DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325 - March 19, 1997)Facts:Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of People’s Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to lift the term limits of elective officials, through People’s Initiative. He based this petition on Article XVII, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the right of the people to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. The COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of the petition and of the notice of hearing and set the case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that one which is cognizable by the COMELEC. The petitioners filed a civil action for prohibition against COMELEC and the Delfin’s petition. In the petition, these following arguments are included: (1) The constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; (2) The people’s initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision. Lifting of the term limits constitutes a revision; therefore it is outside the power of people’s initiative. Issues: (1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.(3) Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a revision or an amendment of the Constitution. Held: Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self executory, thus, without implementing legislation, the same cannot operate. Although the Constitution has recognized or granted the right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress does not provide for its implementation. D The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, which prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void. It has been an established rule that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated .The delegation of the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right to people’s initiative.

The lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a revision, as it would affect other provisions of the Constitution such as the synchronization of elections, the constitutional guarantee of equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be done by initiative.

Lambino Vs. Comelec G.R. No. 174153Oct. 25 2006

Facts: Petitioners gathered signatures for an initiative to change the 1987 constitution. They filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative under RA 6735. Lambino’s group alleged that the petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per centum of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum of its registered voters. Their petition changes the 1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18. The proposed changes will shift the present bicameral- presidential form of government to unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law governing initiative petitions

Issue: 

1. Whether or Not the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative. 2. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino Group's petition.

Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for conducting a people’s initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition. 

The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People. The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is “deceptive and misleading” which renders the initiative void. 

The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution disallowing revision through Initiatives. The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between “amendment” and “revision. Merging of the legislative and the executive is a radical change and alters the separation of powers in the constitution, therefore constitutes a revision. Petition is dismissed.

Laurel vs misaFacts: the Supreme Court, in a resolution, acted on the petition for the writ of habeas corpus filed by petitioner Anastacio Laurel based on the theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by article 114 of the revised penal code for the reason that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and allegiance of Filipino citizens was then suspended and that there was a change of sovereignty over these islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine republic.

Issues: Whether or not the allegiance of the accused as a Filipino citizen was suspended and that there was a change of sovereignty over the Phil Islands.

Held: No, a citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and permanent allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government of sovereign. The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy to

their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby the occupier.

Article 114 of the said Revised Penal Code, was applicable to treason committed against the national security of the legitimate government, because the inhabitants of the occupied territory were still bound by their allegiance to the latter during the enemy occupation; and that the change of our form of government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during the Commonwealth, because it is an offense against the same government and the same sovereign people

The Holy See vs. Rosario, Jr.G.R. No. 101949 01December 199

FACTS: This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land located in the Municipality of Paranaque registered in the name of petitioner. Said lot was contiguous with two other lots registered in the name of the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). These lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the sellers. In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private respondent, a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. The trial court issued an order denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss after finding that petitioner “shed off its sovereign immunity by entering into the business contract in question” Petitioner elevated the matter to the Supreme Court. In its petition, petitioner invokes the privilege of sovereign immunity only on its own behalf and on behalf of its official representative, the Papal Nuncio.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Holy See is entitled to sovereign immunity?HELD: YES. The Holy See is immune from suit for the act of selling the lot of concern

is non-proprietary in nature. The lot was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the

Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. Petitioner did not sell the lot for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose of the lot because the squatters living there made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation. The privilege of sovereign immunity was established by the certificate of the DFA which intervened in this case and officially certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic mission to the Republic of the Philippines exempt from local jurisdiction and entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunities of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this country.

REPUBLIC VS. VILLASOR, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-30671 November 28, 1973FACTS: The decision that was rendered in favor of respondents was declared final and executory by Respondent Hon. Guillermo P. Villasor. Pursuant to the said order, the corresponding Alias Writ of Execution was issued. And for the strength of this writ, the provincial sheriff served notices of garnishment with several banks, especially on the 'monies due the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the form of deposits. The Philippines Veterans Bank received the same notice of garnishment. The funds of the AFP on deposit with the banks are public funds duly appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of military and civilian personnel and for maintenance and operations of AFP. Petitioner filed a petition against Villasor for acting in excess jurisdiction amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of a Writ of Execution against the properties of AFP, hence the notices and garnishments are null and void.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Writ of Execution issued by respondent Judge Villasor is valid.

