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SESIÓN CONTENIDO DOCUMENTOS DE APOYO

Primera SesiónPresentación y primera aproximación a la globalización

SegundaSesión Comentario lecturas Reflexion Metodológica en torno a la Globalización

Shifts in economic geography

Tercera Sesión Metodología: escalas de actividad y análisis

Economic history and "the new economy"New economy: fact or fiction

Presentación empleadaPerspectiva histórica

Cuarta Sesión Comentario lecturas sesión 3 Introducción al crecimiento económico

Quinta Sesión El papel de la tecnología como motor del cambio

Sexta Sesión Comentario lecturas sesión 5

The US Productivity Slowdown the Baby Boom and Management Quality

Technical Change and U.S. Economic Growth

In defence of the dismal science.

The other-wordly philosophers.

SéptimaSesión Producción y servicios

Octava Sesión Comentario lecturas

Novena Sesión El problema energético: análisis global La Inversión exterior directa en 2008

Undécima Sesión Comentario lecturas La globalización de la producción. Empresas

transnacionales.Duodécima

Sesión Exposición de trabajos

DecimoterceraSesión

Comercio y cooperación al desarrollo

El problema energético

World Energy Outlook

La Energía en Internet

DecimocuartaSesión Comentario lecturas

Investigación de conformidad con el artículo 17 del Reglamento (CE) n° 1/2003 en los sectores europeos del gas y la electricidad (informe final)

Energy Sector Inquiry

Regulación y competencia. El sector eléctrico en España y Europa

DecimoquintaSesión Finanzas

DecimosextaSesión Comentario lecturas

DecimoséptimaSesión Regulación estatal

DecimoctavaSesión Comentario lecturas

Anteproyecto de ley de economía sosteniblePrincipales medidas del anteproyectoEstrategias de Kioto

Decimonovena Sesión Exposición de trabajos

REFLEXIÓN METODOLÓGICA EN TORNO A LA GLOBALIZACIÓN

METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTION ON GLOBALISATION

Angel Martínez González-TablasUniversidad Complutense de Madrid

[email protected]

BIBLID [1576-0162 (2003), 9, 83-110]

RESUMEN

Ha pasado el tiempo en que el mero discurso sobre la globalización resul-taba sugerente. Para avanzar, hay que pasar a otra fase. Necesitamos enten-der, caracterizar y medir el proceso de globalización, en cuanto tal, por muypoliforme, mutante e inaprensible que parezca. La intención de este artículoes postular un conjunto de temas que deben ser estudiados y proponer unametodología que permita hacer avanzar la investigación empírica de las finan-zas, el comercio, la producción y la demanda globales, medir el grado deglobalización económica y estudiar las implicaciones para el conjunto de laeconomía mundial.Palabras clave: metodologia, medir la globalizacion economica, grado deglobalizacion, efectos.

ABSTRACT

The time has passed where the discussion about globalization seemedexciting. To advance, it must move to another phase. We must understand,characterize and measure the process of globalization, even as mutant andinapprehensible as it may be. The purpose of this article is to postulate a groupof topics that must be studied and to propose a methodology which enablesthe advancement in the empiric research of finance, commerce, productionand global demand, so as to measure the degree of economic globalizationand to study the implications for the world economy as a whole.Key words: methodology, measuring economic globalisation, degree of globa-lisation, impact.Clasificación JEL: B41, F02.

REVISTA DE ECONOMÍA MUNDIAL 9, 2003, 83-110

ISSN 1576-0162

INTRODUCCIÓN

Sobre la globalización (G) se habla cada día más, pero es sorprendenteque, tratándose de un fenómeno cambiante, que no es en 2003 lo que eraen 1995, los análisis descansen en estereotipos y no estén actualizados.

Además, se pretende establecer sus efectos en términos que permitanconclusiones inequívocas a favor o en contra, cuando, por mucha que sea laurgencia, los pasos tienen que ser otros; un planteamiento de esa naturalezadifícilmente alcanzaría resultados fructíferos.

La mayor aportación que desde el ámbito intelectual se puede hacer ala crítica de la G, a la búsqueda de una G alternativa y a los movimientossociales comprometidos en ese proceso sería producir informes que situaransu cambiante estado y realizar estudios particulares, que caracterizaran conprecisión la posición relativa de países o áreas geográficas respecto a ella,identificando los factores que determinan su desigual situación. Algo sólorealizable a partir de un planteamiento teórico-metodológico consistente.

Sólo si entendemos lo que es la G y su evolución, si diferenciamos ladesigual situación de los países y conocemos los componentes que la deter-minan, sólo entonces estaremos en condiciones de adentrarnos en el análi-sis de su impacto –sobre el crecimiento, la distribución, el bienestar, lapobreza, la cultura- y en la propuesta de medidas. Tratar de analizar direc-tamente los impactos, sin casi saber de qué estamos hablando, es poner lacarreta delante de los bueyes.

Globalización es un término que, aunque se refiera a una realidad, abase de usarlo, ha pasado a ser manido. Superar el cenagal en que normal-mente se empantanan tantas reflexiones exige un sólido cuerpo teórico -unaarticulación de categorías bien definidas- y una sostenida investigación empí-rica que nos permita ver dónde estamos, hacia dónde nos desplazamos,cómo operan las relaciones de causalidad e interdependencia y cuáles son losefectos inducidos. Ese imprescindible ensamblaje de teoría y realidad sólopuede alcanzarse si disponemos de una propuesta metodológica que, de


SECCIÓN GENERAL

forma simultánea, posibilite la comprensión del fenómeno en toda sucomplejidad y propicie su estudio empírico1.

Ha pasado el tiempo en que el mero discurso resultaba sugerente. Hoy esta-mos ahítos de publicaciones que introducen el término globalización en su enun-ciado, en una danza circular y repetitiva. Para avanzar, hay que pasar a otra fase.

La intención de este artículo es precisamente ésa: postular un conjunto detemas que deben ser estudiados y una forma de abordarlos, apuntando ejemplosy posibles aplicaciones para evitar que el discurso se mueva en un excesivo nivelde abstracción.

Es indudable que vamos a utilizar, de forma subyacente, una cierta concep-ción de la globalización, expuesta con detalle en otros trabajos en los que se abor-dan su contenido, sus causas y las consecuencias que induce.

Dado que buscamos huir de metadiscursos estériles para el análisis empíricoe inútiles para la comprensión de la realidad, necesitamos, en primer lugar, enten-der, caracterizar y medir el proceso de globalización, en cuanto tal, por muy poli-forme, mutante e inaprensible que parezca. Es la propuesta a la que se orientanestas páginas, porque si no conseguimos caracterizarlo con rigor y no podemosmedir su evolución estaremos a ciegas, impotentes para cualquier logro.

Pero tendremos que hacerlo conscientes de que los espacios particulares -bloques, economías nacionales, regionales o locales- no desaparecen con elauge de la globalización, sino que se ven determinados por su existencia, comoconsecuencia de la combinación de aspectos internos de esas sociedades y delos términos de su inserción en el proceso globalizante; el impacto será desigualy sólo podrá ser estudiado a través de esa combinación.

Finalmente, seguiremos confrontados con la necesidad de actuar, de inter-venir en el desarrollo de los procesos con políticas congruentes y operativas,gestionando la globalización en lugar de simplemente padecerla (o disfrutarla).

¿Por qué aventurarnos en un tratamiento, que algunos pueden calificar deenrevesado, si podemos estudiar los mismos componentes, con análisis parcialessucesivos? La cuestión nos remite a la relación que debe existir entre análisisparciales y dinámica sistémica, problemática insoslayable en cierto tipo de fenó-menos. Es cierto que la globalización, con toda su trama de variables, niveles einterrelaciones es tema que parece de casi imposible tratamiento científico. Sinembargo, los aspectos parciales susceptibles de análisis empíricos, con categoríasy modelos bien acotados, corren el riesgo de perder lo que es más genuino de laglobalización: el juego de las interdependencias. Por ello, la propuesta enfatiza lanecesidad de reintegrar los análisis parciales al lugar que les corresponde en elsistema, sometiendo los resultados a una prueba adicional de significación: lamedida de lo que aportan a la comprensión del conjunto; de este modo, evitamosdesechar lo que los análisis parciales pueden aportar pero impedimos que vuelen

ANGEL MARTÍNEZ GONZÁLEZ-TABLAS86

1 El planteamiento de este trabajo encuentra sus antecedentes en diversos trabajos del autor: Martí-nez González-Tablas (2000), (2002 a) y (2002 b), siendo también deudor de enfoques explícitos osugeridos por Gray,H.P. (1999) y Held, McGrew, Goldblatt y Perraton (1999).

autónomos, obligándoles a reintegrarse a una visión interdependiente. Es algo quesería a todas luces excesivo si la intensidad sistémica de lo global fuera débil -yaque nos obliga a manejarnos con un pesado bagaje, aparentemente lesivo para laproductividad inmediata de las investigaciones- pero es algo imprescindible si loespecíficamente sistémico es determinante en la composición y comportamientode la realidad estudiada. La tesis que se defiende es que éste es precisamente elcaso de la mundialización de los procesos económicos2.

La línea que defendemos es no renunciar a planteamientos econométri-cos, pero ni buscar obsesivamente análisis formalizados en esos términos, niatribuirles mayor virtualidad de la que sus limitaciones les confieren; el obje-tivo es tratar de avanzar en el conocimiento y la comprensión de los procesosglobalizantes construyendo con pasos sucesivos, sistemáticos y cualitativos,enlazados por líneas de razonamiento económico, aunque no estén sustan-ciadas con un alto grado de estilización formal, sin aceptar el enclaustra-miento en los límites de los análisis parciales.

Resumiendo, necesitamos un método que permita: primero, aprehender elproblema como totalidad interrelacionada y dinámica; segundo, analizar aspectosy subconjuntos en sí mismos (lectura menor) y en sus interrelaciones con el resto(lectura mayor). No nos sirve un método que se concentre en un solo aspecto dela realidad (v.gr. las finanzas o las empresas transnacionales); que sólo sea capazde captar una dimensión de una realidad compleja y pluridimensional, por muypreocupado que en apariencia esté por la totalidad (v.gr. enfoque de economía demercado); tampoco uno que no sea capaz de estudiar aspectos parciales ysubconjuntos constitutivos, obsesionado por no perder la visión integral3.

1. MARCO GENERAL PARA EL ESTUDIO DE LA GLOBALIZACIÓN

Por globalización entendemos la situación que se crea cuando existenfactores, relaciones y procesos que tienen origen, actúan, se reproducen, reper-cuten o se identifican en el espacio mundial, con concreción y materializacióndiversa en flujos, actores, comportamientos y valores.

Aunque nuestro campo de interés vaya a ser la globalización económica, siqueremos llegar a entenderla, tendremos que situarla en relación a otras, estu-diarla en sí misma y plantear el problema de los espacios submundiales, conclu-yendo con todo lo relativo a las políticas tendentes a regular, guiar y controlarlos procesos económicos globalizantes.


87REFLEXIÓN METODOLÓGICA EN TORNO A LA GLOBALIZACIÓN

2 No soy el único que defiende este enfoque. La UNCTAD en el World Investment Report (WIR) (1999:315/6) sostiene que “ es casi imposible medir con precisión los efectos de la IED. Las transnaciona-les representan un complejo paquete de atributos...difícil de separar y cuantificar (de forma que) lasconclusiones de los análisis econométricos de IED y crecimiento económico distan de ser claros, enespecial en lo que concierne a la causalidad dentro de la relación, (mientras que) los análisis cualita-tivos de la IED, que toman sus componentes de forma separada, son más sugerentes...”3 Gray, H.P.(1999) hace un enunciado similar de objetivos y formula una crítica convincente a los enfo-ques convencionales, aunque su potencialidad inicial se diluya en el posterior desarrollo.

1.1. GLOBALIZACIÓN(ES)Además de la económica, hay otras muchas dimensiones que se globalizan y

que de forma más o menos directa interactúan entre si y con lo económico. Notendría sentido intentar caracterizarlas aquí con precisión, pero lo tiene pleno situar-las, aunque sólo sea para no olvidar que existen y que influyen en la economía.

Algunas dimensiones son particularmente relevantes y sus intersecciones conla GE dignas de atención:

- Ecológica. En todo lo que va del comportamiento de los grandes ecosiste-mas al de la propia biosfera.

- Comunicacional. Infraestructuras y redes que posibilitan tanto los flujosmateriales como los informacionales en el espacio mundial.

- Militar. Existencia de medios y procesos que permiten funcionamiento eintervención de este tipo a escala mundial.

- Política. Vigencia de normas, instituciones y organismos de ámbito mundial.- Demográfica. En tanto en cuanto que la evolución de la población mundial

tiende a llenar el mundo y que las migraciones suponen desplazamientofísico significativo de los seres humanos en él.

- Cultural o ideológica. En la medida en la que los referentes de este carác-ter actúan y penetran con tal alcance en los comportamientos.

- Irregular, esto es, componentes y relaciones de ámbito mundial considera-bles como desviados, desde el narcotráfico, a la trata de mujeres o la difu-sión de enfermedades, con sus efectos colaterales de blanqueo de dinero,corrupción, etc.

Las relaciones que inducen cada una de estas globalizaciones son coercitivasunas, cooperativas o competitivas otras, aunque no siempre su condición seaunívoca, ni similar su mensurabilidad. Algunas estarán regidas por relaciones multi-laterales, pero a su lado germinarán variantes marcadas por vínculos más restrin-gidos o por descarnados ejercicios de unilateralidad. La coexistencia y combinaciónde tipos de globalización tan distintos hace aún más complejo el cuadro, porque asu heterogénea naturaleza se añade su dispar lógica de funcionamiento, induciendocompatibilidades imperfectas, fricciones o incluso abiertos antagonismos.

A corto plazo, es difícil establecer la importancia relativa de cada una de lasglobalizaciones. En cambio, en una perspectiva de largo plazo es posible identifi-car las relaciones externas que han sido o son dominantes en los distintos perío-dos históricos, aunque no siempre hayan llegado a alcanzar plenamente lacondición de mundiales y hayan quedado circunscritas al <mundo> conocido oaccesible en una época determinada.

En todo lo que sea posible, la medición de la globalización y la articulaciónde sus dimensiones debe buscar un seguimiento empírico preciso, sin limitarse aenunciados genéricos o valoraciones especulativas. Pero en un estudio de laglobalización económica sólo podemos aspirar a situar el resto de ámbitos y asubrayar los términos cualitativos que parezcan de mayor interés o el eventualpredominio de algunos de ellos.


En la fase actual, un diagnóstico de este tipo resulta a la vez necesario y difí-cil. Hay aspectos cuya intensidad ofrece pocas dudas –piénsese en lo ecológico olo comunicacional-, otros emergen como desafíos y ofrecen un carácter abierta-mente problemático –pudiera ser el caso de lo económico, lo demográfico, lo ideo-lógico y las prácticas desviadas-, algunos, tras su aparente contundencia, parecenestar en abierta mutación –la dimensión militar-, mientras que los hay en marcadaregresión temporal –como todo apunta acaece en la institucionalización política-.Tanta disparidad configura una amalgama precaria, cuya inestabilidad, descom-pensación y acusada fragilidad son rasgos de su identidad.

1.2. GLOBALIZACIÓN ECONÓMICA (GE)Entendemos la globalización económica (GE) como la tendencia a la mundia-

lización del sistema económico capitalista (SEC), a la utilización del espaciomundial por parte de sus componentes y relaciones, ascendiendo esa dimensiónen el funcionamiento y reproducción de cada uno de ellos, de sus interrelacionesy del SEC como totalidad, de modo que el grado de mundialización podrá serdesigual según los planos y su condición consustancialmente evolutiva. Además,ya hemos subrayado que la GE no es una dimensión aislada, sino que se relacionacon otras, sobre las que influye y por las que se ve determinada.

Medir y caracterizar la GE, constatar lo que existe y seguir su evolución,nos conduce inevitablemente al estudio del conjunto de las relaciones externasy de cada una de ellas en particular, al análisis de su naturaleza, su dimensiónespacial, su institucionalización, a los efectos de la GE y al conocimiento e inter-pretación de la economía mundial, como conjunto diferenciado de las relacionesque la crean y la materializan.

La evaluación del grado de GE realmente existente es consecuencia natu-ral de los pasos expuestos, aunque estemos lejos de disponer de un indicadorque permita responder con precisión. Es útil distinguir entre las acepciones posi-tiva y negativa de la GE. Ambas se refieren a factores, relaciones y procesosprocedentes del nivel mundial, pero mientras la primera trata de identificar losque determinan el funcionamiento y reproducción de la economía, la segundabusca los que condicionan y perturban al funcionamiento y a la reproducción4.

Dado que la segunda parte de este artículo va a estar dedicada a profundizaren la temática de este apartado, nos detenemos aquí en su simple enunciado.

1.3. ESPACIOS PARTICULARES ANTE LA GEAun en el supuesto de que conociéramos todo lo relativo a las globaliza-

ciones y de que dispusiéramos de una caracterización satisfactoria y con medi-ciones precisas de la GE, para dotarnos de un conocimiento operativonecesitaríamos abordar el estudio y caracterización de los espacios particula-res ante la GE, una temática que también cabría enunciar como ”los espacios



4 Profundiza en esta distinción Martínez González-Tablas (2002b), págs 79-80.

particulares ante las múltiples globalizaciones”, enunciado que, aunque máscompleto, nos resultaría inabordable.

Desde una actitud pragmática proponemos abordar lo que estamos en condi-ciones de estudiar, conscientes de que, aun así, se trata de un enorme desafío5.Primero, los aspectos internos de los espacios particulares que son determinantespara su relación con el entorno mundial: identidad societaria, dotación de recursos,desarrollo institucional, articulación y consistencia económicas internas, políticaspracticadas. Segundo, la medición y caracterización de la inserción de los espaciosparticulares en el proceso de globalización, estudiable a través de la naturaleza delas relaciones externas, su dimensión espacial, el grado de simetría de las relacio-nes (pasivas o activas), la participación en la institucionalización de los diversosespacios, la estructura de la posición espacial resultante en el espacio mundial, laexposición o sensibilidad a factores externos. Tercero, la medición y caracterizacióndel impacto (de la globalización y de su inserción en ella) sobre los espacios parti-culares y dentro de ellos sobre distintos planos: opciones sociales e identidadesculturales, desarrollo institucional y capacidad de emprenderlo, equilibrio ambien-tal, crecimiento económico, distribución de renta y riqueza, pobreza, bienestar,retroalimentación sobre la inserción, vulnerabilidad, etc.

1.4. POLÍTICAS PARA GOBERNAR LA GESería frustrante no atreverse a plantear las políticas frente a la GE, dado

que sus efectos los percibimos inquietantes y de entidad. De nuevo sería máscompleto pretender formular la búsqueda de ”políticas frente a las globalizacio-nes”, pero sería una pretensión que, por excesiva, correría el riesgo de abocar-nos a un vacío de resultados.

No obstante, las políticas frente a la GE, si quieren ser realistas, no puedenignorar la situación y tendencias de la G en otros planos. No tendría sentidodelinear propuestas en el plano económico de espaldas a la evolución de laglobalización militar o al grado y tipo de institucionalización dimanantes delámbito político. Lo económico sirve de substrato a lo militar y a lo político, pero,a la vez, estos condicionan lo que en lo económico pueda plantearse.

Por otro lado, las políticas que buscan gobernar la G no se radican en unúnico nivel espacial, sino que se desarrollan en una pluralidad de niveles quedialogan entre si y se condicionan recíprocamente. Lo mundial, lo internacional,lo submundial y, a la vez, supranacional, lo concerniente a los Estados e inclusolos espacios subestatales ofrecen posibilidades de regulación, cada una de ellastan limitada como articulable con el resto. Es una consecuencia derivada de loque la G comporta de recomposición del espacio, una consecuencia que desapa-recería si interpretáramos que la G conlleva la afirmación exclusiva y excluyentede lo mundial y la dilución de todos los niveles inferiores.


