Colombia Internacional No. 81

Contenido

Editorial

In memoriam Carta a los lectores Presentación: Procesos de integración política, social y económica Philippe De Lombaerde, UNU-CRIS (Bélgica) Stephen Kingah, UNU-CRIS (Bélgica) Angelika Rettberg, Universidad de los Andes (Colombia)

Análisis: Procesos de integración política, social y económica

Difíusing EU Law beyond the Borders of the Union: The Judicialization of the European Trading Area Alian F. Tatham, Universidad CEU San Pablo (España) Free Trade and Labour and Environmental Standards in MERCOSUR María Belén Olmos Guipponi, University ofStirling (Reino Unido) Addressing Human Rights in the Court of Justice of the Andean Community and the Tribunal of the Southern African Development Community Giovanni Molano-Cruz, Universidad Sergio Arboleda (Colombia) Stephen Kingah, UNU-CRIS (Bélgica) Rights, Free Trade, and Politics: The Strategic Use of a Rights Discourse in the Negotiation of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) Angelika Rettberg, Universidad de los Andesi (Colombia) Philippe De Lombaerde, UNU-CRIS (Bélgica) Liliana Lizarazo-Rodríguez, Consultora independiente (Bélgica) Juan Felipe Ortiz-Riomalo, Universidad de los Andes (Colombia) Una evaluación del Programa de Convergencia Macroeconómica de la Comunidad Andina de Naciones: el caso colombiano Alvaro Pío Gómez Olaya, Universidad del Valle (Colombia)

Tema libre

The Dual Function of Violence in Civil Wars: The Case of Colombia Philippe Dufort, University of Cambridge (Reino Unido) The Generalization of Particularized Trust. Paramilitarism and Structures of Trust in Colombia Jan Boesten, University of British Columbia (Canadá) La seguridad y defensa estadounidenses tras la guerra contra el terror Guillem Colom Piella, Universidad Pablo de Olavide (España)

Documentos

La religión en la evolución del orden político. A propósito de la obra de Fukuyama The Orígins ofPolitical Order (2011) William Mauricio Beltrán, Universidad Nacional de Colombia (Colombia) La importancia de los orígenes del cambio constitucional Nicolás Figueroa García-Herreros, New School for Social Research (EE. UU.)

Colombia internacional

13 I5-17

19-24

27-66

67-97

99-127

129-165

167-202

205-235

237-265

267-290

293-314

315-323

Contents

Editorial

In Memoriam 13 Letter from the Editor 15-17 Introduction: Dynamics of Political, Social and Economic Integration Philippe De Lombaerde, UNU-CRIS (Belgium)Stephen Kingah, UNU-CRIS (Belgium) Angelika Rettberg, Universidad de los Andes (Colombia) 19-24

Analysis: Dynamics of Political, Social and Economic Integration

Difíusing EU Law beyond the Borders of the Union: The Judicialization of the European Trading Area Alian F. Tatham, Universidad CEU San Pablo (Spain) 27-66 Free Trade and Labour and Environmental Standards in MERCOSUR María Belén Olmos Guipponi, University of Stirling (UK) 67-97 Addressing Human Rights in the Court of Justice of the Andean Community and the Tribunal of the Southern African Development Community Giovanni Molano-Cruz, Universidad Sergio Arboleda (Colombia) Stephen Kingah, UNU-CRIS (Belgium) 99-127 Rights, Free Trade, and Politics: The Strategic Use of a Rights Discourse in the Negotiation of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) Angelika Rettberg, Universidad de los Andest (Colombia) Philippe De Lombaerde, UNU-CRIS (Belgium) Liliana Lizarazo-Rodríguez, lndependent Consultant (Belgium) Juan Felipe Ortiz-Riomalo, Universidad de los Andes (Colombia) 129-165 An Evaluation of the Macroeconomic Convergence Program of the Andean Community of Nations: The Colombian Case Alvaro Pío Gómez Olaya, Universidad del VaUe (Colombia) 167-202

General Interest

The Dual Function of Violence in Civil Wars: The Case of Colombia Philippe Dufort, University of Cambridge (UK) 205-235 The Generalization of Particularized Trust. Paramilitarism and Structures of Trust in Colombia

Jan Boesten, University ofBritish Columbia (Cañada) 237-265

U.S. Security and Defense After the War on Terror

Guillem Colom Piella, Universidad Pablo de Olavide (Spain) 267-290

Documents

Fukuyama’s The Orígins of Political Order (2011): The Role of Religión in the Evolution of Political Order

William Mauricio Beltrán, Universidad Nacional de Colombia (Colombia) 293-314 The Importance of the Sources of Constitutional Change

Nicolás Figueroa García-Herreros, New Schoolfor Social Research (US) 315-323

Colombia internacional

In MemoriamGary Hoskin 1938-2014

En nombre del Departamento de Ciencia Política, al que Gary Hoskin dedicó los últimos años de su vida académica, quiero expresar las más sinceras condolencias a sus familiares y amigos.

Deja Gary en la memoria institucional del Departamento un legado in-deleble por la claridad de su orientación académica y por haber estado siempre dispuesto a dirigir y colaborar con esfuerzos orientados a su desarrollo. En gran parte, el Departamento de la Universidad de los Andes es hoy lo que es gracias a la guía, la convicción y la dedicación del profesor Gary Hoskin.

Describir la huella que personalmente deja Gary en cada uno de sus co-legas y estudiantes que tuvieron la fortuna de conocerlo a lo largo de todos estos años es una tarea ardua e infructuosa. Cada quien tiene sus propios recuerdos y evocaciones. Su memoria, sin embargo, dibujará en todos y todas una sonrisa franca y calidad, aunque triste por su ausencia.

Juan carlos rodríguez ragaDirector del Departamento de Ciencia Política

Universidad de los Andes

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Carta a los lectores

Colombia Internacional tiene el gusto de presentar a los lectores el número monográfico “Procesos de integración política, social y económica”, que, co-mo el título señala, reúne artículos que abordan y analizan las dinámicas de integración, cooperación y adopción de tratados de libre comercio en diferen-tes regiones del mundo. Los artículos que acá se incluyen reflexionan sobre cómo acuerdos recientes de cooperación (TLC, Unión Europea, CAN, SADC, Mercosur, entre otros) trascienden los temas comerciales y económicos, y abordan otros problemas que anteriormente no se consideraban. En parti-cular, los autores resaltan la importancia que han adquirido las demandas de diversos actores sobre aspectos relacionados con la protección de ciertos derechos fundamentales.

En la coordinación de este número nos acompañaron tres conocedores del tema: Philippe De Lombaerde —director asociado de UNU-CRIS en Bélgica y profesor en la Universidad de Maastricht (Holanda)—, Stephen Kingah —profe-sor de UNU-CRIS— y Angelika Rettberg —profesora asociada del Departamento de Ciencia Política de la Universidad de los Andes (Colombia)—. A ellos, agra-decemos el tiempo dedicado a la selección de los textos; la lectura detenida que dieron a los diferentes borradores; y en general, la ayuda para facilitar el proceso editorial de este número.

Esta edición incluye también tres artículos de tema abierto. El primero de ellos, de Philippe Dufort, “The Dual Function of Violence in Civil Wars: The Case of Colombia”, analiza la doble función que tiene la violencia en contextos de guerras civiles, a saber, la extracción de recursos y el incremento del control por parte de los actores en conflicto. El artículo combina estrategias metodológicas diferenciadas que permiten ir más allá de los estudios existentes sobre este tema. Por un lado, realiza un análisis cuantitativo que incluye variables macroeconómi-cas y otras que explican la existencia de conflictos bélicos. Por otro lado, el tra-bajo incluye un análisis cualitativo que pretende desenmascarar el modo en el que operan las guerras civiles. Con esto, el autor plantea estudiar las dinámicas que se dan dentro de un Estado y sugiere qué variables de contexto afectan de manera diferenciada los resultados de las guerras. Su argumento teórico lo evalúa al analizar el caso de la guerra que se vive en Colombia.

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Colombia Internacional 81 • COLINT 81 • PP. 352ISSN 0121-5612 • Mayo-agosto 2014 • PP. 15-17

Por su parte, Jan Boesten analiza en “The Generalization of Particularized Trust. Paramilitarism and Structures of Trust in Colombia” la relación entre la política de la formación de Estado en Colombia y la creación de “trampas socia-les”, expresadas estas últimas en el fenómeno del paramilitarismo en el país. El autor reflexiona sobre la coexistencia en Colombia de instituciones democráticas formales en el nivel nacional, e instituciones informales no democráticas en el nivel regional, y argumenta que esta interacción explica la posibilidad que tienen los paramilitares de ejercer poder coercitivo sin ser controlados por el Estado de Derecho que rige en el país.

Finalmente, el artículo de Guillem Colom Piella, “La seguridad y defensa estadounidenses tras la guerra contra el terror”, analiza los cambios que Estados Unidos ha venido incorporando en su política de seguridad y defensa, tras en-frentarse a diversos acontecimientos nacionales e internacionales que han ame-nazado su papel hegemónico en el mundo.

En este número también se incluyen dos documentos: en primer lugar, William Mauricio Beltrán hace una reconstrucción del argumento central del libro de Francis Fukuyama The Origins of Political Order, publicado en 2011 por Farrar, Straus y Girdeux; y, en segundo lugar, Nicolás Figueroa García-Herreros revisa el libro de Gabriel L. Negretto Making Constitutions. Presidents, Parties, and Institutional Choice in Latin America, publicado por Cambridge University Press en 2013.

Como los lectores usuales, y quizá también los nuevos, de Colombia Internacional se darán cuenta, a partir de este número la Revista estrena un nue-vo diseño; esperamos que esta nueva presentación sea más agradable y facilite la lectura y consulta de los textos. Por la realización de esta labor, extendemos un agradecimiento especial al coordinador editorial de la Revista, Norman Mora Quintero, y a la diseñadora y diagramadora Leidy Sánchez. Sea esta la oportunidad de informarle a nuestra comunidad de lectores que a partir de 2013 aumentamos la periodicidad de la publicación, al pasar de ser una publicación se-mestral, a una cuatrimestral; esto nos ha exigido ajustar el cronograma editorial y adelantar las fechas de publicación. A partir de este número también se incluyen los resúmenes de todos los artículos, así como las palabras clave y las políticas éticas de la Revista, en tres idiomas: español, inglés y portugués; con esta nueva modificación esperamos expandir nuestra comunidad de lectores e incentivar a

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Carta a los lectores

académicos anglo y lusoparlantes a participar en nuestra publicación. Finalmente, recompusimos y aumentamos el tamaño de los comités editorial y científico al in-vitar a reconocidos politólogos de prestigiosas universidades en América Latina, Estados Unidos y Europa: a ellos, muchas gracias por aceptar la invitación. Todos estos cambios a los que la Revista se sometió se hicieron con el afán de lograr un mejor posicionamiento, aumentar el público de lectores e incentivar a posibles autores a publicar sus trabajos con nosotros.

Aprovechamos esta oportunidad para extender a todos los lectores una cor-dial invitación a presentar artículos para su publicación en Colombia Internacional. Nuestro propósito es ser una ventana por medio de la cual se establezcan diálogos entre la comunidad académica nacional e internacional; propósito que podremos cumplir con su activa participación.

laura Wills oteroEditora de Colombia Internacional

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Desde los tempranos años noventa los procesos de integración social, eco-nómica y política han ido en aumento. Los estudiosos del regionalismo se refieren a este fenómeno como la “segunda ola” del regionalismo, o al “nuevo regionalismo”. Este así llamado nuevo regionalismo no es sólo un asunto cuantitativo, también hay diferencias cualitativas importantes si se compara con los “antiguos” acuerdos regionalistas de los años sesenta. Por un lado, las formas más institucionalizadas del regionalismo (es decir, las organizaciones regionales) han visto ampliados sus mandatos, al cubrir más áreas de política que las áreas del comercio o de la seguridad abordadas en el “viejo regiona-lismo”. Por otro lado, los contenidos de los acuerdos comerciales (tanto in-traregionales como interregionales) se han ampliado considerablemente y se incluyen crecientemente asuntos que trascienden la dimensión estrictamente comercial, como los servicios, la inversión extranjera directa, los derechos de propiedad intelectual, las condiciones de la contratación pública, la solución de disputas, los estándares laborales y los estándares ambientales, entre otros. Esta tendencia ha coincidido con una creciente judicialización y politización de la política comercial. La judicialización se relaciona con reformas cons-titucionales en diferentes países dirigidas a proteger un mayor número de derechos (tanto derechos humanos fundamentales como derechos sociales, económicos y culturales) así como con instrumentos nuevos y más efectivos para protegerlos. En muchos casos, como Sudáfrica y Colombia, el activis-mo judicial —o la tendencia a que las cortes de justicia adquieran un papel proactivo en la formulación de políticas públicas— ha incidido también en la judicialización de la política comercial.

Presentación: Procesos de integración política, social y económica

Philippe De LombaerdeStephen Kingah

UNU-CRIS (Bélgica)

Angelika RettbergUniversidad de los Andes (Colombia)

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7440/colombiaint81.2014.01

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La tendencia a la politización se refiere al hecho de que las negocia-ciones de las políticas de integración económica y social se han movido gra-dualmente del viejo modelo de la diplomacia económica —a puerta cerrada y poco transparente— hacia un modelo que implica un mayor escrutinio por parte de los grupos de interés y el público en general. Así, negociaciones como aquellas para el Área de Libre Comercio de las Américas (ALCA), los tratados de libre comercio surcoreanos, y los tratados de libre comercio que suscriben los Estados Unidos y la Unión Europea se han convertido en asuntos centrales del debate político en las sociedades relevantes. Además, los opositores políticos de los tratados y de las políticas de integración, en general, están utilizando instrumentos legales para proteger derechos o, por lo menos, utilizan un discurso de derechos en su actividad política. Argumentan, por ejemplo, que las políticas de integración económica afectan potencialmente derechos como el derecho a la vida, la alimentación, la salud, la cultura y la tierra, entre otros.

Las tendencias aquí mencionadas están relacionadas. El propósito de este número especial es explorar las diferentes tensiones que emanan de estos procesos paralelos desde una perspectiva que combina la mirada a la política y al derecho en el estudio de las políticas de integración política, social y económica. Esta mirada no es frecuente, pues los estudios de los procesos en cuestión tienden a centrarse en los aspectos económicos de los procesos de integración. Los textos incluidos en este dossier se arriesgan a buscar entender la interacción entre lo económico, lo político y lo social en los procesos de integración entre países o regiones del mundo, identificar las tensiones entre los contenidos y las aspiraciones de las políticas, analizar los escenarios y actores políticos y jurídicos —muchos de ellos no tradicionales—, así como sus estrategias y las posibles implicaciones para la formulación de políticas públicas. Todos los artículos incluidos se acogen a esta mirada innovadora con base en argumentos empíricamente respaldados.

El punto de partida de este número especial fue un proyecto Jean Monnet, otorgado por la Unión Europea a la United Nations University Institute on Comparative Regional Integration Studies (UNU-CRIS)/College of Europe, titulado Constitutional Rights versus Free Trade in EU-FTAs (CRIFT) (Derechos constitucionales versus libre comercio en tratados de libre

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Presentación: Procesos de integración política, social y económicaPhilippe De Lombaerde • Stephen Kingah • Angelika Rettberg

comercio con la UE).1 En el marco de dicho proyecto se realizaron una serie de talleres y encuentros en Brujas (Bélgica) con algunos de los autores que contribuyeron a este número, y que desembocaron también en un número especial de la revista European Law Journal (que se publicará en el 2014).

Allan F. Tatham inicia el recorrido con un análisis de cómo las leyes de la Unión Europea son difundidas más allá de la Unión. En concreto, se pregunta por la manera en que la judicialización de la política comercial europea impregna e incide en las decisiones judiciales y en las cortes de los países con quienes la Unión Europea firma tratados de libre comercio. Con base en diversos ejemplos, el autor concluye que el proceso de “europeiza-ción” ha sido efectivo no sólo desde el punto de vista de la integración eco-nómica, sino también desde el punto de vista de la creación de un sistema de gobernanza basado en el régimen comercial de la Unión y de sus estándares a lo largo del continente.

Giovanni Molano y Stephen Kingah aportan un estudio comparativo del Tribunal de Justicia de la Comunidad Andina (CAN) y del Tribunal de la Comunidad de Desarrollo de África Austral (SADC). Al investigar cómo ambos tribunales han abordado temas de derechos humanos, los autores buscan aportar insumos acerca de una posible colaboración judicial Sur-Sur: encuentran que las entidades creadas originalmente con el objetivo de la in-tegración económica han ampliado gradualmente su mandato para ocuparse de casos que trascienden el comercio y abordan los derechos humanos. Al ha-cerlo, las cortes encargadas de vigilar el intercambio comercial han ampliado y consolidado su mandato.

María Belén Olmos aborda la inclusión de cláusulas sociales en el tratado de Mercosur, las cuales exigen a los Estados miembros observar ciertos estánda-res laborales y ambientales. Mientras que el tratado original no incluyó ninguna de estas provisiones, a lo largo de los años noventa éstas fueron progresivamente incluidas en las reglas de juego del tratado. Las tensiones generadas entre estas normas y las previsiones constitucionales de los estados miembros, así como

1 Information and Research Activity on Constitutional Rights versus Free Trade in EU-FTAs (CRIFT), del EACEA Lifelong Learning Jean Monnet Programme (Grant Decision No. 2011-2927).

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aquellas relacionadas con la inclusión de estándares laborales y ambientales en las cortes domésticas, fueron progresivamente superadas.

Angelika Rettberg, Philippe De Lombaerde, Liliana Lizarazo-Rodríguez y Juan Felipe Ortiz-Riomalo analizan los casos recientes de la negociación y firma de tratados de libre comercio (TLC) por parte de Colombia con los Estados Unidos y la Unión Europea, respectivamente. Los autores describen y analizan el uso estratégico del discurso basado en la defensa de los derechos humanos por parte de actores domésticos e internacionales involucrados. En el artículo se argumenta que este discurso se construye a partir de la amena-za percibida por parte de estos actores a derechos específicos y es funcional a la necesidad de éstos de movilizar y conseguir apoyo político, legislativo y judicial entre los actores de ambos lados para avanzar en el desarrollo de sus intereses específicos y más generales. Los autores sugieren que algunas diferencias entre ambos acuerdos y el proceso que condujo a su aprobación y ratificación pueden ser atribuidas, por un lado, a la habilidad de los actores relevantes de construir y diseminar argumentos basados en la defensa de derechos para consolidar las coaliciones requeridas a favor de sus intereses y argumentos, y por otro lado, a las características institucionales, y otras características contextuales, de las contrapartes colombianas. Estos casos co-lombianos muestran el posible alcance que pueden tener la politización y la judicialización de la política comercial sobre el curso y las implicaciones de las negociaciones comerciales en el futuro, en la región y fuera de ella.

Por último, Álvaro Pío Gómez evalúa el caso colombiano a la luz del pro-grama de convergencia macroeconómica de la Comunidad Andina de Naciones (CAN). El balance es modesto. Diseñado para facilitar el proceso de coordina-ción internacional de políticas macroeconómicas realizado por Colombia en el Programa de Convergencia Macroeconómica (PCM) de la CAN, la consulta con un grupo de expertos arroja que el buen desempeño macroeconómico del país no parece estar asociado al ejercicio específico de coordinación internacional en la CAN. Otros ejercicios de coordinación, por ejemplo, en el Fondo Monetario Internacional y el Banco Mundial, han resultado ser más influyentes. De igual forma, decisiones domésticas, más que a la efectividad o influencia de los ejer-cicios de coordinación internacional de políticas macroeconómicas, pueden ilustrar el desempeño macroeconómico colombiano.

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Presentación: Procesos de integración política, social y económicaPhilippe De Lombaerde • Stephen Kingah • Angelika Rettberg

Los distintos trabajos no sólo combinan la mirada política con la del de-recho y la de la economía, sino que también consideran variables domésticas e internacionales en diferentes regiones del mundo.

Es oportuna la publicación de este número con ocasión del segundo ani-versario de la entrada en vigor del Tratado de Libre Comercio entre Colombia y Estados Unidos, y cuando el país se ha incorporado en la Alianza del Pacífico y está adelantando otro número importante de negociaciones comerciales con otros países. Los textos incluidos en este número contribuyen al debate y al planteamiento de las preguntas que en un contexto como el nuestro deben guiar el escrutinio de todas las capacidades de los actores y de las implicaciones, ven-tajosas y desventajosas, de estos procesos.

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Philippe de lombaerde es doctor en Ciencia Política de Rheinisch-Westfälische Technische Hochschule (Alemania) y en Economía de Pacific Western Universit (EE. UU.). Actualmente, es director asociado en UNU-CRIS (Bélgica) y profesor en la Universidad de Maastricht (Holanda). Entre sus últimas publicaciones están: “Testing the Relationships between Globalization, Regionalization and the Regional Hub-ness of the BRICs (con L. Chen)”. Journal of Policy Modeling 36, 2014; y Regionalism (IV Volume series) (coeditado con F. Söderbaum). Londres: Sage, 2013.Correo electrónico: [email protected]

stephen Kingah es doctor en Derecho de la Universidad Libre de Bruselas (VUB) (Bélgica). Kingah es profesor en UNU-CRIS (Bélgica) y se desempeña como relator po-nente del SADC para la Asociación Americana de Derecho Internacional. Anteriormente trabajó como administrador ad hoc para instituciones financieras de la Comisión de la Unión Europea. Sus temas de interés son aspectos legales y políticos de la relación entre la Unión Europea y la ACO (African, Caribbean and Pacific States), instituciones financieras y derechos humanos en el Sur. Entre sus últimas publicaciones están: “The Role of Regional Parliaments in Enhancing Democracy in the South”. En Comparative Regionalisms for Development in the Twenty-First Century: Insights from the Global South.

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Farnham: Ashgate, 2013; y “Moving beyond the Last Corrupt Leaders in African Politics: AU-EU Cooperation”. Cameroon Journal of Democracy and Human Rights 6 (1), 2012.Correo electrónico: [email protected]

angelika rettberg es doctora en Ciencia Política de la Universidad de Boston (EE. UU.). Actualmente, Rettberg es profesora asociada del Departamento de Ciencia Política de la Universidad de los Andes (Colombia), directora del Programa de Investigación sobre Conflicto Armado y Construcción de Paz (ConPaz) y becaria visitante de investigación GIGA Institute of Latin American Studies (Alemania). Entre sus últimas publicaciones están: “Encuentro con los otros: perspectivas para la reconciliación en Colombia”. En Costos económicos y sociales del conflicto en Colombia: ¿Cómo construir un posconflicto sostenible?, eds. Ana María Ibañez y Daniel Mejía. Bogotá: Ediciones Uniandes, 2014; y “La construcción de paz bajo la lupa: una revisión de la actividad y de la literatura académica internacional”. Estudios Políticos 42, 2013.Correo electrónico: [email protected]

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ABSTRACT: The European Union (EU) lies at the heart of a network of free trade agreements (FTAs), negotiated with partner countries in Europe and beyond. Within such a context, this paper focuses on the extent to which the judicialization of trade policy in the Union and its diffusion externally have impacted on states which are members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), reflecting the process of Europeanization as a manifestation of the Union external governance.

KEYWORDS: European Union • free trade agreements • judicialization • european trading area • trade policy diffusion • europeanization • European Free Trade Association

Diffusing EU Law beyond the Borders of the Union: The Judicialization of the European Trading Area

Allan F. TathamUniversidad CEU San Pablo (Spain)

DOI: dx.doi.org/10.7440/colombiaint81.2014.02RECEIVED: December 11, 2012ACCEPTED: April 1, 2013REVISED: February 10, 2014

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This article is part of the continuing research of the author into how regional integration law is diffused from the regional court into legal systems that are part of the relevant regional integration community and beyond. It was prepared, in part, as a contribution to the EU-funded Jean Monnet Project Constitutional Rights versus Free Trade in EU-FTAs (CRIFT), Application No. 199732-LLP-1-2011-1-BE-AJM-IC; Grant Decision No. 2011-2927. Project Coordinator: Prof. Philippe De Lombaerde, United Nations University, Comparative Regional Integration Studies Institute, Bruges (Belgium).

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la difusión del derecho comunitario de la ue más allá de sus fronteras: la judicialización del espacio europeo de comercio

RESUMEN: La Unión Europea (UE) está en el centro de una red de acuerdos de libre comercio (TLC) establecidos con países socios en Europa y el mundo. Este artículo examina el grado en que la judicialización de la política comercial de la Unión y su difusión externa han impactado a los Estados que son miembros de la Asociación Europea de Libre Comercio (AELC), lo cual refleja el proceso de europeización de la región y la política exterior de la Unión.

PALABRAS CLAVE: Unión Europea • acuerdos de libre comercio • judicialización • espacio europeo de comercio • difusión de la política comercial • europeización • Asociación Europea de Libre Comercio

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a difusão do direito comunitário na ue mais além de suas fronteiras: a judicialização do espaço europeu de comércio

RESUMO: A União Europeia (UE) está no centro de uma rede de acordos de livre comércio (TLC) estabelecidos com países sócios na Europa e no mundo. Este artigo examina o grau em que a judicialização da política comercial da União e sua difusão externa têm impactado os Estados que são membros da Associação Europeia de Livre Comércio (AELC), o que reflete o processo de europeização da região e da política externa da União.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: União Europeia • acordos de livre comércio • judicialização • espaço europeu de comércio • difusão da política comercial • europeização • Associação Europeia de Livre Comércio

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Introduction1

The European Union (EU) lies at the heart of a network of free trade agreements (FTAs), negotiated with partner countries in Europe and beyond (see Tatham 2009; Telò 2009). Within such a context, this paper focuses on the extent to which the judicialization (see Ehrenhaft 1981) of trade policy in the Union and its diffusion externally have impacted on states which are members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), reflecting the process of Europeanization (see Schimmelfennig 2010) as a manifestation of Union external governance.

In particular, it examines the ways in which courts in EFTA have re-sponded to express or implicit requirements to interpret national law—harmo-nized to EU law—in conformity to the rulings of the Court of Justice of the European Union (Court of Justice, CJUE). Consideration will therefore be made to court decisions concerning the bilateral FTAs signed in the 1970s by the then European Economic Community (EEC) with EFTA States (see generally Wahls 1988); the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement;2 and the Agreement on Free Movement of Persons (FMPA),3 which is one of a series of bilateral agree-ments with Switzerland (Tatham 2009, 185-186). Although these FTAs have dif-fering objectives, they have nevertheless tended to strengthen the EU’s regional (and global) trade reach (see Woolcock 2007; Rigod 2012), extending much of its liberal trade regime and standards across the continent.4

1 The author would like to thank, in chronological order, Prof. Philippe De Lombaerde, Associate Director, United Nations University Institute on Comparative Regional Integration Studies, Bruges (Belgium), for having first proposed the submission of this article for publication as well as for his counsel throughout; Laura Wills Otero, Chief Editor, and Norman Mora Quintero, Editorial Assistant, of Colombia Internacional for their advice and support in its preparation; and finally the two anonymous reviewers whose erudite observations greatly contributed to the author crystallizing his own views and to contextualizing the piece. The usual disclaimer applies.

2 OJ 1994 L1/3.3 OJ 2002 L114/6.4 For the purposes of selecting the FTAs, one of the important criteria used was the accessibil-

ity to national superior court decisions in English, French or German. Thus, regrettably, no reference has been made either to the practice of national courts under the 1963 Association Agreement with Turkey (OJ 1973 C113/2) or under the 1995 EC-Turkey Customs Union (OJ 1996 L35/1).

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This paper starts by providing a brief explanation that positions these EFTA States within the broad conceptualization of Europeanization as the domestic adap-tation to European regional integration (see Vink and Graziano 2008) (Section 1). It follows this exposition by considering the relations between the EU and EFTA, including the distinct links to the EEA-EFTA States and to Switzerland (Section 2). The role of the CJEU in constitutionalizing EU trade policy is then considered from both its internal and external aspects (Section 3). The requirements of judicial homogeneity as an example of EU norm diffusion are approached within the EFTA, EEA and Swiss contexts: while not forming a systematic or exhaustive study, the work addresses the issue of why courts in EFTA (whether national or suprana-tional) have variously used or refused to use EU law and specifically CJEU rulings (Section 4). The last section concludes the article.

1. Europeanization and the EFTA States

Although the focus of the present work is the judicialization of the European trading area, the context within which this process has occurred and continues to evolve is considered by political scientists and international relations experts alike as the Europeanization of structures and methods of behaviour resulting from the impact of the European Union, both internally and externally.

While there are a number of competing ideas from Europe and North America on the conceptualization of the process of Europeanization in political sci-ence and international relations literature (see Vink and Graziano 2008), the present author has decided to select the broad and inclusive definition of “Europeanization” presented by Radaelli. He has referred (see Radaelli 2003, 2006) to Europeanization as consisting of processes of construction, diffusion and institutionalization of “formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles and ‘ways of doing things.’ It also consists of shared beliefs and norms that are first defined and consolidated in the EU public process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political structures and public policies (2003, 30).”

This definition describes an interactive process and represents the domestic impact on and adaptation to “European governance,” by which the EU provides rules and mechanisms to regulate the behaviour of public and private actors across a whole gamut of integrated policy areas (Schimmelfennig 2010). This “internal” governance

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Diffusing EU Law beyond the Borders of the UnionAllan F. Tatham

of the EU—the core of which is focused on the single/internal market—has been ex-ternalized and projected into its near abroad, covering countries that wish to become EU Member States or those that are unwilling to join but nevertheless also wish to benefit from access to a large, attractive market. “External” governance of the EU aims, then, at approximating legal and administrative standards in third states and entities to those of the Union as a means of managing interdependence and fostering integration below the threshold of membership (Lavenex 2008).

In its attempts to transfer certain norms and rules beyond its borders, the EU can avail itself directly of its acquis, its consensually-agreed internal policy templates, already legitimized by their adoption, implementation and enforce-ment by EU Member States. It is this legitimacy of the norms which acts as a decisive factor for rule adoption or norm diffusion in the absence or weakness of power-based strategies such as membership conditionality. In essence, it is argued that the way in which EU rules are communicated and transferred to non-Member States influences the likelihood of their adoption (see Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Franck 1990).

Consequently, “[w]hen applied to EU external relations, the governance approach implies a high degree of institutionalization and the existence of a com-mon system of rules beyond the borders of the EU and its formal, legal author-ity” (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009, 795). Such externalization or “external projection of internal solutions” (Schimmelfennig 2010, 326) has been achieved through the vehicle of norm transfer of the relevant core (internal market, com-petition and flanking policies) acquis.

Most studies of the impact of Europeanization have either examined its internal manifestation in EU Member States (Cowles, Risse, and Caporaso 2001; Featherstone and Radaelli 2003; Klaus and Hix 2001; Hanf and Soetendorp 1998; Héritier, Kerwer, Knill, Lehmkuhl, Teutsch, and Douillet 2001; Kohler-Koch 2003; Meny, Muller, and Quermonne, 1996; Rometsch and Wessels 1996) or its external effect on neighbouring or candidate countries, particularly in the recent waves from Central and Eastern Europe (Grabbe 2005; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005).5 This work, however, will concentrate on a less studied field, i.e., the “twi-

5 Other commentators from different disciplines have also added their perspectives: Barbé and Johansson (2003); Kuus (2007); Tesser (2003); Huelss (2012); and Wichmann (2010).

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light zone” between prospective and actual membership of the Union which is now generally occupied by the sovereignty-conscious States that make up EFTA. In this sense, the analytical framework already provided for the Europeanization effects on actual or prospective Member States must be reconfigured in order to deal with the specificities of the EFTA case.

This reconfiguration has already been achieved to a great extent by Schimmelfennig (2012) who, in view of their trading relations with the Union, has characterized the EFTA Member States as forming part of the hemisphere of “affordable nationalism,” since these countries have rejected the supranationalism of the Union and are wealthy enough to be able to remain outside (Tatham 2009, 173-191). They can be considered as “quasi-members,” a status which results from a combination of high economic interdependence with the Union (as evidenced by the deep level of their integration into the single/internal market) and strong popular opposition to full membership, as evidenced by the referendums in Norway (1972 and 1994 against EU membership) and in Switzerland (1992 against EEA membership) which put paid to their formal participation in the respective processes of supranational integration (Tatham 2009, 22, 60, 68, 175-182, 185-186). The remaining EFTA States were thus forced to look to alternative methods in order to manage their deep trading and policy relations while acknowledging that

the strong asymmetry in market size and trade shares results in the far-reaching formal or informal adoption of highly legalized EU rules by the quasi-members. The basic mechanism behind the Europeanization of the quasi-members is a highly institutionalized form of condition-ality (granting equal market access in return for rule adoption) […]. (Schimmelfennig 2010, 328)

The hallmark of the period before the EEA or the series of bilateral agree-ments with Switzerland, it may be argued, was one of socialization to EEC/EU law through a process of voluntary norm diffusion. Moreover, the present author would still contend that socialization (Kelley 2004; Risse-Kappen, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Schimmelfennig, Engert, and Knobel 2006) itself still has a role to play in the Europeanization of EFTA national and regional judiciaries as the basis for norm diffusion, especially in the form of Court of Justice rulings.

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Having presented the wide conceptual background to the impulses affecting Europeanization in EFTA and its Member States, this study will concentrate on an even more closely delimited part of this complex process, by focusing on the na-tional and supranational judiciaries in EFTA. In particular, it will consider the extent and under what conditions the Union acquis (including Court of Justice rulings) has been (successfully) promoted or diffused in EFTA State courts or the EFTA Court itself in their decision-making processes (Lavenex 2006).

2. Relations between the EU and EFTA

a. Background

Trade relations between the states in the EU and EFTA have always been considered important since the foundation of these two regional organizations in the 1950s and 1960s. Nevertheless, while free trade has remained at the heart of both organizations, their respective development has reflected different aspi-rations. For the Union, in its original incarnation as the EEC, the pursuance of a free trade policy agenda—based initially on a customs union and a common external tariff vis-à-vis third countries—between its Member States was seen as an economic means to a political end, viz, their integration and ostensible union in broadly federal terms. For EFTA, as highlighted in the previous section, the object was to balance their concerns regarding the protection of national sov-ereignty and/or military neutrality with a desire to lower barriers on trade in certain goods between Member States while maintaining separate national tariff walls vis-à-vis third countries.

With the 1973 EEC accession of two EFTA founding members, the United Kingdom and Denmark, together with Ireland, the remaining EFTA States in-dividually concluded bilateral free trade agreements with the then Community. Further steps were taken in 1984 (Preston 1997a) when EFTA proposed a new multilateral dialogue to the EEC and in April that year both groupings committed themselves to the development of the “Luxembourg process.” According to their Joint Declaration, the EEC and EFTA sought to cooperate on the harmoniza-tion of standards, the removal of technical barriers, the simplification of border formalities and improved action against unfair competition. Underlining their mutual interest in going beyond strictly trade issues, they set out the intention to

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establish cooperation in research and development, working conditions, culture, and the environment. Political commitment to the process was represented by the setting up of a High Level Steering Group.

While the Luxembourg process achieved some tangible results, the pub-lication of the Commission’s 1985 White Paper on the Internal Market, the com-mencement of the successful negotiations for the Single European Act, and the complete implementation of the Single Market programme projected for the end of 1992 together acted as a catalyst to alter the EFTAn view of membership. Fear of exclusion from this Single Market was matched, at least externally and politically, by the collapse of Soviet rule in Europe with the concomitant relax-ation of the neutral constraint on most EFTAns as well as their economic need to undertake more trade with the West to replace the loss of their traditional markets in Eastern Europe (Preston 1997b, 89).

A number of EFTA States were coming to the obvious conclusion that they should apply for EEC membership and had been considering the possibility when a new proposal was made by the then-Commission President, Jacques Delors, in a speech to the European Parliament on 17 January 1989. He stated in respect of EEC-EFTA relations that there were two options: (i) maintaining then-existing essentially bilateral relations, with the ultimate aim of creating a free trade area encompassing the Community and EFTA; or (ii) a new, more structured partner-ship with common decision-making and administrative institutions to make their mutual activities more effective and to highlight the political dimension of their cooperation in the economic, social, financial, and cultural spheres (17).

Delors noted that the options would change if EFTA were to strengthen its own structures. In that case, the framework for co-operation would rest on the two pillars of the EEC and EFTA. If that were not the case, there would sim-ply be a system based on Community rules that could be extended—in specific areas—to interested EFTA countries and then, at some possible future date, to other European countries. He continued:

But if we leave the institutional aspect of such a venture aside for a moment and focus on the substance of this broader-based cooperation, several delicate questions arise. It becomes clear in fact that our EFTA friends are basically attracted, in varying degrees, by the prospect of enjoying the

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benefits of a frontier-free market. But we all know that the single market forms a whole with its advantages and disadvantages, its possibilities and limitations. Can our EFTA friends be allowed to pick and choose? I have some misgivings here.The single market is first and foremost a customs union. Are our partners prepared to abide by the common commercial policy that any customs union must apply to outsiders? Do they share our basic con-ceptions? The single market also implies harmonization. Are our partners willing to transpose the common rules essential to the free movement of goods into their domestic law and, in consequence, accept the supervision of the Court of Justice, which has demonstrated its outstanding compe-tence and impartiality? The same question arises in connection with state aids and the social conditions of fair competition directed towards better living and working conditions. These are the questions that arise; these are the questions we will be asking. (17-18)

In fact, Delors clearly understood the legal implications for extending the single/internal market rules beyond the geographical confines of the Union, in particular the perceived role of the Court of Justice in this endeavour.

b. eea agreement

The eventual EEA proposal was seen as an attempt by the Community both to absorb the recent Iberian enlargement and to complete the implementa-tion of the Single Market programme as well as to divert membership applica-tions from the EFTA States.

However, by the time negotiations started on the EEA in autumn 1990, Austria had already applied for EEC membership in July 1989 and remained, at that time, the only EFTA State that viewed the EEA on parallel tracks to eventual EEC accession. The other EFTAns considered the EEA as a means of enjoying the benefits of the Single Market without the need to address the political impli-cations (sovereignty, neutrality, etc.) as Member States of the EEC (Dinan 2010, 163-164). During 1990 and early 1991, it became progressively clearer to the EFTA States that the EEA would probably not provide them with the relatively low-cost benefits for which they had been hoping (Preston 1997b, 95). Most importantly,

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they were generally dissatisfied with the limited “decision-shaping” offered by the EEC and decided that only complete membership would actually give them a voice in the rules which would govern them; and they were fearful of being left out of EMU and consequently any EMU-led economic growth.

By the end of the negotiations in 1991, most of the EFTA States had come to share the Austrian viewpoint, viz., that the EEA was merely a step in the process to full EEC membership (Hveem 1992). The EEA was intended to integrate the then EFTA States— Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, and Austria—economically into the Community without giving them a role in its institutions.

In the relevant areas,6 Community law from all sources—Treaty provi-sions, legislation, and rules laid down by the Court of Justice, the so-called “ac-quis communautaire”—was made applicable to them.7 This covered not only the law as it existed when the Agreement was concluded, but also new legislation that might be adopted in the future, as well as future decisions of the Court of Justice. Under the terms of the Agreement, if the EFTA countries refused to accept these new rules, they risked losing their rights in the sector in question. This scheme had great attractions—it created the world’s largest trading area8—but it also had serious drawbacks. In particular, it meant that the EFTA countries had to apply legal rules over whose conception, drafting, and enactment they had had virtually no say. The EEA structure established a series of further institutions: including an EEA Council and several committees.

In 1991, the EEA Agreement was declared by the Court of Justice to be incompatible with the EC Treaty.9 The reasons for this were complex but they centred around the ECJ’s objection to the creation of a rival court, the proposed EEA Court. Since this would have had jurisdiction to interpret EEA law, it would have had great influence on the development of Community law. The Court of Justice’s objections were not assuaged by the fact that the majority of

6 These include free movement of goods (but only regarding products originating in the Contracting States), persons, services, and capital. Agriculture is excluded.

7 In some cases, modifications were made.8 Though smaller in area than the territory covered by the North American Free Trade

Agreement (NAFTA), it has more consumers and a greater gross domestic product.9 Opinion 1/91, 1991.

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judges on the EEA Court would have been judges from the Court of Justice; indeed, this was an added grievance. The Agreement was then amended to meet the Court of Justice’s objections and the new version was approved by the Court in 1992.10 A further setback occurred when the agreement was rejected by the Swiss voters in a referendum, which meant that Switzerland had to drop out.11

The EEA Agreement eventually came into force on 1 January 1994 between the Community countries and Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, and Austria. Due to the successful conclusion of parallel negotiations to join the EU, Austria, Finland and Sweden left EFTA on 1 January 1995 when they became Union Member States (although they continued to be members of the EEA): meanwhile Liechtenstein acceded to EFTA and to the EEA after approval by a referendum on 9 April 1995. Thus the EFTA side of the EEA currently comprises Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein.

The Court of Justice’s 1992 Opinion led to the establishment of a two-pillar structure for the EEA with solely EEA-EFTA institutions on one side and Joint EEA bodies on the other.12 One of the solely EFTA institutions is the EFTA Court, which interprets the EEA Agreement with regard to the EEA-EFTA States and ensures that it harmonizes its interpretations with those of the Court of Justice: this forms one of the focuses of the present work.

c. switzerland

With the rejection in the 1992 popular referendum on membership of the multilateral EEA, the Swiss federal government was forced back onto the bilat-eral trade track that Switzerland had been pursuing with the EEC, at least since its 1972 Free Trade Agreement.13 In dealing with the EU, the federal government

10 Opinion 1/92, 1992. The Agreement was finally signed in Oporto, Portugal, on 2 May 1992.11 As a result, the Agreement had to be amended by a Protocol signed in Brussels on 17 March 1993.12 On the EEA Agreement generally, see Norberg, Hokborg, Johansson, Eliasson, and Dedichen

(1993). For an outline of the institutions, see the information on the EFTA official website, available at: www.efta.in. For more on the institutional framework, its operation and the need to ensure homogeneity between the EC and EEA-EFTA legal orders, see Blockmans and Łazowski (2006, 108-137).

13 OJ 1972 L300/191.

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decided upon sector-by-sector bilateral negotiations—the leitmotif of Swiss-EU relations ever since (Tatham 2009, 185-186).

Negotiations commenced in 1994 and were concluded on seven agree-ments—known as the “Bilaterals I”—in 1999. These agreements cover: (i) free movement of persons;14 (ii) overland transport;15 (iii) air transport;16 (iv) ag-ricultural products;17 (v) research;18 (vi) technical barriers to trade;19 and (vii) public procurement.20 The Swiss approved the Bilaterals I package of agree-ments in a referendum in May 2000 and they eventually entered into force on 1 June 2002 (see Breitenmoser 2003; Schwok and Levrat 2001). However, a referendum held on 9 January 2014 determined—by a margin of just 50.3% in favour—that quotas should be re-applied to EU nationals wishing to ben-efit from the provisions of the FMPA.21 With the referendum, the continued operation of this bilateral agreement has accordingly been put in jeopardy (Hewitt 2014; Foulkes 2014).

A second set of sectoral, bilateral agreements in nine new areas—the “Bilaterals II” package—were concluded in May 2004 and signed in October 2004 (see Blockmans and Lazowski 2006, 155-157, 169-173). The agreements cover: (i) taxation of savings;22 (ii) participation in Schengen;23 (iii) asylum (Dublin Convention);24 (iv) judicial and administrative cooperation in the fight against fraud;25 (v) trade in processed agricultural products;26 (vi) partic-

14 OJ 2002 L114/6.15 OJ 2002 L114/91.16 OJ 2002 L114/73.17 OJ 2002 L114/132.18 OJ 2002 L114/468.19 OJ 2002 L114/369.20 OJ 2002 L114/430.21 The transitional arrangements under Art 10 FMPA (as amended by the Enlargement Protocols)

allowed Switzerland to impose quantitative restrictions on resident permits to EU nationals between five and twelve years after the entry into force of the FMPA. Limits were progressively abolished from 1 June 2007, with final elimination projected to take place on 31 May 2014 (Blockmans and Lazowski 2001, 177-181).

22 OJ 2004 L385/30.23 OJ 2008 L53/52.24 OJ 2008 L53/5.25 OJ 2009 L46/6.26 OJ 2005 L23/19.

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ipation in the European Environment Agency;27 (vii) statistical cooperation;28 (viii) participation in the Media programme;29 and (ix) avoidance of double taxation of retired EU officials.30 Only with respect to Swiss association to the Schengen acquis was a referendum successfully requested—held on 5 June 2005, the Swiss electorate voted 54.6% in favour of the EU-Switzerland Schengen and Dublin Bilateral Agreements.

Legally speaking, each bilateral agreement is the result of a separate nego-tiation process and the approach is also quite different from the EEA Agreement: since the EU’s acquis is not automatically the basis of the agreements, the nature of the legal obligations arising under nearly all of the each bilateral agree-ments comes closer to traditional international than to supranational EU law.31 Consequently, the principle underlying the relations between the Union and Switzerland is not that of “legal homogeneity” but rather the recognition of the “equivalence of legislation.”

Again, unlike the EEA, there is no EU-Switzerland Association Council or overarching Joint Committee or Court. Instead, relations are decentralized and managed within each sectoral agreement by their respective “mixed commit-tees” composed of Swiss and EU representatives. These mixed committees are in charge of managing both the technical and the political aspects of the bilateral agreements through information exchange and, when necessary, the extension of EU legislation relevant for Switzerland. They are also the forum where imple-mentation problems are discussed, and accordingly provide a kind of ad hoc monitoring function. The absence of central coordinating institutions reflects the formally weak legalization of Swiss-EU association.

27 OJ 2006 L90/37.28 OJ 2006 L90/2.29 OJ 2007 L303/11.30 This Agreement was concluded between the Swiss Federal Council and the European

Commission.31 The exceptions are the bilateral agreements on air transport and on Schengen. Interestingly,

Articles 2, 8, 9 and 10 of the latter bilateral agreement provide that the mixed committee under such agreement has the power to settle disputes arising from substantially divergent interpretations of the Schengen acquis by the Court of Justice and Swiss courts and administrative authorities: it is thus arguable that, in these cases, the mixed committee exercises a quasi-judicial authority.

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3. Role of the Court of Justice in Constitutionalizing EU Trade Law

a. internal dimension

the Union’s economic Constitution

In furthering the completion and deepening of the Internal Market, the Court of Justice has moulded the EU’s economic constitution (Poiares Maduro 1988)—most particularly through its creation and active use of the principles of supremacy and direct effect as the instruments of its work—and has thereby rendered itself an actor in intra-EU trade policy. The Court of Justice’s formation of the “constitutional charter”32 of an EU governed by the rule of law has also been achieved through its recognition of the autonomous nature of the EU legal order (Tatham 2006, 1-147);33 the principle of the indirect effect of EU law (also known as the “principle of interpretation [of national law] in conformity with EU law”);34 the general principles of law35 (including human rights36); Member State liability for breach of EU law;37 and the need for national remedies to protect breaches of rights derived from EU law.38 All these principles have flowed from the decision-making capacity of the Court of Justice as a result of its policy to pursue an integration agenda of encouraging trade flows by reducing or bringing down barriers impeding such flows, especially when—despite express provisions in the Treaties—the common (now internal) market failed to be completed as scheduled. Indeed, in the mid-1980s, the Court of Justice was already able to

32 Case 294/83, 1986; and Opinion 1/91, 1991.33 Case 26/62, 1963; and Case 6/64, 1964.34 Case 14/83, 1984; Case 106/89, 1990; Case 334/92, 1993.35 General principles of EU law are not to be confused with the fundamental principles of

Union law, as expressed in the TEU and TFEU, e.g., the principles of free movement of goods and persons. General principles of law constitute the “unwritten” law of the Union and include various principles such as equality (Case 224/00, 2002; Case 388/01, 2003); proportionality (Case 8/55, 1954-1956; Case 9/73, 1973; Case 30/77, 1977; Case 181/84, 1985); subsidiarity (Case 84/94, 1996); and legal certainty (Case 78/74, 1975; Case 43/75, 1976; Joined Cases 66/79, 127/79, 128/79, 1980). Some of these principles are now expressly provided for in the TEU and TFEU.

36 Case 26/69, 1969; Case 11/70, 1970; Case 4/73, 1974; Case 44/79, 1979; and Case 63/83, 1984.37 Joined Cases 6/90, 9/90, 1991; and Joined Cases 46/93, 48/93, 1996.38 Case 33/76, 1976; Case 45/76, 1976; Case 158/80, 1981; Case 79/83, 1984.

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make the following observation: “The principle of free movement of goods and freedom of competition, together with freedom of trade as a fundamental right, are general principles of law of which the Court ensures observance.”39

In particular, in its judicious use of direct effect as a strategic instrument in trade policy, it has “created” Union-based economic trade rights, the breach of which are enforceable by affected individuals and private commercial entities before their own national courts,40 whose role in enforcing such rights before them has been key to the success of the Internal Market. Moreover, the Court of Justice principle of EU law primacy generally privileges over conflicting national constitutional rights,41 the Union trade rights on the free movement of goods, persons, establishment and capital, as well as the freedom to provide and receive services and the protection of competition (and those linked to them, e.g., the protection of intellectual property rights). While the Court of Justice interprets these freedoms broadly, it is restrictive in determining the justifiable limits which states can impose on them: in other words, impediments to free trade must be kept to an absolute minimum.42

national constitutional rights and Free trade

In its pursuit of a free-trade agenda at the EU level, the Court of Justice has been subject to criticism for privileging trade rights over national fundamental rights. Such fears had already arisen in the late 1960s in respect to German courts’ fears of infringement of the domestic right to property and other fundamental rights by the Court of Justice’s rulings, in particular warnings from the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC)43 about the acceptable limits to integration. These concerns mostly failed to dampen the Court of Justice’s enthusiastic pursuit

39 Case 240/83, ADBHU [1985] ECR 531, 548.40 Exceptionally directly before the Court of Justice itself, e.g., Art 263 TFEU.41 Case 11/70, 1970.42 For example, Art 36 TFEU on the grounds permitted to maintain national quantitative

restrictions and measures having equivalent effect; Arts 45(3) and (4), 51 and 52(1), and 62 TFEU on national restrictions to the free movement of workers and the freedoms of establishment and to provide services justifiable on grounds of public policy, public security and public health as well as the public service exception.

43 Most importantly, FCC 1974.

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of its trade policy agenda of forwarding completion of the Internal Market in the face of European institutional inertia during the 1970s and early 1980s.

In response to such national court concerns, however, the Court cre-ated the “unwritten” general principles of EU law inherent in the Treaties, thereby giving itself sufficient leeway, for example, to formulate a catalogue of Community/Union rights.44 In doing so, it attempted to recalibrate the bal-ance between its predominantly trade policy agenda and the recognition of an increasingly social dimension to integration, by guaranteeing human rights in the EEC. Its halting development from the 1970s onwards of a rights catalogue to bind the Community (and the later Union) in its operations took, as its in-spiration, the common constitutional traditions of the Member States as well as the specific rights provisions of some Council of Europe (i.e., non-EU) treaties, such as the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights and the 1961 European Social Charter, which also bind the EFTA States.45 Nevertheless, its case-by-case, piecemeal creation of such a catalogue was not an ideal solution to guarantee-ing human rights for the Union and its citizens (Lenaerts and Van Nuffel 2011). While Treaty reform from the Single European Act 1986 onwards allowed for an increasingly important role for rights protection in the Union, it was the formulation of the Charter on Fundamental Rights of the European Union in 2000 that has represented the most decisive step in this process. The Charter had (due to certain national objections) been initially included as a declaration to the Treaty of Nice 2001 but became formally binding on and as part of the Union’s legal and institutional system through the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty 2007.46 Moreover, the Lisbon amendments finally required the Union to accede in its own right to the European Convention on Human Rights and its judicial enforcement mechanism.47

This formal Union-level acceptance of the need to protect human rights has also altered the scenery against which the Court of Justice operates in relation

44 On this issue, see Clapham (1991); Alston, Bustelo, and Heenan (1999).45 See now Article 6(3) TEU. For comparisons between the two major systems see Senden (2011).46 Article 6(1) TEU provides that the Charter “shall have the same legal value as the Treaties” (see

Peers, Hervey, Kenner, and Ward 2014).47 Article 6(2) TEU provides the necessary power for the EU to accede to the ECHR (see Gragl 2013).

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to rights at the national level. While the Court of Justice48 had already recognized that the protection of national identities of Member States was a legitimate ob-jective that the EU legal order had to respect,49 domestic (constitutional) court responses to the deepening integration implicit in the Maastricht and Lisbon Treaties50 have forced it to reappraise its approach to the respect of domestic constitutional rights in the Union legal order.

This reappraisal has occurred within the contextual evolution provided by Article 4(2) TEU that states, in part: “The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional […].” In a series of more recent cases, the Court of Justice has accordingly taken into consider-ation domestic judicial concerns of national identity (including constitutional core principles and rights) vis-à-vis the free trade rights under EU treaty law.51 It has thereby initiated a process aimed at recognizing the legitimate concerns of domestic courts in a proper balancing of EU free trade rights and rights under the national constitution, without calling into question the proper func-tioning of the Internal Market or impinging upon the operation of EU external trade relations. This reflects an emerging understanding of the EU as a multilevel governance regime, with the Court of Justice and Member State courts actively contributing to its evolution (Pernice 1999).

Such a multilevel understanding of economic governance is designed and reviewed in “multilevel constitutional systems” (Petersmann 2011, 44) and so varies according to whether the relevant economic regulations are governed, as has been seen, by EU constitutional law as interpreted by the Court of Justice or by national or regional law harmonized to EU law as used or rejected by do-mestic courts or the EFTA Court operating in their own constitutional systems. This extension of the applicability of EU law as a type of common law of trade, as developed through Court of Justice case-law and considered as some sort of

48 Case 473/93, 1996.49 Case 147/86, 1988; Case 379/87, 1989; Case 159/90, 1991.50 FCC 1994 and 2010.51 Case 36/02, 2004; Case 341/05, 2007; Case 438/05, 2007; Case 213/07, 2008; Case 208/09, 2010;

Case 391/09, 2011.

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latter-day lex mercatoria (Stone Sweet 2006, 629-633), represents an extension of EU (commercial) power beyond the borders of the Union (Jacoby and Meunier 2010, 308-309). Consequently, EU law limits the powers of non-Member States having FTAs with the Union that see themselves as being under factual constraint to adopt and implement EU law with a view to minimizing trade barriers and dis-tortions as well as reducing transaction costs to their own disadvantage (Cottier and Hertig 2003, 268).

b. external dimension

The Court of Justice has not limited itself to constitutionalizing the free-ing-up of trade within the Union: it has also turned its eyes towards the Union’s trade relations with third countries.

In its foray into external competences, the Court of Justice has posi-tioned itself as an actor in determining the scope of trade policy in respect to express and exclusively Union policies in the form of the common commercial policy52 and by interpreting the Union’s exclusive internal competence to act in an area as being impliedly transferred to the external plane.53

The Court of Justice has further bolstered its position by deciding, on a case-driven basis, whether provisions of third-country FTAs with the EU,54 as well as decisions made by joint institutions set up under such FTAs,55 can enjoy direct effect in the Union before national courts (even though such protection should be regarded as asymmetric in that the relevant third-country courts, except in cer-tain situations, are not obliged to grant such reciprocal protection to EU nationals before them when claiming infringement of that FTA). This does not, however, amount to a permissive recognition of direct effect for provisions of such FTAs within the Union legal order. Rather, the Court of Justice approaches each case

52 Opinion 1/75, 1975.53 Case 22/70, 1971. 54 Case 104/81, 1982; Case 270/80, 1982.55 Case 192/89, 1990. Provisions of Partnership and Co-operation Agreements—which entail

looser trade and economic links than under the Europe Agreements with the Central and Eastern European states (which acceded in 2004 and 2007) and the Stabilization and Association Agreements (with the Western Balkans states)—may also enjoy direct effect: Case 265/03, 2005.

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on its merits, examining the content of the EU-FTA provision with a similarly-worded provision in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the nature of the FTA, the trade as well as the political and economic relationship of the Union with the third country, and the temporal stage in the deepening of relations, especially (although not exclusively) taking into account the importance of an impending accession (Tatham, 2002/2006).

In contrast, the Court of Justice has been cautious in recognizing the way international trade agreements, of which the EU is signatory, have effect within the Union legal system. The main protagonist in this respect is the World Trade Organization (WTO), whose law may be used as a means of interpretation of EU law56 but which enjoys no direct effect.57 In this sense, the Court of Justice sees its role as preserving the economic constitution of the Union and the principles cre-ated under it from encroachment by the WTO (and its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)) (Kuijper and Bronckers 2005).

4. Treaty Requirements of Judicial Homogeneity as an Example of EU Norm Diffusion

Diffusion of EU norms not only takes the form of the requirement to harmonize national laws of third states to those of the EU but may also extend to the necessity to align domestic judicial practice in given fields. The way in which courts of EFTA States and the EFTA Court strike the balance between the protection of domestic constitutional rights and the principle of free trade, it is contended, is crucial in their own evolution as trade policy actors. In view of the fact that EU law and its interpretation by the CJEU are regarded by the EFTA States’ courts and the EFTA Court itself as international law, domestic constitutional considerations on the reception and position of such law in the national system consequently loom large in the minds of courts applying or refusing to apply it in cases before them. By participating in this recalibration of

56 Case 245/02, 2004; Joined Cases, 447/05; 448/05, 2007.57 Case 149/96, 1999; Joined Cases 120/06 P; 121/06 P, 2008. The Court of Justice earlier rejected

the possibility for Member States to review Community measures within the framework of the GATT: Case 280/93, 1994.

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trade relations between EFTA and the EU, domestic courts and the EFTA Court have emulated the role of trade policy actor played by the CJEU in the Union context. Furthermore, they have used this example as a means to pursue a dif-ferentiated trade policy dynamic in order to increase or lessen the impact of EU law and its CJEU interpretations to the extent that its perceived impact on local constitutional arrangements is adversely affected.

a. eFta states’ Ftas with the eeC

The 1972 FTAs which the individual states of EFTA negotiated with the EEC in the light of impending accessions of the UK and Denmark (together with Ireland) contain no clause requiring courts of EFTA States to use Court of Justice interpretations of EEC Treaty provisions when seeking to apply similarly-worded provisions of the relevant FTA in the cases before them. As a result, courts in the EFTA States were largely left to determine the application of Court of Justice interpretations on a sector-by-sector and case-by-case basis, variously accepting or rejecting its application.

Refusal of national courts to apply Court of Justice interpretations of EU law to similarly-worded provisions of EU-FTAs may be exemplified by the superior courts of Austria and Switzerland—both monist states—in their deal-ings with arguments before them based on the provisions of their relevant FTAs with the EEC.58 For example, the Swiss Federal Court in Adams59 denied the pe-titioner’s claims to apply EEC competition rules as interpreted by the Court of Justice, by means of the FTA, even though there was room for direct application to the extent that private undertakings nullified and impaired trade liberaliza-tion that had otherwise been achieved: the FTA was purely a trade treaty, the Court held, and confined to regulating industrial free trade.60 Although Article 23 FTA reproduced the then EEC competition provisions (now Articles 101, 102, and 107), it merely laid down what practices were incompatible with the proper functioning of the FTA, but did not prohibit them or designate them as unlawful nor, in contrast to the EEC rules, did it declare them void or lay

58 JO 1972 L300/2; JO 1972 L300/189. Also see Seidl-Hohenveldern (1983, 24-25).59 BGE 104 IV 179 (Swiss Federal Court). 60 For a discussion of the case, see March Hunnings (1977).

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down sanctions; rather, it merely authorized the contracting parties to take suit-able measures against such anti-competitive practices. Thus Article 23 FTA did not create any right of action for private persons before the Swiss courts and therefore could not be used to justify the passing on of business secrets to the European Commission, in breach of domestic criminal law.

Use of EEC competition law was also invoked in an Austrian anti-trust case61 where plaintiffs referred to Article 86 EEC (now Article 102 TFEU) by analogy in order to prove their contention that an agreement, according to which a large fig coffee producer granted a fidelity bonus to permanent clients, consti-tuted a cartel. The Austrian Supreme Court held that such an agreement did not constitute a cartel under Austrian law. Austrian law at that time defined a cartel as an agreement serving the common interests of all the partners, whereas the agreement under dispute merely intended to promote the interest of the fig cof-fee producer. The Court therefore deemed it irrelevant to refer to Article 86 EEC under such circumstances.

In a similar way, an attempt to achieve regional exhaustion of intellectual property rights as developed in EEC law was rejected by the Austrian Supreme Court in Austro-Mechana62 when it held that the FTA with the EEC did not oblige Austria to admit a parallel importation of gramophone records from Germany. The holder of the copyright of these records had transferred his rights for Germany to GEMA and for Austria to Austro-Mechana. The defendant alleged that such splitting of the copyright was contrary to Austria’s FTA commitments towards the EEC, submitting that Articles 13 and 20 FTA prohibited the use of industrial and commercial property as a disguised restriction of trade between the contracting parties.

The language of Articles 13 and 20 FTA was nearly identical to that of Articles 30 and 36 EEC (now Articles 34 and 36 TFEU). According to the exhaustion doctrine as expounded by the Court of Justice, owners of an intellectual property right cannot rely on their exclusive right in order

61 Case OGH 30.11.1976 (Supreme Court of Austria); OLG 30.08.1979 (Higher Regional Court of Frankfurt am Main), likewise refused to interpret the Austrian notion of a “cartel” by means of the EEC Treaty.

62 Case No. 4 Ob. 302/79 (Supreme Court of Austria).

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to prevent the (parallel) importation and marketing of a product which has been marketed in another Member State by themselves, with their consent, or by a person economically or legally dependent on them.63 In this particu-lar context, then, the policy of the Court of Justice in ensuring the free f low of trade in the EEC (now in the Union) has been to allow for the broadest opportunities for parallel imports. Against this policy background, the de-fendant therefore contended that Court of Justice decisions64—interpreting the said EEC Treaty Articles as permitting such parallel imports between Member States—should also be applicable to the interpretation of Articles 13 and 20 FTA, following from Austria’s commitments in Articles 22 and 27 FTA. The Supreme Court rejected the argument, stating that the creation and exercise of copyrights in the widest sense were not subject to the FTA, at least in so far as the restrictions stipulated by the parties did not extend beyond the substance of the proprietary right.

Likewise the plaintiffs’ arguments in respect of quantitative restric-tions on imports (Article 13 FTA) and on derogations (Article 20 FTA) within the free trade area were rejected by the Swiss Federal Court in Bosshard65 and in Physiogel66 on the grounds that the provisions of the rel-evant FTAs—although worded in the same way as the relevant provisions of the then EEC Treaty (now Articles 34 and 36 TFEU)—nevertheless could not be interpreted in the same way as Court of Justice rulings since the FTAs differed substantially from the Treaty in purpose and nature; in this way, the Federal Court expressly excluded application of Cassis de Dijon67 to the FTA. In fact, it took a 2010 amendment of the Swiss Federal Law on Technical Barriers to Trade to extend unilaterally Cassis de Dijon to Switzerland, with the result that those products that meet the relevant requirements of EU common rules or, in their absence, the rules of an EU or EEA Member State, can freely enter the Swiss market without having to fulfil any additional

63 See the cases cited to in Lenaerts and Van Nuffel (2011, 221).64 Joined Cases 55/80, 57/80, 1981; Case 78/70, 1971.65 BGE 105 II 49 (Swiss Federal Court).66 Qualicare AG v. Regierungsrat des Kantons Basel-Landschaft, BG, Case No. 2A.593/2005 (Swiss

Federal Court).67 Case 120/78, 1979.