HELD: NO. What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the Constitution. It is a fundamental principle of constitutional law from concept of sovereignty that the state and its government are immune from suit unless it gives its consent. A sovereign is exempt from suit not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.

Sanders v. VeridanoGR No. L-46930; June 10, 1988

FACTS:Petitioner Dale Sanders was the special services director of the US Naval Station (NAVSTA) in Olongapo city. Private respondents Anthony Rossi and Ralph Wyers are American citizens permanently residing in the Philippines and were both employed as gameroom attendants in the special services department of NAVSTA. On October 3, 1975, the respondents were advised that their employment had been converted from permanent full-time to permanent part-time. Sanders disagreed with the hearing officer’s report of the reinstatement of private respondents to permanent full-time status plus backwages. Respondents allege that the letters contained libelous imputations, which caused them to be ridiculed and thus filed for damages against petitioners.

ISSUES: Whether the petitioners were acting officially when they did the acts for which the private respondents have sued them for damages.

HELD:

YES. It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioner are being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. Given the official character of the letters, the petitioners were being sued as officers of the United States government. As such, the complaint cannot prosper unless the government sought to be held ultimately liable has given its consent to be sued. The private respondents must pursue their claim against the petitioners in accordance with the laws of the Unites States of which they are all citizens and under whose jurisdiction the alleged offenses were committed for the Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the case and were covered by the doctrine of state immunity.

Bureau of Printing vs Bureau of Printing Employees AssociationG.R. No. L-15751 January 28, 1961 1 SCRA 340

FACTS: The respondents filed a complaint and alleged that the petitioner have been engaging in unfair labor practices.  The petitioners, denied the charges of unfair labor practices attributed to them and alleged that the BPEA complainants were suspended pending result of administrative investigation against them for breach of Civil Service rules and regulations petitions; that the Bureau of Printing has no juridical personality to sue and be sued; that said Bureau of Printing is not an industrial concern engaged for the purpose of gain but is an agency of the Republic performing government functions. For relief, they prayed that the case be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. After hearing, the trial judge sustained the jurisdiction of the court on the theory that the functions of the Bureau of Printing are "exclusively proprietary in nature,” and, consequently, denied the prayer for dismissal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Bureau of Printing can be sued?HELD: NO. As an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical personality, the Bureau of Printing cannot be sued. Any suit, action or proceeding

against it, if it were to produce any effect, would actually be a suit, action or proceeding against the Government itself, and the rule is settled that the Government cannot be sued without its consent, much less over its objection. The petition for a writ of prohibition is granted. The orders complained of are set aside and the complaint for unfair labor practice against the petitioners is dismissed, with costs 

ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ101 PHIL 155FACTS: The Legislature passed R.A. 1180. Its purpose was to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Phil. from having a stranglehold upon the people’s economic life. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that: it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of their liberty and property without due process ,the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title , the Act violates international and treaty obligations,the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession

ISSUE: Whther or not R.A 1180 deprives the aliens of equal protection of the law

HELD: NO. The law is a valid exercise of police power and it does not deny the aliens the equal protection of the laws. There are real and actual, positive and fundamental differences between an alien and a citizen, which fully justify the legislative classification adopted. The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality among residents. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike. It is this domination and control that is the legislature’s target in the enactment of the Act. The alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes his profit. Through the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, the alien now enjoys a monopolistic control on the nation’s economy endangering the national security in times of crisis and emergency.

Oposa vs. Factoran (G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993)FACTS:

The petitioners in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The first complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit . Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit; use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. Petitioners assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. Plaintiffs prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs. On the other hand, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint had no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have a cause of actionWhether or not the complaint raises a political question

HELD: YES Under Section 16, Article II of the 1987 constitution, it states that: The state shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. Petitioners, minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generation yet unborn. The Supreme Court find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. This case has been ruled as a class suit because the subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest, not just for several but for ALL CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES.

