Consti Vii Digest

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    2009 BAR (TRUE or FALSE): A law fixing the passing grade in the Bar examinations at

    70%, with no grade lower than 40% in any subject, is constitutional.

    FALSE. Although law making is inherent in the Legislative, such law would infringe with

    the Supreme Court's constitutional right to promulgate rules concerning the admission

    to the practice of law and the Integrated Bar.

    2008 BAR

    Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution states that The Congress shall have the

    power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may

    not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5

    hereof. No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the

    security of tenure of its members.

    With the Congress establishing the right to trial by jury, it violates the basic principle of

    the Separation of Powers. Clearly, the Congress, through this enactment, had

    encroached upon the sphere of the judiciary. The act of the Congress in changing the

    procedural system of courts without the concurrence or advice of the Supreme Court

    renders the legislation unconstitutional.

    2004 BAR

    The effect of the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution is

    to limit resort to the political question doctrine and to broaden the scope of judicial

    inquiry into areas which the Judiciary, ended? The previous Constitution, would have

    left to the political departments to decide. If a political question is involved, the Judiciary

    can determine whether or not the official whose action is being question acted with

    grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Marcos vs

    Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 [1981]) Thus, although the house of Representatives

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    Electoral Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction to decide election contents involving

    Members of the House of Representatives, the Supreme Court nullified the removal of

    one of its members for voting in favor of the protestant, who belongs to a difference

    party. (Bondoc vs Pineda, 201 SCRA 792 [1991])

    CREBA vs ERC

    GR no. 174697 July 8, 2010

    Facts:

    Petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, inc. (CREBA) averts that

    Section 2-6 of the Distribution services and Open access Rule (DSOAR), which obligate

    certain elections to advance the amount needed to cover expenses of extending lines

    and installing additional facilities, promulgated by respondent Energy Regulatory

    Commission (ERC), is unconstitutional and contrary to Republic Act No. 9136,

    otherwise known as The Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA).

    Issue: is the challenge on unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9136, otherwise knownas the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA) of transcendental

    importance? Does the petitioner have legal standing?

    Ruling:

    No. The Court provided the following instruction as guides for determining whether a

    matter is of transcendental importance: (1) the character of the funds or other assets

    involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or

    statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the

    government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest

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    prescribed procedures to amend the Constitution by excluding the Senate of the

    Philippines from the complete process of proposing amendments to the Constitution

    and for lack of thorough debates and consultations.

    ISSUE------

    RULING: In the present case, the fitness of petitioners case for the exercise of judicial

    review is grossly lacking. In the first place, petitioners have not sufficiently proven any

    adverse injury or hardship from the act complained of. In the second place, House

    Resolution No. 1109 only resolved that the House of Representatives shall convene at afuture time for the purpose of proposing amendments or revisions to the Constitution.

    No actual convention has yet transpired and no rules of procedure have yet been

    adopted. More importantly, no proposal has yet been made, and hence, no usurpation

    of power or gross abuse of discretion has yet taken place. In short, House Resolution

    No. 1109 involves a quintessential example of an uncertain contingent future event that

    may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. The House has not yet

    performed a positive act that would warrant an intervention from this Court.

    De Castro vs. Judicial and Bar Council

    GR No. 191002, March 17, 2010

    Facts:

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    The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs

    just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010. Even before the

    event actually happens, it is giving rise to many legal dilemmas.This dilemma is rooted

    in consideration of Section 15, Art VII of the Constitution prohibiting the President

    orActing President from making appointments within two months immediately before the

    next presidential election and up to the end of his term, except when temporary

    appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies will prejudice public

    service or endanger public safety. However, Section 4 (1), Art VIII of the Constitution

    also provides that any vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be filled within 90 days from

    occurrence. The question leads to who should appoint the next Chief Justice and may

    the JBC resume the process of screening candidates should the incumbent president

    not prohibited to do so.

    Issue:------

    Ruling:

    We hold that the petitions set forth an actual case or controversy that is ripe for judicial

    determination. Although the position is not yet vacant, the fact that the JBC began the

    process of nomination pursuant to its rules and practices, although it has yet to decide

    whether to submit the list of nominees to the incumbent outgoing President or to the

    next President, makes the situation ripe for judicial determination, because the next

    steps are the public interview of the candidates, the preparation of the short list of

    candidates, and the interview of constitutional experts, as may be needed. We need

    not await the occurrence of the vacancy by May 17, 2010 in order for the principal issue

    to ripe for judicial determination by the Court. It is enough that one alleges conduct

    arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but seemingly proscribed by the

    Constitution. A reasonable certainty of the occurrence of the perceived threat to aconstitutional interest is sufficient to afford a basis for bringing a challenge, provided the

    Court has sufficient facts before it to enable it to intelligently adjudicate the issues.[65]

    Herein, the facts are not in doubt, for only legal issues remain.