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Swiss requirements. As this was a unilateral act, it meant that the EU did not recognize the equivalence of the corresponding Swiss legislation.

Yet not all practice of the courts in these EFTA States, with respect to EEC rules, was negative. In a further case,68 the Austrian Constitutional Court drew direct conclusions from practice pursuant to EEC rules. It had to decide whether the Austrian-German Commercial Treaty of 12 April 1930, granting German citizens the right to acquire real estate in Austria, had be-come obsolete. The Court held that the Treaty was no longer applicable, as it had been abrogated by desuetude. As proof of such desuetude, the Court inter alia relied on the fact that Germany had not asked the EEC Council of Ministers to extend the validity of this Treaty beyond the transition period set out in the EEC Treaty.69

Moreover, the Swiss Federal Court has proceeded on a case-by-case basis in deciding whether or not provisions of the EEC-Swiss FTA may enjoy “direct effect” or be “self-executing” in the national system, e.g., in respect of rules of origin,70 and of the principle of non-discrimination.71

b. eea

According to Article 6 EEA and Article 3(2) of the EFTA Surveillance and Court Agreement, the EFTA Court is, on the one hand, bound to follow Court of Justice precedents (“shall […] be interpreted in conformity with the relevant rulings of the Court of Justice”) for the period prior to the signing of the EEA Agreement (2 May 1992) and, on the other hand, required “to pay due account” to the principles laid down by the relevant Court of Justice rulings rendered after that date. These provisions concern either the interpretation of the EEA Agreement itself or of such rules of EU law in so far as they are identical in substance to the provisions of the EEA Agreement.

68 Case No. B 103/71, 1973 (The Constitutional Court of Austria).69 OJ 1969 L32/39. This was subsequently revised by the time of the Constitutional Court of

Austria decision by Council Decision of 29 September 1970 (JO 1970 L225/24) and Council Decision of 25 October 1971 (JO 1971 L248/7).

70 BGE 111 Ib 323; BGE 114 Ib 168 (Swiss Federal Court).71 BGE 112 Ib 183 (Swiss Federal Court).

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It might appear that the EFTA Court’s duty is different depending on when the Court of Justice ruling was made, since an obligation to fol-low a precedent is not the same as one to pay due account to it. However, the EFTA Court has recognized72 that the establishment of a dynamic and homogeneous market was inherent in the general objective of the EEA Agreement and has, in turn, taken a dynamic view of the obligations for judicial homogeneity.73 In practice, the EFTA Court does not distinguish between pre- and post-May 1992 Court of Justice case-law, thereby respect-ing it in its entirety (Skouris 2005, 124-125) and applying it directly in cases before it, without discrimination as to when the Court of Justice ruling was made. Moreover, the principle of homogeneity has led to a presumption that identically-worded provisions in the EEA Agreement were to be interpreted in the same way as in EU law.74

This position has been followed by the Norwegian Supreme Court,75 which—in one of its first cases where it had to decide on the interpretation of an EEA provision—relied on the Court of Justice ruling in Keck76 when interpreting Article 11 EEA (worded in the same way as Article 34 TFEU) without any discus-sion of the relevance of the latter ruling in the light of temporal limits on Court of Justice case-law contained Article 6 EEA. This approach was confirmed in later rulings and thus the distinction made in Article 6 EEA has lost its meaning since Norwegian courts have been instructed by the Supreme Court to interpret provisions of the EEA Agreement in conformity with all relevant Court of Justice cases (Graver 2004, 15).

Of even greater interest is the fact that the EFTA Court, like its sister court the Court of Justice, has developed its role in the EEA institutional architecture by the judicious use of and harmonization of practice to Court of Justice case-law (Baudenbacher 2003). Having asserted that the EEA Agreement is an internation-al treaty sui generis which contains a distinct legal order of its own,77 the EFTA

72 Case E-4/01, 2002.73 Case E-4/04, 2005.74 Case E-2/06, 2007.75 Norsk Retstidende 1996, 1569 (Supreme Court of Norway).76 Joined Cases 267/91, 268/91, 1993.77 Case E-9/97, 1998.

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Court subsequently recognized78 that this distinct legal order was characterized by the creation of an internal market, the protection of the rights of individuals and economic operators and an institutional framework providing for effective surveillance and judicial review.

In f leshing out this economic constitutional order of the EEA, the EFTA Court has emulated the Court of Justice-created fundamentals of the Union legal order and introduced EEA-equivalent concepts of direct effect,79 supremacy,80 state liability,81 and general principles of law82 (in-cluding fundamental rights83), as well as the economic freedoms and their permissible limitations.84 Such activism has allowed the EFTA Court to emulate some of the main constitutional bases of the Union legal order set out in Court of Justice rulings, albeit in a circumscribed manner and based on the fact that, whilst the depth of integration under the EEA Agreement is less far-reaching than under the TEU and TFEU, the scope and objective of the EEA nevertheless go beyond what is usual for an agreement under public international law.85

This positive evolution may be contrasted to the practice presented by superior Austrian courts with respect to the EEA Agreement during the country’s one-year membership in the EEA. While both the Austrian Supreme Court86 and the Administrative Court87 had recognized that provisions of the EEA Agreement would have priority over earlier, conf licting domestic legislation, the situation was different when it came to a conf lict between the EEA Agreement and a subsequent national legal provision. For example, the Administrative Court:

78 Case E-2/03, 2003. 79 Case E-1/94, 1994-1995.80 Case E-1/01, 2002.81 Case E-9/97. 1998.82 Case E-3/11, 2011.83 Case E-8/97, 1998; Case E-2/02, 2003; and Case E-2/03. 2003.84 Case E-3/00, 2000-2001; Case E-10/04, 2005.85 Case E-9/97. 1998.86 Case No. 4 Ob. 88/94 (Supreme Court of Austria).87 Case No. 94/16/0182 (Austrian Administrative Court).

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The EEA, however, does not have a supranational character. From the nature of its goals and its systematic methods the EEA-Agreement has es-sentially to be understood as a multilateral treaty under international law in a traditional manner. […] The [Court of Justice supremacy case-law] under Art. 5 EC-Treaty [now Article 4(3) TEU] can in this respect not be applied to Art. 3 EEA-Agreement. Art. 3 EEA-Agreement is to this extent not “in its essential contents” in the sense of Art. 6 EEA-Agreement iden-tical with Art. 5 EC-Treaty. […] It can therefore not be assumed, that the national implementation of the Agreement is carried out in such a manner that the EEA-Agreement takes priority over national law (moreover, no constitutional provision was adopted stipulating that the regulations of the Agreement have supremacy in the discussed manner […]). [Emphasis in original]. (Case No. 94/16/0182. See Loibl, Reiterer, and Dietrich 1997, 476)

The Administrative Court thus endorsed the opinion that EEA law in Austrian law did not have priority of effect over subsequent national law: only a constitutional amendment, such as that subsequently secured for EU membership (Seidl-Hohenveldern 1995), could have altered this position. The Austrian supe-rior courts, due to the moderate monist nature of the domestic system,88 persisted in guaranteeing priority of national constitutional provisions over conflicting EEA rules and thereby confirmed its previous practice under the EEC-Austria FTA. This provides a salutary warning on the way in which deepening economic and trade integration—outside the actual EU constitutional area—can be subject to the ever more rigorous demands of domestic constitutional regimes. Were Austria to have remained in the EEA, then the domestic court practice in respect of this Agreement might have developed at variance with that of other states.

c. swiss-eu Bilateral agreements

The possibility of local judicial deployment of CJEU rulings in the trade relations between Switzerland and the EU essentially depends on the provisions

88 This is evidenced by the fact that the Constitutional Court of Austria, under Austrian Constitution Article 140a, has the power to review international treaties for their conformity to law or to the Constitution.

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of the relevant bilateral agreement, although account must be taken of the doc-trine of “autonomer Nachvollzug” (unilateral adaptation), essentially of voluntary alignment or harmonization, according to which Swiss authorities since the late 1980s have required that each new item of national law is to be checked for its compatibility with EU norms.89

In the area of the free movement of persons, and similarly to the EEA, Article 16(2) FMPA between the EU and Switzerland provides that where “the application of this Agreement involves concepts of Community law, account shall be taken of the relevant case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities prior to the date of its signature. Case-law after that date shall be brought to Switzerland’s attention.”

The Swiss Federal Court has recognized the direct effect of FMPA provi-sions before it,90 as well as the Euro-conform interpretation of national law har-monized to EU law and the possibility of taking into account subsequent changes in EU law when interpreting such harmonized law.91 Moreover, it has considered the wording of the Preamble to the FMPA,92 and of Article 16(1),93 as compelling enough for it—in some cases—to take CJEU case-law into account in its decision-making, in terms of decisions made after the FMPA entered into force on 1 June 2002.94 Nevertheless (Maiani 2008, 15-17), even chambers in the Federal Court have

89 As early as 1988, the Swiss Federal Council had decided that new laws should be examined as to whether the draft national legislation was compatible with existing EU law, stating, “This effort to achieve parallelism does not aim at an automatic transposition of European law, but to avoid that unwillingly and unnecessarily new legal differences are created, which hinder the aspired mutual recognition of legal norms.” Schweizerischer Bundesrat, “Bericht über die Stellung der Schweiz im europäischen Integrationsprozess vom 24. August 1988,” (EDMZ, 1988), 380. Nowadays, every communication of a draft new law to the federal parliament contains a so-called “Europe chapter” which examines the law’s relationship to existing or draft European legislation.

90 BGE 129 II 249 (Swiss Federal Court). 91 BGE 129 III 335 (Swiss Federal Court).92 “Resolved to bring about the free movement of persons between them on the basis of the rules

applying in the European Community.”93 “In order to attain the objectives pursued by this Agreement, the Contracting Parties

shall take all measures necessary to ensure that rights and obligations equivalent to those contained in the legal acts of the European Community to which reference is made are applied in relations between them.”

94 Case No. 2C_196/2009: BGE 136 II 5 (Swiss Federal Court) (abandoning Case 109/01, 2003 and using instead Case 127/08, 2008); and Case No. 2C_269/2009: BGE 136 II 65 (Swiss Federal Court) (using Case 413/99, 2002): see Kaddous and Tobler (2009, 609-616).

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failed to follow the 2003 decision on Euro-conform interpretation of harmonized domestic law,95 and in some cases they have even ignored it.96 Such a position has also been maintained by the Swiss Federal Administrative Court, which noted: “It may not be deduced from this that Swiss law should have the same content as EU law, which is not directly applicable in Switzerland. Swiss law must rather be inter-preted in an autonomous manner.”97

Conclusion

In the cases dealt with in this work, courts in the EFTA States as well as the EFTA Court have all approached EU law and Court of Justice case-law from the perspective of their being legal sources of another system under international law. This approach, however, produces different results in dif-ferent systems. In regards to the EEA system, the EFTA Court has developed that system along the constitutional and economic lines already determined by the Court of Justice in reference to the EU. Thus, while maintaining that the EEA system is one of international law, it has nevertheless qualified such an understanding on the grounds of deepening economic integration with the Union trading bloc and has formulated a consideration of another sui generis system in international economic trade akin to the EU. Moreover, the recognition of the international law nature of EU law in the internal systems of EFTA States allows for a degree of flexibility in usage or rejection which is not permissible to EU Member State courts in the face of their duty of sincere cooperation under Article 4(3) TFEU.

Nevertheless, it appears that courts in EFTA take such a flexible ap-proach to Court of Justice case-law in order to derive the maximum benefit from it where the case before them requires. This also allows them the lati-tude to mould their approaches and institutional perceptions along the lines of the Court of Justice in the Union.

95 Case No. 4C.337/2005; 185. BGE 132 III 379 (Swiss Federal Court); Case No. 4A_78/2007; and BGE 133 III 568, par. 4.6 (Swiss Federal Court).

96 BGE 124 II 193, par. 6 (Swiss Federal Court).97 Case No. C-2092/2006, par. 3.5 (Swiss Federal Administrative Court).

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The acceptance by courts in EFTA of the Court of Justice as their model for a trade policy actor has been facilitated, for example, by its protection of the Union constitution from external (trade) interference. It therefore comes as no surprise that the Court of Justice acceptance of GATT/WTO law to interpret EU law but its rejec-tion of the former’s direct effect and primacy in the Union legal order has been largely replicated by the attitude of courts in EFTA to EU law and Court of Justice rulings. Moreover, even the case-by-case approach of the Court of Justice to finding specific provisions of association agreements to enjoy direct effect in the Union system is also echoed by the practice of courts in EFTA. Importantly, too, where the internal court structure of an EFTA Member State has created a number of supreme courts rather than one central one, then diversity of opinions between them on the status of EU law before them (e.g., in Austria before EU accession or in Switzerland) is redolent of the diverging approaches to EU law in Member State supreme courts.98

The requirements, express or implied, to apply Court of Justice case-law in proceedings before them have been used by these courts to reinforce or even gain control over the legal or constitutional relationship between national law and the law deriving from the relevant FTA. The arguments of these courts have been framed in varying ways in order to resolve conflicts between obligations under national con-stitutional law and international trade law, either in deference, as evinced by a very strong compulsion to interpret the FTA-derived law in a Euro-conform manner, or in defence, as exemplified by a rejection of Court of Justice rulings to interpret trade agreement provisions similarly-worded to those in the TFEU.

Even without the rigours of international trade and the major foreign policy decision to redirect their economic and political future towards the EU, superior or supranational courts of EFTA balance the demands of the free market with those of the rule of law and the rights protected under the relevant constitu-tion or EEA Agreement. They are inevitably drawn into the international politi-cal arena that, in previous times, was basically an executive-led competence in external trade policy, possibly subject to parliamentary ratification.

98 Compare the early reactions to European law of the French Cour de cassation (Jacques Vabre [1975] 2 CMLR 336; and Von Kempis [1976] 2 CMLR 152) to those of the Conseil d’Etat (Syndicat Général de Fabricants de Semoules de France [1970] CMLR 395; and Cohn-Bendit [1980] 1 CMLR 543).

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Courts have used their perceived protection of the national (or EEA) public interest as a means of determining when constitutional rights may be compromised in favour of trade rights or when they can instead be enforced as necessary barriers to trade.

The “de-politicization” of trade policy through its concomitant judicializa-tion and constitutionalization has allowed courts in EFTA to seize upon a role in trade policy determination similar to the one enjoyed by the Court of Justice, enabling them to become actors in the process of determining the rate and extent to which the Europeanization of this policy sphere evolves. On the one hand, by using Court of Justice rulings, such courts seek to ensure the effectiveness of the FTA through consistent or Euro-conform interpretation, thereby extending their own citizens’ rights to trade and to benefit from the economic freedoms as well as encouraging trade flows; on the other hand, by declining to use such rulings, these courts deny the extension of rights and preferences to EU-based individuals and companies, thereby justifying discrimination against EU citizens under the cloak of the protection of sovereignty or fundamental constitutional rights and thus limiting trade flows with the EU.

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H

allan F. tatham has a PhD in Law from the Faculty of Law, University of Leiden (The Netherlands) and lectures on EU law at CEU San Pablo University (Spain). He was for-merly Assistant Professor at Pázmány Péter Catholic University (Hungary). His latest pub-lications include: Central European Constitutional Courts in the Face of EU Membership: The Influence of the German Model of Integration in Hungary and Poland. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff (Brill), 2013; and “‘Don’t Mention Divorce at the Wedding, Darling!’ EU Accession and Withdrawal after Lisbon.” In European Union Law after the Lisbon Treaty, eds. Piet Eeckhout, Andrea Biondi, and Stefanie Ripley. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.E-mail: [email protected]

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Free Trade and Labour and Environmental Standards in MERCOSUR

María Belén Olmos GiupponiUniversity of Stirling (United Kingdom)

DOI: dx.doi.org/10.7440/colombiaint81.2014.03 RECEIVED: September 24, 2012ACCEPTED: Januar15, 2013REVISED: January 10, 2014

ABSTRACT: The main argument put forward in the article is that MERCOSUR accommodated the protection of human rights as non-trade issues in its institutional framework, analysing the conflict between the protection of human rights and trade issues at the sub-regional level. In order to give a complete and clear picture of these developments, the paper examines member states’ constitutional provisions and the implementation of MERCOSUR labour and environmental standards before national courts.

KEYWORDS: free trade agreements • human rights • sub-regional integration processes • labour rights • environmental protection • MERCOSUR

H

This article is based on a paper presented at the workshop “Free Trade Agreements vs. Constitutional Rights” (Bruges, 16th-17th February 2012) organized in the framework of the Jean Monnet Project Constitutional Rights and Free Trade Agreements (CRiFT) programme funded by the European Union.

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tratados de libre comercio y derechos laborales y medioambientales en Mercosur

RESUMEN: El artículo señala cómo Mercosur ha incorporado la protección de los derechos humanos como un aspecto no comercial en su marco institucional de integración. Con el fin de dar una imagen completa y clara de esta incorporación, la autora examina, por medio de un análisis socio-legal, las disposiciones constitucionales de los Estados miembros y la aplicación de las normas laborales y ambientales de Mercosur ante los tribunales nacionales.

PALABRAS CLAVE: acuerdos de libre comercio • derechos humanos • integración regional • derechos laborales • protección del medioambiente • Mercosur

H

tratados de livre comércio e direitos laborais e meio ambientais no Mercosul

RESUMO: Este artigo indica como o Mercosul vem incorporando a proteção dos direitos humanos como um aspecto não comercial em seu marco institucional de integração. Com o objetivo de dar uma imagem completa e clara dessa incorporação, a autora examina, por meio de uma análise sociolegal, as disposições constitucionais dos Estados membros e a aplicação das normas laborais e ambientais do Mercosul ante os tribunais nacionais.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: acordos de livre comércio • direitos humanos • integração regional • direitos laborais • proteção do meio ambiente • Mercosul

69

Introduction1

Traditionally, free trade agreements (FTAs) among developing countries in Latin America focused only on economic matters. However, the “new regionalism” that emerged in the 1990s moved towards the inclusion of social clauses requir-ing member states to observe certain labour and environmental standards. In particular, sub-regional integration agreements2 incorporated these standards along with mechanisms for enforcing them. Indeed, a recent feature of these trade agreements is the inclusion of social clauses. The Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR)3 did not remain at the fringes of this process. Even if the founding treaty (1991 Treaty of Asuncion) did not include any provisions on labour or en-vironmental rights, the subsequent developments that occurred in MERCOSUR in the 1990s brought about a recognition of these rights.

As a matter of fact, it must be said that these improvements in terms of the MERCOSUR legal and institutional system were (and still are) closely linked to the evolution of economic integration. In other words, the achievements of MERCOSUR depend to some extent upon the deepening of economic integration processes. As these processes evolved, MERCOSUR authorities attempted to adjust to different circumstances. Thus, over the past twenty years the legal and institutional architec-ture has been adapted to the dynamics of a pragmatic and intergovernmental

1 I would like to thank my colleagues who attended the workshop “Free Trade Agreements vs. Constitutional Rights” (16th-17th February 2012), organized by Philippe De Lombaerde and Stephan Kingah at the UNU-CRIS (Bruges), for their useful comments on this paper. All re-maining errors are my own.

2 Sub-regional agreements are those in which states have a shared history, cultural links and sense of interdependency. Under this category I include the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR, from its Spanish initials), the Andean Community (CAN, from its Spanish initials), the Central American Integration System (SICA, from its Spanish initials) and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM, from its Spanish initials).

3 By MERCOSUR law I refer to the legal system originating from the Treaty of Asunción (signed in 1991 by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) which created the Southern Cone Common Market (known as MERCOSUR). Venezuela was admitted as a member state in 2006. However, its membership is still pending because the Paraguayan Congress has not yet approved it. Up to the present day, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Ecuador are associate states. The main MERCOSUR bodies are: the Common Market Council; the Common Market Group and its various Working Sub-groups; the MERCOSUR Trade Commission; the Parliament of MERCOSUR (since 2007); the Economic and Social Consultative Forum and the Secretariat.

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integration process (Olmos Giupponi 2012). In MERCOSUR’s institutional set-up, the dispute settlement mechanism, the awards issued by the ad hoc Arbitration Tribunals4 and the Permanent Tribunal of Review, created in 2002, have all con-tributed to fostering progress.5

In terms of human rights, MERCOSUR has evolved in the direction of recognizing certain rights and, among them, labour and environmental stan-dards. The inclusion of human rights (and in particular labour and environ-mental rights) was implemented through the adoption of various declarations, treaties and charters in the late 1990s and at the beginning of the 2000s. In recent years, this trend has been confirmed in the form of various awards issued by MERCOSUR arbitration tribunals. Despite this, the protection of social rights in economic integration has received no attention from legal academics. This article aims at filling this gap in the doctrine. Therefore, the main aim of this paper is to analyse the protection of human rights (focusing on environmental and labour rights, the two most significant areas) in the framework of MERCOSUR law, un-derlying the main aspects of the evolution of this process and the relationships with domestic law (namely, constitutional law). The main argument put forward in the article is that MERCOSUR accommodated the protection of human rights as non-trade issues in its institutional framework, analysing the conflict between the protection of human rights and trade issues at the sub-regional level. Therefore, the article attempts to provide a socio-legal analysis to fill a gap in the literature. In order to give a complete and clear picture of these developments, the paper examines member states’ constitutional provisions and the implementation of MERCOSUR labour and environmental standards before national courts.

The article is structured as follows. In the first section, a general overview of the relationship between free trade and human rights (with a focus on labour and environmental rights) in sub-regional integration agreements is presented. The second section looks into the application of MERCOSUR labour and en-vironmental standards by member states’ domestic courts, offering a detailed

4 During the period 1999-2005, there were ten ad hoc arbitration tribunals constituted under the Brasilia Protocol.

5 The Permanent Tribunal of Review was created by the Olivos Protocol in 2002 and established in 2004.

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Free Trade and Labour and Environmental Standards in MERCOSURMaría Belén Olmos Giupponi

analysis of the respective constitutional provisions. The third section is devoted to examining how environmental rights and human rights have been addressed in MERCOSUR arbitration awards. Finally, the author’s conclusions are summarized in the last section.

1. Economic Integration in MERCOSUR: The Interface between Free Trade and the Protection of Human Rights

As in the case of other free trade areas, MERCOSUR agreements did not originally regulate on the recognition of human rights (Olmos Giupponi 2006). The Treaty of Asuncion did not include rules concerning labour rights, environmental rights or any human rights provisions. In fact, MERCOSUR was conceived purely as a process of economic integration. As a whole, the emphasis was put on market integration rather than on the protection of social rights, and fundamental rights were considered to be of secondary importance. MERCOSUR had no competences in the field of human rights.

Towards the end of the 1990s and at the beginning of the 2000s, the ideas of social dimension and social agenda became relevant in the Latin American integra-tion process (Deacon, Yeates and Van Langenhove 2006). Scholars from the Latin American Economic System (SELA, from its Spanish initials), NGOs and unions criticized the regional free trade agreements because of their lack of commitment to address the social side-effects of economic integration (Franco and Di Filippo 1999). Also, other scholars such as Grandi and Bizzozero stressed the need for a greater par-ticipation of social actors (Grandi and Bizzozero 1997). Additionally, other commen-tators underlined the “democratic deficit” of MERCOSUR because of the marginal participation of third sector organizations (Tirado Mejía 1997).

On the one hand, the demand for citizen participation in MERCOSUR increased, with a particular rise in requests on behalf of NGOs and unions (bottom-up process). For instance, universities, unions and third sector organi-zations have tried to participate in decision-making processes in MERCOSUR since the beginning (Tirado Mejia 1997). In MERCOSUR, “in practice, the participation of civil society is given at two levels: (i) in the relations be-tween public and private actors within each country; and (ii) on the relations between actors of different countries […] at both levels there are already

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instances of institutionalization of participation as the Sectoral Commission for MERCOSUR (COMISEC) in Uruguay” (Tirado Mejía 1997, 52). On the other hand, sub-regional integration processes tried to address the regional gover-nance’s lack of social meaning and legitimacy by creating bodies for the par-ticipation of civil society (top-down process). The creation of the Consultative Economic and Social Forum constitutes an example of this trend. This consulta-tive body was created through the Protocol of Ouro Petro adopted in December 1994, and approved by the Common Market Group in July 1996. The Forum includes the respective National Sections of each of the member countries and representatives of the business sector and workers (Moavro 1997).

Different actions were taken in order to make sub-regional integration processes more “human rights-friendly.” Consequently, various human rights dec-larations and charters relating to the protection of fundamental human rights were adopted. These instruments often recognized human rights in similar terms to those set up in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the United Nations Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic and Social Rights. However, within Latin American FTAs, these provisions differ from those of traditional human rights agreements. This is the case because FTA provisions do not establish monitoring bodies and tend to focus on the protection of specific rights which are considered relevant for the integration process.

In this context, labour rights and environmental protection were included as human rights in the sub-regional integration processes. In MERCOSUR, this new model of regionalism was shaped by the developments and obstacles found within MERCOSUR itself in the protection of both labour and environmental rights, as can be seen in the following sub-sections.

a. labour rights

Initially, MERCOSUR member states were reluctant to admit the link be-tween trade and labour issues and to decide whether or not the implementation of higher labour standards should be fostered through trade sanctions (Stern 2003). This reluctance was rooted in the main objective of the liberalization of internal trade, which could be distorted by the inclusion of such norms. Therefore, the im-provement of labour standards in the integration process was addressed in non-trade fora and instances. Notwithstanding this initial reluctance, MERCOSUR

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authorities started dealing with international labour standards and labour rights at the sub-regional level from the mid-1990s onwards.

Therefore, the consideration of the linkage between economic integra-tion and labour rights brought about the need to comply with International Labour Organization (ILO) standards and to adopt norms aimed at protect-ing labour rights at the sub-regional level (Bruni 2004). The ILO and its conventions played a crucial role in the definition of a set of basic or “core” labour standards (see table below). Besides, the improvement of labour standards moved forward through a continuous law-making process, mainly mobilizing worker organizations, companies and NGOs across local, national and regional dimensions.

Argentina Brazil Paraguay Uruguay Venezuela

Freedom of Association and Protection of the

Right to Organize Convention, 1948 (No.

87) (No. 98)

C87 - 1960C98 - 1956

–1956 1962

196619541954

19821968

Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No.

29)1950 1957 1967 1995 1944

Abolition of Forced Labour Convention,

1957 (No. 105)1960 1965 1968 1968 1964

Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention,

1999 (No. 182)2001 2000 2001 2001 2005

Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No.

100)1956 1957 1967 1989 1971

Discrimination (Employment

and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No.

111)

1968 1965 2004 1977 1987

Table 1. International Labour Standards and MERCOSUR Member States

(Source: ILO)

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As some scholars have argued, despite its limitations, MERCOSUR had the potential to evolve into a successful sub-regional model in terms of the protection of labour rights (Schaeffer 2007, 829). This evolution was driven by both governmental and non-governmental initiatives. In the 1990s, the enforce-ment of labour standards became an important issue on the domestic agenda for most MERCOSUR member states. At the same time, the main social actors in MERCOSUR (unions and NGOs) increasingly began to address the relation-ship between trade and labour, pushing for the recognition of common labour standards at the sub-regional level. Labour unions played a significant role in this process. Among them, it is worth mentioning the Federation of Labour Unions of the Southern Cone (Coordinadora de Centrales Sindicales del Cono Sur, or CCSCS, from its Spanish initials), which has been working on initiatives to im-prove labour standards at the sub-regional level.6

In MERCOSUR’s institutional set-up, the Working Sub-Group No. 10 on labour issues, employment and social security (WSG No. 10) and the Economic and Social Advisory Forum (FCES, from its Spanish initials), both established in 1994, have contributed to the evolution of MERCOSUR labour standards.7 In particular, the participation of trade unions in the work of these social and labour institutions was relevant in terms of bringing up new elements for the protection of workers and the enforcement of labour standards at the sub-regional level.

At the end of the 1990s, the adoption of a sub-regional charter was in-cluded on MERCOSUR’S agenda, and this soon became a crucial issue. These debates on the adoption of a social charter in MERCOSUR could be perceived as a mirroring trend following the European Union’s experience with the European social charter. Different actors were involved in these debates, and the CCSCS submitted a final proposal on the approval of a comprehensive Charter of

6 The CCSCS was created in 1986 in Buenos Aires and consists of eight joint trade unions from Argentina (CGT y CTA), Brazil (CGT, CUT, y FS), Chile (CUT), Paraguay (CUT-AyCNT ) and Uruguay (PIT-CNT). Apart from the CCSCS, there are other unions such as Central de Trabajadores Argentinos (CTA); three confederations affiliated to the World Confederation of Labour, and its branch in the region, the Central Latinoamericano de Trabajadores (CLAT); the Centrales Autónomas de Trabajadores (CAT) of Brazil and Chile; and the Central Nacional de Trabajadores (CNT) of Paraguay.

7 The Working Sub-Group 11 created in 1991 is the predecessor of the current WSG No. 10.

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Fundamental Rights. Furthermore, in 1997, member states signed the Multilateral Social Security Agreement (Grugel 2005, 1061).8

As a result of this process, the MERCOSUR Socio-Labour Declaration (Declaración Socio-Laboral) was adopted in 1998. The Socio-Labour Declaration of MERCOSUR (hereinafter referred to as the “Declaration”) was approved by the Common Market Council (CMC, from its Spanish initials) within the framework of the Summit of the Heads of State of MERCOSUR, held in Rio de Janeiro in 1998. The Declaration contains a series of workplace principles and rights, and includes, inter alia, the member states’ decision to strengthen the progress already achieved in terms of the social dimension of the integration process by adopting a common instrument. Also, through the Declaration MERCOSUR member states showed their commitment to support future and on-going advances in the social field, par-ticularly through the ratification and implementation of the main ILO agreements and other international instruments mentioned in the preamble of the Declaration.

With regard to its legal nature, the Declaration was adopted as a soft law instrument. Consequently, it is not binding for the member states and nothing in its provisions requires compliance, approval or the establishment of a mechanism for internalization and implementation.9 As one can observe, all these labour-related topics that have emerged call for a sub-regional approach that should be adopted by MERCOSUR bodies.10

b. environmental rights

No specific provisions on environmental issues were embodied in the Treaty of Asuncion (1991). The only reference made to environmental issues is contained in the preamble of the treaty, which declares that member states seek the accomplishment of a common market, “believing that this objective must be achieved by making optimum use of available resources, preserving the environment […].”

8 The MERCOSUR Multilateral Social Security Agreement was signed in December 1997 by MERCOSUR member and associate states.

9 See Secretaría de MERCOSUR (2004).10 As one of the latest developments in the field, it should be noted that MERCOSUR recently

asked to participate in the ILO meetings. See International Labour Office (2010)

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Despite this absence of specific environmental regulations, shortly after the adoption of the Treaty of Asuncion, MERCOSUR member states issued the Canela Declaration (1992), which enshrined basic international environmental principles further recognized by the Rio Declaration. The par-ticipation of third sector organizations concerned with the protection of the environment was very limited. As Tirado Mejia rightly mentioned, initially only the economic sectors and unions were actively involved in the decision-making process (1997). Also on the international level, the Rio Declaration and the recognition of Sustainable Development as a core principle contrib-uted to developing the environmental dimension.

Furthermore, in 1992, a specialized meeting known as the Reunión Especializada de Medio Ambiente (REMA, from its Spanish initials) was estab-lished, representing the first institutional mechanism to address environmental issues in MERCOSUR. Among its developments, we can mention the adoption of the “Basic Guidelines for Environmental Policy” in 1994. These guidelines set out a series of principles, minimum objectives and lines of action to be followed by MERCOSUR member states when drawing up their environmental policies. Later on, in 1995, member states adopted the Taranco Declaration on environmental issues. At the same time, environmental authorities asked the GMC to upgrade the institutional status of the REMA in order to create the Working Sub-Group No. 6 Environment (WSG No. 6).

In the 2000s, the main innovation was the 2001 signature of the MERCOSUR Framework Agreement on the Environment (hereinafter referred to as FAE), which constitutes the main legal instrument in MERCOSUR on the matter.11 Among its provisions, the FAE underlines the commitment of mem-ber states to cooperate in the implementation of international environmental agreements to which they are party, including the possibility of filing reports when appropriate (Macedo Franca 2010, 225). The FAE also emphasizes the obligation of member states to apply the principles of the 1992 Rio Declaration that are not covered by international agreements. At the sub-regional level, the FAE contemplates the commitment of member states to address environ-

11 The Agreement entered into force in June 2004.

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mental problems in the sub-region, stressing the need to cooperate in envi-ronmental protection and the preservation of natural resources. Furthermore, Chapter III of the FAE is devoted to Cooperation, regulating it in more detail and proposing a list of activities to be performed by member states in order to enhance the application of environmental norms.12 In a general overview, despite all these relevant provisions, the MERCOSUR Framework Agreement on the Environment does not impose specific obligations on the member states (Secretaría del MERCOSUR 2006b).

Additionally, over the past twenty years MERCOSUR has been adopt-ing other environmental regulations such as: the Agreement on the Carriage of Dangerous Goods in MERCOSUR (1994); the Technical Regulation of Maximum Pollutant Emission of Heavy Vehicles (1996); the Code of Conduct for the Import and Release of Exotic Biological Control Agents (2000); the Amendment to the General Plan of Mutual Cooperation and Coordination on Regional Security and Environmental Matters (2000); the Additional Protocol to the Framework Agreement on the Environment of MERCOSUR on Cooperation and Assistance in Environmental Emergencies (2004); the Guidelines for Environmental Management and Cleaner Production (2006); and the Instrument on Promotion and Cooperation Policy on Sustainable Consumption and Production in MERCOSUR (2007).

Up to the present day, there is not a comprehensive study on how member states are applying and implementing these environmental norms adopted within the framework of MERCOSUR. Besides, the above-mentioned Canela and Taranco Declarations merely represent soft law. The evidence provided by the different reports on the application of MERCOSUR law

12 See Article 6 on the commitment of member states to: a) increase the exchange of informa-tion on laws, regulations, procedures, policies and practices as well as its social, cultural, economic and health services, particularly those that affect trade or competitive conditions in the MERCOSUR; c) seek to harmonize environmental legislation, considering the different environmental, social and economic realities of the MERCOSUR countries; f) contribute in order to make that other MERCOSUR forums and agencies address timely relevant environ-mental aspects; g) promote the adoption of policies, production processes and services that are not degrading to the environment; i) promote the use of economic instruments to support the implementation of policies to promote sustainable development and environmental protection (Acuerdo Marco sobre Medio Ambiente del Mercosur 2001).

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shows that member states are enforcing the norms in different ways, as can be observed in the following section.

2. Application of MERCOSUR Labour and Environmental Standards by Member States’ Domestic Courts

In order to better understand how MERCOSUR norms are applied by member states, we shall briefly explain the main features of MERCOSUR law and the different constitutional approaches to it.13 Effective enforcement is a prereq-uisite for a successful regulatory regime; without enforcement, norms amount to nothing more than words on paper.

The recognition of legislation emanating from MERCOSUR as “com-munity law” has generated a vast amount of academic literature (Olmos Giupponi 2010). The mainstream position emphasizes that the MERCOSUR legal system is still intergovernmental, since member states have not yet given up their sovereign competences (Klein Vieira and Gomes Chiappini 2008). The principal argument in this area underlines the idea that primary law has not endowed MERCOSUR governing bodies with supranational powers. It is true that strictu sensu in the case of MERCOSUR law, the recognition of the typical features of community law in European terms (direct effect and su-premacy) is highly controversial.14 Legal scholars agree that the MERCOSUR legal system should currently be considered as a law of integration, which is a specialized category within public international law (Klumpp 2007, 91). The final aim, however, is that MERCOSUR law will eventually evolve into an authentic supranational legal order, in light of the principle of integration as a continuous and progressive process aimed at creating a common market laid down in the Treaty of Asuncion.

13 MERCOSUR legal order consists of primary law (Treaty of Asuncion (1991) and Ouro Preto Protocol (1994)) and secondary law.

14 According to the doctrine of the Court of Justice of the European Union established through its case law in Case 26/62 and Case 6/64. By direct effect we understand that citizens have rights under community law that they can invoke before the national courts. Supremacy means that the norms belonging to community law take prevalence over national norms. Some scholars also distinguish direct applicability as another feature relating to self-executing norms.

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Up to the present day, the supremacy of MERCOSUR primary and secondary law has been interpreted in line with each member state’s constitu-tional system (Klein Vieira and Gomes Chiappini 2008). As a result, there are dissimilar solutions in terms of the application of MERCOSUR law according to the different constitutional provisions of MERCOSUR member states, as explained in the sub-section below.

a. Hierarchy of community law and Human rights Provisions in Mercosur Member states’ constitutions

The constitutions of the respective MERCOSUR member states offered dif-ferent solutions with regard to the relationships between international law and mu-nicipal law. It is important to highlight that most of the constitutions were modified in the 1990s and 2000s. In the following paragraphs, the main provisions concerning the application of international law and the protection of human rights (in particular, labour and environmental rights) are examined in greater detail.

argentina

The 1853, the Argentine Constitution (last amended in 1994) adopted the monist theory of international law, which consequently recognizes the su-premacy of legal acts arising from MERCOSUR rules (Perotti 2004). Hence, MERCOSUR regulations should take primacy over others, taking a constitutional or supra-legal form, depending on their nature. The problems arising from the interpretation of (prevalent) MERCOSUR norms may be solved in the light of Article 75, Paragraph 24 of the Constitution. This article sets the predominance of integration treaties and the rules adopted under these treaties.15 Paragraph 22 of the same article establishes the supremacy of the most relevant human rights

15 Article 75. Congress is empowered: To approve treaties of integration which delegate powers and jurisdiction to supranational organizations under reciprocal and equal conditions, and which respect the democratic order and human rights. The rules derived therefrom have a higher hierarchy than laws. The approval of these treaties with Latin American States shall require the absolute majority of all the members of each House. In the case of treaties with other States, the National Congress, with the absolute majority of the members present of each House, shall declare the advisability of the approval of the treaty which shall only be approved with the vote of the absolute majority of all the members of each House, one hundred and twenty days after said declaration of advisability. The denouncement of the treaties referred to

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treaties, which are at the same level as the Constitution and complement the con-stitutional provisions on safeguarding human rights. Labour rights are protected in Article 14 bis16 whereas the right to environmental protection (introduced by the 1994 reform) is recognized in Article 41.17

Brazil

The 1988 Brazilian Constitution follows the dualism in the recognition and incorporation of international norms into the domestic legal order. This leads (in some cases) to a conflict between domestic legislation and international law. The problem is determined by the need for parliamentary approval of the norms de-rived from MERCOSUR bodies. Similarly, Article 84, Paragraph 8 of the Brazilian Constitution stipulates that the President may conclude treaties, conventions and international covenants, from the moment they are endorsed by the federal

in this subsection shall require the prior approval of the absolute majority of all the members of each House.

16 Article 14bis. Labor in its several forms shall be protected by law, which shall ensure to workers: dignified and equitable working conditions; limited working hours; paid rest and vacations; fair remuneration; minimum vital and adjustable wage; equal pay for equal work; participation in the profits of enterprises, with control of production and collaboration in the management; protection against arbitrary dismissal; stability of the civil servant; free and democratic labor union organizations recognized by the mere registration in a special record. Trade unions are hereby guaranteed: the right to enter into collective labor bargains; to resort to conciliation and arbitration; the right to strike. Union representatives shall have the guarantees necessary for carrying out their union tasks and those related to the stability of their employment. The State shall grant the benefits of social security, which shall be of an integral nature and may not be waived. In particular, the laws shall establish: compulsory social insurance, which shall be in charge of national or provincial entities with financial and economic autonomy, admin-istered by the interested parties with State participation, with no overlapping of contributions; adjustable retirements and pensions; full family protection; protection of homestead; family allowances and access to a worthy housing.

17 Article 41. All inhabitants are entitled to the right to a healthy and balanced environ-ment fit for human development in order that productive activities shall meet present needs without endangering those of future generations; and shall have the duty to preserve it. As a first priority, environmental damage shall bring about the obligation to repair it according to law. The authorities shall provide for the protection of this right, the rational use of natural resources, the preservation of the natural and cultural heritage and of the biological diversity, and shall also provide for environmental infor-mation and education. The Nation shall regulate the minimum protection standards, and the provinces those necessary to reinforce them, without altering their local juris-dictions. The entry into the national territory of present or potential dangerous wastes, and of radioactive ones, is forbidden.

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legislature of National Congress.18 This issue raises serious problems in terms of incorporating the rules arising from MERCOSUR. Therefore, MERCOSUR norms in Brazil, once internalized, rank below the constitutional norms and must take the form of ordinary law. It should be mentioned that treaties are incorporated by decree sanctioned by the President of the Republic and may be implemented by regulations.19 The international standards integrated into Brazilian domestic order take the form of a legislative decree issued by the Executive (Presidential Decree). As for other international law norms, internalization is carried out through various forms of administrative acts based on the content of presidential decrees, which, as discussed, are used, for instance, to pass the originating standards and regulations or tariff measures derived from the institutions. The “portarias” (the name given to the administrative acts issued by ministers or secretaries of state and other authori-ties), are used in many cases to incorporate MERCOSUR norms.20 With regard to human rights, labour rights are protected in Articles 6 and 7, and environmental rights are recognized in Articles 5/LXXIII and 225.21

Paraguay

This member state recognizes the supremacy of international treaties, confirmed by Articles 137 and 141 of the National Constitution of Paraguay (1992).22 With regard to the procedure for the incorporation of MERCOSUR

18 Article 84.The President of the Republic shall have the exclusive power to conclude interna-tional treaties, conventions and acts, ad referendum of the National Congress.

19 Also, the rules of MERCOSUR are conditional and depend on a complex act resulting from the combination of the competence of Parliament and the President. The President of the Republic celebrates international acts (Article 84. VIII of the Federal Constitution), while the Congress has the sole qualification to settle definitely on them (Article 49. I). The integration into the regulatory body also requires the enactment, the act that determines the standard of advertis-ing, by executive decree.

20 This is the case of those norms relating to MERCOSUR technical regulations.21 Article 225. All have the right to an ecologically balanced environment. which is an asset of

common use and essential to a healthy quality of life, and both the Government and the com-munity shall have the duty to defend and preserve it for present and future generations.

22 Article 137. The supreme law of the Republic is the Constitution. [The Constitution], the treaties, conventions and international agreements approved and ratified, the laws dic-tated by the Congress and other juridical provisions of inferior hierarchy, sanctioned in consequence, integrate the positive national law [derecho positivo] in the enounced order of preference [prelación].

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norms, it follows a process of shared competence between the Executive and Legislative branches, but with an emphasis on the consideration of interna-tional norms as superior to national norms.23 In this way, after following the legislative procedure established by the Constitution, MERCOSUR norms enter into force within the Paraguayan order as a constitutional or supra-legal norm. They may take the form of an act to amend the Constitution or any other form, indicating the special nature of the act in terms of keep-ing the status of the legislation transposed and applied within the national system. It should be noted that the Constitution of Paraguay states that any MERCOSUR norm, once incorporated by the Decree of the President, will assume the form of law with primacy over national legislation. Labour rights are recognized and protected in Article 86 and the right to environmental protection is addressed in Articles 7 and 8.24

uruguay

The Constitution of the Republic of Uruguay (1997) also foresees a procedure for the recognition of an international treaty or norm. According to Article 168, Paragraphs 20 and 85.7, the Executive branch may sign agree-ments or treaties which also require parliamentary ratification.25 There is some uncertainty around the validity of the rule after its adoption by the relevant authorities. The Uruguayan Constitution did not anticipate a solu-tion to this issue as there is no provision for the hierarchical position of in-ternational and MERCOSUR norms in the internal legal system. Additionally, Article 239 states that the Constitution represents the supreme law of the legal

23 In practice, the need for the adoption of acts by international law is not defined by the formal quality or the form of consultation that has been assigned, but given its content, is linked to legal nature of the rule.

24 Article 7. Of the Right to a Healthy Environment. Everyone has the right to live in a healthy and ecologically balanced [equilibrado] environment. The preservation, the conservation, the re-composition and the improvement of the environment, as well as its conciliation with the complete [integral] human development, constitute priority objectives of social interest. These purposes orient the legislation and the pertinent governmental policy.

25 Article 168. The President of the Republic, acting with the respective Minister or Ministers, or with the Council of Ministers, has the following duties: To conclude and sign treaties, the approval of the Legislative Power being necessary for their ratification.

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system, and as such all other laws must be consistent with it. The absence of an explicit provision to cover this area has led to a judicial interpretation which favours the treaty. However, the jurisprudence on the matter has not been harmonized in one sense, which causes even more uncertainty. With regard to the incorporation of the resulting norm, it can take the form of a law or an administrative act, depending on the subject. These may also include executive decrees, ministerial resolutions and ordinances. Labour rights are recognized in Article 53 and following articles and environmental rights are recognized in Article 47.26

venezuela

As for the Venezuelan constitutional provisions concerning community law, it must be underlined that the preamble of the Venezuelan Constitution (1999) recognizes regional integration as one of its main objectives (Brewer Carias and Kleinheisterkamp 2008). Furthermore, Article 153 foresees that “the Republic shall promote and encourage Latin American and Caribbean integra-tion in the interest of advancing towards the creation of a community of nations, defending the region’s economic, social, cultural, political and environmental interests,” whereas Article 154 states that treaties concluded by the Republic must be approved by the National Assembly before being ratified by the President. Once ratified, the treaties are incorporated into the internal legal order and have prevalence over national laws (Romero et al. 2003). According to these consti-tutional provisions (Articles 153-154), scholars agree on recognizing the features of self-execution and direct applicability in the case of norms emanating from the Andean Community (Petit and Caligiuri 2002). Therefore, this also seems to be mutatis mutandi the case of MERCOSUR norms currently applicable in

26 Article 53. Labor is under the legal protection of the law. It is the duty of every inhabitant of the Republic, without prejudice to his freedom, to apply his intellectual or physical energies in a manner which will redound to the benefit of the community, which will endeavor to afford him, with preference to citizens, the possibility of earning his livelihood through the development of some economic activity. Article 47. The protection of the environment is of common inter-est. Persons should abstain from any act that may cause the serious degradation, destruction or contamination of the environment. The law shall regulate this disposition and may provide sanctions for transgressors.

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the Venezuelan legal order. As for fundamental rights provisions, Articles 87-97 regulate on labour rights whereas Articles 127-129 contain detailed provisions relating to environmental rights.27

As one can observe, the absence of a real supranational law in MERCOSUR engenders hierarchical differences in terms of the internaliza-tion of rules: each member state is free to select the forms it considers most appropriate in order for the norm to enter into force (Olmos Giupponi 2010). This current system has a specific impact on MERCOSUR member states and the application of the different provisions concerning labour rights and environmental protection.

27 Chapter IX. Environmental Rights. Article 127: It is the right and duty of each genera-tion to protect and maintain the environment for its own benefit and that of the world of the future. Everyone has the right, individually and collectively, to enjoy a safe, healthy and ecologically balanced life and environment. The State shall protect the environ-ment, biological and genetic diversity, ecological processes, national parks and natural monuments, and other areas of particular ecological importance. The genome of a living being shall not be patentable, and the field shall be regulated by the law relating to the principles of bioethics. It is a fundamental duty of the State, with the active participa-tion of society, to ensure that the populace develops in a pollution-free environment in which air, water, soil, coasts, climate, the ozone layer and living species receive special protection, in accordance with law.

ConstitutionalRights

Argentina1853/1994

Brazil1988

Paraguay1992

Uruguay1997/2008

Venezuela1999

Labour rights Article 14 bis

Articles 6, 7

Article 86 and

followings

Article 53 and

followings

Articles 87-97

Right to environmental

protectionArticle 41

Articles 5/LXXIII and 225

Articles 7 and 8 Article 47 Articles

127-129

Table 2. Protection of Labour and Environmental Rights in MERCOSUR Member States’ Constitutions

(Source: compiled by the author)

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b. the implementation of Mercosur labour and environmental standards by domestic courts.

After having analysed the constitutional provisions of member states concerning international law and the protection of human rights, a closer look at the ways in which member states are implementing MERCOSUR labour and environmental standards is in order. The utilization of court processes and the subsequent enforcement of decisions as a case-by-case response to disputes be-tween private parties has contributed to the application of MERCOSUR norms at the national level.

As for labour rights, the Socio Labour Declaration represents an em-blematic case in terms of the application of MERCOSUR norms before domestic courts (Secretaría del MERCOSUR 2004). Even if the Declaration is not a bind-ing instrument, some domestic courts have applied it on a compulsory basis. For instance, in the ruling of the 6th National Labour Chamber (Argentina), the Declaration was applied as a binding norm in files involving workers’ rights (Secretaría del MERCOSUR. 2004, 2006a). In other cases before the same tribunal, the Declaration was deemed as having a higher status than domestic law because it relies on the Treaty of Asuncion and the provisions of Article 75, Paragraph 24 of the Argentine Constitution.

According to the different reports issued by the Secretariat on compliance with MERCOSUR Law, the Socio-Labour Declaration was the main MERCOSUR instrument invoked by different national courts when dealing with work-related disputes (1st and 2nd Report on the application of MERCOSUR norms, 2003 and 2004, respectively). In sum, the Declaration was applied to grant protection to workers on the following matters:

S Right to work and decent conditions of work S Interpretation of national norms in the light of international human

rights instruments, particularly the Pact of San José de Costa Rica and the Socio Labour Declaration

S Job security and dignity, as highlighted and protected in the MERCOSUR Socio Labour Declaration

S Unregistered work as a subtle discrimination in light of Article 1 of the Declaration, in cases where the affected workers were separated from the rest of the workers and marginalized from the social security system

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S Freedom of association in its various positive and negative aspects, as reflected in various ILO conventions and protected in the region by the Declaration (Secretaría del MERCOSUR 2004).

With regard to the application of MERCOSUR law on the protection of the environment and public health, the rulings of different courts at the national level show how these judicial bodies have been dealing with envi-ronmental protection in different ways. As a general feature in terms of the enforcement of international environmental legislation, in Latin America there is a generalized problem concerning the lack of enforcement of envi-ronmental legislation (Nolet 1998; INECE 2005). MERCOSUR member states are not the exception to this rule.

Bearing this in mind, there are cases in which internal courts have applied MERCOSUR law to the protection of the environment and public health, such as in the case of Kraft Food Argentina (Secretaría del MERCOSUR 2006a).28 There have also been cases regarding the application of the Agreement on the Carriage of Dangerous Goods, for instance, the ruling of the Brazilian Federal Court of the 5th Region (2004).29 In this case, the internal court decided that member states can establish restrictions on the circulation of goods on the basis of the right to protect the environment (Secretaría del MERCOSUR 2006a).

In Brazil, the application of MERCOSUR regulations on the importation of retreaded tyres has led to various judgements, both at the regional and federal level, dealing with the protection of the environment.30 The litigation in these cases centred around the restrictions imposed on imports of retreaded tyres based on environmental concerns (for more detail see the section below). In such cases, internal courts applied MERCOSUR regulations, MERCOSUR awards and international norms concerning the protection of the environment (Secretaría del MERCOSUR 2004).

The implementation of MERCOSUR norms does not depict an optimistic scenario. On the one hand, due to the lack of an appropriate system to guarantee compliance with these norms, it is almost impossible to determine their practical

28 See “Kraft Food Argentina s/Recurso de Apelación c/disposición N`016/03 DSA.”29 See, for instance, Tribunal Federal de la 5ta Región, Sala 2 de 31 de agosto de 2004.30 See, for instance Tribunal Regional de la 2da Región, 2 Sala, Agravo de instrumento N 111.929/RJ.

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effects. On the other hand, the issue of inefficiency is related to a wider web of actors and other political and economic questions which are beyond the scope of this article. Likewise, when considering solutions, there are a range of issues and parties to consider. The populist approaches often bear little rela-tionship to the reality of social problems. This is because knowledge about the implementation of norms is often incomplete. To complicate matters further, the protection of rights and the issue of inequality in the region are closely entangled.

3. Free Trade and the Protection of Constitutional Rights: Human Rights Issues in MERCOSUR Arbitration Awards

The relationship between trade and non-trade issues (mainly human rights) has also been addressed in the MERCOSUR dispute settlement system. With regard to the potential scope for future development in terms of the protection of human rights, the Inter American Court of Human Rights already has competence in this field; the protection of human rights by MERCOSUR institutions could therefore only arise within the scope of MERCOSUR legislation. Up to the present day, the claims based on the protection of human rights submitted in the arbitration proce-dure only reflect the impact of trade liberalization on specific rights.

In MERCOSUR the compliance with the law of integration is guaranteed through arbitration. The procedure takes place before an ad hoc arbitration tri-bunal. In 2002, the Olivos Protocol established a Permanent Tribunal of Review (in function since 2004), which is in charge of the appeal and interpretation of the awards issued by the ad hoc tribunals. In general terms, the arbitration proce-dure concerns the settlement of commercial disputes excluding non-trade issues. Furthermore, the complaint procedure is mainly available to member states. It is extremely difficult for natural and legal persons to participate in the arbitration procedure. As Cárdenas and Tempesta point out:

[T]he role played by individuals is quite limited because, although they can start the proceedings and will always be heard, they can do nothing if their claims are dismissed. […] Member states are the ones who have, at all times, control of the proceedings and who, at their discretion, decide whether to resort to the Arbitration Tribunal if the controversy persists. (2001, 345)

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In recent years, MERCOSUR arbitration tribunals have analysed en-vironmental matters and human rights issues argued by member states in different disputes. In these cases, the arbitration tribunals solved the disputes from a traditional international economic law perspective: the applicable principle was free trade and environmental and human rights issues were considered as exceptions to that principle (Olmos Giupponi 2011). In some cases, MERCOSUR arbitral tribunals had to ascertain the various aspects involved in the protection of the environment in the context of economic integration. The object of various awards31 was the application of the envi-ronmental exception. In other words, different tribunals had to come to a decision about whether the restrictions to free trade, with the objective of protecting the environment, were admissible or not.

In Award No. 1/2005 of the Permanent Tribunal of Review, concerning the dispute on Argentina’s ban on the importation of retreaded tyres from Uruguay,32 the Tribunal made clear that:

This tribunal notes that it is wrong to suggest that there are two prin-ciples in conf lict or confrontation in the process of integration, as seems to be stated in paragraph 55 of the award under appeal. There is only one principle (free trade) to which some exceptions can be ap-plied (such as, for example, the above-mentioned environmental excep-tion). Furthermore, this tribunal does not agree with the arguments put forward in paragraph 55 (final part) of the award under appeal, according to which the tribunal should apply the application of the

31 There were three different awards on the same issue (“importation of retreaded tyres”): Arbitration Award 10/2005 (Laudo Arbitral) (in favour of Argentina, overthrown by the Permanent Court of Review); Award No. 1/2005 of the Permanent Court of Review constituted to hear the appeal made by the Eastern Republic of Uruguay against the 25th October 2005 Arbitration Award of the Ad Hoc Tribunal concerning the dispute “Prohibition of the importation of retreaded tyres from Uruguay;” and Award No. 1/2008 of the Permanent Court of Review in the Case No. 1/2008 “Divergence on the implementation of Award No. 1/05 initiated by the Eastern Republic of Uruguay (Article 30, Olivos Protocol).”

32 The Permanent Tribunal of Review addressed the appeal made by the Republic of Uruguay against the 25 October 2005 Arbitration Award of MERCOSUR ad hoc Tribunal.

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above-mentioned confronted principles (free trade and environmental protection) by defining the precedence of one over the other in ac-cordance with the precepts of international law. For this tribunal, the relevant issue is the possibility of invoking the environmental excep-tion under the Mercosur rules and not under international law (sic).

Again, in Award No. 1/2008 of the Permanent Tribunal of Review in the Case “Divergence on the implementation of Award No. 1/05 initiated by the Oriental Republic of Uruguay (Article 30 Olivos Protocol),” the Tribunal recalled:

There are not two principles in conflict or confrontation […] There is only one principle (free trade), and […] some exceptions (such as the aforemen-tioned environmental exception).

In this dispute, Argentina held, on the relationship between environment and trade, that:

Argentina’s law (prohibiting the importation of remoulded tyres) was not only consistent with the laws of MERCOSUR, but also meant a step forward to achieve the welfare of the peoples of the region through the protection of the environment and the health of humans, animals and plants that inhabit its territory. (Section B, page 3.)

The law in question was presented as a preventive measure aimed at avoid-ing potential harm caused by the use of retreaded tyres as a result of the cost, difficulty and level of risk involved in disposing of these tyres. The Permanent Tribunal of Review determined that the exception based upon environmental is-sues was not applicable in this case:

[…] Argentina has presented a long list and reasons related to the problem from the environmental point of view arguing that “the importation of re-manufactured tires (including remoulded) to Argentina, increases the risk for life and health of people, animals and plants.” […] However, the view already expressed by Award

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1/2005 does not agree with this assertion by arguing that “the alleged injury at the discretion of the TPR is not serious or irreversible.” (n. 17) […] Adopting a rigid criterion on certain points raised by Argentina would allow the prohibition of importing a large amount of materials in which toxicity, compared with the tyres, could be much higher, such as batteries, cell phones, MP3s, cans, aluminium, tergopor (sic), plastics in general and especially certain species such as the PET material polyethylene (PET), to mention only a few prod-ucts […] many of which require between 100 to 1000 years to degrade naturally, in the meantime constituting to a greater or lesser extent an element that involves potential environmental damage. (Laudo No. 1/2008, Point C)

However, the Tribunal of Review underlined that the environmental ex-ceptions to free trade “should be discussed in the future by relevant MERCOSUR bodies” (Laudo No. 1/2008, Point C).

In Award 9/2006 on the dispute between Uruguay and Argentina con-cerning the interruption of the international bridges between the two states, the ad hoc arbitration tribunal addressed the conflict between free trade/free movement of persons and goods and the principle of the protection of hu-man rights. In its arguments, Uruguay mentioned that the free movement of persons is a principle to be respected and that the roadblocks ignored existing commitments between the parties under international legal instruments. In particular, Uruguay mentioned the International Land Transport Agreement existing between the “countries of the Southern Cone,” including other state parties, considered by MERCOSUR instruments as an important goal in terms of advancing integration in the transportation sector. The obstruction of the free movement of passengers and loads provoked by the demonstra-tions against the installation of the pulp mill affected transport operations under the Convention not only between MERCOSUR member states but also with regard to movements to or from third-country parties to this Agreement. Uruguay also mentioned the rules of the WTO which bind the parties, such as those relating to the treatment of most favoured nation, freedom of movement, and access to markets, among others, which were affected by the

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measures reported. In conclusion, Uruguay alleged that Argentina had failed to adopt effective measures to end this situation.

Argentina argued that a conflict existed between the right to free ex-pression of thought and assembly, on the one hand, and the right to the free movement of goods, on the other hand. In this case, Argentina emphasized that international human rights standards in force in Argentina have consti-tutional status, while the integration norms are of legal status. In Argentina’s view, human rights concerns may justify a restriction to the exercise of rights under an integration agreement. In order to support its argument, Argentina mentioned the precedent of the Schmidberger case (Case 112/00) decided by the Court of Justice of the European Union, in terms of prioritizing the right to free expression of thought over the right to free movement of goods, which was affected by the blocking of an international motorway by demonstrations. The Tribunal pointed out that:

In multilateral agreements on trade facilitation, with special reference to the WTO […] the harmonization of the rights in conf lict without considering the commitments made under such agreements is ex-tremely difficult or impossible, because they relied on principles and values accepted by the international community. It is inevitable that the solution of safeguarding interests and values of higher rank should be chosen, because “legal rights” are more valuable objects and could be classified hierarchically in a preferred position. However, the Tribunal considers that […] this solution would allow some degree of restric-tion but not the absolute cancellation of the value which is considered minor, in the interests of another to be judged more important. (Laudo Arbitral 9/2006, par. 133)

Furthermore, the Tribunal stated that:

The traffic restriction […] leads to a restriction on the free movement within the integrated economic space. It can be tolerated provided that the necessary precautions were taken to minimize the inconvenience caused by them and to be adopted in short periods that do not interfere

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or cause serious injury, which has not been given in this case in which the courts have delayed the solution […] with serious consequences for both countries. (par. 134)

The Tribunal examined the Argentine position, underlining the fact that the international human rights treaties with positions of constitutional hierarchy recognize the relativity of individual rights before the individual rights of others and the possibility of limiting these on general welfare grounds. The Tribunal concluded that:

[…] even if according to Argentine law, the right to protest is absolute […] it must be limited when it affects the rights of others as expressed in art. 29 paragraph 2 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 32 para-graph 2 of the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights and, in particu-lar, regarding freedom of expression, art. 19 paragraphs 2 and 3 and art. 21 of the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 19 December 1966, which are an integral part of the Constitution of Argentina since 1994, having been incorporated into art. 75 paragraph 22. (pars. 137-139)

Finally, the Tribunal considered that Argentina had not respected its obliga-tion to limit the demonstrations by adopting appropriate measures. For the very first time, a tribunal in the framework of MERCOSUR referred to human rights standards as limiting to free trade and the free movement of people and goods.

Conclusions

As in other FTAs, MERCOSUR provisions on human rights are narrower in scope and in terms of implementation and enforcement than the countries’ respective domestic legal orders. Within MERCOSUR there has been an evolution towards a more protective framework for labour and environmental rights articu-lated on the basis of the adoption of specific norms (mainly soft law instruments). The Socio Labour Declaration represents a successful example of this trend: do-mestic courts have applied the Declaration, in certain cases drawing on the supra-legal hierarchy in order to protect workers’ rights. Furthermore, MERCOSUR

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environmental standards are also applied to settle disputes in order to safeguard the environment and public health at the domestic level.

With regard to the relationship between trade and human rights at the sub-regional level, MERCOSUR arbitration awards seem to suggest that human rights are penetrating commercial issues. The ad hoc Arbitration Tribunal in the case of Award 9/2006 left open the possibility that in the future human rights protection could represent a limit to free trade.

In a critical appraisal of the enforcement of the different standards, the empirical evidence available up to the present day demonstrates that the implementation of regional and international norms at the national level constitutes the main obstacle faced by member states. Despite the advance-ments experienced, MERCOSUR legislation is, in most cases, soft law, so the responsibility for compliance rests with each member state. One may wonder, then, what is the main contribution of MERCOSUR to the protection of la-bour and environmental rights? In my opinion, the different measures taken at the subregional level are contributing to the voluntary enforcement of these standards. A clear example is the lack of enforcement of environmental norms, which present a legal framework for public and private actors (both individu-als and corporations) in order to comply with norms dealing with environ-mental protection both at the domestic and international level.

To conclude, there are still many challenges that MERCOSUR must ad-dress. The main one is to increase the protection of labour and environmental rights at the sub-regional level and to further foster the enforcement and com-pliance of the standards at the domestic level. In this regard, member states (which have primary responsibility for the protection of human rights) often face different obstacles such as the lack of adequate administrative machinery and, ultimately, political willingness.

