OES Presentation 2008-12-13

8/14/2019 OES Presentation 2008-12-13

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Aut oma tio n o fut oma tio n o fElectionslections

Ano ba talaga ito?



Why do we need to automateelections

Process is too long. It takes 25-

40 days before national positionscan be proclaimed.

To eliminate wholesale cheating,incl. DAGDAG-BAWAS



How is cheating done?How is chea

ting done?



Retail cheating

Vote-buying (carbon paper, ballotmarking, “Lanzadera ” ) Ballot box snatchingBallot box stuffing

“Flying voters ”



To v ote once & onl yonce …



Wholesale Cheating Wholesale Cheat ing



Mani pula ti on of

pr eci nct counts

Manila Dist-4 2001

Votes counted as Recorded in words as

Marikina 1998



Mani pul ati on ofpr ovi nci al r esult s

ProvincialCertificate of

Canvass

MunicipalCertificate of

Canvass

Zamboanga del Norte, 2001



Manipula tion in t heof ficial municipal &pr ovincial can vas s

Official Officialmunicipal provincial Illegalcanvass canvass votes

Alaminos 2599 12599 10,000

Dagupan 13784 28784 15,000

Illegal votes from 22 other towns in Pangasinan for asenatorial candidate in the 1995 elections equaled112,994.



Anatomy of Anato my of DAGDAG-BAWASDAGDAG-BAWAS



Province 5

Cand.A

% Cand .B

% To talVoter

s

Total %

C O C : 87,520 100%N A M F R E L : 15,925 20% 58,292 75% 77,967 89%

N AM FREL T rend: 1,951 7,142

C O CI n c r e m e n t :

9,553 11%



Province 5

Cand.A

% Cand .B

% To talVoter

s

Total %

C O C : 33,634 38% 49,803 57% 87,520 100%

N A M F R E L : 15,925 20% 58,292 75% 77,967 89%N AM F RELTrend:

1,951 7,142

C O C

I n c r e m e n t :

17,709 185% (8,489) -89% 9,553 11%



Province 5

Cand.A

% Can d.B

% TotalVoter

s

Total%

C O C : 33,634 38% 49,803 57% 87,520 100%

N A M F R E L : 15,925 20% 58,292 75% 77,967 89%

N AM FR EL T rend: 1,951 7,142

COC I ncrem en t : 17,709 185% (8,489) -89% 9,553 11%Dagdag Bawas:

15,758 (15,631)Dagdag bawas = 31,389

d



Dagdag-BawasSummary

Dagdag-Bawas

% Total Voters

Province 1 103,359 75.8 136,297

Province 2 153,761 64.9 236,768

Province 3 134,505 57.9 232,010

Province 4 60,615 41.33 146,652

Province 5 31,389 35.86 87,520

Province 6 53,798 19.4 277,318

Province 7 38,844 12.35 314,577Province 8 22,289 9.17 242,944

Estimated Total 598,560



Basic Election-related Data83 Provinces

200 Congressional Districts

1,600 Cities and Municipalities

40,000 Barangays

250,000 precincts

40M+ voters



Elective PositionsNational Positions

PresidentVice-President24 Senators (12 elected/3 years)

Party List

Local PositionsCongressmanGovernor

Vice-GovernorProvincial BoardMayorVice-MayorCouncilors



Definition of TermsBEI - Board of Election Inspectors (250,000)

CMBOC - City/Municipal Board of Canvassers (1,600)

PBOC - Provincial/District Board of Canvassers (200)

NBOC - National Board of Canvassers (Comelec/Congress)

ER - Election Returns

SOV - Statement of Votes

COC - Certificate of Canvass



The Manual Election SystemThe Manual Election System

1. Ballots tallied by BEIin each precinct andERs prepared

2. BEIs bring ERs toCMBOCs

3. CMBOCs canvassERs and prepareSOVs and COCs;bring them toPBOCs

4. PBOCs canvassCOCs and prepareprovincial COCs andSOVs; bring them toNBOC

5. NBOC (Comelec)canvasses COCs;Congress canvassesPres/VP COCs



Manual Tallying/CanvassingTime Line

10 days 20 30 40

CITY / MUNICIPAL, PROVINCIALAND NATIONAL CANVASSING (25

– 40 DAYS)PRECINCTTALLYING

5-12hrs

Given the above time line, it becomes obvious, which phase of theelection process should be automated.



So now, we want to applytechnology in our elections ...

1. to speed up the process and to beable to proclaim the winningcandidates earlier;

2. to minimize, if not eliminate,cheating;

Ahh … but we have added a third ...4. to make the election process

transparent to the public.



Election processes that can be

automated

Voters list

Voting TallyingCanvassing

Reporting



In automating elections, two issuesimmediately come to mind:

How do we secure the system?How do we secure the system?