YES The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies

involving rights, which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Casibang v. AquinoFACTS: Respondent Remigio P. Yu was proclaimed as the elected mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan. Casibang, his only rival, filed a protest against election on the grounds of rampant vote buying, anomalies and irregularities and others. During the proceedings of this case, the 1973 Constitution came into effect. Respondent Yu moved to dismiss the election protest of the petitioner on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the effectivity of the new Constitution and the new parliamentary form of government in which a political question has intervened

ISSUE: Whether or not the protest case is a political question

HELD: The Supreme Court held that the electoral protest case herein involved has remained a justiciable controversy. No political question has ever been interwoven into this case. Nor is there any act of the incumbent President or the Legislative Department to be indirectly reviewed or interfered with if the respondent Judge decides the election protest. The term "political question" connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions, which under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive

branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure"

Rodriguez Sr. vs. Gella

Facts:Petitioners herein seek to invalidate Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546 issued on November 10, 1952, the first appropriating the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, and the second setting aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and other calamities. Such Executive Orders were issued in virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 671, also known as the Emergency Powers Act. Petitioners’ primary contention rests on the fact that the National Assembly intended such powers to exist only for a limited period.

Issue:Whether or not EO 545 and 546 are validHELD:NO. E0 545 and 546 declared null and void. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills shall originate exclusively in the HR, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. Indeed, to hold that although the Congress has, for about seven years since liberation, been normally functioning and legislating on every conceivable field, the President still has any residuary powers under the Act, would necessarily lead to confusion and overlapping, if now conflict. The said powers are limited in the prescribed period. It cannot be exercised at any time as the President may want to be

Restituto Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate CourtFACTS:Petitioner Restituto Ynot had transmitted 6 carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nueva, Iloilo for violating Executive Order No. 626-A. Petitioner sued for recovery and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin. The court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity. The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court, which upheld the trial court. The petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional. It authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries. 

ISSUE: Whether or Not Executive Order 626-A is unconstitutional?

HELD: YES. The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not necessary to the purpose of the law and unduly oppressive. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons Executive Order No. 626-A is unconstitutional.

Emmanuel Pelaez Vs. Auditor-GeneralFACTS: From September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders creating thirty-three (33) municipalities. Petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General. It seeks to restrain from the respondent or any person acting in his behalf, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of the executive orders mentioned.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said executive orders constitute an undue delegation of legislative power?

HELD: YES. The power of control under Section 10 (1) of Article VII of the Constitution implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. Such control does not include the authority either to abolish an executive department or bureau, or to create a new one. As a consequence, the alleged power of the President to create municipal corporations would necessarily connote the exercise by him of an authority even greater than that of control, which he has over the executive departments, bureaus or offices. In other words, Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the constitution. Instead of giving the President less power over local governments, it reverses the process by conferring upon him more power over municipal corporations than that which he has over said executive departments, bureaus or offices.

ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS VS COMELECFACTS:

Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor. Private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification"  with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. Petitioner filed an Amended Certificate of Candidacy in the COMELEC‘s head office claiming that her error in the first certificate was the result of an honest misrepresentation and that she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. The Second Division of COMELEC came up with a Resolution finding respondent's Petition for Disqualification meritorious, striking off petitioner's Amended Certificate of Candidacy and canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied. The COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation should the results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections however, the COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes. In a Supplemental Petition, petitioner claimed that she was the winner of the elections.

ISSUES: whether or not the petitioner has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification requirement?

HELD: YES. Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor for supporting petitoner’s claim of legal residence for the following reasons:

1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imelda’s domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte;

2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.

3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law.

4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. She even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones.

Respondent is directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

162. OSMENA VS. PENDATUN GR NO.L-17144

Osmena (in his privileged speech) charged President Garcia for extending pardon for a price.

This prompted the creation of a special committee to investigate the accusations against Garcia. A House Resolution# 59 was passed, requiring Osmena to substantiate his charges against President Garcia).

Osmena submitted a petition for injunction against Pendatun, etc who are member of the Special Committee created by the House through Res#59.

Osmena wants to annul that Resolution on the ground that it INFRINGES HIS PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY

He also claims that the statements he made were no actionable. Nevertheless, OSMENA was FOUND GUILTY OF SERIOUS DISORDERLY BEHAVIOR.

suspended for 15 months. The Special Committee invoked the Power of Congress to Discipline Its Members.