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2. Bruni, Jorge. 2004. Los órganos socio-laborales del MERCOSUR: historia y estado actual de la cuestión. International Labour Organization. [Online] http://white.oit.org.pe/spanish/260ameri/oitreg/activid/proyectos/actrav/proyectos/pdf/dec_soclabor.pdf

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12. Macedo Franca, Alessandra. 2010. MERCOSUR and Environmental Law. In The Law of MERCOSUR, eds. Marcílio Franca Filho, Lucas Lixinsk, and María Belen Olmos Giupponi, 225-240. London: Hart Publishing.

13. Moavro, Horacio. 1997. Un nuevo órgano del Mercosur: el Foro Consultivo Económico-Social. Revista de Relaciones Internacionales. 12. [Online] http://www.iri.edu.ar/revistas/revista_dvd/revistas/R12/R12-EMOA.html

14. Nolet, Gil. 1998. Environmental Enforcement in Latin America and the Caribbean. INECE, Inter-American Bank. [Online] http://www.inece.org/5thvol2/nolet.pdf

15. Olmos Giupponi, María Belén. 2012. International Law and Sources of Law in MERCOSUR: An Analysis of a Twenty Year Telationship. Leiden Journal of In-ternational Law 25 (03): 707-737.

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16. Olmos Giupponi, María Belén. 2011. International Economic Law and Sources of Law in MERCOSUR: An Analysis of a Fifteen Year Relationship. Paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Meeting, Montreal.

17. Olmos Giupponi, María Belén. 2010. Sources of Law. In The Law of MERCOSUR, eds. Marcílio Franca Filho, Lucas Lixinsk, and María Belen Olmos Giupponi, 57-71. London: Hart Publishing.

18. Olmos Giupponi, María Belén. 2006. Derechos humanos e integración en América Latina y el Caribe. Valencia: Tirant Lo Blanch.

19. Perotti, Daniel. 2004. Habilitación constitucional para la integración co-munitaria: estudio sobre los Estados del MERCOSUR. Montevideo: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.

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21. Romero, Carlos A., María Teresa Romero, and Elsa Cardozo. 2003. La política exterior en las constituciones de 1961 y 1999: una visión comparada de sus principios, procedimientos y temas. Revista Venezolana de Economia y Ciencias Sociales 9 (1): 163-183.

22. Schaeffer, Kristi. 2007. MERCOSUR and Labor Rights: The Comparative Strengths of Sub-Regional Trade Agreements in Developing and Enforcing Labor Standards in Latin American States. Journal of Transnational Law 45 (3): 829-867.

23. Stern, Robert M. 2003. Labor Standards and Trade Agreements. Research Semi-nar in International Economics. The University of Michigan. Ann Arbor, Michi-gan. Discussion Paper No. 496. [Online] http://www.fordschool.umich.edu/rsie/workingpapers/Papers476-500/r496.pdf

24. Tirado Mejía, Álvaro. 1997. Integración y democracia en América Latina y el Caribe. BID-INTAL. Documento de Divulgación 1. [Online] http://www.plata-formademocratica.org/Publicacoes/7038_Cached.pdf

Protocols and Treaties25. Tratado de Asunción. 1991. Tratado para la constitución de un mercado común

entre la República Argentinca, la República Federativa de Brasil, la República del Paraguay y la República Oriental del Uruguay.

26. Protocolo de Ouro Preto. 1994. Protocolo adicional al Tratado de Asunción sobre la estructura institucional del Mercosur.

27. Acuerdo Marco sobre Medio Ambiente del Mercosur. 200128. Protocolo de Olivos para la solución de controversias en el Mercosur. 2002.

Tribunal Arbitral Ad Hoc29. Laudo Arbitral 10/2005. Laudo dictado por el Tribunal Arbitral constituido

para solucionar la controversia surgida entre la República Oriental del Uruguay (en adelante denominada “parte reclamante”, “reclamante” o “Uruguay”) y la

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República Argentina (en adelante denominada “parte reclamada”, “reclamada” o “Argentina”), que versa sobre la “Prohibición de importación de neumáticos remoldeados”, 25 octubre 2005.

30. Laudo Arbitral 9/2006. Laudo del Tribunal Ad Hoc de Mercosur consitutido para entender de la controversia presentada por la República Oriental del Uruguay a la República Argentina sobre “Omisión del Estado Argentino en adoptar medidas apropiadas para prevenir y/o hacer cesar los impedimentos a la libre circulación derivados de los cortes en el territorio argentino de vías de acceso a los puentes internacionales Gral. San Martín y Gral. Artigas que unen a la República Argentina con la República Oriental del Uruguay”, 6 de septiembre 2006.

Tribunal Permanente de Revisión31. Laudo No. 1/2005. Laudo del Tribunal Permanente de Revisión constituido

para entender en el recurso de revisión presentado por la República Oriental del Uruguay contra el Laudo Arbitral del Tribunal Arbitral Ad Hoc de fecha 25 de octubre de 2005 en la controversia “Prohibicion de importación de neumáticos remoldeados procedentes del Uruguay”, 20 diciembre 2005.

32. Laudo No. 1/2008. Laudo del Tribunal Permanente de Revisión en el asunto No. 1/2008 “Divergencia sobre el cumplimiento del Laudo No. 1/2005 iniciada por la República Oriental del Uruguay (Art. 30, Protocolo de Olivos)”, 25 abril 2008.

Other documents33. Secretaría del MERCOSUR. 2004. Primer informe sobre la aplicación del

derecho del MERCOSUR por los tribunales nacionales (2003). Montevideo: Secretaría del MERCOSUR, Fundación Konrad Adenauer, Foro Permanente de Cortes Supremas del Mercosur y Asociados. [Online] http://www.merco-sur.int/innovaportal/file/740/1/infome_derecho_mercosur2003.pdf

34. Secretaría del MERCOSUR. 2006a. Segundo informe sobre la aplicación del derecho del MERCOSUR por los tribunales nacionales (2004). Montevideo: Secretaría del MERCOSUR, Fundación Konrad Adenauer. [Online] http://www.mercosur.int/innovaportal/file/734/1/2infaplicaciondermcs.pdf

35. Secretaría del MERCOSUR. 2006b. Medio ambiente en el MERCOSUR, Montevideo: Secretaría del MERCOSUR, Sector de Asesoría Técnica. [On-line] http://www.mercosur.int/innovaportal/file/736/1/medioambienteenel-mercosur.pdf

National Constitutions36. Constitution of Argentina (1994).37. Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (1999).38. Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil (1988).39. Constitution of Paraguay (1992).40. Constitution of Uruguay (1997).

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Other Sentences41. Superior Tribunal de Justicia del Chubut, “Kraft Food Argentina S.A. s/Recurso

de Apelación c/Disposición No. 016/03 DSA”, expediente No. 19.364-K-2003, sentencia No. 6/04.

Court of Justice of the European Union - Judgments and Opinions of the Court

42. Case 26/62. 1963. Van Gend en Loos v Administratie der Belastingen. ECR, 1.43. Case 6/64. 1964. Costa v E.N.E.L. ECR, 585.44. Case 112/00. 2003. Schmidberger. ECR, I-05659.

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María Belén olmos Giupponi holds a PhD in Law, a Masters in Human Rights from Universidad Carlos III (Spain) and a Masters in International Relations from the Advanced Studies Centre (Argentina). Currently, she is a Lecturer at the University of Stirling (Scotland). Her research has been featured in journals in the fields of economic integration and cooperation, human rights and environmental law. She was a Max Weber Postdoctoral Fellow at the European University Institute (2007-2009) and, previously, a Research Fellow at the Istituto di Studi Giuridici Internazionali, Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, (Intaly) in 2006 and at the Centre de Recherche sur les Identités Nationales et l’Interculturalité (CRINI) of the University of Nantes (France) in 2005. She is the author and editor of various books, including The Law of MERCOSUR (co-edited with Marcílio Franca Filho and Lucas Lixinski), Oxford and Portland: Hart, 2010.E-mail: [email protected]

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Addressing Human Rights in the Court of Justice of the Andean Community and the Tribunal of the Southern African Development Community

Giovanni Molano-CruzUniversidad Sergio Arboleda (Colombia)

Stephen KingahUNU-CRIS (Belgium)

DOI: dx.doi.org/10.7440/colombiaint81.2014.04RECEIVED: November 28, 2012ACCEPTED: April 3, 2013REVISED: February 10, 2014

ABSTRACT: The article compares how the regional tribunals of the Andean Community (CAN) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have dealt with human rights issues in order to explore options for South-South judicial cooperation through adjudicative cross-fertilization, while taking into account specificities that characterize both regions. In doing so, focus is placed on four elements: a) the scope of human rights covered by each of the regional tribunals; b) the locus standi of individuals before the tribunals; c) the added value of the regional tribunals; and d) the restrictive role of politics in the functioning of the tribunals.

KEYWORDS: regional tribunals • interregional cooperation • human rights • Tribunal of Justice of the Andean Community • Tribunal of the Southern African Development Community

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The article is the culmination of a collaborative Jean Monnet Project funded by the European Union (EU) Commission. The project explored the tensions between free trade agreements (FTAs) and constitutional rights. Most of these constitutional rights include social and economic ones such as the right to food, shelter, health and water. In many instances courts at both the national and regional levels are keen to uphold these rights.

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los derechos humanos en el tribunal de Justicia de la comunidad andina y el tribunal de la comunidad de desarrollo del África austral

RESUMEN: El artículo compara cómo han resuelto disputas sobre derechos humanos los tribunales regionales de la Comunidad Andina (CAN) y la Comunidad de Desarrollo del África Meridional (SADC). La comparación se hace con el fin de explorar opciones de cooperación judicial Sur-Sur. Se pone énfasis, entonces, en cuatro elementos: a) el alcance de los derechos humanos que abarca cada tribunal; b) el locus standi de los particulares; c) el valor añadido de los tribunales regionales y d) el papel restrictivo de la política en el funcionamiento de los mismos.

PALABRAS CLAVE: tribunales regionales • cooperación interregional • derechos humanos • Tribunal de Justicia de la Comunidad Andina • Tribunal de la Comunidad para el Desarrollo del África Meridionalr

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os direitos humanos no tribunal de Justiça da comunidade andina e o tribunal da comunidade de desenvolvimento da África austral

RESUMO: Este artigo compara como os tribunais regionais da Comunidade Andina (CAN) e a Comunidade de Desenvolvimento da África Austral (SADC, por sua sigla em inglês) têm resolvido disputas sobre direitos humanos. A comparação se faz a fim de explorar opções de cooperação judicial Sul-Sul. Enfatizam-se, então, quatro elementos: a) o alcance dos direitos humanos que abrange cada tribunal; b) o locus standi dos particulares; c) o valor agregado dos tribunais regionais e d) o papel restritivo da política no funcionamento destes.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: direitos humanos • Tribunal de Justiça da Comunidade Andina • Tribunal da Comunidade de Desenvolvimento da África Austral • integração regional • tribunais regionais

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Introduction1

The number of organizations created to foster regional integration has sig-nificantly increased since 1990. The “new” feature of what is known as “new” regionalism is the marked rise in the number of these institutions and arrange-ments that cover a wide variety of thematic issues that go beyond the traditional concept of economic integration. This development is one of the main traits of contemporary regionalism. Contemporary regionalism has, moreover, been characterized by the receptiveness of regional organizations to human rights precepts. The pursuit of human rights is considered as an objective in the trea-ties of many regional bodies. It appears that the drafters of such provisions craft these clauses as a matter of ritual. However, in those regional entities with ac-tive civil societies characterized by constitutional consciousness, regional poli-cies are being forged to activate and fully use these treaty provisions on human rights. In this article, the focus will be on how the regional courts in the South, in particular, the tribunals of the Andean Community (CAN, from its Spanish initials) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), have adjudicated on matters that pertain to human rights. It is important to evalu-ate how these entities, which were initially created with the goal of economic integration, have broadened their mandate over the years to entertain cases that hinge on human rights issues. This is important for a number of reasons.

Firstly, it provides an understanding of how willing regional courts may be to expand their mandates. Secondly, it indicates how politics still remains vital in judicial processes. In other words, even if the regional judicial authori-ties are boldly prepared to widen their mandates, this has to be understood within the clear limits of what is politically acceptable. However, in order to gain a broader vision, it is important to examine the role of the courts in re-gional integration in the South from the angle of human rights because regional integration cannot be an end in itself. It has to serve a purpose, and how better to examine whether these (human) purposes are being served than through the prism of a human rights perspective?

1 The authors are grateful to the reviewers and editors of Colombia Internacional for their useful comments.

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The approach used in this article draws on international human rights law and international political economy. From the perspective of international human rights law, it draws on the global and regional human rights norms that have been adopted by states to explain their patterns of behaviour. Allusion is also made to the dicta of international courts. These developments cannot be separated from the international political economic context wherein developing countries turn to specific sets of rights to en-hance their interests and claims in the global economic context dominated by neo-liberal inclinations.

We have selected two regions from the South for two reasons. Firstly, we seek to identify the patterns, trends and dynamics shared by the CAN and the SADC. What lessons can be drawn from the human rights protection experiences of these entities and what do the experiences of the courts tell us about the future of judicial activism at the regional level? This is important because it also offers the opportunity to identify potential areas for the cross-fertilization of approaches. In other words, how can South-South cooperation in judicial matters be increased in the area of human rights especially at the regional level? Secondly, there ap-pears to be a major dearth or even gap in international legal scholarship on the collation or juxtaposition of shared or comparable regional judicial experiences from regions in the South.

The article proceeds as follows. The next part examines some of the major political developments in both regions. Considering that regional courts cannot be dissociated from the global tapestry of adjudicative bod-ies, in section two we analyse the architecture of regional courts within the context of the proliferation of international courts and tribunals. In section three we outline the rules governing the respective tribunals, while the major human rights cases heard before the regional tribunals of the CAN and the SADC are presented in section four. Finally, in section five, we draw and analyse trends from these cases. This is done in view of gaining a better un-derstanding of elements such as the scope of human rights covered by each of the regional tribunals; the locus standi of individuals before the tribunals; the added value of the regional tribunals as such; and the restrictive role of politics for the tribunals.

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Addressing Human Rights in the CAN and the SADCGiovanni Molano-Cruz • Stephen Kingah

1. Political Issues in Both Regions

Composed of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru, the CAN is a regional economic integration organization created in 1969 following the endorsement of the Cartagena Agreement. Initially, it was composed of Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. Venezuela delayed joining the agreement until 1973. In 1976, the Chilean military dictatorship announced its withdrawal from the Cartagena Agreement. Thirty years later Venezuela left the organization to join the Mercado Común del Sur (Mercosur) in 2012. Despite the extreme fragility of the political links between CAN members during the last decade, the institutional structure of the Andean integration organization is unanimously considered to be the most robust of all the in-tegration processes in Latin America and the Caribbean. Andean countries and CAN institutions have played a crucial role in structuring the most recent Latin American regional integration experiences. In fact, the Andean region-alism process has always gone hand in hand with Latin American integra-tion movements (Molano-Cruz 2011). On the other f lank of the Atlantic, the SADC was created in 1992 to replace the Southern African Development Coordination Conference that was formed in 1981 as a regional response by Frontline States to resist the adverse policies of the South African Apartheid governments. The goals of the organization are the realization of sustainable economic growth, the provision of support for the socially disadvantaged and the promotion of common values through democratic and legitimate institutions, as well as the consolidation of democracy, security and sta-bility (SADC 1992, Article 1(a)-(c); Smis and Kingah 2009). In 2010, the SADC became a free trade area. Plans to attain a customs union by 2010 proved to be overly ambitious. The SADC consists of fifteen member states: Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.2

2 Since 2009, Madagascar has been suspended following an unconstitutional takeover of government.

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Both regions share important traits when we examine the question of overlapping memberships, wrangling in leadership and ties with the main regional power. Overlapping memberships are a common issue in both regions. In South America there are many regional organizations that are closely linked to political relations and alliances between given lead-ers. Besides the CAN, South America contains the Mercado Común del Sur (Mercosur), the Unión de Naciones de América del Sur (Unasur), the Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América (ALBA) and, most recently, the Alianza del Pácifico. In Southern Africa there are also many instances of overlaps as some SADC States also belong to the East African Community (EAC), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC). The motives and interests for preserving over-lapping institutions vary in both regions. In those instances where overlaps have been regarded as too overwhelming, as in the case of African regional economic communities, there are now efforts led at the continental level to better rationalize the regional entities into building blocks that would even-tually form a bigger African Economic Community (the AEC) due in 2028 (Bridges Africa 2012; UNECA 2012).

Wrangling in leadership is also common in both regions. In the past there have been some differences between the government of ex-president Álvaro Uribe of Colombia and the governments of Venezuela and Ecuador. However, this is changing since president Juan Manuel Santos came to power. While the leadership divide in the region appears to be more personal than ideological, political ideologies have played an important role in shaping how leaders perceive the purpose of regional integration. One of the reasons of-fered by Venezuela for leaving the CAN was that president Hugo Chávez be-lieved the decision of Colombia and Peru to sign FTAs with the USA rendered the CAN weak. There have also been leadership disputes in Southern Africa, although these have mainly revolved around events in Zimbabwe and the question of how the region should respond to the humanitarian challenges this country has endured for many years. While some leaders, such as former South African president Thabo Mbeki, have adopted a more conciliatory ap-proach, others, including president Ian Khama of Botswana, have been very

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outspoken against the president of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, and have ap-peared frustrated with the SADC’s weakness in addressing the human rights abuses that have been taking place in the country.

Both regions behave differently when dealing with the supposed regional powers. Some of the member states in the respective regional or-ganizations have explicit or implicit ambitions to lead the regions. In South America, efforts to reclaim leadership positions occur at different levels. In all of these efforts, Brazil stands out even if Venezuela, Colombia and Argentina are also important players in certain areas. For instance, Colombia has clearly been a leading nation within the CAN and events in the country tend to directly affect the other three members of the organization. This is the same scenario in Southern Africa, where South Africa is a leading nation both within Southern Africa and in the continent as a whole.

In the two regions, external influences both from the US, the European Union (EU) and increasingly from China cannot be dismissed. It is interesting to note that the perceived leaders in both regions, Colombia and South Africa, are close allies of the US, even if the latter has also shown a keen interest in allowing greater Chinese inroads into Africa.

2. Proliferation of International and Regional Adjudicative Bodies

Today, regionalism is not only characterized by a diversity in themes (se-curity, cultural cooperation, the environment and human rights) and new forms of actors (corporations, social organizations and individuals). It is also character-ized by a marked proliferation of regional institutions such as regional courts and tribunals, particularly in Africa, Latin America and Europe, Asia is lagging in this regard From a neo-functionalist perspective, some scholars have argued that com-munity law would spill over into new legal domains as litigants realise that regional courts’ precedents can apply to a broad range of issues (Burley and Mattli 1993). At the global level, a normative structure for international trade also encourages the construction of new rules, which leads to new cases, which create additional opportunities for litigation and the expansion of norms (Stone Sweet 1999). The propagation of regional courts and tribunals, including the creation of those in South America and Africa, cannot be understood in a vacuum. This proliferation

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has been taking place within the context of a noticeable increase in the number of international courts and tribunals both at the regional and global levels. However, the creation of many courts and tribunals in itself is a symptom of a subtler phe-nomenon: the fragmentation of the international legal order. This fragmentation is now characterized by a myriad of regimes in specific legal and thematic areas as well as in specific regions.

In terms of courts and tribunals, there has been increased activity in dispute settlement by judicial organs that have global jurisdiction. These include the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which has general jurisdiction; the World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Body, which handles commerce-related litigation; the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, which has general jurisdiction on matters pertaining to the law of the sea; and the International Criminal Court (ICC), which is the forum for proceedings relating to serious crimes. Below these global courts and tribunals (albeit in the absence of any prescribed constitutional hierarchy) are an assortment of regional courts and tribunals that have jurisdiction to apply regional norms that may relate to trade and human rights questions.

While the creation of more courts and tribunals may appear to be anodyne, this is arguably not the case; besides the issue of costs, the prolif-eration of specialized or regional courts and tribunals raises critical concerns regarding the spread of incoherence in the international legal order (Spelliscy 2001, 152). As Thomas Franck argues, the problem with incoherence in the in-ternational legal system is that it dampens the legitimacy of the international legal order (Franck 1988). What is more, while the effectiveness of the inter-national legal system may be hard to measure (Shany 2010), it has nonetheless been contended that an incoherent legal system may significantly weaken its effectiveness and validity (Kelsen 1992, 62).

The more practical dangers raised by the proliferation of courts and tribunals are described aptly by Joost Pauwelyn (2003), who notes that such problems are raised when two international tribunals or courts arrive at differ-ent conclusions to decisions based on the same issue or similar facts. For him, such a development may lead to a dent in the predictability of international law (2003, 114-115). The fallout in terms of legal certainty cannot be measured. These concerns have thus far proved rather academic and some scholars see little cause

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for concern given that international courts can and do exchange experiences, particularly as the ICJ can coordinate the operations of regional courts if needed (Abi-Saab 1999, 926-928; Dupuy 1999, 807). Charney is even more upbeat, argu-ing that the proliferation of courts is actually a welcome development (1998, 347). Such proliferation becomes even more appealing if we regard it as a catalyst for competition amongst the courts and tribunals, which in turn will allow for decent engagement and a “race to the top” in terms of international adjudication.

The proliferation of courts mirrors a deeper issue in international law as a whole. This is the issue of fragmentation or the perceived sundering of inter-national regulation due to the multiplicity of thematic areas into which interna-tional norms are expanding. In one sense, this is a process that cannot be avoided, mindful of the ever-expanding challenges that the world faces and given that cooperation appears to be the only viable solution to addressing these problems. It is in this sense that matters relating to the seas or international waters, trade, the environment, migration, health, human trafficking and terrorism, amongst others, cry out for collective approaches and common solutions. With regard to how these matters should be addressed, there is a global consensus that is fre-quently embodied in international norms and agreements. International law now encompasses a wide array of areas that go well beyond the traditional themes of state responsibility, state succession, immunity and territoriality, amongst others, to encapsulate a broad range of thematic issues. This can be attributed to a global or regional desire to solve common challenges (Brownlie 1987). Given this reality, the international legal order can be subject to a variety of both horizontal and vertical antinomies (Salmon 1965, 285). Such antinomies are largely explained by the fact that the various areas or fields of law, including trade, energy and secu-rity, are highly interdependent (Hafner 2002).

In the view of some scholars, fragmentation presents a significant chal-lenge (Tammelo 1965, 347). The main issue that is often identified is the danger of opposition between norms. The central UN entity that drafts international treaties, the International Law Commission, has asserted that such situations may arise between conflicting general norms; disputing general and special norms; and finally quarrelling special norms relating to specific fields or areas (Koskenniemi 2003). Much as in the debate on the proliferation of courts and tribunals, there is a general view that the discussion on fragmentation is also

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rather academic. Some jurists take for granted that conflicts within the inter-national legal system are simply unavoidable (Rousseau 1932, 191-192; Jenks 1954, 451; Fischer-Lescano and Teubner 2004, 1004). Others are disinclined to regard the issue as a problem (Pauwelyn 2004, 904), especially if aspects such as trade, human rights, security and energy, amongst others, are seen as being part of a whole rather than as compartmentalized issues (Delmas-Marty 2003, 27). Bearing all these positions in mind, it is important and helpful to note that international law itself contains specific conflict of norms resolu-tion principles that can be used as handy tools to avert conflicts. These are contained in the following Latin maxims: lex speciali derogat lege generali (special norms take precedence over general ones); lex posterior derogat lege priori (rules that are issued later in time take precedence); and lex posterior generalis non derogat lege prior speciali (special rules take precedence even over later general norms). This notwithstanding, a customary rule of ius co-gens always takes precedence over a treaty even if the former is generalis or prior (Bos 1984, 97).

The existence of many courts and tribunals in itself epitomizes a di-vergence of international norms and has important implications for human rights in terms of the implementation and enforcement of the rules that codi-fy them. If the protection of human rights has no borders, it is because human rights have become a global issue. Besides the regional courts and tribunals that may have jurisdiction for human rights questions, there are also the spe-cialized continental courts of human rights (for instance, the Inter American Court of Human Rights, the African Court of Justice and Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights). In addition to these regional adjudi-cative bodies that handle human rights issues are regional courts that were initially created to sanction norms on trade liberalization such as the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). Such courts are expanding their competences to also entertain matters relating to human rights.

There is a dearth of comparisons of Southern regional courts and tribunals as such (Olmos Giupponi 2006; Nkatha Murungi and Gallinetti 2010). The Court of Justice of the Andean Community (CJAC) and the SADC Tribunal fall into this category of regional judicial organs initially created to address trade integration norms which have subsequently also addressed issues hinging on human rights.

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The CJAC was established through a treaty signed in 1979 and entered into force in 1983. It has heard numerous contentious issues, actions for non-compliance and labour matters as well as cases revolving on annulment actions. Andean leaders adopted the Charter of the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in 2002. Since then there has been a remarkable crescendo in terms of human rights matters evoked by the court through solid arguments to resolve differences and the utilization of constructive interpretation (Vargas Mendoza 2010). In the case of the SADC, the Tribunal was established through the SADC Treaty of 1992 but only began operations in 2005. Human rights matters are considered delicate in the SADC. A human rights mandate was contemplated for the SADC Tribunal in the parlays that preceded its creation, but the proposal was rejected (Ebobrah 2009). The CJAC and the SADC Tribunal are just two examples of the numerous regional tribunals that are proliferating around the world. Both of them were cre-ated to interpret the rules of the respective regional organizations. However, what is the nature of these rules and how does this relate to human rights?

3. Comparison of the Rules and Tribunals

a. court of Justice of the andean community

The first article of the Cartagena Agreement states that the objectives of regional integration “are aimed at bringing about an enduring improvement in the standard of living of the sub-region’s population.” This means that people and the protection of people are matters directly linked to the Andean regional inte-gration process. Article 87 of Chapter VII, relating to agricultural development programmes, stipulates that member countries shall harmonize their policies and coordinate their national plans in this sector, bearing in mind the improvement of the standard of living of the rural population. Furthermore, the member coun-tries must take steps to satisfactorily meet the population’s food and nutritional requirements. In fact, Chapter XVI of the Agreement makes it clear that social and economic cooperation is only possible through a respect for human rights principles. Achieving social justice; strengthening non-discrimination, participa-tion and the formation of citizenship values; promoting social support systems and embracing programmes on education and the protection and well-being of the working population, as well as women’s participation in economic activity

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and child and family protection; and paying attention to the needs of ethnic and other minority groups must be the goals of regional programmes and regional actions aimed at the social development of the Andean people. In this way, the Charter of Andean integration connects regional processes with the promotion and protection of human rights.

In 2002, the Andean Council of Presidents adopted the Charter of Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. The Charter is considered a dec-laration of community values rather than a binding source of community law. The CJAC is the CAN’s judicial body, created in 1979 by the Treaty Establishing the Tribunal of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement. The CJAC, based in Quito, ensures that regional laws are interpreted properly and are applied across all the member countries. Unlike the Andean Parliament, the Labour Council and the Business Council (also created in 1979 and whose role is advisory), the CJAC is a supranational institution.

Article 1 of the CJAC treaty defines the community legal corpus to in-clude the Cartagena Agreement and its protocols; the Treaty Establishing the Tribunal of Justice; the decisions of the Andean Council of Foreign Ministers and the Commission of the Andean Community; resolutions of the General Secretariat; and agreements entered into by Member States in the context of Andean integration. Generally, the institutional decisions and resolutions per-tain to the rights of workers, labour, education, consumer rights, intellectual property and public health, amongst others. Although the treaty does not refer to the supremacy of Andean community law, in the CAN structure the relation-ship between community law and the national law of member countries accords precedence to community rules. The CJAC treaty does expressly mention the doctrine of direct effect and Andean legislation does not require incorporation procedures to be applied in member countries.

The CJAC settles any dispute that may arise from any action relating to regional norms. Drafters of the treaty creating the CJAC granted it jurisdiction on two types of claims, namely, noncompliance actions (Article 17) and nullification actions (Article 27). Through the action for noncompliance, the Andean judicial body can adjudicate as to whether a member state has breached community law and establish a corresponding sanction. Individuals, corporations and member countries may raise complaints of noncompliance with the Andean General

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Secretariat. With regard to the procedure of actions for nullification, individu-als, companies and states may challenge the validity of decisions and resolutions issued by the two political decision-making bodies (the General Secretariat and the Andean Council of Foreign Affairs) and by the policy-making body (Andean Commission) that allegedly violate community law. In fact, an individual can bring an action to nullify decisions that have been taken by CAN authorities that affect the applicant’s rights or legitimate interests. In addition, the CJAC has authority in terms of the interpretation of community law at the request (optional or mandatory) of national judges in pending proceedings (Articles 28-31). The purpose of a preliminary ruling is not the harmonization of the internal laws of member countries, but rather to ensure that community law is given the same interpretation in all member countries. Besides the power to settle disputes through arbitration, the CJAC has jurisdiction in labour disputes that may arise between the organs of the Andean integration system.

In 1996, the Cochabamba Protocol reinforced the authority of the CJAC. Since then, private litigants can apply directly to the CJAC if they disagree with the Secretariat’s deposition of a complaint. Furthermore, private actors find it easier to start a procedure for an action for annulment. The Protocol also relaxed restrictions on preliminary references.

CJAC’s membership is comprised of one judge for each member state. According to Articles 7 and 9 of the CJAC Treaty, judges must be nationals of a member country, be of high moral character and either fulfil the conditions for exercising the highest judicial office in their countries of origin or be jurists of recognized competence and probity. Plenipotentiary representatives from mem-ber countries unanimously appoint the judges. Each member state submits a list of three candidates from which the judges are eventually chosen. Andean judges serve for a six-year term that may be renewed once. They cannot engage in any gainful occupation, except in academia.

b. the sadc tribunal

Article 4(c) of the SADC Treaty of 1992 stipulates that the SADC shall act in accordance with human rights principles. Although it is not explicitly stated as a goal, Article 5(1)(a) has vital implications for the pursuit of human rights, especially from the perspective of human development. It states that one of the

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objectives of the regional body shall be to “promote sustainable and equitable economic growth and socio-economic development that will ensure poverty al-leviation with the ultimate objective of its eradication, enhance the standard and quality of life of the people of Southern Africa and support the socially disadvan-taged through regional integration.”

Article 9(1)(g) states that the tribunal is one of the institutions of the SADC. It is significant that the tribunal is constitutionally and institutionally em-bedded within the treaty framework because this is not the case for the SADC’s Parliamentary Forum, which is completely excluded from the treaty. The main rules concerning the tribunal within the treaty are contained in Article 16. The ar-ticle states that the main task of the tribunal is to “ensure adherence to and the proper interpretation of the provisions of this Treaty and subsidiary instruments and to adjudicate upon such disputes as may be referred to it” (Article 16(1)). The composition, powers (jurisdiction) and procedures sanctioning the operation of the tribunal are contained in a SADC protocol regarded, importantly, as an integral part of the treaty (Article 16(2)).

With regard to the composition of the SADC Tribunal, which has its head-quarters in Windhoek, Namibia, there cannot be less than ten judges. In addition to these, member states can also appoint five judges, who can be selected by the head of the tribunal for specific cases. A complete tribunal that is competent to hear a case is constituted of three judges, but a full bench requires five judges. No two judges can be of the same nationality (Tribunal Protocol, Article 3). The judges are recommended by the Council but are ultimately appointed by the Summit of Leaders. The judges are appointed for a period of five years, renewable once. With given exceptions to be determined by the head of the tribunal, the judges are not resident but part-time adjudicators with their services solicited as needed (Tribunal Protocol, Article 6).

In terms of powers, it is vital to note that the treaty envisages the power to provide advisory opinions as referred to it by the Summit or the Council (SADC 1992, Article 16(4); Tribunal Protocol, Article 20). Specifically, the tribunal has jurisdiction to interpret the SADC Treaty, protocols, and importantly, if so agreed, agreements entered into between given SADC States (Tribunal Protocol, Article 14). With regards to the scope of its jurisdiction, the tribunal can enter-tain disputes between states on the one hand and disputes between natural or

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legal persons and states on the other. Legal or natural persons cannot bring ac-tions against states unless national remedies have been exhausted. It is of crucial importance that once a claimant with locus standi before the court brings forth a claim, consent from the opposing party is not a requirement to entertain the cause of action (Tribunal Protocol, Article 15).

Regarding appeals, the decisions of the tribunal are not supposed to be subject to appeal as they are considered to be final. This is stated in Article 16(5) of the SADC Treaty. However, as discussed in the sample cases, the relevant political players within the SADC are basically the court of last resort given that they can veto the judgments and rulings of the tribunal.

From a procedural perspective, the SADC Tribunal is open to preliminary ruling proceedings. It can also exercise original jurisdiction on questions of in-terpretation submitted to it from national courts (Tribunal Protocol, Article 16). The tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction in state-Community disputes (Tribunal Protocol, Article 17). Such exclusivity in jurisdiction is also extended to cases between natural or legal persons and the Community (Tribunal Protocol, Article 18) as well as those between staff and the Community on employment-related matters (Tribunal Protocol, Article 19).

Finally in terms of enforcement, states have to take steps to enforce the rulings of the tribunal, but the final word in the ultimate event of non-compli-ance rests with the supreme political organ or the summit of leaders (Tribunal Protocol, Article 32). The hands of the tribunal are not only tied to the apron strings of the political elite but they are also tied to the Community’s pool of financing (Tribunal Protocol, Article 33), which, again, is a function of the dues paid by member states.

4. Practice and Protection of Human Rights at the Regional Level

a. the court of Justice of the andean community

After the CJEU and the European Court of Human Rights, the CJAC is the third most active international court. From 1984 to 2011, CJAC issued deci-sions on 2,003 prejudicial interpretations, 117 non-compliance actions, 52 annul-ment actions and 9 labour demands. The Andean experience shows that when countries resort to the dispute resolution mechanism, they are able to remedy

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non-compliance of community law, particularly regarding trade matters (Fuentes and Allegret 2009). Most of the CJAC’s activities have dealt with intellectual property, specifically the interpretation of Decision 486 of 2000, which is the governing document for intellectual property in the Andean Community. The Court has issued over 1,500 rulings (more than 90 percent of which involve intel-lectual property rights disputes). In fact, within the CAN, intellectual property is principally regulated at the regional rather than the national level (Alter, Helfer, and Guerzovich 2009).

The CJAC’s workload relating to human rights has increased notice-ably since 2003, one year after the Andean Council of Presidents adopted the Charter of Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. To protect human rights, the Andean Court has used techniques such as interpretations, argu-ments and the resolution of contradictions (Vargas Mendoza 2010). However, this regional court has also resorted to diplomatic mechanisms to protect the human rights of Andean citizens. On 25 June 2008, four Andean Judges sent a letter to the President of the CJEU to express their deep concern about the terms on which the new EU immigrant law (the Return Directive) were written. In the letter, the judges noted that the EU Return Directive equated undocumented immigrants to common criminals and allowed the depriva-tion of their rights for eighteen months without any recourse to the courts. Pointing to an opinion from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and to the principle of non-discrimination in the International Law of Human Rights, Andean Judges stated that the principle of equality did not exclude the consideration of immigrant status and called for a just and humane treatment for migrants in Europe, comparable to that which Latin American countries had granted to European immigrants in the twentieth century.

In relation to questions on human rights handled by the CJAC, Mendoza has identified five sample cases (Vargas Mendoza 2010). In 2003, re-garding the health registers of the product Vintix Coated Tablet, the Council of State of Colombia requested a preliminary ruling from the CJAC on the provisions enshrined in Articles 78 and 79 of Decision 344 of the Andean Commission (Process 37-IP-2003). In its ruling on decision 344, concerning the common system of intellectual property, the CJAC considered the is-sues of trade secrets and test data. The Andean tribunal ruled that common

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laws included clear limits to the powers granted to trade secrets. By law or by court order, such information must be disclosed. In its dictum, the CJAC argued that the holder of the information covered by trade secrets cannot act in a manner that erodes fundamental rights. Three years later, in the case of Colombian Association of Pharmaceutical Industries (Asinfar) vs. Colombian State, the CJAC ruled in favour of the request by Asinfar, quashing Decree 2085 of the Colombian state for the breach of Decision 486, which replaced Decision 344. In its dictum the CJAC affirmed that:

The granting of exclusive rights for certain periods of time, may conflict with fundamental human rights such as health and life, since the con-sumption of drugs is related to its price and the monopoly price may make it impossible to access the drug, which can lead to disease and death to their potential customers. (Proceso 114-AI-2004)

For the CJAC, the Colombian state was in non-compliance with its obliga-tions because Decree 2085 was not compatible with community law, public health or the integration process’ aim of progressively seeking to meet the basic needs of the people of the Andean region (Proceso 114-AI-2004).

In the preliminary ruling involving the Colombian state and a phar-maceutical brand company, the CJAC ruled that the registration standards of a trademark covering pharmaceutical products for non-human use (such as products for veterinary purposes) must be extremely rigorous in order to avoid any risk to human health, animals or plants. Therefore, the CJAC found that the competent national authority should assess such health risks and avoid any mistakes in terms of the product consumed (Proceso 45-IP-2008). Therefore, in this case, the jurisprudence connected the interpretation of community law with health-related rights (public health) and environmental rights (animal and plant health).

Another important CJAC case concerned the protection of the rights of children. In 2006, a game production company brought an action against Ecuador for non-compliance with Decision 439, relating to the principles and norms for the trade liberalization of community services. In its judgment, the CJAC examined whether internal rules regulating slot machines violated

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the Andean services trade regime. The judgment stated that the right to free access to the gambling market must give way to the right to good health of people and, in particular, children (Proceso 03-AI-2006). Vargas Mendoza (2010) has argued that, in addition to considerations on the value of health, public order and child protection, this case is relevant because the Andean tribunal drew on two techniques of contemporary jurisprudence: a test of reasonableness and a weighting analysis.

Preliminary rulings requested by Peru in relation to the location of slaughterhouses also illustrate how the CJAC addresses human rights issues in its arguments and interpretation. To build its judgment, the Andean tribu-nal carefully analyzed the relevant regional rules. Its interpretation was that although the overall objective of the legislation was to promote the develop-ment of livestock and beef agribusiness in the Andean region, “this objective is related to higher goods such as health and life of people and the protection of the right to a healthy environment and care for the collective rights and public health safety” (Proceso 90-IP-2008).

In all these cases, and especially in Vintix, Asinfar and the case pertain-ing to the rights of children, the CJAC has used its interpretive mandate to lean clearly towards the protection of human life and human health in those instances where such concerns have to be balanced against other commercial interests. However, the CJAC is not only concerned with rights hinging on human health. As revealed in the preliminary ruling involving Colombia, the CJAC is also keen to help prevent violations of environmental rights that may adversely affect plants and animals. This is very important because it sends a strong signal to private actors that rights advocates have a reliable regional mechanism (the CJAC) that can be used to reject or mitigate abuses to rights that may result from business operations in Andean countries. The CJAC decides to resolve disputes over the implementation of regional rules with direct reference to human rights issues.

b. the sadc tribunal

When juxtaposed to the CJAC, there is a clear dearth of human rights litigation before the SADC Tribunal. The few contentious issues brought be-fore the tribunal have been predominantly related to labour and land rights questions,, with the secondary aspect of property rights playing a prominent

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role in Zimbabwe. In terms of the issues related to labour rights, which referred mainly to aspects of the unlawful termination of employment, the SADC Tribunal did not adopt a clear approach of siding consistently with the employees. In its dictum in Mtingwi v SADC Secretariat (Case No. SADC (T) 1/2007, at 15), the tribunal was at pains to reject the claims of a plaintiff who demanded costs for the wrongful termination of a contract due to pend-ing criminal charges in Malawi. The tribunal ruled in favour of the SADC Secretariat, accepting the argument that the claimant was not entitled to any compensation under the circumstances. In another case, the tribunal adopted an approach that was adverse to the interests of the secretariat. This was the Kanyama ruling, in which the tribunal adjudged (leaning on the concept of justice) that the Secretariat had to explore the lawful contractual extension of the claimant’s employment by a period of four years. In order to reverse the dam-age suffered by the respondent, the employer was ordered to make good the costs of the claimant (Case No. SADC (T) 05/2009).3

In the landmark case involving the late Zimbabwean white farmer Mike Campbell, the tribunal adjudicated in favour of Campbell and claim-ants. It ruled that the action of the government of Zimbabwe, in confiscating the landed property of the claimants, was tantamount to acting in violation of the SADC Treaty that (Case No. SADC (T) Case No. 2/2007, at 57-58),4 amongst other purposes, seeks to protect the rights of SADC citizens, includ-ing their property rights. The Campbell saga epitomized a deeper problem in Zimbabwe that harks back to 1979, when the government of the United Kingdom decided in the Lancaster Agreements that it would regularly pay the government in Harare in exchange or as consideration for the white landowners to maintain their industrial concerns. Subsequently, as the British government fell short in its promised payments, president Mugabe decided to lean on a constitutional amendment (2004 Amendment 17) to seize the farms

3 See also Case No. SADC (T) 07/2009 and Case No. SADC (T) 02/2009, at 2 and 6.4 Other land cases pitting the Government of Zimbabwe against farmers and in which the

Government has been ordered to refrain from evicting title holders from their landed prop-erty include: Case No. SADC (T) 2/2008, Case No. SADC (T) 04/20008, Case No. SADC (T) 06/20008, Case No. SADC (T) 7/2008, Case No. SADC (T) 07/2008.

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that were owned predominantly by white farmers. What irked many in the international community was the fact that Mugabe was using the land issue as a pretext to settle political grievances, all the more so as the confiscated property often went to cronies of the ruling party (ZANU PF), who could not tend to the land as had been the case when the agricultural fields were predominantly in the control of the white farmers.

In the example of the Campbell case, one of the dispossessed white farmers and other claimants leaned on SADC Treaty rules to make a claim against the Mugabe government for expropriating their property. Initially, the claimant filed motions in Zimbabwean courts when his Mount Carmel property (purchased in 1974) was seized. Not pacified by the ruling of the courts in Zimbabwe, the claimant sought the services of the SADC Tribunal. The tribunal ruled that the actions of the government of Harare were in direct violation of Articles 4 and 6 of the SADC Treaty. The tribu-nal found that the government’s actions could not be objectively justified and that they amounted to crass and brazen acts of racial discrimination. The entire land reform programme that Mugabe had championed was brought into question. It then ruled that the claimants were entitled to compensation from Robert Mugabe’s government. Following the dictum, the tribunal transmitted the ruling to the Summit for consideration and implementation. When this was done, in 2009, the Summit adopted an approach of least political resistance by basically stripping the tribunal of its powers and suspending its activities. This also took place subsequently to a declaration by the government of Zimbabwe that it would not respect the ruling of the SADC Tribunal. This, of course, raised the question of the competence and powers of the regional court, especially when faced with a charged political reality.

It could be argued that the judges were not politically savvy or sensi-tive enough to understand how unsettling their ruling would be. Southern Africa is a region that is still marked by strong political ties amongst the rulers, who, not more than thirty years ago, were still linked by the strong bonds of the liberation struggles and who are not ready to delegate their po-litical sovereignty to unelected judges who may not be attuned to or steeped in the sensitive historical details that underpin the political realities of the

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region today. Therefore, it is not surprising that Mugabe simply dismissed the work of the tribunal as a sham and rejected the validity of its rulings (Case No. SADC (T) 01/2010, at 3; and Case No. SADC (T) 03/2009).

The SADC is faced with difficult issues, as exposed by the Zimbabwean land reform challenges. Its leaders have to confront the choice of whether to adhere strictly to the rule of law as ordained in the SADC Treaty and rules or simply to back one of their peers to pacify historical expediencies. Even if there has been resistance by the governments in the SADC to adopt a Bill of Rights (Ruppel 2012), the Campbell case provided a good opportunity for SADC leaders to project their regional system as one based on the rule of law. They failed to do this and, as Ruppel argues, the Campbell case “became a benchmark of the SADC Tribunal’s key role in the integration of legal and institutional systems in its region of jurisdiction” (Ruppel 2012). However, the leaders missed the opportunity to highlight this situation.

Another important SADC case pertained to the rights of private sector operators within the SADC. In the Bach case, the issue was that customs control officers of the Democratic Republic of Congo impounded the applicant’s truck without justification. The claimant brought the matter before the SADC Tribunal and requested damages worth 2 million US dollars. He adduced evidence to cor-roborate the fact that he could not avail himself of national remedies, highlighting that the DRC officials had requested bribes. On various issues raised by the case, the SADC Tribunal leaned on its own stare decisis, especially in the Campbell ruling and found inter alia:

Clearly, there is evidence supported by documents that the Applicant tried to utilize the legal system of the Respondent to have its truck and trailer released but was unsuccessful. It even tried to use the diplomatic channels available but was equally unsuccessful. It was clearly unable to proceed under the domestic legal system of the Respondent. In Mike Campbell (PVT) Ltd v The Republic of Zimbabwe SADC (T) 2/2007, the Tribunal observed: […] where the municipal law does not offer any remedy or the remedy that is offered is ineffective, the individual is not required to exhaust the local remedies […] These are circum-stances that make the requirement of exhaustion of local remedies

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meaningless, in which case the individual can lodge a case with the international tribunal. (Case No. SADC (T) 14/2008, at 4-7)

The Tribunal ruled in favour of the applicant and demanded that due costs be paid to the applicant business operator. The ruling of the tribunal here is very important because it is a fundamental departure from common practice and the basis which many state parties often use to justify the dismissal of non-compliance actions before regional courts. Here, the tribunal was actually making a robust case that, in those instances where national remedies are worthless and less than effective, the exhaustion argument can be waived.

The SADC Tribunal went through a baptism of fire in the Campbell deci-sion. One of the crucial faux pas made by the judges was to overplay their hand in a charged political context. Given the history of the region and the fact that the tribunal is still very young, it would have been better for the SADC Tribunal to mainly focus, at this initial stage of its existence, on technical matters that di-rectly relate to free trade in the region. In adopting the confrontational approach and attracting the wrath of political masters, the baby has been thrown out with the bathwater. One of the reasons behind the CJAC’s success is that it has mainly addressed technical trade matters pertaining to intellectual property. Both courts reveal sympathies to those whose rights are trampled upon but one has been more direct because it has used its mandate to address human rights concerns in ways that initially seemed detached from human rights matters. To be fair, the décalage in outcome could be attributed to the lack of awareness of private par-ties in the SADC about how to use their tribunal tactfully. That said, the SADC Tribunal could have acted sua moto in specific instances to address technical elements of the SADC Treaty without necessarily being seized by litigants while avoiding the wrath of political masters.

5. Analysis in the Variance of the Scope of Action for the Tribunals

Based on these observations, we may assert that there are some similar features between the achievements of the SADC and the CAN in terms of hu-man rights adjudication. Both are institutions that were initially created with the objective of fostering commerce between the state parties. Over time, their

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mandates have broadened and been interpreted creatively to address further questions pertaining to human rights. One main difference between SADC law and CAN community law is that there is no principle of direct effect that is observable under SADC norms. States still tend to incorporate regional norms through specific legislation. This explains some of the differences that can be identified between the two bodies. Another important difference is that while the CAN has developed a strong caseload in the area of intellectual property, the major cases in the SADC concern landed property rights. This again reflects the specific historical contexts of some SADC States such as Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe, where the white minority populations have historically owned a disproportionately significant portion of all arable land. Even with the demise of apartheid in South Africa and the end of the liberation struggles and triumph of majority rule in countries such as Namibia and Zimbabwe, the majority black populations still believe that inequalities in land distribution remain in existence.

The dissimilarities can be further approached from four perspec-tives including: the scope of human rights covered by each of the regional tribunals; the locus standi or standing of individuals before the tribunals; the added value of the regional tribunals as such; and the restrictive role of politics for the tribunals. In both instances, the drafters of the founding texts for the CAN and the SADC had very limited ambitions when they alluded to human rights in the treaties. Given their particular histories, states in both regions sought to reflect the specific needs of their citizens in terms of politi-cal and civil rights. Less emphasis was placed on economic and social rights. However, over the years, these rights have been interpreted broadly to also encompass the second generation of human rights.

In terms of locus standi, individuals can bring cases in both tribunals. This means that they can have recourse to the regional tribunals in the event of rights violation. The remedies developed in the CAN are actions for non-compliance and nullification actions. These are not denominated as such under the SADC legal system, but the class actions brought against the state of Zimbabwe in the Campbell cases were tantamount to actions in view of reversing Zimbabwe’s non-compliance under its SADC Treaty obligations in terms of respect for human rights.

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The added value of the tribunals is that they can serve as appellate juris-dictions in those cases where national adjudicative avenues have been exhausted. Certainly, the CJAC and the SADC Tribunal are new players in terms of the protection of human rights. Moreover, in addition to the provision of advisory opinions, the regional tribunals can also institute proceedings sua motu (on their own accord). However, these judicial bodies face certain problems. The first is one of awareness. For the most part, citizens of both regions often tend to be unaware of the existence of the regional courts. In a way, the courts are seen as detached and distant. Outreach steps could be useful in this respect and the bar associa-tions, both at the national and regional levels, could also play an important role in this regard. The second challenge is that of resources. Running regional courts is similar to running other regional entities. Human resources needs are often acute. Identifying qualified staff for the regional bench is a process that can take time. The third problem is that there are many established human rights bodies both in the Americas and in Africa that have already developed strong reputations in the protection of human rights. As such, the respective human rights courts and commissions in both regions have more credibility on human rights matters and this tends to dampen any enthusiasm that potential complainants may have to bring their cases before tribunals that were initially created mainly to supervise trade liberalization agreements.

Finally, the issue of political interference remains pervasive. The restrictive role of politics is still a thorny issue. It relates to the fact that the political rulers are adept at and prepared to side-line judicial rulings of the regional courts and tribunals whenever it pleases them. In other words, the action of regional courts is linked to national politics. This has been a major concern in the SADC with the suspension of its tribunal, while the Andean regional integration organization has never been characterized by the political homogeneity of its members.

Conclusions

Taking these observations into account, are there any areas where there can realistically be cross-fertilization in the experiences of the two regional adjudicative bodies? In terms of shared insights, there are aspects relating to intellectual property rights protection as upheld in the CAN that can be useful

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for the SADC. This is particularly true since the SADC is one of the regions that has been plagued by the virus causing AIDS and other diseases. Intellectual property norms can often be interpreted in ways that restrict access to affordable medicines and vaccines that can be used to deal with these health problems. The direct interpretive of the CAN courts could provide insight for future SADC Tribunal judges. In terms of insights for CAN, the nature of the political over-reach that has jeopardized the functioning of the SADC Tribunal is a route that CAN leaders would do well to avoid if the rule of law is to retain its hallowed meaning in the region.

Substantively, and in terms of caseloads, the cases that have been brought before the CJAC outweigh those of the SADC Tribunal and tend to involve mat-ters that clearly impinge on socio-economic rights, including intellectual property rights. While politics plays a vital role in the selection of judges in both courts, there is greater political interference in the case of the SADC. It is therefore not surpris-ing that the SADC Tribunal’s activities have been suspended by the region’s leaders pending a re-negotiation of the tribunal’s protocol. Given the circumstances that led to the suspension of the court, it is hard to foresee how a re-negotiated protocol would not dilute any possible leverage that the tribunal could hope to have in terms of independence. In a way, this is disappointing because SADC States face real chal-lenges in the areas of health and the environment and it would have been useful to have a strong regional court that can address trans-border questions rather than having to turn to the ICJ or the WTO dispute settlement body whenever territorial or trade-related claims are made. In this respect, we argue that those working on a re-negotiated SADC Tribunal protocol could draw inspiration from the workings of the CJAC to assess why the Andean court has had such a rich caseload and how it balances its tasks against political forces in a region traditionally dominated by leaders with very strong personalities.

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38. Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement. [Online] http://www.comunidadandina.org/en/TreatiesLegislation.aspx?id=14&title=treaty-creating-the-court-of-justice-of-the-cartagena-agreement&accion=detalle&cat=1&tipo=TL

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African Development Community.42. Case No. SADC (T) 05/2009. Clement Kanyama v SADC Secretariat.43. Case No. SADC (T) 03/2009. William Michael Campbell and Richard Thomas

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Giovanni Molano-cruz has a PhD in Political Science from the University of the Sorbonne, Paris 1 Panthéon (France). He has been associated to UNU-CRIS (Belgium) since 2007, and to Universidad Sergio Arboleda (Colombia) since 2012. His latest

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publications include: “La Communauté andine: trajectoire d’un processus latino-américain d’intégration régionale.” In Relations internationales et régionalisme: Entre dynamiques in-ternes et projections mondiales. Liège: Presses Universitaires de Liège, 2012.Email: [email protected]

stephen Kingah has a PhD in Law from the Free University of Brussels (VUB) (Belgium). He is a professor at UNU-CRIS (Belgium) and serves as rapporteur for the SADC for the International Organizations Interest Group of the American Society of International Law. He previously worked as ad hoc Administrator for international fi-nancial institutions at the EU Commission. He takes interests on the legal and political aspects of EU-ACP relations, International financial institutions, the African Union’s institutional architecture and human rights aspects of accessing affordable health care in the South. His latest publications include: “The Role of Regional Parliaments in Enhancing Democracy in the South.” In Comparative Regionalisms for Development in the Twenty-First Century: Insights from the Global South. Farnham: Ashgate, 2013; and “Moving beyond the Last Corrupt Leaders in African Politics: AU-EU Cooperation.” Cameroon Journal of Democracy and Human Rights 6 (1), 2012.E-mail: [email protected]

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Rights, Free Trade, and Politics: The Strategic Use of a Rights Discourse in the Negotiation of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)

Angelika RettbergUniversidad de los Andes (Colombia)

Philippe De LombaerdeUNI-CRIS (Belgium)

Liliana Lizarazo-RodríguezIndependet Consultan (Belgium)

Juan Felipe Ortiz-RiomaloUniversidad de los Andes (Colombia)

DOI: dx.doi.org/10.7440/colombiaint81.2014.05RECEIVED: February 22, 2014ACCEPTED: February 28, 2014REVISED: April 24, 2014

ABSTRACT: This article seeks to describe the strategic use of a rights discourse by domestic and international actors involved in the negotiation and ratification processes of free trade agreements between Colombia, the United States, and the European Union. We suggest that some of the differences between both FTAs and the processes leading up to their approval and ratification can be attributed to the ability of relevant actors to build and disseminate rights-based arguments in order to develop like-minded political coalitions, and other institutional and contextual characteristics.

KEYWORDS: policy process • human rights • Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR) • free trade agreements • European Union • United States • Colombia

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This article is part of a collaboration between authors at the Universidad de los Andes Political Science Department (Colombia) and at the United Nations University Institute on Comparative Regional Integration Studies (UNU-CRIS) in Bruges (Belgium). The larger project was funded by a European Union Jean Monnet Fellowship. A first draft was presented at the Constitutional Rights and Free Trade Agreements (CRIFT) workshop at UNU-CRIS in February 2012.

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derechos, libre comercio y política: el uso estratégico de un discurso de derechos en la negociación de tratados de libre comercio

RESUMEN: El artículo describe cómo ciertos actores usaron estratégicamente discursos basados en la defensa de los derechos humanos durante la negociación y ratificación de los acuerdos de libre comercio entre Colombia, Estados Unidos y la Unión Europea. Se sugiere que las diferencias entre los dos acuerdos y sus procesos de aprobación y ratificación se pueden atribuir a la capacidad de los actores involucrados para elaborar y socializar argumentos en defensa de los derechos humanos, y a otras características contextuales e institucionales.

PALABRAS CLAVE: procesos normativos • Derechos económicos, sociales y culturales (DESC) • derechos humanos • acuerdos de libre comercio • Unión Europea • Estados Unidos • Colombia

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direitos, livre comércio e política: o uso estratégico de um discurso de direitos na negociação de tratados de livre comércio

RESUMO: Este artigo descreve como certos atores usaram estrategicamente discursos baseados na defesa dos direitos humanos durante a negociação e a ratificação dos acordos de livre comércio entre a Colômbia, os Estados Unidos da América e a União Europeia. Sugere-se que as diferenças entre os dois acordos e seus processos de aprovação e ratificação podem ser atribuídos à capacidade dos atores envolvidos para elaborar e socializar argumentos em defesa dos direitos humanos e outras características contextuais e institucionais.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Processos normativos • Direitos Econômicos, Sociais e Culturais (DESC) • direitos humanos • acordos de livre comércio • União Europeia • Estados Unidos da América • Colômbia

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Introduction1

Over the past few years, Colombia has developed free trade agreements (FTAs) with its two main commercial partners: the United States (Colombia-US FTA, which was ratified in 2011) and the European Union (Colombia/Peru-EU FTA, which was provisionally applied in 2013). The process leading up to signature, application and ratification has been marked by heated debates on all ends of the deals. Opponents to the FTAs have argued that FTAs—and the preferential treat-ment they provide to Colombia’s trading partners—are responsible for many of the problems faced by the country’s growing middle class and impoverished rural sectors (Eslava 2013). In fact, as illustrated in Table 1, much is at stake: together, these trading partners account for over 50 percent of Colombia’s exports, under-scoring the highly asymmetric nature of the relationships (Garay, De Lombaerde, and Barberi 2011).

1 We thank Mariana Gutiérrez and Susana Sierra for their support in collecting data for this article. We also thank three anonymous referees for their valuable comments and suggestions.

Commercial partner Exports Imports Investments

to and from United States

Between 2008 and 2012 Colombian exports to US amounted to USD 17,499 million FOB (38.74% of total, an average annual

growth of 10.45%), including coffee, flowers,

and other agricultural products. Petroleum and mining products were the main products exported in 2012 (75.5% of total).

Between 2008 and 2012, imports from

US represented 26.49% of total imports. These imports grew

12.29% on average in the same

period. Machinery, equipment and petroleum were

the main products imported in 2012.

US investment in Colombia

represented on average a third (24.7%) of total

FDI in Colombia between 2001 and

2012.

In 2012, US exports to Colombia amounted to

0.9% of total US exports.

In 2012, Colombian imports were 1.1 % of

total US imports.

Table 1. General Facts on Trade between Colombia-US, and Colombia-EU

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To and from European Union

Between 2008 and 2012 Colombian exports to EU amounted to USD

6,485 million FOB (annual) on average (14.06% of total, an

average annual growth of 16.73%)

Between 2008 and 2012, imports from

EU amounted to 13.6% of total imports, with an average annual

growth of 13.5%.

From 2000 to 2012, EU

investment in Colombia was USD 10,385.8

million on average, per year; 24% of total FDI.

Exported products included coal,

petroleum, coffee, bananas, ferronickel,

crude oil, flowers, food, and several

manufactured leather goods. Mining and

energy sector accounted for 78.3% of total exports

in 2012.

Imports included machinery and

communications equipment, planes, medical equipment,

chemicals and medicines.

In 2011, Colombia was the destination of 0.3% of EU’s total exports.

In 2011, 0.4% of EU’s total

imports came from Colombia.

Commercial partner Exports Imports Investments

(Source: Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism and DANE. Compiled by the authors)

Throughout the negotiation process of both agreements, various eco-nomic, social, and cultural rights (ESCR), ranging from intellectual property to health, a safe environment, life and labor, were routinely invoked as being imperiled if FTAs were to be enacted (Silva 2007; Gómez and Gamboa 2010; Vargas 2011; Lizarazo, De Lombaerde, Ortiz, Parra, and Rettberg 2014). Much as has been documented for other trade negotiations (e.g., Thacker 2000; De Lombaerde 2002), the political coalitions both in favor of and oppos-ing FTAs brought together affinity groups across borders, including members of the US Democratic Party and Colombian trade unionists, in opposition to the Colombia-US FTA. Noticeably, however, the debate surrounding trade negotiations was not only led by the “usual suspects,” such as labor unions, environmental groups, patenting companies, and companies prone to being

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Rights, Free Trade, and Politics: The Strategic Use of a Rights DiscourseAngelika Rettberg • Philippe De Lombaerde • Liliana Lizarazo-Rodríguez • Juan Felipe Ortiz-Riomalo

affected by the distributive impacts of commerce (Silva 2007; Gómez and Gamboa 2010). Rights-based national and international non-governmental organizations also systematically used constitutional norms and rights to question the contents and procedures of Colombian FTAs before courts and to mobilize the support of relevant social groups within Colombia and abroad. On occasions, these groups were joined by other political groups which took advantage of the negotiation context to oppose government policy, aiming to achieve international impact.

The purpose of this article is not to examine or measure the current or future specific effects of FTAs on the Colombian economy and society, nor whether trade improves or hinders political stability and overall re-spect for human rights. What this article seeks to describe and analyze is the strategic use of a rights discourse—or a set of political arguments addressing different generations of ESCR—by domestic and international actors involved in FTA negotiations in order both to delay the process of the negotiations and to shape the content of the resulting FTAs. We argue that actors involved in free trade negotiations disseminate a rights discourse based both on measurable and expected risks to specific rights and on the need to mobilize and build political, legislative, and judicial support among actors on both sides. In addition to the obvious differences between both trading partners (for example, the contribution of the US to Colombian exports is over two times than that of Colombian exports to Europe), this article thus suggests that some of the differences between the two FTAs and the processes leading up to their approval and ratification can be attributed to the ability of relevant actors to build and dissemi-nate rights-based arguments and develop like-minded political coalitions. Therefore, the central issue of the article is the politics of trade negotia-tions and the use of a rights discourse therein.

Our research is relevant as it supports the view that trade is much more than the exchange of goods and services and that trade negotiations involve discussions over non-trade issues (Feinberg 2003). The large number of FTAs currently in place (Colombia alone has thirteen FTAs in force and four have been signed, see Ministerio de Comercio, Industria y Turismo 2014a), and the future prospects indicating that FTAs will be the strategy of choice for many

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flourishing Latin American economies, requires scholars to examine to what extent and in what way non-trade issues may shape and affect the scope of trade agreements. In this sense, this paper contributes to our knowledge of the politics of trade policy (De Lombaerde 2000; Echavarría 1999; Sáenz-Rovner 1992) in general, and FTA negotiation processes in particular (Silva 2007; Gómez and Gamboa 2010; Vargas, 2011), by centering the analysis on the role played by rights in actor preference formation, on how actors integrate these preferences in specific political strategies, and how they interact with politi-cal, institutional, and other contextual variables.

In the following sections we will first briefly lay out an analytical framework based on insights from the fields of political science and econom-ics, and describe the recent evolution of Colombian trade policy and of its main actors. The subsequent sections will describe both FTAs and identify the protagonists and their strategies when faced with these agreements, in order to identify when and how a rights discourse was included, shaping relevant outcomes during the FTA negotiation process.

1. Political Economy of Trade Policy: Some Conceptual Insights

Broad political-economy models of trade policy tend to focus on the domestic and international driving forces of trade relations. In these models, relevant actors or coalitions include national governments, but also political parties, domestic and international civil society organizations, labor unions, environmental groups, and private sector lobbying associations. According to these models, actor capacity is shaped not only by the control of measur-able resources such as capital (which explains why, for example, different fractions of the private sector weigh in heavily on the orientation and de-sign of trade policy, both in favor and against) but also by the creative use of intangible sources of power, such as legitimacy or the ability to recruit support from like-minded actors across borders (see, for example, Alt and Giligan 2000; Capling and Low 2010a; Frieden and Lake 2000; Rogowski 2000; Thacker 2000).

Thus, specific outcomes of trade negotiations should reflect the existence of certain institutional opportunities and constraints shaping the emergence of

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actors and coalitions and their ability to bring their interests to the agenda, re-cruit support from strategic partners, and promote the adoption of specific items in trade policy—FTAs in this case. In addition, actors should be considered as being able to “learn” during the negotiation and ratification process of a specific FTA, as well as between the corresponding processes of different FTAs.