Which technology should we adopt?Which technology should we adopt?



Two ways of securing a system

Fence it in very tightly soFence it in very tightly sono intrusion can everno intrusion can everoccur (security byoccur (security byobscurity).obscurity).However, implementorHowever, implementormust prove to allmust prove to allinterested parties thatinterested parties thatsystem is indeedsystem is indeedextremely secure.extremely secure.

Not easy to convince all;Not easy to convince all;there will always bethere will always bedoubters.doubters.

Secure the system, butmake a copy of all softwareand data (read only)

accessible to all interestedparties and to the public.

Proof of veracity and accuracyof results becomes automatic.

We favor this becauseit is the transparent

alternative.



Features of an ideal automatedelection system for the PhilippinesAutomates canvassing

Tight security measuresAll steps transparent to the voting public

Software used available to the publicDigital counts and results, in all steps, available to thepublic (any one can do his own tabulation)Results quickly verifiable all the way to original sourcedocumentsCost-effective (P4-8 billion, depending on the solution)Minimum or no training required for >40M votersMinimum or no storage concerns after each electionprocess

Not dependent on the trustworthiness of the implementors



Alternative election automation

technologiesDRE (Direct Recording Electronic) System – “touch-screen”

OES (Open Election System) - manual voting & counting,and automated canvassing

PC-based data encoding of ERs

OES-OMR (Optical Mark Recognition) System – pre-printedballots, read by OMRs at the voting centers (schools)



Direct Recording Electronic SystemDirect Recording Electronic System1. 2-4 Units per

precinct2. Touch screen,

mouse, orkeyboard

3. Voter’s choicesprinted for auditpurposes

4. At end of voting(3:00pm), ER isprinted

5. ER transmitted toCMBOC and NBOC

6. NBOC transmits

data to interestedparties

7. CMBOC producesSOV and COC;transmits to PBOC

8. PBOC producesSOV and COC;

transmits to NBOC9. NBOC produces

DOMINANTPARTY

DOMINANTOPPOSITION

CITIZENSARM

MEDIA &OTHERS

CITY/MUNICIPALBOARD OF CANVASSERS

PROVINCIALBOARD OF CANVASSERS

NATIONALBOARD OF CANVASSERS

PRECINCTS



Direct Recording Electronic System

Instantaneous tally of votes at precinct levelIf all precincts connected,almost instantaneouscanvass at City/Mun.,Prov., & Natl. levels; ergo,theoretically, nationalresults known 1 hr. afterclose of votingLess work for BEI

With one printer perprecinct, printing of 30copies of ER at precincts iseasyNo ballot box snatching

Cost prohibitive, estimatedat P15-20B (some est.>P30B)Logistics can be anightmare (750K units to250K locations)

Thousands of technicalpeople req’d (but where todeploy?)BEI training staggering

40 Million voters to betrainedWhere online connection isunavailable, difficult tosecure electronic media(CDs)After each election,

PROs CONs



If we can’t see it, If we can’t see it,we can’t trust it!we can’t trust it!

TransparentElections.org



Optical Mark Recognition

1. Voters mark pre-printed ballots

2. Ballot boxesbrought toCity/Mun TabCenter.

3. ERs printed;signed by BEI

4. CMBOC tabs allERs; producesSOV and COC

5. ERs, SOV & COCsent to PBOC andNBOC

6. NBOC transmits

to interestedparties

7. PBOC tabs COCs;produces ProvSOVs, COCs

8. PBOC transmitsall data to NBOC;produces Nat’lSOV COC

2

6

3

4

5

5

7 8



Optical Mark Recognition

Ballots are pre-printed sovoters simply mark choicesVoter training minimal,relative to DRE

Faster, because tally of votes automatedLess work for BEI atprecinct levelCost less than DRE;approx. P8B (using $2,000OMRs)

Internal tallying. Voterswon’t see and may nottrust countWholesale cheating,usually possible only atcanvassing level, canhappen at precinct levelSensitivity to externalmarks or smudgesDifficult to fairly resolve

over-marked ballotsEasier to add to under-marked ballotsNeed to store specializedOMR machines

PROs CONs



But … the newspapers reported that the automation of the last

ARMM election was successful.

Was it?



Problems with DRE

Problems in the initialization of voting machinessince some of the BEIs committed repeated errorsin punching their pin codes. Designated IT expertshad to take over the initialization process to speed up the process because this has caused delay invoting.Operational delays in starting the machine due todefective DREs which were however immediately replaced .

Incidents of automatic machine shut down whilethe voters were casting their votes. It was resolved by replacing the electronic voting machines (EVMs).Many BEIs were unfamiliar with the EVM due to the

overnight substitution of BEIs with untrained

persons which could have been perpetrated byinterested parties.