Osmena argues further: that the House can no longer take action against him because before Res59 had been approved, the House had taken up other business.

ISSUE:Can Osmena be held liable for his speech?

SC:The Constitution provides that the speech or debates in Congress shall not be questioned in any other place. They are privileged speech. However, the provision has always been understood to mean that although EXEMPT FROM PROSECUTION OR CIVIL ACTIONS for the words uttered in Congress, THE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS MAY NEVERTHELESS BE QUESTIONED IN CONGRESS ITSELF.

Parliamentary immunity guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression before the courts or any other forum. BUT this is only OUTSIDE THE CONGRESSIONAL HALLS. It does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof.

On the question of whether the speech constitutes disorderly conduct, the House is the sole judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour. These are matters dependent on factual circumstances which the House knows best and cannot be presented in black and white before the Courts. If the court would review the act of the House, then it is tantamount to giving appellate jurisdiction to a co-equal branch of the government.

House Resolution 59 remains VALID. The house has exclusive power to discipline, the courts have no jurisdiction to interfere. It is inherent legislative prerogative to suspend.

165. CASCO VS. GIMENEZ G.R. No. L-17931 

This is a review of the decision of the Auditor General denying the claim for refund by Casco.

Pursuant to the FOREX Margin Fee Law, the Central Bank issued a circular fixing a uniform MARGIN FEE OF 25% on FOREX TRNSX.

Casco, in order to import Urea and Formaldehyde for its business, bought FOREX and paid MARGIN FEES.

However, it later claimed that Urea and Formaldehyde are exempt from the Margin Fees, hence they now seek a refund of the margin fees paid.

This was denied by the AG because it says that only UREA FORMALDEHYDE (the finished product) is exempt and that UREA “AND” FORMALDEHEDY (as raw materials) are not.

Casco claims however, that the bill approved in Congress contained the conjunction “AND” between “UREA” and “FORMALDEHYD”, and that Congress intended these raw materials to be exempt.

ISSUE: Are the raw materials UREA and FORMALDEHYD exempt based on the bill passed in Congress?

SC:NO. It is well-settled that the ENROLLED BILL – which uses the term “UREA FORMALDEHYDE” instead of “UREA” AND “FORMALDEHDYE” – is CONCLUSIVE UPON THE COURTS as regards the TENOR OF THE MEASURE passed by Congress, and approved by the President.

If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill, before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the President (which we cannot speculate now), the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial legislation.

Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by issuing E.O. 464 “Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes”. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the so-called “Gloriagate Scandal”.Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress.

ISSUE:Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and constitutional?

RULING:No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the

executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case. Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.

Case Digest: Romulo L. Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, et. al.

G.R. No. 180643 25 March 2008

FACTS:

Neri appeared before the Committees and testified for about 11 hours on matters concerning the NBN Project, a project awarded by the DOTC to ZTE.

Neri disclosed that then Comelec Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He informed PGMA of the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on PGMA and his discussions relating to the NBN Project, Neri refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege.”Respondent Committees initiated the investigation by sending invitations to certain personalities and cabinet officials involved in the NBN Project. Petitioner was summoned to appear and he testified to the Committees for eleven (11) hours, but refused to answer three important questions, invoking his right to executive privilege. For failing to appear in the other days that he was summoned, Neri was held in contempt.

ISSUES:

Whether Neri can invoke executive privilege;Whether the invocation of executive privilege violate Sec. 28, Art. II and Sec. 7, Art. III; andWhether the Committees gravely abused their discretion by holding Neri in contempt.RULING:

The communications elicited by the three questions are covered by executive privilege. Despite the revocation of E.O. 464, there is a recognized claim of executive privilege. The privilege is said to be a necessary guarantee of presidential advisors to provide “the President and those who assist him with freedom to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately.” Furthermore, the claim was properly invoked by the letter provided by Executive Secretary Ermita stating the precise and certain reason that the said information may impair the country’s diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Republic of China.The petitioner was able to appear in at least one of the days where he was summoned and expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim of executive privilege. The right to public information and full public disclosure of transactions, like any other right, is subject to limitation. These include those that are classified by the body of jurisprudence as highly confidential. The information subject to this case belongs to such kind.