In a synthesis of the main contributions that have been made under this perspective, Rodrik (1995) identifies four central elements that should be part of any political economy model designed to analyze trade policy. The first element refers to a description of actors’ preferences regarding the policy instruments under discussion. Each instrument will lead to a specific outcome which, in turn, defines a set of costs and benefits for each actor. Based on these possible scenarios, actors form their preferences and decide their courses of action. Here it is important to note that actors’ preferences are driven both by material and nonmaterial interests—such as the defense of human rights (Capling and Low 2010b). As the second element, the model has to describe “how these prefer-ences are aggregated and channeled through pressure groups, political parties or grass-roots movements into ‘political demands’ for a particular policy or another” (Rodrik 1995, 1459). The third element of the model must specify the policymakers’ (state actors) preferences. Finally, the fourth element refers to the institutional context—especially the role of political2 and economic insti-tutions—framing interactions among actors. Several elements of recent FTA discussions and contents—described in the paragraphs below—illustrate the main tenets of this model.

Diagram 1 synthetizes the main theoretical elements exposed above and sketches the different possible relations that may develop between the domestic and international levels. Here, international negotiations (Level I), led by national governments, on the process and content of FTAs are influenced by domestic (Level II) and international pressures led by state actors (including national governments and their agencies, courts, and Congress), and non-state actors

2 For example, political constitutions define the formal and informal arenas in which actors interact, advance their preferences, and develop tools and strategies. To the extent that constitutions—such as in the Colombian case—define fundamental rights for every citizen, which any citizen could claim are being harmed by FTA implementation, these institutions shape preferences and actions.

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Finally, it is important to note that the characteristics of the countries involved in FTA negotiations in terms of their importance as trade partners, the size and the structure of their economies, and the scope of the agree-ments negotiated will inf luence the number of actors involved, their prefer-ences, and somehow the distribution of their relative capabilities—i.e., the broader the scope, the larger the number of actors who eventually will feel compelled to participate in the negotiation process (e.g., Dür and De Bièvre 2007). The greater the economic importance of one country for the other’s balance of trade, the higher the expected visibility/importance of the agree-ment at hand.

Diagram 1. A General Framework of the Political Economy of Trade Policy

(Source: Based on Silva (2005), adapted by the authors)

State actors (SA) A

State actors

NegociationsA

Level II

NegociationsB

Level II

Non-stateactors (NSA)

A

Non-stateactors (NSA)

Gov. B

Gov. A

Domestic context (economic and institutional) or level II in Country B.Domestic context (economic and institutional) or level II in Country A.International and transnational interactions between actors involved.

(including NGOs, unions, business associations, and other civil society organiza-tions). Interactions among these actors go both ways throughout the whole FTA negotiation process and are based on material and non-material interests.

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2. Changes in FTA Scope, Institutional Control, and Content

Tariff elimination was a prominent feature of FTAs signed between the 1960s and 1980s, during the wave of “first generation” FTAs3. Since then, the scope of FTAs has considerably widened. The introduction and diffusion of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)-model for FTAs (De Lombaerde and Garay 2008; Devlin, Estevadeordal, and Jank 2002; Heydon and Woolcock 2009; Woolcock 2006) implied a significant broadening of FTA contents: in addition to tariff elimination, it included provisions such as Harmonized System (HS)-based rules of origin, special rules for the automo-bile sector, separate agricultural chapters, Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measures, technical barriers to trade, investment, investor-state dispute settle-ment, services, temporary entry of business persons, public procurement, intellectual property rights (IPR), anti-dumping/countervailing measures, and dispute settlement; in addition, a number of side agreements covered labor and environmental issues. This broader scope in comparison to “first genera-tion” FTAs, which can be observed in both cases examined here, explains to a large extent why the political-economy of trade agreements has also become more complex. As issues from more areas are covered, more interests and rights are potentially affected.4

A second element marking change in the formulation of FTAs refers to institutional transformations that have taken place in many countries. Modern twentieth century Latin-American constitutions contain vast numbers of social guarantees (Schor 2006, 21) and sometimes operate in combination with activist courts and the globalization of constitutional law, the promotion of the balanc-ing method in adjudication, and the expansion of justiciability of human rights (Bomhoff 2008, De Sousa Santos 1998, Tushnet 2008, Schor 2008). This has led

3 First generation agreements focused on tariff reduction commitments. Subsequent agreements, such as NAFTA, included investment and other commitments, and are therefore described as second generation agreements. Finally, some analysts consider that agreements such as the US-Chile FTA are third generation because they include additional commitments in terms of intellectual property, environment and labor (Pizarro 2006, 32).

4 This aspect of the European case is illustrated in Dür and De Bièvre (2007).

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to a growing judicialization of trade policy, or the involvement of judicial bodies in the definition of the scale and scope of countries’ trade relations.5

A third element refers to how the globalization of the economy has accentu-ated the ability of international regulations and norms to bind and shape national jurisdictions. FTAs have been incorporated into national legal systems in differ-ent ways: they have been considered as a supranational legal framework or as being at the same level as national constitutions (in some cases passing con-stitutional control before ratification),6 and they have been incorporated as ordinary laws subordinated to the Constitution (as in the case of Colombia). The latter means that they can be challenged before courts in spite of their previous constitutional control, in case some of their rules or their imple-mentation become unconstitutional. The fact that North-South FTAs include clauses or principles that refer to the protection of rights, such as workers’ rights or public health rights (access to medicines) (Alavi 2009), in combina-tion with the growing justiciability of fundamental rights—often supported by international normative frameworks—turns the protection of fundamental rights into a central issue in FTA negotiations and contents, as has been the case in the negotiation of the FTAs examined here.

Given the prevalence of human rights issues in current FTA discus-sions, the interaction between FTAs and human rights deserves a special discussion. Commonly, this relationship has been presented as a conflictive relation between free trade principles and the justiciability of ESCR, as illus-trated, for example, by the tensions between protecting IPR versus protecting public health and biodiversity. From a legal point of view, the interaction between the regulation of international trade, mainly via FTAs, and the en-forcement of human rights may occur before or after the agreements enter

5 The judicialization of trade policy implies that national courts are adjudicating on the scope of international trade agreements when they (could) violate constitutional rights, especially eco-nomic, social, and cultural rights (ESCR). This should be distinguished from dispute settlement mechanisms, which refer to the resolution of conflicts between the parties to the agreement that relate to the compliance with or interpretation of its clauses.

6 In many EU member states, European economic integration treaties (which incorporate FTAs), once approved and ratified, cannot be unaccomplished on the basis of reasons based on na-tional constitutions (Besselink, Claes, Imamović, and Reestman 2014).

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into force and in different ways (Van Hees 2004, 2): (i) trade sanctions for human rights abuses; (ii) human rights conditionality in trade agreements (Aaronson 2010; Bartels 2008; Ebert 2009); (iii) human rights issues in the WTO framework; or (iv) effects of trade on human rights. How the topic is addressed and solved is also influenced by the parties of the agreement, particularly if one of them is the EU, the US or Canada. Aaronson identified clear patterns in FTAs signed by these countries. While the EU emphasizes universal human rights as well as specific rights, such as labor rights, due procedure, and political participation, the US and Canada FTAs refer mainly to very few specific rights, such as transparency, labor rights, due procedure, political participation, access to medicines, and rights of minorities, among others (2010, 435). The right to public health and labor rights have been more relevant in the negotiation of FTAs with the US.

The combination of these elements explains why today FTAs tend to be more contested and why actual and potential conflict between FTA contents and the constitutional frameworks in the signing countries may, in fact, increase. In particular, the national and international context described in the previous paragraphs illustrates the development of an institutional structure of incentives increasing the likelihood of non-trade issues being addressed in negotiation and implementation processes. These issues are capable of promoting or stalling the discussion and framing of trade policy, and in particular the different types of rights and rights protection instruments gathered here under the general label of “rights discourse.” Combining elements of the political economy model presented in section two with aspects of the transformed social, political, and economic context in which FTAs are currently negotiated, as presented here, we will now proceed to focus on the Colombian case.

3. Colombian Trade Policy: Contents and Implications of the Colombia-US FTA and Colombia-EU FTA

Despite having been engulfed in armed conflict for over four decades, Colombia has experienced a significant decrease in homicides and other manifestations of political violence in recent years. This has provided the background against which foreign and domestic investment has regained

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momentum. According to a recent report by the World Bank, “Colombia is a regional leader in narrowing the gap with the world’s most efficient regulatory practice” (World Bank 2013, 26).

For Colombian policymakers, economic adjustment policies adopted since the 1990s have played a central role in promoting and fostering econom-ic expansion (De Lombaerde and Lizarazo 2011; Franco and De Lombaerde 2000; Ochoa 1998; Volpe Martincus 2010). As a part of these policies, a turn to the promotion of “new generation” FTAs is expected to boost the country’s export capacity and to consolidate economic growth. Since the 1990s, the Colombian government has adopted several measures oriented towards trade liberalization. As Colombia’s main trade destinations, the US and the EU have been the preferred partners in this venture (Table 1 presents some general figures regarding these trade relationships).

In addition, institutional change, and more specifically change in the constitutional framework, is important in terms of understanding the present-day political-economy of trade policy in Colombia. The country has been presented as an example of the ambitious constitutional empowerment of high courts as a way of consolidating democracy (Schor 2008, 1-3). In this context, constitutional case law since 1991 has promoted the balancing method of adjudication, 7 by which the Court seeks to actively protect consti-tutional rights by the active use of the constitutional bloc.8

Crucial instruments created by the Colombian constitution to protect fundamental rights include the Action of Protection of Fundamental Rights (acción de protección de derechos fundamentals—APFR—, CPC Article 86) and the Popular Action (acción popular—PA—, CPC Article 88), as well as the above-mentioned tool of the “constitutional bloc.” The APFR is com-parable to the concrete judicial review and has helped the Court broaden the scope of precedent regarding constitutional rights. The PA is a judicial

7 See Alexy (2002); Bomhoff (2008); and Dworkin (1994). On the application of the balancing method by the Colombian Constitutional Court, see Lizarazo (2011).

8 This refers to constitutional case law developing the Constitution of 1991, which states that in-ternational human rights treaties ratified by Congress prevail over national rules and together with the constitutional rules on fundamental right form the “constitutional bloc.”

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mechanism for the protection of collective rights and interests related to the homeland, public space, safety and health, the environment, and free economic competition. Constitutional actions such as these allow citizens to present claims and put case law at the center of the public debate, thereby strengthening the law-making role of the judiciary (Cepeda 2004; Landau 2005; López 2000). In this way, the Court has played an active role in the process of rules creation through judicial review sentences but also through APFR sentences.9

This section will present the main facts, contents, and expected winners and losers of both FTAs, as well as the processes leading up to the coming into effect of these agreements.

a. the colombia-us Fta

Although Colombia first initiated preliminary contact with the US to seek the signature of an FTA in the early 1990s, it was not until May 2004 that the negotiation process formally started. Initially, negotiations began with Colombia, Ecuador and Peru together. However, by the end of 2005 the three countries had opted for different strategies. Colombia and Peru pursued the signing of bilateral agreements, whereas the negotiations between Ecuador and the US were suspended in May 2006. The signature of the agreement on November 22, 2006 took over two years, fourteen rounds of negotiations and sixty regional fora to secure. Law 1143 of 2007 approved the trade agreement. In July 2008, the Colombian Constitutional Court upheld the Colombia-US FTA (Court Rulings C750/08 and C751/08). However, approval of the FTA stalled in the US Congress for five years, until it was finally signed by the Obama administration on October 21, 2011. Over 80 percent of US exports of consumer and industrial products to Colombia became duty free immediately, with the remaining tariffs phased out over ten years.

9 Supporters of the Colombian court’s activism have placed it in the Latin American vanguard of the justiciability of rights, by promoting democracy and deepening its social basis in a country with high inequalities (Schor 2008, 15, 18-19). Critics of the Court have raised concerns that activism may displace legislators as the main guardians of rights by the rejection of legal for-malism as method of interpretation (Schor 2008, 8, 14).

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One crucial ingredient of the Colombia-US FTA is the parties’ explicit commitment to comply with internationally-recognized labor rights standards as promoted by the International Labor Association (ILO). This commitment is reflected in rights such as the right of association and the prohibition of forced labor (as detailed in Chapters XVII, “Labor,” and XVIII, “Environment,” of the agreement, Ministerio de Comercio, Industria y Turismo, 2014b).

b. the colombia/Peru-eu Fta

The negotiations of the Colombia/Peru-EU FTA started after the sig-nature of the Colombia-US FTA in 2007. In consistence with the EU’s inter-regional negotiation strategy (Santander 2008, 192), the negotiations of an Association Agreement with the Andean Community (CAN, from its Spanish initials) were initially announced in 2006. However, when the CAN negotiation bloc disintegrated in 2008 (as Bolivia and Ecuador abandoned the process), the EU changed its negotiation mandate and accepted the negotiation of bilateral trade agreements (Parra 2010). In this way, the EU moved away from its char-acteristic inter-regionalist strategy, with a strong region-building component (De Lombaerde, Pietrangeli, and Schulz 2009, Pietrangeli 2010), in the direc-tion of the “new bilateralism” (Heydon and Woolcock 2009). The negotiations were finally concluded at the EU-LAC Summit in Madrid in 2010. The treaty was then signed in June 2012 and approved by the European Parliament (EP) on December 11, 2012. After ratifications by the Colombian Congress in June 5, 2013, the Colombian government issued Decree 1513 of July 18, 2013, in order to temporarily implement the commercial part of the agreement. However, only after examination by the Constitutional Court—still pending—and the approval of each of the 27 EU member states parliaments10 will this FTA come into full force. The Colombia/Peru-EU FTA will eliminate tariff barriers for all industrial and fishery products, broaden market access for agricultural products, improve access to state contracts, services, and investment markets, reduce technical barriers to trade, and adopt common rules regarding intellectual property, transparency, and competition.

10 As of December 2013, ten countries had approved the agreement.

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The protection of rights figures prominently as part of this FTA. According to the Colombian government, “parties to the agreement must ensure that internationally recognized human rights and democratic prin-ciples—including labor rules—are observed and upheld” (Ministerio de Comercio, Industria y Turismo 2014c). This principle was fixed in Chapter IX, Article 267 of the agreement, according to which the parties agree to “strengthen their commitment to the principles and labor rights” in order to improve the contribution of trade to sustainable development (Colombia-EU FTA, Chapter IX, Article 267). In this regard, the FTA was coherent with the general legal mandate of the EU to improve human rights worldwide via its trade policy, and to avoid any harm (Articles 21 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and 205 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (FTEU)). Since 1995, the EU has included a general “Human Rights Clause” in all political framework agreements. According to this clause, “respect for democratic principles and human rights, as laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other relevant international hu-man rights instruments, and for the principle of the rule of law, underpins the internal and international policies of both Parties and constitutes an essential element of this Agreement” (European Parliament 2014, 9). In the words of Karel de Gucht, the European Commissioner for Trade, “we have both carrots and sticks. We offer major economic incentives at the same time as applying strict rules about the conditions to qualify. These are not paper tigers—but tough rules that we have had, occasionally, to put into practice” (2010, 3).

c. Projected Winners and losers: a Balance

At the beginning of the negotiation process for the Colombia-US FTA, the Colombian government, through its National Planning Office (DNP, from its Spanish initials), estimated that the FTA would help Colombian exports grow by over 6% (DNP 2003), and would attract investment in infrastructure, industry, and rural development. According to several stud-ies conducted during the negotiation process, the expected winners of the Colombia-US FTA would therefore be the informal and unqualified labor intensive sectors (with a growth rate of between 19% and 21% in some sectors, such as the textiles industry), agriculture (which depends on the elimination

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of US non-tariff barriers), and informal employment (with a rough growth in income of 5%). Additionally, the tourism sector (Rueda 2004), as well as the auto parts industry, publicly expressed their support of the FTA. According to Botero (2004), both the demand for skilled and unskilled labor would increase, although the latter would take place four times as quickly. Meanwhile, the formal and qualified intensive sectors and capital intensive sectors (Martín and Ramírez 2005) were the expected losers in this process. However, some sectors of the industrial labor industry favored the signing of FTAs, arguing that more investment would mean more jobs and more unionized workers. This version of “new unionism” (Dinero 2008) defended Colombia’s advantage in providing labor in order to stem the pressure from manufacturing based on cheap labor in China and India.11

In their analysis of the possible impacts of an FTA between the CAN and the EU, Vanzetti and Laird (2008) predicted some negative impacts on Colombian industry and manufacturing. This has been confirmed by a more recent study commissioned by the EU, predicting net negative growth figures for manufacturing, and positive figures for the agricultural and energy sectors (Francois, Gopalakrishnan, Norberg, Porto, and Walmsley 2012).12 According to the reference scenario in the same study, overall Colombian exports to the EU are expected to grow by 11%. The expected winners include the sugar, vegetables and fruit sectors (including bananas), while expected losers in-clude textiles, motor vehicles, and machinery and equipment (Francois et al. 2012, 31-32). Real wages for both skilled and unskilled labor are expected to increase, although unskilled wages are expected to increase more significantly (0.45% compared to 0.25%) (Francois et al. 2012, 41), leading to small reduc-tions in levels of poverty and inequality.

The DNP has estimated an increase of 0.25% in qualified labor salaries, 0.53% in unqualified labor, and 0.38% in capital (Vanzetti and Laird 2008). Similarly, the

11 An initial balance of the Colombia-US FTA after twenty months of operation suggests that Colombian production has benefited from the agreement. However, imports have increased, confirming the fears of some of this FTA’s opponents (Ministerio de Comercio, Industria y Turismo 2014d).

12 The study by Francois et al. (2012) updated the estimates in the previously commissioned Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA), carried out by Development Solutions (2009).

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planning office found that industry will suffer from negative rates of growth due to the implementation of the treaty. However, the Colombian government predicts an increase of half a percentage point in the GDP growth rate, 0.71% in exports, and 1.73% in imports, in addition to wage increases of 0.25% for qualified labor and 0.53% for unqualified labor (Ministerio de Comercio, Industria y Turismo 2010).

NGOs aimed at promoting human rights, such as Planeta Paz, several US civil society organizations, and Oxfam, added that the FTA would especially damage peasant populations (Garay Barberi, and Cardona 2006), leading to a decrease of between 16% and 45% in their income, which would push at least 1.8 million into illicit crops, affecting the right to life and to a healthy environment.

4. The Strategic Use of a Rights Discourse: Context, Actors and Strategies

Public discussion on the desirability and content of both FTAs largely re-volved around the economic figures and expectations described above. However, non-trade issues also played a prominent role. Overall, the debate demonstrated the strategic use of a rights discourse by the actors involved, who became mobi-lized in favor of or against FTAs. This section explores this issue further. Special emphasis will go to the growing and preponderant role of labor unions and hu-man rights NGOs, who used constitutional actions, especially the APFR and the AP (see section 4), to influence the processes of FTA negotiation, approval, and/or implementation. In addition, we will analyze the alliances developed between labor unions, human rights organizations, and members of selected political par-ties involved in the negotiation process of both FTAs in the US, Colombia, and the EU. Central to these coalitions was the strategic use of constitutional tools to bring the discussion before courts seeking a favorable judicial adjudication. The rights discourse not only defined identification and collaboration among actors but was also linked to delays and progress made in negotiations and in the rati-fication process, as well as to particular elements of FTA content.

In brief, this section should make clear that actors involved in free trade negotiations develop a rights discourse based both on measurable risks to specific rights and on the need to mobilize and build legislative and judicial support for preferred economic conditions and associated rights. It will be further argued that

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delays and obstructions of the negotiation process or specific content can be traced to the application of this strategic rights discourse. While the relationship between the countries involved may therefore be profoundly asymmetric in terms of trade volume and capacity (Garay, De Lombaerde, and Barberi 2011), actors involved in negotiations may in fact be able to alter inherent power imbalances leading to outcomes that cannot be read solely based on the economic leverage of the parties.

a. trade and non-trade reasons: actors in context

While FTAs are an important element of the commercial expansion strate-gies of the US and the EU, non-trade reasons were important for both actors when pursuing FTAs with Colombia. In the case of the Colombia-US FTA, complement-ing the war on drugs by strengthening the domestic economy in order to provide legal alternatives for generating income to drug-dependent local economies was a prominent policy goal. Although Plan Colombia—a massive US-led cooperation effort to bring peace and fight drugs in Colombia—has been gradually fading out, Colombia is still considered a strategic ally of the US’ war on drugs in the Andean region, as reflected in ongoing military cooperation (Tickner 2007). In addition to the war on drugs, the US strategy was also marked by the need to strengthen ties to Colombia in the face of growing efforts by the now deceased president of Venezuela, Hugo Chávez, to consolidate his role as a regional leader, with growing animosity against the US. Finally, the ratification process of the Colombia-US FTA centered on Colombia’s unfavorable performance in regards to union safety and on overall labor (rights) conditions: in 2009, Colombia was the country with the larg-est number of trade unionist homicides (48), ahead of Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico (Mejía and Uribe 2009). In sum, FTA negotiations between Colombia and the US were part of a larger political and economic agenda aimed at promoting trade as well as developing other political and strategic interests.13

13 See, for example, the statement issued by Senator John McCain: “Colombia is a beacon of hope in a region where others are actively seeking to thwart economic progress and democracy. We must not turn our back on fledgling democracies in this region, and we must not turn our back on American workers when all they want is the right to sell them in other countries” (2011). The expectation that trade liberalization increases overall wealth and supports human rights, such as the right to property, non-discrimination and the right to trade, is also discussed in Dunoff (1999); Lizarazo et al. (2014); Edwards (1998); Sachs and Warner (1995); Sachs (1998); and Warner (1999).

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Similarly, the EU has invested significant amounts of human and material resources in peace-building programs, most notably “Peace and Development Laboratories” in over ten Colombian regions (García and Llinás 2012), in addition to numerous programs and organizations promoting respect for human rights. Thus, discussions around the Colombia/Peru-EU FTA brought to the forefront the need to promote sustainable peace and development in order to continue and consolidate the EU’s decade-long engagement as a motivation for deepen-ing and diversifying their investments and commitments in the country. The Colombia/Peru-EU FTA was therefore shaped by the EU’s experience and larger goals in the country and region.14

b. opposing Ftas: actors in action

the colombia-us Fta

As we pointed out in Lizarazo et al. (2014), both the Colombia-US and the Colombia/Peru-EU FTAs met with fierce opposition from groups high-lighting the possible negative effects of the implementation of the agreements in several areas (see also Gómez and Gamboa 2010; Olivet and Novo 2011; Silva 2007; Vargas 2011). Human rights organizations and NGOs in Colombia, such as the Red Colombiana de Acción Frente al Libre Comercio y ALCA (RECALCA), and in the US, such as Public Citizen and Oxfam America (Oxfam 2011), argued that any trade agreement with a government linked to ongoing human rights violations should be stopped. A common thread in the opposition to the Colombia-US FTA was the transgression of fundamental rights by the proposed trade agreement, including life, life quality, access to medical care, culture, environment, dignity, privacy, and property, among others, involving different vulnerable groups, such as women and indigenous groups (Buckley and Boulle 2008; GRAIN 2006; Fink and Reichenmiller

14 As the European Commissioner for Trade, Karel De Gucht, pointed out: “[…] it is important that Parliament know that the protection of human rights is already central to our relation-ship with Colombia and Peru, precisely because we have long used our cooperation programs to further human rights in the region […] Human rights is a priority area of focus under the 2007-2013 Country Strategy Paper for Colombia” (2012, 2).

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2005; Lizarazo et.al. 2014; Malpani and Bloemen 2009; Médecins sans fron-tières 2004; Moon 2008; Nasu 2010; Vélez 2005; Zerda 2005).

The discussion of the FTA in the Colombian Congress and in the court hearings unveiled the expected domestic winners (e.g., unqualified and informal labor) and losers (organized labor) (De la Cadena 2008). Although some of the main representatives of the trade unions expressed their opposi-tion to the Colombia-US FTA from the beginning of the negotiations and led some of the main protests (Semana 2004a, 2004b), during its initial stages emphasis in Colombia was put on the risks of the FTA for the sovereignty of the Colombian state, for the right to health as a consequence of the increasing cost of drugs, and for the future of Colombian agriculture (Pérez 2007; Suárez 2007). Concerns about labor rights or conditions did not capture public atten-tion in Colombia, reflecting the fact that labor unions have been historically weak (according to Mejía and Uribe (2009), only about 4.1 to 7 percent of the Colombian formal labor force is unionized, and several unions compete for overall spokesmanship). Concerns raised by civil society organizations on prior consultation with indigenous populations also failed to attract much public attention (Gómez and Gamboa 2010).

Most of the Colombian opposition to the agreement was coordinated by the Colombian Network Against the FTA (RECALCA, from its Spanish initials)15 and focused on exerting pressure on the Colombian courts to de-clare the agreement unconstitutional—both through APFR, PA, and directly at Constitutional Court hearings—, because it affected the right to life and to a healthy environment (Lizarazo et al. 2014; Pérez and Novoa 2007; Suárez 2007). A glimpse of the actors’ statements at the court hearings (which were included in the text of Court Ruling C750 of 2008) provides an overview of central concerns raised. All of the opponents focused on the harm that could be done to specific rights should the FTA be enacted, illustrating the strate-gic use of a rights discourse. RECALCA led the expressions of interest, argu-ing against declaring the FTA constitutional. It suggested that a framework

15 RECALCA includes organizations that represent the interests of small farmers, trade unions, environmentalists, and other non-state actors such as think tanks that clearly opposed the Colombia-US FTA (Suárez 2007).

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conducive to promoting investments would curtail the exercise of all rights pertaining to a state of social welfare. In addition, it criticized what it called “insufficient consultation” with vulnerable groups in the months leading up to the design of the framework. The Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (CUT), one of Colombia’s largest trade unions, seconded RECALCA’s ob-servations, adding that FTA dispositions failed to include appropriate con-trol mechanisms to protect labor rights. Senator Jorge Enrique Robledo, a leading Left-wing politician who has championed social causes for years, criticized the agreement because it put at risk national sovereignty, food security, labor rights, the environment, and agriculture. A group of women’s organizations (Corporación Sisma Mujer, Asomujer y Trabajo, Instituto Latinoamericano de Servicios Legales Alternativos (ILSA); Corporación CACTUS; Punto Focal para Colombia de la Red Internacional de Género y Comercio Capítulo Latinoamérica; and Fundación para la Formación de Líderes Afrocolombianos, AFROLIDER) argued that the upcoming FTA gave insufficient consideration to how the norms and practices of international trade would infringe upon women’s rights. The Colombian Commission of Jurists joined the group of opponents and pointed towards risks to sover-eignty as well as several risks to ESCR, such as food security, intellectual property, and health. Several health organizations referred to how the FTA would jeopardize the right to health in the country (IFARMA, Misión Salud, and Acción Internacional por la Salud).

Other actors, such as the Health Mission (Alliance for the Defense of Health), sought to influence specific outcomes in the final text of the agree-ment—specifically the prevention of barriers to access to medicines in trade agreements—instead of rejecting it altogether (Gómez and Gamboa 2010, 80). Similarly, business associations such as the Farmers Society of Colombia (SAC, from its Spanish initials) and FENAVI, which represents the country’s egg and poultry producers, sought to shape the agreement in their favor but abstained from refusing to support the FTA (see Silva 2007; Gómez and Gamboa 2010).

In spite of opposition in Colombia, the Colombian Congress approved the Colombia-US FTA. Next, the Colombian Constitutional Court ruled it con-stitutional (Court Ruling C -750/08), via the automatic, abstract and preventive

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constitutional control. The Court consistently upheld the constitutional nature of FTAs, arguing that FTAs are part of a legitimate development strategy of the Colombian state (Lizarazo et al. 2014). As a result, an eventual but unexpected consequence of an FTA (such as an increased risk to the right to health) could not in itself be deemed unconstitutional. In its ruling, the Court underscored the competence of national authorities in terms of monitoring and protect-ing fundamental rights in the implementation of FTAs. This was in line with increasing judicial activism and with the argument that courts, in addition to traditional political actors who become mobilized in FTA discussions, have become powerful counterparts in discussions on trade policy.

In contrast with the Colombian situation, discussions in the US were marked by the prominent role of labor unions, a focus on labor rights and vio-lence against labor unionists in Colombia as a central concern (Villarreal 2014). The American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), the US’ largest federation of unions, led opposition to the FTA on the grounds that the agreement is part of the “same flawed trade model that has sent jobs overseas, suppressed wages and provided the benefits of trade to a narrow class of wealthy investors” (AFL-CIO 2014). Specifically in relation to Colombia, the AFL-CIO commissioned a study and stated that “the United States should not, as a matter of principle, commit to deep and more permanent economic integration, by way of a comprehensive trade agreement, with any country with such an atrocious record on trade union and human rights. As re-flected in innumerable governmental and non-governmental reports, Colombia is such a case” (AFL-CIO 2008, 2). To further underscore its point of view, the AFL-CIO pointed towards the fifty-one homicides against unionists that took place in 2010 alone, coining the well-known phrase that “Colombia is still the world’s most dangerous country for labor unions” (Portafolio 2011). This state-ment became a guiding motive for opposition against the FTA in Washington, both for US- and Colombia-based labor and human rights interest NGOs, and was adopted by Colombian union leaders and human rights organizations dur-ing visits to the US Congress.

The position of the AFL-CIO was echoed by members of the US Democratic Party, under the direction of the then Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi. The Democratic Party has been historically highly sensitive to and

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permeated by trade union interests, linked to a long-standing reticence to sup-port free trade for fear that American unionized labor would then be forced to compete with industries employing labor in unfavorable conditions. Democrat congresswoman Linda Sánchez visited Colombia by invitation of Oxfam’s Fair Trade campaign. During her visit, she was adamant about the Colombian gov-ernment’s responsibility to protect human and labor rights, strengthen the judi-cial system, and collaborate in the war against drugs (US Office on Colombia), in addition to protecting workers and trade unionists.

A meeting between Democratic Party members Harry Reid, Nancy Pelosi, and James McGovern and the Colombian president in 2007 further underscored these concerns: as long as Colombia failed to address questions regarding links between the government and regional political elites and right-wing extremists connected to the killing of unionists, a Colombia-US FTA was not feasible. Representative James McGovern was eloquent when he said “this is not about words, reports, or creating prosecution units, but about results and sentences, real progress” (Portafolio 2007). Notably, and underscoring the ef-ficacy of the labor lobby, other manifestations of human rights violations occur-ring in Colombia were not publicized as widely in FTA discussions, especially during the ratification process.

The strategy carried out by FTA opponents in the US, along with the consolidation of a Democratic Party majority in the US Congress, was effective in stalling congressional FTA approval for five years. As Representative Sánchez had warned, only after further amendments—included in a Bipartisan Trade Agreement referring to obligations related to basic ILO labor rights, multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), and pharmaceutical IPR—would the FTA be approved (Villarreal 2014). After nearly five years of intense lobbying work on both sides (see Portafolio 2007; Semana 2009; Vargas 2011; Semana 2006, 2007a, 2007b, and 2008), the US government sent the FTA to Congress for discussion and ratification. In April 2011, Presidents Obama (US) and Santos (Colombia) agreed that Colombia would present an “Action Plan on Labor Rights” to improve Colombian labor legislation and the physical conditions of workers (including se-curity concerns). After verifying Colombia’s accomplishment on the agreements reached, the US government sent the agreement to Congress, which approved it in both chambers on October 12, 2011. In May 2012, six years after being signed,

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FTA implementation began. Alleging ongoing human and labor rights viola-tions, organizations such as the Colombian Labor Union (CUT, from its Spanish initials) and the US labor organization AFL-CIO, continue to question the agree-ment (CUT and CTC 2014).

the colombia/Peru-eu Fta

Negotiations with the EU followed a similar pattern. However, one in-teresting difference was that while US Congress people and organizations were highly involved in the process during its ratification, their European counter-parts participated in the process earlier, during the negotiation stage. Whereas the strongest partners for FTA opponents in the US were select members of the Democratic Party, in the case of the EU, Center and Left-wing European political parties and powerful European human rights NGOs played this role. As opposed to the Colombia-US FTA, which focused on labor rights, in the case of the FTA with Europe concerns were centered around ongoing human rights violations in Colombia and the risk that these would continue. The agreement was also criticized for its possible impacts on the environment, indigenous communities and African-Colombians’ prior consultation rights, development, and income distribution. Critics also argued that the Colombia/Peru-EU FTA was a means by which Europe would provide legitimacy to human rights violations in Colombia and because of fears that an FTA with Colombia would stimulate conflict over land ownership and other forms of human rights violations amidst the ongoing internal armed conflict.

Numerous statements illustrate these points. By invitation of civil society organizations opposed to the agreement, members of the EP visited Colombia in 2010 to study human rights conditions in the country. Following their visit, they sent letters to European authorities voicing their concerns about Colombia’s human rights situation and expressing their opposition to the signing of an agree-ment that could worsen and legitimate human rights violations (MEPs 2010). In a related policy brief, the TEU human rights clause was referred to as being “little more than window dressing” (Olivet and Novo 2011, 6). The debate extended to the national level: German MPs, for example, called on “the Bundestag to exercise its legislative duty of taking a decision on the ratification of a free-trade agree-ment between the EU, Colombia and Peru which, rather than dealing exclusively

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with trade policy, also deals with issues relating to structural, constitutional and human rights policy” (German Bundestag 2010).

In addition to the EP, several social and human rights organizations took part in the debate. After the conclusion of negotiations in March 2010, a statement signed by over two hundred organizations in Europe and Latin America, including both NGOs and labor unions, asserted that “the agreements, besides from containing decisions which will affect economic, social and cultural rights of Centro American, Peruvian and Colombian peoples, do not include effective mechanisms which should condition commercial preferences to the adequate application of human rights, nei-ther do they comprise functional mechanisms of commercial sanction to face viola-tions. Additionally, it is worth mentioning that the conclusion of the negotiations stood above any consideration in reference with good government or human rights” (Enlazando Alternativas 2010). The statement was echoed by the European Trade Union Confederation and the International Trade Union Confederation (ETUC-ITUC 2010). The different organizations urged the EP to declare the FTA a “mixed agreement” in order to broaden the discussion to EU Member States’ parliaments, and to not allow its provisional enforcement until ratification by all twenty-seven member states (Olivet and Novo 2011).

Based on those criticisms, civil society organizations such as OIDHACO (International Office for Human Rights Action on Colombia, which repre-sents over thirty human rights organizations), CUT, CTC (Confederación de Trabajadores de Colombia), and RECALCA opposed this FTA and demanded additional guarantees to ensure the protection of human rights. Similarly to the case of the Colombia-US FTA, those business associations which felt that the agreement could potentially harm their economic interests opposed specific pro-visions of the FTA and raised their concerns in the media.16

16 FEDEGAN (National Federation of Cattle Breeders), ANALAC (National Milk Producers’ Association), and ANDEMOS (Colombian Association of Motor Vehicles) opposed specific provi-sions in the FTA that could harm their interests and preferences (Portafolio 2010a; Semana, 2010a). Both Colombian Conservative and Liberal Parties were sensitive to those concerns and initially opposed the approval of the FTA with the EU in Congress if no clear solutions were proposed to farmers. In response to these claims, the Colombian government promoted specific compensation programs (Portafolio 2010b) and the EU granted 30 million euros to be invested in programs aimed at increasing competitiveness in the dairy sector (Semana 2010b).

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However, in March 2012 the European Council consented to the pro-visional implementation of the Colombia/Peru-EU FTA upon approval by the EP and before the approval of the twenty-seven member state parliaments. This was followed by approval of the agreement in September by the European Commission. In December, the majority of the Members of EP (MEPs) had voted favorably on the agreement, demanding specific actions from Colombia and Peru in order to guarantee the protection of the environment and of human and labor rights (European Parliament 2012). As of December 2013, ten countries had approved the Colombia/Peru-EU FTA, which was provisionally enforced in August of the same year. Prior to its approval by the EP’s trade committee (INTA) in November and by the whole EP in December, both Colombia and Peru had submitted roadmaps to guarantee significant improvements in human rights in general and labor rights in particular, as well as the environment.

c. analysis and discussion

This article began by proposing a political economy model of trade policy, suggesting that actor capacity to exert influence on trade negotiations is shaped not only by the control of measurable resources but also by the creative use of intangible sources of power, such as legitimacy or the ability to recruit support from like-minded actors (within and across borders). In addition, the framework proposed that certain institutional opportunities and constraints condition the emergence of actors and coalitions, as well as their ability to bring their interests to the agenda. Finally, the conceptual framework suggests that actors learn during the negotiation and ratification processes of FTAs and apply those lessons to subsequent processes. The description presented above of the nature and strategies of the actors involved in FTA discussions between Colombia, the US, and the EU supports these claims.

The case illustrates how actors choose multiple strategies to advance their interests, depending on available institutional opportunities and on their own capacity. Groups involved in the FTA debate unleashed their persuasive abilities both domestically and internationally and on different institutional scenarios, including the Colombian Congress, the Colombian judiciary, the US Congress, the EP, the European member state parliaments, civil society fora, and the media. Crucial in their endeavor was the strategic use of a

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rights discourse, which actors adapted to different national contexts. This rights discourse served as a catalyst for a broad coalition of actors to advance their material interests—trade unions and small farmers—and nonmaterial interests—civil society organizations with interests in environmental, ethnic, labor, sustainability, and general human rights concerns. The strategic use of a rights discourse was effective in highlighting the non-trade effects and impacts of the FTAs on Colombian society. This mechanism was also facili-tated by the broad scope of FTAs and institutional contexts of the countries involved, most importantly the turn towards court activism in Colombia and the ability of the US Congress to influence trade agreements. Ultimately, no major changes in the FTAs’ final texts were made in response to rights-based claims raised by the actors studied here. However, structurally weak actors such as Colombian unions were able to influence the FTA negotia-tion process, thereby overcoming structural power imbalances. In both cases Colombia was requested to ratify ILO conventions and present a roadmap or action plan to secure human rights protection and promotion.

According to the strategy followed, opponents to both FTAs can be classified in two broad groups, which can be distinguished by whether they opposed FTAs altogether or were favorable to incremental change, and by whether they communicated with public officers or not. The first group re-fers to those actors who opposed specific provisions of the agreements and tried to advance their interests looking for specific adaptations in the final text. Although they raised their concerns in the media, tried to sway public opinion and organized public mobilizations, they preserved institutional (both formal and informal) channels of dialogue with governments on their issues of interest. Actors in this group defended both material—i.e., farmers, cattle breeders, milk, automobiles, egg and poultry producers—and nonma-terial interests—i.e., the Health Mission, defending the right to health—and attempted to advance their concerns through their own associations and with the occasional support of political parties. A second group refers to fierce opponents to any FTA, who gradually abandoned communication with gov-ernment officials, mobilized people on the streets, raised their concerns in the media, public fora, and meetings, and sought the declaration of uncon-stitutionality of the agreement by the Colombian Constitutional Court—in

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the case of the Colombia-US FTA—, employing the instruments provided by Colombia’s constitutional context. These actors found important allies in opposition political parties—both domestic and abroad—and among interna-tional NGOs and civil society organizations. Actors in this second group were able to build a unified opposition to both FTAs on the basis of a complete rejection of the agreements and shared concerns about human rights viola-tions—a rights discourse—which resonated across the political and social contexts on both sides of the Atlantic.

In addition, the degree of effectiveness also seems to be mediated by the institutional and political conditions of the countries involved and the ac-tors participating in the negotiation and ratification process. Although rights concerns were raised in both cases, at the end of the day domestic aspects conditioned how effective each strategy was in the context in which it was deployed. For example, while the Democratic Party—sensitive to labor union interests and dominating the US House of Representatives since 2006—was helpful in terms of delaying the approval of the Colombia-US FTA l, the EP and other European authorities such as the European Commission—and to some extent the European Council—have traditionally been open to this kind of trade agreement (Gstöhl 2013), and therefore favored the Colombia/Peru-EU FTA. Thus, the traditional inability of European civil society organiza-tions to effectively influence trade policy-making processes in the EU (Dür and De Bièvre 2007; Vargas 2011) was confirmed anew.

Finally, a few words on learning. Clearly, the two FTA processes described here were linked in that similar issues were raised by, overall, the same actors (Altmann, Rojas, and Beirute 2011, 16). Suggesting some degree of path-depen-dence for FTA negotiations (North 1990), the transmission of a rights discourse throughout the negotiations, the stability of the actors involved, and their main arguments should be further explored.

Conclusion

In this article, we sought to include in our analysis of the formation of trade policy the development of a rights discourse as a valuable strategic tool for the actors involved, as well as the constraints and opportunities offered by

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understudied actors in trade negotiations and implementation, e.g., courts and constitutional contexts. As revealed by our analysis of two FTAs negotiated between Colombia, the US, and the EU, this turn of events offers new possibili-ties for analyzing the political economy of trade policy. While the relationship between trade and rights is not a new concept, the framework presented here broadens our scope of actors, power resources, and implications beyond con-templating gains and losses for specific sectors and products. Developed here in order to understand the generation of trade policy, such a framework will also be useful in terms of evaluating the process of implementation over the coming years, and analyzing the connections between both processes under an integral approach to trade policy as a whole and as pursued by the Colombian government in other upcoming trade agreements.

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112. Semana. 2010a. La leche “amarga” del TLC entre Colombia y la UE. 19 May 2010. [Online] http://www.semana.com/economia/articulo/la-leche-amarga-del-tlc-entre-colombia-ue/116847-3

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120. Reuters. 2010. After BRICs, Look to CIVETS for Growth. 27 April 2010. [Online] http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/04/27/hsbc-emergingmarkets-idUSLDE-63Q26Q20100427

121. Rueda, Óscar. 2004. El TLC y su impacto en el turismo colombiano. Semana. 23 May 2004. [Online] http://www.semana.com/on-line/articulo/el-tlc-su-impacto-turismo-colombiano/66601-3

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angelika rettberg holds a PhD in Political Science from Boston University (US). She is an Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science at Universidad de los Andes (Colombia) and Program Director of ConPaz. She is currently is a Visiting Researcher at the GIGA Institute of Latin American Studies (Germany). Her latest publications include: “Encuentro con los otros: perspectivas para la reconciliación en Colombia.” In Costos económicos y sociales del conflicto en Colombia: ¿Cómo construir un posconflicto sostenible?, eds. Ana María Ibañez and Daniel Mejía. Bogotá: Ediciones Uniandes, 2014; and “La construcción de paz bajo la lupa: una revisión de la actividad y de la literatura académica internacional.” Estudios Políticos 42, 2013.E-mail: [email protected]

Philippe de lombaerde holds a PhD in Political Science from RWTH (Germany) and a PhD in Economics from PWU (US). He is currently Associate Director at the UNU-CRIS (Belgium) and Lecturer at the University of Maastricht (The Netherlands). His latest publi-cations include: “Testing the Relationships between Globalization, Regionalization and the Regional Hub-ness of the BRICs (with L. Chen).” Journal of Policy Modeling 36, 2014; and Regionalism (IV Volume series) (co-edited with F. Söderbaum). London: Sage, 2013.E-mail: [email protected]

liliana lizarazo-rodríguez holds a PhD in Law from Ghent University (Belgium). Her research interests are Economic Law, Public Procurement, Business Law and Administrative and Constitutional Law. Her latest publications include: “Cumplimiento de tratados de libre comercio: carácter vinculante de sus reglas y justiciabilidad de derechos constitucionales” (with Philippe De Lombaerde). In Después de Santiago: in-tegración regional y relaciones Unión Europea-América Latina, ed. Joaquín Roy. Miami: University of Miami, 2013; and “The Legal Scope of IMF Conditionality,” Revista de Derecho Público 27, 2011.E-mail: [email protected]

Juan Felipe ortiz-riomalo is an MA-Candidate at the Department of Political Science of Universidad de los Andes (Colombia). His research interests have revolved around political economy, government, and natural resources, with special emphasis on the Colombian mining sector. E-mail: [email protected]

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Una evaluación del Programa de Convergencia Macroeconómica de la Comunidad Andina de Naciones: el caso colombiano

Álvaro Pío Gómez OlayaUniversidad del Valle (Colombia)

DOI: dx.doi.org/10.7440/colombiaint81.2014.06RECIBIDO: 22 de febrero de 2013APROBADO: 12 de junio de 2013MODIFICADO: 5 de marzo de 2014

RESUMEN: El artículo se propone evaluar el proceso de coordinación internacional de políticas macroeconómicas realizado por Colombia en el marco del Programa de Convergencia Macroeconómica (PCM) de la Comunidad Andina de Naciones (CAN). El artículo examina la relación entre el cumplimiento de las metas de política macroeconómica y el ejercicio de coordinación internacional de políticas en la CAN mediante una consulta a un grupo de expertos en el área.

PALABRAS CLAVE: coordinación internacional de políticas • Comunidad Andina de Naciones • Programas de Convergencia Macroeconómica • evaluación de políticas públicas

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Este artículo es el resultado de la investigación titulada “Tipos de gestión y procesos de toma de decisiones para el cumplimiento de las metas de integración económica en la Comunidad Andina de Naciones (CAN)”, financiada por la Facultad de Ciencias de la Administración de la Universidad del Valle (Colombia).

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an evaluation of the Macroeconomic convergence Program of the andean community of nations: the colombian case

ABSTRACT: The article evaluates the international coordination process of macroeconomic policies carried out by Colombia within the framework of the Macroeconomic Convergence Program of the Andean Community of Nations (CAN, from its Spanish initials). It examines the relationship between the achievement of macroeconomic policy goals and the international coordination of CAN policies by consulting a group of experts in this field.

KEYWORDS: international policy coordination • Andean Community of Nations • Macroeconomic Convergence Program • public policies

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uma avaliação do Programa de convergência Macroeconômica da comunidade andina de nações: o caso colombiano

RESUMO: Este artigo avalia o processo de coordenação internacional de políticas macroeconômicas realizado pela Colômbia no Programa de Convergência Macroeconômica (PCM) da Comunidade Andina de Nações (CAN). Examina-se a relação entre o cumprimento das metas de política macroeconômica e o exercício de coordenação internacional de políticas na CAN mediante uma consulta a um grupo de especialistas na área.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Coordenação internacional de políticas • Comunidade Andina de Nações • Programa de Convergência Macroeconômica • políticas públicas

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Introducción1

La coordinación internacional de políticas macroeconómicas se ha consti-tuido como una de las características más sobresalientes de los procesos de internacionalización. Una revisión del papel de la coordinación y la coo-peración macroeconómica en las relaciones internacionales ilustra tanto la ausencia de instituciones internacionales de cooperación financiera antes de 1913 como el crecimiento explosivo de las burocracias estatales para atender la cooperación internacional (ministerios, agencias, etcétera). Los intentos de establecer procesos de coordinación internacional de políticas macroeconó-micas se remontan a las conferencias internacionales relacionadas con asun-tos monetarios de mediados del siglo XIX y continúan con las conferencias monetarias de los años veinte del siglo XX relativas al patrón oro, la creación de instituciones como el Fondo Monetario internacional (FMI) y el Banco mundial (BM), los esfuerzos bilaterales de diversas naciones para coordinar políticas de tipo de cambio y, finalmente, los ejercicios de cooperación para enfrentar las crisis de finales del siglo XX, en Latinoamérica y Asia, entre otros casos (Eichengreen 2011). A pesar de estos intentos de manejar las crisis macroeconómicas regionales o mundiales mediante la aplicación coor-dinada de políticas, la implementación efectiva de esquemas de coordinación ha sorteado, históricamente, diversos obstáculos. Las razones por las que la coordinación de políticas macroeconómicas no es implementada con mayor frecuencia son tres: en primer lugar, las asimetrías en el tamaño de los paí-ses; en segundo lugar, los desacuerdos acerca de los efectos transfronterizos por la aplicación de políticas domésticas y, por último, las limitaciones que tienen los tomadores de decisiones y los hacedores de políticas públicas para reconocer que deben afrontar disyuntivas entre diversos objetivos de política económica (Ostry y Ghosh 2013).

1 El autor agradece a los expertos consultados y entrevistados, por sus comentarios y análisis, así como a las instituciones involucradas, por permitir el acceso a ellos. Igualmente, a las in-vestigadoras Carolina Rojas y Mery Saavedra, quienes fueron de gran ayuda en el desarrollo de esta investigación, y al grupo de investigación Gestión y Evaluación de Programas y Proyectos (GyEPRO) de la Universidad del Valle (Colombia), por el soporte brindado.

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Recientemente, la crisis mundial de 2008, marcada por un contexto de creciente integración económica, sumado a las asimetrías existentes en el manejo de los tipos de cambio, ha demostrado que no es posible confiar en los mecanismos de ajuste automático, sino que, por el contrario, está vigente la necesidad de implementar esquemas de cooperación y coordina-ción de políticas macroeconómicas en el mundo contemporáneo (Adam, Subacchi y Vines 2012).

En el contexto específico latinoamericano, a partir de la década de los noventa, la Comunidad Andina de Naciones (CAN) comenzó a avanzar en la consolidación de programas de coordinación de políticas macroeconómicas, los cuales representan un ejercicio de coordinación que debe ser evaluado para determinar si ha incidido en el buen desempeño de un país (medido a partir de indicadores asociados a variables de política monetaria y fiscal). Es importante dilucidar si efectivamente la participación de Colombia en el ejercicio de coordinación en el contexto de integración de la CAN ha inf lui-do o determinado los buenos resultados que ha logrado el país en materia de estabilidad macroeconómica. En este sentido, el propósito principal de este trabajo es evaluar la relación entre el cumplimiento de metas de políti-ca macroeconómica y el ejercicio de coordinación internacional de políticas desarrollado por la CAN.

El presente artículo expone los resultados de una consulta a expertos relacionada con la evaluación de políticas y programas públicos; de manera específica, aborda el análisis de la participación de Colombia en el Programa de Convergencia Macroeconómica (PCM) de la Comunidad Andina de Naciones y su influencia sobre el desempeño macroeconómico del país. El PCM de la CAN es un caso sui generis desde el punto de vista de políticas públicas colombianas orientadas al contexto internacional, puesto que se constituye, desde una pers-pectiva institucional, como el principal ejercicio de coordinación internacional de políticas macroeconómicas implementado en el marco de un proceso de integración económica.

El PCM opera desde 1999 y forma parte de un conjunto de programas semejantes desarrollados en el marco de diversos procesos de integración en Latinoamérica —el Mercado Común del Sur (Mercosur), el Mercado Común Centroamericano (MCCA) y la CAN—, los cuales tienen como referente

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Una evaluación del Programa de Convergencia Macroeconómica de la CANÁlvaro Pío Gómez Olaya

conceptual los criterios de convergencia nominal propuestos por el Tratado de Maastricht.2 Estos programas han contado con apoyo técnico de la Unión Europea para el diseño de métodos de gestión que les permitan operar en el contexto latinoamericano.

Además de la introducción, el presente artículo consta de seis seccio-nes. En la primera sección se realiza una breve descripción de la evolución del proceso de integración de la CAN, el modelo de gestión implementado en el marco de coordinación de políticas macroeconómicas y las metas y los resultados del desempeño del PCM. La segunda sección expone elementos metodológicos. En la tercera sección se detallan los resultados de la consulta realizada al grupo de expertos. La cuarta sección presenta un análisis sin-tético de los resultados en un contexto de análisis “positivo” y “normativo”. La quinta sección se centra en el papel de los modelos de coordinación in-ternacional puestos en práctica por Colombia (el “diálogo macroeconómico”, la “supervisión” y la “autodisciplina”). En la última sección se presentan las conclusiones generales.

1. Antecedentes

Desde 1969, con la firma del Acuerdo de Cartagena, comenzó el pro-ceso de integración andino, con la participación de cinco naciones: Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Perú y Colombia. El primer artículo del Acuerdo establece como propósito “promover el desarrollo equilibrado y armónico de los países miembros en condiciones de equidad, mediante la integración y la cooperación económica y social; acelerar su crecimiento y la generación de ocupación; facilitar su participación en el proceso de integración regional, con miras a la formación gradual de un mercado común latinoamericano” (Acuerdo de Cartagena 1969, art. 1).

2 El Tratado de Maastricht entró en vigor en 1993 y es considerado como el tratado cons-titutivo de la Unión Europea. Los criterios de convergencia nominal establecidos fueron: estabilidad de precios, finanzas públicas sostenibles, participación en el mecanismo de tipos de cambio del sistema monetario europeo y tipos de interés a largo plazo.

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En materia de armonización gradual de las políticas económicas, el Acuerdo plantea adoptar progresivamente una estrategia para alcanzar un de-sarrollo integrado de la región por medio de acciones planificadas en las polí-ticas monetaria, fiscal, cambiaria y financiera. En este sentido, se designa a la Secretaría General para aprobar normas y definir plazos para la armonización gradual de las legislaciones económicas, y los instrumentos y mecanismos de regulación y fomento del comercio exterior de los países miembros (art. 58). En 1973, Venezuela se unió a la organización, y en 1976, Chile se retiró. En esta dé-cada se formaron casi todos los órganos e instituciones andinas, a excepción del Consejo Presidencial Andino, que nació en 1990.

En la década de los ochenta, los países andinos se estancaron, e incluso retrocedieron, en el proceso de integración, debido a la crisis del “modelo de sustitución de importaciones” (modelo de integración “cerrado”) y a la crisis de la deuda que afectó a Latinoamérica. A finales de este período se decidió adoptar el modelo de integración abierto, para enfrentar el mundo globaliza-do, donde el comercio y el mercado tenían un papel protagónico; por lo cual se modificó la estrategia de integración.

A inicios de la década de los noventa, precisamente con la creación del Consejo Presidencial Andino, comenzó el proceso de convergencia macroeco-nómica de la CAN, el cual sentó las bases operativas de la armonización gradual de políticas cambiarias, monetarias y fiscales. El Consejo Presidencial Andino asignó a los ministros de Hacienda o Finanzas, a los presidentes de los bancos centrales y a los responsables de planeación económica de la CAN, el desarrollo de una agenda de trabajo en programas de convergencia y moni-toreo en la subregión. De esta forma, la CAN diseñó e implementó un modelo de gestión del proceso en el programa de coordinación de políticas macroeco-nómicas, el cual tenía como referente la asesoría brindada por el proyecto Redima-CAN, coordinado por la Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (Cepal) y patrocinado por la Unión Europea.

a. el modelo de gestión de la convergencia macroeconómica implementado por la Can

El referente básico del modelo de gestión de convergencia macroeco-nómica de la CAN es el implementado por la Unión Europea. Así, desde una

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perspectiva metodológica, se concibe como un “método abierto de coordina-ción” (Cárcamo-Díaz 2012) entre las autoridades económicas descentraliza-das, el cual incluye como herramientas el diálogo, la revisión de las mejores prácticas, el intercambio de las mismas, así como el monitoreo mutuo, todo ello en el contexto del llamado “principio de subsidiariedad”, según el cual las decisiones de política económica están en manos de los Estados y son coordinadas por un marco institucional común.

Si bien hay una cercanía con el modelo de la Unión Europea, la im-plementación del ejercicio de coordinación internacional de políticas ma-croeconómicas entre los países miembros de la CAN ha requerido un diseño institucional específico, el cual consiste en un programa de monitoreo de un conjunto de indicadores, consensuados por los participantes, esencialmente relacionados con la estabilidad macroeconómica. La modalidad de gestión adoptada fue la denominada “red de diálogo macroeconómico” (Redima), la cual pone énfasis en los mecanismos de evaluación entre “pares”, bási-camente técnicos, provenientes de los ministerios de Economía, Hacienda, Planificación, y el banco central.

Así lo expresa claramente Christian Ghymers, asesor de la Unión Europea para el proyecto de cooperación entre la Comisión Europea y la Cepal, que dio origen a la red:

Redima es solo un método que no apoya ninguna doctrina o política económica en particular, a excepción de la atención específica que pone en las ventajas potenciales de las estrategias de cooperación regional para las subregiones de América Latina, que es la hipótesis de trabajo que orienta su acción. Incluso en esta área específica, Redima no pre-tende proponer o elegir a priori opciones institucionales sino solamente ofrecer un mecanismo colegiado para la selección progresiva de aque-llas ideas, políticas económicas e instituciones que podrían responder a las realidades locales. (2005, 93)

Cárcamo-Díaz, asesor de Asuntos Económicos de la Cepal, ar-gumenta que el método del diálogo macroeconómico, en cuanto a las metas de convergencia macroeconómica, es el adecuado para el contexto

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específico latinoamericano, dado que éste puede conducir a un proceso de aprendizaje y conocimiento mutuos que favorece la capacidad para implementar un proceso de convergencia macroeconómica en un contexto de incertidumbre, información asimétrica y racionalidad limitada de los participantes (2005, 26-27).

De igual forma, el trabajo de Escaith y Paunovic (2003) fundamenta, desde el punto de vista teórico, la implementación del modelo de gestión adoptado por la CAN, al aplicar la teoría de juegos al contexto de los pro-cesos de integración regional, específicamente a las dinámicas de coordina-ción macroeconómica en Latinoamérica. Los autores ilustran los beneficios asociados a la creación de alguna instancia formal de coordinación que promueva el uso de estrategias de cooperación entre los participantes. A continuación se describe cronológicamente el esquema de gestión seguido por la CAN.

En 1997, en la IX reunión del Consejo Presidencial Andino, se desig-nó como instancia de dirección del programa al Consejo Asesor, integrado por ministros de Hacienda o Finanzas, bancos centrales y responsables de la planeación económica. El propósito era desarrollar una agenda de trabajo para la armonización de políticas macroeconómicas de los países andinos miembros, en aras de crear un ambiente económico estable. En 1999 se estableció el primer criterio de convergencia: alcanzar gradualmente las tasas anuales de inf lación de un dígito (III Reunión Ordinaria del Consejo Asesor). Un año después se estableció como mecanismo de seguimiento la presentación de informes semestrales en los cuales se reporte la evolución de la inf lación en cada país miembro (IV Reunión Ordinaria del Consejo Asesor). En 2001 se adoptó el segundo criterio de convergencia, que esta-blecía que para 2002 el déficit del sector público no financiero no debía exceder el 3% del PIB. Al mismo tiempo, se estableció el tercer criterio de convergencia, que disponía que el saldo de la deuda pública (externa e interna) del sector público consolidado no debía exceder el 50% del PIB (V Reunión Ordinaria del Consejo Asesor).

A partir de 2001 se implementó un mecanismo de seguimiento, cuyo propósito era realizar exámenes periódicos del cumplimiento de las metas esta-blecidas, por medio del Grupo Técnico Permanente (GTP), del cual forman parte

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técnicos de los bancos centrales, los ministerios de Hacienda y los organismos de planeación económica. El GTP usa los análisis de los programas de acción de convergencia que los países miembros presentan cada tercer trimestre de cada año, en donde especifican los supuestos macroeconómicos y las políticas económicas que planean ejecutar en el siguiente año (V Reunión Ordinaria del Consejo Asesor, cláusula 5).

En 2003 se adoptó un mecanismo de “transparencia y credibilidad” que obliga a los países miembros a presentar anualmente los Programas de Acciones de Convergencia (PAC). Los PAC se presentan a la Secretaría General a inicios de cada año para la evaluación anual del cumplimiento de las metas comunitarias; requieren refrendación tanto del Ministro de Economía como del presidente del banco central de cada país para su pre-sentación a la Secretaría General (Decisión 543, 2003). Finalmente, se incor-poró la aplicación de un método de gestión, denominado Red de Diálogo Macroeconómico (Redima). El proyecto Redima se ejecutó en dos etapas. La primera fase (2000-2003) fue el Proyecto CAN-Redima, realizado por la Cepal con el propósito de fomentar el diálogo entre los empleados de alto nivel de los ministerios y bancos centrales. La segunda fase, denominada Redima II (2005-2006), estaba orientada a seguir contribuyendo al intercam-bio de opiniones entre los hacedores de política y funcionarios de alto nivel, pero también buscaba fortalecer el marco analítico para armonizar políticas macroeconómicas y financieras y la capacidad de proveer estadísticas e ins-trumentos cuantitativos para ayudar en la toma de decisiones en cuanto a política económica. Esta fase del proceso contó con apoyo financiero y parti-cipación de expertos de la Unión Europea.

b. Metas y resultados del desempeño en el marco del Programa de convergencia Macroeconómica

Como se mencionó antes, el proceso de coordinación de políticas macroeco-nómicas incorporó la adopción de tres criterios de convergencia, cuyo objetivo era alcanzar una mayor estabilidad subregional para evitar los efectos externos negativos de las decisiones políticas domésticas. La síntesis del desempeño reportado por cada uno de los países, frente a las metas comprometidas en el marco del PCM de la CAN en el período, se presenta a continuación (ver tabla 1).

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En el caso colombiano, los informes anuales del PCM ilustran el cumplimiento de las metas establecidas en el marco del programa. Así, por ejemplo, la inf lación siempre ha sido de un dígito, el déficit del sector pú-blico no financiero es inferior al 3% del PIB, con la excepción del año 2003,

Criterio País 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Inflación

Meta comunitaria 1. Inflación anual de un dígito.

Bolivia 3,94% 4,62% 4,91% 4,95% 11,73% 11,85%

Colombia 6,5% 5,5% 4,85% 4,48% 5,69% 7,67%

Ecuador 6,1% 1,9% 3,14% 2,87% 3,32% 8,83%

Perú 2,5% 3,48% 1,5% 1,14% 3,93% 6,65%

Venezuela 27,08% 19,18% 14,4%

Déficit fiscal

Meta comunitaria 2. El déficit del sector público no financiero no debería exceder el 3% del PIB. Se consideró un período de transición

del 2002-2004 en el cual este indicador podría llegar al 4% del PIB.

Bolivia -7,9% -5,8% -2,1% 5,1% 1,8% 3,2%Colombia -3,3% -1,2% -0,3% -1% -1% -0,10%Ecuador 1,8% 2,5% 0,7% 3,30% 3% -1,10%

Perú 1,9% 1,1% 0,4% 2,10% 3,10% 2,10%Venezuela 2,1% 1,9%

Deuda pública

Meta comunitaria 3. El saldo de la deuda pública, tanto externa como interna, del sector público consolidado no debe exceder el 50% del

PIB al final de cada ejercicio económico.

Bolivia 85,5% 81,5% 75% 55,9% 44,40% 44%

Colombia 53,3% 47,1% 43,2% 31,2% 41,60% 31,90%

Ecuador 54% 48,1% 39,9% 25% 31,60% 26,10%

Perú 45,4% 45,3% 38,2% 32,7% 29,20% 24%

Venezuela 47,2% 39,70%

Tabla 1. Criterios, metas y desempeño de los países de la CAN

Fuente: elaborada a partir de los Informes de seguimiento. Convergencia Macroeconómica Andina, 2003-2008. Secretaría General de la CAN.

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y ha venido disminuyendo constantemente, y el saldo de deuda inferior al 50% del PIB sólo se incumplió en 2003. Esto indica que el país ha mejorado de manera continua su desempeño macroeconómico, medido respecto a las variables o criterios de convergencia nominal que corresponden a las políti-cas monetaria y fiscal.

