner MANILAPRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares

of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to


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execute the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds asmay be necessary for purpose.

PEOPLE VS.POMAR[46 Phil 126; G.R. No. L-22008; 3 Nov 1924]

Facts:

Macaria Fajardo was an employee of La Flor de la Isabela, a Tobaccofactory. She was granted a vacation leave, by reason of her pregnancy,which commenced on the 16

thof July 1923. According to Fajardo, during that

time, she was not given the salary due her in violation of the provisions of ActNo. 3071. Fajardo filed a criminal complaint based on Section 13 and 15 ofsaid Act against the manager of the tobacco Factory, Julio Pomar, hereindefendant. The latter, on the other hand, claims that the facts in thecomplaint did not constitute an offense and further alleges that theaforementioned provisions of Act No. 3071 was unconstitutional. Section 13,

Act No. 3071 provides that, Every person, firm or corporation owning ormanaging a factory, shop or place of labor of any description shall be obligedto grant to any woman employed by it as laborer who may be pregnant, thirtydays vacation with pay before and another thirty days after confinement:Provided, That the employer shall not discharge such laborer without justcause, under the penalty of being required to pay to her wages equivalent tothe total of two months counting from the day of her discharge. Section 15 ofthe same Act provides for the penalty of any violation of section 13. The latterwas enacted by the legislature in the exercise of its supposed Police Powerwith the purpose of safeguarding the health of pregnant women laborers in"factory, shop or place of labor of any description," and of insuring to them, toa certain extent, reasonable support for one month before and one monthafter their delivery. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff,sentencing the defendant to pay the fine of fifty pesos and in case ofinsolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment. Hence, the case was raised tothe Court of Appeals which affirmed the former decision.

Issue:

Whether or not Section 13 of Act No. 3071 is unconstitutional.

Whether or not the promulgation of the questioned provision was a validexercise of Police Power.

Held:

The Supreme Court declared Section 13 of Act No. 3071 to beunconstitutional for being violative or restrictive of the right of the people to

freely enter into contracts for their affairs. It has been decided several times,

that the right to contract about one's affairs is a part of the liberty of theindividual, protected by the "due process of law" clause of the constitution.The contracting parties may establish any agreements, terms, and conditionsthey may deem advisable, provided they are not contrary to law, morals orpublic policy

The police power of the state is a very broad and expanding power. Thepolice power may encompass every law for the restraint and punishment of

crimes, for the preservation of the public peace, health, and morals. But thatpower cannot grow faster than the fundamental law of the state, nortranscend or violate the express inhibition of the constitution. The PolicePower is subject to and is controlled by the paramount authority of theconstitution of the state, and will not be permitted to violate rights secured orguaranteed by the latter.

LAMBINO VS.COMELEC[G.R. No. 174153; 25 Oct 2006]

Facts:

Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiativepetition to change the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition with theCOMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under RA6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support of 6Mindividuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the constitution. Theirpetition changes the 1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 andsections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18. the proposed changes will shiftthe present bicameral- presidential form of government to unicameral-parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling lawgoverning initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec rulingthat RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative petitions.

Issue:

Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution througha peoples initiative.

Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA6735 incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditionsto implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.

Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion indenying due course to the Lambino Groups petition.


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Held:

According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basicrequirements for conducting a peoples initiative. The Court held that theCOMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambinopetition.

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of

the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the PeopleThe petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must beinformed at the time of the signing of the nature and effect, failure to doso is deceptive and misleading which renders the initiative void.

2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the ConstitutionDisallowing Revision through InitiativesThe framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction betweenamendment and revision, it is intended that the third mode of stated insec 2 art 17 of the constitution may propose only amendments to theconstitution. Merging of the legislative and the executive is a radicalchange, therefore a constitutes a revision.

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not NecessaryEven assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the resultbecause the present petition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative,must first comply with the constitution before complying with RA 6735

Petition is dismissed.

SANTIAGO VS.COMELEC[270 SCRA 106; G.R. No.127325; 19 Mar 1997]

Facts:

Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of Peoples Initiative forReforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petitionto amend the constitution to lift the term limits of elective officials, throughPeoples Initiative. He based this petition on Article XVII, Sec. 2 of the 1987Constitution, which provides for the right of the people to exercise the powerto directly propose amendments to the Constitution. Subsequently theCOMELEC issued an order directing the publication of the petition and of thenotice of hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing. At the hearing,Senator Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, PublicInterest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared asintervenors-oppositors. Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfinpetition on the ground that one which is cognizable by the COMELEC. Thepetitioners herein Senator Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpin

filed this civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Courtagainst COMELEC and the Delfin petition rising the several arguments, suchas the following: (1) The constitutional provision on peoples initiative toamend the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed byCongress. No such law has been passed; (2) The peoples initiative is limitedto amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Lifting of the termlimits constitutes a revision, therefore it is outside the power of peoplesinitiative. The Supreme Court granted the Motions for Intervention.

Issue:

Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executingprovision.

Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct ofinitiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absencein the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative.

Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute arevision or an amendment of the Constitution.

Held:

Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self executory, thus, withoutimplementing legislation the same cannot operate. Although the Constitutionhas recognized or granted the right, the people cannot exercise it if Congressdoes not provide for its implementation.

The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which prescribes rules andregulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, isvoid. It has been an established rule that what has been delegated, cannotbe delegated (potestas delegata non delegari potest). The delegation of thepower to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter cannot validly promulgaterules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right to peoplesinitiative.

The lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a revision, as it wouldaffect other provisions of the Constitution such as the synchronization ofelections, the constitutional guarantee of equal access to opportunities forpublic service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be doneby initiative. However, considering the Courts decision in the above Issue,the issue of whether or not the petition is a revision or amendment hasbecome academic.