The Committees violated Sec. 21, Art. VI of the Constitution for having failed to publish its Rules of Procedure. Inquiries are required to be in accordance with the “duly published rules of procedure.” Without these, the aid of legislation are procedurally infirm.

MA. CAROLINA P. ARAULLO ET AL. v. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III ET AL., G.R. NO. 209287, July 1, 2014Budget Secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad came up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP). The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next year’s appropriation. Under DAP, if a certain government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as “savings” by the Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the economy. Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA. In September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made statement claiming that he, and other Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the Senators. It turns out that the DAP does not only realign funds within the Executive but some non-Executive projects were also funded. This prompted the petitioner and several other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. 

Issues:I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law” IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.

HELD: I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP because under the law, such funds may only be used if there is a certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were used.III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President is allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such transfer or realignment should only be made “within their respective offices”. Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.Further, transfers “within their respective offices” also contemplate realignment of funds to an existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the Executive, these projects are non-existent because no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because they were not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal basis.

V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return what they received especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable to the authors, implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals that they have not acted in good faith.

Belgica v. Executive Secretary Ochoa (2013)Facts:Before the Court are consolidated petitions which assail the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System. Pork Barrel refers to an appropriation of government spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a representative's district. The Malampaya Funds was a special fund created under PD 910 issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos for the development of indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth. In 1996, an anonymous source later identified as Former Marikina City Romeo Candazo revealed that huge sums of government money went into the pockets of legislators as kickbacks. In 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF for being unconstitutional. Unfortunately, the petition was dismissed. In July 2013, NBI made allegations that “the government has been defrauded of some P10Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of ghost projects.” The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six whistle-blowers who declared that Janet Lim Napoles Corporation had facilitated the swindling of billions of pesos from the public coffers for “ghost projects” .On August 2013, the Commission on Audit released report revealing substantial irregularities in the disbursement and utilization of PDAF by the Congressmen during the Arroyo administration. As for the 'Presidential Pork Barrel', whistle-blowers alleged that "at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project has gone into a dummy NGO. Several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the Pork Barrel System be declared unconstitutional

ISSUES: I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.

HELD: I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it violates the following principles:a. Separation of PowersAs a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds. The executive implements the laws – this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part of. After the GAA, was enacted, the legislators themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to. a violation of the principle of separation of powers. The fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have to get the concurrence of the legislator concerned.

b. Non-delegability of Legislative PowerAs a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. Legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate further that which was delegated to it by the Constitution. In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to which his PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative power. The power to appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress collectively and not lodged in the individual members.

c. Principle of Checks and BalancesThe power of the president to veto items in the GAA which he may deem to be inappropriate. This power is already being undermined because of the fact that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now identify the project to which he will appropriate his PDAF. “Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President useless.”

II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the

Malampaya and PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a particular legislation.The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as well as PD 1869 which amended PAGCOR’s charter, provided for the appropriationThese are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The appropriation contemplated therein does not have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.

176. TOLENTINO VS. SOF GR 115544

petitions filed in these cases for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law.

Some of the petitioners (Tolentino, Kilosbayan, Inc,, Philippine Airlines (PAL), Roco, and Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association [CREBA]) reiterate previous claims made by them that R.A. No. 7716 did not "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives as required by Art, VI, § 24 of the Constitution.

Although they admit that H. No. 11197 was filed in the House of Representatives where it passed three readings and that afterward it was sent to the Senate where after first reading it was referred to the Senate Ways and Means Committee, they complain that the Senate did not pass it on second and third readings.

Instead what the Senate did was to pass its own version (S. No. 1630) which it approved on May 24, 1994.

Petitioner Tolentino adds that what the Senate committee should have done was to amend H. No. 11197 by striking out the text of the bill and substituting it with the text of S. No. 1630. That way, it is said, "the bill remains a House bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the House bill."

Tolentino contends that the word "exclusively" was Inserted to modify "originate" and "the words 'as in any other bills' (sic) were eliminated so as to show that these bills were not to be like other bills but must be treated as a special kind,.

The addition of the word "exclusively" in the Philippine Constitution and the decision to drop the phrase "as on other Bills" in the American version, according to petitioners, shows the intention of the framers of our Constitution to restrict the Senate's power to propose amendments to revenue bills.