5 Sobre el margen de maniobra de las economías particulares y sobre las políticas posibles frente a laglobalización, ver Martínez González-Tablas (2002 a).

Un estudio riguroso de la globalización tendría que afrontar simultáneamentetodos esos planos, profundizando en cada uno de ellos y, a la vez, entrelazándolos.Como no tenemos capacidad para hacerlo, el propósito tiene que ser más modesto:crear un marco metodológico que permita caracterizar y seguir la evolución de laGE, posibilitando la realización de análisis parciales, que se puedan integrar en unesquema interpretativo más amplio, al modo en que lo hacen las piezas en unpuzzle. La propuesta se limita, pues, a intentar medir la GE, dejando fuera de focolas diversas globalizaciones y sus interacciones, el estudio de los espacios particu-lares y las políticas para gobernar la globalización. No se cuestiona que todos ellossean aspectos cruciales, pero de nada nos serviría el empeño en abordarlos si nodisponemos de las categorías teóricas y el método para estudiar cada uno de losgrandes apartados que hemos enunciado y para combinarlos en una visión deconjunto. Se trata de aceptar con modestia y realismo que son tareas que quedanpendientes6, porque saltar de una a otra manifestación es pura banalidad y preten-der avanzar en todo el frente temático propósito ingenuo. Si queremos ser modes-tamente científicos, hay que decir que ya vale, que hay que parar. Hay que ponersea la tarea, hay que hacerlo con constancia, paso a paso, con la ambición queproporciona el rigor. Sembrar, irrigar, sin pretender cosechar antes de que grane.

2. PROPUESTA ESPECÍFICA PARA MEDIR LA GLOBALIZACIÓN ECONÓMICA

¿Cuánta GE existe? ¿Cuánta en cada uno de sus momentos constitutivos?¿Cuáles sus efectos? ¿Cuál, a la postre, el grado de globalización realmenteexistente y en qué medida mayor o menor que el de épocas pasadas? ¿De quémodo se ven afectados por el proceso analizado el funcionamiento y reproduc-ción de la economía mundial?

No hay respuesta directa a estas preguntas, por lo que hay que entrar aabordar el tema a través de aproximaciones sucesivas. Empezaremos con lasdificultades metodológicas del estudio de las relaciones económicas externas -hasta cierto punto, vehículo y plasmación de la GE- y formularemos unapropuesta al respecto. Continuaremos con el análisis específico de cada relacióneconómica externa, adaptando a su singularidad la propuesta metodológica delpunto anterior. Finalmente, daremos el salto cualitativo de inquirir por la econo-mía mundial en su conjunto, al fin y al cabo punto de destino hacia el que estáabocado cualquier estudio de la globalización que aspire a tener sentido.

2.1. PROPUESTA METODOLÓGICA PARA EL ESTUDIO DE LAS RELACIONES ECONÓMICASEXTERNAS

Empezamos identificando las relaciones económicas básicas, para avanzarhacia la delimitación de la fase actual de su dimensión externa, cuya caracteri-zación -determinada por componentes, cuantía, agentes, lógica e institucionali-



6 En el mejor de los casos han podido ser o están siendo abordadas en otros trabajos.

zación, nos permite tomar distancia respecto a la simplificación de basarse enlo simplemente externo, dando paso al estudio de los efectos que de ella sederivan y del grado de globalización resultante.

2.1.1. RELACIONES ECONÓMICAS BÁSICAS Y DESARROLLO DE SU DIMENSIÓN EXTERNA

Las relaciones básicas -que deben ser objeto de medición, estática y diná-mica- son las que afectan y determinan los momentos y los protagonistaseconómicos fundamentales. Se seleccionan en función de lo que entendemospor globalización económica, poniendo especial atención en las que son suscep-tibles de medición objetiva, descendiendo siempre que sea posible hasta lassubrelaciones significativas para el funcionamiento y reproducción de cadamomento específico y de la economía en general. Desde esta perspectiva, finan-zas, comercio, producción y demanda son los momentos determinantes de laactividad económica capitalista.

En la globalización nos concierne e interesa lo mundial, pero la forma máselemental de acercarnos a lo global es considerar a lo externo como una primeraaproximación, aunque sepamos no lo es en sentido estricto y progresivamenteintentemos diferenciarlo.

Para poder concentrar el estudio en períodos relativamente homogéneos,es conveniente delimitar fases del desarrollo externo de las relaciones económi-cas, eludiendo las generalizaciones que serían inevitables si nos ocupamos deun tiempo, por dilatado, poblado de plasmaciones heterogéneas.

2.1.2. CARACTERIZACIÓN DE LAS RELACIONES ECONÓMICAS EXTERNAS

Necesitamos una caracterización que permita medir la situación de las rela-ciones económicas externas y seguir el curso de su evolución. Pero no será posi-ble hacerlo si no somos capaces de identificar los componentes constitutivos decada relación -diversos y con rasgos específicos en cada caso- cuya cuantía, abso-luta y relativa, no es mensurable a través de indicadores estandardizados sino quetendrán que adaptarse a la naturaleza de los componentes.

Los agentes que llevan a cabo y protagonizan las relaciones económicasexternas pueden ser de muy distinta condición y estar nítidamente delimitados otener un perfil difuso, circunstancias que pueden llegar a cualificar el carácter dela relación. Se trata, en la medida de lo posible, de identificarlos, haciendo aflorarlas articulaciones y organizaciones con presencia o influencia transnacional.

La lógica de las relaciones económicas externas está determinada en últimainstancia por la del SEC, pero puede tener entidad propia la de cada relación, porlo que conocer la específica de la fase actual ayuda a precisar el tipo de relaciónante el que nos encontramos.

La dimensión institucional caracteriza cualquier relación económica externa y,si existe institucionalización a distintos niveles espaciales, será útil abordar la derango mundial, y situar la de niveles inferiores, conscientes de que, cuando trata-mos de medir el grado o el tipo de regulación, cualquier juicio de valor inevita-


blemente conlleva cierto grado de subjetividad, dado que no estamos ante magni-tudes perfectamente mensurables. Finalmente, algo que en principio es desigualy susceptible de medición, es la accesibilidad de las distintas relaciones externasy de sus instituciones para las economías particulares.

2.1.3. PROFUNDIZANDO EN LA DIMENSIÓN ESPACIAL DE LO EXTERNO

Una vez medido, tratamos de diferenciar las diversas condiciones de loexterno: mundial, regional, bilateral, ya que es obvio que no todo tiene lamisma dimensión espacial. Dado que externo y mundial no son equivalentes,para avanzar se necesita desagregar los indicadores brutos (de cada una) de lasrelaciones, diferenciando lo que es global de lo que es simplemente externo, yaque la apertura puede quedarse en relaciones bilaterales o en regionalización.

En lo más alto de la escala están relaciones externas no contenidas enespacios regionales supranacionales o simplemente bilaterales. El tránsito deinternacional a mundial no lo tomamos en sentido cualitativo sino sólo comocuestión de grado: mundial lo que interconecta muchos o casi todos los espa-cios nacionales existentes e internacional lo que sólo vincula a algunos (pocos)espacios. Una diferenciación a todas luces burda aunque nos sirvamos de ellamientras nos sea de utilidad.

El análisis del grado de dispersión permite desagregar espacialmente losindicadores obtenidos en el punto anterior, midiendo la proporción en los flujosexternos de las relaciones contenidas en distintos niveles espaciales: internas abloques regionales (por ejemplo, flujos internos de la UE), circunscritas a zonasde influencia creadas en torno a un polo determinado, intratriada (entre lasgrandes áreas desarrolladas del mundo) y un resto que podríamos calificar depropiamente mundial, en cuanto marcado por su elevado grado de dispersión.

Interesa hacer estas mediciones desagregadas en todos los aspectos esti-mados al referirnos a lo externo (finanzas, comercio, producción, demanda),enriqueciéndolas con lo que pueda ayudar a desvelar lo que buscamos7.

Este enfoque permite evaluar la importancia relativa de los niveles, analizarla dispersión espacial, relacionar las magnitudes obtenidas para cada uno deellos y medir la participación de los espacios en las distintas relaciones.

Es una propuesta relativamente objetivable, aunque en ocasiones sólopodamos establecer la concentración de las operaciones en determinadosmercados (las transacciones comerciales tienen radicación espacial, peromuchas operaciones financieras se realizan en mercados identificables con sumi-nistradores y tomadores de fondos de radicación espacial difusa).

Buscamos un juicio sintético sobre el grado de dispersión o su contrario,el grado de concentración de las transacciones económicas externas, así comosobre la mundialización relativa de los distintos ámbitos.



7 Podrían cualificarse aún más los resultados con datos adicionales sobre relaciones bilaterales especí-ficas que parezcan significativas (por ejemplo, en lo comercial las derivadas de intercambios energéti-cos o agrícolas).

Podemos evaluar la evolución de la dispersión a través del ritmo de cambiode cada relación estudiada y de la modificación de la estructura de relacionesresultante. ¿Hasta qué punto sube lo externo, pero no lo mundial? ¿Avanzamoshacia la mundialización o lo más notorio es la tendencia a la regionalización?¿Son los comportamientos similares en todos los planos o difieren sustancial-mente de unos a otros?

El juicio sobre la interconexión de los espacios no se debería limitar a unoscomponentes, sino realizarse a través de tantos como estemos en condiciones demedir, buscando la dimensión espacial de agentes, lógica e institucionalización ysin descuidar redes de actividad y estructuras de poder. Sin embargo, mediremosprincipalmente los componentes más accesibles (transacciones, flujos, stocks) yaque los demás aspectos no tienen un reflejo estadístico inequívoco y sólo podre-mos utilizarlos de forma cualitativa o mediante investigaciones específicas.

2.1.4. EFECTOS DE LAS RELACIONES ECONÓMICAS MUNDIALES

Delimitado lo que representan las relaciones mundiales dentro del total derelaciones económicas externas, se trataría ahora de considerar los efectos queinducen, ya que lo necesitamos para medir el grado de GE. Sin embargo, debe-mos ser conscientes de que la medición de los efectos nos adentra en un terri-torio complejo, plagado de interrelaciones en cuyo seno las relaciones decausalidad distan de ser inequívocas. No podremos ir más allá del simpleesbozo, porque se trata de una problemática que requiere una investigaciónautónoma, conducida de forma separada, aunque podamos formular hipótesisde trabajo o incorporar sus resultados a nuestro proyecto con indudable prove-cho. En resumen, de no necesitarlo para medir el grado de GE, lo lógico seríaprescindir aquí del estudio de esta temática.

Una dificultad adicional proviene de que no buscamos los efectos genéricosde las relaciones económicas externas, sino sólo los efectos específicos de las derango mundial, las que pertenecen a la GE y la determinan. Es, por otro lado,obvio que los efectos de finanzas, comercio y producción mundiales son disparesy actúan de forma inmediata sobre muy distintas variables, aunque a la postretodos reviertan sobre lo económico. Seguir la pista de esos efectos específicos sóloes realizable desde el análisis concreto de cada relación, no mediante un plantea-miento teórico-metodológico de validez general para todas las relaciones.

2.1.5. GRADO DE GEPara medir el grado de GE tenemos que utilizar plenamente la capacidad

discriminatoria que nos proporciona la profundización en la dimensión espacialde lo externo, quedándonos exclusivamente con lo que concierne al nivelmundial, depurado de las relaciones externas de niveles espaciales inferiores.

Pero para hacerlo tendremos que tener en cuenta no sólo la caracterizaciónsino también los efectos, combinando ambos. Como sostuvimos al referirnos ala GE, la medición del grado de GE se facilita si distinguimos entre sus acepcio-


nes positiva y negativa. Ambas tienen en común que se refieren a factores, rela-ciones y procesos provenientes del nivel mundial, pero la primera inquiere porla medida en la que determinan el funcionamiento, mientras que la segundabusca detectar los condicionamientos y perturbaciones que inducen.

Es una distinción metodológica que podremos aplicar con provecho paramedir el grado de G de los distintos momentos y también para medir el del SECen su conjunto. En determinados momentos, si prescindiéramos de esta dife-renciación nos sería muy difícil afinar las conclusiones, porque nos veríamosconfrontados con palmarios déficits de GE junto a consecuencias profundas yperturbadoras perfectamente detectables. ¿Con qué quedarnos, con la imper-fección de la GE o con la intensidad de algunos de sus condicionamientos?

2.2. ANÁLISIS ESPECÍFICO DE CADA UNA DE LAS PRINCIPALES RELACIONES ECONÓMICASEXTERNAS.

Necesitamos adaptar ahora la propuesta metodológica genérica a cadaplano singular, aplicándola de forma sucesiva a finanzas, comercio, produccióny demanda.

2.2.1. FINANZAS

Entender el significado de las finanzas y el desarrollo de su dimensión externapresupone una buena comprensión de la función del dinero en el SEC, así comode lo que implica el surgimiento diferenciado de lo financiero, la peculiar idiosin-crasia del mercado en que se intercambian sus productos y la composición yfunciones que realiza el sistema financiero dentro del conjunto económico. Estare-mos así en condiciones de situar los antecedentes financieros internacionales y, enparticular, el origen de la fase actual de las finanzas internacionales.

La caracterización de las relaciones financieras externas exige identificar loscomponentes característicos de la fase actual, muchos de los cuales son peculia-res y no mera continuidad de los procedentes de períodos anteriores. No hay,pues, un indicador unitario con capacidad para medir las relaciones financierasexternas, por lo que, desde el inicio tendremos que distinguir divisas, capitales yderivados, así como las subdivisiones significativas en el seno de cada uno deellos: distintas monedas en las divisas, renta variable y fija (sea en forma de títu-los o préstamos) en los capitales, continua aparición de nuevos instrumentos enlos derivados.

La medición de la cuantía de las operaciones tendrá que adaptarse a la natu-raleza de los distintos componentes, de forma que si en las divisas podremosmedir el volumen de las transacciones, en los capitales tendremos que distinguirentre flujos brutos y netos (dado que su significado económico es profundamentediferente) y en los derivados será preciso habilitar indicadores adaptados a sucapacidad de ramificación y a la continua innovación de los productos.

Tampoco los agentes ofrecen una foto fija: hay cierta continuidad en lapermanencia de bancos que actúan en el ámbito internacional, pero junto a ellos



emerge una pléyade de instituciones de inversión colectiva de distinto perfil(compañías aseguradoras, fondos de inversión o fondos de pensiones), cadauna con propósito y exigencias propias.

La combinación de nuevos componentes, cambiante estructura cuantitativay diversidad de operadores no es extraño dé lugar a una lógica de funciona-miento con rasgos peculiares, en la que se detecta tendencia a la desinterme-diación, agudización de la información asimétrica, comportamiento de rebaño,cierto ensimismamiento cuando lo financiero parece cerrarse sobre si mismo,acento en el corto plazo y una compleja conexión con la economía real (de laque provienen impulsos, respecto a la que se realizan imperfectamente lasfunciones esenciales de los sistemas financieros, pero a la que se transmiten connotable intensidad condicionamientos y perturbaciones).

Al aproximarnos a la institucionalización de las finanzas sólo buscamos lasimple constatación de lo existente, sin adentrarnos para nada en la realizaciónde propuestas que excederían nuestro propósito de mera caracterización. Laradiografía de la trama institucional vigente debe detectar la que concierne a losdistintos componentes y agentes en los sucesivos niveles espaciales. Hay quediferenciar la que regula las transacciones en divisas (a menudo en nivelessubmundiales), de las que se ocupan de los capitales, con variantes segúnproductos y agentes (bancos o instituciones de inversión colectiva) o las que deforma tentativa se refieren a derivados. Algunos organismos tienen larga trayec-toria y un funcionamiento reglado (FMI), mientras que otros tienen un origenmás reciente y unas pautas de comportamiento menos precisas que los confi-guran como regímenes difusos (BIS, IOSCO).

La profundización en la dimensión espacial de lo externo busca identificarlas relaciones estrictamente mundiales dentro del universo de las externas, paralo cual habrá que desarrollar indicadores que midan el grado de dispersiónespacial de estas últimas, su concentración en determinados focos y el punto enque estos se vinculan en una red articulada con cierta dimensión espacial. Alfinal lo inicialmente calificado de externo se concretará en bilateral, circunscritoa un bloque, área geográfica o zona de influencia, o bien trascenderá esas agru-paciones inferiores y sólo mostrará su verdadero alcance si se contempla desdeuna perspectiva mundial. Aplíquese a divisas, capitales y derivados y obtendre-mos lo que buscamos para el plano financiero.

Los efectos de las relaciones financieras mundiales podemos medirlos,primero, sobre las funciones atribuidas al sistema financiero, en concreto, porsu impacto sobre ahorro, precio del dinero y de los activos financieros, inver-sión, estructura de carteras. Segundo, sobre otras relaciones, variables ycomportamientos económicos, como comercio, producción, demanda, funcio-nes económicas del Estado, incertidumbre, grado de competencia.

La medición del grado de globalización financiera (GF) podemos realizarlodesde una doble perspectiva. En su acepción positiva la GF viene dada por elpeso de factores, relaciones y procesos procedentes del ámbito mundial en la


determinación del funcionamiento del mercado y sistema financieros; de formaque una plena GF implicará la existencia de mercado y sistema financiero únicosen todo el espacio mundial. El logro de una completa GF exige como condiciónprevia la ausencia de barreras para todos los componentes y agentes, tanto enlo concerniente a carencia de controles intencionados, como en la ausencia decostes de transacción y, a la vez, un resultado acorde con dichas condiciones,esto es, similares rentabilidades y precios de dinero (sin diferenciales en lostipos de interés) y activos, así como sustituibilidad entre activos domésticos yextranjeros que se manifieste en falta de sesgo doméstico en la constitución delas carteras. Si se dan tanto las condiciones ex -ante como los resultados ex -post implicará que sólo opera un mercado financiero en el que se intercambianeste tipo de productos y que las funciones del sistema financiero se determinany ejercen desde el nivel mundial.

Por su parte, la GF en sentido negativo viene dada por el peso de factores,relaciones y procesos procedentes del ámbito mundial en la existencia de condi-cionamientos y perturbaciones en el funcionamiento del mercado y sistemafinancieros. En la medida en la que no es directamente dependiente del gradode GF positiva no presupone mercado y sistema financieros únicos en el ámbitomundial y podrá, al margen de aquélla, repercutir en el comportamiento de losque existan en los niveles nacional, internacional o mundial y en la realizaciónde las funciones a ellos atribuidas. También se relaciona con la problemática delos contagios y los efectos que de los mismos se derivan.

2.2.2. COMERCIO

El comercio o circulación de mercancías se lleva a cabo en el mercado, peroéste -dentro de una tendencia a la afirmación del mercado autorregulado (Polanyi)a medida que se generaliza la producción de mercancías bajo el dominio del SEC-puede ser de muy variada condición y alcance. La creciente mercantilización esuna forma de expresar la expansión de las mercancías, su penetración en ámbitosinicialmente ajenos o resistentes, extensión interna de los mercados que suelecorrer en paralelo con el desarrollo de su dimensión externa. El comercio externotiene larga trayectoria histórica y múltiples variantes, pudiendo decirse que la faseactual es la que bajo el impulso del GATT y en el marco de la apuesta por la multi-lateralidad emerge de la segunda guerra mundial, se desarrolla en la segundamitad del siglo XX y no deja de profundizarse, en medio de fricciones y con conti-nuos cambios, hasta llegar a nuestros días.

En cuanto a la caracterización de las relaciones comerciales externas -adiferencia de lo que acaece en las finanzas internacionales, en las que los obje-tos de globalización pueden ser diversos- aquí todos los componentes sonmercancías, aunque podamos diferenciar algunas de sus categorías más signifi-cativas : primeras materias, manufacturas, servicios; interindustrial, intraindus-trial, intrafirma; mercancías de distinto contenido tecnológico, hasta ladepuración extrema que representan las propias transferencias de tecnología



La referencia básica para medir la cuantía es el volumen monetario decomercio exterior, exportaciones e importaciones que a escala mundialtendrían por definición que compensarse, aunque imperfecciones estadísticase intercambios irregulares no registrados lleven al incumplimiento de estaregla básica. Es obvio que nos interesará medir el volumen de los principalescomponentes antes aludidos.