2. Metodología

En el marco del PCM se busca evaluar si el cumplimiento de las me-tas de este programa, para el caso colombiano, obedece a una dinámica “en-dógena”, es decir, si el resultado (cumplimiento de metas) está determinado por la dinámica interna del programa, o si es de naturaleza “exógena”, es decir, si el logro de las metas macroeconómicas se debe a procesos externos a la dinámica del Programa de Convergencia Macroeconómica de la CAN, por ejemplo, a procesos de coordinación con otros países o instituciones multilaterales o procesos de toma de decisiones domésticas que también estén orientados a alcanzar estos objetivos.

Con este propósito, se aplicó una aproximación tipo “Delphi”,3 la cual con-siste en un sondeo a un conjunto de expertos, conocedores del funcionamiento del Programa de Convergencia Macroeconómica de la CAN y con capacidades valorativas para, por medio de sus juicios individuales y la síntesis analítica del estudio, evaluar si el cumplimiento de las metas macroeconómicas del programa obedece a una cierta efectividad del PCM. El perfil de los participantes de la muestra es heterogéneo, para así brindar robustez a los resultados.

Algunos de los parámetros que se tuvieron en cuenta para el diseño del ejercicio evaluativo fueron: los objetivos del programa, los instrumentos, la duración temporal, las características institucionales, la gestión, el desem-peño, entre otros.

3 El método Delphi, dentro del conjunto de métodos de investigación cualitativos, resulta apropiado para estructurar procesos de consulta a grupos de individuos con alto grado de experticia específica sobre un problema o tema particular en contextos de evaluación frente a posibles cambios a futuro, razón por la cual ha sido aplicado en ejercicios prospectivos de construcción de políticas.

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a. características técnicas de la consulta

La metodología empleada se enmarca en el ejercicio de consulta a expertos, cuya característica principal es el conocimiento especializado y directo de los procesos de coordinación. El grupo de convocados estuvo compuesto por funcionarios de las instituciones directamente relacionadas con el proceso —ministerios de Hacienda y Comercio, Banco de la República, Fondo Latinoamericano de Reservas (FLAR)— y académicos e investigadores, a los cuales se les pidió valorar algunos aspectos esenciales del proceso de coordinación de políticas macroeconómicas de la CAN, específicamente su PCM entre 2000 y 2007.

Un primer paso en la aplicación de la consulta fue la conformación del panel de expertos, para lo cual se tuvieron en cuenta los posibles sesgos en su composición (tales como la participación mayoritaria de expertos repre-sentativos de una tendencia o representantes de una ideología determinada). El segundo paso fue la formulación del cuestionario, basado en preguntas concretas con una línea conductiva, que contenía información adicional para que el experto pudiera contar con más herramientas para dar su opinión, pero cuidando de que se formaran interpretaciones erróneas o se desviara la respuesta. El cuestionario que se planteó es breve (diez preguntas), con el fin de que los expertos mantuvieran el interés (ver Anexo 2).

b. objetivo de la consulta

El objetivo fundamental de la consulta a expertos es obtener su aprecia-ción sobre algunos temas relacionados con el ejercicio de coordinación interna-cional de políticas macroeconómicas en Colombia, con énfasis en el PCM de la CAN en el período 2000-2007.

c. características de los expertos consultados

Los expertos debían tener un conocimiento amplio en temas de teoría y política comercial relacionados con los procesos de integración. Estas caracterís-ticas pueden haber sido acumuladas por su educación, profesión o experiencia laboral. Con relación a este último aspecto, se recogieron las opiniones de per-sonas que estaban relacionadas directamente con el proceso de coordinación de políticas macroeconómicas de la CAN.

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Para recoger la opinión desde distintas perspectivas se seleccionaron expertos que se destacaban en distintos escenarios: académicos, asesores económicos, funcio-narios del Gobierno colombiano que formaban parte del proceso (Departamento Nacional de Planeación [DNP], Ministerio de Comercio, Banco de la República).

d. Componentes de la consulta

La consulta se desagrega en tres grandes componentes. Un componente de evaluación del grado de coordinación internacional de políticas macroeconó-micas; un componente dedicado específicamente a obtener una valoración del PCM y un componente de coordinación internacional de políticas y estabilidad macroeconómica, con el propósito de establecer cuál o cuáles factores han sido los más influyentes en el desempeño del programa, lo cual puede indicar cuál es el grado de influencia o efectividad que el grupo de expertos le otorga al ejercicio de coordinación de la CAN.

El cuestionario está planteado en dos dimensiones desde el punto de vista epistemológico de la política económica (Fernández Díaz, Parejo Gámir y Rodríguez Saíz 1999, 23), que, por una parte, contiene un conjunto de preguntas de naturaleza “positiva” (que intenta establecer “lo que es”, es decir, las caracte-rísticas o los resultados de los procesos de gestión o de las políticas o programas aplicados), y por otra parte, un conjunto de preguntas de naturaleza “normati-va” (que intenta establecer “lo que debería ser”, es decir, lo que a juicio de los consultados debería o podría hacerse para modificar o mejorar el programa).

e. tipo de pregunta

La mayoría de las preguntas realizadas a los expertos están formuladas en una escala del tipo “Likert”. Esta escala de nivel ordinal se caracteriza por ubicar una serie de frases seleccionadas en una gradación de acuerdo/desacuerdo, con el fin de conocer las opiniones del grupo encuestado.

Las preguntas de los segmentos 1 a 5, al igual que las preguntas 7 y 10, fueron construidas con base en esta escala haciendo una variación. El formato principal de estas preguntas consiste en la presentación de cuatro opciones: alto, medio, bajo y nulo. Así, por ejemplo, las escalas de la pregunta 5 son: contribu-ción alta, media, baja y sin contribución (la palabra contribución es cambiada en las demás preguntas por coordinación, cumplimiento e importancia).

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f. tipo de aplicación

El proceso de recolección de información, análisis y procesamiento se realizó por medio de una aplicación web de encuestas en línea denominada “e-encuesta”. La encuesta se aplicó en 2010, entre los meses de octubre y diciembre. Se hicieron diecisiete encuestas en total.

3. Resultados y tendencias

Con base en las respuestas de los expertos consultados, a continuación se hace una breve descripción estadística de los resultados obtenidos, los cuales se presentan siguiendo el orden del cuestionario (ver Anexo 2).

Cuando se preguntó sobre el grado de coordinación internacional de la política monetaria en Colombia, el grupo mayoritario de encuestados (47%) respondió que el grado de coordinación corresponde a un nivel medio, segui-do por un 29% de los expertos que opinan que el grado es bajo. El resto de los entrevistados se distribuye entre los que piensan que el grado de coordinación es alto (18%) y los que piensan que no hay coordinación de política monetaria (6%) (ver gráfica 1).

Las respuestas obtenidas sugieren que las decisiones de política monetaria en Colombia tienen un grado de coordinación internacional medio/bajo, lo cual implicaría un papel importante de los procesos de toma de decisión domésticos.

Gráfica 1. Grado de coordinación internacional de las políticas monetaria y fiscal de Colombia

Fuente: elaboración propia a partir del cuestionario.

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%Grado alto Grado medio Grado bajo Sin coordinaciónpo

rcen

taje

de

expe

rtos

Política fiscal Política monetaria

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Del mismo modo, se preguntó sobre el grado de coordinación inter-nacional de la política fiscal de Colombia (ver gráfica 1). La mayoría de los expertos (47%) respondió que el grado de coordinación es bajo, seguidos por los que piensan que el grado de coordinación es medio (35%). Por último, están los que opinan que no hay coordinación internacional en la política fiscal colombiana (18%). En este caso, ninguno de los encuestados piensa que el grado de coordinación es alto.

Los resultados referidos al grado de coordinación internacional en el caso de la política fiscal reflejan resultados similares a los obtenidos en el caso de la política monetaria, los cuales sugieren incluso un grado menor de coordinación y, por lo tanto, refuerzan la idea de la importancia de los procesos domésticos de toma de decisiones de política macroeconómica.

También se preguntó sobre el grado de coordinación internacional de políticas macroeconómicas de Colombia frente a distintos actores (ver grá-fica 2). Los expertos identificaron, entre los actores que tienen un grado de coordinación alto, al FMI, principalmente, el (BM), el Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID) y, en menor medida, la Organización Mundial del Comercio (OMC).

Las opiniones de los expertos con respecto a la coordinación de política macroeconómica con otros países se dividen, pero la mayoría se distribuye entre los que creen que no hay coordinación y los que opinan que el grado es bajo. Así mismo, en el caso de la coordinación realizada con bloques de integración económica tales como el Mercosur, la CAN y la Unión Europea, la mayoría de los encuestados piensa que la coordinación de política es baja.

En síntesis, cuando se solicitó a los consultados evaluar el grado de coordinación discriminando por tipo de actor, dividiendo a los mismos en tres grandes grupos (instituciones multilaterales, bloques económicos y de integración y países), el mayor grado de coordinación es atribuido a las ins-tituciones multilaterales; en este sentido, resalta el papel reconocido al FMI como actor principal. Por otra parte, cuando se trata de bloques económicos o países individualmente considerados, el grado de coordinación es bajo. Finalmente, el grado de coordinación reconocido a la CAN por la mayoría de los encuestados es bajo.

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Con relación al PCM, se buscó captar la percepción de los expertos con respecto al grado de cumplimiento de las metas de convergencia macroeco-nómica (ver gráfica 3). Las opiniones son heterogéneas y dependen del tipo de meta. Frente a la pregunta sobre el grado de cumplimiento de las metas de convergencia, la mayoría de los encuestados (88%) piensa que, en cuanto a la primera meta —inflación de un solo dígito—, el grado de cumplimiento es alto. En cuanto a la segunda meta —déficit del sector público menor de 3% del PIB—, las opiniones se dividen: aproximadamente el 47% de los entrevis-tados piensan que el grado de cumplimiento es alto, 23,5% de los entrevistados piensan que el grado de cumplimiento es medio, y 23,5% piensan que es bajo. Uno de los entrevistados piensa que no hay ningún grado de cumplimiento. De la tercera y última meta —saldo de la deuda pública menor al 50% del PIB—, el 53% de los expertos piensan que el grado de cumplimiento es alto, el 42% opinan que el grado es medio, y sólo un encuestado cree que el grado de cumplimiento es bajo.

Gráfica 2. Grado de coordinación internacional de políticas macroeconómicas de Colombia con distintos actores


Otra institución

Otro País

Perú

Ecuador

Brasil

Chile

Venezuela

EUA

Mercosur

Unión Europea

CAN

OMC

BID

Banco Mundial

FMI

act

ores

0 5 10 15

sin coordinación Grado bajo Grado medio Grado alto

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Ante la pregunta sobre el grado de importancia de los componentes del PCM de la CAN, la mayoría de los encuestados (71%) piensa que el Consejo Asesor tiene un grado de importancia alto, seguido por el GTP. Sólo el 18% de los expertos consideran que el mecanismo de monitoreo tiene un grado de importancia alto, y la mayoría (47%) opina que el grado de importancia es medio. Igualmente, sólo un gru-po reducido de los encuestados (23,5%) percibe la Redima como un grado de impor-tancia alto; los demás se distribuyen entre grado de importancia medio (41%) y bajo (29%), e incluso uno de los expertos considera que no tiene ninguna importancia. Lo anterior implica que, en cuanto al diseño o arquitectura institucional, los expertos dan valoraciones heterogéneas a los componentes. En escala, valoran más el órgano de dirección (Consejo Asesor y GTP) que el mecanismo de gestión, y relativamente menos al método (Redima).

Ahora bien, cuando se preguntó sobre el tipo de ejercicio de coordi-nación internacional de política macroeconómica, la mayoría de los expertos identificaron que el Programa de Convergencia Macroeconómica de la CAN4

4 En esta pregunta, el experto consultado pudo seleccionar dos o más opciones de respuesta simultánea-mente. Las opciones que se solicitaron a los encuestados seleccionar pueden observarse en el Anexo 2.

Gráfica 3. Grado de cumplimiento de las metas de convergencia macroeconómica por parte de Colombia en el marco del PCM


Ningún

Bajo

Medio

Alto

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16

Gra

do d

e cu

mpl

imie

nto

número de encuestados

saldo de deuda pública (menor 50% PiB)déficit sector público (menor 3% PiB / excepto período 2002-2004 menor 4%)inflación (de un solo dígito)

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corresponde a dos tipologías básicas: 1) intercambio de información y opi-niones acerca de decisiones políticas y 2) acuerdos respecto de definiciones comunes de conceptos y mediciones.

Los expertos respondieron con respecto al grado de contribución de diversos factores en la estabilidad macroeconómica de Colombia (ver gráfica 4). La mayoría de los entrevistados señala que las decisiones de política econó-mica, las reformas político-institucionales y legales y las condiciones externas favorables tienen un grado de contribución alto en la estabilidad macro del país. Seguidamente, los encuestados consideran que los acuerdos y programas con el FMI tienen un grado de importancia medio. De igual forma, un grupo importante de los encuestados (59%) opina que el Programa de Convergencia Macroeconómica de la CAN tiene un grado de contribución bajo en la estabi-lidad macroeconómica, e incluso hay unos pocos que consideran que no existe ninguna contribución en este programa.

Gráfica 4. Contribución de distintos factores a la estabilidad macroeconómica de Colombia


Otros factores

Acuerdos y programas con el FMI

Programa de Convergencia Macroeconómica CAN

Condiciones externas favorables

Reformas político-institucionales y legales

Decisiones domésticas de política económica

Fact

ores

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14

Bajoninguna medio alto

Como se señaló antes, el grado de coordinación del PCM de la CAN es bajo, y, por tanto, la contribución o influencia efectiva sobre la estabilidad ma-croeconómica del país es baja. Los ejercicios de coordinación con organismos multilaterales como el FMI, según lo plantean los expertos, apenas tienen una

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influencia media. De esta forma, toma fuerza la idea de que los factores inter-nos o domésticos, como las decisiones económicas y las reformas estrictamente nacionales, son más influyentes que los demás factores. En la gráfica 5 se pre-sentan los resultados sobre la dimensión normativa (lo que debería ocurrir en el PCM). Los expertos se dividen entre los que opinan que deben mantenerse todos los componentes del Programa de Convergencia Macroeconómica (42%) y los que consideran que deberían incorporarse nuevos componentes (37%). La minoría (el 11% y 10%) piensa que se debería sustituir por otro programa o suprimir algunos de los componentes, respectivamente.

Gráfica 5. Percepción sobre el “deber ser” del PCM de la CAN


De esta manera, los expertos estiman conveniente mantener los com-ponentes tal como están o incorporar componentes adicionales al programa. Las opciones de sustituir o suprimir el programa en su conjunto no se con-sideran convenientes, lo que muestra que, aunque el programa influye poco, y a pesar de que valoran de manera heterogénea sus componentes, les parece conveniente su continuidad.

Con relación a la viabilidad o inviabilidad de la aplicación de acciones de cambio en el PCM, la mayoría de los encuestados optó por responder que es viable mantener todos los componentes del programa, seguidos por aquellos que consideran viable incorporar nuevos componentes. Ante la posibilidad de suprimir componentes,

42%37%

11%10%

mantener todos sus componentesincorporar nuevos componentes suprimir algunos de sus componentes

ser sustituido por otro programa

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las opiniones están casi igualmente divididas entre las opciones de viable e inviable. Finalmente, la única acción que los encuestados consideran inviable es la de susti-tución del programa por otro diferente. Cuando se agrega a la conveniencia de los cambios una valoración de su viabilidad (“lo que es posible” ), se encuentra que se considera inviable la supresión y que se consideran viables modificaciones o mejorías.

Por último, los expertos piensan que Colombia debería tener un grado alto de coordinación de políticas macroeconómicas con países vecinos, en es-pecial con Ecuador, Perú y Venezuela. Asimismo, pero en menor medida, los encuestados consideran que el país debería tener un nivel alto de coordinación con la CAN, la OMC, Mercosur y el BID. La mayoría de expertos coinciden en que el grado de coordinación con el FMI, la Unión Europea, Estados Unidos y Brasil debería ser medio. Del mismo modo, una considerable cantidad de expertos piensan que el grado de coordinación con el BM y con el BID debería tener un grado de coordinación de política bajo.

En general, los encuestados creen que deben fortalecerse los ejercicios de coordinación tanto con organismos internacionales como con países vecinos. De igual forma, manifiestan que el grado de coordinación con el FMI debería ser medio, lo cual demandaría un debilitamiento del ejercicio de coordinación con este organismo, si se tiene en cuenta que el grado de coordinación efectivo con dicho organismo es calificado como alto.

4. Análisis sintético de los resultados de la consulta

La aproximación de la consulta en las dimensiones positiva (descripti-va) y normativa (lo que debe ser, lo deseable) permite analizar y reflexionar acerca de la pertinencia del PCM en un contexto de consolidación y profun-dización de un proceso de integración económica y comercial. Las opiniones de los expertos nos permiten corroborar las características, bondades y limi-taciones del programa.

El bloque de preguntas 1 a 3 —las cuales pretenden establecer inicialmente la relevancia del programa en relación con el grado de coordinación de política monetaria y fiscal— muestra que los expertos consideran que, en términos ge-nerales, el grado de coordinación macroeconómica de Colombia con la CAN es bajo, e identifican a otros actores como más influyentes (FMI y BM).

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Las preguntas 4 a 7 tienen relación directa con el programa y sus compo-nentes, que buscan evaluar:

S el grado de cumplimiento de las metas comprometidas por Colombia S la importancia que se otorga a los componentes o instrumentos del programa S el tipo de gestión que identifica al Programa de Convergencia

Macroeconómica de la CAN (desde la coordinación suave o débil hasta la coordinación fuerte)

S el grado de contribución frente a diversos factores relacionados con la estabilidad macroeconómica en Colombia.

Los resultados mostraron un grado alto de cumplimiento de las metas del programa de la CAN, asociado a un grado de coordinación bajo, lo que sugiere que el cumplimiento de las metas propias del programa no está asociado o correlacio-nado con el ejercicio específico de dicha coordinación, a pesar de que los expertos consideran que los instrumentos son relevantes, y que el tipo de gestión caracte-rística del ejercicio de coordinación es el de “Soft Coordination”. Para los expertos, el buen desempeño macroeconómico colombiano, en general, se debe a decisiones domésticas, más que a la influencia de los ejercicios de coordinación internacional, y destacan al FMI, al cual otorgan un grado de contribución medio.

Por otra parte, el componente normativo, nos ofrece la posibilidad de diferen-ciar entre las acciones “viables” (lo que se cree que es posible institucionalmente) y las acciones “recomendables” (lo que se desearía o recomendaría) para el programa, con lo cual es viable evaluar las posibilidades de incorporación de cambios en el mismo.

Las preguntas 8 a 10 ofrecen el componente de percepción del “deber ser” del PCM frente a la posible introducción e implementación de cambios o no dentro del programa, y la viabilidad o no de estos posibles cambios y pres-cripciones de política (recomendaciones) sobre el grado de coordinación desea-ble. En síntesis, este componente tiene por objeto conocer qué acciones serían convenientes y viables en relación con el programa, dadas la evaluación respecto al desempeño y las características del mismo. Al respecto, los resultados muestran que, a pesar de su bajo grado de influencia sobre el desempeño macro colombiano (el alcance de metas), los expertos otorgan importancia a la existencia, el man-tenimiento y mejoría del programa, y no consideran recomendable suprimirlo o cambiarlo por otro de naturaleza diferente. Además de considerar importante su existencia, los encuestados opinan que las acciones más viables respecto al

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programa serían dejarlo tal como está o agregar componentes. Por último, los expertos señalan que el grado de coordinación con la CAN debería ser alto, incluso superior al alcanzado con otros organismos o países como el FMI.

En síntesis, los resultados consolidados revelan un reconocimiento de la valía institucional que tiene el programa y del método de diálogo macroeconó-mico —el cual facilita el intercambio de información, el reconocimiento mutuo entre autoridades y responsables de políticas—, probablemente debido a que, tal como ocurrió en la UE, esos elementos resultaron de gran valor para impulsar la consolidación o profundización del proceso de integración. Con respecto a la disyuntiva, en cuanto a la gestión, de lo que debería implementarse (lo que es recomendable) y lo que efectivamente es posible implementar (lo viable), los ex-pertos sugieren una profundización en su arquitectura, y en términos generales no ven viable la implementación de cambios sustantivos en el mismo.

5. Métodos de coordinación internacional y desempeño macroeconómico colombiano

Los resultados consolidados de la consulta sugieren una influencia “resi-dual” del proceso de coordinación llevado a cabo en el seno de la CAN, por lo que resulta importante inquirir sobre los factores a los que puede atribuirse el buen desempeño macroeconómico del país en el período de estudio.

Al respecto, algunos autores, como Sánchez-Gómez (2006, 13), han seña-lado el papel que pueden haber cumplido la suscripción y ejecución de acuerdos con el FMI, los cuales suelen implicar compromisos de reforma o ajuste estruc-tural, es decir, la importancia del papel asumido por el FMI como “disciplinador externo” en el contexto regional latinoamericano, en referencia a los procesos de coordinación internacional de políticas macroeconómicas.

En efecto, la presencia de compromisos, programas y metas asociados a los préstamos adquiridos por los países integrantes de la CAN con el FMI sugeriría, en primera instancia, que debe considerarse la hipótesis de que esta institución hubiese asumido un papel de “coordinador implícito”, es decir, que por medio de un conjunto o paquete de medidas, recomendaciones y programas de ajuste estructural (que se corresponden con un paradigma de políticas macroeco-nómicas), orientado al cumplimiento de compromisos y metas en los programas

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pactados con el Fondo, se establecería una especie de ruta hacia el cumplimiento de los objetivos de desempeño macroeconómico fijados dentro de la CAN en el marco de su ejercicio de coordinación.

Los acuerdos con el FMI constituyen un marco permanente de compro-misos adquiridos por el país en cuanto a políticas económicas en los ámbitos monetario y fiscal, acompañados de reformas estructurales en temas puntuales o compromisos sobre temas como la privatización. En el caso de Colombia, se han suscrito cuatro acuerdos con el FMI: un Acuerdo de facilidades extendidas, entre 1999-2002; dos Acuerdos Stand-by, en los períodos 2002-2004 y 2005-2006, y por último, un Acuerdo de línea de crédito flexible, entre 2009-2010. Para efectos de ilustración, se presentan los criterios y metas del primer acuerdo Stand-by de Colombia y el FMI, en el período 2002-2004 (ver Anexo 1). Como puede obser-varse, los compromisos pactados con el FMI son más específicos e involucran más áreas de acción o de política que los establecidos en el marco de coordinación de la CAN. Bajo esta perspectiva, es claro que hay un paralelismo, o quizá un fenómeno de “traslape”, entre los programas y compromisos adquiridos por parte de Colombia con el FMI y los adquiridos en el ejercicio de coordinación propio de la CAN.

Las políticas económicas adoptadas por Colombia en las tres dimensiones cubiertas por el PCM en la CAN (inflación, deuda pública y déficit) habrían sido influenciadas por los compromisos adquiridos con el FMI o se habrían bene-ficiado de éstos de manera subsidiaria, en el sentido de que las autoridades de política monetaria y fiscal en Colombia los tuvieron en cuenta en el diseño y/o la ejecución de las políticas macroeconómicas. Si se tiene en cuenta que la naturaleza del PCM es un “diálogo entre pares”, y si se considera que el logro de las metas de convergencia no implica mecanismos de retroalimentación o compromisos de modificación de las políticas macroeconómicas adoptadas por cada país tras el proceso de evaluación llevado a cabo en el marco de los trabajos anuales del GTP, se puede intuir que la influencia comparativa que tiene el ejercicio de coordina-ción con el FMI, incluso es mayor que el conjunto de compromisos adquiridos con la CAN. De hecho, los compromisos adquiridos con el FMI son de obligatorio cumplimiento, y los de la CAN son más flexibles. En tal sentido, el éxito de los programas de coordinación internacional, especialmente el de la CAN, depende del ejercicio de autodisciplina macroeconómica nacional, y vale la pena pregun-tarse qué tanto necesita esta última del primero.

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Puesto que los ejercicios de coordinación dentro de la CAN, y los rea-lizados con el FMI, no parecen ofrecer una base consistente para explicar la estabilidad macroeconómica de Colombia durante el período analizado, vale la pena mencionar algunas explicaciones ofrecidas desde diversos ángulos, las cuales giran alrededor de una mejoría sustancial de la capacidad interna o doméstica del país (y de los países de la región, de hecho) para manejar de manera adecuada la política macroeconómica, con la consiguiente mejoría en el desempeño. Wiesner (2011) asocia el manejo responsable de las políticas macroeconómicas, principalmente, al lado de la oferta —los técnicos, repre-sentados por grupos de economistas y líderes políticos competentes—, más que a la existencia de una demanda política de estabilidad macroeconómica (la cual ha sido insuficiente en el caso colombiano). Respecto del objetivo de la tasa de inflación, señala:

El encomiable logro de una inflación baja y de un solo dígito desde princi-pios de la década del 2000 plantea la pregunta de hasta qué punto este re-sultado pudo no haber sido más la consecuencia de la abrupta, inesperada y no deliberada desinflación de los años 1998 y 1999, que el éxito rotundo de la política monetaria. (Wiesner 2011, 10)

Por otra parte, Wiesner identifica como característica institucional clave para explicar el desempeño macroeconómico colombiano tras la crisis de los años 1998-1999, la consolidación de un cierto consenso, un “paradigma conceptual” basado en la maximización del desempeño macroeconómico, la minimización de los costos de transacción y de coordinación, el cual tiene como eje de consistencia la preservación de una baja inflación como objetivo de política, acompañado de un enfoque de política cambiaria que supera la dicotomía “fijo versus flexible”.

El entonces gerente del Departamento de Investigación del BID, Eduardo Lora (2008), habla de una “revolución silenciosa de las institu-ciones” en América Latina, la cual explica en buena medida la estabilidad macroeconómica alcanzada por las economías de la región. Lora identifica reformas en áreas tales como las instituciones políticas, los sistemas judi-ciales, las instituciones fiscales, la propiedad y regulación de los servicios

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de infraestructura y de los sectores financieros, los sistemas de pensiones y de protección social (con excepción de sectores tales como la promoción industrial y la educación, en los cuales no se produjeron cambios profundos). El conjunto de factores que acompañan a esta revolución institucional se compone (entre otros) de factores tales como la independencia de los bancos centrales, las nuevas técnicas de manejo monetario enfocadas en el objetivo de la estabilidad de precios, los límites efectivos al déficit fiscal y al endeu-damiento del sector público (leyes de responsabilidad fiscal), y, finalmente, los cambios en el panorama político de las dos últimas décadas (restricciones al poder ejecutivo y mayor competencia electoral).

Conclusiones

Los resultados de la consulta realizada con expertos muestran un grado alto de cumplimiento de las metas del PCM de la CAN por parte de Colombia. Sin em-bargo, se evidencia que el grado de coordinación alcanzado con la CAN es bajo, lo que sugiere que el cumplimiento de las metas propias del programa no está asociado o correlacionado con el ejercicio específico de coordinación.

Por tanto, parece importante revaluar o reconsiderar la pertinencia, la uti-lidad y los beneficios reportados por los ejercicios de coordinación internacional de políticas macroeconómicas adelantados por Colombia. Como lo ha indicado la consulta, en el caso de la CAN (e incluso en el del FMI), la influencia de dichos ejercicios de coordinación ha sido residual frente a la de otros factores como la capacidad doméstica de manejo de la política macroeconómica nacional.

En el caso particular de la CAN, al parecer la coordinación entre países no fue necesaria para alcanzar el valor deseado de las variables relevantes para la convergencia macroeconómica.5 Aun así, los expertos consultados, además de considerar importante la existencia del programa de la CAN, opinan que las ac-ciones más recomendables o viables respecto al futuro del programa son dejarlo tal y como está o agregar componentes.

5 Al respecto, es importante tener en cuenta que para el período analizado, el grado de interdependencia macroeconómica entre los países era relativamente bajo (Machinea y Rozenwurcel 2005).

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En la explicación de la efectividad de la política macroeconómica que permitió al país exhibir un buen desempeño macroeconómico, se señalan tres ejercicios: el de mejoramiento de las capacidades internas para el manejo macroeconómico o “autodisciplina” (capacidad doméstica); el ejercicio de “Soft Coordination” o “diálogo macroeconómico” (CAN) y el esquema de compromisos con un “disciplinador externo”, en el contexto de un ejercicio de “Supervisión” (FMI). Es claro que existe un paralelismo, o quizá un fenómeno de “traslape”, entre los ejercicios de coordinación internacional de política macroeconómica sostenidos con la CAN y con el FMI. Los resultados de la consulta con expertos, y la consideración de factores clave en la explicación del desempeño macroeco-nómico del país, sugieren que los efectos de ambos ejercicios son residuales, lo cual lleva a plantear interrogantes relevantes acerca de la pertinencia y conveniencia de mantenerlos activos (dado su carácter paralelo o traslapado) o de desactivarlos, por considerarlos redundantes. Al parecer, el papel efectivo de los ejercicios de coordinación tipificados como “diálogo entre pares” y “su-pervisión” estaría reducido al de ejercer una presión externa que simplemente reforzaría la “autodisciplina” nacional. En tal contexto, es válido cuestionarse, para el caso de cualquier ejercicio de coordinación, si el éxito alcanzado en sus resultados es casual (accidental, subsidiario) o producto de la gestión (dirigi-do), y permite pensar que quizá no es necesario emprender un PCM entre los países integrantes del proceso de integración regional para lograr los objetivos de estabilidad macroeconómica.

Aunque debe reconocerse el valor del ejercicio de coordinación (de hecho, así lo hacen los expertos consultados), y el de la consolidación del conocimiento mutuo y la confianza entre naciones —los cuales son quizá el propósito principal del método adoptado—, es necesario preguntarse si vale la pena mantener un programa que quizá es favorable en cuanto a consolidación institucional, pero no necesariamente en cuanto a efectividad de la política macroeconómica.

Por su parte, los resultados de la consulta muestran que, a pesar de su bajo grado de influencia sobre el desempeño macroeconómico colombiano (el alcance de metas), los expertos otorgan importancia a la existencia, el mantenimiento y la mejoría del Programa de Convergencia Macroeconómica de la CAN como ejercicio de coordinación, y no consideran viable y/o recomendable suprimirlo o cambiarlo por otro de naturaleza diferente.

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Anexo 1

Tabla 2. Criterios y metas específicas en los acuerdos con el FMI

Meta específica

Criterio AñoSaldo año

anterior

31 de marzo

30 de junio

30 de septiembre

31 de diciembre

Fiscal Topes en billones de pesos

Criterio de desempeño para el déficit total del sector público

consolidado

2003 8.350 1.590 3.240 3.315 5.490

2004 -6.375 -1.200 -1.650 -1.850 -6.100

Monetario Topes en porcentajes (%)

Criterio de desempeño de la inflación

2003 6,0 6,1 5,9 5,7 5,5

2004 5,9 6,0 6,0 5,7 5,5

Externo Topes en millones de dólares

Criterio de desempeño saldo de reservas internacionales

netas del Banco de la República

2003 10.300 10.360 10.420 10.480 10.540

2004 10.540 10.240 10.300 10.400 10.540

Criterio de desempeño

desembolsos acumulado netos de

mediano y largo plazo de deuda externa del

sector público

2003 1.100 650 1.050 1.050 950

2004 1.850 800 1.300 1.750 1.800

Criterio de desempeño para los desembolsos

netos de la deuda externa de corto plazo

del sector público

2003 375 300 300 300 -180

2004 100 200 200 200 200

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Fuente: elaborado a partir de datos del Banco de la República de Colombia.

Cronograma de reformas estructurales (sólo año 2003)

Para el 31 de marzo: aprobación por parte del Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y Social (CONPES) del plan de sostenibilidad financiera del Instituto de

Seguros Sociales (ISS).

Para el 30 de junio: a) aprobación por el Congreso de la Ley de Responsabilidad Fiscal; b) presentación al Congreso de los cambios al Código de Presupuesto (Ley

Orgánica); c) presentación al Congreso de una revisión de la Ley 80 con el fin de mejorar el manejo de los contratos del Gobierno; d) implementación de una

reforma a los regímenes especiales de pensiones.

Para el 31 de diciembre: a) aprobación por parte del Congreso de cambios al Código de Presupuesto; b) finalización por parte del CONPES de un plan para consolidar el manejo de los activos físicos del Estado; c) aprobación por parte del Congreso de las modificaciones a la Ley 80 para mejorar el manejo de los

contratos del Gobierno; d) privatización de Bancafé.

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Anexo 2

Evaluación gestión Programa de Convergencia Macroeconómica de la Comunidad Andina de Naciones (CAN) 2000-2007

coordinación internacional de políticas macroeconómicas

En esta sección de la consulta se evalúan diversos temas relacionados con el ejer-cicio de coordinación internacional de políticas macroeconómicas en Colombia (2002-2007).

Colombia ha realizado diversos ejercicios de coordinación internacional de políticas macroeconómicas con diversos actores (instituciones, países, bloques económicos de integración). A continuación abordamos la valoración del tipo y grado de coordinación internacional de políticas macroeconómicas para el caso colombiano, en términos generales.

1. Por favor, en su concepto, ¿cuál es el grado de coordinación internacional de política monetaria de Colombia?:a. Altob. Medioc. Bajod. Sin coordinación

2. Por favor, a su juicio, ¿cuál es el grado de coordinación internacional de la política fiscal de Colombia?:a. Altob. Medioc. Bajod. Sin coordinación

3. Por favor, en su opinión, ¿cuál es el grado de coordinación internacional de políticas macroeconómicas de Colombia con los siguientes actores:

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Alto Medio Bajo Sin coordinación

Fondo Monetario Internacional (FMI)

Banco Mundial (BM)

Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID)

Organización Mundial del Comercio (OMC)

Comunidad Andina de Naciones (CAN)

Unión Europea (UE)

Mercosur

Estados Unidos (EE. UU.)

Venezuela

Chile

Brasil

Ecuador

Perú

Otro país

Otra institución

Programa de convergencia Macroeconómica de la comunidad andina de naciones (can)

En esta sección de la consulta abordamos específicamente el ejercicio de coordinación internacional de políticas macroeconómicas realizado por Colombia en el Marco del Programa de Convergencia Macroeconómica de la CAN, en particular.

El Programa de Convergencia Macroeconómica de la CAN ha sido gestionado por medio de la Red de Diálogo Macroeconómico (Redima), en el período 2000-2007. Los Informes sobre Convergencia Macroeconómica de la CAN evalúan el grado de cumplimiento de las metas establecidas por el Programa de Convergencia Macroeconómica de la CAN. Nos interesa cono-cer la valoración que los expertos pueden hacer del desempeño colombiano respecto del cumplimiento de dichas metas.

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4. Por favor, en su concepto, ¿cuál es el grado de cumplimiento de las metas de convergencia macroeconómica por parte de Colombia en el marco del Programa de Convergencia Macroeconómica de la CAN? Si lo desea, puede apoyarse en la información contenida en el cuadro adjunto:

Grado de cumplimiento

Criterio Alto Medio Bajo Ninguno

Inflación (de un solo dígito)

Déficit sector público (menor 3% PIB/excepto período 2002-2004 menor 4%)

Saldo de deuda pública (menor 50% PIB)

5. Por favor, a su juicio, ¿cuál es el grado de importancia que tiene cada uno de los componentes del Programa de Convergencia Macroeconómica de la CAN?

Grado de importancia

Componentes Alto Medio Bajo Sin importancia

Consejo Asesor (ministros de Hacienda o Finanzas, bancos centrales y responsables de

planeación económica)

Grupo Técnico Permanente (GTP)

Mecanismo de monitoreo

Red de Diálogo Macroeconómico (Redima)

6. Por favor, identifique el tipo de ejercicio de coordinación internacional de política macroeconómica que, a su juicio, se identifica con el Programa de Convergencia Macroeconómica de la CAN. Puede seleccionar dos o más opciones.a. Intercambio de información e intercambio de opiniones acerca de deci-

siones políticas.b. Acuerdos respecto de definiciones comunes de conceptos y mediciones.c. Acuerdo respecto de normas comunes.d. Definición de una política común ante eventos externos que afecten las

economías de los países involucrados.

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e. Seguimiento conjunto de variables.f. Establecimiento conjunto de metas cuantitativas comunes consistentes entre sí.g. Formulación y aplicación de una política macroeconómica común.

coordinación internacional de políticas macroeconómicas y estabilidad macroeconómica

En esta sección abordamos la valoración de la relación existente entre los ejerci-cios de coordinación internacional de política macroeconómica y la estabilidad macroeconómica de Colombia.

7. Por favor, en su concepto, ¿cuál es el grado de contribución de los siguientes factores a la estabilidad macroeconómica de Colombia?

Grado de contribución

Alto Medio Bajo Ninguno

Decisiones domésticas de política económica

Reformas político-institucionales y legales

Condiciones externas favorables

Programa de Convergencia Macroeconómica de la CAN

Acuerdos y programas con el Fondo Monetario Internacional (FMI)

Otros factores

8. En su opinión, el Programa de Convergencia Macroeconómica de la CAN debe-ría. Seleccione una de las cuatro opciones principales. Puede usar un cuadro de texto para especificar componentes o programas:a. Mantener todos sus componentesb. Incorporar nuevos componentesc. Suprimir algunos de sus componentesd. Ser sustituido por otro programa

Si lo desea, en esta casilla puede especificar cuál o cuáles componentes o programas.

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9. En su opinión, ¿es viable o inviable la aplicación de las siguientes acciones respecto del Programa de Convergencia Macroeconómica de la CAN?

Viable Inviable

Mantener todos sus componentes

Incorporar nuevos componentes

Suprimir algunos componentes

Sustituir por otro programa

10. Por favor, en su concepto, ¿cuál es el grado de coordinación internacional de políticas macroeconómicas que Colombia debería tener con los siguientes actores:

Grado de coordinación

Actores Alto Medio BajoNo debería

haber coordinación

Fondo Monetario Internacional (FMI)

Banco Mundial (BM)

Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID)

Organización Mundial del Comercio (OMC)

Comunidad Andina de Naciones (CAN)

Unión Europea (UE)

Mercosur

Estados Unidos de América (EUA)

Venezuela

Chile

Brasil

Ecuador

Perú

Otro país

Otra institución

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entrevistas24. Encuestado 1. Departamento Nacional de Planeación (DNP). Encuesta en línea.25. Encuestado 2. Ministerio de Comercio, Industria y Turismo. Encuesta en línea. 26. Encuestado 3. Fondo Latinoamericano de Reservas (FLAR). Encuesta en línea.27. Encuestado 4. Ministerio de Comercio, Industria y Turismo. Encuesta en línea. 28. Encuestado 5. Ministerio de Comercio, Industria y Turismo. Encuesta en línea. 29. Encuestado 6. Universidad ICESI. Encuesta en línea.

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30. Encuestado 7. Banco de la República. Encuesta en línea.31. Encuestado 8. Departamento Nacional de Planeación (DNP). Encuesta en línea.32. Encuestado 9. Ministerio de Comercio, Industria y Turismo. Encuesta en línea. 33. Encuestado 10. Universidad Jorge Tadeo Lozano. Encuesta en línea.34. Encuestado 11. Universidad Nacional. Encuesta en línea.35. Encuestado 12. Asociación Nacional de Instituciones Financieras (ANIF). En-

cuesta en línea.36. Encuestado 13. Universidad Jorge Tadeo Lozano. Encuesta en línea.37. Encuestado 14. Universidad Autónoma de Occidente. Encuesta en línea.38. Encuestado 15. Universidad Javeriana. Encuesta en línea.39. Encuestado 16. Universidad Jorge Tadeo Lozano. Encuesta en línea.40. Encuestado 17. Banco de la República. Encuesta en línea.

H

Álvaro Pío Gómez olaya es candidato a Doctor por el Departamento de Economía Aplicada III (Política Económica) de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid (España). Actualmente, es profesor de la Universidad del Valle (Colombia) y vi-cedecano académico de la Facultad de Ciencias de la Administración de la misma Universidad. Se ha desempeñado como director (e) de la Maestría en Políticas Públicas en la misma Universidad y como director del grupo de investigación “Gestión y evaluación de programas y proyectos” (GYEPRO).Correo electrónico: [email protected]

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The Dual Function of Violence in Civil Wars: The Case of Colombia

Philippe DufortUniversity of Cambridge (United Kingdom)

DOI: dx.doi.org/10.7440/colombiaint81.2014.07RECEIVED: April 15, 2013ACCEPTED: September 20, 2013REVISED: February 28, 2014

ABSTRACT: When considering both the economic and military dimensions of civil war it is clear that the violence of belligerents has the dual instrumental function of extracting resources and increasing control. Recently developed datasets of geo-localized violent events—such as the ACLED or the SCAD database—open new pathways for explaining strategic dynamics within conflicts. This article underlines how this task can be achieved through qualitative analyses of patterns in belligerents’ modes of operation and statistical analyses of violent incidents and macro-economic variables.

KEYWORDS: political economy of civil wars • microdynamics of civil wars • armed actors • warfare • quantitative studies • counter-insurgency

H

This article is the result of a methodological research seminar organized by Dr Pieter van Houten at the University of Cambridge (UK). The seminar aimed at developing dialogue between different methodological approaches.

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la doble función de la violencia en las guerras civiles: el caso colombiano

RESUMEN: Al considerar la dinámica económica y militar de la guerra civil se aprecia que los actores usan la violencia para cumplir dos propósitos: extraer recursos y aumentar el control. Las bases de datos (eventos violentos geolocalizados) recientemente desarrolladas ofrecen nuevas explicaciones para entender las dinámicas estratégicas de los conflictos. Este artículo muestra cómo esto se puede lograr mediante el análisis cualitativo de los patrones en los “modos beligerantes de operación” y el análisis estadístico de incidentes violentos y variables macroeconómicas.

PALABRAS CLAVE: economía política de las guerras civiles • microdinámica de guerras civiles • actores armados • conflictos armados • estudios cuantitativos • contrainsurgencia

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a dupla função da violência nas guerras civis: o caso colombiano

RESUMO: Ao considerar a dinâmica econômica e militar da guerra civil, observa-se que os atores usam a violência para cumprir dois propósitos: extrair recursos e aumentar o controle. As bases de dados (eventos violentos geolocalizados) recentemente desenvolvidas oferecem novas explicações para entender as dinâmicas estratégicas dos conflitos. Este artigo mostra como isso pode ser atingido mediante a análise qualitativa dos padrões nos “modos beligerantes de operação” e a análise estatística de incidentes violentos e variáveis macroeconômicas.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Economia política das guerras civis • microdinâmica de guerras civis • atores armados • conflitos armados • estudos quantitativos • contrainsurgência

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Introduction1

While mainstream media portrayals often characterize violence as both irrational and chaotic, political science emphasizes the rational nature of violence. Among the several approaches that take the instrumental-ity of violence as their focus, quantitative studies are perhaps the most inf luential. Research projects compiling large datasets on civil war (e.g., Singer, and Small 1994; Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, and Strand 2002), have used econometric analyses in order to identify the most inf luential factors in the onset and duration of civil war. Without a doubt, this approach has resulted in heuristic, cross-country compari-sons and has provided extremely valuable sources of data. Paradoxically, by focusing on the conf lict itself as the unit of analysis, researchers have been restricted in the types of questions they can ask. As Tarrow pointed out, these studies have now “reached a plateau in their capacity to inform or enlighten” (2007, 587). Therefore, studies on conf lict should not be limited to the structural determinants of their initiation, duration, and termination, but rather, should also consider internal strategic dynamics in order to better understand the meaning of each variable involved. In spite of their f laws, by identifying the most significant macroeconomic variables, such quantitative studies have nonetheless demonstrated the neces-sity of bringing the economic feasibility of rebellion back to the forefront of our analyses.

In fact, it appears that conf lict dynamics cannot be understood without differentiating the overlapping trends within them. The aggrega-tion of data at a global or national level makes it difficult to distinguish

1 The author is grateful to Pieter van Houten, Lecturer in Politics at the University of Cambridge, Brian Mabee, Lecturer at the University of London, and Stéphane Roussel, Professor at the University of Quebec in Montreal (UQAM) for their comments on this article. I am especially in debt to Camilo Echandía Castilla, Professor at the University Externado of Colombia, for his precious collaboration. This research has been con-ducted with the financial support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC).

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the various dynamics at play. The meaning of a variable in one spe-cific context is often different in another. For example, the reduction in violent incidents can be symptomatic of pacification, control consolida-tion, or military parity, depending on the context. Thus, qualitatively identifying these general strategic trends within conf lict is essential to interpreting statistics. Acknowledging this inherent limitation of a macro-perspective, this article proposes the concept of “mode of opera-tion” in order to study strategic dynamics in civil wars at the intrastate geographic level. This concept, this article argues, allows both strategic and economic determinants to be considered through a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods.

The main implication of considering both the economic and mili-tary dimensions of civil wars is to reveal the dual instrumental function of belligerents’ violence; any violent act has simultaneous impacts on resource extraction and control attempts. Violence aimed at resource extraction may harm a contender’s attempt to increase control and vice versa. This deduction explains why the use of violence is so “tricky” in civil wars. New pathways for explaining strategic dynamics within conf licts are now being contemplated in order to consider violent events though the use of geo-localized data collection (e.g., Raleigh Linke, Hegre, and Karlsen 2010; Hendrix, Salehyan, Case, Linebarger, Stull, and Williams 2010). Using more localized data allows us to identify specific trends in conf lict by following the strategies used by armed actors to secure economic resources and to enhance control. This ap-proach calls for quantitatively tracing the constellations of strategic and economic incentives that structure belligerents’ behaviours at the local level in civil wars.

This article underlines how this complex task can be achieved, on the one hand, by using qualitative analyses of patterns in belligerents’ modes of operation and, on the other hand, statistical analyses of violent incidents and macro-economic variables. Moving between the two methods allows for identifying the main strategic dynamics temporally and spatially and for comparing their manifestations synchronically and diachronically. As the ex-ample of the Colombian conflict demonstrates, a qualitative understanding of

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The Dual Function of Violence in Civil Wars: The Case of Colombia Philippe Dufort

each belligerent’s mode of operation allows for identifying trends in military competition where variable variations have a shared meaning.2

The first part of the article proposes a process based on two mecha-nisms that explain the interdependence of the economic and military di-mensions of civil war through an analysis of belligerents’ behaviours. This qualitative analysis is described as a mode of operation, the occurrence of which can be associated with variations in specific forms of violence and economic variables. The second part applies the proposed method to the Colombian case. The paramilitaries’ mode of operation will first be quali-tatively identified through a socio-historical analysis. This approach allows for chronologically and geographically mapping the development of specific dynamics within conflicts. Those dynamics are understood as the geographic expansion/constriction of the qualitatively-identified modes of operations of the belligerents under study during a defined period of time. The case of Colombia is of special interest as it allows us to better understand the rela-tionship between military control and resource extraction by irregular bellig-erents since both rebels and insurgents have formed irregular armed groups. As it involves irregular actors on both sides of the war, the Colombian case

2 In recent studies, a number of authors have approached the role of economic variables in the micro-dynamics of conflicts either by isolating one factor such as unemployment (Shapiro Berman, Callen, and Felter 2011) or poverty (Justino 2009) or through attendant perspectives such as violence against civilians (Metelits 2010) or recruitment practices (Weinstein 2007). As for other authors, who initiated the coeval use of disaggregated economic and violence data, those propositions are not concerned with strategic dynamics per se. During the first stages of the development of the resource-conflict sub-field, this last problematic was not studied in depth due to the hardships of finding usable data. Nevertheless, the appearance of a whole new generation of geo-localized datasets integrating spatial and temporal coordinates opens new opportunities for studying the dynamics of civil war (Cederman and Gleditsch 2009). Buhaug and Gates (2002) initiated the coding of sub-national conflict zones. Buhaug and Rød (2006) use a similar perspective. This approach nevertheless “still tends to be too coarse to allow the study of localized accounts of violence” (Korf 2011). A more promising direction for the study of strategic dynamics is the attempt to spatially and temporally code precise events. The Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED) (Raleigh et al. 2010), the Uppsala Conflict Data Project (Melander and Sundberg 2011), the Militarized Interstate Disputes Location (MIDLOC) dataset (Braithwaite 2010), the Significant Activities (SIGACTS) dataset and the Social Conflict in Africa (SCAD) database (Hendrix et al. 2010) are some of the most promising projects along this line. A theoretically informed approach will be necessary in order to explore these new possibilities. See also Gleditsch and Weidmann (2012) for a review of geo-localized datasets.

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enables a deeper understanding of the role of violence in civil wars. In other words, this case allows for studying violence as used by both insurgent and counter-insurgent irregular actors.

The first section proposes centring the study of armed conflicts on the dynamic process that qualitatively characterizes the strategic modes of operation linking resource extraction and patterns of violence by belligerents. This ap-proach integrates the economic macro-determinants identified by quantitative macro-models to Kalyvas’ multi-level theory of military competition. Literature on conflict has overlooked the specific mechanisms explaining strategic dynamics and their interdependent relationship with resource extraction. In other words, the puzzle here is to conceptualize how the dynamics of resource extraction and military competition are linked. As we shall see, disaggregation is absolutely necessary since only certain resources influence belligerents’ strategic behaviour, depending on their specific social alliances involving certain economic sectors.

1. Conceptualizing the Process Linking Economic and Military Behaviours

A multi-level understanding of military and economic interdependence is more complex than a simple, unidirectional analysis of insurgents’ finances. Defining the process that allows us to qualitatively define the interdependence of these two dimensions represents the key theoretical puzzle of this article. Building on Kalyvas’ theory, the process that links the military and economic dimensions of civil war is conceptualized as two connected mechanisms. The first mechanism is the well-developed conception of military control as developed by Kalyvas. The second mechanism, extraction, highlights the role of military resources in allowing resource appropriation. In order to integrate this last mechanism into Kalyvas’ theory of irregular warfare, his concept of alliance will be revisited.3

3 The second mechanism proposed is based on the argument presented in the last chapter of Kalyvas’ The Logic of Violence in Civil War, “Cleavage and agency,” (2006, 364-387). Here, he invites further studies to “reintroduce complexity” into his theory through the mechanism of alliance (385). Alliances are conceived here as the micro-founded “missing link” in the second mechanism which explains how local control shapes the extraction of resources.

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When putting the two proposed mechanisms together, the result is a dynamic process that links the economic and military dimensions of civil war—that is, a standardized approach to qualitatively defining belligerents’ modes of operation.

Military competition during civil war is influenced by more than the mili-tary capacity of the state. Belligerents’ behaviour is structured by local impera-tives that are related to different levels of control. Following Kalyvas’ model of the joint production of violence, control is established and consolidated using scarce military resources that must be used in the most effective way. In other words, belligerents use these military resources to produce violence and gain civilians’ “collaboration via deterrence” (Kalyvas 2006, 142) in order to provoke a shift in the balance of control.

The combination of micro and macro approaches described in Kalyvas’ theory allows for a conceptualization of the relationship between belligerents and their context while avoiding the overly simplistic explanations that char-acterize political economy perspectives on civil war (e.g., rebellion as busi-ness arguments). For this purpose, Kalyvas’ theory is highly relevant since it theorizes the complex strategic dynamics inherent to variations of levels of control in civil war. However, Kalyvas relegates all economic influence on strategic behaviour to conjunctures. Consequently, economic influences are only considered on a case-by-case basis. This is highly problematic since their systematic influence on conflict has been verified by research on the political economy of civil war.

At the core of this theoretical exercise lies the concept of alliance. Kalyvas (2006, 382) inductively suggests this concept as a complementary mechanism that structures the relationship between belligerents and civil-ians (meso level):

Alliance entails a process of convergence of interests via a transaction between supralocal and local actors, whereby the former supply the lat-ter with external muscle, thus allowing them to win decisive advantage over local rivals; in exchange, supralocal actors are able to tap into lo-cal networks and generate mobilization. A great deal of action in civil war is, therefore, simultaneously decentralized and linked to the wider conf lict. Thus civil war is (also) a process that connects the collective

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actors’ quest for power and the local actors’ quest for local advantage. Put otherwise, violence can also be a selective benefit that produces local mobilisation via alliance. (383)

Here, alliance is understood in a more precise manner in order to empha-size alliances based only on economic grounds. The local cleavages considered are therefore limited to socio-economic antagonisms. It is in this context of local ci-vilian economic feuds that belligerents intervene to access resources. As a neces-sary condition for the establishment and continuation of such local alliances, the armed organization needs a minimum degree of control over the area. Indeed, as mentioned in the previous citation, the alliance is based on a belligerent’s capacity to provide “external muscle” in order to give his allies an economic asymmetric advantage.4 Violence is therefore shaped by the nature of the alliance, not only by control. Land-based conflicts offer typical examples of this mechanism, where an armed group allies itself with large landowners and agro-industrials while an-other sides with small-scale peasantry. Consequently, the two groups have access to different resources depending on their position within social institutions and local power relations.

2. The Process Linking the Economic and Military Dimensions of Civil War: A Synthesis

The concept of alliance is presented by Kalyvas as a complementary mech-anism at the meso level of his multi-level approach (see Figure 1). Its inclusion makes it possible to connect the complex microstrategic interactions of armed actors during civil war (structured through the joint production of violence) to their economic context by considering extraction as a form of alliance between civilians and belligerents.5

4 Hirshleifer pointed out this dimension of civil war in the very early days of the debate: “Exchange theory and conflict theory constitute two coequal branches of economic analysis, the first based upon contract and mutual gain, the second upon contest for asymmetric advantage” (1995, 2).

5 Of course, some forms of extraction imply the strong coercion of involved civilians, includ-ing extortion, kidnapping, and the protection racket. However, the logic remains the same independent of civilians’ willingness to engage in a relationship with belligerents.

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All things considered, integrating extraction as a complementary mechanism into Kalyvas’ theory expands his explanatory scope in two ways. First and foremost, it explains the interdependence of the economic and military dimensions of civil war. Military competition at the macro-level can be partially explained as a function of belligerents’ financial capacity. Secondly, it explains how belligerents’ behaviour is simultaneously structured by both economic and military imperatives while producing violence towards civilians. On this basis, complex strategic behaviour can be studied by isolat-ing patterns in sets of economic and violence-related data. The data on the macro-variables and the statistics on violence can therefore be disaggregated, related, and interpreted according to a better understanding of the internal mechanisms of conflict.

Understanding belligerents’ agency during civil war must not be lim-ited to the results from only one level of analysis; for a full picture, agency must be analysed from various levels. Kalyvas defines agency in the encounter of the micro and macro dynamics of civil war in terms of military competition for control. Similarly, the theoretical “structure” is neither associated with the micro nor macro level. Rather, it is conceptualized within this multi-level

Figure 1. A Micro-founded Dual Structure of Civil War


civilian collaboration and economy

insurgentsincumbents

Micro level

Meso level

Macro levelMilitary competition

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lenc

eViolence

Control C

ontr

ol

Extraction(Incumbent

Alliances)

Extraction(IncumbentAlliances)

Violen

ce

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Resources

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articulation. The integration of an alternative mechanism into Kalyvas’ frame-work does not create problems regarding the level of analysis since both mechanisms operate complementarily at the meso level (linking civilians and belligerents). However, a significant tension results from the duplication of the considered dimensions.

The main implication of simultaneously considering the economic and military dimensions of civil war is that the violence of belligerents has the dual instrumental function of extracting resources and increasing control (see Figure 1). While producing instrumental violence, belligerents’ behaviour is structured by the two mechanisms, which operate at the meso level. Any violent act has simultaneous impacts on both mechanisms. This deduction explains why the use of violence is so “tricky” in civil war, as violence used for extractive purpose can have a synergic or backlash effect on control. Material structure is therefore contextualized simultaneously in the economic and military dimensions. Economic structural imperatives affect the extrac-tive behaviour of belligerents through the mechanism of extraction. Military structural imperatives affect the behaviour of belligerents in competition for control through the mechanism of control variation. In this case, the struc-tural imperatives of extraction and control maximization are present at the micro level (the economic antagonism and collaboration of civilians) and the macro level (macroeconomic variables and military competition), and are articulated at the meso level (extraction and control variation mechanisms). Correspondingly, it is possible to propose a conceptualization of agency as si-multaneously embedded in economic and military structural imperatives—or more succinctly, as modes of operation.

3. Strategic Dynamics, Agency and Empirical Observation: The Concept of Mode of Operation

The interdependence of the economic and military dimensions of civil war can be understood from the perspective of belligerents in terms of financial and military viability. It can also be analysed from a macro perspective in terms of transformations in economic and military contexts. These two perspectives represent two sides of the same coin. However, the qualitative understanding of

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belligerents’ alliances remains the first step in understanding the dynamics of a conflict. The empirical study of its microdynamics reveals the meaning of large-scale variations in statistical data related to violence and pertinent economic sectors. Therefore, microanalysis shall precede the contextual analysis in order to explain the relevant relationships between the macro-variables.

Structured within the micro-mechanisms identified, belligerents devel-op certain regularities in their behaviour while seeking to attain, sustain, and expand their economic and military capacity. In this strict sense, I propose defining and observing those regularities specific to a belligerent’s strategy as constituting a mode of operation. Therefore, a mode of operation is defined as a constant pattern in a belligerent’s practices aimed at increasing military and economic capability.

The recurring practices that constitute a mode of operation occur at the confluence of Kalyvas’ micro and macro levels of analysis. These recurring practices of a belligerent seeking to increase its financial and military capabil-ity are structured through the imperatives of two mechanisms: extraction and control variation. Therefore, the concept of mode of operation represents a constant strategic pattern in belligerents’ behaviour when using violence to in-crease its military and financial capability. As such, the use of violence is struc-tured simultaneously by the imperatives of control variation and extraction. Moreover, a belligerent’s capacity to adjust and adapt its mode of operation (notably by adapting its alliances) in function of the changing macroeco-nomic context explains most of its efficacy in sustaining and expanding its financial capability. Its resulting military resources will thereafter determine its potential gains in terms of control.

The soundness of this concept is not merely theoretical. It makes it possible not only to observe micro-patterns in belligerents’ behaviour when interacting with civilians, but also to trace manifestations of these microdynam-ics at the macro-level. Indeed, military and economic capabilities are difficult to quantify in many conflicts.6 Studying the actors based on their recurring practices at the micro-level (i.e., qualitatively defined alliances and the specific

6 Therefore, putting the emphasis on the actions of belligerents instead of on their capability represents an interesting empirical orientation that can explain strategic dynamics.

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forms of violence involved) represents a viable alternative.7 When these recur-ring practices are applied to a large scale, their related manifestations can be observed at the macro-level. The intensity of military competition for control as exercised by a specific actor can be observed empirically in the specific manifes-tations of violence they use that are comprised within statistics on violent inci-dents (e.g., statistics of massacres in the case of Colombian paramilitaries). The nature of the extraction mechanism is qualitatively described as alliances with specific socioeconomic groups and involves specific sectors of the economy. Therefore, variations in extraction opportunities for a specific form of alliance (e.g., agro-producers as long-term allies of Colombian paramilitaries) can be empirically observed through specific economic variables (e.g., agribusiness sectoral data or land concentration).

Testable implications of this conceptualization of agency in irregular warfare can be identified. Strategic trends are composed of the expansion of a specific mode of operation. These modes of operation can be observed diachron-ically and geographically by correlated variations between allied socio-economic sectors and specific forms of violence. Therefore, the empirical observation of macro-variables should be carried out on the basis of an understanding of the micro-dynamics that cause their variation.

In conclusion, a specific mode of operation is empirically observed through the recurring practices aiming at increasing financial and military ca-pability. The manifestations of a mode of operation are observed through the alliances of an armed actor with socio-economic groups allowing resource ex-traction and through the form of violence used to secure control. The following example, using qualitative research along with disaggregated data available on Colombia, demonstrates how this method can be applied.

Most studies on the relationship between armed actors and economic niches in irregular wars have concentrated their attention on guerrillas. The work of Echandía Castilla (2006) is especially valuable in this regard as it clearly identi-fies patterns in the Colombian guerrillas’ mode of operation. Castilla identifies

7 This analysis implies identifying qualitatively specific sets of indicators (both violence-related and economic) that capture the specific manifestations of a belligerent’s mode of operation when extracting resources (M1) and increasing control (M2).

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the specific types of violent events that are associated with the guerrillas’ way of extracting economic resources. Using socio-economic and violence indicators to follow the guerrillas’ territorial expansion between 1986 and 2006, his work clearly demonstrates how their geographical expansion correlates with socio-economic macro-variables corresponding with the economic niches they occupy. Although his work indirectly illustrates the potential of the concept of mode of operation, Castilla never formalized such an approach.

The following section aims at expanding Castilla’s general approach to paramilitary groups in order to clearly operationalize a mixed method for studying economic and strategic dynamics through the concept of mode of operation. Colombian paramilitaries were created as natural competitors to the guerrillas as they aimed to take control of the economic niches that allow insurgents to thrive. The case of Colombia is therefore especially interesting for the study of belligerents’ modes of operation since both insurgents and counter-insurgents use irregular forms of warfare involving economic extrac-tion from the civilian population. Through this case study, the next section demonstrates how an analysis centred on belligerents’ modes of operation allows us to map their progression by a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods and to identify the specific meaning of fluctuations in macro-level variables.

4. Mode of Operation: An Application Using Disaggregated Data

Colombia has suffered the consequences of war for more than sixty years. Since its emergence, the Colombian conflict has been influenced by the changing context of world politics: political liberalism, the Cold War, globalization, the war on drugs, and the more recent war on terrorism. Instead of vanishing, however, as have most other conflicts, the local dynamics have adapted.

Scholars have put forth a number of arguments explaining this long-lasting conflict. Some argue that geography impedes the state from penetrat-ing remote regions, others see Colombians as characterized by a culture of violence, while still others maintain that the objective material conditions of poverty and exclusion are behind the Colombian rebellion (see Red de Estudios de Espacio y Territorio 2004). In order to fully understand the

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persistence of violence in Colombia, different perspectives (psychology, eco-nomics, sociology, etc.) and levels of analyses (individual, local, national, and even global) need to be employed. However, the sin qua non condition of its longevity is the persistence of a viable, armed challenger to the state. Without this, no contention can take the form of civil war. It seems that Colombia has maintained the exceptional material circumstances that allow insurgency to emerge and last. The Colombian conflict has lasted longer than others because both the state and its challengers have been able to access the enormous re-sources needed to finance sixty years of protracted warfare.

The concept of mode of operation—presented in the previous section of the article as two interdependent mechanisms—will serve to outline and locate the evolution of the most important strategic trend caused by paramili-taries in the Colombian conflict during the 1990s. The strategy at the origin of this trend allowed paramilitaries to maintain their financial viability but also to drastically expand counterinsurgent control. To understand this specific strategic dynamic, this section first qualitatively identifies the paramilitary mode of operation—that is, the specific arrangement of the relationship be-tween paramilitaries’ extraction practices and military control. This will al-low us to interpret the dynamics underlying macro-economic variations and national variations in violence. As such, the following section exemplifies how a qualitative analysis of strategic dynamics—as mode of operation—allows for more prudent interpretations of aggregated data.

The Colombian conflict clearly does not follow the linear evolution of revolutionary warfare as theorized by Ernesto Guevara (2006 [1961]). In fact, since the appearance of the leftist guerrillas in the 1960s, the confrontation has undergone “successive strategic ruptures that originate in changes in the modus operandi of its protagonists” (Echandía Castilla 2006, 13). An approach exclusively considering macro-variables or micro-dynamics cannot perceive these general trends. Consequently, such analyses of the Colombian conflict data remain ex-tremely thin and contribute few convincing explanations.