GONZALES VS.COMELEC

[21 SCRA 774; G.R. No. L-28196; 9 Nov 1967]


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Facts:

The case is an original action for prohibition, with preliminary injunction.

The main facts are not disputed. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and theHouse of Representatives passed the following resolutions:

1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing that Section 5,Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, be amended so as toincrease the membership of the House of Representatives from a maximumof 120, as provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to beapportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according tothe number of their respective inhabitants, although each province shallhave, at least, one (1) member;

2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to saidConstitution, the convention to be composed of two (2) elective delegatesfrom each representative district, to be "elected in the general elections to beheld on the second Tuesday of November, 1971;" and

3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the sameConstitution, be amended so as to authorize Senators and members of theHouse of Representatives to become delegates to the aforementionedconstitutional convention, without forfeiting their respective seats inCongress.

Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by thePresident, on June 17, 1967, became Republic Act No. 4913, providing thatthe amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementionedResolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at thegeneral elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967.

Issue:

Whether or Not a Resolution of Congress, acting as a constituent assembly,violates the Constitution.

Held:

Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of declaring RepublicAct 4913 and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 unconstitutional and invalid, the petitionsin these two (2) cases must be, as they are hereby, dismiss and the writstherein prayed for denied, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so

ordered.

As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer cannot be assailedcollaterally. It may not be contested except directly, by quo warrantoproceedings. Neither may the validity of his acts be questioned upon theground that he is merely a de facto officer. And the reasons are obvious: (1)it would be an indirect inquiry into the title to the office; and (2) the acts of ade facto officer, if within the competence of his office, are valid, insofar as thepublic is concerned.

"The judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be calledupon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the severaldepartments and among the integral or constituent units thereof."

Article XV of the Constitution provides:

. . . The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote ofthree-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of theHouse of Representatives voting separately, may proposeamendments to this Constitution or call a contention for thatpurpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of thisConstitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast atan election at which the amendments are submitted to thepeople for their ratification.

From our viewpoint, the provisions of Article XV of the Constitution aresatisfied so long as the electorate knows that R. B. H. No. 3 permitsCongressmen to retain their seats as legislators, even if they should run forand assume the functions of delegates to the Convention.

SANIDAD VS.COMELEC[78 SCRA 333; G.R. No. 90878; 29 Jan 1990]

Facts:

This is a petition for certiorari assailing the constitutionality of Section 19 ofComelec Resolution No. 2167 on the ground that it violates the constitutionalguarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press. On October 23,1989, Republic Act No. 6766, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR ANORGANIC ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION" wasenacted into law. Pursuant to said law, the City of Baguio and the Cordilleraswhich consist of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abraand Kalinga-Apayao, all comprising the Cordillera Autonomous Region, shalltake part in a plebiscite for the ratification of said Organic Act originallyscheduled last December 27, 1989 which was, however, reset to January 30,1990 by virtue of Comelec Resolution No. 2226 dated December 27, 1989.The Commission on Elections, by virtue of the power vested by the 1987


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Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), said R.A. 6766 and otherpertinent election laws, promulgated Resolution No. 2167, to govern theconduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera

Autonomous Region. In a petition dated November 20, 1989, hereinpetitioner Pablito V. Sanidad, who claims to be a newspaper columnist of the"OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, a weekly newspapercirculated in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras, assailed theconstitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167, whichprovides:

Section 19. Prohibition on columnists, commentators orannouncers. During the plebiscite campaign period, onthe day before and on the plebiscite day, no mass mediacolumnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall usehis column or radio or television time to campaign for oragainst the plebiscite Issue.

It is alleged by petitioner that said provision is void andunconstitutional because it violates the constitutional guarantees ofthe freedom of expression and of the press enshrined in theConstitution. Unlike a regular news reporter or news correspondentwho merely reports the news, petitioner maintains that as acolumnist, his column obviously and necessarily contains andreflects his opinions, views and beliefs on any issue or subject aboutwhich he writes. Petitioner likewise maintains that if mediapractitioners were to express their views, beliefs and opinions on theissue submitted to a plebiscite, it would in fact help in thegovernment drive and desire to disseminate information, and hear,as well as ventilate, all sides of the issue.

Issue:

Whether or not Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 isunconstitutional.

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled that Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 isunconstitutional. It is clear from Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that whatwas granted to the Comelec was the power to supervise and regulate theuse and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for theoperation of transportation or other public utilities, media of communication orinformation to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right toreply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public informationcampaigns and forums among candidates are ensured. The evil sought to be

prevented by this provision is the possibility that a franchise holder may favor

or give any undue advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising space orradio or television time. This is also the reason why a "columnist,commentator, announcer or personality, who is a candidate for any electiveoffice is required to take a leave of absence from his work during thecampaign period (2nd par. Section 11(b) R.A. 6646). It cannot be gainsaidthat a columnist or commentator who is also a candidate would be moreexposed to the voters to the prejudice of other candidates unless required totake a leave of absence.

However, neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par.of R.A. 6646 can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also beengranted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by mediapractitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite periods.Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebisciteperiods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, thereare no candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of ComelecResolution No. 2167 has no statutory basis.

Plebiscite Issue are matters of public concern and importance. The people'sright to be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decisionwould be better served by access to an unabridged discussion of the Issue,including the forum. The people affected by the Issue presented in aplebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum wherethe right to expression may be exercised. Comelec spaces and Comelecradio time may provide a forum for expression but they do not guarantee fulldissemination of information to the public concerned because they are limitedto either specific portions in newspapers or to specific radio or televisiontimes.

