GOBERNANZA Y LUCHA CONTRA LA CORRUPCIÓN Luiz de Mello Director Adjunto Dirección de la Gobernanza...

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Transcript of GOBERNANZA Y LUCHA CONTRA LA CORRUPCIÓN Luiz de Mello Director Adjunto Dirección de la Gobernanza...

Visin de la OCDE: "Integridad y Anticorrupcin en el Siglo XXI"

Gobernanza y lucha contra la corrupcin Luiz de MelloDirector AdjuntoDireccin de la Gobernanza Pblica y Desarrollo Territorial

Senado de Mxico 28 de septiembre de 2015

1LA OCDE y la lucha contra la corrupcin34 Pases + Discusiones de adhesin + Socios estratgicosDiscusiones de adhesin en curso (Rusia, Colombia, Letonia)Se abrirn discusiones de adhesin en 2015 (Costa Rica, Lituania)

Socios estratgicos*The Council decided on 12 March 2014 to postpone activities related to the OECD accession process for the Russian Federation for the time being. [see C/M(2014)3/REV1].This map is without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area.Mexico es miembro desde 1994. 3

La OCDE y el G20This map is without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area.G20: 11 Miembros de la OCDE + 8 Pases + la UE4La OCDE hoy: Algunos datosLa OCDE hoy: Algunos datos

5Recomendacionestica y Conflictos de intersCabildeoCompra pblica

Marcos analticos para la integridad en el Sector Publico

Herramientas (Toolkits) y Manuales

Instrumentos clave de la OCDEPrincipios sobre la mejora de la conducta tica en el sector pblicoDirectrices y herramientas para la gestin de conflictos de inters en el servicio pblico Principios y caja de herramientas (Toolkit) para mejorar la Integridad en la Contratacin PblicaPrincipios de la Transparencia e Integridad en el Cabildeo (Lobbying)Guas de Buenas Prcticas para la Transparencia Presupuestaria y de Base de Datos Internacional de PresupuestoConvencin de la OCDE para Combatir el Cohecho de Servidores Pblicos Extranjeros en Transacciones Comerciales InternacionalesDeclaracin de la OCDE sobre la Inversin Internacional Lneas Directrices de la OCDE para Empresas Multinacionales Recomendacin sobre la deduccin fiscal de los sobornos a funcionarios pblicos extranjerosPrincipios de la OCDE para la accin de los donantes en Anticorrupcin

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Government at a Glance (Panorama de las Administraciones Pblicas)

Informes Temticos:Lobbying/cabildeoConflictos de intersAuditora

Evidencia y anlisis comparativoIn addition to international instruments and tools the OECD collects internationally comparative data on integrity rules and practices. This is not just data for benchmarking performance but also an evidence-base for our thematic comparative research on how integrity contributes to governance outcomes and trust in institutions.

7Estudios de Integridad (Peer Reviews)ItaliaBrasilMexico..

Estudios particularesEvidence is about not just quantitative data but also case studies about what works and what does not work in strengthening integrity. Good practices. Innovations. Lessons learned (both good and bad) from reforms. Countries benefit from an outside, independent perspective and also 8Mexico Integrity ReviewInicio en abril de 2015Alcance: tica, cdigos de conducta, conflictos de inters, proteccin a denunciantes, control y auditoria interna, marco institucional Dialogo y difusin con talleres con expertos internacionalesInforme final 2016Informe de Progreso 2018Estudio de Integridad de Mxico The OECD is currently carrying out an Integrity review of Mexico as an input to the countrys current integrity and anti-corruption reforms, and with the intention to benefiting from international good practices during this process.The Government of Mexico has invited the OECD to support these efforts and the OECD will focus on some particular areas of importance identified jointly by the SFP and OECD (ethics/conflict of interest, internal control and audit, institutional arrangements for integrity, whistle-blowers protection). As for the methodology, a series of dedicated workshops will be organized between 2015 and 2017 which will benefit from the inputs of selected country peers. Following the release of the Integrity Review Report, the SFP will develop an Action Plan for implementing OECD Recommendations. A follow-up Progress Report on the OECD Recommendations from the Integrity Review is scheduled for 2018 in order to assist the SFP in monitoring progress and identifying potential bottlenecks to effective reform.