First, it is necessary to understand how violence in Colombia was shaped by the unequal distribution of land even before 1964, when what is be-lieved to be today’s oldest revolutionary guerrillas appeared: the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the National Liberation Army (respectively

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FARC and ELN, from their Spanish initials). During the period known as “La Violencia” (1946-1953), Colombians fought along the scattered lines of land ownership. Large local landowners mobilized their tenants and fought each other, divided along the lines of the central bipartist cleavage of the liberal and conservative parties (Medina Gallego 2001). During this confrontation, some peasant factions also fought with the liberals but with a more radical agenda. They opposed the very existence of the hacienda (large estate) system and decried the unequal distribution of land (Kalmanovitz 1994).8 Put simply, the hacienda system was the main connection between national and local cleavages during the Colombian “Violencia” period.

The contemporary conflict stems from this history. Its dynamics are entrenched in the pre-capitalist hacienda, a form of rural power that has never been truly reformed. From the mid-1980s onwards, increased levels of global trade accelerated the introduction of agribusiness and narcotraffic into this previ-ously fixed context. At the turn of the twenty-first century, the Colombian rural economy was marked by rapid transformation, where continuity and change were deeply intertwined. Any attempt to reduce the history of the Colombian conflict to a simple and elegant logic would therefore be misleading.

During the 1980s and 1990s, increased international trade and struc-tural adjustment policies, along with the emerging narcotics traffic, led to significant transformations in Colombia’s rural economy. As narcotraffic surpluses grew rapidly during the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, narcot-ics dealers/traffickers/producers increasingly bought land as a way of clean-ing narco-dollars (Hylton 2006; Echandía Castilla 1997). The general trend of land concentration indeed has its economic roots in the narcotics sector of the economy, which in turn shaped the dual function of violence in this spe-cific context. The development of the narcotics industry was not a marginal economic trend; in 1994, cocaine exports represented 8 to 9% of Colombia’s GDP, making it a significant form of revenue for the country (Clawson and Lee 1998, 25). The dynamics of paramilitary expansion in the 1990s was strongly dependent on the narcotics trade and money laundering, as narcotics

8 The contemporary guerrillas benefited from the experience of some of these “veterans.”

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traffickers funded paramilitary groups. The growth of the narcotics sector of the economy in Colombia is indeed a central macro-determinant of the expansion of paramilitarism.

Along with the local feuds that stemmed from land concentration and the enlargement of the agricultural frontier, the Colombian rural economy experi-enced another fundamental change:

[…] it is possible to appreciate the double dimension of narcotraffic in the farming sector […]. On the one hand, the use of violence protected a process of “agrarian counter-reform” that obligated the peasant to sell or to abandon his or her land; on the other hand, a rapid modernizing process was introduced due to the adoption of new technologies that determined the transformation of traditional large estates into companies in need of machines and qualified workers for the handling of modern technolo-gies. (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and Department of National Planification 1991, as reported in Echandìa Castilla 2006, 33-34)

The emerging large landowners were connected to the money launder-ing that stemmed from narcotrafficking (Hylton 2006; Reyes Posada 1997). Therefore, contrary to the experience of traditional large estates, they had high levels of liquidity. In this context, what is striking about the Colombian economic liberalization of the 1990s is that investment in modern agriculture was largely introduced by narcotraffickers (Richani 2002).

Once again in the history of Colombia, land concentration antagonized the small peasantry and large estates. Paramilitary violence was used system-atically as an “external muscle” to settle local feuds to the advantage of agro-producers. An analysis of the alliances among narcotraffickers, paramilitaries, and agro-producers shows how increasing investment opportunities in the agri-cultural sector triggered the concentration of land in Colombia. From a macro-analytical perspective, these micro dynamics resulted in the general trend of increasing land concentration: an agrarian counter-reform (Jaramillo 2002). This general economic trend illustrates how violence has a dual function in civil war. The violence used by paramilitaries not only provoked the guerrillas to retreat, it simultaneously transformed the economic context.

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Through this process, paramilitary groups, agro-producers, and nar-cotraffickers became more intrinsically interconnected. After the fall of the big Cartels of Medellín and Cali, in many instances the paramilitary re-gional strongman was also the head of the traffic networks (e.g., Don Berna, commander of the “Nutibara Bloc” and a preeminent figure in the drug-underworld of Medellín). The fortunes gained from the narcotics trade were legalized through land purchases and investment in modern agro-business. The paramilitaries therefore positioned themselves as a nodal point in this counterinsurgent alliance network.

Colombia’s rural integration into the global economy has been medi-ated through the expansion of the paramilitaries’ mode of operation. At the national level, the dual function of this pattern of violence resulted in land concentration and counterinsurgent control consolidation. Without a doubt, globalization and warfare have been closely interacting through this process. In order to better understand this mode of operation, a socio-historical perspective allows us to identify the forms of violence used and the socio-economic alliances involved.

a. the Paramilitary Mechanism of Military control

The first contemporary Colombian paramilitary group (known as Death to kidnappers or MAS, from its Spanish initials) appeared in 1982 in Puerto Boyacá. Its strategy of irregular counterinsurgency differs from strategies previously used, which were based on regular large-scale military operations. MAS aims to dry the fish out of the water—to paraphrase Mao Zedong’s famous axiom. That is to say that its aim is not limited to direct military competition, but is also focused on cutting off the guerrillas’ access to civilians, thereby impeding extraction from the civilian economy. In the years following MAS’ emergence, its operating mode would serve as a model for its expansion into other regions.

The military component of this emerging mode of operation appeared capable of destabilizing the guerrillas’ control over the territory of Puerto Boyacá. To evaluate the first mechanism considered (military control) we must first out-line the techniques employed by paramilitaries to subjugate the local population. All social sectors suspected of having a potential connection with socialist, com-munist and insurgent organizations were targeted for homicide:

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The joint operations of the paramilitary group and the National Army centred their attention initially on disarticulating the work and the organizations of the PCC [Colombian Communist Party] and the FARC. To do so, they exerted a brutal repression on peasant and urban populations; in a systematic and selective way they persecuted activists and union leaders, citizens and politicians, peasants and cattle ranch-ers, and any person that could have, in any form, a relationship with these organizations or that may support them: “they fumigated” the municipality until they had carried out a general cleansing. (Medina Gallego 1990, 175)

Based on this pattern, the waves of paramilitary violence generally forced the guerrillas to retreat from the zone and leave civilians unprotected (Medina Gallego 1990, 397):

[…] the insistence on selective assassination and massacres, principally committed by paramilitary groups, aimed at impeding the consolida-tion of enemies’ advances, striking at his support networks, informant networks, relatives, and militia. The massacres were indiscriminate. The list of names at hand was often not more than a sophism, although it was on some occasions real. In fact, more important than the interest of eliminating the other actor’s support was the interest in demonstrating the incapacity of the other actor to defend the affected population. And, in consequence, to demonstrate that it would be preferable for the popula-tion to subject itself to the new actor, which would end up taking control through terror. (Echandía Castilla 2006, 143)

The use of selective or indiscriminate massacres is a distinct military practice of counterinsurgency intent on gaining control (Pécault 2006, 398). Incidents of massacre, however, tend to decrease as paramilitary control con-solidates and guerrillas are forced to retreat (Echandía Castilla 2006, 146). The large-scale application of this recurrent pattern of counterinsurgency has caused an explosion of homicides in the affected zones (Medina Gallego 1990; Pécault 2006; Echandía Castilla 2006).

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To register the associated form of violent event, a choice must be made between the two main techniques employed by paramilitaries: individual ho-micides and massacres.9 There is an extremely important sub-registration of violent incidents in Colombia (Echandía Castilla 2006, 34).10 However, trends are constant from one database to another and are, therefore, quite reliable in identifying patterns of violent incidents against civilians (see Banco de Datos de Violencia Politica en Colombia 2005). The pattern of general homicide rates reflects paramilitary action during the period of 1996 to 2004. For example, between 1988 and 1998, of the cases in which the identity of the perpetuator was identified, 24,751 homicides were ascribed to irregular belligerents in the Colombian conflict. The guerrillas were responsible for 3,884 of these homicides, while the main paramilitary organization and other small, private militia were responsible for 20,887 (CCJ 2007).

The violent practices of paramilitaries seem to determine national trends. However, the homicide rates are not the optimal indicator of paramilitary military action. In fact, any increase in the intensity of combat between the Colombian forces and guerrillas influenced local statistics. The systematic use of collective homicides in paramilitary modes of operation offers a more precise alternative. The incidents of massacre are a very specific manifestation of paramilitary military action aimed at increasing control. Since the model of Puerto Boyacá was exported to other regions, national statistics of massacres have increased significantly. The tendencies in mas-sacre statistics are determined by paramilitary actions and do not correspond with the guerrillas’ behaviour. A violent event registered as a massacre is an indicator of paramilitary action intended to increase control.

b. the Paramilitary Mechanism for resource extraction

Regarding the second mechanism, resource extraction, we now turn to the socio-historical function of paramilitary violence and its relation to the interests of

9 A massacre is statistically defined as the assassination of four or more people during one single action (Echandía Castilla 2006, 35).

10 Most analysts agree that only a small proportion of all incidents are reported to the state or observed by NGOs in Colombia. Most incidents are never registered (CCJ 2007; Echandía Castilla 2006).

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their local sponsors.11 In fact, the first wave of paramilitary expansion responded to specific imperatives related to their old alliance with large local landowners. Initially collecting voluntary contributions from large landowners and businesses, the paramili-taries then standardized this practice and forced all producers to give them significant payments. The paramilitaries of the 1990s extracted as heavily as the guerrillas pre-viously had through forced “contributions.” In many instances, cattle ranchers and other producers who initially collaborated to form paramilitary groups to prevent the guerrillas from “over-extracting” taxes ended up paying even more (Medina Gallego 2005). The very same dynamic sectors of the economy which were targeted by the guerrillas’ extractive practices became the socio-economic foundations of the paramilitary organizations (Pécault 2006, 397).

On the basis of voluntary financial support and then systematic extortion, paramilitary organizations progressively consolidated their power on a regional level. The groups first became part of a regional federation in northern Colombia: the Peasants’ Self-Defence Forces of Córdoba and Urabá (ACCU, from its Spanish initials). Then, at a national conference of self-defence strongmen held on April 18th, 1997, a federation of the most important paramilitary groups was created: the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC, from its Spanish initials). The for-malization of a national umbrella group in 1997 indicates the significant increase in the paramilitaries’ military capacity. It gave the organization discursive unity and coordination capacity at the national level.

The appearance of paramilitary groups radically changed the financial condition of military competition: irregular counterinsurgent forces started to compete with the guerrillas for extractive opportunities. Paramilitary groups evolved from dependent, locally-rooted militia founded by large local land-owners and businesses that were victims of extortion by the guerrillas into a central belligerent force in the conflict. As described above, the initial eco-nomic and military viability of local paramilitary groups was made possible

11 Case studies still have a lot to demonstrate on the topic of civil war. Their “ability to accommodate complex causal relations such as equifinality, complex interactions, and path dependency” (Bennet 2004, 38) should not be overlooked by the quantitative research on conflict. The problem of equifinality is particularly important when studying statistics on violence. A reduction or increase may have very different meanings. This is what makes it such a “tricky” indicator when considered independently from control variation.

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by local, voluntary contributions (Medina Gallego 2005). Later, this irregular mode of operation was consolidated and the local militia became centralized in the regions around local strongmen. As for the guerrillas, the paramilitar-ies used the increasing macroeconomic opportunities of the narcotics trade and trade liberalization to become financially independent from their initial socio-economic bases.

Paramilitaries competed with guerrillas for the very same economic niche, although their alliances with these socio-economic groups were more often col-laborative. Up to 1997, they restricted the expansion of the guerrillas in the north of the country. However, after this date, the irregular belligerents competed at the national level and the guerrillas were forced into strategic retreat. In fact, after 1997, the paramilitaries turned to a drastic national offensive strategy and started to expand towards the guerrillas’ traditional safe havens. The alliance between paramilitaries and large landowners quickly became part of the conflict dynamic at the national level, as is commonly recognized within specialized qualitative studies (e.g., Duncan 2006; Medina Gallego 1990; Echandía Castilla 2006; Piccoli 2005; Rangel 2005; Richani 2002). In conclusion, the paramilitary mode of opera-tion can be described as follows:

Alliances Tactics Available indicators

Paramilitaries’ extractive practices

Collaborative and forced extraction from large land

owners, commerce and industries

Protection of property,

contributions, and extortion

Activities per economic sector

Taxing of narcotraffic-related

activitiesTaxing illicit crops Surface area and

value of crops

Paramilitaries’ specific military

practicesMassacres Massacre statistics

Table 1. A Description of the Paramilitary Mode of Operation


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In order to illustrate the plausibility of this argument, the author of this article compiled local data of registered massacres between 1993 and 2000 along with data on the concentration of agri-business. Results indicate that with the agrarian cleavage that has characterized the Colombian conflict since its incep-tion, a strong correlation exists between massacres and agribusiness.

Table 2. The Correlation of Massacres and Sectoral Data (1993-2003)12

Agribusiness departmental proportion (1999) ρ = 0.74

Petroleum and mining departmental proportion (1999) ρ = -0.02

Narcotics departmental proportion (1999) ρ = -0.03

12 The local data on massacres have been shared by the Centro de Investigacion y Proyectos Especiales (CIPE) of the Faculty of Finance, Government, and International Relations at the Universidad Externado de Colombia (Colombia). The data have been originally gathered by the Colombian Government (Presidency of the Republic), the Colombian Police, and the Fundalibertad Institute. The economic data have been gathered from Bogotá in collaboration with the CIPE and other insti-tutions (UNODC and DANE). The economic potential of a department for extraction can be meas-ured by an agglomerate composed of the most relevant economic variables. The sectoral proportion for each department is multiplied by its corresponding proportion in guerrilla finances. The results are then totalled for each department. The exercise is based on Echandia’s (2006, 54) evaluation of guerrilla’s finances per sector 1991-1998: a) Petroleum and mining (p): 15%; b) Kidnapping (k): 20%; c) Agribusiness (g): 8%; d) Narcotics (n): 48%; e) Transport and commerce (t): 5%. i. As such the agglomerate of sectoral data = p+k+g+n+t. The sources and method used to

calculate the departmental value for each sector were as follows: ii. Petroleum and mining sectors (p) = (Current departmental value of annual production for

petroleum and mining in 1999) / (Total Colombian current value for petroleum and min-ing) (15%) (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística 1999a).

iii. Kidnapping (k) = (Number of kidnappings per department in 1999) / (Total number of kidnappings in Colombia in 1999) (20%) (Centro de Investigacion y Proyectos Especiales [Unpublished Database]).

iv. Agribusiness sector (g) = (Current value of annual production for Agribusiness per department in 1999) / (Total Colombian current value for agribusiness in 1999) (8%) (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística, 1999a).

v. Narcotics (n) = (((Departmental production of coca in Kg) (Value of coca exports per Kg) + (Departmental production of amapola in Kg) (Value of amapola exports per Kg))) / (Total value of narcotics exports in Colombia for 1999)) (48%) (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2008, 225; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2004, 54, 59).

vi. Transport and commerce (t) = (Current value of annual production for transport and com-merce per department in 1999) / (Total current value of terrestrial transport and commerce for Colombia in 1999) (8%) (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística 1999b).


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The correlation underlines the heuristic value of such an approach. It re-lates qualitative understandings of conflict dynamics to quantitative evaluations. In this case it offers an interesting explanation of how massacres are linked to agribusiness through the alliance of paramilitaries and large landowners. The qualitative analysis of paramilitaries’ mode of operation allows us to explain how forms of violence and the economic sector are strategically linked.

Building on the new geo-localized datasets identified in the first section of this article, the resource-conflict research agenda could expose the local links between other forms of violence statistics (homicides, forced displacement, rapes, etc.) and economic variation (poverty, agro-industrial production, family farm-ing, PCE, etc.). The meaning of these different variables cannot be interpreted heuristically without a qualitative understanding of each group’s mode of opera-tion. Tracing correlations between economic and violence variables not only al-lows us to corroborate the qualitative analysis, but could also serve to trace the expansion of a belligerent’s specific mode of operation in time-space series.

5. Different Readings from the Political Economy of Civil Wars and Micro-dynamics of Civil Wars

Considering the previous analysis, it appears that the microdynamics of civil wars model (Kalyvas 2006) and the political economy of civil wars approach have a more limited grasp on the recent strategic dynamics of the Colombian conflict.

Kalyvas’ theorization of violence has already proven its explanatory ca-pacity to link forms of violence (indiscriminate versus selective) with the consolidation of control. However, strongly correlated economic and control variations may expose some inconsistencies. If we consider the violent practices of paramilitaries using Kalyvas’ theory, collective indiscriminate violence (mostly indiscriminate massacres) is overused and should not lead to the consolidation of control by counterinsurgents. If Kalyvas’ model predicts counterproductive effects in most cases, the Colombian case underlines how the systematic reliance on massacres has been effective in terms of counterinsurgents gaining control.

The recurrent use of massacres by paramilitaries and their success in securing control contradicts Kalyvas’ claim that indiscriminate violence tends to be counterproductive. Indeed, in most instances, massacres are indiscriminate

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and target people by association or randomly (Medina Gallego 2001; Echandía Castilla 2006). The choice to rely on specific forms of violence may need to be understood on the basis of previous descriptions of belligerents’ alliances. In the case of paramilitaries, the use of indiscriminate violence does not only destabi-lize the military control of insurgents, it simultaneously settles local feuds and enhances extraction opportunities:

Forced displacement of civilian populations has become an integral part of the strategy employed by some paramilitary forces. They employed terror campaigns in some cases to depopulate communities believed to be loyal to leftist guerrillas; in other cases, the paramilitary groups loyal to large economic interests (often including narcotics traffickers) displaced popula-tions so that valuable land and economic assets could then be purchased very cheaply. (US State Department 1998)

Both the macro-cleavage of counterinsurgency and the micro-cleavages related to land conflicts along the agricultural frontier determined the para-militaries’ use of violence.13 The dual function of violence may explain how the indiscriminate violence characterizing the paramilitary mode of operation af-fects the economic and military contexts and, then, how these effects may favour paramilitary control.

Further analysis of the use of massive indiscriminate violence to provoke the displacement of populations could demonstrate this special feature of the Colombian paramilitaries’ mode of operation. Indiscriminate violence is the most likely cause of the displacement of populations and, therefore, could be part of

13 The national coherence of paramilitarism as a unified force depended on the central cleavage of (counter)insurgency. However, the decentralization of military command into regional blocs was an intrinsic characteristic of paramilitarism. Indeed, paramilitary structures remained highly decentralized and tended to expand in function with the various (and sometimes competing) alliances of its regional strongmen, who had local interests. Local economic op-portunities are not limited to land ownership. The confrontation between the Nutibara Bloc and the Metro Bloc in Medellín is a clear case of a struggle between paramilitary organizations for the control of revenues stemming from illicit activities. These alliances with local private interests facilitate a better understanding of why the national paramilitary organization, the AUC, disintegrated in 2003 when the narcotics trade became an issue for demobilization.

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the dynamics generating land concentration. Indeed, narcotraffickers bought more than four million hectares of land in Colombia in 1997 (Reyes Posada 1997).14 During the same period, more than three million people, or around 10% of the Colombian population, were displaced, with population displacement be-ing a phenomenon closely associated with paramilitary practices (CCJ 2007).15 An integrated approach allows us to explain the relationship between economic transformations, variation in military control and violence patterns.

Following an analysis of the dual function of violence and contra Kalyvas (2006), it is imperative to interpret violence-related variables and economic variables as being interdependent. Understanding belligerents’ divergent modes of operation allows for a better interpretation of the different meanings for the same aggregated macro-variable.

Indeed, existing intrastate analyses—deprived of a qualitative understand-ing of belligerents’ modes of operation—found very thin explanations of the strategic dynamics involved. Rubio (2002) and Bottía (2003) produced two sta-tistical studies of the Colombian conflict based on the political economy of civil wars approach. These statistical models applied at the intrastate level in Colombia analyse the relationship between violence and economic variables. They identify economic variables, such as mining and land distribution, as being significantly linked to the presence of insurgents.

The first model, produced by Rubio (2002), concludes that the inten-sity of violence is strongly correlated to the presence of guerrillas and has no significant relationship to “grievance-related variables” (e.g., inequalities or poverty). However, this conclusion remains uncertain if considered in light of Kalyvas’ micro model, which explains why the absence of violence in zones of uncontested control cannot be interpreted as the absence of insurgents. In this line of thought, it is correct to affirm that the intensity of violence is strongly correlated with the presence of guerrillas. However, contrary to what Rubio (2002) suggests, it would be erroneous to interpret low homicide rates as the absence of belligerents. The low level of violence can more probably

14 Other estimates vary from 2.6 to 6.8 million hectares (HREV 2006, 12).15 Colombia has the world’s highest number of displaced people (internally and externally)

after Somalia.

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be linked with unchallenged control, as was the case in most regions before the paramilitary surge.16 Since Rubio does not integrate a qualitative analysis of the strategic trends that shape the variations in the main variables, most interpretations remain vague or simply inconclusive.

The second model produced by Bottía (2003) uses logit, probit, and tobit methods to identify the most important factors that determined the FARC’s zones of expansion between 1992 and 2000. In line with the integrated analysis previously outlined in this article, her model identifies change in permanent rural revenue as the most significant “greed-related variable” (Bottía 2003, 36). However, the potential for explaining the strategic dynamics at stake are limited because they are based on a binary-dependent variable (the presence or absence of guerrillas). Moreover, the absence of an analytical effort at the micro level does not allow this last author to reach any conclusions on the underlying strategic dynamics explaining this result.

This is not to say that quantitative results using macro-variables are with-out value. Again, it is only if they are controlled for strategic trends that they can corroborate qualitative analyses of the conflict or allow for generalizations based on micro-dynamic analyses, an avenue opened by geo-localized datasets. As the description of the Colombian conflict considering the strategic and economic dimensions at micro and macro levels have underlined, the macro-dynamics are nothing more than the contingent generalization of effective micro-patterns. It is only by understanding these micro-patterns constituting the paramilitaries’ main strategic trends that one can contextualize a shift in data variation and under-stand their different meanings.

The limitations of the conclusions of quantitative macro-analyses derive from their incapacity to consider these dynamics. As Kalyvas stated, “[p]ay-ing attention to local cleavages is necessary for achieving a closer fit between macrolevel and microlevel theory and interpreting cross-national findings about

16 Kalyvas argues that a zone of “[p]arity of control between the actors (zone 3) is likely to produce no selective violence by the armed actors” (2006, 204). However, due to the system-atic reliance on indiscriminate violence by paramilitaries and the non-characterization of indiscriminate violence (except massacres) in official statistics, this trend remains hardly distinguishable in Colombia.

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macrovariables […]” (2006, 386). The relationship between macro-variables (e.g., agrobusiness, poverty, statistics on violence, etc.) is meaningful when interpreted as the manifestation of local modes of operation (i.e., socio-economic alliances and patterns of violence).

Conclusion

Violent scenarios may appear disorderly and chaotic. However, the material dimensions of conflict are characterized by dynamics that are pos-sible to understand and explain. In order to do so, it is necessary to identify the micro-patterns of each mode of operation and its distinct macro-level manifestations. This complex task can be achieved by using two methods in a complementary way: qualitative analyses of the patterns of strategic micrody-namics (i.e., mode of operation), and statistical analyses of violent incidents and macro-economic variables. Although not based on the new geo-localized datasets, the empirical case study demonstrates the soundness of such an argument for future research within the resource-conflict sub-field. The cor-relation of the indicators of the paramilitary mode of operation illustrates the potential of such an approach. Moving between the two methods could also allow us to temporally and spatially circumscribe the main strategic dynam-ics and to synchronically and diachronically compare their manifestations. This approach represents a promising orientation to better explain strategic dynamics within conflicts. It identifies trends in military competition that are qualitatively characterized by similar modes of operation and where macro-variables have a shared meaning.

All in all, the conceptualization of agency—as a micro-founded mode of operation operationalizing the dual function of violence in civil wars—could al-low for the intrastate empirical study of the strategic dynamics within conflicts and the mapping through time and space of belligerents’ main strategic trends. Many other directions and topics could be explored from this perspective. Returning to the Colombian case, it can be postulated that not only did the in-creasingly globalized market produce extraction opportunities for armed groups, but also that paramilitaries fuelled the global integration of the Colombian agrar-ian sector through the widespread application of their mode of operation. In this

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case, paramilitary violence seems to have the dual impact of increasing counter-insurgent control and enhancing an agrarian counter-reform. These interrelations give structure to strategic dynamics and transform the macro-economic context. Considering the dynamic perspective offered by this approach, relating economic and strategic contexts should be a central preoccupation of quantitative studies where relevant disaggregated data are available.

In fact, practitioners have long understood the implications of the dual function of violence in the context of irregular warfare. As in Malaysia under the command of the British High Commissioner Sir Gerald Templer (1952-1954), counterinsurgent violence was used to promote economic sectors particularly hostile to insurgents (e.g., extensive production of palm oil and rubber). Land, violence, and power are linked in many ways. As Herbst (2000) argues in the context of Africa, power and property rights in different regions have different historical foundations and distinct dynamics. It is therefore most probable that alliances between belligerents and civilians are shaped along distinct political, socio-economic and/or cultural peculiarities. The richness of recent microanalyses of these relationships is of enormous value to the study of conflict (e.g., Duncan 2006; Bundervoet 2009; Mamdani 1996). The macro-micro linkage proposed in this article may provide more “thickly” informed quantitative analyses of warfare in different parts of the world while still taking the special features of these societies into account.

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H

Philippe dufort recently completed his PhD in International Relations at the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Cambridge (UK). He was an Associate Editor at the Cambridge Review of International Affairs from 2009 to 2013. He is currently a sessional Lecturer at UQÀM (Canada). His general research interests include: Development Studies; Strategic Studies; Critical IR Theories; International Historical Sociology; Identity and Conflict Politics. His latest publication include: “Introduction: Experiences and Knowledge of War.” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 26 (4), 2013; and “Droit international, relations sociales de propriété et processus de paix en Colombie: Une réarticulation politico-juridique.” Études internationals 39 (1), 2008.E-mail: [email protected]

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The Generalization of Particularized Trust. Paramilitarism and Structures of Trust in Colombia

Jan BoestenUniversity of British Columbia (Canada)

DOI: dx.doi.org/10.7440/colombiaint81.2014.08RECEIVED: 4 de junio de 2013ACCEPTED: 10 de octubre de 2013REVISED: 14 de febrero de 2014

ABSTRACT: This paper examines the relation between the politics of state formation and the accompanying appearance of social traps based on the example of Colombia. It shows that egregious exceptions to the rule of law, exemplified by the parapolitica and “false positives” scandals, are themselves a result of “social traps,” which are generated by the generalization of particularized trust. The generalization of particularized trust entails the incorporation of a closed trust network in the effort of monopolizing the means of violence against an internal insurgency.

KEYWORDS: socio-political trust • social capital • social trap • monopolization of violence • Colombia • paramilitarism

H

The article is based on the author’s MA thesis submitted at the University of British Columbia (Canada). In its first articulation, the paper was a theoretical piece on social trust literature and how it can be made utilizable for the Colombian case. The article was elaborated under the supervision of Prof. Mark E. Warren.

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la generalización de la confianza particularizada. Paramilitarismo y estructuras de confianza en colombia

RESUMEN: El artículo examina la relación entre las políticas de formación del Estado y la creación paralela de trampas sociales en el caso colombiano. Se demuestra que las excepciones al “imperio de la ley” (parapolítica y “falsos positivos”) son el resultado de “trampas sociales”, las cuales son generadas por el proceso de generalización de una confianza particularizada. Este proceso de generalización es la adopción de una red de confianza cerrada, en el esfuerzo de monopolizar los medios de violencia contra la insurgencia interna.

PALABRAS CLAVE: confianza sociopolítica • capital social • trampa social • monopolización de la violencia • Colombia • paramilitarismo

H

a generalização da confiança particularizada. Paramilitarismo e estruturas de confiança na colômbia

RESUMO: Este artigo examina a relação entre as políticas de formação do Estado e a criação paralela de armadilhas sociais com base no caso colombiano. Demonstra-se que as exceções ao “império da lei” (parapolítica e “falsos positivos”) são o resultado de “armadilhas sociais”, as quais são geradas pelo processo de generalização de uma confiança particularizada. Esse processo de generalização é a adoção de uma rede de confiança fechada no esforço de monopolizar os meios de violência contra a insurgência interna.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Confiança sociopolítica • capital social • trapaça social • monopolização da violência • Colômbia • paramilitarismo

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Introduction1

The Colombian political system is rife with paradox. Colombia is a liberal state with a long history of constitutional rule; yet, it has also displayed immensely high levels of criminal and political violence (See Taylor 2009; Gutiérrez Sanín, Acevedo, and Viatela 2007; Archer and Shugart 1997; Martz 1997; Hartlyn 1989, 1988). Illegal armed actors, paramilitaries and guerrilla groups, and the state’s armed forces, continually commit atrocities. Formal and informal institutions, which have evolved over centuries, separate the country into a core and periphery that varies in terms of the quality of governance. The parapolitica and the “false positives” scandals are the latest evidence of the contradictory characteristics of Colombia’s political system; again displaying that formally democratic institu-tions have been co-opted by illicit social forces.2

Drawing on Max Weber’s famous definition of the modern state, Colombia’s conundrum and its history of violence are usually explained with reference to the failure of the state to build and maintain a monopoly of violence. The lack of state capacity to radiate power from the center to the periphery of the country is attributed to the lack of external competition (Centento 2002) or the peculiar convulsions of internal politics in the creation of the nation-state in Colombia—particularly the ill-conceived decentralizations and federalizations that took place in the 1860s and then again in the 1980s (Centeno 2002; Sánchez and Mar Palau 2006). In addition, the ubiquity of clientelistic networks is argued to have historically weakened the dominance of the central state by relying on brokerage relationships between different factions within the national territory (Osterling 1989; Archer 1989; Peñate 1998; Gutiérrez and Dávila 2001; Eaton 2006; García Villegas and Revelo Rebolledo 2010).

1 The author would like to thank Mark E. Warren, Maxwell A. Cameron, Katrina Chapelas and Samuel T. Reed for their comments on various drafts of this paper. Any mistakes that remain are his own.

2 The parapolitica scandal involved members of congress, who had signed pacts of mutual sup-port with paramilitaries that had been involved in massacres and other human rights abuses. The false positives involved the military, also in collaboration with paramilitaries, kidnapping pauperized youth, executing them, and then presenting the bodies in guerrilla uniforms in order to receive bonuses and promotions.

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The contention of this paper is not that these explanations are defi-cient. Its intention is rather to push the analysis of relations of domination in Colombia further and to invoke the existing trust literature in an effort to better understand the results of the sub-optimal equilibrium between the center and the periphery (Acemoglu, Robinson, and Santos 2010) in relation to the rule of law. The paper will proceed by outlining the latest research on the evolution of statehood in Colombia. This literature suggests that the most important disruption to the evolution of a clear monopoly of violence has been the abundance of clientelistic relationships. While clientelism is a century-old phenomenon, its mode has been transformed in Colombia by the international drug trade, internal fragmentation of the party system, and decentralization of rule into what is termed “armed clientelism.” The asym-metric loyalties rooted in the capacity to coerce provide a niche for warlords at the regional level to coexist with the central state and build political proj-ects that increasingly co-opt politicians in formal institutions.

My argument is that symbiotic relations between Señores de la Guerra and politicians (Duncan 2006) not only undermine the predictability and rationalization of domination, but also damage the rule of law by emascu-lating ideal-type trust relations. Constitutional democracies institutionalize accountability towards rulers through various checks on power. In other words, the ruled distrust their rulers and this distrust comes to be expressed in, and built into, democratic institutions. Inversely, in constitutional de-mocracies rulers trust the ruled by granting private and civic rights. The result is that coercion, which is at the disposal of rulers, is made predictable and non-arbitrary. In authoritarian regimes, the relationship between trust and distrust is reversed because citizens cannot exercise checks on estab-lished power, nor are they protected from encroachment on their private and civic rights. The result is that coercion is arbitrary. From these findings in the research on political trust and social capital, this paper builds a hypoth-esis for the Colombian case.

In Colombia, democratic formal institutions coexist with undemocratic informal institutions at the regional level that results in the unpredictable exercise of coercion by warlords. The rule of law becomes a mere nomencla-ture, since paramilitary groups trust within the confines of their own group

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The Generalization of Particularized TrustJan Boesten

but do not extend that trust outside of it. When equipped with sufficient means of coercion, such groups can undermine the rule of law because it is contingent on embedding coercion in structures of distrust. The equilibrium between formal and informal institutions in Colombia that gave rise to the paramilitary phenomenon indicates that this constitutes a social trap. I call this social trap the generalization of particularized trust.

1. The State and Clientelism in Colombia

Since comparative political science ventured to bring the state back in (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985), its capacity to coerce or coordinate society became the central dependent variable of social science research into the character of the state, its relation to society, and its trajectory on the path to becoming the most dominant organization in politics. Charles Tilly (1985, 1992) was in the vanguard of what is sometimes referred to—somewhat derogatorily—as the “Bellicist School” of state formation. This school placed “the organization of coercion and preparation for war squarely in the middle of the analysis” (Tilly 1992, 14). Others in the same tradition stressed that the state was functionally better equipped to deal with competing political orga-nizations (Spruyt 1994), or could better reduce boundary costs and strengthen the center (Herbst 2000).

Poignantly summarized, Tilly argues that states make war and war makes states. He identified four patterns in European state-making (war-mak-ing, state-making, protection, and extraction) that mutually reinforced each other in a virtuous-circle-logic. The fourth component is arguably the most crucial, since extraction involves three risky terrains upon which state and society are brought together: adjudication, distribution and production (1992, 96-7). What is more, when it comes to extraction, the dialectics between state and society have the corollary of rationalizing law and bureaucracy. The pro-cesses involved imply that a) the balance between those four tasks affects the organization of the state, and b) popular resistance could result in concessions in the form of rights and institutions. What Tilly at first recognized as im-plications of the evolution of the nation-state, he later identified as mutually reinforcing mechanisms:

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In the long run, increases in governmental capacity and protected con-sultation reinforce each other, as state expansion generates resistance, bargaining, and provisional settlements, on one side, while on the other side protected consultation encourages demands for expansion of state intervention, which in turn promote increases in capacity.3 (2004)

The apparent teleology of the argument should not detract from the analytical value of the concepts. The South American context of state formation in the nineteenth century provides the opportunity to test the argument against counterfactual variables. What happens without external competition providing pressure to streamline conscription and raise capital for war? Centeno found that South American states might have acted despotically towards their citizens, but have greatly lagged behind in their capacity to coordinate their societies. This weakness of the state in Latin America coincided with a lack of “total war” with external enemies. Colombia’s history fits well with this narrative. Since the people of Gran Colombia did not fight each other over an abstract and nationally coher-ent cause, violence in nineteenth century Colombia (as in the twentieth century) turned inwards and not outward against external enemies (Centeno 2002, 67). Ideological divisions only existed at the elite level; and, the elites built horizontal alliances with regional power clusters but did not vertically integrate the institu-tions to build a national project (Valencia Villa 2012 [1987]).

Succinctly stated, the lesson from Tilly and Mann in Colombia then is that the virtuous state-making circle also implies a vicious circle that runs in the opposite direction. Bejarano and Pizarro explain:

If, as Charles Tilly posited, the primary function of the state is its war-making capability, from which then emanate all its other functions (1985, 1992), the lack of war provides an explanation for why this is the case. According to Tilly, states perform four basic tasks: (1) Through “war

3 Similarly, Michael Mann argued that increases in state power also signaled a shift from despotic power to infrastructure power. In the case of the former, the state acts despotically over society and in the case of the latter it co-ordinates activities through society. In other words, increasing modernization alters the mode of state-society relations from coercion to coordination (1984).

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making,” they eliminate or neutralize their foreign enemies; (2) “state making,” in turn, implies the elimination of their rivals within the terri-tory; (3) “protection,” relates to the capacity to eliminate or neutralize the enemies of their clients; and finally (4) “extraction” allows them to acquire the resources needed to fulfill the other three tasks (1985, 181). All four activities depend on the capacity of the state to monopolize the concen-trated means of coercion. […] Inversely, we argue, the incapacity to fulfill any one of them tends to weaken all the rest. A state like the Colombian one, incapable of eliminating or neutralizing its rivals within its territory, is neither able to eliminate or neutralize the enemies of its potential clients (the citizens) nor to extract the resources needed in order to perform its basic functions. (2001, 252)

These deficiencies of state functions that Bejarano and Pizarro identified in the early 2000s, when paramilitaries and guerrillas were at the apex of their power, have historical origins. Since the days of Gran Colombia in the 1830s, the Colombian republic has not been able to establish a clear and uncontested monopoly of violence. The patterns of violence certainly changed over time, yet, a distinguishable mode of governance weaved into the fabric of the Andean nation remained surprisingly constant in its defining parameters: the vestment of particularistic interest within a framework of statehood. Extraction remained ineffective because the applica-tion of political power by the central government always functioned through a network of friendships among unequal parties (Archer 1989).

Such relations among unequal groups are properly defined as “clientelistic relations,” and, while their mode has changed over time, they consistently reap-pear in the course of Colombia’s nation-state history. Peculiarly, they conjoin national interest with residual interests emanating from the regional centers of power. Clientelism has three defining features:

1) [T]wo parties unequal in status, wealth, and influence; 2) the forma-tion and maintenance of the relationship depends on reciprocity in the exchange of [non-comparable] goods and services; 3) the development and maintenance of a patron-client relationship rests heavily on face-to-face context between the two parties. (Archer 1989)

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Colombia’s socio-political history is conventionally separated into three different types of clientelism: traditional clientelism, modern or broker clien-telism, and market clientelism. Each of the three was prevalent during a different period and exhibited a distinct configuration of informal and formal institutions. The last ideal type involves what some have referred to as “armed clientelism” (García Villegas and Revelo Rebolledo 2010).

Traditional clientelism evolved in the immediate post-independence period. After victory in the wars of independence, national armies ceased to exist, but local militias persevered and became the power base of regional warlords. Gran Colombia was parceled off between these regional Caudillos, who developed the areas under their control economically and tied the popu-lation to their domus. Race fears held the militias together and provided a modicum of social cohesion. When they fought each other over ideological projects in vicious civil wars, the resulting institutions did little to unify the country. Rather, when a victorious faction in a civil war imposed its ideologi-cal preferences, this remained largely symbolic. Colombians refer to this type of constitutional politics as “changing everything so nothing changes” (Archer 1989; Valencia Villa 2012). Caudillo and state authority coexisted side by side and, given the absence of external war, they had little incentive or need to expand the provision of security as a public good (Centeno 2002, 239). Just as external competition did not force national unity upon Colombia, neither was democracy an inevitable outcome. Democracy was not pushed upon elites by the masses, but rather developed as a “means for elites to share power among themselves in a way that would avoid infighting” (Robinson 2013).

One unusual feature of Colombia is that socio-political commotions, that in other contexts have resulted in modernization and the integration of previ-ously excluded political groups, occurred here as well (see, for example, Collier and Collier 2002). However, rather than modernizing the system as a whole, these commotions only modernized its subsystems (in this case clientelistic relations), at-tuning them to new contextual conditions. The country’s integration into the global economic system, a phase that in Colombia essentially spanned the first half of the twentieth century, “reformed” patron-client relations, tying previously autonomous single patrons together into clusters, who could then negotiate for political favors. As such, the system could even provide some degree of mobility and augment the

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poor distributive capacity of a weak state (Gutiérrez Sanín et al. 2007; Archer 1989). Even more surprisingly, the evolution of broker clientelism involved something of a democratic opening. In order to avoid infighting, the two political parties decided on a more representative electoral system that, by undercutting the monopolization of power by a single party, provided each one with a voice and replaced military fronts with electoral coalitions (Mazzuca and Robinson 2009, 288). Even judicial review was a by-product of bipartisan cooperation. Moreover, this process was implemented in 1910 and 1911, making Colombia one of the first countries in the world to subject its legislature to the rule of law.

Nevertheless, the capacity of Colombia’s formal institutions to incorpo-rate previously excluded social groups was eventually exhausted because the underlying relations of patronage remained intact. The fate of the Revolución en Marcha in the 1930s and the assassination of left-wing populist Jorge Elicier Gaítan in 1948 signaled that the incorporation of the working classes had failed and that the democratization of Colombia along social democratic lines was also a doomed endeavor (Collier and Collier 2002, 457; Sánchez and Meertens 2001, 13). Violence ensued and, though it was briefly avoided by power-sharing agreements under the National Front, regime crisis became a fundamental and ongoing characteristic of Colombia’s political system. Insurgency groups on the left and vigilante groups on the right sprung into existence. In addition, regime illegitimacy paved the way for the illicit narcotics trade to take root in Colombia (Thoumi 1995, 2003). The resources from that trade had extensive ramifications for the political landscape. It enabled groups at the margin of the law to build political capital at a regional level and capture state institutions by running their own candidates and intimidating opponents. As a result, those groups could then siphon off resources transferred from the national state to their own municipali-ties. This is referred to as “armed clientelism” (Peñate 1998; Eaton 2006).

2. Armed Clientelism, Institutions, and Paramilitarism

When the term “armed clientelism” was coined, Peñate used it to describe the practice of the ELN guerrilla of extracting resources from oil revenues in Arauca (1998). Further research showed it resonates equally well with territories, in which paramilitaries exercised control. Yet, there is one

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important difference between the guerrilla and paramilitaries that is central to the theoretic considerations of this paper: their relation to the state. Initially not only tolerated but instigated by law, paramilitaries sought to boost their legitimacy by aligning themselves with the state against the insurgency. The ties between the evolving paramilitaries and the state were never fully broken, and their evolution over the last two and a half decades provides an analyti-cal narrative regarding how diverging interests and set preferences between the national and sub-national level not only affect the monopolization of violence, as Acemoglu et al. convincingly show (2010), but also the rule of law. The latter can be explained by the de-institutionalization of political trust structures.

Armed clientelism has its roots in the conflation of drug money and politics that began in the 1980s. While the big cartels, and most notably Pablo Escobar himself (Gutiérrez Sanín and Barón 2005; Duncan 2006), did not view the guerrilla as their natural enemy (after all, they received protection from state prosecution in areas under guerrilla control), traditional land-owning elites and cattle ranchers very much did. They were amongst the first to feel the brunt of guerrilla infiltration into ranching territory (Gutiérrez Sanín and Barón 2005). The inability of landowners to pay for the security of their estates and the movement of drug traffickers into the real estate mar-ket in order to launder money and gain status brought them together into a heterogeneous interest group (Gutiérrez Sanín and Barón 2005, 44). The state, for its part, was caught in limbo, as it had to fight two wars at once: one against the insurgency and one against the drug trade. The coincidence of the two wars had increasingly contradictory results. The state was fighting the guerrilla on the side of landowners, who were gradually joining forces with actors involved in the illicit narcotics trade. In addition, the illegality of the drug trade meant that armed groups benefitted exponentially from narco-trafficking rents, while the state’s relative capacities further contracted in those regions (Bejarano and Pizarro 2001).

While the presence of drug money was increasing in Colombia’s economy, its political system was undergoing fundamental reforms that also allowed that money to penetrate Colombian politics. The reforms that took place in the second half of the 1980s and then in the new 1991 Constitution

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aimed to deepen democracy and assuage the regime crisis. Again, the ef-fects were rather contradictory. One reform, the direct election of mayors, provided armed groups with the opportunity to develop their activities and establish much better terms with those municipal governments than with national institutions. At the same time, the traditional party system became increasingly fragmented, resulting in the emergence of electoral entrepre-neurs who ran under the banner of a party in name only (Crisp and Ingall 2002; Gutiérrez Sanín et al. 2007). In reality, they organized their elections autonomously from the national directorate, providing an opportunity for local party strongmen to forge strategic alliances with armed actors (draw-ing their resources from the drug trade) to garner more votes. Together, de-centralization and the de-institutionalization of the two traditional parties provided political opportunity structures that strongly benefited actors with high violence capacities. These actors were particularly able to capitalize on weak institutionalization (Sánchez and Mar Palau, 2006).

The 1990s further cemented the state’s peculiar position. On one hand, the big drug cartels were dismantled, but on the other, the drug trade did not disappear, and nor did the self-defense forces on the right. Indeed, these self-defense forces underwent their most systemic expansion during this period. The leading figures of the paramilitary movement in the 1990s, the Castaño brothers, learned their craft in the cartels. After falling out with Escobar they formed functional alliances with the state in order to bring him down in the Pepe organization. Furthermore, while the 1968 law that allowed self-defense forces was repealed in 1989, the state responded to increased guerrilla activity in the early 1990s by largely emulating the law under the new CONVIVIR system (the Spanish acronym for Special vigilance and private security services). When CONVIVIR was dismantled in 1997, the ACCU (Autodefensas Campesinas de Córdoba y Urabá) continued under the AUC (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia)—seemingly uniting the loose confederation of groups under one umbrella organization. Finally, the demo-bilization of the AUC under Uribe’s Justice and Peace Law did not signal the end of paramilitarism, as evidenced by the upsurge of new “criminal bands” such as the Black Eagles (Ágilas Negras). More crucially, the demobilization of the AUC was preceded by what is now known as parapolitica: pacts of

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mutual support between heads of the AUC and politicians in Congress. In all of this, paramilitaries stood between legality and illegality. The question, then, is how to interpret this bipolarity.

It is well documented that, out of the mélange of violent actors in Colombia, paramilitaries have been responsible for the vast majority of atroci-ties.4 A fundamental characteristic of these vigilante groups seems to be the unpredictability of their coercion and their lack of accountability. The reason for this lies in their nature. As the preceding analysis made abundantly clear, paramilitaries can hardly be described as mere banditry groups. Any valuable evaluation must begin by taking into account those aspects of their behavior that go beyond pure rent-seeking. However, it is also important not to go to the other extreme and allude to paramilitaries as a full state within a state (let alone a democratic state). Rather, the relationship between paramilitaries and statehood is an ambiguous one: they are at the same time adversaries, allies, and parasites of the state (Gutiérrez Sanín and Barón 2005, 27).

In light of this ambiguous relation with the state, Duncan defined the paramilitary groups at the height of their power as Señores de la Guerra. These Colombian warlords unite a superior capacity (in comparison with the democratic state) to coerce in certain regions and the ability to extract resources to finance coercive capabilities (from illicit sources) with political-military hegemony. This last factor involves the production and regulation of the social norms that govern the interaction and administration of “jus-tice” in the life of “their groups and citizens” (Duncan 2006, 40-46).5 Their hegemony and administration of justice were not intended as a replacement for the state, but rather as a way to compensate for its absence. The para-

4 Human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Cinep, and the United Nations have estimated the various paramilitary fractions to be responsible for up to 80% of the non-combatant and politically-motivated killings. See annual country reports by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch 1999-2005.

5 Romero (2000) was amongst the first to note that paramilitaries play a crucial role in identity formation in the territories under their control. The Group and Center for Historical Memory, implemented after the Justice and Peace Law, confirmed the overlaying of various identities in areas affected by the conflict. See in particular the 2012 reports Justicia y paz. ¿Verdad judicial o verdad histórica? (CMH 2012a ) and Justicia y paz. Tierras y territorios en las versiones de los paramilitares (CMH 2012b).

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militaries’ self-declared claim to legitimacy even goes so far as to suggest that they were acting as fighters for democracy. Yet, the strategy utilized to enforce political hegemony (massacres and selective assassination) is any-thing but democratic. In areas controlled by the paramilitaries there is little room for contestation and accountability—let alone anything resembling the rule of law.

Paramilitary expansion tells us more still. The paramilitary strategy of refounding the nation and legalizing land grabs through counter-agrarian re-form (Lopéz Hernández 2010), in fact runs counter to the state-making logic of Tilly’s paradigm of the state as organized crime. In this paradigm, rules are homogenized and rackets turned into taxes. In Colombia, paramilitarism drove a wedge between territorial expansion and policing. As Gutiérrez Sanín and Barón explain with the example of paramilitaries in Puerto Boyacá, in a “system [based on] territorial delegation, each commander [gave] a zone to a subcommander, who has latitude to impose his own rules” (2005, 24). Econometric data from the parapolitica scandal corroborates this evidence. Acemoglu et al. found that a deficient monopoly of violence in “peripheral areas, can be an equilibrium outcome which ‘modernization’ need not auto-matically change” (2010, 2). They show that by controlling citizens’ voting behavior, paramilitaries can delegate votes to their preferred candidates, reducing “the incentives of the politicians they favor to eliminate them.” The result is that “in non-paramilitary areas policies are targeted to citizens while in paramilitary areas they cater to the preferences of paramilitaries,” thereby providing citizens in those areas with fewer public goods (2). This suboptimal outcome is locked-in with relative stability, because “paramilitaries deliver votes to politicians with preferences relatively close to theirs, while politicians they helped elect leave them alone” (2).

The contention of this paper is that an accompanying phenomenon to the symbiotic equilibrium between politicians as representatives of the state and non-state armed actors is the prevalence of informal institutions that undermine the effective rule of law. Moreover, this points towards a social trap in which the political trust relations that assuage the potential for violence through embedded negotiations are displaced by those informal institutions. This is what I call the generalization of particularized trust.

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3. Politics and the Question of Trust

The issue of trust has appeared repeatedly in academic debates on questions of democracy and the quality of democracy. Most famously, it was included in Robert Putnam’s definition of social capital, which, for Putnam, is the fuel that makes a democracy vibrant (1993). Ever since Putnam’s famous rendering of social capital as the product of norms, networks, and trust, which results in social cooperation and fosters deeper democratization, the research on social trust has progressed considerably. Most importantly for the purposes of this essay, research has shown that not all forms of trust are beneficial for fostering social goods and democracy. On the contrary, “bad social capital” can function as an impediment to deeper democratization despite formally democratic institutions (Warren 2008). My definition of the Colombian situation as a social trap that constitutes the generalization of particularized trust works off research into the logic and nature of bad social capital. I will proceed by outlining basic definitions of social and political trust and their function within political systems. From there, the essay moves on to identify the paradox of trust in democracies, which suggests that sover-eign power cannot be trusted, but that citizens must trust each other in order to make democracy vibrant. Such ideal-type structuration of trust is reversed in autocratic regimes (rulers are trusted, while citizens are not trusted and cannot trust each other), providing the necessary clues to identify the struc-turation of trust in nominally-democratic regimes with a weak monopoliza-tion of violence, such as Colombia. In Colombia, institutionalized distrust, in the form of formal democratic institutions, is displaced at the regional level by undemocratic informal institutions.

When we return to Weber’s famous rendition of the modern state as the “human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legiti-mate use of physical force within a given territory,” we quickly encounter its relation to trust as a basic social fact (1994, 304). What is important is that it is not solely the capability to monopolize the means of force, but also to make a legitimate claim to those means, that defines the state. This legitimate claim to the monopoly of violence becomes important, because even though the abundance of violence is without a doubt the greatest impediment to the

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evolution of social trust, it does matter, as I will show below, how this trust is affected by political institutions in society.

Niklas Luhmann posited that the “absence of trust would prevent [hu-mans] even from getting up in the morning. [They] would be prey to a vague sense of dread, to paralyzing fears” (1979, 4). From there, it is not a great leap to see that the monopolization of violence is intrinsically important to the evolution of trust, since coercion in the hands of every individual in the form of violence is certainly the most dangerous or risky element inherent in political situations. Consequently, the monopolization of violence helps generate trust and reduce risk by taking the violence that is potentially in the hands of every individual or group and subduing it to the monopoly of the state. The state thereby converts unpredictable and arbitrary violence into patterned coercion, a pattern that is unquestionably deficient in Colombia.

However, the issue of social trust is not as simple as that, since trust as a fact of social life is entangled in the human condition: in the reality that men and not man populate the earth (Arendt 1958). It is also from this basic fact of human existence that trust becomes functionally important to reduce complexity. To trust someone implies an expectation of a certain type of behavior in the fu-ture, while this judgment is made in the present. A person bestowing trust cannot supersede time, but must come to a decision about the future in the present situ-ation: yet, “neither the uncertain future nor even the past can arouse trust since that which has been does not eliminate the possibility of the future discovery of alternative antecedents” (Luhmann 1979, 12).

The situation, though, gets more complicated still as the social dimen-sions (the first-hand experiences of other people) only increase the world’s complexity. As such, the alter-ego (the appearance of other people’s first-hand experience in our own consciousness) is a “source of profound insecurity” (Luhmann 1979). This profound insecurity does not diminish with the so-phistication of rationalized planning. Rather, rationalized planning entails a projection of the dependencies and contingencies that a decision might bring about and, with that, an increased number of future possibilities. Hence, “in-determinate complexity […] is actually a consequence of instrumental plan-ning” (1979, 15). Thus, society is reliant on trust, as it is situated between the confidence of what is known and has happened and the contingency of new

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possibilities. At the same time, however, the contingent nature of these new possibilities carries with it the potential for paralysis.

In order to properly define trust and distinguish it from hope or famil-iarity, as well as to understand it as a social phenomenon that connects the individual with the multitude, we then need to tie together risk, complexity and the individual decision one takes to cope with that risk. Succinctly stated, on a very basic, individual level, trust “involves a judgment […], tacit or habitual, to accept vulnerability to the potential ill will of others by granting them discretionary power over some good” (Warren 1999, 311). It is a personal or individual judgment on the behavior of other individuals. In short, it is a “gamble, a risky investment” (Luhmann 1979, 24). However, trust can come with positive and negative externalities, requiring a deeper investigation into its ontology for us to draw intelligible conclusions for the Colombian events and processes outlined above.

Politics, by definition, amplifies risks and foregoes cognitive solutions modeled after past experiences. Political situations are set apart by their conflictual nature or by the fact “that some issue or problem or pressing matter for collective action meets with conflicts of interests or identities” (Warren 1999, 311). Mark Warren juxtaposes this to the apparent automatism implicit in familiar social relations6, arguing that “when social relations be-come political […], one or more of the goods of everyday life have become problematic in ways that are not addressed, or no longer addressed, by the relatively automatic coordination of social relationships” (Warren 1999, 312). In addition, not only do traditional means of coordinating social relationships break down, “political uncertainty is never benign. Parties to a conflict bring with them resources (coercive, economic, and symbolic) which heighten the chance of losing” (Warren 1999, 312).

6 Familiarity pertains to a world that the observer can directly prove or disprove. The familiar, rooted in past experiences, dominates the present and the future; “complexity is reduced at the outset,” while trust “goes beyond the information [the subject] receives and risks defin-ing the future” (Luhmann 1979, 20; see also Warren 1999). Familiarity is related to a testable cognitive experience, which reduces complexity by essentially eliminating it. If it becomes a form of trust, it is, as I will demonstrate below, a different form of trust and not the type that Putnam (1993) included in his definition of social capital.

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Of course, Carl Schmitt defined the essence of politics as the decisions between friend and foe (2002). However, politics is not as one-sided as this definition suggests. Instead, it retains an ambivalent nature within its confron-tational shell; conflicts and uncertainties contain risks and possibilities. Warren, for example, refers to Arendt’s principle of natality functioning in the domain of politics. In other words, when situations become fractious—that is, when they cannot be solved by references to established social norms—new possibilities emerge to alter these social norms (1999).

The final caveat to our conceptualization of trust emerges from an understanding of how complexity-reducing mechanisms can be separated into different forms of social trust. Such separations are analogous to the divide between familiarity and trust. As we have seen, the former shies away from risk and remains in the known, while the later ventures to take a risk by making a bet about the unknown; familiarity turns towards the past, and trust towards the future (see note 6). Recent research into the nature of trust, and how it relates to the positive effects of social capital, differentiates between types of trust (Warren 2008; Rothstein and Stolle 2008). Similarly to politics, trust can expand possibilities and prosperity, but it can also contract possi-bilities. Whether the former or the latter is accomplished depends upon the type and degree of trust. Prosperity and democratic rule are contingent on a higher order of trust.

Efficiency in an increasingly complex world is contingent on expanding trust beyond the habitual world. Taking a leap into the unknown enables more possibilities and reduces interaction costs. The literature differentiates between particularized and generalized trust. The former defines relations of trust that exist in networks of close relations where trust is conferred to members of an in-group, who have intimate knowledge of one another. The similarity to familiarity is evident. The generalized form refers to trust that goes beyond the familiar world and is essential to the functioning of a complex society where a member cannot possibly know everything about all the contingencies a decision requires from him or her. It is only in the form of generalized trust that social trust fulfills the function that Robert Putnam assigns to it in his definition of social capital as “networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual cooperation” (1993).

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The ambivalent nature of trust in political situations is at the center of what is termed the “democratic dilemma,” which ties together social and political trust. The dilemma arises out of the reality that requires trust but in which “goods conflict, collective action, and collectively binding decisions” are constantly un-dermining naturally accumulated trust. Respectively, they are the source of dis-sension, “us-them” boundaries, and unequal realizations of individual and group interests. Such facets of political situations are much more prevalent in the public policies of democratic societies and require that political actors have significant trust in the legitimacy of the outcome (Tilly 2005, 134).

Material interests or interests related to identities often trump ethical norms in politics. Where the common good should be an overriding concern, the particular interests of certain parties often come to dominate the public arena and groups draw on resources such as power and money to further their agendas. This calls for institutions that hold organized power in check and protect the public good. However, to build effective checks on sovereign power, citizens have to trust one another without actually knowing each other. Here generalized forms of trust are of crucial importance. In the next section, I will explain how distrust and trust function in political systems and then bring together the concepts and tools discussed in order to propose an answer to the Colombian conundrum outlined at the begin-ning of this essay: that is, the question of why high levels of criminal and political violence persist despite the existence of democratic institutions.

4. Bringing Parapolitica and Trust Together

To move forward, we need to bring together the discussion of empiri-cal studies focusing on the issues of violence, violent actors, and clientelism in Colombia, and the analysis of sociological terms regarding the issue of trust in society. The thesis of this essay states that Colombia represents a particular type social trap, namely the generalization of particularized trust. In order to make this argument fully intelligible, I will embed the notions of generalized and par-ticularized trust discussed in the previous section in ideal-type considerations of structures of trust in political systems. This will help to show that groups that demonstrate internal and tightly-knit trust relations can offset structures of trust and distrust that function in constitutional democracies. Such relations between

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rulers and ruled are crucial for ensuring the rule of law and the predictability of coercion—precisely the factors that are missing or gravely damaged in Colombia.

In many ways, this idea of the social trap sounds like a conceptualization from game theoretic studies into non-cooperative situations. However, while it certainly shares important aspects with rational choice theories, it also diverges from these theories in a number of significant ways. Laying out these differences and defining the social trap more precisely is a good starting point for the final discussion of this paper. Rothstein argues that everyone can win if everyone chooses to cooperate, e.g., pay their taxes. If most people, however, cannot trust that “almost everyone will co-operate,” non-cooperation is the rational course of action, meaning that cooperation for common purposes is only likely to occur if people trust that most other people will also choose to cooperate. Lacking that trust, the social trap will slam inexorably shut. While this conceptualiza-tion shares the understanding that political and economic actions are strategic, because people’s actions depend on what they believe others are going to do, with game theoretic situations, it also contains nuanced differences. The concept involves a clear distinction between individual and collective rationality, which makes utility maximization equations less useful for predicting sub-optimal out-comes. Rational action in such instances is not contingent on individual prefer-ences, but on social context and collective memory. The contingency on collective memory makes exiting social traps intrinsically difficult, because “we cannot rationally decide to forget” (Rothstein 2005, 13; italics in the original).

The utility of the social trap concept for an analysis of Colombia’s situation becomes intelligible once we insert the democratic dilemma of trust into the differentiation between democratic and authoritarian regimes. Here it reappears as an apparent paradox: democracy requires trust amongst citi-zens, yet the very concept of a liberal democracy rests on the notion that sov-ereign power cannot be trusted (Warren 1999; Sztompka 1999). This apparent contradiction is resolved by institutionalizing trust and distrust in opposite directions. In order to control the abuse of power by the sovereign, liberal de-mocracies involve institutions and mechanisms that disperse power. In such a case, we can talk about the institutionalization of distrust. However, democ-racy does not entail solely the institutionalization of distrust, but encapsulates something that we can call the “institutionalization of public reason.” Public

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reason depends on communication amongst citizens, tolerance for other opinions, the replacement of struggle and conflict with compromise and consensus, civility in public disputes, and participation (Sztompka 1999). The institutionalization of these ideals comes in the form of citizens’ rights: the right to free speech, freedom of assembly, and a free press. Viewed then as a sociological ideal type, the resulting relationship between rulers and ruled is a trusting one, and constitutes what I call “institutionalized trust.” Distrust and trust in constitutional democracies have the functional imperative of shifting politics from a mode of conflict to deliberation and participation and, in turn, generate generalized trust amongst citizens, guaranteeing that political outcomes will enjoy legitimacy (Warren 1999).

Graph 1 schematizes this configuration of institutions and socio-political trust. It shows two loci of institutionalized trust and distrust in democracies. Distrust is institutionalized vis-à-vis power. It runs bottom-up. Meanwhile, trust is institutionalized and oriented towards citizens in the form of rights and free-doms. It flows top-down.

Graph 1. Institutionalized Distrust in Democracies


InstitutonalizedDistrust


political elite

Bargaining monopoly of violence

People / citizens

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Graph 2 schematizes the ideal-type scenario in authoritarian regimes. Here, the institutionalization of trust and distrust runs in the exact opposite direction: the rulers are bestowed with a blind form of trust that does not question the role they play.7 Citizens, on the other hand, are bestowed with distrust, resulting in constant surveillance and the absence of rights and freedoms. This pattern follows the same logic at work in democracies, only with reversed vectors. Consequently, the institu-tionalization of trust towards rulers, and the institutionalization of distrust towards citizens, breeds distrust within society. In this way, given their lack of accountability to citizens and the lack of public participation by citizens, autocratic societies do not require the same levels of trust as democracies. The different ways in which trust is institutionalized within democracies and autocracies also have contrasting conse-quences. While autocracies breed distrust amongst citizens and force them to turn their trust inwards, democracies have the exact opposite effect, in that citizens spread their trust more openly and liberally and not just to peers or in-groups. While this only touches on the Colombian situation tangentially (after all Colombia is a democ-racy), the last point is important for the Colombian case, as we will see when we turn to the generalization of particularized trust.

7 For ideal-type consideration, it does not matter whether those in power are feared or in fact blindly trusted. Without accountability mechanisms such as elections and term limits, the exercise of power resembles the blind trust of interpersonal relationships.

Graph 2. Institutionalized Trust in Autocratic Regimes


InstitutonalizedTrust


political elite


People / citizens

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Thus far, this study has differentiated between structures of social and politi-cal trust in democracies and autocracies. As shown, Colombia exhibits elements of democratic rule at the national level and autocratic characteristics at the sub-national level. The crucial agents that combine the two are non-state armed actors. This raises the following question: how do these actors fit into the framework of trust relations introduced above? This study, drawing on Diego Gambetta’s work on the Sicilian Mafia, treats them as outwardly predatory closed trust networks, who “are first and foremost entrepreneurs in a particular commodity—protection” (1993, 15). They sell their commodity, where trust is absent. In his seminal study he shows that where mutual low-trust expectations generate the demand for guarantees to be provided in business transactions, a Don Peppe steps in to guarantee contract obligations. This economy of trust differs from other business enterprises, in that the most quintes-sential components of its products are violence and coercion. Gambetta argues that mafia services are sold where trust is scarce and legitimate enforcement agencies (i.e., states) are absent. Evidently, illegal transactions fulfill both of these conditions (1993, 17). The entrepreneur must be able to coerce like a state, but cannot spread trust as widely because of the nature of its business. As a consequence, it turns trust inwards towards its group members. In the vocabulary of the trust literature, it is an in-group held together through particularized trust.