    .

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    Re: Entitlement to Hazard Pay of SC Medical and Dental Clinic Personnel

    A.M. No. 03-9-0

    November 27, 2008

    572 SCRA 1

    FACTS

    The Supreme Court Medical and Dental Services (SCMDS) Division were entitled to

    hazard pay through Republic Act (RA) 7305, also known as The Magna Carta of Public

    Health Workers. This paved the way to the issuance of Administrative Circular No. 57-

    2004 which prescribed the guidelines of the grant of hazard allowance in favor of the

    SCMDS personnel. The circular initially classified SCMDS employees according to level

    of exposure to health hazards, and not on salary grades alone. But the Department of

    Health (DOH) abolished the classification, and declared that a uniform hazard pay rate

    should be given, without regard for the nature of the risks and hazards to which they are

    exposed. Thus, 11 SCMDS personnel requested that the hazard grant must be based

    not on the salary grade, but on the degree of hazard. However, before the request could

    be acted upon, AO 2006-011 was issued with the amended guidelines in the payment of

    hazard pay, regardless of the nature of their appointment. Hence, some concerned

    personnel requested that the subject circular be amended to conform AO 2006-011,

    which was found reasonable by Chief Administrative Officer Atty. Eden Candelaria. She

    issued a memorandum recommending that the classification as whether employees are

    exposed to high or low risk be abolished, and that the payment of the adjusted hazard

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    allowance be charged against the regular savings of the Court. The Court referred the

    memorandum to the Fiscal Management and Budget Office (FMBO) and to the Office of

    the Chief Attorney (OCAT) for comment. OCAT posits that the subject Circular be

    amended in accordance to AO 2006-0011. But FMBO advances a contrary position.

    ISSUE

    Does the DBM have authority to review Supreme Court issuances relative to court

    personnel on matters of compensation?

    HELD

    The role of the DBM is "supervisorial in nature, its main duty being to ascertain that the

    proposed compensation, benefits and other incentives to be given to (government)

    officials and employees adhere to the policies and guidelines issued in accordance with

    applicable laws." Thus, its authority to review Supreme Court issuances relative to court

    personnel on matters of compensation is very limited, circumscribed as it is by the

    provisions of the Constitution, specifically Article VIII, Section 3 on fiscal autonomy.

    Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. The Court, in its ruling, has to

    deny the request because the subject Circular cannot be amended according to the

    mechanism of hazard pay allocation under AO 2006-0011. Moreover, AO 2006-0011

    reveals that DOH has exceeded its powers in implementing the provisions of RA 7305,

    for it tried to modify the rates of hazard pay and the mechanism for its allocation. It was

    an attempt to amend the rates of hazard allowance and mechanism as provided for in

    RA 7305. With this, the Court finds that the administrative order violates the established

    principle that administrative issuances cannot amend and act of Congress. The request

    of the Supreme Court Medical and Dental Services Division to amend AO 57-2004 to

    the provisions of DOH AO 2006-0011 is DENIED.

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    Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside

    for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.

    Issues:

    1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and

    2. Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

    Held:

    1. The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are

    thus unconstitutional.

    2. Yes. There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood

    bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere

    pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a material difference to

    distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement.The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or determine the

    level of income of a municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th

    Congress might even have lower annual income than municipalities that did not have

    pending cityhood bills. In short, the classification criterion mere pendency of a

    cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not rationally related to the purpose of the law

    which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting into cities.

    Canlas v. NHA

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    G.R. No. 182795

    June 5, 2008

    FACTS

    The petitioners, settlers in a certain parcel of land situated in Barangay Manggahan,

    Pasig City, filed and sought for the issuance of a "Writ of Amparo" on the premise that

    they were deprived of their liberty, freedom and/or rights to shelter as embodied in our

    Constitution. Their dwellings/houses have either been demolished as of the time of filing

    of the petition, or is about to be demolished pursuant to a court judgment. With the claim

    that land titles were fraudulent and spurious, they expressed willingness to help thegovernment to unearth the so called "syndicates" clothed with governmental functions,

    and by way of the said prayer for the issuance of the "Writ of Amparo, the petitioners

    request that the unprincipled Land Officials be summoned to answer their participation

    in the issuances of fraudulent and spurious titles, which are now in the hands of the

    private respondents. The petition was actually made to seek the reversal of the Court's

    dismissal of previous petitions in G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701, 177038,

    considering that no motion for reconsideration can be filed for the second or third time in

    the Supreme Court.

    ISSUE

    Is the Writ of Amparo available against a threatened demolition of a dwelling?