9Impacto de la corrupcinPeores y menos inclusivas polticas publicas que resultan gasto ineficiente de los recursos pblicos Costes adicionales a las empresas, perdida de competitividadDaos a la confianza en mercados y en las instituciones publicas

Efectos de la corrupcin: daos econmicos, sociales, e institucionalesFuente: Informe deCompetitividadGlobal, 2014-2015, Foro Econmico Mundial, 2014. http://www.weforum.org/issues/global-competitiveness

Los factores ms problemticos para hacer negocios (2014)Notas: Media de la LAC excluye Belice, Cuba, Curazao, Ecuador, El Salvador por falta de datos.%En la lista de los factores, se pidi a los encuestados seleccionar los cinco factores ms problemticos para hacer negocios en su pas y que los clasificaran de 1 (ms problemtico) al 5. Las barras del grfico indican las respuestas ponderadas de acuerdo con su clasificacin.

Para Mexico, el 18.6% de los encuestados reportaron que la corrupcion era un problema para hacer negocios. Esto es en comparacion con 11% en la region LAC, y solo el 4% promedio en la OCDE.12Nivel de Confianza en el Gobierno y Percepcin de CorrupcinFuente: OECD (Government at a Glance, 2015 con datos de World Gallup Poll, 2014. Fuerte relacin (negativa) entre percepcin de corrupcin y confianza en las instituciones nacionales, 2014 Correlation between confidence in national government and perception of government corruption, 2014Fuente: Government at Glance 2015 using data from World Gallup Poll.

For Mexico 33% de poblacion tiene confianza en el gobierno nacial, y 62.1% reporta que opinan que el gobierno es corrupto.

Las preguntas exactas de la encuesta eran:

Data refers to the percentage who answered yes to the questionDo you have confidence in national government Data for Chile,Hungary and Iceland are 2013 rather than 2014.

Data for the perception of government corruption represent thepercentage of yes answers to the question Is corruption widespreadthroughout the government or not?. Data for Australia,Canada, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Korea and Mexico arefor 2013 rather than 2014.13Notas: El promedio para OLACEFS no incluye informacin paraBelice, Costa Rica, Cuba,Curazao, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panam, Puerto Rico, RepblicaDominicanay el promedio para la OCDE no incluye Austria,Islandia,Irlanda,Holanda,Polonia,SueciaInstituciones consideradas corruptas o extremadamente corruptasFuente: Global Corruption Barometer. Transparencia Internacional. 2013. ndice 1-5, 1 indica falta de corrupcin y 5 indica nivel extremadamente alto de corrupcin, 2013 Score scale 1-5, where 1 means not at all corrupt, 5 means extremely corrupt

En Mexico, como resalta el grafico, los partidos polticos, la polica, y los servidores pblicos se perciben como las instituciones mas corruptas. (igual que en la OCDE en promedio).

Pero en general (en casi todas las instituciones) se percibe en Mexico que la corrupcion es mas alta. 14Integridad para mejores polticas publicasHacia un mejor marco de formulacin de polticas pblicasLa confianza en las instituciones pblicas est impulsada no slo por el contenido y los resultados de las polticas , sino tambin por el proceso de elaboracin de las mismasUna mejor poltica pblicaDecisiones bien informadasContrarrestar vulnerabilidadesRecopilacin y anlisis de informacinPromover la participacin de todas las partes interesadasTransparencia e integridad en el cabildeo LobbyingGestionar los conflictos de intersUna poltica de financiacin de partidos polticos balanceada16El trfico de influencias por parte de cabilderos

Fuente: OECD (2014), Lobbyists, Governments and Public Trust, Volume 3: Implementing the OECD Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying, OECD Publishing. Entre el 2009 y 2013 ha habido un incremento en el porcentaje de cabilderos que consideran que el trafico de influencias (en contribuciones, favores y regalos) es un problema--- en 2009 eran el 9% que opinaban que era un problema frecuente, y en la ultima encuesta de la OCDE en 2013, este porcentaje era mas del doble (25%)17Transparencia e integridad en el Cabildeo LobbyingTransparencia e integridad en el Cabildeo Lobbying

Fuente: OECD (2014), Lobbyists, Governments and Public Trust, Volume 3: Implementing the OECD Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying, OECD Publishing.La regulacin esta incrementando, ser gracias a la crisis? Que resalto que el acercamiento indebido del sector privado (i.e. financiero) a los polticos, puede tener consecuencias gravsimas. 18Pases de la OCDE con un registro de actividades de cabildeo, 2013

Fuente: OECD (2014), Lobbyists, Governments and Public Trust, Volume 3: Implementing the OECD Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying, OECD Publishing.Mexico es uno de los pases que reporto que tenia un registro de las actividades de cabildeo, se encuentra entre los 36% de los pases de la OCDE. Aun la mayora no tienen. 19Conflictos de inters: nivel de divulgacin y disponibilidad publica de intereses privados entre poderes del Estado, 2014Fuente: OECD (2014), Survey on Managing Conflict of Interest in the Executive Branch and Whistleblower Protection, OECD, Paris.Poder EjecutivoPoder LegislativoPoder JudicialLevel of disclosure and public availability of private interests across branches of government