Charles Tilly identified the importance of trust networks and their subjec-tion for the trajectory of democratization and the evolution of statehood. He argued that democratization is contingent on whether trust networks’ members consent to their subjection to public politics. This consent is conditional on the government’s shift away from coercion towards combinations of capital and commitments. From Margaret Levi’s work, he then deduces that “democracy entails contingent consent based mainly on combinations of material incentives with shared commitment” (2005, 106). As a consequence, he argues that “the trajectory of democratization dif-fers greatly depending on whether the previous relationships between trust networks and rulers are those of authoritarianism, theocracy, patronage, brokered autonomy, evasive conformity, or particularistic ties” (Tilly 2005, 134-135).

This investigation claims that the nature of the trust network itself does alter the road towards complete democratization and even statehood (defined in Weberian terms). Even in the case of consent by the trust network to the subjec-tion to state power, particularized trust can have highly detrimental effects on

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democratic rule. The basic problem is that if particularized networks of trust are incorporated into state power, particularized trust itself is generalized. Colombia is a case in point. Paramilitaries were not enemies of the state and committed themselves, nominally, to the democratic ideal. The result, however, was far from democratic. Paramilitaries killed and massacred with almost complete impunity and a total lack of accountability. Basing their legitimacy on the absence of the central state, they in fact prevent(ed) the definite monopolization of violence by the state through replacing traditional forms of interpersonal exchange with new forms rooted in their superior capacity to coerce.

So, how can we relate these peculiar relations in Colombia with the general concepts outlined in this theoretic discussion of concepts arising out of the exist-ing social capital literature? If we incorporate the conceptual discussion outlined above, which utilizes sociological and political theories of trust, we can tweak those concepts to better understand the Colombian paradox through the lens of social and political trust and see what constitutes the particular Colombian social trap. Schematically, the Colombian conundrum looks as shown in Graph 3.

Graph 3. The Generalization of Particularized Trust


Institutionalized Distrust

InstitutonalizedTrust

political elite


Bargaining / mundial

dependencie

Coercion

Closed trust network

(Paramilitaries)

People / citizens

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Graph 3 schematizes the Colombian social trap. As we can see, political elites have access to the means of violence through a bargaining mechanism, which is entrenched within the framework of institutionalized distrust towards sovereign power and trust towards the people. As previously explained, this means that citizens enjoy constitutional rights, such as freedom of speech and assembly. On the other hand, political elites are kept in check through elections, the separation of power, and an independent judiciary. This institutionalized dis-trust prevents them from arbitrarily utilizing the instruments of the monopoly of violence for their own purposes, and forces them to go through the entrenched bargaining process. So far, this constitutes the ideal setting of a liberal democratic state rooted in the rule of law.

This ideal setting, however, is offset by what we see on the right-hand side of the graph. Political elites (at the regional level) have access to coercive means in the form of a closed trust network (paramilitaries). The only check on this predatory trust network comes in the form of the bargaining that takes place between political elites and the network. However, since the relationship is one of mutual dependence, the check on the coercion exercised by the paramilitaries is diminished or virtually non-existent. Their interests are aligned. Most impor-tantly, the people or citizens, against whom the coercion of the paramilitaries is directed, have few ways to influence the closed trust network. In addition, the closed trust network, due to the lack of information about the loyalty of its “citi-zens,” resorts to violence to enforce loyalty (Duncan 2006, 40). Finally, since the financing of coercive capacities emanates from external sources (drug money), those subjected to the coercive force are further distanced from those exercising the coercion (the paramilitaries). In conclusion, the incentives are structured in such a way that this structuration of socio-political trust functions as a social trap that operates predictably and systematically, reinforcing sub-optimal outcomes.

Conclusion

We began this inquiry with a paradox: the institutional and consti-tutional design of the Colombian state follows liberal democratic doctrines, yet, this institutional design could not prevent pervasive political and crimi-nal violence. This ambivalence was most dreadfully displayed by the recent

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developments insidiously known as the parapolitica and the “false positive” scandals. This paradox begs the question of why such patterns of power abuse persist despite an institutional design that should prevent them. Research has placed this within the historical context of pervasive clientelistic relations that have undermined the full monopoly of violence by the state and resulted in an equilibrium between illegal armed groups at the periphery and politicians at the core of Colombia’s political institutions.

This essay took these cues and implemented them into the existing re-search on social capital. It put forward the argument that trust and distrust are intrinsically linked to the functioning of the rule of law. The rule of law is what enables progressive democratization and participation. This study utilized two dichotomies within the concept of trust: first, the distinction between particularized and generalized trust, and second, institutionalized trust and distrust. We defined trust as a risky gamble for cooperative be-havior over a valued good. Particularized trust refers to making this gamble with members of an in-group of whom the truster has intimate knowledge, and therefore, risks relatively little. Generalized trust is the extension of trust beyond the familiar world. Democracies require the latter form of trust, since public policies in democracies tend to exacerbate oscillation and con-f lict over goods and issues. In order for this kind of trust to function in political situations, which were defined as situations of possible malignant intent in which interests and identities are often in conf lict, democracies rely on a framework of institutionalized trust and distrust. Political elites who may exercise the monopoly of violence are restrained by institutional-ized distrust in the forms of constitutional constraints on their ability to utilize coercion. The people or citizens, however, are bestowed with trust in the form of constitutional rights such as freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and the right to vote.

This normative framework of trust and democratic governance works in conjunction with established political power. Hobbes already knew that in a pol-ity with an established monopoly of violence, said monopoly minimizes the risks of dying a violent death at the hands of another individual. In Weber’s normative model, the state is the only legitimate purveyor of violence, which therefore gen-erates the trust required for citizens to engage non-violently in political disputes.

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Colombia’s social trap arises out of the necessity of establishing a monopoly of violence over an internal insurgency, a process which utilized not only the armed forces but also paramilitaries with direct ties to the drug trade. These paramilitar-ies constitute closed trust networks, which generate particularized trust amongst their members and turn predatory towards outsiders. As Graph 3 illustrated, uti-lizing such a closed trust network offsets the institutionalized distrust embedded in the Colombian institution. I call this the generalization of particularized trust.

When the paramilitaries were incorporated into the struggle against the insurgency, the state was using closed trust networks. The problem here is that if particularized networks of trust are incorporated into state power, particularized trust itself is generalized. Generalizing particularized trust functions as a social trap, because it undermines the rule of law in a polity. Even if the constitutional prerequisites for the rule of law exist, closed trust networks circumvent the rule of law and, therefore, replace law itself. Law in such circumstances only exists in the form of violent coercion exerted against the people, while the people have no direct point of access to those exercising that violence or ability influence the application of coercion.

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Jan Boesten is a PhD-candidate at the Department of Political Science at the University of British Columbia (Canada), working together with Prof. Maxwell A. Cameron. He was a Visiting Researcher at the Universidad de los Andes (Colombia), and a visitor to the Centre of Latin American Studies at the University of Cambridge (UK). Currently, he is a visitor at the Rule of Law Centre at the WZB in Berlin (Germany). His latest publications include: Cultural Diplomacy and “The Power of Giving” (Report). Short-study commissioned by the Staatliche Kunstsammlung Dresden (with Kurt Huebner and J. Robertson Mcllwain), 2011; and Climate Policies, International Regimes, and Global Trade. A Transatlantic Perspective (Report). Institute for European Studies Climate Policies Conference, 2011.E-mail: [email protected]

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La seguridad y defensa estadounidenses tras la guerra contra el terror

Guillem Colom PiellaUniversidad Pablo de Olavide (España)

DOI: dx.doi.org/10.7440/colombiaint81.2014.09RECIBIDO: 11 de septiembre de 2013APROBADO: 10 de octubre de 2013MODIFICADO: 28 de marzo de 2014

RESUMEN: Tras una larga guerra contra el terror, dos campañas bélicas y en un contexto de transición estratégica, auge de nuevas potencias regionales y una profunda crisis financiera, Estados Unidos está reconfigurando su estrategia global y su política de seguridad y defensa para mantener su hegemonía política, conservar la supremacía militar y combatir conflictos futuros. Este artículo analiza los cambios que Washington está adelantando en materia de defensa para adaptarse a la situación actual.

PALABRAS CLAVE: Estados Unidos • política de defensa y seguridad • planeamiento militar • transición estratégica • guerra contra el terror

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Este artículo fue elaborado por interés personal del autor, quien en el momento está finalizando un libro sobre el proceso de transformación de la defensa y seguridad estadounidenses desde el final de la Guerra Fría. El artículo no contó con ninguna fuente de financiación.

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u.s. security and defense after the War on terror

ABSTRACT: After a long war on terror, two military campaigns and within the context of strategic transition, with the rise of new regional powers and a profound financial crisis, the United States is refiguring its global strategy and security policy in order to maintain its political hegemony and military supremacy. This article analyzes the changes that Washington is driving forward in terms of defense to adapt to its current situation.

KEYWORDS: United States • defense and security policy • military planning • strategic transition • war on terror

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a segurança e a defesa estadunidenses após a guerra ao terror

RESUMO: Após uma longa guerra ao terror, duas campanhas bélicas e num contexto de transição estratégica, auge de novas potências regionais e uma profunda crise financeira, os Estados Unidos da América está reconfigurando sua estratégia global e sua política de segurança para manter sua hegemonia política e supremacia militar. Este artigo analisa as mudanças que Washington está realizando no tema da defesa para adaptar-se à situação atual.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Estados Unidos da América • política de defesa e segurança • planejamento militar • transição estratégica • guerra ao terror

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Introducción

Desde el fin del orden internacional bipolar, Estados Unidos ha realizado pro-fundos cambios en su arquitectura defensiva para mantener su liderazgo global en un entorno estratégico en constante evolución. En la inmediata pos-Guerra Fría, estos se orientaron a adaptar su entramado militar a la disipación de la amenaza soviética y a la conquista de una Revolución en los Asuntos Militares que prometía garantizar la supremacía militar futura del país. Los sucesos del 11 de septiembre de 2001 mediaron para que la transformación, inicialmente entendida como el proceso mediante el cual se conquistaría la revolución y se prepararían las fuerzas armadas heredadas de la Guerra Fría para los retos del siglo XXI, se convirtiera en un imperativo estratégico para enfrentar con éxito los nuevos peligros para la paz y la seguridad internacionales. Hasta la fecha, tras una larga guerra contra el terror y dos onerosas campañas bélicas, y en un contexto marcado por la redefinición de la estructura del poder global y la crisis financiera que atraviesa Occidente, Washington ha emprendido una transición estratégica para adaptar su arquitectura militar al nuevo escenario de seguridad y reducir el montante total de su defensa.

Si asumimos que la política de defensa es la dimensión de la seguridad nacional encargada de establecer los fines, determinar los objetivos y proporcio-nar los medios necesarios para garantizar la defensa del país con instrumentos militares, el presente trabajo pretende analizar los cambios que Estados Unidos está llevando a cabo en su arquitectura defensiva desde el final de la guerra contra el terror, para adaptarse al nuevo panorama doméstico e internacional, e insinuar las líneas maestras que guiarán el planeamiento estratégico del país para los años venideros. Para lograr este objetivo, el artículo se fundamentará en la siguiente hipótesis: en la actualidad Estados Unidos está transformando su arquitectura defensiva para adaptarse tanto al escenario estratégico actual como a la frágil situación de su economía. Para ello, Washington está desarrollando un nuevo modelo de defensa que, construido en oposición al que reinó durante la guerra contra el terror, pretende evitar los grandes despliegues de fuerzas y limitar sus intervenciones; reducir la presencia militar en el exterior; suplir con tecnología los problemas operativos identificados y orientarse hacia los conflictos conven-cionales contra adversarios tecnológicamente avanzados.

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Aunque es muy probable que este modelo se consolide definitivamente en la Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional que el presidente Obama deberá presentar a lo largo de este año, el artículo comenzará estudiando el desarrollo, las lecciones aprendidas y las herencias recibidas de la guerra contra el terror sobre la defensa estadounidense, antes de proceder al análisis de las características, el alcance y los potenciales efectos de esta transición estratégica1 sobre la acción exterior del país. Para lograr este objetivo, se estudiarán los principales documentos estratégicos del país; las declaraciones de sus líderes; las reflexiones de sus centros de estudio sobre seguridad; las publicaciones especializadas en la materia, y se evaluarán las acciones que Washington actualmente está llevando a cabo en materia de defensa.

1. La seguridad y defensa estadounidenses en la guerra con-tra el terror

Después de una plácida pos-Guerra Fría en la que Estados Unidos asumió su papel de potencia hegemónica del nuevo orden internacional, los trágicos acontecimientos del 11 de septiembre de 2001 dieron paso a un nuevo período histórico. Para Washington, esta fatídica fecha supuso el final de una década de optimismo estratégico y acabó con un modelo de seguridad nacional fundamen-tado en el aprovechamiento del dividendo de la paz para reducir el montante de la defensa; la participación en guerras de elección para modelar el entorno internacional y el uso de la pausa estratégica2 existente durante este período para

1 El concepto transición estratégica (strategic transition) se ha popularizado en la jerga especia-lizada, tras su aparición en el documento Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense (OSD 2012), para explicar la transformación de una arquitectura defensiva enfocada en los conflictos presentes a otra capaz de enfrentarse a los retos futuros.

2 El concepto pausa estratégica (strategic pause), entendida como el período comprendido entre la desaparición de la Unión Soviética y la emergencia de un nueva potencia capaz de disputarle la hegemonía a Estados Unidos, fue empleado por primera vez de manera oficial por el secretario de Defensa Les Aspin (1993-1994) en la revisión de la defensa Bottom-Up Review, de 1993. Ampliamente utilizada por la administración Clinton (1992-2000) para justificar sus decisiones en materia de defensa, fue muy criticada por la oposición republi-cana, que pretendía aprovechar la aparente estabilidad que brindaba la pos-Guerra Fría, a fin de transformar, tal y como planteó con sumo detalle el think tank neoconservador Project for a New American Century, en el año 2000, la maquinaria bélica del país para enfrentarse a los retos futuros (Donnelly 2000).

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La seguridad y defensa estadounidenses tras la guerra contra el terrorGuillem Colom Piella

conquistar una Revolución en los Asuntos Militares (RMA),3 que prometía garan-tizar la supremacía militar futura del país (Kagan 2006; Colom 2008). Además, estos ataques mediaron para que la nueva administración estadounidense alterara las líneas maestras de la defensa nacional propuestas pocos meses antes y se viera obligada a participar en una guerra de necesidad que no había proyectado.4

Fue así como la guerra contra el terror escaló hasta la cúspide de la vida polí-tica estadounidense y pasó a definir las relaciones internacionales entre 2001 y 2011.5 Caracterizada por la búsqueda y eliminación de Osama Bin Laden, el desmantela-miento de la organización terrorista Al Qaeda y las campañas militares de Afganistán e Iraq, la guerra contra el terror ha servido para exponer el nuevo rostro de la guerra, revelar los límites del poder militar estadounidense, acabar con la aparente unipo-laridad del orden internacional de la pos-Guerra Fría y facilitar la consolidación de nuevas potencias capaces de limitar la influencia y disputar la hegemonía regional a Estados Unidos (Gray 2010; Colom 2010).

En el plano militar, Washington pasó de una euforia revolucionaria motivada por la veloz invasión de ambos países al desconcierto estratégico, tras el auge de la

3 Una RMA se define como un profundo cambio en la forma de combatir que —motivado por la explotación de nuevos sistemas armamentísticos, conceptos operativos, doctrinas de empleo de la fuerza o maneras de organizar y administrar los medios militares— convierte en obsoleto el estilo militar anterior. En la década de 1990, esta posibilidad articuló el análisis estratégico internacional y el planeamiento de la defensa estadounidense, puesto que se asumía que esta revolución —posibilitada por las tecnologías de la información, fundamentada en la obtención de un pleno conocimiento del campo de batalla y configurada en torno a la generación de una fuerza conjunta capaz de dominar las esferas terrestre, naval, aérea, espacial y ciberespacial— permitiría incrementar la brecha militar entre Estados Unidos y sus potenciales adversarios y contribuir al mantenimiento de su hegemonía política. Un análisis más detallado de esta idea puede hallarse en Shimko (2010), Colom (2008) y Tomes (2007).

4 En términos generales, el programa de defensa de Bush para los comicios presidenciales del año 2000 se fundamentaba en la retirada de las fuerzas desplegadas en misiones de paz, la limitación de las intervenciones militares a la defensa del interés nacional, la orientación del gasto hacia la construcción de un escudo antimisiles y la transformación de la arquitectura defensiva del país para alcanzar la RMA y preparar a las Fuerzas Armadas para combatir en los conflictos futuros (Bush 2001, 53-61; Kitfield 2005).

5 El concepto guerra contra el terror (Global War on Terror) fue definido por el presidente George W. Bush tras el 11-S y formalizado en la National Security Strategy de 2002 para definir las ac-tividades que Estados Unidos y sus aliados llevaron a cabo para combatir la Yihad global. Con el nombramiento de Barack H. Obama, este concepto fue eliminado de la terminología política estadounidense y sustituido por los conceptos Overseas Contingency Operation, utilizado en las declaraciones públicas y en la justificación del gasto de las misiones, y War Against Al Qaeda, presente en la National Security Strategy de 2010.

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insurgencia y las dificultades para estabilizar el territorio (Kagan 2006; Henrotin 2008). Y es que en un primer momento, estos espectaculares triunfos parecieron corroborar la eficacia del nuevo estilo militar estadounidense producto de la RMA6 y motivaron la aceleración del proceso de transformación iniciado por Bush pocos meses antes.7 No obstante, una vez finalizadas las acciones de combate, el reducido volumen de tropas empleadas en la invasión y su falta de preparación para prestar seguridad o asistencia humanitaria, la inexistencia de un plan coherente para la reconstrucción de ambos países una vez alcanzados los objetivos militares o la insu-ficiente inteligencia humana motivada por el desconocimiento de la cultura afgana e iraquí impidieron proceder a la estabilización de ambos países. Además, el férreo control ejercido desde unos Estados mayores localizados a miles de kilómetros de dis-tancia y desconocedores de la rápida evolución de los acontecimientos, y las erróneas decisiones que se tomaron al finalizar las operaciones de combate (como desmantelar inmediatamente, y sin que existiera un sustituto, toda la organización de los regíme-nes anteriores, desde la Justicia hasta la Policía o las Fuerzas Armadas), facilitaron el estallido de una insurgencia que todavía persiste, a pesar de los esfuerzos de la co-munidad internacional para estabilizar el territorio y traspasar las responsabilidades a los gobiernos locales (Kagan 2006; Gvosdev y Reveron 2010).

El florecer de la insurgencia cogió desprevenida a la comunidad estratégica es-tadounidense, que, fascinada por las proclamas revolucionarias de los años anteriores,

6 El término New American Way of War fue concebido a finales de la década de 1990 para de-finir el estilo militar propio de la RMA, que —fundamentado en la superioridad tecnológica, el pleno conocimiento del campo de batalla y la capacidad para realizar ataques de precisión desde grandes distancias— permitiría al país obtener victorias rápidas, limpias y contundentes frente a cualquier adversario. Construido en oposición al modelo militar tradicional —de tipo logístico y fundamentado en la capacidad industrial estadounidense para derrotar al enemigo mediante una guerra de desgaste (Weigley 1977)—, y caracterizado por su apoliticismo, tec-nocentrismo y sensibilidad a las bajas propias (Gray 2010; Shaw 2005; Boot 2003), es uno de los indicios, tales como el creciente empleo de drones, armamento de precisión y fuerzas de opera-ciones especiales, que sugieren cómo este modelo está acomodándose a los ejes del pensamiento estratégico actual (Colom 2013).

7 En efecto, la forma en que se planearon y condujeron las invasiones de Afganistán —donde una pequeña fuerza creada ad hoc con el apoyo de la Alianza del Norte acabó con el régimen Talibán en poco más de un mes— y de Iraq —en la que un destacamento conjunto terrestre-anfibio con menos de 100.000 efectivos ocupó el país en un mes— fue considerada por la élite política y militar del país como signo inequívoco de que la RMA estaba dando sus frutos, por lo que propusieron acelerar el proceso de transformación militar (Shimko 2010; Kagan 2006).

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parecía haber obviado algunos de los fundamentos de la guerra,8 en particular, que ésta es siempre un choque de voluntades y que cualquier actor busca explotar las debilidades del adversario, lucha con los medios que tiene a su alcance y emplea las estrategias que le proporcionan mayores beneficios. Así, frente a la supremacía convencional del invasor, la resistencia afgana e iraquí planteó respuestas que aprove-charon las lagunas del nuevo estilo militar estadounidense y explotaron las vulnera-bilidades políticas, estratégicas y sociales de cada país (Echevarria 2010; Gray 2010).9

En consecuencia, el auge de la violencia insurgente no sólo puso de ma-nifiesto las limitaciones del nuevo estilo americano de combatir en escenarios de baja y media intensidad, sino también las dificultades estratégicas y operativas que entraña la pacificación de zonas hostiles, los costes humanos, materiales y políti-cos que implican los cambios de régimen por la fuerza o las nuevas y apremiantes necesidades operativas motivadas por la participación militar del país en ambos conflictos (Gvosdev y Reveron 2010; Echevarria 2010).

Estos factores mediaron para que la búsqueda de la revolución desapareciera de la agenda política norteamericana y motivaron que el planeamiento de la defensa del país se orientara hacia la generación de capacidades militares apropiadas para la estabilización posconflicto, apoyo militar a la reconstrucción, labores de construc-ción nacional, antiterrorismo y lucha contra la insurgencia (DoD 2006). Además, el pensamiento estratégico pasó a primar en el estudio de las amenazas asimétricas (orientadas a explotar las debilidades de las fuerzas regulares), irregulares (contrarias a los usos y costumbres de la guerra) o híbridas (que combinan el empleo de medios

8 Codificados por el prusiano Carl Von Clausewitz (1984 [1832]), éstos se refieren a la naturaleza dialéc-tica del conflicto, puesto que cualquier guerra se reduce a un choque de voluntades enfrentadas con in-tereses irreconciliables, por medio de las armas; a la “niebla de la guerra” o la imposibilidad de conocer con precisión todo lo que sucede en el campo de batalla; a la “fricción”, entendida como la disparidad entre el potencial teórico de los ejércitos y su desempeño práctico en el conflicto; a la separación que existe entre la guerra ideal (como la han planteado los estrategas) y la real (como se libra realmente); a la imposibilidad de predecir la evolución del conflicto o a la permanencia de la dimensión objetiva de la guerra, puesto que cualquier choque armado generará violencia, horror, muerte y destrucción.

9 Entre estas debilidades destacan la volubilidad de la opinión pública doméstica y la presión de la comunidad internacional; el pánico a las bajas propias y el temor a los daños colaterales; el someti-miento a unos usos y costumbres de la guerra restrictivos y anacrónicos; la ansiedad por los costes políticos y efectos electorales de las operaciones; la exigencia de restringir su alcance, impacto y duración; la reticencia a utilizar fuerzas terrestres en operaciones o la necesidad de emplear la fuerza de forma limitada y restrictiva (Shaw 2005).

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regulares e irregulares),10 consideradas como los mayores riesgos que se cernían sobre las Fuerzas Armadas estadounidenses (Colom 2013; Chad 2011; Hoffman 2007).

Este cambio de orientación hacia los conflictos de baja y media intensidad se formalizó en la Revisión Cuadrienal de la Defensa de 200611 y se materializó tras el nombramiento de Robert Gates como titular de defensa. Determinado a solucionar las dificultades que estaban sufriendo las fuerzas norteamericanas en Afganistán e Iraq, Gates se propuso construir un nuevo estilo militar adecuado para la guerra contra el terror (Kaplan 2013).12 Para ello, realizó importantes cambios en el pensamiento es-tratégico (al orientarlo hacia las cuestiones presentes, en detrimento de la prospectiva futura); en el planeamiento de la defensa (al priorizar el desarrollo de capacidades aptas para las operaciones en curso); en los programas de obtención de material (al redefinir o posponer los grandes proyectos de armamento futuros, con el objeto de liberar fondos para adquirir por procedimiento de urgencia los equipos necesarios para las misiones presentes) y en la estructura de fuerzas (al reconvertir grupos de artillería en unidades de infantería, al incrementar el número de fuerzas de operaciones especiales, unidades de cooperación-civil militar, replantear los ciclos de despliegue o regular la presencia de contratistas militares privados) (Cimbala 2010; Ucko 2009; Gates 2009).

Este renovado interés por la guerra irregular, los conflictos de baja intensi-dad, la construcción de Estados o la lucha contra la insurgencia, característicos de la segunda administración Bush, se mantuvo con la llegada de Barack H. Obama a

10 En sentido estricto, una amenaza híbrida puede definirse como “Threats that incorporate a full range of different modes of warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder, conducted by both states and a variety of non-state actors” (Hoffman 2007, 8).

11 Esta estrategia de segundo orden, basada en las directrices planteadas por la National Security Strategy de 2006, y utilizada para guiar el planeamiento de la defensa para el período 2005-2009, asumía que Estados Unidos estaba en guerra, por lo que el Pentágono debía priorizar la resolución de las carencias operativas identificadas (el caso del conocimiento cultural y lingüístico, labores de estabilización, apoyo militar a la reconstrucción, contrainsurgencia, inteligencia humana, unidad de acción civil-militar o relevos de fuerza) para triunfar en Afganistán e Iraq, y combatir al terrorismo internacional, antes que preparar la defensa del país para combatir en conflictos futuros (DoD 2006). Esta idea estará presente en el pensamiento estratégico del país hasta el inicio de la etapa actual, donde la defensa estadounidense ha vuelto a interesarse por las guerras del futuro.

12 De hecho, este nuevo modelo se impuso mediante un proceso bottom-up, puesto que el liderazgo político aceptó e institucionalizó de forma progresiva las ideas —y consolidó a los oficiales que las planteaban, siendo el caso más paradigmático el de David H. Petraeus, director de la Agencia Central de Inteligencia— que procedían del terreno (Kaplan 2013).

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la Casa Blanca.13 No obstante, éste reemplazó progresivamente estas labores extensi-vas en hombres y material por las acciones antiterroristas con drones y unidades de operaciones especiales, sensiblemente más asequibles y con menos riesgos para las fuerzas propias. A pesar de estos cambios en la forma de enfocar ambos conflictos, ambos presidentes relegaron a un puesto secundario la emergencia de otros riesgos más tradicionales. Aunque durante esta misma etapa empezaron a manifestarse otros peligros —tales como la inestabilidad política paquistaní, el armamento atómico nor-coreano, la proliferación nuclear persa, el expansionismo militar chino, la inseguridad de los suministros energéticos o las amenazas en el ciberespacio—, éstos no se inte-graron en el planeamiento de la defensa estadounidense hasta la muerte de Osama Bin Laden, en 2011 (Kugler 2011; Cordesman 2011).

2. La posguerra contra el terror

La eliminación de Osama Bin Laden terminó de facto con la guerra contra el terror;14 permitió adelantar el repliegue de Iraq a 2011 y de Afganistán, previsto para finales de este año y facilitó la sustitución del modelo de seguridad y defensa vigente —enfocado en la construcción de Estados, la contrainsurgencia y el contraterrorismo— por un nuevo paradigma militar. Motivado por la coyuntura doméstica e internacional de la posguerra contra el terror, el modelo se orientó de nuevo al mantenimiento de la supremacía militar frente a cualquier adversario futuro, mediante la adaptación del estilo militar estadouni-dense producto de la RMA a la coyuntura actual. Gestado durante los años previos, y al coincidir con la erosión del paradigma anterior por su incapacidad de resolver satisfacto-riamente las campañas afgana e iraquí, este nuevo modelo empezó a materializarse en 2012

13 En efecto, la elección de Obama no comportó ningún cambio significativo en la política de defensa es-tadounidense. A pesar de proclamar que realizaría profundos cambios en la defensa del país para acabar con la herencia de Bush y presentaría en 2010 una nueva Quadrennial Defense Review que prometía ser muy distinta de las anteriores, la confirmación de Robert Gates al frente del Pentágono garantizó la continuidad de la política de defensa del país, en una coyuntura marcada ya por la crisis económica y la urgencia de encontrar una salida a las campañas afgana e iraquí (Colom 2010; Gates 2009).

14 No obstante, Al Qaeda y sus organizaciones afines continúan siendo calificadas por Washington como una amenaza, tal y como lo atestiguan la Strategic Defense Guidance (OSD 2012), la Quadrennial Defense Review (DoD 2014) y los comentarios vertidos durante los debates presidenciales en los pasados comicios o las declaraciones de los máximos responsables políticos de la actual administración estadounidense.

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con la presentación de la Guía Estratégica de la Defensa,15 y se consolidó dos años después con la promulgación de la Revisión Cuadrienal de la Defensa 2014.

A pesar de que Al Qaeda no ha sido totalmente derrotada y que la inestabilidad que se está viviendo en el norte de África y en Siria brinda nuevas oportunidades a los mo-vimientos yihadistas, -la marcha de Iraq ha dejado al país en una delicada situación, y el repliegue de Afganistán se realizará sin haber alcanzado la situación final deseada-, la sen-sación de amenaza que surgió tras el 11 de septiembre de 2001 se ha debilitado.16 Además, la esperanza de normalizar completamente la situación de estos dos países se ha desvanecido por completo: el panorama estratégico se ha transformado, Estados Unidos ha dejado de ser el único polo del poder global y la crisis económica que está afectando al país requiere reducir los objetivos de fuerzas, catálogos de capacidades, planes de modernización o patrones de despliegue militar, y priorizar un menguante gasto en defensa que, en caso de no contener el déficit público, podría reducirse en más de un billón de dólares hasta 2021.17

15 Este informe, que establece las líneas maestras de la política de defensa y la organización militar esta-dounidenses para los próximos años, carece de cualquier valor legislativo. De hecho, es simplemente una hoja de ruta que el Ejecutivo demócrata elaboró ad hoc para presentar un plan de ajuste previo al debate sobre los presupuestos de 2013 y bloquear la acción de la Cámara Baja, controlada por el Partido Republicano. No obstante, el grueso de sus contenidos ya se ha formalizado en la reciente Revisión Cuadrienal de la Defensa, y posiblemente también lo harán en la Estrategia Nacional de Seguridad que el Ejecutivo debe presentar a lo largo de 2014. Por otro lado, en el plano militar, muchas de las provisiones contenidas en este documento ya habían sido insinuadas en la vigente National Military Strategy (CJCS 2011), codificadas en el Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CJCS 2012) —que fija los principios para el empleo de la fuerza y establece las bases para el desarrollo de nuevos conceptos operativos y la generación de capacidades militares futuras— y articuladas en el presupuesto federal de 2015 (Executive Office of the President of the United States 2014).

16 Es conveniente apuntar que si bien los principales documentos estratégicos del país continúan haciendo referencia a la necesidad de combatir al terrorismo internacional, esta misión es la quinta en el orden de prioridades del Pentágono (DoD 2014, 61).

17 Hace tres años se aprobó el Budget Control Act of 2011 (2 de agosto de 2011) que reducía la base de gasto militar —entendida como la partida aprobada en el presupuesto federal para garantizar el funcionamiento del Pentágono en condiciones normales— en 487.000 millones de dólares, una cifra que podría doblarse en caso de no lograr la contención del déficit público en los próximos ejercicios presupuestarios. Además, esta ley introdujo un mecanismo de sequestration de un 7% adicional sobre el presupuesto base de defensa que se activaría automáticamente si el Gobierno y la oposición no lograban consensuar los presupuestos. Este mecanismo entró en funcionamiento en marzo de 2013, obligando al titular de Defensa a aplicar un plan de recortes de urgencia que afectó el normal funcionamiento del Pentágono y comprometió la seguridad nacional del país. Aunque el pasado diciembre se aprobó la Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 (26 de diciembre de 2013) que incrementa la base de gasto hasta los 526.800 millones de dólares para 2014 y 495.000 para 2015, los recortes podrían continuar a partir de 2016. Sobre el impacto que puede tener el abismo fiscal sobre las Fuerzas Armadas del país, véase Belasco (2013).

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En consecuencia, en una coyuntura marcada por la mala salud de la eco-nomía estadounidense, la inminente retirada de Afganistán, la desaparición de la sensación de amenaza surgida tras el 11-S, la consolidación de otros riesgos para la seguridad internacional y la necesidad de Washington de ofrecer una nueva imagen al mundo, los estrategas estadounidenses han dado carpetazo a todo lo relacionado con la guerra contra el terror y han vuelto a interesarse por estos nuevos riesgos. Así, las grandes contingencias de la pasada década, aunque inca-paces de alterar la estructura del sistema internacional —como la guerra contra el terror, la construcción de Estados o la contrainsurgencia—, han dado paso a otros peligros susceptibles de perturbar el equilibrio estratégico, tales como la proliferación de armamento de destrucción masiva, la inestabilidad del mundo árabe y musulmán, la competición entre los poderes emergentes y las potencias consolidadas por la hegemonía regional y el control de los recursos, la geopolítica del escenario Asia-Pacífico y las ambiciones del gigante chino, la carrera arma-mentística del Lejano Oriente, cualquier intento de limitar el liderazgo o coartar la autonomía de acción estadounidense en el ciberespacio o las amenazas que se ciernen sobre el libre acceso al mar, el cielo, el espacio y el ciberespacio (DoD 2014; OSD 2012; CJCS 2012).18

Además, es en esta coyuntura cuando las enseñanzas de la guerra con-tra el terror se están integrando en el pensamiento estratégico estadounidense. Así, desde una óptica política, se ha comprendido la extrema dificultad que tiene una democracia avanzada para emplear la fuerza armada en defensa de su interés nacional y la inviabilidad práctica de mantener largos despliegues en el exterior, debido a los costes humanos, materiales, económicos y políticos que éstos generan (Belasco 2011). También se han expuesto la volubilidad de la opinión pública doméstica, la influencia de los medios de comunicación de

18 Más específicamente, las tendencias estratégicas perfiladas por la Guía Estratégica de la Defensa (OSD 2012) son la multipolaridad del orden internacional, la irrelevancia estratégica europea, los riesgos asociados a la Primavera Árabe, los peligros que presenta un Irán nuclear, la cre-ciente inestabilidad en el subcontinente asiático y la insalvable brecha con China. Un análisis más detallado de los planteamientos recogidos en este documento puede hallarse en Dale y Towell (2012); un enfoque complementario —incluso, podría sugerirse que éste sentó las bases teóricas para la elaboración del documento político— puede hallarse en el estudio prospectivo realizado por el Consejo Nacional de Inteligencia estadounidense (NIC 2012).

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masas para condicionar la acción política, la incompatibilidad entre los ciclos políticos propios del juego democrático y los tiempos necesarios para explotar las líneas estratégicas, las limitaciones del jus in bello en los conflictos actua-les, la imperecedera vigencia de la doctrina Weinberger-Powell para guiar la acción militar estadounidense,19 la peligrosidad que entrañan los cambios de régimen por la fuerza o la inviabilidad práctica de las labores de construcción nacional (Walt 2012; Kapstein 2010; Gvosdev y Reveron 2010).

Desde una óptica militar, estas campañas han vuelto a demostrar la im-batibilidad de Estados Unidos en el terreno convencional y revelado la brecha de capacidades que todavía existe entre el país y cualquiera de sus posibles competi-dores (CJCS 2012; OSD 2012; DoD 2014). A pesar de que las ingentes inversiones que el país viene realizando de manera sostenida desde hace más de cuarenta años en tecnologías avanzadas han contribuido a reforzar esta hegemonía, esta distancia ya no parece ser tan grande como antes, por tres grandes razones: 1) la difusión de tecnologías avanzadas y su integración en estrategias asimétricas; 2) la crisis financiera, que está obligando a reducir el montante total de la defensa y descartar el desarrollo de varias capacidades o la modernización de muchos materiales; y 3) los costes derivados de la guerra contra el terror, que ha consu-mido enormes recursos humanos y materiales que han erosionado la institución militar, obligado a generar capacidades de limitada utilidad para conflictos de alta intensidad e impedido implementar con normalidad los grandes programas de modernización de armamento y material proyectados en las décadas anteriores (Stimson 2012; Davis y Wilson 2011b).

Asimismo, Afganistán e Iraq también han supuesto un baño de rea-lismo para Estados Unidos al exponer, en primer lugar, las carencias de es-te ejército equipado, adoctrinado, organizado y adiestrado para el combate

19 Planteada por el secretario de Defensa Caspar Weinberger en 1984 y refinada por el jefe de la Junta de Jefes de Estado Mayor, Colin Powell, en 1991, esta doctrina pretende restringir el empleo de la fuerza armada al recomendar su empleo como último recurso, de forma aplastante y con objetivos estratégicos y fines políticos claramente definidos. Planteada informalmente para evitar otra guerra como Vietnam, el secretario de Defensa Donald Rumsfeld la desechó a la hora de invadir Iraq porque la consideraba obsoleta, anacrónica, y por restringir innecesariamente el empleo del potencial bélico estadouni-dense (Kitfield 2005).

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contra adversarios tecnológicamente avanzados, cuando se ha visto obligado a estabilizar y apoyar la reconstrucción de zonas hostiles mientras realiza una campaña de contrainsurgencia y lucha contra fuerzas irregulares. En segundo lugar, también han revelado el precio político, humano, económico, material y diplomático que debe pagarse cuando se pretende el cambio forzoso de un ré-gimen y su posterior pacificación. Finalmente, estos conflictos han revelado las limitaciones del nuevo estilo americano de combatir, que, fundamentado en la capacidad industrial del país para producir armamento sofisticado y la búsque-da de soluciones tecnológicas a problemas estratégicos, pretende aprovechar su brecha tecnológica para lograr victorias rápidas, fáciles, limpias y decisivas con-tra cualquier adversario (Lind 2006; Echevarria 2012). Aunque este modelo afín a la cultura estratégica estadounidense parece el más adecuado para preservar los pilares estratégicos del país (disuadir a cualquier actor de iniciar un conflic-to convencional contra Washington; permitir el libre acceso a cualquier teatro de operaciones del globo y derrotar a cualquier competidor presente o futuro), durante la guerra contra el terror ha mostrado su inadecuación en escenarios de baja o media intensidad y su total irrelevancia en operaciones de contrain-surgencia (Henrotin 2008). No obstante, por encima de todo, estas campañas han acabado con la ilusión de la guerra quirúrgica, limpia, tecnológica, sin bajas propias ni tampoco daños colaterales, y han servido para ratificar la inmutable naturaleza de la guerra, en la que la violencia, la destrucción y la muerte son sus elementos definidores. También han ayudado a recordar que la fuerza ar-mada es la última razón del gobernante, y que por ello debe ser empleada como último recurso, de manera racional y siempre orientada al logro de unos fines políticos y estratégicos claramente definidos, realistas y alcanzables en tiempo, espacio y forma (Walt 2012; Gvosdev y Reveron 2010).

En otras palabras, aunque Afganistán e Iraq han puesto de manifiesto las limitaciones intrínsecas de la tecnología y han modulado las proclamas revolu-cionarias de los años anteriores (Colom 2013; Chad 2011), Estados Unidos parece continuar confiando en las posibilidades que brinda la RMA para resolver los problemas estratégicos que debe afrontar el país tras la guerra contra el terror; eliminar la violencia inherente de la guerra mediante la robotización de los ejér-citos (Work y Brimley 2014) y mantener su hegemonía presente y futura frente a cualquier potencial adversario (Watts 2011).

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3. Las nuevas líneas maestras de la seguridad y la defensa estadounidenses

Este conjunto de elementos mencionados en las páginas anteriores ha mediado para que Washington emprenda una transición estratégica que reem-place el agotado modelo de defensa propio de la guerra contra el terror por otro paradigma más adecuado a la situación actual y futura,20 asumiendo que:

S La estabilidad global podrá verse comprometida por la persistencia de los efectos perversos de la globalización, tales como la expansión de actores ca-paces de disputar el monopolio de la violencia a los Estados, inestabilidades regionales, extremismos violentos motivados por cosmovisiones enfrentadas, competición por los recursos, difusión de tecnologías avanzadas, proliferación de armamento de destrucción masiva o el auge de potencias regionales capa-ces de limitar la influencia estadounidense (CJCS 2012; NIC 2012).21

S La acción exterior estadounidense podrá verse condicionada por la irrele-vancia estratégica europea, la inestabilidad política en el Magreb y Oriente Medio, los riesgos que entrañaría un Irán nuclear, una creciente descon-fianza hacia China, la debilidad de su economía y el incremento de la pre-sencia norteamericana en la región Asia-Pacífico (DoD 2014; OSD 2012).

S La situación financiera del Pentágono no experimentará ninguna me-joría y hasta incluso podría empeorar en los próximos años, en caso de no controlar el déficit público del país (DoD 2014).

S Las Fuerzas Armadas estadounidenses deberán prepararse para combatir en todo el espectro del conflicto, desde guerras híbridas contra actores no

20 Más específicamente, esta hoja de ruta asume que la nueva estrategia debe fundamentarse en tres elementos: a) la asunción de los principios de la Guía Estratégica de la Defensa para guiar la transición entre los dos modelos de defensa; b) el reequilibrio, redefinición y transformación de las Fuerzas Armadas para enfrentarse a los retos futuros y c) la racionalización y el abaratamiento del coste de funcionamiento del Pentágono (DoD, 2014: IV).

21 En este sentido, tanto el Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CJCS 2012) como el Global Trends 2030 (NIC 2012) parecen sugerir que el entorno internacional se fundamentará en la existencia de “dos mundos de la política” con intereses, conductas y dinámicas contradictorios (Rosenau 1990); y en el que el organizado, estratificado y regulado sistema de Estados westfaliano coexistirá con otro mundo anárquico y confuso en el que interactuarán todos los actores excluidos del primero (territorios sin Estado, grupos insurgentes, bandas terroristas u organizaciones criminales).

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estatales que emplean medios y tácticas asimétricas hasta acciones de alta intensidad contra países equipados con armamento de destrucción masiva o ejércitos tecnológicamente avanzados, y realizar una amplia gama de misiones en un ambiente operativo complejo, cambiante, transparente y sin fronteras físicas ni virtuales (DoD 2014).22

Washington ya parece haber trazado las líneas maestras de su nuevo modelo de defensa. Aunque estos planteamientos deberán consolidarse en la Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional que el Ejecutivo presentará antes de finales de año, la Guía Estratégica de la Defensa, el Concepto Cardinal para las Operaciones Conjuntas y la Revisión Cuadrienal de la Defensa sugieren que Washington redu-cirá su presencia avanzada, especialmente la situada en suelo europeo, aunque los recientes sucesos en Crimea podrían motivar una revaluación de esta decisión, y la concentrará en la región Asia-Pacífico. También indican que abandonará los despliegues de fuerza masivos y descartará conducir grandes campañas militares o embarcarse en operaciones de cambio de régimen y construcción nacional. Igualmente, evitará participar en labores de gestión de crisis, estabilización, apoyo a la reconstrucción y lucha contra la insurgencia,23 y mostrará un limitado interés

22 Más específicamente, el catálogo de misiones es el siguiente: 1) contraterrorismo y guerra irregular, en el marco de un Enfoque Gubernamental (Whole-of-Government Approach) y en cooperación con terceros países; 2) disuasión y combate global, mediante el mantenimiento de fuerzas suficientes como para combatir en dos conflictos de forma simultánea; 3) proyección del poder a cualquier punto del globo, con independencia de las defensas enemigas; 4) lucha contra el armamento de destrucción masiva empleando todos los medios a disposición del país; 5) operaciones en el espacio y ciberespacio, mediante el desarrollo de capacidades defensivas y ofensivas que garanticen la supre-macía militar del país en ambos dominios; 6) disuasión nuclear, con un arsenal moderno, reducido y empleado como último recurso; 7) defensa del territorio nacional, mediante un escudo antimisiles, medios de protección Nuclear, Químico, Biológico y Radiológico, y la plena disponibilidad de las Fuerzas Armadas en apoyo a las autoridades civiles; 8) presencia avanzada reducida y orientada a las zonas de interés para el país; 9) capacidad residual para conducir operaciones de estabilización y contrainsurgencia, porque el repliegue de Afganistán e Irak entrañará el final de esta tipología de misiones y 10) operaciones humanitarias y de asistencia a desastres, mediante la provisión de apoyo logístico a los actores civiles tanto dentro como fuera del país (OSD 2012, 4-6). Una evaluación de los efectos que estas misiones pueden tener sobre la estructura de fuerzas, el catálogo de capacidades y el patrón de despliegue de las Fuerzas Armadas estadounidenses puede hallarse en Dale y Towell (2012, 19-27); mientras que la hoja de ruta para su desarrollo puede observarse en CJCS (2012, 7-11).

23 De hecho, las operaciones de estabilización y contrainsurgencia; las labores de apoyo a las autoridades civiles y las acciones de asistencia humanitaria y respuesta a desastres son la antepenúltima, penúltima y última prioridades en relación con las misiones de las Fuerzas Armadas (DoD 2014, 61).

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en colaborar con organizaciones multilaterales de seguridad o participar en un Enfoque Integral multinacional (Murdock y Crotty 2013; Stimson 2012).24

Este conjunto de actividades será sustituido por un progresivo replie-gue global susceptible de incrementar el aislacionismo y unilateralismo del país en materia exterior (Kugler 2011). Ello se combinará con la priorización de la inteligencia prospectiva, obtenida gracias al absoluto dominio que Washington tiene del ciberespacio y las capacidades de ataque estratégico de precisión, proyección global de las fuerzas y el acceso a cualquier punto del planeta, con independencia de las medidas defensivas que pueda desplegar el adversario.25 Igualmente, el país volverá a un modelo mixto de dos guerras para definir la entidad de sus Fuerzas Armadas, su catálogo de capacidades y su patrón de despliegue: por un lado, en tiempo de paz los ejércitos del país deberán ser capaces de defender la nación, realizar acciones antiterroristas en varias regiones del globo, disuadir cualquier posible agresión y garantizar la seguridad de los aliados y socios mediante la presencia avanzada. Por otro lado, si se desata un conf licto, las Fuerzas Armadas del país deberán ser ca-paces de derrotar a un adversario en una guerra convencional e impedir la consecución de los objetivos o imponer costes inaceptables sobre un segundo

24 A grandes rasgos, el concepto Enfoque Integral (Comprehensive Approach) se refiere a la in-tegración de las estrategias, los recursos y actividades de todos los actores participantes en la gestión de una crisis en todos los niveles y fases de la operación, con el fin de incrementar la coherencia de la respuesta multinacional y facilitar su resolución de forma satisfactoria. Este concepto, que logró un notable protagonismo durante la década pasada, va un paso más allá del Enfoque Gubernamental (Whole-of-Government Approach), que, muy presente en los prin-cipales documentos estratégicos del país (OSD 2012; CJCS 2012, 2011; DoD 2010), se refiere a la coordinación de las agencias nacionales en materia de acción exterior y gestión de crisis.

25 Aunque no puede calificarse como algo novedoso porque ya constituía una de las promesas de la RMA y una preocupación latente de los estrategas norteamericanos desde la administra-ción Clinton, la capacidad para proyectar el poder militar con independencia de las medidas antiacceso (anti-access) para dificultar el despliegue de fuerzas en el teatro de operaciones y de negación de área (area denial) para dificultar la conducción de operaciones en zonas donde el adversario no impide el acceso, se ha convertido en una de las funciones principales de la fuerza conjunta. Si a ello se le añaden el concepto batalla aeronaval (Air-Sea Battle) y las capacidades militares requeridas para su aplicación, parece evidente que los estrategas del país están imaginando dos escenarios de guerra: el estrecho de Ormuz contra Irán y el mar de la China contra Beijín, y el retorno al paradigma tecnocéntrico de la RMA para el desarrollo de la fuerza futura (DoD 2014; OSD 2013; Tata 2013; Krepinevich 2011).

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agresor en otra región del planeta (DoD 2014, 22).26 Ello no sólo parece in-dicar la tradicional disuasión de Teherán y Pyongyang, sino que también sugiere la ilusoria voluntad de contener a Irán y China con una estructura de fuerzas claramente insuficiente (Tata 2013).27

Además, es muy probable que Washington incremente las colabora-ciones ad hoc con terceros países y limite tanto sus compromisos defensivos como su presencia avanzada. Ello se combinará con la conducción de opera-ciones limitadas en tiempo, espacio y medios implicados; la oposición a man-tener grandes despliegues permanentes de fuerzas y la renuencia a desplegar unidades terrestres en zonas de conflicto; la multiplicación de las acciones contraterroristas puntuales con fuerzas de operaciones especiales, armas in-teligentes y drones; la priorización de la capacidad para conducir operaciones globales integradas empleando medios terrestres, navales, aéreos, espaciales y ciberespaciales, en el marco de un Enfoque Gubernamental (OSD 2012; CJCS 2012; Dale y Towell 2012).28

26 Este modelo se originó durante la Guerra Fría, cuando la administración Kennedy adoptó el estándar de dos guerras y media, o la capacidad para combatir simultáneamente en dos conf lictos regionales (sudeste asiático y centroeuropa) y en un tercer conf licto de baja in-tensidad, para calcular la estructura de fuerzas, el catálogo de capacidades y el patrón de despliegue en tiempo de paz. Aunque la caída del Telón de Acero motivó su sustitución por una Fuerza Base mucho menor y compuesta por cuatro bloques (fuerza estratégica, fuerza atlántica, fuerza del Pacífico y fuerza de contingencia), la guerra del Golfo de 1991 aconsejó replantear el modelo de dos guerras que se mantuvo, con algunos cambios menores en relación con las intervenciones a pequeña escala, hasta la administración Bush, que pro-puso un planeamiento de la defensa basado en capacidades polivalentes susceptibles de ser empleadas en cualquier contingencia y un modelo de una guerra y media o 1-4-2-1, donde las Fuerzas Armadas del país estuvieran en condiciones de defender el territorio nacional, mantener la disuasión en cuatro zonas del planeta, conducir dos campañas simultáneas y vencer definitivamente en una guerra. Para un análisis más detallado de su evolución y efectos sobre la definición de la estructura de fuerzas y la generación del catálogo de capacidades, Metz (2001) y Larson, Orletsky y Leuschner (2001).

27 De hecho, el objetivo de fuerzas para 2019 es el siguiente: 18 divisiones terrestres; 11 grupos aeronavales; 48 escuadrones de combate; 9 escuadrones de bombarderos estratégicos y 660 grupos de operaciones especiales (DoD 2014, 39-42).

28 Definidas en el Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CJCS 2012), las Globally Integrated Operations se fundamentan en la capacidad del país para desplegar globalmente sus fuerzas, combinarlas con el resto de los instrumentos del poder nacional, u otros actores externos, si así lo aconseja la misión, y operar de manera integrada en todos los dominios (tierra, mar, aire, espacio y ciberespacio) sin ninguna limitación física, geográfica, tempo-ral, orgánica o jerárquica.

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El curso de los acontecimientos determinará la manera en que se refinan, refuerzan y ejecutan estos nuevos principios estratégicos que deberán consolidar-se a lo largo de este año. No obstante, la inclusión de este conjunto de riesgos y amenazas, perspectivas estratégicas y orientaciones para el empleo de la fuerza en la agenda estratégica del país ha supuesto un importante baño de realismo que ha enterrado definitivamente los sueños unipolares de la inmediata pos-Guerra Fría y de los cambios de régimen o las construcciones de Estados que caracterizaron la guerra contra el terror (Dale y Towell 2012, 53; Stimson 2012; Kugler 2011).

Paralelamente, el titular de Defensa, Chuck Hagel (2013-), debe continuar tomando dolorosas decisiones en materia defensiva que ya se han plasmado en la Revisión Cuadrienal de la Defensa y se repetirán en los sucesivos ejercicios presu-puestarios (Cordesman 2014). Hagel debe abaratar el coste de funcionamiento del Pentágono al minimizar la pérdida de capacidades militares, reducir el volumen de fuerzas o desactivar unidades. En consecuencia, en una coyuntura marcada por la incertidumbre estratégica, la indeterminación política, la moderación presupuestaria y la reformulación de las líneas maestras de la defensa nacional, Washington está empezando a especificar hoy cómo deben ser sus ejércitos del mañana. El titular de Defensa debe realizar importantes cambios en la arquitec-tura de defensa teniendo en cuenta que el grueso de la estructura de fuerzas y del catálogo de capacidades futuro no puede alterarse, debido a la inflexibilidad de la programación militar y los compromisos industriales adquiridos durante los años previos (Carter 2014);29 que el armamento heredado de la Guerra Fría podría quedar obsoleto en bloque, debido a su antigüedad y desgaste tras diez años de guerra (Davis y Wilson 2011b) y que la máxima prioridad del Pentágono es restablecer el equilibrio entre el nivel de ambición, la estructura de fuerzas y el catálogo de capacidades, al tiempo que establece los pilares de la defensa del país para las próximas décadas (Murdock y Crotty 2013; OSD 2012; Conetta 2012). El titular de defensa también está obligado a abaratar el funcionamiento del Pentágono sin perder capacidades fundamentales ni reducir en exceso el volumen de fuerzas ni tampoco comprometer el adiestramiento y la disponibilidad de las unidades; y paralelamente elegir qué capacidades militares desarrollar, cuáles

29 En este sentido, se estima que el 80% de la estructura de fuerzas y del catálogo de capacidades militares del país se halla comprometido, y sólo es posible actuar sobre el 20% restante (CJCS 2012, 8).

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descartar y cuáles conservar (Stimson 2012). Aunque formalmente cualquier de-cisión en este ámbito debe fundamentarse en una difícil reversibilidad, entendida como la capacidad para adaptar la defensa del país a cualquier cambio de situa-ción motivado por una sorpresa estratégica (OSD 2012), será preciso definir un volumen de fuerzas y un nivel de ambición realistas y acordes con los recursos disponibles y previsibles, basar cualquier decisión política sobre consideraciones estratégicas y operativas o vencer las inercias de una institución militar reticente al cambio, orientada a los grandes conflictos convencionales y erosionada tras las largas campañas de Afganistán e Iraq (Conetta 2012; Davis y Wilson 2011a).

Este conjunto de actuaciones requiere una plena determinación política, y su desarrollo entrañará enormes cambios en la concepción, el funcionamiento y gestión de la administración militar estadounidense. Es por ello que la reduc-ción del gasto sin eliminar capacidades clave, la reforma del planeamiento de la defensa y la redefinición del proceso de transformación militar en una coyuntura marcada por los cambios estratégicos y la crisis económica se plantean como las principales líneas del pensamiento estratégico estadounidense y los mayores retos que debe superar su arquitectura de seguridad y defensa durante esta transición estratégica del país tras la guerra contra el terror.

Conclusiones

De ahora en adelante Estados Unidos deberá actuar en un marco de segu-ridad muy distinto del que definió las relaciones internacionales en la pos-Guerra Fría o durante la guerra contra el terror. En efecto, la sensación de amenaza surgida tras el 11-S se ha debilitado, la salida de Iraq ya se ha producido y la retirada de Afganistán está próxima. Washington ha dejado de ser el único polo del poder mundial y su retraimiento estratégico es cada vez mayor, aunque éste se haya disfrazado de un vacuo “leading from behind”. Además, la consolidación de este escenario ha coincidido con una crisis económica global que ha puesto a Estados Unidos en una delicada situación, dado que debe redefinir a la baja los objetivos de fuerzas, catálogos de capacidades, planes de modernización o patro-nes de despliegue, sin que ello entrañe una pérdida de capacidades esenciales, una erosión en la preparación de la fuerza o la imposibilidad de garantizar los objetivos de seguridad del país (Mearsheimer 2014).

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Aunque la combinación de estos factores puede sentar las bases para que se produzca la tan temida tormenta perfecta —una sorpresa estratégica motivada por la disminución del gasto, la pérdida de capacidades militares, la falta de anticipación y la configuración de un nuevo entorno de amenazas—, advertida por Robert Gates tras conocer el plan de recortes en el gasto militar norteamericano, lo cierto es que hasta la fecha parece estarse erigiendo un nuevo paradigma estratégico que, formal-mente articulado en oposición al que reinó durante la guerra contra el terror, contiene las lecciones que Washington ha aprendido tras once años de guerra.

Tal y como sugieren la limitada participación del país en el conflicto libio, su pasividad ante la guerra civil siria o su tibia crítica a las actuaciones chinas en el Lejano Oriente y las acciones rusas en Crimea, la expansión geográfica de los ataques con drones, la red de espionaje informático PRISM y la determinación del país de conservar su supremacía en el ciberespacio, la disminución del tamaño de las fuerzas terrestres hasta niveles previos al 11-S, la reducción de la presencia militar en suelo europeo o la consolidación de la doctrina de la batalla aeronaval, Estados Unidos parece fundamentarse en las siguientes características: el recogimiento estratégico, la limitación del volumen, alcance e impacto de sus acciones militares, la resistencia a emplear fuerzas terrestres en operaciones, la negativa a participar en labores de estabilización, apoyo militar a la reconstrucción o contrainsurgencia, la búsqueda de soluciones tecnológicas a los nuevos problemas estratégicos, o la reorientación de su presencia avanzada hacia la región Asia-Pacífico para contener la expansión china y prepararse para un hipotético conflicto entre ambas potencias (Etzioni 2013; Tata 2013). En otras palabras, este nuevo paradigma va pareciéndose cada vez más al mo-delo tecnocéntrico de la RMA que reinó imbatible durante la década de los noventa (Watts 2011; Davis y Wilson 2011b).

En conclusión, después de que la guerra contra el terror supusiera un parénte-sis en la gran estrategia estadounidense para el siglo XXI y obligara al país a participar en unos conflictos que chocaban, tal y como había hecho Vietnam cuarenta años atrás, con su cultura estratégica y tradición militar, hasta la fecha Washington parece nuevamente determinado a conquistar la Revolución en los Asuntos Militares. Y es que su consecución no sólo parece ser fundamental para mantener la brecha militar sobre sus adversarios, resolver los nuevos interrogantes estratégicos que debe afron-tar el país y consolidar el nuevo estilo americano de combatir, sino también porque muchas de sus promesas parecen estar haciéndose realidad.

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Faltan por ver las directrices que fijará la Estrategia Nacional de Seguridad que el Ejecutivo estadounidense deberá presentar antes de terminar este año, la marcha de la economía del país y la existencia de nuevos acuerdos entre el Gobierno y la oposición en materia presupuestaria, la seguridad en el Lejano Oriente tras el incremento de tensión entre China, Japón, Rusia y Corea del Norte, y los movimientos de Moscú en su tradicional área de influencia, para conocer cómo continuará esta transición estratégica y cómo se articulará este nuevo modelo de defensa de la posguerra contra el terror.

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29. Kapstein, Ethan. 2010. Do Three Ds Make an F? The Limits of “Defense, Diplo-macy and Development”. Prism 1 (3): 21-26.

30. Kitfield, James. 2005. War and Destiny: How the Bush Revolution in Foreign and Military Affairs Redefined the American Power. Washington: Potomac Books.

31. Krepinevich, Andrew. 2011. Why Air Sea Battle? Washington: Center for Strate-gic, Budgetary Assessments.

32. Kugler, Richard. 2011. New Directions in U.S. National Security Strategy, Defense Plans and Diplomacy. Washington: National Defense University Press.

33. Larson, Eric, David Orletsky y Kristin Leuschner. 2001. Defense Planning in a Decade of Change: Lessons from the Base Force, Bottom-Up Review, and Quadren-nial Defense Review. Santa Mónica: RAND Corporation.

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34. Lind, Michael. 2006. The American Way of Strategy: U.S. Foreign Policy and the American Way of Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

35. Mearsheimer, John. 2014. America Unhinged. The National Interest 129: 9-30.36. Metz, Steven. 2001. Revising the Two MTW Force Shaping Paradigm. Carlisle:

Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College.37. Murdock, Clark y Ryan Crotty. 2013. A Methodology for Making the Right Trade-

Offs in Defense for the Decade Ahead. Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies.

38. Rosenau, James. 1990. Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

39. Shaw, Martin. 2005. The New Western Way of War. Risk Transfer and Its Crisis in Iraq. Cambridge: Polity Press.

40. Shimko, Keith. 2010. The Iraq Wars and America’s Military Revolution. Nueva York: Cambridge.

41. Stimson. 2012. A New U.S. Defense Strategy for a New Era: Military Superiority, Agility and Efficiency. Washington: Stimson.

42. Tata, Samir. 2013. Recalibrating American Grand Strategy: Softening U.S. Poli-cies toward Iran in Order to Contain China. Parameters 43 (1): 47-58.

43. Tomes, Robert. 2007. U.S. Defense Strategy from Vietnam to Operation Iraqi Freedom: Military Innovation and the New American Way of War, 1973-2003. Nueva York: Routledge.

44. Ucko, David. 2009. The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Mili-tary for Modern Wars. Washington: Georgetown University Press.

45. Walt, Stephen. 2012. Top Ten Lessons of the Iraq War, Foreign Policy, 20 March 2013. [En línea] www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/03/20/top_ten_lessons_of_the_iraq_war

46. Watts, Barry. 2011. The Maturing Revolution in Military Affairs. Washington: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

47. Weigley, Russell. 1977. The American Way of War: A History of U.S. Military Strategy and Policy. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

48. Work, Robert y Shawn Brimley. 2014. 20YY: Preparing for War in the Robotic Age. Washington: Center for a New American Security.