    HELD

    "The Writ of Amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and

    security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public

    official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal

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    Ruling:

    The restriction on petitioners right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the

    criminal case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish

    that his right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to aserious violation of his right to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no readily

    available legal recourse or remedy. Additionally, petitioner is seeking the extraordinary

    writ of amparo due to his apprehension that the DOJ may deny his motion to lift the

    HDO. Petitioners apprehension is at best merely speculative. Thus, he has failed to

    show any clear threat to his right to liberty actionable through a petition for a writ of

    amparo. The absence of an actual controversy also renders it unnecessary for us on

    this occasion to pass upon the constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 17, Series of 1998.

    BOAC vs CADAPAN

    G.R. Nos. 184461-62 May 31, 2011

    Facts:

    Armed men abducted Sherlyn Cadapan (Sherlyn), Karen Empeo (Karen) and Manuel

    Merino (Merino) from a house in San Miguel, Hagonoy, Bulacan. The three were herded

    onto a jeep bearing license plate RTF 597 that sped towards an undisclosed location.

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    Spouses Asher and Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeo filed a petition for

    habeas corpus1 before the Court impleading then Generals Romeo Tolentino and

    Jovito Palparan (Gen. Palparan), Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac (Lt. Col. Boac), Arnel Enriquez

    and Lt. Francis Mirabelle Samson (Lt. Mirabelle) as respondents. The Court issued a

    writ of habeas corpus, returnable to the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals. The

    Court of Appeals dismissed the habeas corpus petition. Petitioners in moved for a

    reconsideration of the appellate courts decision. During the pendency of the motion for

    reconsideration in, Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeo filed before this Court a

    Petition for Writ of Amparo.

    Issue: refer to syllabus...=P

    Ruling:

    An amparo proceeding is not criminal in nature nor does it ascertain the criminal liability

    of individuals or entities involved. Neither does it partake of a civil or administrative

    suit.46 Rather, it is a remedial measure designed to direct specified courses of action to

    government agencies to safeguard the constitutional right to life, liberty and security of

    aggrieved individuals.The appellate court deemed it a superfluity to issue any inspection

    order or production order in light of the release order. As it earlier ruled in the habeas

    corpus case, it found that the three detainees right to life , liberty and security was being

    violated, hence, the need to immediately release them, or cause their release. The

    appellate court went on to direct the PNP to proceed further with its investigation since

    there were enough leads as indicated in the records to ascertain the truth and file the

    appropriate charges against those responsible for the abduction and detention of the

    three.

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    OCA vs. Judge Floro

    Facts: It was in 1995 that Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr. first applied for judgeship. A pre-

    requisite psychological evaluation on him then by the Supreme Court Clinic Services

    (SC Clinic) revealed "(e)vidence of ego disintegration" and "developing psychotic

    process." Judge Floro later voluntarily withdrew his application. In June 1998, when he

    applied anew, the required psychological evaluation exposed problems with self-

    esteem, mood swings, confusion, social/interpersonal deficits, paranoid ideations,

    suspiciousness, and perceptual distortions. Both 1995 and 1998 reports concluded that

    Atty. Floro was unfit to be a judge.

    Because of his impressive academic background, however, the Judicial and Bar Council

    (JBC) allowed Atty. Floro to seek a second opinion from private practitioners. The

    second opinion appeared favorable thus paving the way to Atty. Floros appointment as

    Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge of Branch 73, Malabon City, on 4 November 1998.

    Upon Judge Floros personal request, an audit on his sala was conducted by the Office

    of the Court Administrator (OCA) from 2 to 3 March 1999.2

    After conducting the audit, the audit team, led by Atty. Mary Jane Dacarra-Buenaventura, reported its findings to erstwhile Court Administrator, Alfredo L.

    Benipayo, who submitted his own report/memorandum 3 to then Chief Justice Hilario G.

    Davide, Jr. dated 13 July 1999 recommending, among other things, that his report be

    considered as an administrative complaint against Judge Floro and that Judge Floro be

    subjected to an appropriate psychological or mental examination. Court Administrator

    Benipayo recommended as well that Judge Floro be placed under preventive

    suspension for the duration of the investigation against him.

    Issue: is Judge Floro guilty of conduct unbecoming necessitating his dismissal?

    Ruling: "Misconduct" is defined as wrong or improper conduct while "gross" connotes

    something "out of all measure; beyond allowance; not to be excused; flagrant;

    shameful." 40 For serious misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained of should be

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    corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law or a persistent disregard of well-

    known legal rules. 41With the foregoing as yardstick, we find the act of Judge Floro in

    circulating calling cards containing self-laudatory statements constitutive of simple

    misconduct in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as it

    appears that Judge Floro was not motivated by any corrupt motive but, from what we

    can see from the evidence, a persistent and unquenchable thirst for recognition.

    Concededly, the need for recognition is an all too human flaw and judges do not cease

    to be human upon donning the judicial robe. Considering, however, the proscription

    against judges seeking publicity for personal vainglory, they are held to a higher

    standard as they must act within the confines of the code they swore to observe.