The instant petition is GRANTED. Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No.2167 is declared null and void and unconstitutional.

BONDOC VS

.P

INEDA[201 SCRA 792; G.R. No. 97710; 26 Sep 1991]

Facts:

In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP andEmigdio Bondoc of the NP were candidates for the position ofRepresentative for the Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimedwinner. Bondoc filed a protest in the House of Representatives ElectoralTribunal (HRET), which is composed of 9 members, 3 of whom are Justicesof the SC and the remaining 6 are members of the House of Representatives(5 members belong to the LDP and 1 member is from the NP). Thereafter, adecision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda.Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and


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Congressman Cerilles of the NP to proclaim Bondoc the winner of thecontest.

On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, CongressmanCamasurareceived a letter informing him that he was already expelled from the LDP forallegedly helping to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco andfor allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao Del Sur to join said politicalparty. On the day of the promulgation of the decision, the Chairman of HRETreceived a letter informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from theLDP, the House of Representatives decided to withdraw the nomination andrescind the election of Congressman Camasura to the HRET.

Issue:

Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominantpolitical party therein, may change that partys representation in the HRET tothwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in anelection contest pending therein

Held:

The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the ElectoralCommission was to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for thedetermination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisanconsideration.

As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They mustdischarge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality andindependence even independence from the political party to which theybelong. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline are not validgrounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expellingCongressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a conscience vote

in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination andappreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, theHouse of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, aninjustice and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsionagainst Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.

Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House ofRepresentatives is that it violates Congressman Camasuras right to securityof tenure. Members of the HRET, as sole judge of congressional electioncontests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the Judiciaryenjoy security of tenure under the Constitution. Therefore, membership inthe HRET may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the

expiration of the members congressional term of office, his death,

permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in thetribunal, formal affiliation with another political party or removal for other validcause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives forparty disloyalty, short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another

MIRASOL VS CA[351 SCRA 44; G.R. No. 128448; 1 Feb 2001]

Facts:

The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters. Philippine National Bank(PNB) financed the Mirasols' sugar production venture FROM 1973-1975under a crop loan financing scheme. The Mirasols signed Credit

Agreements, a Chattel Mortgage on Standing Crops, and a Real EstateMortgage in favor of PNB. The Chattel Mortgage empowered PNB tonegotiate and sell the latter's sugar and to apply the proceeds to the paymentof their obligations to it.

President Marcos issued PD 579 in November, 1974 authorizing PhilippineExchange Co., Inc. (PHILEX) to purchase sugar allocated for export and

authorized PNB to finance PHILEX's purchases. The decree directed thatwhatever profit PHILEX might realize was to be remitted to the government.Believing that the proceeds were more than enough to pay their obligations,petitioners asked PNB for an accounting of the proceeds which it ignored.Petitioners continued to avail of other loans from PNB and to make unfundedwithdrawals from their accounts with said bank. PNB asked petitioners tosettle their due and demandable accounts. As a result, petitioners, conveyedto PNB real properties by way of dacion en pago still leaving an unpaidamount. PNB proceeded to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgagedproperties. PNB still had a deficiency claim.

Petitioners continued to ask PNB to account for the proceeds, insisting thatsaid proceeds, if properly liquidated, could offset their outstandingobligations. PNB remained adamant in its stance that under P.D. No. 579,there was nothing to account since under said law, all earnings from theexport sales of sugar pertained to the National Government.

On August 9, 1979, the Mirasols filed a suit for accounting, specificperformance, and damages against PNB.

Issue:

Whether or not the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a statuteunconstitutional without notice to the Solicitor General where the parties haveagreed to submit such issue for the resolution of the Trial Court.


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Whether PD 579 and subsequent issuances thereof are unconstitutional.

Whether or not said PD is subject to judicial review.

Held:

It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority and jurisdiction toconsider the constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree, or executiveorder. The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power todeclare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidentialdecree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, butin all Regional Trial Courts.

The purpose of the mandatory notice in Rule 64, Section 3 is to enable theSolicitor General to decide whether or not his intervention in the actionassailing the validity of a law or treaty is necessary. To deny the SolicitorGeneral such notice would be tantamount to depriving him of his day in court.We must stress that, contrary to petitioners' stand, the mandatory noticerequirement is not limited to actions involving declaratory relief and similarremedies. The rule itself provides that such notice is required in "any action"and not just actions involving declaratory relief. Where there is no ambiguityin the words used in the rule, there is no room for construction. 15 In allactions assailing the validity of a statute, treaty, presidential decree, order, orproclamation, notice to the Solicitor General is mandatory.

Petitioners contend that P.D. No. 579 and its implementing issuances arevoid for violating the due process clause and the prohibition against thetaking of private property without just compensation. Petitioners now ask thisCourt to exercise its power of judicial review.

Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise of thispower: First, there must be before the Court an actual case calling for theexercise of judicial review. Second, the question before the Court must be

ripe for adjudication. Third, the person challenging the validity of the act musthave standing to challenge. Fourth, the question of constitutionality musthave been raised at the earliest opportunity, and lastly, the issue ofconstitutionality must be the very lis motaof the case.