Issue:Whether the Senate had the power to introduce amendments? Would it still be considered a bill that originated from the house?

SC:LAW VALID.The enactment of S. No. 1630 is not the only instance in which the Senate proposed an amendment to a House revenue bill by enacting its own version of a revenue bill.The power of the Senate to propose amendments must be understood to be full, plenary and complete "as on other Bills." Thus, because revenue bills are required to originate exclusively in the House, the Senate cannot enact revenue measures of its own without such bills. After a revenue bill is passed and sent over to it by the House, however, the Senate certainly can pass its own version on the same subject matter. This follows from the COEQUALITY OF THE TWO CHAMBERS of Congress.

The power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments is apparently without restriction. It would seem that by virtue of this power, the Senate can practically re-write a bill required to come from the House and leave only a trace of the original bill.

The above-mentioned bills are supposed to be initiated by the House of Representatives because it is more numerous in membership and therefore also more representative of the people. Moreover, its members are presumed to be more familiar with the needs of the country in regard to the enactment of the legislation involved,The Senate is, however, allowed much leeway in the exercise of its power to propose or concur with amendments to the bills initiated by the House of Representatives. It is also accepted practice for the Senate to introduce what is known as an amendment by substitution, which may entirely replace the bill initiated in the House of Representatives.

In the exercise of this power, the Senate may propose an entirely new bill as a substitute measure. As petitioner Tolentino states in a high school text, a committee to which a bill is referred may do any of the following:(1) to endorse the bill without changes; (2) to make changes in the bill emitting or adding sections or altering its language-, (3) to make and endorse an entirely new bill as a substitute, in which case it ",III be known as a committee bill, or (4) to make no report at all.

Case 3: Marcos v Manglapus GR 88211FACTS:

President Aquino did not allow the Marcoses to return to the Philippines from their exile in Hawaii. According to the Marcoses, President Aquino acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion.

President Aquino reasoned that the return of Marcoses pose a threat to national interest and welfare for it is believed that their return would have a catalytic effect to the impending destabilization against the present government.

President Marcos died prior this present appeal.

ISSUE:Whether or not, President Aquino acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion.HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Petition dismissed. President Aquino exercised her residual powers. The President, upon whom executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of

executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the constitution. The powers of the president is not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on executive department and in

scattered provisions of the constitution. The framers of the Constitution did not intend a diminution of the general grant of executive power. The residual powers of the President should not be confused with the power of the President under the 1973 Constitution to

legislate pursuant to Amendment No. 6. Residual powers do not grant the President the power to legislate.

 JOSEPH ESTRADApetitionerv GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYOrespondent

 G.R. No. 146710-15FACTS

ESTRADA alleges that he is the President on leave while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President. From the beginning of Erap’s term, he was plagued by problems that slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000. Singson, a longtime friend of the Estrada, went on air and accused the Estrada, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 19, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. At 1:20 p.m., the petitioner informed Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected. January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the powers and duties of the Presidency. After his fall from the pedestalof power, the Erap’s legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy2. whether petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.3. whether he is immune from criminal prosecution.

HELD:1. YES. The petitions present a justiciable controversy because the cases at bar pose legal, and not political questions. Hence, the cases are within the jurisdiction of the Court to decide.

2. For the president to be deemed as having resigned, there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment.  It is important to follow the succession of events that struck petitioner prior his leaving the palace. Furthermore, the quoted statements extracted from the Angara diaries, detailed Estrada’s implied resignation On top of all these, the press release he issued regarding is acknowledgement of the oath-taking of Arroyo as president despite his questioning of its legality and his emphasis on leaving the presidential seat for the sake of peace. The Court held that petitioner Estrada had resigned by the use of the totality test:  prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.

3. NO. the Court held that petitioner is no longer entitled to absolute immunity from suit. Given the intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a public office is a public trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim executive immunity for his alleged criminal acts committed while a sitting President. The intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the president from suit is concurrent only with his tenure and not his term

Case 4: Sarmiento v Mison; 1st sentence – enumeration is limited; 3rd sentence- use of word “alone,” as mere lapsus; head of bureau; no CA confirmation GR 79974

FACTS: The appointments of Mison as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Carague as Secretary of the Department

on Budget are assailed. In this petition, said appointments are alleged to be unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by

the Commission on Appointments.