Lo habitual es que los agentes que protagonizan el comercio externo seanempresas que, según sectores, producen las mercancías o sólo asumen lafunción de comercialización. Entre ellas, en las últimas décadas, ha crecido laparticipación relativa de las empresas transnacionales, cuyo peso y evolucióndebe ser seguido con particular atención.

A estas alturas, es difícil pretender que exista una única lógica reguladora detodas las variantes de comercio exterior, desde la primeras materias a los secto-res tecnológicos de punta, desde el comercio interindustrial al intrafirma. Nuevosenfoques teóricos han venido a añadirse a los planteamientos tradicionalescreando un cuerpo interpretativo controvertido, que desborda nuestro propósito.

En el plano institucional, el incontestable predominio de la OMC se combinacon la dificultad de que sus procesos decisorios ganen en transparencia y legiti-midad, al tiempo que sigue en cuestión su capacidad para imponerse a todos susmiembros, en especial los más poderosos. A su lado, los procesos de integracióneconómica son un desafío y plantean el interrogante de cuál de las dos dimensio-nes, la multilateral o la de bloque, va a predominar y en qué medida va a darseuna evolución compatible y acumulativa o friccional y excluyente.

La profundización en la dimensión espacial del comercio externo conduceal análisis de la estructura espacial de las transacciones, que debe permitir dife-renciar lo que es bilateral, interno de bloques o multilateral dentro del comer-cio externo. Los dos primeros no pertenecen propiamente a la G y dentro delúltimo tendremos que afinar los criterios para precisar lo que vamos a tomarcomo mundial, porque no todo lo que en principio se presenta como multilate-ral tendrá necesariamente ese carácter.

Los efectos de las relaciones comerciales mundiales pueden leerse sobre laconfiguración y comportamiento de los mercados: tipo y grado de competencia,gama de productos ofertada, proceso de formación de los precios. Pero tambiénen lo relativo al impacto sobre otras relaciones, variables y comportamientoseconómicos, terreno más escabroso, porque son mayores las mediaciones nece-sarias para concretar la influencia sobre crecimiento, distribución o bienestar.Por citar algunas de las más relevantes.

El grado de globalización comercial, en su acepción positiva viene dado porel peso de factores, relaciones y procesos procedentes del ámbito mundial en ladeterminación del funcionamiento de la circulación de mercancías. Son condi-ciones para su desarrollo la ausencia de barreras de cualquier tipo a dicha circu-lación (contingentes, aranceles o la gama de instrumentos restrictivos que sevinculan al nuevo proteccionismo) y la pérdida de relevancia de los costes de


transacción (transporte, normas legales, resolución de conflictos, etc). En lamedida en que esas condiciones se asienten plenamente darán lugar a precioúnico para productos similares y a una distribución de compras y ventas sinsesgo doméstico. Sin embargo, la total materialización de este último resultadopresupondría la ausencia de especialización y de división internacional deltrabajo, y el predominio de mercados carentes de todo grado de monopolio, deforma que, si existen tanto los unos como los otros, es obligado reformular eseenunciado. La toma en consideración de esas restricciones aconseja limitar eljuicio sobre el grado de globalización comercial en sentido positivo a mercadosparticulares y no al conjunto de la economía, ya que la existencia de costes detransacción configura sectores no expuestos al comercio externo o la extremaespecialización en la producción de algunos productos los excluye a priori deuna eventual ponderación. No obstante, el grado de apertura, expresado envalor añadido de exportaciones multilaterales sobre PIB o su simétrico, de simi-lares importaciones sobre la demanda total será un indicador tanto más signifi-cativo cuanto más podamos aproximarnos al valor añadido realmente contenidoen las transacciones externas registradas (depuradas, por tanto, de importacio-nes y exportaciones interpuestas que hinchan las magnitudes y convierten enheterogéneos los términos de comparación).

En su acepción negativa estará determinado por el peso de factores, rela-ciones y procesos procedentes del ámbito mundial en la existencia de condicio-namientos y perturbaciones en la circulación de mercancías. ¿En qué puedenconcretarse esos condicionamientos y perturbaciones? ¿En hacer inviable laproducción interna de gamas de productos que podrían elaborarse sin la presióndel mercado mundial? ¿En la vigencia de precios gravados por el poder demercado de las empresas fabricantes? ¿En la materialización de una especiali-zación inductora de deterioro de la relación real de intercambio para ciertaseconomías? ¿En la tendencia a la aparición de perturbadores desequilibrios enlas balanzas comerciales?

2.2.3. PRODUCCIÓN

La producción de mercancías siempre ha tenido centralidad en el funciona-miento y reproducción del SEC, por la importancia determinante de las relacionessociales de producción y por la influencia de este momento en la extracción y apro-piación del excedente social. Sus protagonistas, capital y trabajo asalariado, se arti-culan a través de un tejido de relaciones y ámbitos funcionales profundamentediferentes a los que rigen la circulación de mercancías. La permanencia de unnúcleo inmutable en el carácter de su relación no ha impedido que los términosconcretos de la misma hayan estado sometidos a cambios significativos, siendo lasempresas las organizaciones en cuyo seno se desarrolla el proceso productivo yestando el universo empresarial marcado por una gran heterogeneidad. El desarro-llo de la dimensión externa de los procesos productivos sólo tiene lugar a partir delmomento en que el SEC en general y las empresas en particular alcanzan un cierto



grado de maduración, circunstancia que propicia la instalación incipiente de activi-dades empresariales fuera del espacio de origen y la progresiva conversión en prác-ticas generalizadas de lo que empezó como anécdotas dispersas. La fase actual delproceso de transnacionalización productiva la situamos en la década de los 70s,momento en el que confluyen un conjunto de circunstancias propiciadoras de unsalto cualitativo en el lento despegue iniciado en las dos décadas anteriores

La caracterización de las relaciones de producción externas tiene que basarseen el análisis de la doble componente que las define: la IED y la actividad empre-sarial que induce, siendo la materialización sectorial de ambas significativa y dignade seguimiento, por los notables cambios a que se está viendo sometida.

La cuantía de la producción transnacional se escinde en la de sus doscomponentes. En el seno de la IED las distinciones pueden ser varias, pero talvez las más significativas sean las que diferencian, de un lado, entre flujos ystock, de otro, entre IED de nueva planta o vinculada a fusiones y adquisicio-nes. En la actividad empresarial externa inducida por los flujos de IED los planossusceptibles de medición son tan variados como los de la actividad de lasempresas (movilización de capital, empleo, organización del trabajo, compras,ventas, valor añadido, beneficios y su reparto).

El análisis de los agentes de la producción transnacional nos remite a ununiverso de transnacionales -matrices y filiales, de tamaño y condición diversa-cuya combinación da lugar a los grupos transnacionales. En particular, cobrarelieve la medición del grado de transnacionalización de las empresas porque,aunque a todas se las denomine de forma similar, su contenido transnacionalreal puede ser diferente y digno de estudio.

La IED y la actividad de sus empresas no son fruto del azar, tienen una lógica,pero el empeño de descubrir una teoría general de la producción transnacionalpuede ser estéril, ya que pretendería una explicación única para variantes hetero-géneas, nacidas de causas diferentes y alimentadas por comportamientos singu-lares. Tomar conciencia de esa diversidad es un primer paso que posibilita cuerposexplicativos singularizados, poco enriquecidos por intentos eclécticos.

Desde la perspectiva de una economía nacional, la producción transnacio-nal es una actividad externa, pero su institucionalización puede tener coberturadispar. De hecho, se superponen la proliferación de acuerdos regulatorios bila-terales (BITS), con normativas que no superan el ámbito de bloques (UE oNAFTA), hasta llegar a intentos de acuerdos de amplio espectro e irrestrictageneralidad, tipo AMI (al margen de la institución concreta en la que se nego-cie y formalice). Junto a ellos se sitúan los compromisos que regulan aspectosparciales de la actividad empresarial, conciernan al trabajo y al ámbito social(OIT) o a normas ambientales y códigos de conducta, sean indicativos (OCDE),voluntarios o promovidos por distintas partes interesadas (multistakeholders)

Si profundizamos en la dimensión espacial de la producción externa detec-tamos cierta similitud con lo expuesto para el comercio: hay que diferenciar loque es bilateral, interno de bloques o multilateral, pero aplicado aquí a IED y a


los distintos ámbitos de la actividad empresarial, siempre buscando segregar loque tiene rango mundial.

Los efectos de las relaciones de producción mundiales se reflejarán directa-mente sobre el funcionamiento y reproducción del sistema productivo: correlaciónde fuerzas entre capital y trabajo, estructura del tejido empresarial y todos losaspectos a los que nos referiremos al ocuparnos del grado de globalización produc-tiva en el próximo párrafo; también, de forma indirecta y difícilmente evaluable,sobre otros planos y variables económicos, como finanzas, comercio, demanda,funciones del Estado, grado de competencia, crecimiento, distribución, bienestar.

El grado de globalización productiva8, en su acepción positiva viene determi-nado por el peso de factores, relaciones y procesos procedentes del ámbitomundial en la determinación del funcionamiento del sistema productivo. Suaumento exige condiciones de ausencia de barreras a los flujos de IED y a la insta-lación y libre funcionamiento de las empresas e irrelevancia de los costes de trans-acción en el desarrollo de dichas actividades. Si esas condiciones se alcanzaran deforma completa tenderán a aparecer similares rentabilidades y perdida relativa desesgo en la distribución espacial de las actividades productivas de las empresas,descontada la influencia de economías de escala y similares; son indicativas laproporción que representan las transnacionales sobre los respectivos totalesmundiales en volumen de producción, demanda de fuerza de trabajo, formaciónbruta de capital fijo, generación, difusión y utilización de tecnología, generación,apropiación y utilización de excedente; además, el grado de convergencia salarialy la homogeneidad de condiciones y organización del trabajo.

Su acepción negativa viene marcada por el peso de factores, relaciones yprocesos procedentes del ámbito de la producción transnacional en la existen-cia de condicionamientos y perturbaciones en aspectos relevantes del sistemaproductivo: ¿perturban la creación de empleo?, ¿dificultan la inversión?, ¿disminuyen el excedente total y erosionan la tasa de ganancia?, ¿perjudican alnivel y comportamiento de los salarios?, ¿degradan las condiciones del trabajo?,¿erosionan las expectativas de los empresarios?

2.2.4. DEMANDA

La demanda es necesaria para la reproducción del SEC, pero a la vezelusiva dado que aparece desvinculada de las necesidades de los seres huma-nos y la lógica de funcionamiento del sistema tiende a comprimir una de suscomponentes más sustantivas, la masa salarial. En cambio, se ve favorecida porla tendencia a exceso relativo de acumulación. Su dimensión externa dependedel desarrollo del comercio externo y, por tanto, la delimitación de su fase estaráinevitablemente relacionada con la de éste.

En lo que concierne a los componentes de su dimensión externa, para lasempresas la demanda se concreta en ventas y, en el comercio externo, en expor-



8 OCDE (2001) representa una tentativa de medición en la que predomina la recopilación de estadís-ticas sobre la utilización coherente y sistemática de categorías e indicadores.

taciones, mientras que, desde la óptica del consumo, la materialización de lademanda son las compras y, en el comercio externo, las importaciones. A la postre,dado que las dos perspectivas son igual de válidas y desembocan en los mismosimportes podemos concluir que exportaciones e importaciones son expresionesequivalentes de la demanda externa. Sin embargo, su composición es de distintanaturaleza por el tipo de producto y comprador, así como por la razón de ser de suexistencia. En el consumo productivo, las mercancías consumidas son medios deproducción, los compradores empresas y la razón de la compra un destino produc-tivo. En cambio, en el consumo final se compran mercancías no productivas, lohacen economías domésticas y su motivación es satisfacer una necesidad o deseo.

En lo referente a la cuantía de la componente externa de la demanda, si noslimitamos a medir exportaciones e importaciones, estaremos repitiendo lo que yahemos considerado en el comercio externo, ya que ambas dimensiones son, a lavez, expresiones de la circulación y representaciones de la demanda. Igualmente,si obtenemos expresiones relativas por medio de las distintas mediciones delgrado de apertura (valor añadido de exportaciones sobre PIB o importacionessobre demanda total) los resultados parecen de nuevo redundantes respecto a losya calculados al medir el comercio externo. La conclusión es que la cuantificaciónde la demanda externa no parece aportar información adicional, por lo que, paraanalizar esta dimensión, habrá que recurrir a relecturas, desde otra perspectiva,de los materiales obtenidos en el análisis del comercio exterior.

Los agentes que protagonizan la demanda son, como acabamos de indicar,empresas en el consumo productivo y economías domésticas en el final. Denuevo una conclusión inespecífica y de escasa virtualidad.

La lógica que determina la demanda externa es la misma que genera elcomercio exterior, subrayando desde la perspectiva de la demanda la necesidadde creación de un patrón de consumo tecnológico y final con vigencia en losespacios vinculados por las transacciones externas.

En lo que hace al consumo final, la vigencia de un referente universal es dedifícil institucionalización, aunque puedan serlo normas sanitarias, ambientales,etc. que lo propician. En lo concerniente al consumo productivo el predominiode un determinado estilo tecnológico puede venir favorecido por la dinámicaque determina la tecnología y, complementariamente, por la reglamentación dela propiedad intelectual.

La profundización en la dimensión espacial de la demanda externa nos llevaa un territorio ya tratado en el comercio externo. Pero la evaluación del gradode universalización del patrón de consumo no parece abordable sin recurrir amateriales cualitativos (por la dificultad de encontrar indicadores capaces demedir con precisión esta dimensión).

Los efectos de la presencia de una demanda de ámbito mundial no pare-cen diferentes de los de una demanda simplemente externa: no para todas,pero sí para las economías cuya posición se lo permita, hará disminuir la nece-sidad relativa de crear demanda interna.


El grado de globalización de la demanda en su acepción positiva vienedeterminado por el peso de factores, relaciones y procesos procedentes delámbito mundial en la determinación de la demanda total. Requiere condicionesde conocimiento y accesibilidad al patrón de consumo y los resultados espera-bles conducirían a la universalización de dichos patrones.

Su acepción negativa está marcada por el peso de factores, relaciones yprocesos procedentes del ámbito mundial en la existencia de condicionamien-tos y perturbaciones que afectan a la formación de la demanda. Su concreciónno es sencilla: ¿erosión de la capacidad adquisitiva? ¿inadaptación de lasmercancías demandadas a las producidas?

* Finalmente, podremos comparar lo que con carácter bien meramenteexterno o bien mundial existe en los distintos planos. Si, al realizar las medicio-nes parciales de cada uno de ellos, hemos obtenido grados de G comparableslas preguntas se presentan sugerentes ¿En cuál de ellos es mayor la G? ¿Cuántomás o menos que en los demás planos? Sin embargo, se impone la cautela,dado que en la mayor parte de los casos nos hemos limitado a considerar cadarelación en sí misma, desde una perspectiva tanto estática como dinámica y, enconsecuencia, lo que podamos obtener de la comparación de los datos obteni-dos tendrá una virtualidad limitada. En resumen, podremos hablar de magnitu-des heterogéneas y de su crecimiento en el tiempo, pero apenas nada más; suponderación relativa tendrá un valor precario y tendremos que esperar amomentos ulteriores para obtener información más significativa.

2.3. LA ECONOMÍA MUNDIAL EN SU CONJUNTO

Disponemos del conocimiento que hemos acumulado en la caracterización decada una de las relaciones económicas externas, en el estudio de sus efectos, enel intento de aislar las que dentro de ellas tienen rango mundial y en la deteccióndel grado de G de cada uno de esos momentos, un conjunto que, aunque cons-truido mediante la adición de análisis relativamente parciales, proporciona valiosainformación sobre la economía mundial. Damos ahora un paso adicional y preten-demos - articulando esos planos y complementándolos con otros aspectos- dotar-nos de una visión de conjunto que nos ayude, primero, a realizar unacaracterización descriptiva de la economía mundial en su fase actual, para desve-lar luego el modo en que el grado de GE alcanzado por el conjunto del SEC -y nosólo por cada uno de sus planos sucesivos- influye en el funcionamiento y repro-ducción del nivel mundial y provoca en él condicionamientos y perturbaciones. Notratamos de explicar el modelo de desarrollo que tiende a regular la economíamundial actual, sino sólo analizamos la contribución o función que dentro de élrealiza la GE. Son cosas distintas, de mucha mayor amplitud la primera9, circuns-crita a un campo más limitado la segunda.



9 La pugna e incertidumbre en torno a la emergencia de un nuevo modelo de desarrollo emergente esobjeto de investigación en curso del autor. Un esbozo del enfoque en Martínez González-Tablas (2002b), págs 96-100.

2.3.1. MANIFESTACIONES, ESTRUCTURA ESPACIAL E INTERDEPENDENCIAS

La constatación del comportamiento agregado de la economía mundial, ladisección de su estructura espacial y la toma de conciencia de la trama de inter-dependencias que se establece entre los distintos ámbitos objeto de G nos propor-cionan una primera aproximación al conjunto de la economía mundial, a modo deescalón intermedio que nos acerca a los siguientes apartados.

La consideración del comportamiento agregado de la economía mundial selimita a constatar cómo se comporta la economía mundial, no busca aportar nadanuevo respecto a los múltiples informes de este tipo, sólo leer los datos desde laperspectiva de la mundialización para dejar constancia de ellos y evitar errores devaloración.

Con el estudio de la estructura espacial de la economía mundial nos detene-mos en la posición económica relativa de los distintos espacios, en su eventualdiversidad y en el grado en que están vinculados a ella.

La posición relativa de los espacios dentro de la economía mundial no tratade establecer relaciones de causalidad entre la situación de los distintos espaciosy la globalización. Sólo constata la calidad de las situaciones de hecho, su simili-tud o desigualdad, sin pretensión alguna de causalidad científica (nos mantendre-mos en proposiciones del tipo siguiente: “el aumento del grado de GE coexiste conun aumento de la igualdad o desigualdad entre países o entre grupos sociales”),pudiendo construirse escalas descriptivas y esbozos de tipologías. A pesar de quenos alimentemos de la información estadística que proporcionan los organismosinternacionales, es una medición que hay que hacer con escrúpulo para no presen-tar como causalidades probadas las que no lo están. La lectura dinámica de laposición relativa de los espacios nos remite a un terreno harto controvertido: losestudios relativos a la convergencia10. Tampoco se puede ignorar el grado de jerar-quía en y de las distintas relaciones externas y de sus instituciones, porque sondatos a los que subyacen relaciones de poder y de dominación.

La visión de la diversidad en el ámbito mundial se enriquece si, junto a losdatos económicos, consideramos la permanencia, transformaciones o aparición decivilizaciones, culturas, perfiles sociales, variantes de capitalismo, modelos dedesarrollo, dentro del proceso globalizador. El riesgo de este ensanchamiento decampo es caer en el descriptivismo banal, pero es indudable que, en contrapar-tida, ilumina la heterogeneidad existente.

Un último aspecto que ayuda a matizar la estructura espacial nos lo propor-ciona el conocimiento de la vinculación relativa de los espacios a la economíamundial; aunque explícitamente lo excluimos de nuestra propuesta de investiga-ción, nada nos impide servirnos de los estudios que puedan existir al respecto.Conlleva comparar lo externo con lo interno y sopesar el grado y tipo de extraver-sión (y de actividad autocontenida en los espacios particulares); obliga a salir de la


10 Martínez González-Tablas (2002 b), págs 106-113.

mera comparación entre relaciones externas, para estudiarlas respecto a otrasmagnitudes económicas, unas u otras según lo que se pretenda medir en cadacaso; también aquí habrá que diferenciar entre la mera externalización (proporciónde las relaciones externas respecto a macromagnitudes totales) y el grado demundialización (porcentaje de las relaciones mundiales en esas macromagnitudes).Para conseguirlo serán necesarios indicadores que permitan evaluar en términosrelativos los de finanzas, comercio, IED y transnacionalización empresarial11.