DUMLAO VS.COMELEC[95 SCRA 392; G.R. No.L-52245; 22 Jan 1980]

Facts:

Petitioner Dumlao questions the constitutionality of Sec. 4 of Batas

Pambansa Blg 52 as discriminatory and contrary to equal protection and due

process guarantees of the Constitution. Sec. 4 provides that any retiredelective provincial or municipal official who has received payments ofretirement benefits and shall have been 65 years of age at thecommencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected, shallnot be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he hasretired. According to Dumlao, the provision amounts to class legislation.Petitioners Igot and Salapantan Jr. also assail the validity of Sec. 4 of BatasPambansa Blg 52, which states that any person who has committed any actof disloyalty to the State, including those amounting to subversion,insurrection, rebellion, or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified for any ofthe offices covered by the act, or to participate in any partisan activity therein:provided that a judgment of conviction of those crimes shall be conclusiveevidence of such fact and the filing of charges for the commission of suchcrimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigationshall be prima facie evidence of such fact.

Issue:

Whether or Not the aforementioned statutory provisions violate theConstitution and thus, should be declared null and void

Whether or not the requisites of judicial review are complied with

Held:

No constitutional question will be heard and decided by the Court unlessthere is compliance with the requisites of a judicial inquiry, which are: 1)There must be an actual case or controversy; 2) The question ofconstitutionality must be raised by the proper party; 3) The constitutionalquestion must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and 4) Thedecision of the constitutional question must be necessary to thedetermination of the case itself.

As to (1), Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the application of theprovision. His question is posed merely in the abstract, and without thebenefit of a detailed factual record. As to (2), neither Igot nor Salapantan hasbeen charged with acts of loyalty to the State, nor disqualified from beingcandidates for local elective positions. They have no personal nor substantialinterest at stake. Igot and Salapantan have institute the case as a taxpayerssuit, but the institution of a taxpayers suit per se is no assurance of judicialreview. As to (4), there is no cause of action in this particular case.Therefore, the necessity for resolving the issue of constitutionality is absent.

In regards to the unconstitutionality of the provisions, Sec. 4 of BP Blg 52remains constitutional and valid. The constitutional guarantee of equal

protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. One class can be


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treated differently from another class. In this case, employees 65 years ofage are classified differently from younger employees. The purpose of theprovision is to satisfy the need for new blood in the workplace. In regards tothe second paragraph of Sec. 4, it should be declared null and void for beingviolative of the constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to anaccused.

LACSON VS.PEREZ

[357 SCRA 756; G.R. No. 147780 ;10 May 2001]

Facts:

President Macapagal-Arroyo declared a State of Rebellion (Proclamation No.38) on May 1, 2001 as well as General Order No. 1 ordering the AFP and thePNP to suppress the rebellion in the NCR. Warrantless arrests of severalalleged leaders and promoters of the rebellion were thereafter effected.Petitioner filed for prohibition, injunction, mandamus and habeas corpus withan application for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ ofpreliminary injunction. Petitioners assail the declaration of Proc. No. 38 andthe warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof. Petitioners

furthermore pray that the appropriate court, wherein the information againstthem were filed, would desist arraignment and trial until this instant petition isresolved. They also contend that they are allegedly faced with impendingwarrantless arrests and unlawful restraint being that hold departure orderswere issued against them.

Issue:

Whether or Not Proclamation No. 38 is valid, along with the warrantlessarrests and hold departure orders allegedly effected by the same.

Held:

President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of Proc. No. 38 on May 6,2006, accordingly the instant petition has been rendered moot and academic.Respondents have declared that the Justice Department and the policeauthorities intend to obtain regular warrants of arrests from the courts for allacts committed prior to and until May 1, 2001. Under Section 5, Rule 113 ofthe Rules of Court, authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests ofpersons suspected of rebellion in suppressing the rebellion if thecircumstances so warrant, thus the warrantless arrests are not based onProc. No. 38. Petitioners prayer for mandamus and prohibition is improperat this time because an individual warrantlessly arrested has adequateremedies in law: Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, providing for preliminaryinvestigation, Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, providing for the periodin which a warrantlessly arrested person must be delivered to the proper

judicial authorities, otherwise the officer responsible for such may bepenalized for the delay of the same. If the detention should have no legalground, the arresting officer can be charged with arbitrary detention, notprejudicial to claim of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Petitionerswere neither assailing the validity of the subject hold departure orders, norwere they expressing any intention to leave the country in the near future.To declare the hold departure orders null and void ab initio must be made inthe proper proceedings initiated for that purpose. Petitioners prayer for reliefregarding their alleged impending warrantless arrests is premature being thatno complaints have been filed against them for any crime, furthermore, thewrit of habeas corpus is uncalled for since its purpose is to relieve unlawfulrestraint which Petitioners are not subjected to.

Petition is dismissed. Respondents, consistent and congruent with theirundertaking earlier adverted to, together with their agents, representatives,and all persons acting in their behalf, are hereby enjoined from arrestingPetitioners without the required judicial warrants for all acts committed inrelation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of Malacaang.

SANLAKASVS.EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

[421 SCRA 656; G.R. No. 159085; 3 Feb 2004]

Facts:

During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officersand enlisted men of the AFP, acting upon instigation, command and directionof known and unknown leaders have seized the Oakwood Building in Makati.Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the AFP and declared theirwithdrawal of support for the government, demanding the resignation of thePresident, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts constitute aviolation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue ofProclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the Philippines was declaredunder the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers wentback to their barracks in the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003,both the Proclamation and General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No.435, declaring the Cessation of the State of Rebellion was issued.

In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKASAND PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of the Constitution does notrequire the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and thatthere is no factual basis for such proclamation. (2)SJS Officers/Members v.Hon. Executive Secretary, et al, petitioners contending that the proclamationis a circumvention of the report requirement under the same Section 18,

Article VII, commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within48 hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that the


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presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergencypowers as Congress has not delegated any such power to the President. (3)Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive SecretaryRomulo, petitioners contending that there was usurpation of the power ofCongress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. (4)Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state ofrebellion "opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation ofwarrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion.