Public officials conflicts of interest pose a threat to public trust and disclosure of private interests of public officials is an effective tool for managing conflict of interest. Although it remains primarily public officials responsibility to manage their conflict of interest situations, disclosure of their private interests can greatly aid in preventing apparent and potential conflict of interest situations. Furthermore, public availability of the disclosed information allows the general public to hold public officials more accountable of theirofficial decisions and strengthens transparency in the process. However, disclosure and public availability of the information also concerns the public officials right to privacy.The level of disclosure and public availability of private interests differs across three primary branches of government, among which the legislative branch requires the highest level of disclosure and public availability in vast majority of the OECD countries surveyed. The at risk area including tax and customs officials, procurement agents and financial authorities display lower level of disclosure requirement compared to the three branches of government.20Conflictos de inters: nivel de divulgacin y disponibilidad publica de intereses privados por nivel de servidores pblicos en el poder executivo, 2014Fuente: OECD (2014), Survey on Managing Conflict of Interest in the Executive Branch and Whistleblower Protection, OECD, Paris.Puestos de alto cargo/nivelPuestos de Consejeros PolticosServidores pblicos de alto cargoServidores pblicosLevel of disclosure and public availability of private interests by the level of public officials in the executive branch

Within the executive branch, disparity of disclosure and public availability levels is observed between public officials.In OECD countries, the level of disclosure, on average, is closely related to the level of seniority. The top decision makers tend to have more obligations regarding disclosure of private interests followed by senior civil servants and political advisors or appointees. Disclosure requirements of private interests for public officials with higher decision making power have continued to be further expanded and developed in most OECD countries, especially for top decision makers in the Executive branch, including President, Prime Minister and Ministers. In fact, in 2014 gifts are prohibited or have to be disclosed for 73% of the top decision makers in OECD countries surveyed compared to 68% in 2009.

Public officials in some OECD countries such as Chile, Greece, Hungary, Korea, the Netherlands, Sweden, Turkey and the United States go beyond disclosing their own private interests and disclose as well those of some of their family members. In some countries, disclosure of family members private interests is not obliged by law and is left at public officials discretion to disclose where potential conflicts ofinterest could arise. This is the case in Canada and the Netherlands in an effort to balance transparency andpublic officials privacy.21Conflictos de inters: para el empleo pre-publico falta en gran parte regulacin, 2014Fuente: OECD Government at a Glance (2015). - Pre-public employment is still largely unregulated

Increased mobility between the public and private sector revolving door phenomenon has raised public and governmental concerns of impropriety which can affect trust in public service. At the same time, it is also in the interest of the public and government to attract experienced and skilled workforce to serve the public interest. In this regard, conflict of interest situations should be appropriately and adequately identified and managed to ensure sound democratic governance. An excessively strict approach could result not only in bureaucratic inefficiency but also in discouraging the employment of potential skilled and competent workers in the public sector. In sharp contrast to post-public employment, for which 22 OECD countries have stipulated specific rules and procedures, fewer restrictions exist with regard to pre-public employment. Only seven OECD countries Australia, -Austria, France, Israel, Japan, the Netherlands and New Zealand have restrictions on both private sector employees or lobbyists and suppliers to the government or those who negotiate public sector contracts on behalf of a company, to fill a post in the public sector. Most restrictions take place during the recruitment process where the applicants' previous employments are assessed for potential conflicts of interest. Once recruited, they are also expected to manage their conflicts of interest through recusal from involvement in an affected decision-making process or restriction from certain information.

22Financiacin de partidos y candidatos polticos

Declaracin pblica de informacin de reportes partidos polticos y/o candidatos en pases OCDEFuente: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance

Partidos polticos no deben reportar sus finanzas en relacin con sus campaas polticas: 35%Partidos polticos deben reportar sus finanzas en relacin con sus campaas polticas: 65%Candidatos no deben reportar sus finanzas en relacin con sus campaas polticas: 32%Candidatos deben reportar sus finanzas en relacin con sus campaas polticas: 68%Mexico esta entre los 65% pases donde los PP DEBEN reportar sus finanzas en relacin con sus campanas. Problema: la verificacin y anlisis de los datos declarados!!

Mexico esta entre los 32% de pases donde los CANDIDATOS individuales no deben reportar sus finanzas en relacin a sus campanas polticas. (en contraste con el 68% donde si es el caso).

23Muchas gracias

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