Documentos institucionales49. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [CJCS]. 2012. Capstone Concept for Joint

Operations: Joint Force 2020. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office. [En línea] http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/ccjo_2012.pdf

50. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [CJCS]. 2011. The National Military Strategy of the United States of America. Redefining America’s Leadership. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office. [En línea] http://www.army.mil/info/referen-ces/docs/NMS%20FEB%202011.pdf

51. Department of Defense [DoD]. 2014. Quadrennial Defense Review. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office. [En línea] http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf

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52. Department of Defense [DoD]. 2010. Quadrennial Defense Review. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office. [En línea] http://www.defense.gov/qdr/qdr%20as%20of%2029jan10%201600.pdf

53. Department of Defense [DoD]. 2006. Quadrennial Defense Review. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office. [En línea] http://www.defense.gov/qdr/report/report20060203.pdf

54. Executive Office of the President of the United States. 2014. Fiscal Year 2015. Budget of the U.S. Government. Washington: Office of Management & Bud-get. [En línea] http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2015/assets/budget.pdf

55. National Intelligence Council [NIC]. 2012. Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds. Washington: National Intelligence Council. [En línea] http://global-trends2030.files.wordpress.com/2012/11/global-trends-2030-november2012.pdf

56. Office of the Secretary of Defense [OSD]. 2013. Air Sea Battle. Service Colla-boration to Address Anti-Access & Area Denial Challenges. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office. [En línea] http://www.defense.gov/pubs/ASB-Con-ceptImplementation-Summary-May-2013.pdf

57. Office of the Secretary of Defense [OSD]. 2012. Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office. http://www.defense.gov/news/defense_strategic_guidance.pdf

H

Guillem Colom piella es doctor en Paz y Seguridad Internacional del Instituto Universitario General Gutiérrez Mellado (UNED) (España). Actualmente es profesor de Ciencia Política en la Universidad Pablo de Olavide (España) y de Relaciones Internacionales en la Universidad Pontificia de Comillas (España). Sus líneas de investigación se centran en los asuntos estraté-gicos y políticas de seguridad y defensa. Entre sus últimas publicaciones están: “El ocaso de la defensa británica durante la Guerra Fría”. Ayer (Asociación de Historia Contemporánea) 93, 2014; y “La NSA en la era del ciberespionaje masivo”. Política exterior 28 (157), 2014.Correo electrónico: [email protected]

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Introducción

La obra de Fukuyama sobre los orígenes del orden político puede inscribirse en el programa de investigación que planteó originalmente Weber, quien se preguntó por qué en Occidente —y sólo en Occidente— nació y se consolidó el conjunto de instituciones que constituyen el mundo moderno. Este programa que incluía la pregunta sobre el Estado:

También el Occidente es el único que ha conocido el “Estado” como orga-nización política, con una “constitución” racionalmente establecida, con un derecho racionalmente estatuido y una administración de funcionarios especializados guiada por reglas racionales positivias: las “leyes”; fuera de Occidente, todo esto se ha conocido de modo rudimentario, pero siempre faltó esa esencial combinación de los elementos característicos decisivos. (Weber 2011 [1904], 57)

Según Fukuyama, una exitosa democracia liberal depende del equili-brio armónico entre tres grandes instituciones: 1) el Estado, 2) el imperio de la ley y 3) un gobierno responsable. El Estado ejerce el monopolio legítimo de la violencia. El imperio de la ley y un gobierno responsable limitan el poder del Estado, defienden el interés público o interés general y permiten unas reglas de juego claras, que someten a todos los ciudadanos. El objetivo de Fukuyama no es elaborar una “historia del desarrollo político”, sino establecer el origen de estas tres instituciones y las diversas contingencias históricas que hicieron posible su convergencia en los primeros Estados europeos modernos. Como

La religión en la evolución del orden político. A propósito de la obra de Fukuyama The Origins of Political Order (2011)

William Mauricio BeltránUniversidad Nacional de Colombia (Colombia)

DOI: dx.doi.org/10.7440/colombiaint81.2014.10

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Weber, Fukuyama considera que en el proceso de consolidación de estas ins-tituciones la religión, y particularmente el cristianismo, desempeñó un papel fundamental (Fukuyama 2011, 15-22).

Esta ambiciosa obra se pregunta, además, por el origen mismo del poder político. Si bien este autor comparte la idea de que los seres huma-nos son racionales e interesados, y reconoce su inclinación a la violencia, destaca la tendencia humana a la cooperación, por lo cual enfatiza que ni la organización social ni las luchas políticas se pueden explicar exclusivamente en función de disputas alrededor de intereses económicos. Considera que la cooperación humana se da en el marco de unas características biológicas particulares, que incluyen: 1) la propensión de los humanos a cooperar entre parientes; 2) su tendencia a crear modelos teóricos de tipo religioso que les permiten a las sociedades darle sentido al conjunto de las experiencias y ma-nipular las diversas fuerzas de la naturaleza; estos sistemas teóricos generan cohesión social y constituyen uno de los fundamentos de la organización política; 3) la predisposición humana a crear normas y sistemas legales que se sustentan en los modelos teóricos de tipo religioso; 4) la tendencia humana a rivalizar por el reconocimiento y el estatus. La lucha por el reconocimiento no involucra solamente a individuos, sino también a colectividades que se esfuerzan por demandar respeto por sus creencias y costumbres. Por lo tanto, detrás de las confrontaciones bélicas no sólo están en juego intereses materia-les sino también luchas simbólicas que buscan el reconocimiento y el respeto a una determinada cultura (Fukuyama 2011, 43-45, 439-442).

1. Sobre el estado de naturaleza

Fukuyama destaca que hoy, gracias a los avances de la biología, es po-sible retornar con mayor rigurosidad a las preguntas planteadas originalmente por Rousseau, Locke y Hobbes acerca del origen del Estado. Señala que estos autores coinciden en observar al ser humano en “estado de naturaleza” como un ser esencialmente individualista. Por lo cual imaginaron las sociedades como un estadio posterior a la existencia de la especie humana y como un producto de acuerdos o contratos entre individuos. Si bien Fukuyama reco-noce que para estos autores el estado de naturaleza no es tanto un período

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La religión en la evolución del orden político. A propósito de la obra de FukuyamaWilliam Mauricio Beltrán

histórico, sino más bien un recurso teórico para comprender “la naturaleza humana” —la inclinación humana a la violencia y a la rivalidad—, considera que las “motivaciones individualistas” no son útiles para explicar la génesis de las instituciones políticas. Hoy sabemos que no existió un período en el que los seres humanos vivieran como individuos aislados, y que los humanos primitivos no se incorporaron a la vida social como resultado de una decisión racional. Por el contrario, fue el individualismo, y no la vida en sociedad, el fenómeno que tuvo lugar en un determinado momento de la historia. Los primates predecesores de los humanos ya vivían en sociedad y desarrollaban actividades políticas y de cooperación. Se organizaban en torno a jerarquías y enfrentaban disputas con otros grupos. Manadas de chimpancés salvajes —con quienes la especie humana comparte más del 95% de su estructura ge-nética— se organizan de manera jerárquica y han sido observados atacando a otras manadas de chimpancés vecinas, ataques que pueden ser comparados con los observados entre tribus humanas. Los chimpancés se organizan ade-más en torno a reglas colectivas. La violación de estas normas o el desafío a la autoridad conlleva sanciones para el transgresor. Por lo tanto, el estado de naturaleza como un estado de “guerra de todos contra todos”, tal y como lo imaginó Hobbes, nunca existió. Aunque la disputa por el territorio o los recursos siempre ha desencadenado confrontaciones violentas entre los pri-mates superiores, éstas ocurren entre manadas o bandas y no entre individuos aislados (Fukuyama 2011, 32).1

Para Fukuyama, los humanos estamos genéticamente programados para la vida en grupo, si bien las formas específicas de cooperación y orga-nización social dependen de múltiples factores como “el ambiente, las ideas y la cultura”. La biología ha puesto de manifiesto que la “conducta cooperativa” se da por dos vías: por los vínculos de parentesco y por el altruismo recípro-co. En el primer caso, la evolución biológica no busca la supervivencia de un organismo aislado, sino la de sus genes, por lo cual la cooperación y el altruismo varían en función del número de genes que comparten los agentes —padres e hijos comparten el 50% de los genes, por lo cual son más altruistas

1 Para sustentar esta argumentación, Fukuyama cita, entre otros, a Wrangham y Peterson (1996), LeBlanc y Register (2003) y Waal (1989, 1997).

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que los primos hermanos, que comparten sólo el 25%—. La cooperación entre parientes ha sido también observada en otros mamíferos. Así, la organización de los humanos en bandas o grupos con base en el parentesco y la inclina-ción al nepotismo no es simplemente una adquisición cultural, sino que de-pende también de una predisposición genética; por esta razón, el nepotismo constituye una constante de la conducta humana (Fukuyama 2011, 30-34).2 Pero además del parentesco, los agentes humanos cooperan con no parientes cuando esta cooperación representa beneficios recíprocos, es decir, cuando es rentable para ambas partes, conducta que también se puede observar en otros mamíferos (Trivers 1971, citado por Fukuyama 2011, 31).

Algunos biólogos citados por Fukuyama (2011, 34-35)3 consideran que las habilidades cognitivas orientadas a crear formas complejas de organización social fueron claves en el proceso de selección natural de la evolución humana. Así, al parecer, el gran tamaño del cerebro humano está asociado, en buena medida, a la adquisición de habilidades sociales.

El lenguaje verbal les permitió a los primeros humanos mejorar la coo-peración y desarrollar nuevas habilidades cognitivas que ayudaron a comple-jizar los sistemas de clasificación de los miembros del grupo. Puesto que las virtudes o los defectos de un determinado miembro podían ser comunicados a los demás y a las nuevas generaciones, se generaron mecanismos de prestigio o desprestigio, y mecanismos de selección de los miembros de un determina-do grupo. Mayores habilidades sociales se convirtieron en una ventaja, dado que quienes las poseían podían, por ejemplo, identificar posibles embusteros y tener mayores posibilidades de apareamiento.4 Es posible, tal y como lo han propuesto estudios recientes, que los humanos se hayan autodomesticado,5 en otras palabras, los sujetos con mejores habilidades sociales tuvieron mayores

2 Sobre este aspecto, Fukuyama hace referencia a los trabajos de Sherman (1977), entre otros.3 Como Humphrey (1976) y Alexander (1974 y 1990).4 Fukuyama cita, entre otros, a Miller (2000) y Miller y Geher (2008).5 Algunos primatólogos creen que los humanos podrían ser “simios autodomesticados”. Esta

“autodomesticación” habría consistido, entre otras cosas, en un proceso de selección intragru-pal en el que los individuos menos violentos tenían mayores oportunidades de reproducirse. Proceso que garantizaba niños menos violentos y, por ende, más fáciles de criar (ver, por ejem-plo, Hare, Wobber y Wrangham [2012]).

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posibilidades de ser aceptados por un grupo y, por lo tanto, de reproducirse, mientras que los más hostiles tendían a quedar aislados.

Gracias al lenguaje fue posible la abstracción, y con ella, la inclinación humana a crear teorías. Los seres humanos nos caracterizamos por establecer relaciones entre diversos eventos y por inferir asociaciones del tipo causa-efecto. Al parecer, esta capacidad está en la base del carácter universal de la religión. Tal y como lo plantearon inicialmente Durkheim (2008 [1912]) y Weber (1964 [1922]), toda religión es una forma de conocimiento: una teoría que pretende, entre muchas otras cosas, dotar de sentido a la naturaleza y a la existencia humana. Según Weber (1964 [1922], 328), las teorías de tipo religioso tienen originalmente un carácter pragmático: manipular el mundo: poner los poderes naturales y sobrenaturales al servicio de intereses humanos, algo similar a lo que busca la ciencia en nuestros días. Fukuyama precisa que incluso los Neandertales y otros grupos prehumanos ya practicaban una religión (Fukuyama 2011, 35).6

Hoy, debido en gran medida al despertar y la expansión de los funda-mentalismos religiosos, es fácil argumentar que la religión es una fuente de violencia y conflicto.7 Si bien a lo largo de la historia diversas tribus y nacio-nes han vivido confrontaciones violentas por motivos religiosos, Durkheim (2008 [1912]) propuso hace más de un siglo que una de las funciones de la religión es generar cohesión social: garantizar la integración de un grupo. Por ejemplo, la religión está íntimamente asociada con la identidad, en cuanto a la pertenencia a un grupo, y la definición de sus límites, en otras palabras, per-mite establecer quiénes son “los nuestros” y quiénes son “los otros”. Además, los rituales y las creencias religiosas configuran convicciones y valores: no sólo sugieren el camino correcto, también constituyen en sí mismos impera-tivos morales. Estos imperativos se traducen en orientaciones y prohibiciones que van acompañadas de un sistema de castigos y recompensas, que, aunque pueden ser simbólicos y postergados al más allá, incentivan la cooperación en el seno del grupo. El control social que ejerce la religión se puede traducir en sen-timientos subjetivos como la culpa o la preocupación por cuidar del honor y

6 Sobre la universalidad de la religión, Fukuyama cita a Wade (2009, 18-37).7 Al respecto, Fukuyama cita, entre otros, a Hitchens (2007) y Dawkins (2006).

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del buen nombre (Fukuyama 2011, 37-38). La religión no es el único sistema de creencias que permite la solidaridad a gran escala: los nacionalismos y ciertas ideologías seculares, como el marxismo o la ideología nazi, han des-empeñado un papel similar. Robert Bellah (1970) acuñó la expresión “religión civil” para referirse al conjunto de rituales y símbolos nacionalistas que des-piertan sentimientos similares a los religiosos en la sociedad estadounidense y que ayudan a cohesionarla.

A diferencia de la ciencia, los sistemas de conocimiento de tipo religioso —los dogmas y las doctrinas— no son asumidos como hipótesis provisionales por parte de los creyentes ni son revisados con base en la verificación empírica; por el contrario, suelen constituir sistemas de conocimiento rígidos: verdades absolutas que, de ser cuestionadas, provocan sanciones. Esta dimensión conservadora de las doctrinas religiosas tendría como función otorgar estabilidad a las sociedades. Según la teoría económica, cuando las normas ya se han cristalizado —ya han sido objetivadas, acudiendo a la expresión de Berger y Luckmann (1968)—, son económicamente funcionales. Por el contrario, buscar consensos para maximizar los beneficios en cada situación implica asumir nuevos costos, que dificultan todo tipo de transacción. En otras palabras, si debiésemos negociar constantemente nuevas reglas para establecer cuáles son las más adecuadas en cada situación, la vida cotidiana se haría cada vez más lenta y torpe, y la interacción se tornaría inviable. Por lo tanto, gozar de sistemas normativos estables facilita los acuerdos y la cooperación. Es pertinente recordar que hasta hace relativamente poco, en Occidente, sólo en casos excepcionales —revoluciones, guerras o crisis sociales—, las sociedades se atrevían a cuestionar las instituciones, los valores y las normas vigentes, que eran por lo general legitimados por argumentos de tipo religioso. Estas aseveraciones de Fukuyama parecen confirmar los postulados de Durkheim (2008 [1912]), quien consideraba que el carácter sagrado de los sistemas norma-tivos de tipo religioso, y de los rituales que los actualizan, está relacionado con el papel que tienen como guardianes de los bienes más valiosos de una sociedad: la cohesión y la estabilidad. Por lo cual, amenazar los valores y las normas sagra-dos se traduce en atentar contra “la conciencia colectiva” y contra la integración social. Esto explica por qué las sociedades tienden a ser conservadoras en cuanto a sus creencias y valores religiosos, rigidez que a su vez se transmite a sus cos-tumbres y normas.

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En este punto Fukuyama señala una interesante paradoja: la rigidez de los valores religiosos puede tornarse disfuncional cuando arriban cambios sociales: si los valores y las creencias no evolucionan al mismo ritmo que la economía, la demografía, la tecnología o los cambios políticos, los valores tradicionales tien-den a volverse obsoletos en su capacidad de orientar la vida social y de regular las nuevas situaciones. Ésto puede acarrear la decadencia e incluso el colapso de las instituciones sociales que han sido legitimadas por la vía religiosa. La erosión de la legitimidad del “derecho divino de los reyes” es un ejemplo de este proce-so (Fukuyama 2011, 40-44); y el actual debate sobre los derechos de las parejas homosexuales —por ejemplo, a casarse y adoptar hijos— muestra que valores tradicionales —como el amor heterosexual como base del matrimonio, según la definición de la mayoría de las iglesias cristianas— se van haciendo obsoletos frente a las nuevas demandas sociales.

2. De la banda al Estado

Con base en la revisión de una amplia bibliografía,8 Fukuyama define unos tipos ideales —según la metodología weberiana9— de organización humana: 1) la banda, 2) la tribu, 3) el cacicazgo y 4) el Estado. En los dos primeros tipos, la coo-peración se basa en el parentesco. Son sociedades segmentarias y comunitarias —de solidaridad mecánica, según la clasificación de Durkheim (2007 [1893])—. Los cacicazgos y los Estados están organizados jerárquicamente y no dependen del parentesco, sino de la capacidad de ejercer control sobre un determinado territorio (Fukuyama 2011, 51-53).

Según esta tipificación, las organizaciones sociales más primitivas fueron las bandas: pequeños grupos nómadas de cazadores y recolectores que no cono-cían la idea de propiedad privada y no practicaban la acumulación de riquezas, ya que los productos de la caza y la recolección se consumían inmediatamente. Practicaban una división natural del trabajo donde los hombres cazaban y las mujeres se dedicaban a las crías. Como las manadas de chimpancés, estos grupos

8 Fukuyama cita, entre otros, a White (1959), Steward (1963), Service (1971), Fried (1967), Sahlins y Service (1960) y Gellner (1987).

9 Sobre los tipos ideales, ver Weber (2001 [1958]).

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habitaban y defendían un determinado territorio, pero si éste era invadido o los recursos escaseaban, podían migrar a otro. No tenían una jerarquía ni un lide-razgo permanente; la autoridad la ejercían círculos de parientes, cuya autoridad estaba determinada por cualidades como la edad, la fuerza, la inteligencia y la confiabilidad (Fukuyama 2011, 53-54).

El desarrollo de la agricultura en diversas partes del mundo —Mesopotamia, China, América—, hace aproximadamente nueve mil años, permitió el au-mento de la densidad demográfica, lo que a su vez demandó nuevas formas de organización social como tribus o clanes. Estas formas de organización son también segmentarias —de solidaridad mecánica—. En otras palabras, no se basan en una división compleja del trabajo: son el producto de unir diversos segmentos sociales similares constituidos por parientes. Cada uno de estos segmentos es autosuficiente. Las tribus, así como las bandas, son sociedades muy igualitarias, carecen de una estructura política centralizada y de un sistema legal independiente. Las jerarquías y la autoridad son definidas por factores como la edad, el carisma o la fuerza. La fuente de integración de los diversos segmentos es la referencia o creencia en uno o varios ancestros comunes. Los diversos segmentos que componen una tribu rivalizan entre sí, por lo cual las tribus pueden engendrar en su seno conflictos violentos, acompañados de alianzas entre segmentos. Pero, asimismo, los segmentos pueden organizarse como un solo ente político para hacer frente a otra tribu o a cualquier amenaza externa. Así, pues, los segmentos de una tribu pueden unirse o enfrentarse dependiendo del nivel del conflicto —interno o exter-no—, tal y como se infiere de un viejo proverbio árabe que Fukuyama cita: “Yo contra mi hermano, yo y mi hermano contra mi primo, yo y mi primo contra el extranjero” (Fukuyama 2011, 55-58).

La solidaridad entre parientes lejanos en el seno de una tribu es posible gracias a apuntalamientos sociales de tipo religioso. Los ances-tros o patriarcas comunes devienen en referencias sagradas y suelen ser objeto de culto. Este culto constituye una fuente de cohesión social entre los diferentes segmentos. Así, religión, parentesco e integración social es-tán íntimamente relacionados en las sociedades tribales (Fukuyama 2011, 60-61). De nuevo, esta idea había sido ya sugerida por Durkheim (2008 [1912]), quien además observó que el respeto por los objetos sagrados debe

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ser reforzado periódicamente por medio de ritos; la periodicidad de los ritos religiosos no sólo garantiza la subsistencia de las creencias religiosas, también cumple la función de actualizar y reforzar los lazos sociales que unen a estas comunidades.

Fukuyama es consciente de que el papel social de la religión puede ser observado desde diversas perspectivas. Desde la perspectiva marxista, los argu-mentos religiosos para mantener cohesionadas a las sociedades aparecieron a pos-teriori, con la intención de legitimar un determinado orden económico y político, y así, beneficiar a una “clase” dominante. Desde una perspectiva durkheimiana, las creencias religiosas están en la génesis de las sociedades tribales y garantizan su integración. Sin embargo, para Fukuyama una explicación no excluye la otra, es decir, si bien la religión puede ser analizada como una elemento esencial de cohesión social, particularmente en las sociedades elementales, un líder o un grupo pueden usarla para legitimar un determinado orden económico y político que les es conveniente (Fukuyama 2011, 62).

El carácter sagrado que tiene el territorio en las sociedades triba-les le permite a Fukuyama rebatir una nueva concepción equívoca de los ilustrados. Rousseau (2001 [1754]) afirmaba que el origen de la desigualdad radicaba en el origen de la propiedad privada: “el origen de la injusticia se remonta al primer hombre que cercó un terreno y lo declaró suyo” (citado por Fukuyama 2011, 64). Al respecto, Fukuyama señala que las primeras for-mas de propiedad de la tierra no fueron individuales, sino colectivas, y que la propiedad colectiva de la tierra fue posible gracias a creencias religiosas, por ejemplo, la creencia de que las almas de los ancestros habitan cerca de sus tumbas. Basta recordar que patriarca y patria comparten la misma raíz eti-mológica, y ambas palabras hacen referencia a bienes sagrados: los ancestros y el territorio. Así, el territorio de las tribus no es sólo de los vivos, también es de los ancestros fallecidos —de los padres o patriarcas—, e incluso de los hijos que aún no han nacido. Por lo tanto, la importancia que tiene el territo-rio para las tribus no se basa solamente en preocupaciones económicas, sino también en argumentos religiosos. En cuanto bien sagrado, los miembros de la tribu no pueden permitir la profanación de su territorio, por ejemplo, que sea privatizado por alguno de sus miembros o usurpado por un invasor. Además, en la medida en que la tierra es colectiva y sagrada, no puede ser

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vendida o enajenada, como ocurre en las sociedades modernas. La propiedad colectiva y el culto al territorio como bien sagrado constituyen también me-canismos de integración social de la tribu (Fukuyama 2011, 66-68).

Con el surgimiento de tribus, la organización social de la violencia se hace también más compleja, ya que la tribu permite la implementación de pequeños ejércitos que ofrecen mayor eficacia que las bandas a la hora de emprender ma-niobras bélicas. Con las tribus, además, surge una casta especializada de guerre-ros, cuyo líder es también un líder político, tal y como ya lo había señalado Weber (1964 [1922], 370-371). Hasta hoy, en las pandillas, las guerrillas y las mafias, el líder militar es también un líder político. Los guerreros no sólo actúan por mo-tivaciones económicas, también están motivados por bienes simbólicos como el honor o el amor a una causa (Fukuyama 2011, 73-74).

Según Fukuyama, cuando se consolidaron los Estados-nación en China, India, Medio Oriente y América Latina, las estructuras tribales no se disolvieron por completo, sino que dichos Estados se organizaron con base en estructuras mixtas, en un delicado equilibrio en el que los poderes centrales conviven con po-deres regionales basados en el parentesco. En el único lugar donde el tribalismo fue reemplazado completamente por el individualismo moderno fue en Europa, tal y como observaremos más adelante. En el caso de América Latina, las estruc-turas tribales fueron reemplazadas por maquinarias clientelistas, donde cacique y cliente se mantienen unidos por favores recíprocos, que incluyen el favor del voto. Esto ha permitido que los poderes regionales se mantengan en manos de determinados clanes familiares, hasta hoy (Fukuyama 2011, 77-79).

¿Cómo fue posible superar las estructuras tribales para constituir for-mas de organización social que no estén basadas en el parentesco? Fukuyama busca la respuesta en los casos de China, India y Europa, sociedades que por diversas contingencias históricas concibieron en algún momento formas impersonales y burocráticas de gobierno. Muestra cómo muchas de las ins-tituciones políticas que hoy consideramos modernas nacieron relativamente temprano. Los griegos inventaron la democracia: la posibilidad de que los gobernantes sean elegidos por votación, en lugar de que hereden el poder. Sin embargo, el sistema político imperante tanto en Atenas como en la República romana es definido por Fukuyama como “republicanismo clásico”, y no como “democracia”, por cuanto la participación política —el voto y la

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ciudadanía— estaba circunscrita a un determinado sector de la población, ex-cluyendo, entre otros, a los esclavos y a las mujeres. Este tipo de republicanis-mo fue copiado por muchas sociedades posteriores, incluidas las “oligarquías republicanas” de Génova y Venecia. Fukuyama considera que este “republica-nismo clásico” sólo funciona en sociedades pequeñas y homogéneas, del tipo ciudades-Estado. Tanto en el caso de Grecia como en el de Roma, el creci-miento económico y la expansión de estas sociedades debilitaron los valores comunitarios que las mantenían unidas, e implicaron cambios en sus sistemas de gobierno. Las ciudades griegas fueron conquistadas por monarquías, y la República Romana se transformó en imperio (Fukuyama 2011, 19-20).

Los Estados difieren de las sociedades tribales en diversos aspectos: 1) poseen una fuerte autoridad central —rey, presidente o primer ministro— que domina un determinado territorio; 2) esta autoridad ostenta el monopolio legítimo de la violencia por medio de un ejército y/o de un cuerpo de policía; 3) la autoridad del Estado no está construida con base en relaciones de paren-tesco; 4) los Estados son propios de sociedades más estratificadas y desiguales que las sociedades tribales, donde se han consolidado unas élites económicas y políticas; 5) los Estados están legitimados por sistemas religiosos complejos que cuentan con una clase sacerdotal independiente, aunque en determinadas circunstancias un sacerdote puede ser la cabeza del poder político: teocracia; o un líder político secular puede asumir el liderazgo de la organización reli-giosa: papismo o césar (Fukuyama 2011, 80-81).

Según Fukuyama, la convergencia de diversos factores precipita la orga-nización de Estados, por ejemplo, la necesidad de desarrollos tecnológicos y de formas organización que garanticen la provisión de recursos materiales, como la agricultura y la ganadería. A medida que el trabajo se divide, las formas de organización social se hacen más complejas y se facilita el surgimiento de una élite (Fukuyama 2011, 86-88).

El Estado chino se formó en una época relativamente temprana, poco después de Egipto y Mesopotamia y antes que el Estado griego y el romano. El chino fue entre éstos el más moderno, según los tipos ideales que for-muló Weber (1964 [1922]). Es decir, fue un Estado burocrático, centralizado y uniforme, capaz de gobernar una enorme población y controlar un gran territorio. Además, los chinos inventaron relativamente temprano un sistema

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impersonal para reclutar los miembros de su cuerpo burocrático basándose en sus méritos, lo que representa un antecedente importante en la creación de cuadros burocráticos a partir de criterios “meritocráticos”. Esto nunca ocurrió en Grecia o en Roma. La institucionalización de diversos gremios —como el campesinado, los terratenientes y los mercaderes— facilitó este proceso. A diferencia del Imperio romano, en la China imperial el poder militar se mantuvo siempre bajo el control del emperador y sirvió para defender el imperio de las amenazas externas. Según Fukuyama, el Estado chino fue muy diferente al Estado indio, por lo cual fue un error de Marx ubicarlos a ambos bajo el “paradigma asiático”, ya que las dinámicas de parentesco que se cris-talizaron en el sistema de castas, sólo le permitieron a India funcionar como un imperio unido, estable y centralizado por breves períodos, mientras que el Imperio chino se mantuvo unido por varios siglos, e incluso las guerras y las invasiones ayudaron a consolidarlo (Fukuyama 2011, 90-94). Sin embargo, los chinos no desarrollaron un sistema legal comparable al de los griegos o al de los romanos ni crearon las bases para un sistema jurídico autónomo, y, además, carecieron de una cultura basada en el individualismo. Además, a merced de la gran cantidad de poder en manos del emperador, la China imperial se caracterizó por el despotismo (Fukuyama 2011, 21).

3. La religión en la consolidación del Estado

Fukuyama considera que los líderes religiosos de tipo carismático tuvieron un papel importante en la consolidación de los primeros Estados.10 Estos líderes legitiman su autoridad política como un “don” proveniente de los dioses. La religión que confiesa el líder carismático —y que sustenta su autoridad— debe

10 Weber formula tres tipos ideales de dominación: 1) La dominación legal o burocrática, que descansa sobre la creencia en la legalidad de los sistemas normativos y en la legitimidad de los funcionarios designados para ejercer la autoridad. 2) La dominación tradicional, que tiene como base la creencia en el carácter sagrado de las tradiciones ancestrales y en la legitimidad de los señalados por la costumbre para ejercer la autoridad. 3) La dominación carismática, que se fundamenta en la confianza que expresan los seguidores en un líder que demuestra cualidades extraordinarias —héroe, santo o profeta—, cuyos ejemplo, mandato y consejo se ven impelidos a seguir (Weber 1964 [1922], 170-201).

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imponerse “por la seducción o la fuerza” a las diversas tribus que éste pretende agrupar, tal y como lo logró Mahoma con el pueblo árabe. Las formas de religión que logran aglutinar diversas tribus, por lo general, no se basan en el culto a un ancestro común, sino a una divinidad y una doctrina comunes. Fukuyama insis-te en que prácticamente todos los Estados han recurrido a alguna religión para legitimarse (Fukuyama 2011, 86-88).

Como ya se mencionó, en los casos de China, India y Medio Oriente, los Estados emergentes no destruyeron las estructuras tribales; más bien, el poder central se logró articular —y aún convive— con los poderes tribales locales. Todos estos Estados, en determinadas circunstancias, implementaron estrategias para incentivar la lealtad de sus funcionarios y minar la lealtad de éstos a sus clanes familiares. Incluso, implementaron formas de reclutamiento a partir del talento, como se dio, por ejemplo, en los procesos de selección de mandarines y derviches. Una estrategia singular fue la del Imperio turco-otomano, que secues-tró niños extranjeros, especialmente cristianos, para formarlos como burócratas, y, de esta manera, suprimir la lealtad de éstos a sus parientes (Fukuyama 2011, 229, 453; ver también Coser 1978, 46-51).

Sin embargo, todos estos Estados, al no lograr debilitar las estructuras tribales, volvieron al patrimonialismo y al nepotismo, puesto que los funcio-narios que inicialmente fueron reclutados de manera impersonal terminaban inclinándose a compartir —o heredar— sus cargos y privilegios con parientes y amigos (Fukuyama 2011, 453). Fukuyama añade que en toda sociedad donde la democracia y la meritocracia se han consolidado existe el riesgo de que el nepotismo resurja en la forma de cacicazgos, clientelismo y mafias, y en su consideración, estas formas de organización social representan una “decaden-cia” o “retroceso” en la evolución de las instituciones políticas. Como ya se señaló, este fenómeno se explica por la tendencia humana a favorecer a los parientes, tendencia que hace parte de nuestra determinación genética y que constituye la forma más natural de solidaridad. Así, pues, la democracia y la meritocracia exigen una constante supervisión por parte de los ciudadanos (Fukuyama 2011, 439-441).

En el único lugar donde el tribalismo fue reemplazado completamente por el individualismo moderno fue en Europa Occidental. Según Fukuyama, la Iglesia católica desempeñó un papel fundamental en la consolidación del

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individualismo, por cuanto se empeñó a lo largo de la Edad Media en reem-plazar la familia extensa por la familia nuclear como base de la cohesión social, debilitando de esta manera las estructuras tribales. Por otro lado, el poder acumulado por la Iglesia católica le permitió imponer límites al poder del monarca, lo que facilitó el desarrollo de un sistema legal autónomo e in-dependiente del poder del Estado. Por último, la Iglesia, al imponer el celibato de los sacerdotes, creó una burocracia no hereditaria y debilitó la lealtad de sacerdotes y obispos a sus familias. Si bien el celibato ha hecho crisis recu-rrentemente, y son conocidos los casos en que se vendieron o negociaron cargos religiosos, el celibato contribuyó a la consolidación de un cierto tipo de meritocracia en el seno de la Iglesia (Fukuyama 2011, 20 y 454).

Para Marx, el modelo de familia “burguesa” fue impulsado por el ascenso del capitalismo moderno (Marx y Engels 1988 [1846]). Para Weber (1964 [1922]), el individualismo y la desintegración de las estructuras so-ciales tradicionales están relacionados con los cambios desencadenados por la Reforma protestante y la Ilustración. Por su parte, Fukuyama, basado en diversos estudios,11 considera que el individualismo precedió al capitalismo y, por lo tanto, a la consolidación de los Estados europeos. Durante la Edad Media la propiedad de la tierra dejó de ser tribal, y en el siglo XV los ingle-ses que poseían tierras podían venderlas o heredarlas sin el permiso de sus señores (Fukuyama 2011, 230-233).

¿Cómo se dio este proceso? Goody (1983) considera que la transición hacia la familia nuclear se inició en el siglo VI y fue impulsada por la Iglesia católica. En los años de decadencia del Imperio romano, el modelo de fami-lia dominante en el Mediterráneo era patrilineal y segmentario; los grupos familiares tendían hacia la endogamia con mecanismos como el matrimonio entre primos. En el siglo VI, el papa Gregorio I prohibió el matrimonio entre parientes cercanos y el levirato —costumbre que obligaba a las viudas que no habían tenido hijos a casarse con uno de sus cuñados—; posteriormente, la Iglesia condenó también el divorcio y el concubinato; en otras palabras, impulsó la monogamia y la indisolubilidad del matrimonio. Esto permitió

11 Ver Hajnal (1965) y MacFarlane (1978).

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que la herencia empezara a circular tanto por la vía paterna como por la vía materna (Goody 1983 y 2000, citado por Fukuyama 2011, 237).

Según Goody (1983), la Iglesia católica no promovió este nuevo mo-delo de familia por razones teológicas, sino por intereses materiales. Por ejemplo, el matrimonio entre primos y el levirato eran permitidos entre los judíos. Con estas medidas la Iglesia buscaba debilitar la propiedad colectiva de la tierra y la familia extensa, pues estas instituciones competían con la lealtad que la Iglesia demandaba de sus fieles. En términos weberianos, estos cambios buscaban debilitar la comunidad de sangre para favorecer la comu-nidad de fe. El nuevo modelo de familia erosionó las estructuras tribales de Europa Occidental. Las tribus germanas, nórdicas y eslavas se disolvieron rápidamente después de su conversión al cristianismo (Fukuyama 2011, 237-239). Un efecto no buscado por la Iglesia católica en este proceso, pero con consecuencias fundamentales para la modernidad, fue el empoderamiento relativo de las mujeres, que se expresó inicialmente en la autonomía de la que éstas empezaron a gozar para disponer de sus propiedades. Ya en el siglo XI, las mujeres inglesas podían vender sus propiedades, incluso a personas que no hacían parte de su familia extensa. Y en el siglo XIII las mujeres inglesas suscribían contratos bajo la supervisión de un hombre tutor (Fukuyama 2011, 233-235). Gracias al empoderamiento de las mujeres fue posible la idea mo-derna según la cual todos los ciudadanos, independientemente de su sexo, son iguales ante el Estado y ante la ley.

El derecho de las viudas a disponer de sus propiedades y la libertad de que gozaron para no contraer segundas nupcias benefició ampliamente a la Iglesia, pues esta última se convirtió en la principal receptora de donaciones de viudas sin hijos y, en general, de las herencias de los cristianos que morían sin descendientes. Por lo cual, entre los siglos VII y IX, la Iglesia duplicó sus tierras en Francia, Alemania e Italia. El nuevo poder económico de la Iglesia se tradujo en poder político. Es decir, estos cambios le permitieron consolidarse como uno de los principales actores políticos de la Edad Media y como la única institución capaz de competir con el poder del emperador (Fukuyama 2011, 239).

Según Marc Bloch (1968), la crisis social desencadenada por las in-vasiones bárbaras y por el debilitamiento de la familia extensa permitió el

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ascenso del feudalismo, que creó una nueva fuente de lazos sociales, donde los siervos ofrecían voluntariamente su trabajo y obediencia a cambio de la seguridad que les proporcionaba el señor feudal: un extraño, un no-pariente. El vínculo de vasallaje en cuanto vínculo contractual y voluntario se conso-lidó alrededor de los siglos XII y XIII. Fukuyama destaca que se trataba de un contrato entre dos individuos —señor y siervo—, y no de un pacto entre clanes o grupos familiares (Fukuyama 2011, 235-236). Esta relación contractual permitió una nueva forma de cohesión social que dependía cada vez menos de los lazos de sangre. Según Szücs (1988), en este vínculo contractual se en-cuentra en germen el individuo moderno, pues si el señor feudal no cumplía con sus compromisos, el vasallo podía exigir su libertad: emanciparse. Así, el vasallaje, aunque forjó una sociedad desigual, generó unas condiciones favorables al ascenso del individualismo, pues al vasallo se le reconocían unos derechos mínimos en cuanto individuo. Este individualismo en ciernes prosperó alentado por la Reforma protestante, la Ilustración y la Revolución Industrial (Fukuyama 2011, 240).

De esta manera, Fukuyama refuta a Marx y a Engels (Engels 2010 [1884]), pues afirma que no fue el capitalismo —con sus fuerzas y relaciones de produc-ción— lo que presionó la organización de la familia nuclear moderna, sino que fueron los cambios en la organización social del parentesco los que erosionaron las estructuras tribales y permitieron el nacimiento del individualismo, y con éste, del capitalismo industrial en Inglaterra y Holanda (Fukuyama 2011, 233-240).

4. El “Estado de derecho” o “imperio de la ley”

Las sociedades tribales carecen de un sistema legal especializado; los cas-tigos o las retaliaciones están en manos de parientes cercanos, y los agravios son también colectivos —entre familias y clanes, por ejemplo— (Fukuyama 2011, 255). ¿Cómo fue posible la consolidación de un sistema legal independiente que some-te a todos los ciudadanos? Fukuyama (2011, 245) considera que en este aspecto también son precursores los Estados europeos.

Por un lado, la tradición judeocristiana se basa en un código religioso y normativo escrito, lo que a la postre facilitó la concreción de un código legal escrito. A diferencia de otras tradiciones religiosas —como la hinduista,

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donde prevaleció la transmisión oral de los códigos religiosos, que sólo de manera relativamente tardía tomaron la forma de un texto escrito—, en Europa Occidental los diversos escritos religiosos y sus múltiples interpre-taciones adquirieron la forma de una teología sistemática consistente y de un único código de derecho canónico. Por lo cual, según Fukuyama, no se puede encontrar un documento comparable al código Justiniano (529 y 534) o al Decreto de Graciano (1140 y 1142) —una de las primeras compilaciones del Derecho Canónico de la Iglesia católica—, en cuanto a su racionalidad y coherencia entre los musulmanes, y ni siquiera en la tradición cristiana orto-doxa (Fukuyama 2011, 288).

Por otro lado, la Iglesia católica logró un autonomía institucional y un poder que le permitieron competir con el poder del rey; así, en la práctica, funcionó como contrapeso al poder del monarca, creando un antecedente a la “división de poderes” de los Estados modernos. Esta autonomía le permi-tió a la Iglesia católica consolidar su propio sistema de normas, que tuvo un alcance internacional. Parafraseando a Weber, Fukuyama insiste en que “sólo en el Occidente cristiano” fue posible un evento como la Reforma Gregoriana —siglo XI—, en la cual la jerarquía católica, con el liderazgo de los papas Nicolás II y Gregorio VII, reclamó la completa autonomía en su administra-ción. Fukuyama precisa que si bien existieron instituciones religiosas inde-pendientes en India y en el Imperio bizantino, éstas no tuvieron la capacidad de consolidar su autonomía y de instaurar un orden legal independiente del monarca (Fukuyama 2011, 288-289 y 444-445).

Nietzsche creía que el cristianismo había creado la idea de una “comunidad universal” sometida a la ley de Dios que es administrada por la Iglesia. Según Fukuyama, en esta idea puede estar en germen la noción de una ley universal que somete a todos, incluido el rey —tal y como se observa en el caso de la Ley Común inglesa—, lo que constituye uno de los supuestos del sistema “legal moderno” (Fukuyama 2011, 255-256). Por lo tanto, la implementación de un sistema judicial independiente en Europa dependió en buena medida de la inf luencia e independencia de la Iglesia católica, lo que explica, a su vez, la ausencia de un sistema similar en India o en el mundo musulmán (Fukuyama 2011, 260-261; ver también Pollock y Maitland 1923, 182).

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Siguiendo a Weber, Fukuyama admite que algunos de los valores sobre los que descansan las sociedades democráticas son una herencia de la tradi-ción cristiana. Menciona, por ejemplo, la creencia en la existencia de unos “derechos” comunes a todos —incluidos los pobres, las mujeres y las minorías étnicas— o “la igualdad” de los ciudadanos frente el Estado. Sin embargo, antes que ser iguales ante las leyes, el cristianismo predicó la igualdad de los fieles ante Dios. Estas ideas empezaron a independizarse de sus raíces reli-giosas gracias a la Ilustración y a las ideas de Hegel, Tocqueville y Nietzsche, entre otros (Fukuyama 2011, 241-445).

Tschannen denomina generalización “al proceso por el cual los sím-bolos, valores, normas, modelos de comportamiento e interacción, o tipos de organización, que tuvieron su origen en la esfera religiosa, se disuelven en la esfera secular, después de haber sido superficialmente desembarazados de su carácter religioso” (Tschannen 1992, 65). A partir de esta definición, es posible afirmar que la secularización no es la desaparición de los valores cristianos, sino su generalización en el conjunto de la sociedad, que ahora los reconoce como legítimos. Ahora, estos valores, además de estar respaldados por la tra-dición religiosa, gozan del apoyo de los Estados. Así, buena parte de los que hoy se denominan “derechos ciudadanos” están fundados en y respaldados por valores judeocristianos. Es por esta misma razón que algunos derechos occidentales, como el derecho de las mujeres al voto, son de muy difícil acep-tación en sociedades que descansan sobre otras tradiciones religiosas, como las de tradición musulmana.

Conclusiones

Volviendo a la pregunta de Weber (2011 [1904]) sobre la relación entre Occidente y la modernidad, Fukuyama considera que el Estado moderno se consolidó en Occidente por diversas contingencias históricas, pero en particular, para los propósitos de este artículo, por el papel que desempeñaron en Occidente determinados valores religiosos.

Siguiendo el camino señalado por Weber (2011 [1904]) —quien mostró la afinidad entre los valores predicados por el protestantismo ascético y los valores que orientaron a los primeros empresarios industriales—, Fukuyama

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considera que los “derechos universales” y muchos de los valores sobre los que descansan los sistemas normativos de los “Estados de derecho” sólo fueron posibles en el Occidente cristiano, pues no son otra cosa que la “ge-neralización” en la esfera secular de valores predicados originalmente por el cristianismo. Idea en la que coincide con otros pensadores contemporáneos como Tschannen (1992).

Pero tomando distancia de Weber (2011 [1904]), Fukuyama cree que el mundo moderno no dependió exclusivamente de la generalización de determi-nados valores religiosos, dependió también de la consolidación en el seno de la Iglesia católica de determinadas instituciones que hicieron posible el individua-lismo y las modernas democracias liberales (Fukuyama 2011, 288).

En cuanto promotora de la familia nuclear, la Iglesia católica contri-buyó a erosionar las comunidades tribales y fundó las bases para el indivi-dualismo moderno. Además, a lo largo de la Edad Media, la Iglesia fue la única institución capaz de consolidar una autonomía legal y burocrática que impusiera límites al poder del monarca. Este poder y autonomía constituyen un antecedente fundamental en la consolidación de un sistema legal indepen-diente, y por esta vía, de la división de los poderes políticos que es propia de los Estados modernos.

No obstante, el papel de las instituciones católicas en la consolidación del Estado moderno sigue el proceso weberiano de los efectos no buscados de la acción. En otras palabras, las decisiones de los jerarcas que promovieron las instituciones de las que hemos hablado buscaban exclusivamente respon-der a sus intereses y consolidar el poder de la Iglesia. En ningún momento imaginaron que con estas decisiones estaban participando en la consolidación de un orden político en el que, a larga, todas las instituciones religiosas, par-ticularmente la Iglesia católica, quedarían progresivamente supeditadas a un papel político relativamente secundario.

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31. Szücs, Jenö. 1988. Three Historical Regions of Europe: An Outline. En Civil So-ciety and the State: New European Perspectives, ed. Jhon Keane, 291-352. Nueva York: Verso.

32. Trivers, Robert. 1971. The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism. Quarterly Review of Biology 46 (1): 35-57.

33. Tschannen, Olivier. 1992. Les théories de la sécularisation. Ginebra: Droz. 34. Waal, Frans de. 1997. Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Human

and Other Animals. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.35. Waal, Frans de. 1989. Chimpanzee Politics: Power and Sex among Apes. Baltimore:

Johns Hopkins University Press.36. Wade, Nicholas. 2009. The Faith Instinct: How Religion Evolved and Why It En-

dures. Nueva York: Penguin.37. Weber, Max. 1985 [1904]. La ética protestante y el espíritu del capitalismo. Bar-

celona: Orbis.38. Weber, Max. 1964 [1922]. Economía y sociedad. Bogotá: Fondo de Cultura

Económica.39. Weber, Max. 2001 [1958]. Ensayos sobre metodología sociológica. Buenos Ai-

res: Amorrortu.40. White, Leslie A. 1959. The Evolution of Culture. The Development of Civilization

to the Fall of Rome. Nueva York: McGraw-Hill.41. Wrangham, Richard y Dale Peterson. 1996. Demonic Males: Apes and the Origins

of Human Violence. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

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William Mauricio Beltrán es sociólogo y máster en Sociología de la Universidad Nacional de Colombia y doctor en Estudios sobre América Latina de la Universidad París III, Sorbonne Nouvelle (Francia). Actualmente se desempeña como profesor

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asociado del Departamento de Sociología de la Universidad Nacional de Colombia, sede Bogotá, y como investigador del Grupo de Estudios Sociales de la Religión (Centro de Estudios Sociales, CES) de la misma Universidad. Entre las diversos problemas que ha tratado se destacan: la pluralización religiosa y su impacto en los campos cultural y político; los procesos de secularización y laicidad y la emergen-cia de nuevas identidades y creencias en Colombia. Ha publicado diversos libros y artículos sobre estos temas. Entre sus últimas publicaciones están: Del monopolio católico a la explosión pentecostal. Pluralización religiosa secularización y cambio so-cial en Colombia. Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 2013; y “Pluralización religiosa y cambio social en Colombia”. Theologica Xaveriana 63 (175), 2013.Correo electrónico: [email protected]

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Negretto, Gabriel L. Making Constitutions: Presidents, Parties, and Institutional Choice in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 2013.

Gabriel Negretto, profesor de Estudios Políticos en el CIDE de México, publicó en 2013 el libro Making Constitutions: Presidents, Parties, and Institutional Choice in Latin America con la editorial de la Universidad de Cambridge. En este libro, Negretto nos ofrece una teoría para el análisis sistemático de los orígenes del cambio constitucional. Como se verá, Negretto abre una línea de investigación de gran pertinencia para aquellos interesados en comprender las particularida-des de las instituciones políticas en América Latina.

En la primera parte del libro, Negretto muestra cuáles son las tendencias y las particularidades del cambio constitucional en América Latina y elabora una teoría en dos niveles (en adelante, teoría dual) que busca responder a las limitacio-nes propias de la ciencia política contemporánea frente al estudio de las instituciones políticas. Según esta teoría, la adopción de nuevas estructuras constitucionales está determinada por el funcionamiento pasado del régimen constitucional y por los intereses partidistas y el poder relativo de los actores políticos reformistas en el momento del cambio. Para demostrar el poder explicativo de su teoría, Negretto acude a dos métodos de análisis empírico que, aunque diferentes, son complementarios. Negretto cierra la primera parte del libro con un análisis es-tadístico dirigido a demostrar la forma como los intereses partidistas y el poder relativo de los actores políticos involucrados en procesos de cambio constitucio-nal impactan las decisiones sobre la adopción de nuevas instituciones políticas.

Sin embargo, la teoría dual de Negretto va más allá de este análisis tra-dicional sobre la distribución del poder político y su impacto en momentos de

La importancia de los orígenes del cambio constitucional

Nicolás Figueroa García-HerrerosNew School for Social Research (EE. UU.)

DOI: dx.doi.org/10.7440/colombiaint81.2014.11

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cambio. En la segunda parte del libro, Negretto desarrolla tres estudios de caso con el apoyo de herramientas cualitativas: Argentina, Colombia y Ecuador, los cuales son usados por el autor para ilustrar la forma en la cual los eventos que dan lugar a los procesos de cambio constitucional y los niveles de incertidumbre electoral de los actores políticos reformistas terminan por atenuar el impacto de consideraciones puramente distributivas, e incrementan la importancia de los objetivos de carácter cooperativo.

Con la intención de hacer esta reseña lo más breve posible, daré priori-dad a los aspectos del libro que considero de mayor pertinencia y me limitaré a ilustrar el poder explicativo de la teoría de Negretto a partir del análisis que el autor hace del caso colombiano. Aun así, los casos de Argentina y Ecuador son igualmente interesantes. Esta reseña es tan sólo una invitación para que el lector se acerque a esta importante contribución a la ciencia política y juzgue por su cuenta el potencial de la teoría desarrollada por Negretto.

Son dos las razones por las cuales la ciencia política contemporánea se ha mostrado inadecuada para un estudio de las estructuras constitucionales, especialmente para el caso de América Latina. Por un lado, se ha dado mayor importancia al estudio de los efectos de largo plazo producidos por la elección de determinadas instituciones políticas que al análisis de las razones por las cuales fueron adoptadas dichas instituciones, y de los contextos en los cuales fueron tomadas tales decisiones. Por otro lado, en aquellos casos en los que se ha buscado tratar con mayor detenimiento el problema de los orígenes del cambio constitucional, esto se ha hecho desde perspectivas de análisis uni-dimensionales incapaces de apreciar en su totalidad la complejidad de estos procesos de cambio. Negretto, por su parte, desarrolla una teoría dual del cambio constitucional que busca responder a estas limitaciones de la ciencia política contemporánea.

Para el autor, el énfasis sobre los efectos de largo plazo del cambio constitucional impide entender el papel que desempeñan las instituciones políticas en los países de América Latina. En esta región las instituciones cambian constantemente, por lo que el estudio de sus efectos a largo plazo es imposible. La inestabilidad de las instituciones políticas de la región lleva al autor a rechazar la estricta distinción entre los orígenes de las instituciones y su desarrollo, y a adoptar una aproximación más fluida y dinámica para su

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La importancia de los orígenes del cambio constitucionalNicolás Figueroa García-Herreros

estudio. Por otra parte, Negretto asume una perspectiva de análisis que acepta la complejidad del cambio institucional y el carácter mixto de las constitu-ciones. Las constituciones no son simplemente el conjunto de normas básicas que hacen posible la cooperación social (teorías cooperativas) ni tampoco instrumentos en la lucha por el poder entre partidos y facciones políticas (teorías distributivas). El estudio del cambio constitucional en América Latina requiere una teoría capaz de tener en cuenta el problema de los orígenes y de integrar los aspectos cooperativos y distributivos propios de cualquier estructura constitucional.

Negretto busca explicar las tendencias del cambio constitucional en América Latina durante gran parte del siglo XX y los primeros años del siglo XXI. Con este propósito, fija su atención sobre las reformas a las reglas electo-rales y a las reglas que determinan la distribución de poderes entre presidentes y cuerpos legislativos. Según el análisis del autor, los regímenes presidenciales de América Latina presentan tendencias contradictorias en la reforma a este tipo de reglas. En el caso de las reglas electorales, Negretto encuentra que las reformas a las reglas para la elección de presidentes y miembros de la rama legislativa han tendido a incrementar la inclusión, el pluralismo y la compe-tencia. Sin embargo, también encuentra que las reformas recientes a las reglas sobre la reelección presidencial se han hecho con espíritu permisivo, lo cual reduce la competencia electoral, pues se limita la rotación de partidos e in-dividuos en el ejercicio del poder presidencial. Las tendencias de reforma en el caso de las reglas sobre la distribución de poderes entre el Ejecutivo y el Legislativo han sido también contradictorias. Aunque es evidente la tendencia hacia la reducción de los poderes de gobierno del Ejecutivo, podemos ver que sus poderes legislativos han sido incrementados.

Estas tendencias contradictorias, según Negretto, evidencian el carácter híbrido de los diseños constitucionales en América Latina. Las constituciones no siguen de forma necesaria un principio único. Los actores políticos con poder de reforma pueden perseguir objetivos diferentes. Por ejemplo, dadas las tendencias contradictorias señaladas arriba, podemos pensar que estos actores políticos pueden buscar al mismo tiempo incrementar la representatividad política y esta-blecer las bases para un gobierno efectivo. Es en este punto donde Negretto en-cuentra el problema central de los estudios sobre el cambio constitucional: ¿cómo

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podemos explicar la escogencia de esta particular combinación de instituciones? La ciencia política necesita de una teoría que pueda explicar al mismo tiempo las tendencias generales de reforma y las variaciones particulares de cada caso. Para ello debemos ser capaces de comprender las razones por las cuales los actores políticos dan inicio a procesos de cambio constitucional y escogen una serie de instituciones, y no otras (40-42). La teoría dual de Negretto busca responder a estas necesidades.

Según esta teoría, la adopción de un determinado conjunto de normas constitucionales durante un momento de cambio está hasta cierto punto deter-minada por el funcionamiento de las estructuras constitucionales preexistentes y por las expectativas electorales y el poder relativo de los actores políticos refor-mistas. Las constituciones funcionan al mismo tiempo como estructuras coopera-tivas y como estructuras para la distribución del poder. Por esta razón, los actores políticos que protagonizan momentos de cambio tienen un interés compartido en el funcionamiento eficiente de las constituciones y un interés partidista en los beneficios políticos que ciertas reglas constitucionales pueden proveer. Pero estos intereses no son necesariamente contradictorios (52). Aunque los intereses partidistas de los actores políticos envueltos en esta clase de procesos de cambio siempre van a tener un papel importante, éstos se verán limitados por los inte-reses cooperativos que se derivan de los situaciones históricas que dan lugar a la necesidad de cambio y/o de la existencia de una relación de poder entre partidos que haga necesario el compromiso entre las partes.

Como bien lo indica Negretto, los incentivos para reformar o reem-plazar en su totalidad una constitución están estrechamente relacionados con los factores que disminuyen el valor de las estructuras constitucionales exis-tentes. Hay tres tipos de eventos que suelen dar lugar a procesos de cambio constitucional: transformaciones políticas al nivel del estado o del régimen; cambios en el balance de poder entre actores políticos y crisis institucionales generadas por el inadecuado funcionamiento de la constitución existente (45-46). La historia de América Latina nos muestra que estos tres tipos de eventos son recurrentes. Sin embargo, los cambios de régimen han dejado de ser representativos durante las últimas décadas del siglo XX y los inicios del siglo XXI. Últimamente, los cambios constitucionales se han dado princi-palmente por la alteración del balance de poder entre actores políticos y por

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el surgimiento de crisis de funcionamiento de las estructuras constituciona-les. Estos eventos son cruciales para entender la orientación que tomarán las reformas, pero aun así, la decisión final sobre cuáles instituciones adoptar no se encuentra determinada por ellos. Otros factores entran en juego una vez ha sido tomada la decisión de emprender una reforma, entre ellos los niveles de incertidumbre electoral existentes en el momento y la relación de fuerzas entre los diferentes actores políticos.

Los estudios cualitativos desarrollados en la segunda parte del libro, entre los cuales encontramos los casos de Argentina, Colombia y Ecuador, muestran la utilidad de la teoría dual propuesta por Negretto para comprender las decisiones que toman los actores políticos relevantes en procesos de cambio constitucional. El análisis que el autor hace del caso colombiano resulta particularmente intere-sante, pues no sólo ilustra muy bien el alcance de la teoría de Negretto, también nos permite comprender bajo qué tipo de condiciones se hace posible llevar a cabo procesos de cambio que profundicen el carácter democrático de nuestras estructuras políticas.

A diferencia de Argentina, donde las reformas constitucionales más significativas han tenido lugar con la intención de consolidar el poder de un partido político dominante (1949) o como una estrategia para redistribuir el poder entre los principales partidos políticos (1994), el proceso de cambio constitucional que llevó a la adopción de la Constitución de 1991 en Colombia es descrito por Negretto como una respuesta a una crisis general de fun-cionamiento del Estado. Las reformas analizadas por Negretto para el caso de Argentina estuvieron motivadas por el deseo de los actores políticos de reacomodar la relación de poder entre los partidos y fueron adelantadas en contextos de baja incertidumbre electoral frente a los resultados de las eleccio-nes futuras, por lo que pueden ser suficientemente explicadas a partir de los intereses partidistas y del poder relativo de los actores políticos involucrados en el proceso de reforma. Estos procesos de reforma no se originaron como respuesta a una crisis que llevara a los agentes reformistas a poner mayor én-fasis en la creación de estructuras cooperativas. Por lo tanto, el único factor que podría llevar a atenuar los intereses partidistas de los actores políticos con poder de reforma tendría que buscarse en el poder relativo de cada uno de los partidos, en la necesidad de negociar para poder sacar adelante las reformas.

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Sin embargo, cuando un partido logra hacerse dominante, como sucedió en Argentina en 1949, o en Venezuela a finales de los noventa, sus intereses parti-distas terminan por controlar el proceso de cambio, dando lugar a estructuras constitucionales excluyentes y que incrementan el poder del Ejecutivo. El caso de Colombia, como veremos, es radicalmente distinto.

Negretto argumenta que el proceso de cambio constitucional colom-biano tuvo lugar como respuesta a una crisis profunda de funcionamiento de las estructuras constitucionales del momento. Al mismo tiempo, este proceso se dio bajo altos niveles de incertidumbre electoral. A partir de la teoría dual de Negretto podemos decir que en este tipo de situaciones los actores políti-cos involucrados en el proceso de cambio probablemente pondrán un mayor énfasis a consideraciones de eficiencia y cooperación, y, así mismo, mode-rarán sus intereses partidistas de corto plazo (166). Son varios los factores que contribuyeron a que la Asamblea Constituyente diera gran importancia a la consideración de intereses cooperativos, lo cual hizo posible la adopción de una nueva estructura constitucional bastante más incluyente, pluralista y democrática que la anterior. La Asamblea se vio llamada, bajo fuerte presión por parte de la opinión pública y la población en general, a dar respuesta a los problemas crónicos de la democracia colombiana.

Entre los principales problemas que se buscaba resolver por medio de este proceso de cambio constitucional estaba la crisis de la democracia repre-sentativa y el desprestigio de los partidos tradicionales. El carácter excluyente de la política colombiana, que se vio reforzado por las estructuras constitucionales heredadas del Frente Nacional, era visto como una de las principales causas de la violencia política que afectaba al país. Por otro lado, era necesario acabar con la tendencia del Ejecutivo a gobernar por medio de sus poderes de emergencia, y dar al Congreso un papel más importante en la resolución de los problemas del país. Para esto, se hacía necesario reformar el Congreso buscando atenuar la in-fluencia del clientelismo y abrir paso a la posibilidad de un poder legislativo más comprometido con los problemas nacionales. En pocas palabras, era necesario emprender una reforma importante de las reglas electorales y de las reglas sobre la distribución de poderes entre las diferentes ramas del poder público.

Esta crisis contribuyó a que el presidente Gaviria tomara la iniciativa en el proceso de cambio y buscara la suscripción de un acuerdo entre los

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principales partidos políticos del momento sobre los objetivos que debería perseguir la Asamblea y la forma en la que debería hacerlo. Este espíritu de cooperación se vio reforzado por los sorpresivos resultados electorales en las votaciones para elegir los miembros de la Asamblea. La regla electoral escogida para estas elecciones se fundó en el principio de la representación proporcional, lo que hizo posible que la Asamblea se conformara de manera incluyente y plu-ralista. Al mismo tiempo, partidos políticos emergentes obtuvieron muy buenos resultados y se dio participación a las minorías políticas del país, entre ellas representantes de algunos grupos guerrilleros recientemente desmovilizados. Ningún partido logró alcanzar mayorías que le permitieran imponer sus deseos en la Asamblea, lo que los obligó a negociar. Por último, esta disposición al compromiso se vio reforzada por la incertidumbre electoral generada por el in-esperado éxito de los partidos políticos emergentes. Frente a la duda respecto a qué sector político resultaría vencedor en las elecciones venideras al Congreso, y con unas elecciones presidenciales lejanas en el tiempo, los partidos represen-tados en la Asamblea recibieron un incentivo para escoger reglas electorales y de distribución de poderes que fueran aceptables para todos. Y aunque primó un espíritu de consenso y cooperación, no todo fue decidido bajo esta lógica. También hubo espacio para consideraciones puramente partidistas en lo que concierne a reformas específicas. Sin embargo, el caso de Colombia se ajusta muy bien a las situaciones bajo las cuales, según la teoría dual de Negretto, los intereses distributivos de los actores políticos se ven atenuados, y abrir así una oportunidad para la adopción de estructuras constitucionales propicias para una democracia más incluyente.

Ahora, la experiencia exitosa del proceso de cambio constitucional colombiano descrita por Negretto, difícilmente puede ser vista como algo replicable en el futuro, tanto en Colombia como en otros países. Muchos de los factores que hicieron posible el proceso colombiano no dependen de la buena voluntad de actores políticos reformistas, sino que están condicionados por la trayectoria histórica y las particularidades políticas de los momentos de cambio constitucional. Pero la teoría dual de Negretto puede resultar útil para políticos reformistas comprometidos con la profundización de la de-mocracia como una herramienta que permite diagnosticar si las condiciones políticas están dadas para una reforma que avance en esta dirección, o si, por

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el contrario, todo está servido para que un partido dominante se consolide en el poder. Al mismo tiempo, la teoría dual de Negretto nos permite entender me-jor la naturaleza híbrida de las estructuras constitucionales que encontramos actualmente en la región y nos pone en buen camino para evaluar el potencial que tienen estas estructuras para la profundización de la democracia. Por estas razones, el libro de Negretto es de gran valor para el estudio del cambio constitucional en América Latina.

Quizás la teoría que Negretto propone para el estudio del cambio consti-tucional podría verse complementada si se amplía el número de los actores polí-ticos relevantes para el análisis. Negretto limita su atención a tres actores políticos que él considera los más importantes: presidentes, legisladores y delegados a las asambleas constituyentes (57). Sin embargo, deberían ser te-nidos en cuenta otros actores y variantes para entender de mejor manera las razones por las cuales los actores políticos analizados por Negretto escogen ciertos medios y contenidos para el cambio constitucional. En este sentido, sería importante considerar tanto el papel desempeñado por las cortes como las limitaciones que impone la legalidad existente al proceso de cambio. Las altas cortes de América Latina han venido desempeñando papeles relevantes en los procesos recientes de cambio constitucional, y su intervención ha sido determinante para entender los niveles de libertad o restricción dentro de los cuales operan los actores políticos principales. Las variantes puramente políticas tenidas en cuenta por Negretto para explicar la forma en la cual los intereses cooperativos y distributivos encuentran expresión durante momen-tos de cambio podrían complementarse con otras de tipo legal.

Podríamos pensar en el impacto que tienen las normas que regulan el cambio constitucional -y las interpretaciones que de ellas hacen las altas cortes- sobre los cálculos de los actores políticos reformistas. Por men-cionar tan sólo un caso, es innegable que hoy en día cualquier proceso de cambio constitucional que se quiera adelantar en Colombia tiene que tener en cuenta la jurisprudencia desarrollada por la Corte Constitucional sobre la sustitución de la Constitución. ¿Cómo explicar la intervención de las cortes dentro de estos procesos? ¿Aplican las mismas consideraciones usadas para entender las actuaciones de presidentes, legisladores y delegados al análisis de las actuaciones de los jueces constitucionales? ¿Cómo explicar el impacto,

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si lo tiene, de la legalidad existente sobre la determinación de las opciones disponibles para la reforma? Estas preguntas podrían guiar futuros intentos de profundizar en la línea de estudio abierta por Negretto. De cualquier forma, este libro debe ser tenido en cuenta por aquellos interesados en el desarrollo de una ciencia política preocupada por los problemas específicos de América Latina.

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nicolás Figueroa García-Herreros es estudiante de doctorado en Sociología en The New School for Social Research (EE. UU.). Actualmente es profesor de cátedra de la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad de los Andes. Entre sus últimas publicaciones están: “Counter-Hegemonic Constitutionalism: The Case of Colombia”. Constellations. An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory 19 (2), 2012; y “El debate sobre la reelección presidencial”. En 20 años de la Constitución colombiana: logros, retrocesos y agenda pendiente, ed. Stefan Jost. Bogotá: Fundación Konrad Adenauer, 2012.Correo electrónico: [email protected]

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