Issue:

Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 areconstitutional?

Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bringsuit?

Held:

The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and GeneralOrder No. 4 are constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not expresslyprohibit declaring state or rebellion. The President in addition to itsCommander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution executivepowers. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power tocall out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise ofsuch power. While the Court may examine whether the power was exercisedwithin constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse ofdiscretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported theirassertion that the President acted without factual basis. The issue of thecircumvention of the report is of no merit as there was no indication thatmilitary tribunals have replaced civil courts or that military authorities havetaken over the functions of Civil Courts. The issue of usurpation of thelegislative power of the Congress is of no moment since the President, in

declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merelyexercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chiefpowers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President bySections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powerscontemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The fear on warrantless arrest isunreasonable, since any person may be subject to this whether there isrebellion or not as this is a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code,and as long as a valid warrantless arrest is present.

Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal andsubstantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or willsustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being

challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges

"such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure thatconcrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of Issue upon whichthe court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Basedon the foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS Officers/Membershave no legal standing to sue. Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen.Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have standing to challenge the subjectissuances. It sustained its decision in Philippine Constitution Association v.Enriquez,

that the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the

power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participatein the exercise of the powers of that institution.

JOYA VS.PCGG[225 SCRA 568; G.R. No. 96541; 24 Aug 1993]

Facts:

On 9 August 1990, Mateo A.T. Caparas, then Chairman of PCGG, wrotethen President Corazon C. Aquino, requesting her for authority to sign theproposed Consignment Agreement between the Republic of the Philippinesthrough PCGG and Christie, Manson and Woods International, Inc

concerning the scheduled sale on 11 January 1991 of eighty-two) OldMasters Paintings and antique silverware seized from Malacaang and theMetropolitan Museum of Manila alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth ofthe late President Marcos, his relatives and cronies. On 14 August 1990,then President Aquino, through former Executive Secretary CatalinoMacaraig, Jr., authorized Chairman Caparas to sign the Consignment

Agreement allowing Christie's of New York to auction off the subject artpieces for and in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. On 15 August1990, PCGG, through Chairman Caparas, representing the Government ofthe Republic of the Philippines, signed the Consignment Agreement withChristie's of New York. According to the agreement, PCGG shall consign toCHRISTIE'S for sale at public auction the eighty-two Old Masters Paintingsthen found at the Metropolitan Museum of Manila as well as the silverwarecontained in seventy-one cartons in the custody of the Central Bank of thePhilippines, and such other property as may subsequently be identified byPCGG and accepted by CHRISTIE'S to be subject to the provisions of theagreement.

On 26 October 1990, the Commission on Audit through then ChairmanEufemio C. Domingo submitted to President Aquino the audit findings andobservations of COA on the Consignment Agreement of 15 August 1990 tothe effect that: the authority of former PCGG Chairman Caparas to enter intothe Consignment Agreement was of doubtful legality; the contract was highlydisadvantageous to the government; PCGG had a poor track record in assetdisposal by auction in the U.S.; and, the assets subject of auction were


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historical relics and had cultural significance, hence, their disposal wasprohibited by law.

After the oral arguments of the parties on 9 January 1991, we issuedimmediately our resolution denying the application for preliminary injunctionto restrain the scheduled sale of the artworks on the ground that petitionershad not presented a clear legal right to a restraining order and that properparties had not been impleaded.

On 11 January 1991, the sale at public auction proceeded as scheduled andthe proceeds of $13,302,604.86 were turned over to the Bureau of Treasury.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.

Whether or not the Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware areembraced in the phrase "cultural treasure of the nation".

Whether or not the paintings and silverware are properties of public dominionon which can be disposed of through the joint concurrence of the Presidentand Congress.

Whether or not PCGG has complied with the due process clause and otherstatutory requirements for the exportation and sale of the subject items.

Whether or not the petition has become moot and academic, and if so,whether the above Issue warrant resolution from this Court.

Held:

This is premised on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court which provides thatevery action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-

in-interest, and that all persons having interest in the subject of the actionand in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs. The Courtwill exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it bya party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legalquestion. "Legal standing" means a personal and substantial interest in thecase such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a resultof the governmental act that is being challenged. The term "interest" ismaterial interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, asdistinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mereincidental interest.

Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff must be

personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right ofsome third and related party.

There are certain instances however when this Court has allowed exceptionsto the rule on legal standing, as when a citizen brings a case for mandamusto procure the enforcement of a public duty for the fulfillment of a public rightrecognized by the Constitution, and when a taxpayer questions the validity ofa governmental act authorizing the disbursement of public funds.

Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. They lack basis in fact and in law.The ownership of these paintings legally belongs to the foundation orcorporation or the members thereof, although the public has been given theopportunity to view and appreciate these paintings when they were placed onexhibit.

The confiscation of these properties by the Aquino administration howevershould not be understood to mean that the ownership of these paintings hasautomatically passed on the government without complying withconstitutional and statutory requirements of due process and justcompensation. If these properties were already acquired by the government,any constitutional or statutory defect in their acquisition and their subsequentdisposition must be raised only by the proper parties the true owners thereofwhose authority to recover emanates from their proprietary rights which areprotected by statutes and the Constitution. Having failed to show that theyare the legal owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have becomepublicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever toquestion their alleged unauthorized disposition.

Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit. Obviously,petitioners are not challenging any expenditure involving public funds but thedisposition of what they allege to be public properties. It is worthy to note thatpetitioners admit that the paintings and antique silverware were acquiredfrom private sources and not with public money.