Finalmente, se trata de detectar las interdependencias e interrelaciones entremomentos parciales derivados o identificables con la globalización, fundamentán-dolas, siempre que sea posible, con información estadística. Supone un paso másallá de la simple constatación de la importancia de la mundialización relativa delos distintos momentos. La trama de interacciones es una primera aproximaciónal funcionamiento del conjunto del sistema como ilustran los siguientes ejemplos:

- La producción de las filiales extranjeras para los mercados internos en losque están instaladas se relaciona con el comercio exterior, si eventualesexportaciones de las matrices (relaciones mediadas por mercados) dan pasoa suministro a los mismos mercados valiéndose de producción transnacio-nal (relaciones internas de producción). Un proceso en el que habría unamodificación de la lógica dominante, marcada ahora por relaciones socialesde producción, donde antes regían las mercantiles.

- Las transferencias de tecnología en el seno de grupos transnacionales sonuna plasmación mercantil de dinámica interna empresarial, una articulaciónde comercio y producción que puede ser importante.

- El comercio intrafirma es una combinación de las dimensiones de comercioy producción (desde el punto de vista empresarial, de nuevo, aparienciamercantil de un funcionamiento que, en lo substancial, es intraempresarial;pero desde la perspectiva macroeconómica, auténtico comercio exterior, encuanto mediado por tipo de cambio y reflejado en la balanza de pagos). Ensuma, una articulación sui generis de lógicas y efectos.

- Las operaciones financieras realizadas por los grupos transnacionales ennada se diferencian, desde un punto de vista formal, de las similares reali-zadas por otros protagonistas, pero proceden de la lógica de la produccióntransnacional y son, a la postre, interacción de los planos productivo y finan-ciero, consecuencia de una lógica híbrida.

- Las transnacionales sufren perturbaciones y contagios provenientes de lasfinanzas internacionales, que impactan sobre su actividad empresarial; denuevo intersección entre finanzas y producción.

- Los mercados de divisas han adquirido un carácter dominantementefinanciero, pero el tipo de cambio que ellos establecen determina losprecios relativos de exportaciones e importaciones y los flujos comercia-les; interacción de las lógicas de finanzas y comercio.



11 La referida al conjunto mundial no siempre será sencilla de medir y, en ocasiones, habrá que tomar,como aproximación, la de los espacios de los que se tenga suficiente información (EEUU, UE, Japón,etc).

2.3.2. LA GE POSITIVA: INFLUENCIA EN EL FUNCIONAMIENTO Y REPRODUCCIÓN DE LAECONOMÍA MUNDIAL.

El propósito es evaluar hasta qué punto factores, relaciones y procesosprovenientes del nivel global determinan el funcionamiento y reproducción de laeconomía mundial. Para que esa determinación fuera plena sería condiciónbásica la ausencia de barreras intencionadas o fácticas y resultados esperableslos que hemos considerados en cada momento parcial al hablar de su grado deG específico y, en el límite, convergencia de tasas de ganancia y sincronizaciónde coyunturas. Los resultados de cada momento parcial serían convergencia detipos de interés y del precio de los activos financieros, con ausencia de sesgodoméstico en la estructura de las carteras; precios únicos para las mismasmercancías y alto grado de apertura; elevada proporción del valor añadido y lainversión de las TNCS sobre el PIB y la FBCF mundiales, convergencia de losprecios de similares tipos de fuerza de trabajo, confluencia de los patronestecnológicos, con dinámica mundial en su generación, difusión y reparto decostes, predominio de las relaciones mundiales en lo relativo a la generación,apropiación y asignación del excedente; tendencia a patrones de consumouniversales.

La eventual existencia de un sistema económico mundial o, con máspropiedad, de un sistema económico mundial capitalista es cuestión de menosentidad de lo que pudiera parecer, porque lo importante no es si existe sino suvirtualidad o grado de vigencia relativa, ya que dadas las relaciones económicasde rango mundial que hemos detectado parece razonable concluir que en elnivel mundial existe cierta densidad sistémica, esto es, que hay propiedadessistémicas emergentes en el nivel espacial mundial. Con lo cual, volvemos a algoque hemos enunciado desde el inicio pero que es difícil de fundamentar empí-ricamente: en qué medida la lógica de funcionamiento y reproducción del SECen la fase actual se ve determinada por el proceso globalizador.

A título indicativo, apuntamos algunos ejemplos de influencias de esecarácter sobre el funcionamiento y reproducción de la economía mundial:

- Fuerzas de origen mundial, aplicadas a distintas circunstancias, puedenintervenir en la formación de los precios de factores y mercancías, hacién-doles confluir hacia un precio único o permitiendo que sean desiguales.

- Todo lo relacionado con el excedente puede verse afectado: la generación(acceso a la fuerza de trabajo mundial con efecto inducido sobre la rela-ción salarial, la fijación de las condiciones de trabajo y los costes), laapropiación (por una correlación de fuerzas crecientemente favorable alcapital) y la asignación (mayor espectro en la elección de inversiones). Ensentido amplio, implicará una extensión del espacio abierto a la valoriza-ción de los capitales.

- El proceso de formación de las tasas de ganancia se desarrolla en nuevascircunstancias, marcadas por la extensión del espacio de valorización delos capitales y por la modificación de los términos de competencia.


- El grado de sincronía de las coyunturas económicas se ve favorecido porla mayor densidad de relaciones capitalistas de ámbito mundial e influidopor la erosión de la capacidad reguladora de las instituciones públicas.

- El aumento de la apertura de la economía mundial disminuye la necesi-dad de generar demanda interna en cada economía.

- Las funciones económicas del Estado se ven confrontadas con nuevasdemandas y un nuevo contexto.

- Los agentes se ven obligados a formular sus expectativas y a tomar deci-siones en entornos de mayor incertidumbre.

- Se hacen posibles distintas formas de ejercicio de la hegemonía en elámbito mundial y los poderes dominantes disponen de una gama másamplia de medios para ejercerla.En suma, si existe un significativo grado de GE en sentido positivo, tiene

que haber múltiples determinaciones sobre el funcionamiento y reproducción dela economía mundial. Nuestro objetivo es detectarlas e interpretar su alcance.

2.3.3. LA GE NEGATIVA: CONDICIONAMIENTOS Y PERTURBACIONES DERIVADOS

Al referirnos a la GE negativa no buscamos respuestas del rango de las queperseguíamos en el apartado anterior. Las preguntas son aquí más abiertas y esposible obtener resultados con la simple acumulación de respuestas parciales.

Se trata de evaluar hasta qué punto factores, relaciones y procesos prove-nientes del nivel global condicionan y perturban el comportamiento de la econo-mía mundial, procurando avanzar, más allá de la constatación de las apariencias,hacia la trama de interrelaciones y causalidades.

Dado el carácter que atribuimos a la GE negativa no es difícil formular pregun-tas relacionadas con lo que planteamos, como ya hicimos al considerar las especí-ficas de cada plano: ¿perturba la creación de empleo?, ¿dificulta la inversión?,¿disminuye el excedente total y erosiona la tasa de ganancia?, ¿perjudica al nivel ycomportamiento de los salarios?, ¿degrada las condiciones del trabajo?, ¿erosionalas expectativas de los empresarios?, ¿hace inviable la producción interna de gamasde productos que podrían elaborarse sin la presión del mercado mundial? Pero elavance sería muy escaso si nos mantenemos a ese nivel de generalidad.

Para subrayar el tipo de problemas que habría que estudiar en estepunto, apuntamos algunos ejemplos más concretos de condicionamientos yperturbaciones:

- La problemática de los contagios financieros, con la secuela de efectosque de los mismos se derivan para las funciones de los sistemas finan-cieros y para las economías en general es, posiblemente, la dimensión deGE negativa más importante en la actualidad.

- Existe una mayor facilidad para los trasvases espaciales de excedente,como consecuencia de la disposición de canales cada vez más diversifica-dos (financieros, comerciales, productivos), con el riesgo de que el ahorromundial fluya hacia las economías más dotadas.



- Los mecanismos de dominación y de reproducción de la desigualdad son decreciente complejidad y los vínculos que desarrollan cada vez más inextri-cables, con lo que el aumento de las diferencias y la profundización deexclusiones corren el riesgo de convertirse en rasgos endémicos.

- Hay aumento aparente y alejamiento fáctico de las oportunidades para lossubdesarrollados, atrapados en una maraña en la que se combinan imposi-ciones de los mercados financieros, con riesgos de una especializacióninductora de deterioro de la relación real de intercambio, continuo despla-zamiento de una frontera tecnológica cada vez más inaprensible o compe-tencia por la captación de una IED que de día en día pide más garantías ysoporta menos restricciones.

- Existe amenaza de erosión de la capacidad adquisitiva de los trabajadoresy de los sectores populares como consecuencia de la accesibilidad de lafuerza de trabajo mundial, la menor dependencia de la demanda prove-niente de la masa salarial y el deterioro de la posición relativa del trabajo.

- En lo concerniente a competencia y fiscalidad, la tendencia oligopólica y lacapacidad elusiva de las obligaciones fiscales de los agentes de ámbitotransnacional convierten a estas cuestiones en terrenos de difícil control,con consecuencias para el deterioro del grado de competencia y para losingresos públicos que sustentan las funciones del Estado del Bienestar (alládonde existe o donde las sociedades aspiran a dotarse de él).

- La labilidad de las normas de cumplimiento de contratos en el ámbitomundial dificulta, para empresas y capitales, la consolidación del procesoglobalizador, pero su posición dominante les hace reacios a emprenderprocesos de negociación participativos y de amplio espectro.

- La falta de regulación pública supone para los capitales individuales, a cortoplazo, un aumento del margen de maniobra, pero a la vez socava la regu-lación que exige la reproducción del capital social en su conjunto y erosionalos cimientos de cohesión social que precisa todo sistema para perdurar.

- Hay una fuerte tendencia al aumento del impacto en los ecosistemas parti-culares y en la biosfera, como consecuencia de la extensión irrestricta delpatrón de producción y consumo vigentes.

La propuesta metodológica que posibilita la lectura de la GE en sentido nega-tivo nos libera de una interpretación demasiado rígida y abre un sugerente campode investigación de las múltiples manifestaciones que pueden tener este carácter.

CONCLUSIONES

Las mediciones sugeridas se plantean en un marco coherente y, si dispu-siéramos de ellas, nos darían información sobre el grado de globalización exis-tente, su carácter y evolución.

El conocimiento de todo lo que habría que estudiar para alcanzar unacaracterización suficiente de la globalización no empece la necesidad de profun-dizar en aspectos concretos, abriendo y precisando indicadores que permitan


captar la idiosincrasia y los comportamientos singulares. Más aún, sólo hacién-dolo conseguiremos llevar a término las posibilidades de la propuesta.

Hay que subrayar la conveniencia de reintegrar los resultados de esos análi-sis parciales al cuadro general, regenerando así sus limitaciones y alimentandoel análisis de conjunto con el conocimiento detallado de sus componentes.

También sería aconsejable que los estudios fueran periódicos, porque esta-mos ante una realidad evolutiva, algunos de cuyos cambios pueden alcanzarrango de mutaciones, sólo captables a tiempo con un seguimiento sistemático.

En teoría, sería útil dar un paso más y hablar, en algún punto, del bienes-tar de la humanidad en su conjunto. Pero cualquier avance en esa direcciónrequiere escrúpulo y la aplicación rigurosa de un método. La libertad expositivasería otra si nos situáramos en los terrenos, legítimos y complementarios, delensayo o del activismo social.

En resumen, estudiar de forma sistemática la globalización y sus efectos no estarea ni de un día, ni sólo de un tipo de especialistas. Tenemos ante nosotros untrayecto proceloso. Empezar a caminarlo es aceptar y entender que es una tareacon muchos planos, cada uno con subdivisiones y matices difíciles de dominar yque, además, tendrán que ser retomados desde fuera de la especialidad que los hahecho avanzar, buscando su sentido en un contexto más amplio, en el que aflora-rán interdependencias inicialmente no detectadas que darán lugar a nuevas proble-máticas a su vez necesitadas de estudio. Quienes sólo vivan a gusto considerandoque la Economía se ocupa de un sistema cerrado y que los mejores estudios serealizan en el refugio de análisis parciales susceptibles de modelización formal yejercicios también formales de contrastación empírica, es mejor que abandonen elcampo; se necesita modestia para aceptar que todas las investigaciones y propues-tas están llamadas a ser reelaboradas y, por así decirlo, destruidas dentro de unprograma de investigación de mayor cobertura, cuyo avance requiere de especia-listas, pero también de generalistas que, siendo capaces de entender los logros quese consigan en campos concretos, tengan una visión sistémica del conjunto, queles habilite para integrar cada componente en el lugar que le corresponde. Proba-blemente una tarea más propia de equipos que de personas aisladas.

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- (2002b): “Aspectos más relevantes de la globalización económica”, en Laglobalización económica. Incidencia en las relaciones sociales y económi-cas, Cuadernos de Derecho Judicial V-2002, Consejo General del PoderJudicial, pp.71-130.

OCDE (2001): Measuring Globalisation. The Role of Multinationals in OECDEconomíes, 2 vols, OCDE, Ginebra.

UNCTAD (1999): Foreign Direct Investment and the Challenge of Development,World Investment Report, Nueva York y Ginebra.

ABREVIATURAS Y ACRÓNIMOS

AMI Acuerdo multilateral de inversionesBIS Bank for International Settlements (Banco de Basilea)BITS Tratados bilaterales de inversionesFBCF Formación bruta de capital fijoFMI Fondo Monetario InternacionalGATT General Agreement on Trade and TariffsG GlobalizaciónGE Globalización económicaGF Globalización financieraIED Inversión extranjera directaIOSCO International Organization of Securities CommissionsOCDE Organización para el comercio y el desarrollo económicosOIT Organización internacional del trabajoOMC Organización mundial de comercioNAFTA Acuerdo de libre comercio de América del NortePIB Producto interior brutoSEC Sistema económico capitalistaTNCS Empresas transnacionalesUE Unión EuropeaUNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and DevelopmentWIR World Investment Report


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Shifts in Economic Geography and Their CausesAnthony J VenablesEconomic Review - Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City; Fourth Quarter 2006; 91, 4; Academic Research Librarypg. 61


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Metodología: escalas de actividad y análisis

Economic history and "the new economy" New economy: fact or fiction

Perspectiva histórica

31/10/2010

1

Economía política pinternacional

MERIGG, 2009-10ÓUNIVERSIDAD AUTÓNOMA DE

MADRID

La nueva “geo-economía”

Signos de mundialización:Signos de mundialización:Noticias empresarialesProductos básicosServiciosT iTurismoEducaciónCapitales, etc.

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Consecuencias

Nuevos mercadosNuevos mercadosNuevos agentesNuevas formas de organizaciónNueva “regulación”

Factores que facilitan la “mundialización”

• Mejoras en transportes

• Mejoras en la transmisión de información (TIC)(TIC)

Factor clave: TECNOLOGÍAFactor problema: mano de obra

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GLOBALIZACIÓN: concepto

Proceso que afecta a diversas facetas de la vidaProceso que afecta a diversas facetas de la vida,no sólo económica, sino también cultural,tecnológica, política... y que se concreta en unincrementoincremento generalizado del comercio, lainversión y en general las relacionesrelaciones entreagentes a nivelnivel mundialmundial.g

Debate acerca de la definición

¿global-nuevo orden natural?

Ámbitos de la globalización

Sistemas AcercamientoSistemas físicos-biológicos

• Demografía• Recursos no

renovables

Acercamiento espacio-temporal

• Mejoras transporte• Mejoras sistemas

transmisión de i f ió• Recursos renovables información

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Globalización vs. internacionalización

Internacionalización GlobalizaciónInternacionalizaciónFenómeno históricoCarácter cuantitativoComercio de bienes y

servicios

GlobalizaciónProceso vivoCarácter cualitativoIntegración funcional

Comprensión de la globalización

Unidad de análisis superior al Estado naciónUnidad de análisis superior al Estado-naciónCambios en las “cadenas de producción”:• Coordinación y regulación• Configuración geográfica

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Coordinación y regulación a dos niveles

Por parte de las empresas: Por parte del Estado:Por parte de las empresas:• Relaciones inter e intra

empresasVarios tipos de organización de negociosRegulación en t i

o pa te de stado:• Influencia significativa

incluso en mercados “desregulados”Sistemas regulatorios nacionales e internacionales: ventajas d l di id d (transacciones

verticalmente integradas o en transacciones externalizadas

de la diversidad (nexo triangulador de interacciones empresas-estado)

Configuración geográfica

Localización geográfica de cada elemento de laLocalización geográfica de cada elemento de la cadena de producciónNuevo significado “distancia geográfica” (tecnología transporte y comunicaciones)“Espacio de lugares” frente a “espacio de flujos”P ti id d ó i “ l d ” fí i tPero actividad económica “anclada” físicamente y a través de las relaciones sociales Agrupación de actividades (escala local)

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Agrupaciones económicas

• Origen difuso• Origen difuso• Gran desarrollo debido a:

– Interdependencias “de mercado” (reducción costes de transacción e intensidad transacciones)

– Interdependencias “no de mercado” (cuestiones socio-culturales y económicas)

El “lugar” SI importa

Conclusiones

Escalas de actividad y análisis: local y globalEscalas de actividad y análisis: local y globalDimensión vertical: Cadenas de producción

globalesDimensión horizontal: Sistemas territoriales a

diversas escalasSistema global: unión de las dos dimensiones


Economic history and the "new economy"Joel MokyrBusiness Economics; Apr 2001; 36, 2; Academic Research Librarypg. 9

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Nueva metodología: escalas de actividad y análisisPerspectiva histórica

Economía política internacional.Merigg 2009-10

Explicaciones tradicionales

Existen cambios en las tendenciasExisten cambios en las tendencias actuales relativos a la producción, el comercio y la inversión; pero¿cuáles son los procesos que crean la internacionalización y globalización de la economía?

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TEORÍAS TRADICIONALES

TEORÍA DEL COMERCIOTEORÍA DEL COMERCIO INTERNACIONALTEORÍA CLÁSICA DE LA LOCALIZACIÓNTEORÍAS SOBRE LA INVERSIÓNTEORÍAS SOBRE LA INVERSIÓN DIRECTA¿NUEVO ENFOQUE?



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Teoría del comercio internacional (I)Concepto básico: teoría de la ventajacomparativa (Ricardo, 1817)p ( , )Problema: No explica por qué existendiferenciasModelo Heckscher-Ohlin: Diversa dotaciónde factores (capital y trabajo) de lospaísespaísesProblema: No aparecen grandesdiferencias entre países (desarrollados)

Teoría del comercio internacional (I)Asunciones del modelo

Movilidad de los factores de producción muyMovilidad de los factores de producción muy limitadaCostes de transporte igual a ceroTecnología dada y constanteNo existencia de tecnologías de escala (i t t ) i d t i(internas y externas) si se da competencia perfecta

¿Con qué grado de certeza se dan en la economía real?

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Teoría clásica de la localización (I)

Dos corrientesA) centrada en los costes de producciónA) centrada en los costes de producción como determinante de la localización de una industria (Weber)B) centrada en el tamaño y forma del área de mercado de una empresa

Punto clave en ambas: Distancia geográfica

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Teoría del coste de producción: La localización de una industria viene

Teoría clásica de la localización (II)

localización de una industria viene determinada por :* factores generales o primarios* factores locales o secundarios

Posible tercer factor: aglomeración (pool)



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Teorías sobre la inversión directa

Concepto básico: Las empresas situaránsus inversiones en los lugares donde estésus inversiones en los lugares donde estéel mayor retorno financiero.