Problems with DRE (cont.)Many voters and BEIs were unfamiliar with the systemsince there was hardly any opportunity to see and testthe DRE before the elections, this could be attributable tolack of voter education due to time constraints.

There were several instances where illiterate voters andthose who were not familiar with the new system were

being accompanied by another person inside theprecincts as coach. The relationship between the voterand his/her companion was not properly validated. Theseso called coaches do not only guide the voters inside thevoting precincts but even control the hand of the voter asto who to vote. Even some of the BEIs and watchershave been seen coaching the voters as well.

On the secrecy of voting, there were no booths to coverthe DRE machines enabling the voters of anotheradjacent DRE machine to see the votes being cast.Size of the candidates’ pictures (too small) made theimage unclear.



Problems with OMR

1. Votes shaded in the OMR ballot were exposed totampering. Reports of unscrupulous erasures weredocumented.

2. The distribution of the official OMR Ballots werelikewise exposed to the threat of advance shading.

3. The voters would sometimes accidentally scratch orink-blot the OMR ballots which hampered its opticalscanning.

4. The folding and unfolding of OMR ballots resulted tosome extent in time inefficiency at the counting

centers.5. In a number of the PPCRV’s poll watchers reports,

some BEIs, accidentally perhaps, tore off the barcode of the ballots resulting in their rejection.

6. The BEIs had the lack of procedural knowledge on

the disposition of invalid ballots.



Problems with OMR (cont.)1. Valid ballots that were crumpled, folded (to fit in the size

of the ballot box) and those that contained unnecessarymarkings or smudges as well as those lightly shadedballots were rejected, which slowed down the counting.

2. The number of ballots to be counted per ACM was not asit was projected. There are discrepancies in the counting

of ballots between those who actually voted with resultscounted. An example of this was experienced in one of the precincts of Shariff Kabunsuan where the actualnumber of voters is 371 but the machine counted only276, there was a discrepancy of 95 ballots papers. But,after the BEIs conducted a recount the machine counted365.

3. Incidents of over voting in some precincts that used OMR,such as Bumbaran, Lanao del Sur, were also encounteredbecause of BEIs voting in their assigned precincts. Inthese cases the result was invalidated (treated as zero)and COMELEC had to override it.



Problems with OMR (cont.)

1. The counting and Canvassing System (CCS) was notprogrammed to accommodate failure of elections insome municipalities, such as Balindong, Lanao delSur and Basilan, thus the machine had to be shutdown to force the system to close the counting.

There were incidents wherein the system wouldnot close the counting and canvassing since itshowed that it didn’t count 100% of the total votesfrom all the precincts though all precincts were ableto count the votes.

2. Some ACMs to include laptops and printersoverheated, stopped functioning and had to be re-started.

3. Constant paper jamming (of the OMR Ballots).4. The attached full 196-key Keyboard in the ACM is

open to programming intrusion.



But even assuming that use of the DRE and OMR during the

ARMM elections were successful …

F D A i l R bi ’ b k



From Dr. Aviel Rubin’s book,“Brave New Ballot”

“Past performance is no guarantee of future results, especially when itcomes to security.”

“Success on a small scale does not

guarantee success once the scale of aproject is enlarged.”



If we insist on using DRE …

The COMELEC, with its limitedresources (permanent staff of 5,000),will have to worry about running twodifferent systems . And this is apartfrom the many other duties that theynormally perform during elections(cleaning up voters’ lists, training teachers and otherdeputized agencies, regulating political campaigning,addressing possible violence among partisans, etc. .)

This is the perfect formula for failure!




We are NOT vendors of election

systems

We are a team of like-minded IT

practitioners who have implementedelection-related projects in the past,using ICT



Option 2: Open Election SystemPC Encoding

1. Votes cast & talliedas in manual voting

2. ERs brought to

school encoding(PC) center

3. ERs validated thenposted on the webw/ BEIs digitalsignature

4. CMBOC will accessdatabase, produceSOV, COC

5. All interestedparties may accessand process thedata by themselves

6. All interestedparties can sendSMS to watchers toverify figures

7. PBOCs access DB;produce Prov SOVsand COCs

8. NBOC accesses DB




DOMINANTPARTY

DOMINANTOPPOSITION

CITIZENSARM

MEDIA &OTHERS

DOMINANTPARTY

DOMINANTOPPOSITION

CITIZENSARM

MEDIA &OTHERS

VOTING CENTER

ENCODING CENTERPRECINCTS



Open Election System

Most transparent - votersand watchers observe tallyat precinct levelNo need for voter trainingOnce ER is encoded, result(web database) becomesaccessible to the publicCost affordable at about P2B(Comelec only buysPCs/servers)

PCs/servers can be passedon to DepEd after eachelectionNo storage concerns,because machines can bepassed on to DepEdBallot box

Manual tallying is tediousERs will have to beencodedLooking for tens of thousands of encoders is achallengeSince it’s still manualtallying, public may thinkthat election is not

automated

PROs CONs



If we adopt OES …

This COMELEC would leave the legacyof making the Philippines probablythe first country in the world to usetechnology to effect transparency inall steps of the election process.