Anent the second requisite of actual controversy, petitioners argue that thiscase should be resolved by this Court as an exception to the rule on mootand academic cases; that although the sale of the paintings and silver has

long been consummated and the possibility of retrieving the treasure trove isnil, yet the novelty and importance of the Issue raised by the petition deservethis Court's attention. They submit that the resolution by the Court of theIssue in this case will establish future guiding principles and doctrines on thepreservation of the nation's priceless artistic and cultural possessions for thebenefit of the public as a whole.

For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actualcase of controversy one which involves a conflict of legal rights, anassertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the casemust not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similarconsiderations not cognizable by a court of justice. A case becomes moot

and academic when its purpose has become stale, such as the case before


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us. Since the purpose of this petition for prohibition is to enjoin respondentpublic officials from holding the auction sale of the artworks on a particulardate 11 January 1991 which is long past, the Issue raised in thepetition have become moot and academic.

The cultural properties of the nation which shall be under the protection ofthe state are classified as the "important cultural properties" and the "nationalcultural treasures." On the other hand, a "national cultural treasures" is aunique object found locally, possessing outstanding historical, cultural,artistic and/or scientific value which is highly significant and important to thiscountry and nation. This Court takes note of the certification issued by theDirector of the Museum that the Italian paintings and silverware subject ofthis petition do not constitute protected cultural properties and are not amongthose listed in the Cultural Properties Register of the National Museum.

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition for prohibition and mandamus isDISMISSED.

OPOSA VS.FACTORAN,JR.[224 SCRA 792; G.R. No. 101083; 30 Jul 1993]

Facts:

Principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by theirrespective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the PhilippineEcological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profitcorporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concertedaction geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources.The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., thenSecretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C.

Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. Thecomplaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and alleges that theplaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, andentitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasurethat is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed forthemselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation ofsaid resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them allbefore the Court."

On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed aMotion to Dismiss the complaint based on two grounds, namely: the plaintiffshave no cause of action against him and, the issue raised by the plaintiffs isa political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executivebranches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, thepetitioners maintain that, the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable

cause of action, the motion is dilatory and the action presents a justiciablequestion as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.

On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting theaforementioned motion to dismiss.

In the said order, not only was the

defendant's claim that the complaint states no cause of action against himand that it raises a political question sustained, the respondent Judge furtherruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairmentof contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside thedismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused hisdiscretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minorsnot only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case.

Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states acause of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to asound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code(Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating theDENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (PhilippineEnvironmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitutionrecognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, theconcept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man'sinalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied innatural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlativeobligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to ahealthful environment.

It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's allegedgrave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) tocover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicialquestion.

Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in thiscase because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAsmay be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that theymay still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi.

Whether or not the petiton is in a form of a class suit.

Whether or not the TLAs can be out rightly cancelled.


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Whether or not the petition should be dismissed.

Held:

As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that thesame cannot be done by the State without due process of law. Once issued,a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time usually for twenty-five(25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised norcancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, tohave violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws andregulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminatelycancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirementsof due process.

The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest notjust to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since theparties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible,to bring all of them before the court. The plaintiffs therein are numerous andrepresentative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests.Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12,Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil caseand in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well asgenerations yet unborn. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeedinggenerations can only be based on the concept of intergenerationalresponsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology isconcerned. Nature means the created world in its entirety.

Every generation

has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for thefull enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. The minors' assertion oftheir right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, theperformance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for thegenerations to come.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to abalanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation'sconstitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under theDeclaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, itdoes not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rightsenumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rightsaltogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the

advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and

constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be writtenin the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception ofhumankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, itis because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to abalanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policiesby the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance andimposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protectand advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would belost not only for the present generation, but also for those to comegenerations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable ofsustaining life.

Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecologyand the right to health, as well as the other related provisions of theConstitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of thecountry's natural resources, then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgatedon 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, Section 4 of which expressly mandates thatthe Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primarygovernment agency responsible for the conservation, management,development and proper use of the country's environment and naturalresources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, includingthose in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, aswell as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may beprovided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefitsderived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations ofFilipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:

The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a soundecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of theenvironment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specificallyspeaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular referenceto the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority.

It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to the"environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977,P.D. No. 1151 and P.D. No. 1152 were issued. Thus, the right of thepetitioners to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR'sduty under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O.No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance thesaid right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty orobligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action.Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done

with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful


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ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAsshould be renewed or granted.

It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the groundthat the complaint fails to state a cause of action; the question submitted tothe court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in thecomplaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truthof falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof isdeemed hypothetically admitted. Policy formulation or determination by theexecutive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue.What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policiesalready formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, beemphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, theinsurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrableshield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry orreview.

In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts,the instant case does not involve a law or even an executive issuancedeclaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence,the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting

further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations ormodifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such aslaw could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of thestate for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced andhealthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare.

Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairmentclause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondentSecretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving newtimber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as ofyet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the

holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.

Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judgeof 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. Thepetitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendantsthe holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.

AGAN JR.VS. PIATCO[402 SCRA 612; G.R. No. 155001; 5 May 2003]

Facts:

Some time in 1993, six business leaders, explored the possibility of investingin the new NAIA airport terminal, so they formed Asians Emerging DragonCorp. They submitted proposals to the government for the development ofNAIA Intl. Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III). The NEDA approved theNAIA IPT III project. Bidders were invited, and among the proposal Peoples

Air Cargo (Paircargo)was chosen. AEDC protested alleging that preferencewas given to Paircargo, but still the project was awarded to Paircargo.Because of that, it incorporated into, Phil. Intl. Airport Terminals Co. (PIATCO). The DOTC and PIATCO entered into a concession agreement in1997 to franchise and operate the said terminal for 21years. In Nov.1998 itwas amended in the matters of pertaining to the definitionof the obligationsgiven to the concessionaire, development offacilities and proceeds, fees andcharges, and the termination of contract. Since MIAA is charged with themaintenance and operationsof NAIA terminals I and II, it has a contract withseveral service providers. The workers filed the petition for prohibitionclaiming that they would lose their job, and the service providers joinedthem,

filed a motion for intervention. Likewise several employees of the MIAA fileda petition assailing the legality of arrangements. A group of congressmenfiled similar petitions. Pres. Arroyo declared in her speech that she will nothonor PIATCO contracts which theExec. Branch's legal office concluded nulland void.