ISSUE:Whether or not, appointments of Commissioner of Bureau of Customs and Secretary of the Department of Budget need confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.HELD: No. Only the first group of officers needs confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. The list is exclusive.

Hence, all other appointments, those which fall under the third and fourth group of officers as in the present case, need no confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

The President can appoint 4 groups of officers:1. The heads of executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed

forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain and other officers whose appointments are vested in him by the Constitution.

2. All other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law.3. Those whom the president may be authorized by law to appoint.4. Officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.

The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Thus, only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent [confirmation] of the Commission on Appointments.

Under the 1935 Constitution, all appointments need confirmation by the CA while in the 1973 Constitution, all appointments need no confirmation by the CA. The 1987 Constitution is a middle ground of the two extremes.

The use of the word “alone” in the third sentence is a merely a slip or lapsus in draftsmanship. The first sentence speaks of nomination by the President and the appointment by the President with the Consent of the Commission on Appointments, whereas, the second and third sentence speak only of appointment by the President.

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) G. R. No. 191002. March 17, 2010.

The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010. Even before the event actually happens, it is giving rise to many legal questions. This dilemma is rooted in consideration of Section 15, Art VII of the Constitution prohibiting the President or Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential election and up to the end of his term, except when temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. However, Section 4 (1), Art VIII of the Constitution also provides that any vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be filled within 90 days from occurrence.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 15, Article VII apply to appointments in the Supreme Court or to the Judiciary.

HELD: No. Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary. The Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive Department.

The framers did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because their establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and screening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that there would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary. The 90-day period is directed at the President, not at the JBC.Thus, the JBC should start the process of selecting the candidates to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Courtbefore the occurrence of the vacancy. Under the Constitution, it is mandatory for the JBC to submit to the President the list of nominees to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court in order to enable the President to appoint one of them within the 90-day period from the occurrence of the vacancy.

Case 7: David v. Macapagal-Arroyo; PP 1017 GR171396FACTS: PP 1017 – issued by PGMA as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of Edsa People Power

I; declared a state of national emergency in order to suppress “any act of insurrection or rebellion” by “elements in the political opposition.”

General Order No. 5 – implemented PP 1017; called upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police.

Pursuant thereto, rallies were dispersed and several personalities were arrested. Also, a raid was conducted in several offices of newspapers namely; Daily Tribune, Malaya and Abante. Further, officials threatened the public sector of the possibility of “take-over” by the government.

Proclamation No. 1021 – lifted PP 1017 and declared that the state of national emergency ceased to exist; issued exactly one week after.

In the interim, several petitions challenged the constitutionality of PP 1017 and General Order No. 5.

ISSUE:Whether or not, PP 1017 and General Order No. 5 are valid and constitutional.HELD: Partly Constitutional. PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions:1. First provision : invoked Section 18, Article VII in commanding the AFP to maintain law and

order and to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion. First provision of Calling-out power is constitutional. Section 18, Article VII granted the calling-out power of the President. The only criterion for the exercise of such power is that “whenever it becomes necessary”

that the President may call the armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.”

PP 1017 is not a declaration of martial law, it is merely an exercise of the President’s calling-out power.

2. Second provision: granted the power to the President in promulgating decrees, orders and regulations. Second provision is unconstitutional. Section 17, Article VII which grants the “take care” power to the President does not grant

the power to the President to promulgate decrees with the force of law. PGMA’s ordinance power is limited and does not have the force of law as issued by

President Marcos.

Neither Martial law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify PGMA’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.

3. Third provision: declared a State of National Emergency Third provision is constitutional. Section 17, Article XII grants the power to the President to “temporarily take over or direct

the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.”

PGMA could validly declare the existence of a state national emergency even in the absence of a congressional enactment. But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking-over of privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest, is a different matter. This requires delegation from Congress.

Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23(2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President.

The taking-over of said businesses falls under the classification of an emergency power which rightfully belongs to the Congress but may be delegated to the President.