    RELIEVE Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. of his functions as Judge of the Regional Trial

    Court, Malabon City and consider him SEPARATED from the service due to a medically

    disabling condition of the mind that renders him unfit to discharge the functions of his

    office, effective immediately.

    CSC v. Andal

    G.R. No. 185749

    December 16, 2009

    FACTS

    Herminigildo L. Andal, respondent, holds the position of Security Guard II in the

    Sandiganbayan. He filed an application to take the Career Service Professional

    Examination-Computer Assisted Test (CSPE-CAT), was admitted to take the

    examination, and the result showed that he passed with the rate of 81.03%. However,

    when Arlene S. Vito who claimed to have been authorized by respondent to secure the

    results of the examination went to do so, verification and comparison of the pictures

    attached to the Picture Seat Plan and the identification card of Andal brought by Vito

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    showed dissimilarity in the facial features. Civil Service Commission National Capital

    Region (CSC-NCR) rendered judgment finding the respondent guilty of dishonesty and

    imposing upon him the penalty of dismissal from the service. Aggrieved, the respondent

    appealed, however, it was denied. He then elevated the case to the Court of Appeals

    (CA), in which the CA ruled in favor of the respondent. The CSC filed a motion for

    reconsideration in the CA but was denied. Hence, the present petition for reversal of the

    decision of the CA.

    ISSUE

    Does the CSC's disciplinary jurisdiction extend to court personnel?

    HELD

    The Court of Appeals ruled that the CSC encroached upon the Supreme Courts power

    of administrative supervision over court personnel. In reversing the CSC resolutions, the

    Court of Appeals cited Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which provides

    that the Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the

    personnel thereof. The Court of Appeals further stated that what the CSC should have

    done was to refer the administrative case for dishonesty against respondent to the

    Office of the Court Administrator for appropriate action instead of resolving the case.

    The CSCs authority and power to hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases are

    not in disp ute. The question is whether the CSCs disciplinary jurisdiction extends to

    court personnel in view of Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. In the present

    case, while respondent may have filed his Answer to the formal charge of dishonesty

    after having been directed to do so, he denied having taken the civil service

    examination and did not even appear at the formal investigation conducted by the CSC-

    NCR. He appealed to the CSC after the adverse decision of the CSC-NCR was

    rendered but raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction over his person. He argued that as

    an employee in the Judiciary, the jurisdiction to hear disciplinary action against him

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    borrowing money from her staff and other court officers , reports to court only twice a

    week, obtained loans from court personnel and lawyers during the pendency of a case.

    ISSUE:

    Will debt-condonation admibnistratively absolved a judge for =boorowing

    money from a lawyer-creditor who has pending cases before his sala?

    RULING:

    Judge Victoria Villalon-Pornillos is found guilty of violating paragraph 7, Section8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court (borrowing money from a lawyer in a case pending

    before her court) which is also a gross misconduct constituting violation of the Code of

    Judicial Conduct. The impression that respondent would rule in favor of complainant

    because the former is indebted to the latter is what the Court seeks to avoid. She is

    DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued

    leave credits, with prejudice to re-employment in any government agency or

    instrumentality.

    .

    in the matter of the charges of Justice Del Cstillo

    Facts:

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    Suplico vs. NEDA, GR 178830, July 14, 2008

    FACTS: Respondent avers that there is no more justiciable controversy with the ZTE

    National Broadband Network Project controversy for the Court to resolve. Petitioners

    contend that because of the transcendental importance of the issues raised in the

    petition, which among others, included the Presidents use of the power to borrow, i.e.,

    to enter into foreign loan agreements, this Court should take cognizance of this case

    despite its apparent mootness.

    ISSUE: Is the moot and academic principle a magical formula that can automatically

    dissuade the courts in resolving a case?

    RULING: Judicial power presupposes actual controversies, the very antithesis of

    mootness. In the absence of actual justiciable controversies or disputes, the Court

    generally opts to refrain from deciding moot issues. Where there is no more live subjectof controversy, the Court ceases to have a reason to render any ruling or make any

    pronouncement. For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an

    actual case or controversy one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of

    opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or

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    academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a

    court of justice. Where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable

    controversy, and an adjudication thereon would be of no practical use or value as courts

    do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however

    intellectually challenging.

    While there were occasions when the Court passed upon issues although supervening

    events had rendered those petitions moot and academic, the instant case does not fallunder the exceptional cases. In those cases, the Court was persuaded to resolve moot

    and academic issues to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles,

    precepts, doctrines or rules for future guidance of both bench and bar.

    De Castro vs. Judicial and Bar Council

    GR No. 191002, March 17, 2010

    Facts:

    The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs

    just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010. Even before the

    event actually happens, it is giving rise to many legal dilemmas.This dilemma is rooted

    in consideration of Section 15, Art VII of the Constitution prohibiting the President

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