Issue:

Whether or Not the 1997 concession agreement is void, together with itsamendments for being contrary to the constitution.

Held:

The 1997 concession agreement is void for being contrary to public policy.The amendments have the effect of changing it into and entirely differentagreement from the contract bidded upon. The amendments present newterms and conditions which provide financial benefit to PIATCO which mayhave the altered the technical and financial parameters of other bidders hadthey know that such terms were available. The 1997 concession agreement,the amendments and supplements thereto are set aside for being null andvoid.

The petitioners have local standi. They are prejudiced by the concessionagreement as their livelihood is to be taken away from them.


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UMALI VS.GUINGONA[305 SCRA 533; G.R. No. 131124; 21 Mar 1999]

Facts:

Osmundo Umali the petitioner was appointed Regional Director of theBureau of Internal Revenue by Pres Fidel V. Ramos. He assigned him inManila, November 29, 1993 to March 15, 1994 and Makati, March 16, 1994to August 4, 1994. On August 1, 1994, President Ramos received aconfidential memorandum against the petitioner for alleged violations ofinternal revenue laws, rules and regulations during his incumbency asRegional Director, more particularly the following malfeasance, misfeasanceand nonfeasance. upon receipt of the said confidential memorandum, formerPresident authorized the issuance of an Order for the preventive suspensionof the petitioner and immediately referred the Complaint against the latter tothe Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and Corruption (PCAGC), forinvestigation. Petitioner was duly informed of the charges against him. Andwas directed him to send in his answer, copies of his Statement of Assets,and Liabilities for the past three years (3), and Personal Data Sheet. Initialhearing was set on August 25, 1994, at 2:00 p.m., at the PCAGC Office. On

August 23, the petitioner filed his required answer. After evaluating the

evidence on record, the PCAGC issued its Resolution of September 23,1994, finding a prima facie evidence to support six (6) of the twelve (12)charges against petitioner. On October 6, 1994, acting upon therecommendation of the PCAGC, then President Ramos issued

Administrative Order No. 152 dismissing petitioner from the service, withforfeiture of retirement and all benefits under the law.

Issue:

Whether or Not AO No. 152 violated petitioner's Right to Security of Tenure.

Whether or Not Petitioner was denied due process of law

Whether or Not the PCAGC is a validly Constituted government agency andwhether the petitioner can raise the issue of constitutionality belatedly in itsmotion for reconsideration of the trial courts decision.

Whether or Not the ombudsman's resolution dismissing the charges againstthe petitioner is still basis for the petitioner's dismissal with forfeiture ofbenefits as ruled in AO No. 152

Held:

Petitioner maintains that as a career executive service officer, he can only be

removed for cause and under the Administrative Code of 1987, 6 loss of

confidence is not one of the legal causes or grounds for removal.Consequently, his dismissal from office on the ground of loss confidenceviolated his right to security of tenure, petitioner theorized. After a carefulstudy, we are of the irresistible conclusion that the Court of Appeals ruledcorrectly on the first three Issue. To be sure, petitioner was not denied theright to due process before the PCAGC. Records show that the petitionerfiled his answer and other pleadings with respect to his alleged violation ofinternal revenue laws and regulations, and he attended the hearings beforethe investigatory body. It is thus decisively clear that his protestation of non-observance of due process is devoid of any factual or legal basis. Neithercan it be said that there was a violation of what petitioner asserts as hissecurity of tenure. According to petitioner, as a Regional Director of Bureauof Internal Revenue, he is CESO eligible entitled to security of tenure.However, petitioner's claim of CESO eligibility is anemic of evidentiarysupport. It was incumbent upon him to prove that he is a CESO eligible butunfortunately, he failed to adduce sufficient evidence on the matter. Hisfailure to do so is fatal. As regards the issue of constitutionality of thePCAGC, it was only posed by petitioner in his motion for reconsiderationbefore the Regional Trial Court of Makati. It was certainly too late to raise forthe first time at such late stage of the proceedings. As to last issue, It isworthy to note that in the case under consideration, the administrative action

against the petitioner was taken prior to the institution of the criminal case.The charges included in Administrative Order No. 152 were based on theresults of investigation conducted by the PCAGC and not on the criminalcharges before the Ombudsman. In sum, the petition is dismissable on theground that the Issue posited by the petitioner do not constitute a valid legalbasis for overturning the finding and conclusion arrived at by the Court of

Appeals. However, taking into account the antecedent facts andcircumstances aforementioned, the Court, in the exercise of its equitypowers, has decided to consider the dismissal of the charges againstpetitioner before the Ombudsman, the succinct and unmistakablemanifestation by the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue thathis office is no longer interested in pursuing the case, and the position taken

by the Solicitor General, that there is no more basis for Administrative OrderNo. 152, as effective and substantive supervening events that cannot beoverlooked.

IN RE CUNANAN[94 Phil 534; Resolution; 18 Mar 1954]

Facts:

Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, commonly known as the BarFlunkers Act of 1953. In accordance with the said law, the Supreme Courtthen passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an

average of 72 per cent by raising it to 75 percent.