212. MONSATO VS. FACTORAN GR 78239pardon: nature and legal effects, reinstatement to former rights.

Monsato was convicted of estafa thru falsification of public documents. President Marcos extended absolute pardon.

By reason of such pardon, she wrote the Calbayog City Treasurer, requesting that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer.

The matter was referred to the Minister of Finance. It was ruled that she may be reinstated without need for a new appointment but not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon.

Monsato however insisted that full pardon had wiped out the crime, such that her service in the government has never been interrupted and therefore her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive suspension. Monsata further argues that the pardon was granted to her before the final verdict of guilt when the conviction was pending appeal. Monsato thus claims that it was equivalent to acquittal because there was no offense to speak of.

The matter was referred to the President/ Executive Secretary Factoran, who ruled that Monsata was not entitled to automatic reinstatement.

ISSUE: Does Monsato’s pardon have the effect of acquittal?

SC: NO. FACTORAN WAS CORRECT. PARDON IMPLIES GUILT. While it relieves the party pardoned from all the punitive consequences of his criminal act, it relieves him from nothing more. A pardon looks into the future, it does not impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered.

Pardon is an act of grace proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of laws, which exempts the individual from punishment for a crime he has committed. The very essence of pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt. It does not erase the fat of

commission of crime and the conviction thereof. IT DOES NOT WASH OUT THE MORAL STAIN. IT INVOLVES FORGIVENESS AND NOT FORGETFULLNESS. (naks!)

Thus, even if Monsato was pardoned, she CANNOT BE ENTITLED TO BACKPAY FOR LOST EARNINGS.

*Here, we do NOT subscribe to the fictitious belief that pardon blots out the guilt of an individual and that once he is absolved, he should be treated as if he were innocent.

There cannot also be automatic reinstatement because pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office which was forfeited by reason of the conviction. Such pardon merely restores his eligibility for appointment to that office.

A pardon, even if full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character. The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment imposed by the RPC. The pardon granted results only in removing her disqualification and cannot go beyond that. She must therefore RE-APPLY AND UNDERGO THE USUAL PROCEDURE FOR A NEW APPOINTMENT.

Case Digest: Kilosbayan, Incorporated, et. al. vs. Teofisto Guingona, PCSO and PGMC

05 May 1994 G.R. No. 113375

FACTS:

The PCSO decided to establish an online lottery system for the purpose of increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds. Sometime before March 1993, after learning that the PCSO was interested in operating on an online lottery system, the Berjaya Group Berhad, with its affiliate, the International Totalizator Systems, Inc. became interested to offer its services and resources to PCSO. Considering the citizenship requirement, the PGMC claims that Berjaya Group undertook to reduce its equity stakes in PGMC to 40% by selling 35% out of the original 75% foreign stockholdings to local investors. An open letter was sent to President Ramos strongly opposing the setting up of an online lottery system due to ethical and moral concerns, however the project pushed through.

ISSUES:

Whether the petitioners have locus standi (legal standing

HELD:YES. The petitioners have locus standi due to the transcendental importance to the public that the case demands. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic and moral well-being of the people. The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition, and in the exercise of its sound discretion, the Court brushes aside the procedural barrier.

BRILLANTES vs. YORAC 192 SCRA 358, 1990

Facts: Respondent, as Associate COMELEC Chairman, was appointed by the President as Chairman thereof, replacing former Chairman Hilario Davide; the former chairman was appointed to

the fact-finding commission regarding the December 1989 Coup de etat. The petitioner argues that the choice of the Acting Chairman is an internal matter to the COMELEC and contrary to Article IX-A Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution. It is also averred that the designation done by the President of the Philippines violates the independence of the COMELEC.

Issue: Is respondent’s appointment as Chairman in the case at bar unconstitutional.Ruling: Yes. Article IX-A Section 1 of the Constitution expressly provides for the independence of the Constitutional Commissions from the executive department; this means that they are governed by the Constitution itself and cannot be under the control of the President.

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVESG.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003.

FACTS:On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court . The complaint was endorsed was referred to the House Committee. The House Committee on Justice ruled that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.

2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question – has resulted in a political crisis. 

HELD:

1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions." Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political in nature.