Problema: Medición del retorno financieropor diferencias geográficas en los tipos deinterés de las inversiones financieras.



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Necesidad de un nuevo enfoque

Siguen vigentes ciertos elementosSiguen vigentes ciertos elementos relativos a las teorías del comercio y la localización.Pero los modelos clásicos tienen ciertas limitaciones:

Son estáticosSon estáticosAsumen procesos sencillosAparecen “discontinuidades”

En resumen:

Mundo volátilVentaja comparativa cambianteFenómenos complejos e interconectados

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PERSPECTIVA HISTÓRICAPERSPECTIVA HISTÓRICA

Breve perspectiva histórica (I)

Antes del S XV-XVI: comercio local y deAntes del S. XV XVI: comercio local y de larga distanciaS. XV-XVI: Expansión marítima

núcleo y periferiamanufacturas/bienes básicos

Aparición corporaciones internacionalesSegunda Guerra mundial

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Breve perspectiva histórica (II)

¿Por qué es necesaria la visión histórica?¿Por qué es necesaria la visión histórica?Confusión: proceso y resultados de la globalizaciónEs necesario conocer antecedentesSirve para desmitificar ciertos erroresSirve para desmitificar ciertos errores comúnmente aceptados

Tendencias del SECPremisa: el capitalismo tiende a intensificar y

extender sus relacionesextender sus relaciones.- La mercantilización creciente posibilita el

crecimiento…- … pero el avance es cíclicoSurgen tres dificultades de análisis: definir qué hay

di ó di l ó i t t lque medir, cómo medirlo y cómo interpretar lo medido.

En resumen, el capitalismo tiende a extender e intensificar sus relaciones, aunque sea de forma desigual el ritmo temporal y utilizando variables múltiples, hasta lograr que, a día de hoy, no existan espacios no sometidos en cierto grado al capitalismo.

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Tendencia a la globalización de los elementos del SEC

Transporte y comunicacionesTransporte y comunicacionesMigracionesFinanzasComercioProducciónProducciónDemandaAgentes

1

INTRODUCCIÓN AL CRECIMIENTO ECONÓMICO

1. INTRODUCCIÓN. LOS “HECHOS ESTILIZADOS”

La preocupación de por qué unos países son tan ricos y otros tan pobres ha

preocupado a la mayoría de autores desde el comienzo de la ciencia económica. Sin

embargo, el mayor desarrollo comienza en la década de los 50, cuando Robert Solow

publicó dos ensayos en los que aclara el papel de la acumulación de capital e insiste

en la importancia del progreso tecnológico como fuerza impulsora del crecimiento

económico sostenido.

Durante los 60 y 70 aparecieron numerosos trabajos sobre crecimiento de autores

como Moses Abramovitz, Kenneth Arrow, Simon Kuznets, etc. A principios de los 80,

Paul Romer y Robert Lucas, de la U. de Chicago, dieron un nuevo enfoque del

crecimiento insistiendo en la economía de las “ideas” y del capital humano. Siguiendo

estos trabajos han aparecido otros como los de R. Barro, en Harvard.

Antes de estudiar alguna de estas teorías, exponemos lo que algunos autores han

llamado “hechos estilizados”, que hacen referencia a las regularidades básicas que

experimentan países similares a largo plazo. Siguiendo a Jones, éstos son:

- hay una variación muy grande en el ingreso per cápita entre las economías.

Los países más pobres tienen ingresos per cápita que son inferiores al 5% de

los ingresos per cápita de los países más ricos.

- Las tasas de crecimiento económico varían de forma importante entre países.

- Las tasas de crecimiento no son necesariamente constantes en el trasncurso

del tiempo.

- La posición relativa de un país en la distribución mundial del ingreso per cápita

no es inmutable. Los países pueden cambiar de ser pobres a ser ricos y

viceversa.

- En Estados Unidos, durante el último siglo se observa que (y se han observado

como características de la mayor parte de las economías a largo plazo):

o La tasa real de rendimiento de capital, r, no muestra tendencia

ascendente ni descendente

o Las partes del ingreso dedicadas al capital, rK/Y, y al trabajo, wL/Y, no

muestran tendencias, y

o La tasa de crecimiento promedio de la producción por persona ha sido

positiva y relativamente constante en el tiempo

2

- El crecimiento en la producción y el crecimiento en el volumen del comercio

internacional están estrechamente relacionados (suma de exportaciones más

importaciones frente a PIB).

- Tanto los trabajadores cualificados como los no cualificados tienden a emigrar

de países o regiones pobres a los ricos.

2. LA COMPRENSIÓN DEL CRECIMIENTO ECONÓMICO.

Las tres preguntas básicas que hay que intentar responder son: ¿por qué somos tan

ricos y otros son tan pobres?, ¿cuál es el motor del crecimiento económico? y ¿cómo

comprendemos los milagros económicos?

La respuesta a la primera pregunta nos la da el modelo de Solow. La producción por

trabajador en estado estacionario se determina por la tasa de inversión en inputs

privados como capital físico y habilidades, por la tasa de crecimiento de la fuerza

laboral y por la productividad de esos inputs. Los datos sobre capital, educación y

productividad dan un fuerte respaldo a la hipótesis de Solow. Los países ricos son los

que invierten una gran parte de su PIB y su tiempo para acumular capital y

habilidades. Sin embargo, países como EE.UU. son ricos no sólo porque tienen

grandes cantidades de capital y educación por trabajador, sino también porque estos

factores se usan en forma muy productiva. Los países pobres no sólo carecen de

capital y educación sino que la productividad con que usas los factores productivos

que poseen también es baja.

Pueden surgir otras preguntas adicionales (¿por qué unos países invierten mucho

menos que otros? ¿por qué usan el capital y las habilidades con menor

productividad?) que encuentran la respuesta en factores como leyes, políticas

gubernamentales, instituciones... en conjunto, la infraestructura que da forma al

ambiente económico en el cual las personas producen y realizan las transacciones. Si

dicha infraestructura estimula la producción e inversión, la economía prospera, pero si

estimula los desvíos en lugar de la producción, las consecuencias pueden ser nocivas.

Cuando no se puede asegurar a los empresarios que recibirán un rendimiento, ni

invertirán. Esto sucede para inversiones en capital, habilidades o tecnología. La

corrupción, los sobornos, el robo y la expropiación pueden reducir los incentivos para

la inversión, con efectos devastadores sobre la renta. Los impuestos, la regulación, los

litigios, etc. son otros ejemplos, menos graves de desvíos que afectan a las

inversiones de toda clase, incluso en las economías avanzadas (aunque estos países

3

son avanzados precisamente porque han encontrado las formas de limitar el grado de

desvío de las economías).

En cuanto a la segunda pregunta, el motor del crecimiento es la invención. El modelo

de Solow sugiere esto a nivel matemático: el crecimiento en ese modelo cesa a menos

que la tecnología de la producción mejore exponencialmente. Para Romer este motor

funciona gracias a los empresarios que, en busca de la fama y fortuna que

recompensan la invención, crean las nuevas ideas que impulsan el progreso

tecnológico. Las ideas no son bienes rivales (el uso de una idea –el cálculo, por

ejemplo –no impide el uso simultáneo de la misma idea por otra persona al mismo

tiempo). Esta propiedad significa que la producción involucra, necesariamente,

rendimientos crecientes. Por ejemplo, para producir la primera copia de Windows NT

se necesitaron cientos de millones de dólares, pero una vez creada la idea de

Windows NT es posible duplicarla sin apenas coste alguno. La presencia de

rendimientos crecientes a escala significa que no es posible hacer un modelo de la

economía de las ideas en competencia perfecta, por lo que hay que incluir la

competencia imperfecta: las empresas deben estar en posibilidad de cobrar precios

mayores que el coste marginal para cubrir el gasto, por una sola vez, requerido para

crear una idea.

Los milagros económicos (economías como Hong Kong o Japón, en las que desde la

Segunda Guerra Mundial hasta finales del siglo XX los ingresos reales crecieron

alrededor de un 5% anual) sólo son comprensibles como reflejo de los movimientos de

una economía dentro de la distribución del ingreso mundial. Algo sucedió en estas

economías para desplazar sus ingresos relativos en estado estacionario, de valores

que eran muy bajos en comparación con los de EEUU a valores que son relativamente

altos. Para realizar la transición del estado estacionario bajo al estado estacionario

alto, estas economías tienen que crecer con más rapidez que EEUU. Según los

principios de la dinámica de la transición, cuanto más lejos se encuentre un país de su

estado estacionario, tanto más rápidamente crecerá. Se espera que a la larga se

complete la transición al nuevo estado estacionario y el crecimiento en esos países se

estabilice en torno a la tasa tecnológica mundial.

¿Cómo tiene lugar esta transformación? La respuesta está implícita en la explicación

de la riqueza de las naciones. Si las diferencias en infraestructuras son un

determinante clave de las diferencias en ingresos entre un país y otro, entonces los

cambios en infraestructura en una economía pueden conducir a cambios en la reta.

4

Las reformas fundamentales que desplazan los incentivos en una economía, lejos de

los desvíos y hacia actividades productivas, pueden estimular la inversión, la

acumulación de habilidades, la transferencia de tecnología y el uso eficiente de esas

inversiones. Al desplazar el estado estacionario a largo plazo de una economía, esas

reformas adoptan el principio de la dinámica de transición y producen milagros del

crecimiento.

Como conclusión podemos decir que durante el transcurso de la historia del

crecimiento económico fue esporádico e inconsistente. Debido a que instituciones

como los derechos de propiedad no estaban suficientemente desarrollados, no eran

frecuentes los descubrimientos y las invenciones. No existían las inversiones en

capital y habilidades necesarias para generar y aplicar estas invenciones. En la

actualidad, problemas similares empobrecen a muchas naciones en el mundo. En

siglos recientes y en algunos países en particular han surgido las instituciones y la

infraestructura que son la base del crecimiento económico. El resultado es que el

progreso tecnológico, motor del crecimiento, ha adquirido vida.

3. EL MODELO DE SOLOW

3.1 Formalización del modelo

El modelo supone que se produce un único bien homogéneo con dos factores: capital

y trabajo.

Las dos ecuaciones a través de las cuales se construye el modelo son: una función

de producción y una ecuación de acumulación de capital.

La función de producción, tiene la forma tradicional de una Cobb-Douglas, y se

determina por:

αα −==

1),( LKLKFY , donde α es algún número entre 0 y 1.

Una de las características de esta función es que presenta rendimientos constantes a

escala (si duplicamos los inputs, la producción también se duplicará).

Podemos redactar de nuevo la ecuación de producción, en términos de producción por

trabajador, LYy ≡ , y capital por trabajador, LKk ≡ .

La nueva ecuación será por tanto:

αky =

Si representamos esta función, tenemos un gráfico como el siguiente:

5

Según el gráfico, con más capital por trabajador, las empresas generan más

producción por trabajador, sin embargo, a medida que aumentamos más el capital por

trabajador, la producción por trabajador va aumentando a tasas menores, es decir, hay

rendimientos decrecientes en el capital por trabajador.

La segunda ecuación a través de la cual se construye el modelo, es la ecuación de

acumulación de capital, que se expresa así:

dKsYK −=&

Según esta ecuación, el cambio en la existencia de capital, K& , es igual a la cantidad

de inversión bruta, sY , menos la cantidad de depreciación que ocurre durante el

proceso de producción, dK .

La notación “punto” indica que trabajamos con una derivada con respecto al tiempo, es

decir, dt

dKK ≡& .

Uno de los supuestos del modelo, es que la economía es cerrada, por lo que tenemos

que el ahorro es igual a la inversión, y suponemos que en esta economía el único uso

de la inversión es la acumulación de capital.

Para estudiar la evolución de la producción por persona, en esta economía,

reescribimos la ecuación de acumulación de capital en términos de capital por

persona. De este modo, la función de producción representada anteriormente,

mostrará la cantidad de producción por persona realizada para cualquier existencia de

capital por persona que tengamos en la economía.

Para obtener la ecuación de acumulación de capital en términos de capital por

trabajador (para así poder compararla con la de producción) necesitamos valernos de

un sencillo “truco matemático”. Este “truco” consiste en primero tomar logaritmos, y

después derivarlos.

αky =y

k

6

LKkLKk logloglog −=⇒=

k

kk

kdt

dk

dk

kd

dt

kd && ===

1loglog

L

L

K

K

k

k

dt

Ld

dt

Kd

dt

kd &&&−=⇒−=

logloglog

Si combinamos este último resultado con la ecuación de acumulación de capital

dKsYK −=& , tenemos:

dK

sY

K

K−=

&

y del desarrollo anterior tenemos:

L

L

k

k

K

K &&&+=

por lo que combinando ambas tenemos:

dK

sY

L

L

k

k−=+

&&

y reordenando:

L

Ld

K

sY

k

k &&−−=

y de esta ecuación sólo nos queda por explicar el último término. L

L& es la tasa de

crecimiento de la fuerza laboral. Nosotros supondremos que la tasa de participación de

la fuerza laboral es constante y que la tasa de crecimiento de la población se expresa

mediante el parámetro n . Puesto que la participación de la fuerza laboral es

constante, esta crecerá a la misma tasa que lo hace la población, es decir, a la tasa n .

Por lo tanto, la última ecuación se nos queda en:

ndK

sY

k

k−−=

&

Así obtenemos la ecuación de acumulación de capital en términos por trabajador:

kdnsyk )( +−=&

Esta ecuación determina el cambio en cada periodo del capital por trabajador

mediante tres términos. La inversión por trabajador, sy , aumenta k , mientras que la

depreciación por trabajador, dk , lo disminuye. El nuevo término nk , influye en la

ecuación reduciendo k . En cada periodo, hay nL nuevos trabajadores que no se

encontraban ahí durante el último periodo, por lo que si no se produjeron nuevas

7

inversiones, el capital por trabajador disminuirá como consecuencia del aumento de la

fuerza laboral.

A partir de las dos ecuaciones clave del modelo de Solow:

αky =

kdnsyk )( +−=&

realizaremos el diagrama básico de Solow.

El diagrama de Solow, se compone de dos curvas. La primera de ellas es la cantidad

de inversión por persona: αsksy = . La forma de esta curva es la misma que la de la

función de producción representada antes, sólo que ahora se encuentra desplazada

hacia abajo por el factor s . La segunda curva, es la línea kdn )( + , que representa la

cantidad de nueva inversión por persona necesaria para mantener constante la

cantidad de capital por trabajador. La diferencia entre las dos curvas es el cambio en

la cantidad de capital por trabajador. Cuando este cambio es positivo y en la economía

aumenta el capital por trabajador, se dice que está ocurriendo una profundización del

capital. Cuando este cambio es de cero, pero la existencia de capital crece (debido al

aumento de la población), se dice que ocurre un ensanchamiento del capital.

Supongamos que una economía, dispone de un capital k0, como es el caso de la figura

anterior. Lo que tratamos de ver es lo que ocurrirá con el paso del tiempo. En k0 la

cantidad de inversión por trabajador es mayor que la necesaria para mantener

constante el capital por trabajador, por lo que tiene lugar una profundización del

capital, k aumenta con el paso del tiempo. Cuando llegamos al punto en el que el

capital por trabajador es igual a k*, finaliza la profundización del capital, ya que

sy

y

k

kdn )( +

0k *k

8

kdnsy )( += , por lo que 0=k& . Llegamos en este punto a una situación en la que el

capital por trabajador permanece constante, y que es conocido como el estado

estacionario.

Si en lugar de partir de un punto como k0 menor que k*, lo hiciéramos desde uno

mayor que k*, ocurriría el fenómeno inverso. En un caso así, el término k& sería

negativo y por tanto la cantidad de capital por trabajador comenzaría a descender.

Este descenso continuaría hasta alcanzar de nuevo del estado estacionario k* donde

kdnsy )( += .

La utilidad del diagrama de Solow, reside en que determina el valor del capital por

trabajador en estado estacionario, a partir del cual y a través de la función de

producción αky = obtenemos el valor en estado estacionario de la producción por

trabajador.

3.2 Estática comparativa

En este punto trataremos de ver como reacciona el modelo ante cambios en los

valores de diversos parámetros. Analizaremos lo que ocurre cuando se produce un

aumento en la tasa de inversión y uno en la tasa de crecimiento de la población.

Partiendo de una economía que ha llegado al valor de estado estacionario de la

producción por trabajador, supondremos que los consumidores desean ahora

aumentar de forma permanente la tasa de inversión, desde s hasta s’. El aumento en

la tasa de inversión desplaza la curva sy hacia arriba hasta s’y. Con el valor actual de

existencias de capital, k*, la inversión por trabajador excede la cantidad necesaria para

mantener constante el capital por trabajador y, por tanto, la economía comienza la

profundización del capital. Esta profundización continúa hasta que llegamos a un

nuevo estado estacionario para un nivel de capital por trabajador k**. Con este capital

por trabajador tendremos un mayor nivel de renta per cápita; la economía es ahora

más rica que antes.

9

Supongamos ahora que debido a la inmigración, la tasa de crecimiento de la población

pase de n a n’. En este nuevo caso, lo que tendrá lugar, será un ascenso de la curva

(n+d)k. Al valor actual de las existencias de capital, k*, la inversión por trabajador ya no

es lo suficientemente alta para mantener constante la razón capital-trabajo. Por tanto,

la razón capital-trabajo comienza a descender, hasta que llega al nuevo estado

estacionario para un nivel de capital por trabajador k**. En este punto la economía tiene

un menor nivel de capital por trabajador y por lo tanto es más pobre. La producción per

cápita es menor después del aumento del crecimiento de la población.

3.3 Propiedades del estado estacionario

La cantidad de capital por trabajador en el estado estacionario se determina por la

condición de que 0=k& .

Con las dos ecuaciones básicas del modelo, hallaremos la solución de las cantidades

en estado estacionario de capital por trabajador y producción por trabajador.

αky =

kdnsyk )( +−=&

Si sustituimos la primera ecuación en la segunda, obtenemos:

kdnskk )( +−=α&

y estableciendo la condición de estado estacionario 0=k& ,

( )α−

+=

11

*

dn

sk

si sustituimos este resultado en la función de producción, obtenemos la cantidad en

estado estacionario de producción por trabajador.

( )αα −

+=

1

*

dn

sy

Con estos resultados podemos llegar a algunas conclusiones.

Los países que tienen más altas tasas de ahorro/inversión tenderán a ser más ricos.

Estos países acumulan más capital por trabajador y por tanto más producción por

trabajador.

10

Los países que tienen altas tasas de crecimiento de la población, tenderán a ser más

pobres. En estas economías, una mayor parte de los ahorros tiene que dedicarse

simplemente a mantener constante la razón de capital-trabajo. Este requisito de

ensanchamiento del capital hace que sea más difícil la profundización del capital, y

estas economías tienden a acumular menos capital por trabajador.

3.4 Crecimiento económico en el modelo sencillo

Con la versión del modelo de Solow que acabamos de analizar, no tenemos en el

estado estacionario crecimiento per cápita. La producción por trabajador es constante

en el estado estacionario. La producción en sí, está creciendo, pero sólo a la tasa de

crecimiento de la población.

En este modelo, las economías quizás crezcan por un tiempo pero no indefinidamente.

Por ejemplo, una economía que comienza con una existencia de capital por trabajador

inferior a su valor en estado estacionario experimentará crecimiento en k y en y, a lo

largo de la ruta de transición al estado estable. Sin embargo, con el tiempo el

crecimiento disminuye según la economía se acerca a su estado estacionario, llegará

un momento en que el crecimiento se detiene por completo. Mostramos a continuación

cómo el crecimiento disminuye a lo largo de la ruta de transición:

A partir de la ecuación de acumulación de capital:

kdnskk )( +−=α&

calculamos la tasa de crecimiento de esta acumulación de capital:

)(1 dnskk

k+−=

−α&

como α es menor que 1, según aumenta k, la tasa de crecimiento de k disminuye de

forma gradual. Ya que la tasa de crecimiento de y es proporcional a la tasa de

crecimiento de k, esta afirmación también es cierta para la producción por trabajador.