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After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filedpetitions for admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while other motionsfor the revision of their examination papers were still pending also invokedthe aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are alsoothers who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without,however, invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to individualpetitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration,irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972.

Issue:

Whether or Not RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid.

Held:

RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar,those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials andinadequate preparation.

In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission,

suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practiceof the profession and their supervision have been indisputably a judicialfunction and responsibility. We have said that in the judicial system fromwhich ours has been derived, the admission, suspension, disbarment orreinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession isconcededly judicial.

On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions ofthe judicial and legislative departments of the government.

It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for thepractice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by

Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authoritiesmay say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.

Republic Act Number 972 is held to be unconstitutional.

PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS GRP PEACE PANEL ON

ANCESTRAL DOMAIN

G.R. No. 1833591, October 14, 2008

Decision:

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Subject of these consolidated cases is the extent of the powers of the

President in pursuing the peace process. While the facts surrounding this

controversy center on the armed conflict in Mindanao between the

government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the legal issue

involved has a bearing on all areas in the country where there has been a

long-standing armed conflict. Yet again, the Court is tasked to perform a

delicate balancing act. It must uncompromisingly delineate the bounds within

which the President may lawfully exercise her discretion, but it must do so in

strict adherence to the Constitution, lest its ruling unduly restricts the freedom

of action vested by that same Constitution in the Chief Executive precisely to

enable her to pursue the peace process effectively.

Facts:

On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP)

and the MILF, through the Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating

panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the

Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on

Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not tomaterialize, however, for upon motion of petitioners, specifically those who

filed their cases before the scheduled signing of the MOA-AD, this Court

issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing the

same.

The MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of negotiation and the

concluding of several prior agreements between the two parties beginning in

1996, when the GRP-MILF peace negotiations began. On July 18, 1997, the

GRP and MILF Peace Panels signed the Agreement on General Cessation

of Hostilities. The following year, they signed the General Framework of

Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998.

On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato and Vice-Governor

Emmanuel Piol filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 183591, for

Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary

Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Invoking the right to information

on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to compel respondents to

disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD

including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD,

pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD and the holding of a

public consultation thereon. Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the MOA-

AD be declared unconstitutional.


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Issues:

1. Whether the petitions have become moot and academic

(i) insofar as the mandamus aspect is concerned, in view of the disclosure of

official copies of the final draft of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA);

and

(ii) insofar as the prohibition aspect involving the Local Government Units is

concerned, if it is considered that consultation has become fait accompli with

the finalization of the draft;

2. Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for

adjudication;

3. Whether respondent Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace

Panel committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction when it negotiated and initiated the MOA vis--vis ISSUES Nos. 4

and 5;

4. Whether there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters

of public concern (1987 Constitution, Article III, Sec. 7) under a state policy of

full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (1987

Constitution, Article II, Sec. 28) including public consultation under Republic

Act No. 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991)[;]

If it is in the affirmative, whether prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules

of Civil Procedure is an appropriate remedy;

5. Whether by signing the MOA, the Government of the Republic of thePhilippines would be BINDING itself

a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a

separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized

by law;

b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the

MOA;

c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front

for ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE

INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997), particularly Section 3(g) &

Chapter VII (DELINEATION, RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL

DOMAINS)[;]

If in the affirmative, whether the Executive Branch has the authority to so

bind the Government of the Republic of the Philippines;

6. Whether the inclusion/exclusion of the Province of North Cotabato, Cities

of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, Lanaodel Norte in/from the areas covered by the projected Bangsamoro Homeland

is a justiciable question; and

7. Whether desistance from signing the MOA derogates any prior valid

commitments of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.

Held:

The main body of the MOA-AD is divided into four strands, namely, Concepts

and Principles, Territory, Resources, and Governance.

The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies.

Courts decline to issue advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or

feigned problems, or mere academic questions. The limitation of the power of

judicial review to actual cases and controversies defines the role assigned to

the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power, to assure that the courts will

not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government.

As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public

interest or of transcendental importance, the Court grants the petitioners,

petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the requisite locus

standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo.

Contrary to the assertion of respondents that the non-signing of the MOA-AD

and the eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel mooted the present

petitions, the Court finds that the present petitions provide an exception to

the "moot and academic" principle in view of (a) the grave violation of the

Constitution involved; (b) the exceptional character of the situation and

paramount public interest; (c) the need to formulate controlling principles to

guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the fact that the case is

capable of repetition yet evading review.


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The MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to

carry out the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace signed by the

government and the MILF back in June 2001. Hence, the present MOA-AD

can be renegotiated or another one drawn up that could contain similar or

significantly dissimilar provisions compared to the original.

That the subject of the information sought in the present cases is a matter of

public concern faces no serious challenge. In fact, respondents admit thatthe MOA-AD is indeed of public concern. In previous cases, the Court found

that the regularity of real estate transactions entered in the Register of

Deeds, the need for adequate notice to the public of the various laws, the

civil service eligibility of a public employee, the proper management of GSIS

funds allegedly used to grant loans to public officials, the recovery of the

Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth, and the identity of party-list nominees,

among others, are matters of public concern. Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD

subject of the present cases is of public concern, involving as it does the

sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives

of the public at large.

In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave

abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation

process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic

Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and

crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to

a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof.

It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform

the duty enjoined.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws.

Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely,the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are

unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a

state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.

The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the

GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 is declared contrary to law

and the Constitution.

II. POLICE POWER

AGUSTIN VS.EDU[88 SCRA 195; G.R. No. L-49112; 2 Feb 1979]

Facts:

Presid

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