How do we implement OES?How do we im plement OES?

COMELEC should …COMELEC should …espouse the conceptespouse the concept

bid out the development of thebid out the development of thesystem and computer programssystem and computer programsmake system/programs available tomake system/programs available to

IT community and to publicIT community and to publicadopt good contributionsadopt good contributionsmake the system available to allmake the system available to all

interested parties,interested parties, free of chargefree of charge

O hO h OESOES h bh b



Once theOnce the OESOES system has beensystem has beendeveloped, the COMELEC woulddeveloped, the COMELEC would

only need to …only need to …

Bid out the PCs, servers, and theBid out the PCs, servers, and the

communications requirementscommunications requirements

Bid out the management andBid out the management andimplementation of the projectimplementation of the project



How do we implement OES?How do we im plement OES?

COMELEC should …COMELEC should …espouse the conceptespouse the concept

bid out the development of thebid out the development of thesystem and computer programssystem and computer programsmake system/programs available tomake system/programs available to

IT community and to publicIT community and to publicadopt good contributionsadopt good contributionsmake the system available to allmake the system available to all

interested parties,interested parties, free of chargefree of charge



If OES is the best system for thePhilippines because …

it is the least expensiveit makes wholesale cheatingextremely difficult to executeall steps are transparent to thevoting public

… then what are we worriedabout?

There were disturbing statements



There were disturbing statementscoming from the CAC

"DRE was well-received but was seenby some as too expensive. OMR wascheaper but it still requires humanintervention .""DRE is suited for areas where there isgood infrastructure includingelectricity and connectivity. OMR ismore suitable for rural areas whereinfrastructure isn't that reliable."

In its resolution dated 29 November



In its resolution dated 29 November2008, the CAC recommended the

following technologies:

Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) orPrecinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS)technology for all areas, subject to theelection automation budget of theCOMELEC; Central Count Optical Scan (CCOS)

technology for all other areas not coveredby DRE or PCOS technology; andthe public telecommunications networksfor the transmission of results.



With all due respect to the CAC,we truly cannot comprehend why DRE remains an option.

We cannot understand why there seems to be a compellingreason to use DRE.



It is the most expensive

Using it will be a logistical nightmare

It is the least transparent



IF it is illogical to employ an all-DRE system, why then would there be logic in partly employing it?



Reality check …

IF the COMELEC has already madethe political decision to use DRE orOMR, then following is ourrecommendation …



Disallow the use of DRE (shouldbe non-negotiable!)

OMR should be voting center-based (school-based), NOT precinct-based (unless they can find anOMR that’s less than P20,000 each)



O El ti S t



Open Election System- OMR

1. Votes cast & talliedas in manual voting

2. ERs brought toschool encoding

(OMR) center3. ERs validated then

posted on the webw/ BEIs digitalsignature

4. CMBOC will accessdatabase, produceSOV, COC

5. All interestedparties may accessand process thedata by themselves

6. All interestedparties can sendSMS to watchers toverify figures

7. PBOCs access DB;produce Prov SOVsand COCs

8. NBOC accesses DBfor final results




DOMINANT

PARTY

DOMINANT

OPPOSITION

CITIZENS

ARM

MEDIA &

OTHERS

DOMINANTPARTY

DOMINANTOPPOSITION

CITIZENSARM

MEDIA &OTHERS

VOTING CENTER

OMRPRECINCTS



Some final words about DRE …



Peter Erben, who was a speaker inNovember’s Vendors’ Fair said that

electronic voting machines are “..inits infancy with significant problemsstill facing their widespread use ...”



Kinstall Brace, president of Election Data Services,

a company that examines voting machine usageacross the country stressed that “From 2004 to2006, electronic voting machine usage went upand 2006 was the high water mark. Then usecame down. From 2006 to 2008, every

jurisdiction that has changed has gone to opticalscan … and election administrators are nowmoving their decisions in that direction.”Some parts of Florida and California, all of Connecticut, parts of New York and other

jurisdictions around the country, switched fromeither DRE or lever machines to optical-scansystems.

Comm. Rene Sarmiento



And we may become thelaughingstock of other countries …

for using a technology that is now,because of their sad experience in atleast two elections, being discarded

in the United States .



Please join …


… make our electionstransparent!



Thank you!hank you!

OES Presentation 2008-12-13

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Transcript of OES Presentation 2008-12-13