Estudiaremos ahora la dinámica de transición de la última ecuación.

El primer término de la ecuación, 1−αsk , es igual a ksy . Cuanto más alto sea el nivel

de capital por trabajador, menor será el producto promedio del capital ky , debido a la

acumulación de los rendimientos decrecientes del capital (α es inferior a 1). Por lo

tanto esta curva tiene pendiente descendente.

El segundo término, al lado derecho de la ecuación, es n+d, que es independiente de

k, por lo que lo dibujamos como una línea horizontal.

11

La diferencia entre estas dos líneas, es la tasa de crecimiento de las existencias de

capital, k

k&.

La figura muestra que cuanto más baja se encuentre una economía de su valor en

estado estacionario de k, con mayor rapidez crecerá. También cuanto más alta se

encuentre una economía sobre su valor en estado estacionario de k, más rápidamente

disminuirá k.

3.5 La tecnología y el modelo de Solow

Para generar crecimiento sostenido en el ingreso per cápita en este modelo, hay que

introducir el progreso tecnológico en el modelo. Logramos esto introduciendo una

variable de tecnología, A, en la función de producción:

αα −==

1)(),( ALKALKFY

Cuando la tecnología entra de esta forma en la función de producción, se dice que es

“neutral de Harrod”. El progreso tecnológico ocurre cuando A aumenta con el paso del

tiempo, lo que hace que una unidad de trabajo se haga más productiva a medida que

el nivel tecnológico es más alto.

Uno de los hándicaps más importantes del modelo, es que considera la tecnología

como algo exógeno, como un “maná del cielo” del que no tratamos de analizar cual es

su procedencia. Simplemente reconocemos que existe progreso tecnológico, y

hacemos la suposición de que está creciendo a una tasa constante:

gA

A=

&

g es el parámetro que expresa la tasa de crecimiento de la tecnología.

La ecuación de acumulación de capital en el modelo de Solow es la misma que antes:

12

dK

sY

K

K−=

&

La función de producción en términos de producción por trabajador, quedaría:

αα −=

1Aky

después de tomar logaritmos y diferenciar:

A

A

k

k

y

y &&&)1( αα −+=

En la ecuación de acumulación de capital, se observa que la tasa de crecimiento de K

será constante si y sólo si Y/K es constante. Además, si Y/K es constante, y/k también

lo es, y lo más importante, y y k estarán creciendo a la misma tasa. La situación donde

el capital, la producción, el consumo y la población están creciendo a tasas constantes

se conoce como una ruta de crecimiento equilibrada.

A lo largo de una ruta de crecimiento equilibrada en el modelo de Solow, tanto la

producción por trabajador como el capital por trabajador crecen a la tasa del cambio

tecnológico exógeno, g.

El modelo con tecnología, revela que el progreso tecnológico es la fuente del

crecimiento per cápita sostenido.

3.6 El diagrama de Solow con tecnología

La única diferencia con respecto al análisis anterior (sin tecnología), es que la variable

k no sigue siendo constante a largo plazo, por lo que se tiene que escribir la ecuación

diferencial en términos de otra variable. La nueva variable de estado será ALKk ≡~

.

Esto es equivalente a Ak , y es constante a lo largo de la ruta de crecimiento

equilibrada. La variable k~

representa la razón del capital por trabajador a la

tecnología. Nos referiremos a esto como la razón de “capital-tecnología”.

Si rescribimos la función de producción en términos de k~

, obtenemos:

αky~~ =

donde AyALYy =≡~ . Denominaremos a y~ como la razón “producción-

tecnología”.

Si rescribimos ahora la ecuación de acumulación de capital en términos de k~

,

tenemos:

13

L

L

A

A

K

K

k

k &&&&−−=~

~

al combinar esto con la ecuación de acumulación de capital, obtenemos:

kdgnysk~

)(~~++−=

&

En la figura siguiente se representa el diagrama de Solow con progreso tecnológico.

Si la economía comienza con una razón de capital-tecnología inferior a su nivel de

estado estacionario, por ejemplo, en 0

~k , la razón de capital-tecnología se elevará

gradualmente con el tiempo. Esto sucede así, porque la cantidad de inversión que se

realiza, excede a la cantidad necesaria para mantener constante la razón capital-

tecnología. Esto será así hasta alcanzar el punto *~

k , donde kdgnys~

)(~ ++= , y

donde la economía se encuentra en estado estacionario y creciendo a lo largo de una

ruta de crecimiento equilibrada.

3.7 Solución para el estado estacionario

La razón producción-tecnología en estado estacionario se determina mediante la

función de producción y la condición de que 0~

=k&

)1(1

*~α−

++

=dgn

sk

al sustituir en la función de producción, se nos queda:

)1(

*~αα −

++

=dgn

sy

si lo dejamos en términos de producción por trabajador, rescribimos la ecuación como:

)1(

* )()(

αα −

++

=dgn

stAty

según esta última ecuación la producción por trabajador a lo largo de la ruta de

crecimiento equilibrado se determina mediante la tecnología, la tasa de inversión y la

tasa de crecimiento de la población. Para el caso especial en que g = 0 y A0 = 1, es

decir, de ningún progreso tecnológico, el resultado obtenido es el mismo que ya

explicamos anteriormente.

Un resultado interesante que se obtiene del análisis de la última ecuación es que los

cambios en la tasa de inversión o en la tasa de crecimiento de la población afectan al

14

nivel de la producción por trabajador a largo plazo, pero no afectan a la tasa de

crecimiento de la producción por trabajador a largo plazo.

Un ejemplo sencillo para entender esto último:

Supongamos que una economía comienza en estado estacionario con la tasa de

inversión s, y después aumenta permanentemente esa tasa a s’ (debido por ejemplo a

un subsidio a la inversión permanente). Según la siguiente figura, a la razón inicial *~

k ,

de capital-tecnología, la inversión excede la cantidad necesaria para mantener

constante dicha razón capital-tecnología por lo que k~ comienza a subir.

Vemos a continuación los efectos sobre el crecimiento de dicha variable.

De la ecuación de acumulación de capital:

kdgnysk~

)(~~++−=

&

obtenemos que:

kdgnk

ys

k

k ~)(~

~

~

~

++−=&

observamos que 1~

~

~−

=αk

k

y. En la figura siguiente mostramos la dinámica de transición

implícita en esta ecuación.

15

Como muestra el diagrama, el aumento en la tasa de inversión hasta s’ eleva

temporalmente la tasa de crecimiento, mientras la economía transita al nuevo estado

estacionario, **~k . Puesto que g es constante, el crecimiento más rápido en k~ , a lo

largo de la ruta de transición, implica que la producción por trabajador aumenta con

mayor rapidez que la tecnología: gyy >& . Esto se muestra en la figura siguiente, en

la que vemos como la tasa de crecimiento de la producción por trabajador se hace

mayor que g en el momento t*, y en periodos posteriores, a medida que se acerca de

nuevo al estado estacionario, la producción por trabajador vuelve a crecer a la tasa g.

Dos conclusiones interesantes que obtenemos son. Primero, los cambios de política

en el modelo de Solow, aumentan las tasas de crecimiento, pero sólo en forma

temporal, a lo largo de la transición al nuevo estado estacionario. Es decir, los cambios

en las políticas no tienen “efectos de crecimiento” a largo plazo. Segundo, los cambio

en las políticas pueden tener “efectos de nivel”. Es decir, un cambio de política

permanente puede elevar (o disminuir) permanentemente el nivel de producción per

cápita.

Comentario lecturas sesión 6

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1105634

1

Forthcoming in Paul Rhode and Gianni Toniolo, eds., Understanding the 1990s: The Economy in Long Run Perspective Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Technical Change and U.S. Economic Growth: the Interwar Period and the 1990s

by

Alexander J. Field Department of Economics

Santa Clara University Santa Clara, CA 95053 email: [email protected]

• For comments on earlier versions of this research, I am grateful to Nick Crafts, Stanley Engerman, Robert Gordon, Robert Solow, and Gavin Wright. I also thank participants in the conference “Understanding the 1990s: The Economy in Long Run Perspective” held at Duke University, March 26-27, 2004, seminars at Harvard, Dartmouth, Rutgers, the University of Virginia, Indiana University, the All Ohio Economic History Seminar (joint with the Macroeconomics Seminar), the World Cliometrics conference, Venice, Italy, the Economic History Association meetings, San Jose, California, Yale University, the University of Michigan, and UCLA.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1105634

2

Technical Change and U.S. Economic Growth: the Interwar Period and the 1990s

ABSTRACT

Multifactor productivity growth in the U.S. economy between 1919 and 1929 was almost entirely attributable to advance within manufacturing. Distributing steam power mechanically over shafts and belts required multistory buildings for economical operation. The widespread diffusion of electric power permitted a shift to single story layouts in which goods flow could be optimized around work stations powered by small electric motors. Within this framework, as well as opportunities to produce a variety of new products, economies of scale and learning by doing permitted rapid and across the board gains in manufacturing productivity. The sector contributed 83 percent of the 2.02 percent per year overall advance in the private nonfarm economy in this ten year period.

The Depression years witnessed manufacturing MFP growth that was not as uniformly distributed as it had been during the twenties, and only half as rapid: 2.60 as opposed to 5.12 percent per year. As a consequence, and in spite of a rise in the sector’s share, manufacturing accounted for only 48 percent of PNE MFP growth between 1929 and 1941. Yet overall growth in MFP was by far the highest of any comparable period in the twentieth century – 2.31 percent per year. This resulted from combining a manufacturing contribution which by any standard of comparison other than that of the 1920s was world class, with spillovers from government financed infrastructural investment that enabled rapid advance in other parts of the economy, particularly transport and public utilities and wholesale and retail distribution.

MFP growth between 1989 and 2000 was more than twice what it had been during the years 1973-89, but less than a third that registered between 1929 and 1941. Within manufacturing, advance was narrowly concentrated within the old SIC 35 and 36, virtually all of this attributable to information technology (IT). IT was also responsible for some MFP growth in using industries, notably wholesale and retail distribution and securities trading. This paper questions the common practice of also crediting IT with the portion of capital deepening’s effect on labor productivity associated with the accumulation of specific IT capital goods.

3

Introduction

Looking back over the twentieth century, the years 1948-73 stand out as the golden

age of labor productivity growth and living standard improvement in the United States –

the result of a combination of respectable multifactor productivity growth and robust

rates of capital deepening. The period 1973-89, in contrast, was the most disappointing,

because of the virtual collapse of multifactor productivity growth during these years. The

contrast between these periods gave rise to a raft of studies trying to pinpoint the causes

of the slowdown in MFP growth and, as a consequence, labor productivity growth. More

recently, attention has shifted toward determining the contribution of the IT revolution to

the revival of productivity growth in the 1990s.

Most of these studies, however, embrace an historical perspective that reaches back

no further than 1948, the year in which most of the standard series maintained by the

Bureau of Labor Statistics begin. This paper, in contrast, pushes the time horizon back to

the end of the nineteenth/beginning of the twentieth century, with particular attention to

the period following the First World War and preceding U.S. entry into World War II in

1941. It combines a summary of the magnitude and sources of productivity advance

during the interwar years with a comparative examination of progress during the last

decade of the century.

Because of the influence of cyclical factors on productivity levels, it is common in

historical research to restrict calculations of productivity growth rates to peak to peak

comparisons. For the most recent episode, this requires measurement from 1989 to 2000.

Many students of the productivity revival prefer nevertheless to measure from 1995.

Although 1995 is not a business cycle peak, the acceleration in output growth after 1995

4

does make the revival look more striking. Whether it is desirable or appropriate to

choose one’s start date with the objective of making the contrast between recent and past

history more dramatic is of course an open question.

Table 1 Compound Annual Growth Rates of MFP, Labor, and Capital Productivity

Private Non-Farm Economy, United States, 1889-2000

Note: Output per adjusted hour uses an hours index that has been augmented to reflect changes in labor quality or composition. In creating this index, different categories of labor are weighted by their respective wage rates. Sources: 1889-48: Kendrick (1961), Table A-XXIII. The unadjusted data are from the column headed output per man hour, the adjusted data from the column headed output per unit of labor input. Capital Productivity is output per unit of capital input. 1948-2000, Bureau of Labor Statistics www.bls.gov, series MPU750021, MPU750023, MPU750024, and MPU750028. These data are from the multifactor productivity section of the website, accessed April 12, 2004. The labor productivity section contains more recent data and is updated more frequently.

That said, the recent achievement is impressive when measured in relation to the

period of slow growth that preceded it. But even if we show the recent acceleration in its

best light, by measuring from 1995 onward to the peak of the cycle in 2000, end of

century labor productivity advance remained well below golden age rates. Perhaps more

surprisingly, it remained in the same range as that registered during the interwar period

MFP Output/HourOutput/Adjusted

HoursOutput/UnitCapital Input

1889-1901 2.21 2.20 2.79 .52 1901-19 1.08 1.71 1.44 .01 1919-29 2.02 2.27 2.33 1.09 1929-41 2.31 2.35 2.21 2.47 1941-48 1.29 1.71 1.42 1.32 1948-73 1.90 2.88 2.64 .18 1973-89 .34 1.34 1.03 -1.24 1989-2000 .78 1.92 1.41 -.61 1973-95 .38 1.37 .98 -.98 1995-2000 1.14 2.46 2.08 -.84

5

(see Table 1). And multifactor productivity growth was less than half what it was during

the Depression years.2

The seminal studies by Abramovitz (1956) and Solow (1957) showed that, in

comparison with the nineteenth century, a large gap opened up in the first half of the

twentieth century between the growth of real output and a weighted average of inputs

conventionally measured. This gap, termed the “residual”, was subsequently interpreted

by Abramovitz as reflecting a shift to a knowledge based type of economic development

which, from the vantage point of mid-century, was expected to persist (Abramovitz,

1993, p. 224).

By and large it did so for another quarter century. But the sixteen year period of

slow productivity growth generally dated from 1973 forced, or should have forced, a

reassessment of the view that the Abramovitz and Solow studies identified a permanent

sea change. The end of century revival of productivity growth, in turn, has focused

attention on what caused the growth of the residual to accelerate and how much of it

could be laid at the feet of IT.

This paper focuses on the two major cycles of the interwar period (1919-29 and

1929-41) and the more recent 1989-2000 period. All three periods experienced

comparable labor productivity growth rates. The respective contributions of multifactor

productivity growth and capital deepening were, however, quite different, as were the

sectoral locations of rapid advance.

2 Some scholars restrict the term Depression to the years 1929-33. As a terminological matter, I view the Depression to have extended over the 12 year period 1929-41; over these years output was persistently depressed below its potential.

6

Overview of Twentieth Century Growth Trends

For the moment, let’s look forward from 1929. With some simplification the labor

productivity growth history of the United States between 1929 and 1995 can be thought

of as consisting of three periods in which the respective contributions of MFP growth and

capital deepening were quite distinct. The years 1929-1948 witnessed exceptionally high

rates of MFP growth, but very little capital deepening.

Between 1948 and 1973 lower but still respectable MFP growth combined with a

revival of physical capital deepening to produce the highest rates of labor productivity

growth in the century, and a golden age of living standard improvement. Between 1973

and 1995 capital deepening continued at somewhat slower rates but multifactor

productivity growth in the U.S. economy effectively disappeared. Labor productivity

rose, but at greatly reduced rates (1.37 percent per year) compared with the 2.88 percent

annual growth clocked during the golden age (see Table 1; data is for the private nonfarm

economy). At the end the century, labor productivity growth again approached golden

age rates, principally as the result of a revival of MFP growth.

The Rise in Output per Hour during the Depression: Causes and Consequences

A number of economists have been aware of the rise in output per hour during the

Depression, but most of the attention in explaining this has been on the effects of

selective retention of workers, particularly during the 1929-33 downturn.(Margo, 1991).

By 1941, however, when recovery had finally pushed unemployment rates into single

digit levels, much of this should have been unwound. There were secular improvements

in labor quality during the Depression years as well, but comparison of columns 2 and 3

of Table 1 suggests that such improvements can explain only a small fraction of the

7

growth in output per hour between 1929 and 1941.3 Clearly other factors had to have

been operative, and among these was not physical capital deepening, as can also be seen

from Table 1.

Since there was virtually no increase in private sector inputs conventionally

measured between 1929 and 1941, MFP advance accounted for all of the 32 percent

increase in the real output of the private nonfarm economy over these years. And since

there was no private sector capital deepening, the same was true for the increase in output

per hour. Masked by the continuing levels of high unemployment, an impressive

expansion of the potential output of the U.S. economy was taking place.

Does the claim that the Depression years witnessed the highest MFP growth rates of

the century include consideration of the end of century “New Economy” boom? The

short answer is that it does. From my offices at a university in the heart of Silicon

Valley, I had a ringside view of the investment boom, the rising share prices, and some of

the hyperbolic claims that drove both. The upwardly spiraling equity valuations of the

1990s were propelled by human fallibility and one of the most formidable marketing

machines ever assembled in this country. With assists from research departments of

brokerage firms, IT companies celebrating their own prospects, independent public

relations firms, radio, television and print media and, at times, government officials and

academic economists, massive quantities of warm air continuously fanned speculative

fires fueled by dreams of Dow 36,000. The drum beat thus created could be heard

distinctly and sometimes quite loudly within the Valley. For better or for worse, this

enthusiastic advocacy lead to a reorganization of the Federal government’s statistical

3 For a more extended discussion of this issue, see Field, 2004a.

8

apparatus in an effort to make it more sensitive to the possible contributions of the IT

revolution to growth.

But the data from the end of the twentieth century, even after incorporating the use

of hedonic methods to adjust for quality changes, tell a more nuanced story.

Revolutionary technological or organizational change – the sort that shows up in MFP

growth -- was concentrated within distribution, securities trading, and a narrow range of

industries within a shrinking manufacturing sector. MFP advance within industry was

largely localized within the old SIC 35 and 36,4 sectors that include the production of

semiconductors, computers, networking, and telecommunications equipment. Aggregate

MFP growth remained modest by the historical standards of the twentieth century.

Evidence from the beginning of the twenty first century suggests that we may

finally be getting more substantial MFP payback in the IT using sectors (Wall Street

Journal, November 7, 2003). Labor productivity grew at 2.94 percent per year

continuously compounded from 1995 to 2003 (BLS series PRS85006093, accessed

November 22, 2004). But the staying power of recent trends remains uncertain. We do

not yet have MFP estimates beyond 2001 so it is not clear how much of this recent

growth might be due to an increase in the labor composition contribution due to selective

retention during a recession (which would not persist at this rate through a full recovery),

or how much the capital deepening contribution may have changed since the heady days

of 1995-2000. Capital services grew at 5.38 percent per year between 1995 and 2000,

and their rate of increase has certainly slowed. But hours, which grew at over 2 percent

per year between 1995 and 2000, declined at -1.72 percent per year between 2000:3 and

4 The Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes are being replaced in post 1997 reporting with North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) codes, but I will use the older vocabulary throughout this paper.

9

2003:3. Until we have the capital services numbers we can’t know what has happened to

the capital/hours ratio, but it seems likely that it has risen. We will need to have the

economy approach closer to potential output, and have the data for it, before we can have

a clearer picture of the sustainability of these recent trends. The bottom line is that,

measuring from 1989 through the end of the boom in 2000, aggregate MFP growth,

including that in the IT using sectors, although more than double the rate in 1973-1989,

was only a third that registered between 1929 and 1941 (see Table 1).

Why 1989? And why 2000? Multifactor productivity data is available only on an

annual basis. According to the NBER business cycle chronology, the peak of activity in

July of 1990 was followed by a recession which bottomed out in March of 1991 followed

by the long expansion of the 1990s, culminating in the peak 120 months later (March of

2001). But 2001 was also a year of economic downturn, with the trough reached only

eight months afterwards in November of 2001. Similarly, 1990 included five postpeak

months. Since we are using annual data, I measure from the last full year of expansion

(1989) before a downturn to the subsequent final full year of expansion before a

downturn (2000).5

It is well known that MFP and labor productivity grew at an accelerated pace during

the second half of the 1990s, and it has become conventional to measure to and from

1995, even though the year was not a business cycle peak. The argument against 1995 is

that it is not a peak, a point reflected in the controversy surrounding Gordon’s claims that

much of the end of century improvement reflected cyclical acceleration in both labor and

5 The story told here is not especially sensitive to using 1990 rather than 1989 (the level of MFP in the private nonfarm economy was identical, so the annual rates calculated would rise a bit if we measured from 1990) although choosing 2001 rather than 2000 would reduce the calculated growth rates, since MFP fell between 2000 and 2001.

10

multifactor productivity common in later stages of a business expansion (Gordon, 2003).

Nevertheless, there does seem to be a break in the series circa 1995, and, in deference to

current practice, I also report MFP advance over the last five years of the century. Here

the compound average annual growth rate comes in at 1.14 percent per year. This is three

times the anemic MFP growth registered between 1973 and 1995. But it is still

substantially below golden age rates and, even more remarkably, less than half the rate

registered between 1929 and 1941.

The Role of Manufacturing

If we are discussing contributions to achieved productivity levels in the interwar

period, it is appropriate to place a good deal of emphasis on a growing manufacturing

sector that by 1941 comprised almost a third of the economy. I estimate that 83 percent

of MFP growth in the private nonfarm economy between 1919 and 1929 and about 48

percent of the growth between 1929 and 1941 originated in manufacturing (see below).

For 1995-2000, manufacturing’s contribution was about 39 percent of total MFP growth,

but that total and manufacturing’s percentage point contribution to it were much smaller

than was true in the interwar period.

Although Kendrick does not provide enough information to allow calculation of

MFP growth rates within manufacturing for the 1929-41 and 1941-48 subperiods, I have

attempted to do so for the sector as a whole using Kendrick’s estimates for output and

labor input combined with capital input data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s

Fixed Asset Table 4.2.6 These calculations shows MFP growth within the setcor over the

1929-41 period to have proceeded at the rate of 2.60 percent per year. This is higher than

6 “Chain-Type Quantity Indexes for Net Stock of Nonresidential Fixed Assets by Industry Group and Legal Form of Organization.” See www.bea.gov.

11

in any subsequent period of the twentieth century. It does, however, represent a halving

of the 5.12 percent rate registered over the 1919-29 period, years in which the flexibility

offered by the unit drive electric motor facilitated the shift to single story layout and

assembly line production of automobiles and a host of new electrically powered

consumer durables (David and Wright, 2003, Field, 2004c). My calculations also

suggest, consistent with arguments advanced in Field (2003), a decline in the level of

MFP in manufacturing over the 1941-48 period.

Table 2 Growth of MFP, Labor, and Capital Productivity in Manufacturing

United States, 1889-2000

MFP Output/Hr.

Output/Adjusted

Hour

Output/unit capital input

1889-1919 .71 1.29 1.12 -1.53 1919-29 5.12 5.45 5.45 4.20 1929-41 2.60 2.61 2.46 2.96 1941-48 -.52 .20 .03 -1.82 1949-73 1.49 2.51 n.a. -.03 1973-89 0.57 2.42 n.a. -1.22 1989-2000 1.58 3.56 n.a. .16 1973-1995 0.66 2.61 n.a. -.82 1995-2000 2.09 4.07 n.a. .08

Sources: 1889-29: Kendrick, 1961, Table D-1, p. 464. 1929-41 and 1941-48. Output and Labor Iput are from Kendrick, Tables D-1 and D-2. Capital input is based on the index for manufacturing fixed capital in the Bureau of Economic Analysis Fixed Asset Table 4.2, Chain-Type Quantity Indexes for Net Stock of Nonresidential Fixed Assets by Industry Group and Legal Form of Organization. MFP is calculated based on an assumed share of .7 for labor, .3 for capital. See Appendix Table A-3 for complete calculations. 1949-2000, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Series MPU300001, MPU300002, MPU300003, accessed November 22, 2004.

Technical advance in manufacturing during the 1929-1941 period was not as rapid

and not as uniformly distributed across two digit industries as was true during the 1920s.

The performance in the Depression years looks more impressive, however, when

12

contrasted with what took place in the second half of the century, including the new

economy period at the end of the 1990s. Although technical progress was broadest and

most uniformly high during the 1920s, advance within manufacturing was taking place

across a broader frontier during the Depression than was true in the 1990s.

MFP advance in manufacturing during the Depression years was increasingly

dependent on organized research and development. Table 3 summarizes National

Research Council data on employment of scientists and engineers in U.S. manufacturing.

Total R and D employment increased from 6,274 in 1927 to 10,918 in 1933, and then

almost tripled in the next seven years, reaching 27,777 in 1940.

Margo has documented how much lower was the incidence of unemployment

among professional, technical, and managerial occupational classifications as compared,

for example, with unskilled or blue collar labor, or those with fewer years of schooling

(Margo, 1991). This is indirect evidence that the sharp increase in R and D employment

during the Depression was driven more by an outward shift in the demand for this type of

labor than by a shift in its supply.

According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the real net manufacturing capital

stock was less than 10 percent higher in 1941 than it had been in 1929 while, according to

Kendrick, hours had risen 15.5 percent over the same period (Kendrick, 1961, Appendix

Table D-II). So, at the same time that the aggregate capital-labor ratio in the sector fell,

the relative demand for scientists and engineers increased – not an instance of the capital-

skill complementarity described by Goldin and Katz (1998). During this period

complementarity was between high end labor and the disembodied technical change that

was such an important feature of the Depression years.

13

Table 3 Employment of Scientists and Engineers, United States, 1927-1940

1927 1933 1940 Chemicals 1,812 3,255 7,675 Electrical Machinery 732 1,322 3,269 Petroleum 465 994 2,849 Nonelectrical Machinery 421 629 2,122 Primary Metals 538 850 2,113 Transport Equipment 256 394 1,765 Food/Beverages 354 651 1,712 Stone/Clay/Glass 410 569 1,334 Fabricated Metal Products 334 500 1,332 Instruments 234 581 1,318 Rubber Products 361 564 1,000 Totals, 11 industries 5,917 10,309 26,489 Totals, Manufacturing 6,274 10,918 27,777

Source: National Research Council; Mowery (1981); Mowery and Rosenberg (2000), p. 814.

Table 3 lists the eleven two digit industries that employed at least 1,000 scientists

and engineers in 1940. Chemicals tops the list by a wide margin, followed by electrical

machinery and petroleum. These three industries alone account for almost half the total R

and D employment on the eve of the Second World War. Absent from the list are

tobacco, textiles, apparel, lumber, furniture, paper, publishing and leather – industries

which, with the possible exception of tobacco manufacture, we can identify with the first,

pre-Civil War industrial revolution. Although the emphasis here is on R and D intensive

industries like chemicals, which turned in stellar productivity results during the

Depression, it should be noted that a number of these latter industries, including tobacco

and textiles, also turned in very respectable MFP performance over the period.

14

The overall trends revealed in the employment data are echoed in other R and D

indicators. Between 1929 and 1936 the annual rate of founding of new R and D labs (73)

exceeded the comparable statistic between 1919 and 1928 (66), and real spending on R

and D in manufacturing more than doubled during the 1930s, with an acceleration at the

end of the decade (Mowery and Rosenberg, 2000, pp. 814, 819).

Between 1929 and 1941, as noted, MFP growth in manufacturing fell by half

compared with 1919-29 (see Table 2). There are two closely related questions here. On

the one hand, why did MFP growth fall from 5.12 percent per year to 2.60 percent per

year? The main explanation is that the across the board gains from exploiting small

electric motors, and reconfiguring factories from the multistory pattern that mechanical

distribution of steam power required to the one story layout made possible by

electrification, were nearing exhaustion by the end of the 1920s. As of 1929, 79 percent

of manufacturing horsepower in the United States was already provided by electricity

(Devine, 1983). It’s not that productivity levels in manufacturing were going to fall as a

result of this exhaustion, it’s just that one could not hope to continue to generate five

percent per year growth in the residual from this source.

The related question, then, is why didn’t MFP growth in manufacturing fall more?

Here the answer has to do with the contributions of a maturing and expanding privately

funded research and development system that had begun with Edison at Menlo Park. The

lion’s share of private R and D spending was then and is now done in manufacturing, and

a variety of new technological paradigms, most notably in chemical engineering, were

ripe for exploitation.

15

The growing importance of the manufacturing sector – it generated about a quarter

of national income in 1929, almost a third in 1941 -- helped counterbalance the within

sector decline in MFP growth in terms of the ability of the sector to contribute to high

and indeed accelerating MFP growth in the aggregate economy during the 1930s. Still,

this roughly 2.6 percentage point decline in the MFP growth rate in the sector worked in

the opposite direction, reducing the overall importance of manufacturing in aggregate

MFP growth. Clearly, one had to have substantial accelerations in MFP growth in other

sectors in order to produce the 2.31 continuously compounded growth rate reported in

Table 1 for the private non-farm economy.

That acceleration came principally within transportation and public utilities (about a

tenth of the economy) and to a lesser degree within wholesale and retail distribution

(about a sixth of national income). The remaining sectors, on net, contributed somewhat

less. Agriculture is excluded from this analysis since we are examining the performance

of the private nonfarm economy, but we know that the farm sector’s productivity growth

in the 1930s also lagged behind that of the rest of the economy (see Field, 2003).

With the exception of water transport, productivity performance in transportation

and public utilities between 1929 and 1941 was stellar (Field, 2004a). Of the 4.67

percent per year MFP growth in the sector, trucking and warehousing accounted for

almost 40 percent of the total (1.80 percentage points), railroads an additional 26 percent

(1.22 percentage points). Thus almost two thirds of the sectoral advance took place in

surface transportation, and trucking and warehousing alone accounted for approximately

10 percent of MFP growth in the entire private nonfarm economy.

16

It is useful to contrast the effects of the boom in street, highway, and other

infrastructure construction during the 1930s with those of the rather different government

financed capital formation boom that took place during the 1940s. The latter effort

poured more than $10 billion of taxpayer money into GOPO (government owned,

privately operated) plants. Almost all of this infusion was in manufacturing, and a large

part went for equipment, particularly machine tools, in such strategic sectors as

aluminum, synthetic rubber, aircraft engines, and aviation fuel refining (Gordon, 1969).

Most of this was then sold off to the private sector after the war. This boom in equipment

investment was associated with negative MFP growth in manufacturing between 1941

and 1948 and, partly as a result, a slowdown in private nonfarm economy MFP growth

overall (see Field, 2004b). In contrast, the infrastructure spending during the 1930s had

positive spillovers in the private sector, particularly in transportation and distribtution.

The achievements of the 1930s built on foundations put in place during the

Depression years as well as work done in the1920s and earlier. By establishing

groundwork for subsequent advance, the period also restocked the larder. For example,

almost all of the development work done by Farnsworth on the quintessential postwar

consumer commodity was carried out during the Depression, supported by venture capital

funding. The new product (television) was introduced to a wide public in 1939 at the

New York World’s Fair, but the demands of war forestalled its full exploitation until after

1948.

Overall, I estimate that of the 2.31 percent CAAGR of MFP in the private

nonfarm economy between 1929 and 1941, 48 percent was contributed by

manufacturing, 24 percent by transport and public utilities, 18 percent by wholesale and

17

retail distribution, with the remainder of the private nonfarm economy contributing about

11 percent (see Field, 2004a).

We can now summarize the main distinctions between 1919-29 and 1929-41 with

respect to aggregate MFP growth and its sources. First, MFP growth in the 1920s was

almost entirely a story about manufacturing. Comparing the latter with the earlier period,

there was a significant drop in the share of MFP growth in the private nonfarm economy

accounted for by manufacturing, from 83 percent in the 1920s to 48 percent in the 1929-

41 period. This is primarily due to a halving of within sector MFP growth only partially

compensated for by the expanding size of the manufacturing sector. There is also a

change in the sources of advance – away from the one time gains associated with the final

stages of electrification to those associated with exploiting the results of organized and

expanding research and development efforts. This interpretation is supported by the

aforementioned R and D employment and expenditure data (see Table 3) and by

chronologies of major process and product breakthroughs (Kleincknecht, 1987, Mensch,

1979 and Schmookler, 1966; see Field, 2003) which all show peaks during the 1930s,

particularly its latter half.

The End of Century Episode

The aim of the second part of this paper is to examine the end of century episode in

historical perspective, and in particular to consider how much of recent productivity

growth and its acceleration should be credited to the enabling technologies of the IT

revolution. If we want to take the measure of the IT revolution, we need to try and

imagine a world in all respects similar save for the availability of these enabling

technologies. In their absence, saving flows would have been congealed in other not

18

quite as good capital goods. Output and productivity growth rates would have been

somewhat lower, and we would like to know by how much.

Common practice in estimating the IT revolution’s impact on labor productivity to

date has been to sum three components: a contribution within the IT producing industries

to MFP growth, a contribution within the IT using industries to MFP growth, and a

portion of the effect on labor productivity of capital deepening associated with the

accumulation of IT capital (Oliner and Sichel, 2000, or Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh, 2003).

There can be few conceptual objections to the first two of these components. We

should credit to the enabling technologies most of the MFP growth in the semiconductor

and computer/network equipment manufacturing industries (SIC 35 and 36) and, where

we can demonstrate it, a portion of noncyclical MFP growth in IT-using industries such

as securities trading and wholesale and retail distribution. The inclusion of the third

component is more problematic, although it is endorsed by many, including Barro and

Sala-I-Martin (1995, p. 352) and Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997, p. 608).

The objection to including a portion of the capital deepening effect is this. What we

are trying to do here is to estimate the social saving of the IT revolution. In its absence,

saving flows would have been congealed in a slightly less beneficial array of physical

capital goods. We want to emphasize that breakthroughs such as the integrated circuit,

and continuing advances in the manufacture of semiconductors, display screens, and

mass storage devices, have saved us real resources in generating quality adjusted IT

services. We will pick that up in MFP growth in the IT producing sectors. The very

19

rapid MFP growth in these sectors is indeed the reason why the relative prices of

semiconductors and goods embodying them have plummeted.7

We also want to ask whether the fact that saving flows were congealed in this

slightly superior range of physical capital goods, as opposed to others, enabled a set of

resource savings in other parts of the economy. This we will pick up in MFP growth in

the IT using sectors (these are typically referred to as spillovers or productive

externalities).

But unless we can make the argument that the enabling technologies of IT raised

the rate of return to new investment projects at the margin, and that there was a response

of aggregate saving rates to this rise, the capital deepening effect should ultimately be

credited to saving behavior, and not to the enabling technologies.8 It is of course

conceivable that the enabling technologies of the IT revolution led, by raising the

incremental return to investment and perforce saving, or by redistributing income to

households with higher saving propensities, to an increase in the total flow of

accumulation as a percent of GDP at either the U.S. or the world level, in which case it

becomes more difficult cleanly to distinguish between the roles of saving and technical

change in fostering labor productivity growth.

The evidence is, however, that investment in these goods did not crowd out

consumption goods. Rather, it crowded out other not quite as good capital goods within

the United States and outside of it. Although we can comfortably posit an upward

7 The “dual” approach to estimating MFP advance looks at relative price changes across sectors as an alternate means of inferring its incidence. 8Assertions or assumptions of such a link are easy to find: “Ongoing technological advances in these (IT producing) industries have been a direct source of improvement in TFP growth, as well as an indirect source of more-rapid capital deepening” (Jorgenson and Stiroh, 2000, p. 128); “The spread of information technology throughout the economy has been a major factor in the acceleration of productivity through capital deepening” Economic Report of the President, 2001, p. 33.

20

influence of IT innovations on marginal returns to investment and thus saving (this was

after all the rationalization for rising stock market values during the 1990s), we would

also need to argue, in order to justify the inclusion of the third component, that saving

responded. And we would be hard pressed to do so.

There is a large literature on the responsiveness of saving to after tax interest rates.

Theoretically, as in the case of the response of labor supply to increases in after tax

wages, there is the possibility of both an income and a substitution effect. Empirically,

the evidence is inconclusive, although consistent with a conclusion of little net effect. As

far as the income distribution mechanism, there is no question that there was a trend

toward greater inequality in the last quarter of the century, particularly in the United

States, and marked by a widening gap in the wages of highly and less highly educated

workers. But there is no evidence that this redistribution resulted in an increase in private

sector saving rates.

Some argued, particularly in the late 1990s, that saving rates were improperly

measured because they did not include unrealized capital gains. But the conventionally

measured saving rate was largely invariant both to the expansion of stock market

valuations in the 1990s and their collapse in the early twenty first century.

Between 1995 and 2000, consumption spending in the United States increased $1.7

trillion (34 percent), from $4969 billion to $6683.7 billion nominal.9 Consumption rose

not just absolutely, but as a share of a rising GDP, from 67.2 percent to 68 percent. At

the same time, the growth of IT capital services accelerated from .41 percent per year

(1973-95) to 1.03 percent per year (1995-2000). Part of this acceleration came at the

9 In all of the subsequent discussion of the financing of the 1995-2000 investment boom, I use nominal data, which insures that the saving – investment identities hold for each year. Inflation was relatively modest over this period.

21

expense of the services of other components of the stock within the United States, whose

growth declined from .30 percent per year in the earlier period to .06 percent per year

(Economic Report of the President, 2001, pp. 29). How was the boom in capital

formation, much of it IT capital, financed?

Table 4 Changes in the Uses and Sources of Saving, United States, 1995-2000

1995 2000 Change Change

in uses in

sources Gross Private Domestic Investment 1,143.8 1,755.4 611.6Gross Government Investment 238.2 319.8 81.6 Personal Saving 302.4 201.5 -100.9 Retained Business Earnings 203.6 152.6Depreciation Allowances 743.6 1,017.9Gross Business Saving* 963.6 1,170.5 206.9 Gross Government Saving -8.5 435.8 444.3 Net Foreign Investment -98.0 -395.8 297.8 Statistical Discrepancy 26.5 -128.5 -155.0 TOTALS 693.2 693.1 *Includes wage accruals and disbursements not shown separately. All numbers are billions of dollars, nominal. This table is based on a rearrangement of the open economy investment savings identity: I = S + (T - G) + (M - X). Private domestic investment must be financed by the sum of private domestic saving, government saving, and inflows of foreign saving (capital account surplus or current account deficit). Note that negative net foreign investment is entered as a positive number in the sources of saving column. Source: Economic Report of the President, 2003, Table B-32

Table 4 shows that between 1995 and 2000 there was a 53.5 percent increase in

gross private domestic investment (a $611.6 billion increase) as well as an increase in

22

government investment of $81.6 billion. How was this financed? Personal saving fell by

a third (decline of $100.9 billion). Retained business saving (net business saving) fell by

a quarter (decline of $51 billion). Gross business saving rose, however, as a consequence

of a $274.3 billion increase in corporate and unincorporated capital consumption

allowances. This reflected the large portion of the gross investment surge comprised of

relatively short lived IT capital goods, which increased the importance of short lived

capital goods in the capital stock. We thus experienced a net change in gross private

saving of $106.1 billion.

The increase in gross domestic investment was $693.2 billion. A saving gap of

almost $600 billion remains. It was filled through two main mechanisms: First, a

movement in the consolidated government surplus from $-108 to $302.8 billion – a

swing of $410.8 billion in the surplus direction. Secondly, a deterioration of net exports

from a deficit of $38 billion to one of $395.8 billion, a swing of $297.8 billion The

remaining gap between the changes in the sources and uses of saving is accounted for by

an increase of $155 billion in the statistical discrepancy.

The end of century investment boom was enabled on the one hand by the

willingness of foreign wealth holders to divert their saving flows from investment in their

own countries or elsewhere and make it available to the U.S., and on the other hand by

the tax policies of the Clinton and George H.W. Bush administrations. Their fiscal

policies, in particular modest tax increases in conjunction with an economy operating at

close to capacity, provided the foundation for the big increase in government saving.

It is conceivable that, although the IT accumulation spurt was not associated with a

rise in the private saving rate within the U.S., it was associated with a rise in the world

23

saving rate. But I have seen no data suggesting this to have been the case. We are left

with the conclusion that, by and large, the IT capital accumulation spurt in the United

States represented a substitution not away from consumption, but away from other not

quite as good capital goods, both within the United States and abroad.

Whether the flows necessary to finance capital accumulation came from national

saving or from outside the country is irrelevant from the standpoint of productivity trends

within the United States. But it does have welfare implications, particularly for the

future. Reliance on foreign borrowing meant that we were able to forego the sacrifice of

current consumption that would otherwise have been the price of capital deepening. The

borrowing will turn out to have been a good deal for the country if the increases in output

per hour associated with the additional capital deepening exceed the increases in debt

service per hour of labor input. But there is no guarantee this will be the case – it

depends on how much of the additional investment turns out to have been well directed.

In any event, the gains in output per hour obtained through foreign borrowing will not be

manna from heaven, given the obligation of debt repayment.

Within the United States, there was indubitably an acceleration in overall capital

deepening, comparing 1995-2000 with 1973-95. Capital services per quality adjusted

hour grew at 2.93 percent per year in the latter period, as compared with 1.96 percent per

year in the former. Thus the slowdown in non-IT capital accumulation was more than

compensated for by the rising rate of IT capital accumulation. One could argue that the

drop in the U.S. private saving simply compensated collectively for the rise in

government saving. But this seems doubtful, since the saving rate has been trending

downward for decades through periods of government deficit and surplus. More likely,

24

had the tax increases of the early 1990s not been enacted, the deterioration of the current

account would have been even worse.

If the enabling technologies of the IT revolution diverted toward the United States

some portion of world saving flows that would not otherwise have come this way even

though U. S. and world saving rates remained unaffected and may actually have

declined, it would technically be correct to say that we should grant to the IT revolution

that part of the growth in labor productivity associated with IT’s share of capital

deepening. But if we care about labor productivity because we care ultimately about

consumption per person in the U.S., this is a misleading calculation. Much of the capital

deepening has associated with it a liability tied to increased foreign indebtedness. This is

in sharp contrast with the contributions to labor productivity growth of the first two

components of the traditional triad used to measure IT “contributions.”

The IT Contribution and Social Saving Controversies

This framework for reckoning the impact of the IT revolution, particularly its

emphasis on MFP to the exclusion of the portion of the increase in labor productivity

attributable to IT’s share of capital deepening, runs counter to current practice. It can be

better appreciated by comparing the challenge of coming to terms with IT in the 1990s

with one of the critical disputes that gave rise to the new economic history. This

involved the attempt to estimate the social saving of the U.S. railroads. W.W. Rostow

(1960) had argued that railroads were “indispensable” to American economic growth.

Both Albert Fishlow (1965) and Robert Fogel (1964) wanted more precision. They tried

to imagine worlds otherwise similar save for access to the blueprints needed to build

railroads. They calculated alternate channels for saving flows (into canal building and

25

river dredging, for example) and ultimately how much lower U.S. GDP would have been

in this alternate world.

The social savings calculations that came out of those debates four decades ago

were designed to impress upon us first of all the fact that because saving flows were

congealed in railroad permanent way and rolling stock, as opposed to other forms of

physical capital such as canals, GDP was indeed higher than it otherwise would have

been. But not by a whole lot. Fogel argued, for example, that 1890 US GDP was about

4 percent higher than it would have been in the absence of the availability of the railroad.

What kind of an increment to MFP over a quarter of a century would one have needed to

produce a GDP (or output per hour) in 1890 four percent higher than it otherwise would

have been? About .15 percent per year, continuously compounded.

In fact, Abramovitz’s and Kendrick’s analysis of nineteenth century growth after

the Civil War suggest, as was true for the 1973-95 period, that, at least up until 1889,

almost all of the growth in real output can be accounted for by growth in inputs

conventionally measured. It would make little sense to suggest that we have

underestimated the contribution of the availability of railroad blueprints to growth in

living standards in the nineteenth century because we have not accounted for the share of

the increment to output per hour attributable to that portion of capital deepening

associated with investments in locomotives, rolling stock, and permanent way.10

The key message of the classic works by Fishlow and Fogel was that, in the absence

of the railroad, saving flows would have been congealed elsewhere, with results for the

10 In this respect as well the railroad/infrastructure investment boom of the late nineteenth century was analogous to the IT boom of the late twentieth century: both triggered and were associated with foreign borrowing.

26

economy that would have been almost, but not quite as good. We should take the same

approach to reckoning the importance of the IT revolution.

In defense of what has become the conventional approach, some labor productivity

is certainly, in an accounting sense, attributable to capital deepening. And a large fraction

of capital deepening, particularly at the end of the 1990s, was indeed associated with the

accumulation of physical IT goods: computers, servers, fiber optic cable, routers, etc.11

But since the counterfactual I have in mind imagines saving behavior largely unaffected

by the presence or absence of the IT blueprints, our estimate of the portion of labor

productivity growth we attribute to saving (as opposed to technical innovation) should be

largely independent of the particular forms in which saving flows were congealed.

It should, to be fair, also be independent of the sources of that saving. With respect

to the labor productivity growth caused by capital deepening, it is irrelevant whether the

saving came from outside of the country. But from the standpoint of their contribution to

U.S. standards of living, labor productivity gains from capital deepening financed by

foreign borrowing come encumbered in a way that similar gains financed by domestic

saving do not.

It is true that if we are operating below capacity, and a new attractive invention

offers profitable opportunities for new investment, it is reasonable to talk about the extent

to which the innovation increases real output through its effect on the amount of real

capital formation. From an aggregate perspective, such investment will be largely self

financing (just as, in the presence of accommodative monetary policy, will be

11 Estimates of the amount of this capital formation surge have been augmented by the BLS’s 1999 reclassification of business software acquisition as capital formation (as opposed to its previous treatment as an intermediate good.

27

government deficits). Under these circumstances, we can argue that it is investment that

drives saving.

But once we reach potential output, the old rules of microeconomics again apply.

Choices have opportunity costs, and saving constrains investment rather than the other

way around. This has always been the rationale for policy changes designed to increase

the after tax return to saving, and, if the elasticities are right, saving flows – policies

which make sense from a long range growth perspective but are contraindicated if one is

below capacity. By and large, in growth accounting, we are trying to abstract from

cyclical effects, and study the effect of saving and innovation on the increase of potential

output. We want to know, in the long run, what is the effect of the IT enabling

technologies on the growth of potential output. If we are concerned with contributions to

long run growth, an appeal to the role of IT capital formation role in “contributing” to

increases in real output based via these Keynesian arguments is misplaced.

It is analogous to emphasizing, as did Rostow, the stimulus to the iron and steel

and lumber industries caused by late nineteenth century railroad construction. That

emphasis obscured the fact that, once we are at potential output, these resources had

alternate uses, and the enormous costs of constructing the railroads raised the hurdle they

had to overcome to make a positive contribution to GDP. They managed to do so, as

Fogel and Fishlow demonstrated, by speeding up the turnover of inventories in the

economy and by enabling a superior exploitation of regional comparative advantage. But

it was close.

MFP Growth vs. The Capital Deepening Effect

28

How important, in terms of their impact on labor productivity, were the respective

roles of MFP and capital deepening over the 1995-2000 period? There are a couple of

ways of looking at this. The first is to ask how much of the acceleration in labor

productivity growth each is responsible for. For the private nonfarm economy, that

acceleration, comparing 1995-2000 with 1973-95, was 1.09 percentage points, and about

three fourths of this is attributable to MFP acceleration.

The contribution to output per hour growth of labor composition change was about

the same during the two periods (slightly lower between 1995 and 2000). Comparing

1995-2000 with 1973-95, capital services growth accelerated from 3.94 percent per year

to 5.38 percent per year. Growth in hours rose from 1.58 to 2.09 percent per year. As a

result, the rate of capital deepening increased from 2.36 to 3.28 percent per year between

1995 and 2000.

But assuming a capital share of .32,12 this .92 percentage point increase should have

accounted for an increase in the growth of output per hour of a modest .29 percentage

points. In fact the growth of output per hour rose 1.09 percentage points, from 1.37 to

2.46 percent per year. Almost all of the balance – about three fourths of the total - was

due to MFP acceleration.13

A second approach is to ask what portion of labor productivity growth (2.46 percent

per year) each is responsible for. Between 1995 and 2000 MFP growth was 1.14 percent

per year. The rate of capital deepening was 3.28 percent per year. Multiplied by .32, this

12 BLS capital share for 1995 is .3268; for 2000, .3109. 13 Alternately, converting everything to an adjusted hours basis, we can calculate a 1.06 percentage point increase in the rate of capital deepening (capital growth less adjusted hours growth), implying the increase in the rate of capital deepening should have been responsible for a .36 percentage point increase in the growth in output per adjusted hour (.34*1.06). Adding in the increase in MFP growth (.76 percentage points) we conclude that output per adjusted labor hour should have increased a total of 1.10 percentage points (.36.+.76).

29

yields a capital deepening contribution of 1.05 percent per year. The remainder, about

.27 percent per year, is the contribution of labor quality improvement. Looked at from

this perspective, we can say that MFP growth accounted for less than half -- about 46

percent (1.14/2.46) -- of labor productivity growth between 1995 and 2000. Table 5

summarizes these calculations.

Table 5 MFP Contribution to Labor Productivity Growth and Acceleration, 1995-2000

Labor Productivity Growth, 1995-2000a 2.46 MFP a 1.14 Capital deepening a 1.05 Labor Composition a .26

Labor Productivity Growth Acceleration, 1995-2000 vs. 1973-95b 1.09 MFP b .76 Capital Deepening b .32 Labor Composition b -.01

a percent per year b percentage points Note: Components do not sum exactly to aggregates due to rounding errors.

There is no hard and fast guide to what metric we should prefer here, although for

an individual country it seems to me that the more meaningful measure is IT’s

contribution to the rate of improvement, not the rate of improvement of the rate of

improvement, of labor productivity. For comparisons between countries, we should also

be interested in levels.

MFP Growth in the IT Producing and Using Sectors

In spite of the various frameworks that researchers have used to measure the overall

impact of IT on productivity growth, there is now enough consensus to make some

noncontroversial statements about trends in MFP growth and their sources at the end of

30

the century. First, in spite of some initial skepticism (see Jorgenson and Stiroh, 2000), it

is clear that MFP growth, and, largely because of it, labor productivity growth, did

accelerate between 1995 and 2000. Second, it is generally agreed that an important

contributor to labor productivity growth and its acceleration was MFP advance associated

with technical change in the semiconductor industry and in the manufacture of such

products as computers, networking devices, and telecommunications equipment that

embodied them. This shows up in very rapid (and accelerating) rates of MFP growth in

SIC 35 and 36.

Table 6 Contribution to Labor Productivity Acceleration (percentage points)

McKinsey (2002) Nordhaus (2002): 1995-99 over 1987-95 1995-2000 over 1975-89 Total Acceleration 1.33 1.61 Wholesale Trade .37 .27 Retail Trade .34 .46 SIC 35 (includes semiconductors) .12 .23 SIC 36 (includes computers) .17 .08 Securities Trading .25 .32

Sources: McKinsey Global Institute (2002); Nordhaus (2002), Table 6, p. 233.

Third, it is likely, although the inferences are more indirect and the statistical

support weaker, that some of the IT using sectors, in particular wholesale and retail trade

and securities trading, began to throw off significant MFP growth. Two analyses of the

contributions to the acceleration of labor productivity growth (McKinsey Global Institute

2002, and Nordhaus 2002; see also the 2001 Economic Report of the President) are

suggestive. The McKinsey study focuses on four years (1995-99) whereas Nordhaus

covers five (1995-2000), and the base periods on which the acceleration is calculated

31

differ. Both rely on BEA value added data in the numerator, although the McKinsey

study uses persons employed rather than hours in the denominator.

Both nevertheless find that distribution contributed substantially to the acceleration

of labor productivity growth, and substantially more than did manufacturing, although the

two studies reverse the relative contribution of wholesale and retail trade on the one hand,

and SIC 35 and 36 on the other. Of course we can’t reason directly from decompositions

of labor force acceleration to conclusions about MFP acceleration. Rates of capital

deepening may have been exceptionally rapid in these sectors, explaining much of the

acceleration of labor productivity growth. Indeed, at least through 2000, the data support

this view.

Distribution was an extremely heavy user of IT capital. Largely as a consequence,

its overall use of capital services soared. An index of capital services input in wholesale

distribution rose 18.8 percent a year between 1973 and 1995 and 20.5 percent a year

between 1995 and 2000. Hours in wholesale rose only 1.32 percent per year from 1995

to 2000. So capital deepened in the sector at a rate of 19.2 percent per year over the last

five years of the century, far higher than the average for the economy. Similar

calculations for retail distribution show capital deepening at 15.3 percent per year over

these years.14

The BLS Industry Productivity Indexes and Values Table shows labor productivity

growth in wholesale trade rising from 2.82 percent per year (1987-95) to 4.17 percent per

year (1995-2000). In retail trade the comparable numbers are 1.95 percent per year

14 Sources for capital are Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Capital and Related Measures from the two Digit Database, 1948-2001”; for hours, “Industry Productivity and Values Table”, November 5, 2003.

32

(1987-95) to 3.72 percent per year (1995-2000). So labor productivity growth in

distribution did accelerate.

The problem for the residual, however, is that assuming a capital share of .32, the

very high rates of capital deepening more than account for the labor productivity growth,

implying negative MFP growth in both sectors overall. Moreover, this negative growth

accelerates in the 1995-2000 period, along with the acceleration in capital deepening.

The bottom line is that while heavy capital deepening in distribution did cause an

acceleration in labor productivity growth in the sector, it is uncertain whether the results

through 2000 fully justify the massive IT expenditure.

Some of this uncertainty and pessimism may be due to an overestimate of how

much “true” computer prices dropped, and thus an overestimate of how much real IT

output (and investment) grew. This is a controversial view, since a number of economists

have actively pressured the BLS to make more use of hedonic methods to estimate the

rate of quality improvement (and implied price decline) and praised it for what efforts it

has made (see, e.g., Nordhaus, 1997).

The most compelling argument for why these methods might be leading to some

overestimate of real product growth is that in products whose quality has improved, users

are typically forced to purchase bundles of attributes, not all of which they may actually

desire or value. No one disputes that the issues of quality improvement and the

introduction of new products are important challenges in constructing realistic estimates

of real product growth. But some of the resulting estimates do not seem to satisfy a

reasonableness test.

33

Hedonic price techniques have yielded end of century estimates in the range of -27

percent per year for the rate of decrease of quality adjusted computer prices (Berndt,

Dulberger, and Rapaport, 2000). This rate of price decrease would reduce a 1999

computer priced at $2000 to $500 over 5 years. Thus, if I used a five pound laptop in

1999 and another in 2004 selling at the same nominal price, the BEA would conclude,

based on the price data received from the BLS, that there has been a four fold increase in

the ratio of capital services to hours in my intellectual work. I leave it to readers to judge

whether or not this is reasonable.

For the sake of argument, grant that the BLS may have given us estimates of the

rates of decline of IT capital prices that have resulted in an overestimate by the BEA of

real product growth in the sector. Although this would of course boost MFP growth in

the IT producing sectors, it has the effect of worsening it in IT using industries. One of

the advantages of adopting the framework for reckoning the importance of IT proposed in

this paper is the elimination of the possible “incentive” to push for more rapid rates of

estimated price decline to make IT’s contribution appear larger.

Overestimating the real growth of IT services will, of course, also overestimate the

capital deepening component of its contributions within what has become the

conventional triadic approach. Since the framework I advocate credits most of the effect

of capital deepening on labor productivity to saving, rather than the availability of IT

technology, we are left with the effect on MFP growth in the IT producing sectors, plus

the effect in the IT using sectors, such as distribution, if it can be demonstrated. An

34

overestimate of real IT output growth will increase the former component, while it will

reduce the latter. The two effects may largely cancel out. 15

For analysis of smaller subsectors of the economy, however, the effects will not

cancel out, and the standard value added approach as applied to subsectors has been

criticized precisely because it can be so sensitive to errors in deflation (see Basu and

Fernald 1995). For subsectors the BLS prefers its KLEMS methodology which uses a

gross output rather than value added measure, and subtracts weighted input growth rates

for purchased materials, energy, and business services as well as hours and capital input.

Their MFP estimates for the sector are unpublished and incomplete. But the unofficial

data show MFP rising at .8 percent a year in wholesale although not at all in retail

between 1992 and 1997.16 It is likely that, were data available through 2000, calculated

rates of growth of MFP between 1995 and 2000 would be higher.

With respect to retail distribution, the McKinsey study argues that virtually all of

the gains in labor productivity have been attributable to “big box” retailers such as

Costco, Walmart, and Circuit City. And it is the relative ease with which these can be put

in place in the United States, as compared with the relative difficulty with which this can

be done in Europe and other parts of the world, that Gordon has cited as a principal

explanation of cross country differences in MFP growth in distribution, and, perforce, the

economy as a whole (Gordon, 2003).17

15 Overestimating the real flow of IT goods increases the estimated growth of real output and of real output per hour, as well as the capital stock and thus the rate of capital deepening. IT goods are, however, a much larger fraction of investment than they are of output; the effect on estimated MFP growth is ambiguous, although it is likely to reduce it. 16 I am grateful to Larry Rosenblum of the BLS for making these data available to me. 17 In a paper broadly consistent with this view, Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan have argued that most of the productivity advance in retail trade has been the result of “more productive entering establishments displacing much less productive exiting establishments” (Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan, 2002).

35

Although the McKinsey group is willing to lay at IT’s doorstep only about half the

gains in wholesale and retail distribution (assuming we can demonstrate them), it is

important to keep in mind that these are gains in labor productivity. The evidence for

uncompensated productivity spillovers – increases in value added attributable to IT that

aren’t captured by the equipment or software manufacturers - is still weak. There are

enough straws in the wind, however, to speculate that we are in fact in the middle of a

second IT revolution in distribution, a revolution whose trace on sector MFP data has

been temporarily clouded or even obliterated by overdeflation of IT prices.18

Summary: The 1990s and the 1930s

Let’s now try and bring together what we can say about the 1995-2000 episode and

how it relates to the 1929-41 period. In this instance, because of paucity of

disaggregated sectoral data outside of manufacturing, I divide the private nonfarm

economy into three subsectors: manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade, and other.

Excluding agriculture, government, nonfarm housing, and the non-profit sector, the

private nonfarm economy accounts for 72.4 percent of value added. Using year 2000

sectoral shares, we can calculate a manufacturing weight (share of PNE) of .214 and a

wholesale and retail trade weight of .223.

Again, we commence with BLS numbers for MFP growth for the private nonfarm

economy between 1995 and 2000 (1.14 percent per year), and the BLS estimate for

manufacturing as a whole of 2.08 percent per year (see Tables 1 and 3). For wholesale

and retail trade, we lack data on MFP growth. As noted, unpublished estimates using the

KLEMS methodology show .8 percent per year between 1992 and 1997 in wholesale, and

18 For discussion of an earlier revolution associated with the simultaneous deployment of the telegraph and the railroad, see Field (1987, 1992a, 1996) and Chandler (1977).

36

no growth in retail. Allowing for some acceleration towards the end of the decade in

both wholesale and retail, and considering the relative weights of wholesale and retail, we

can hazard an estimate of .7 percent per year for the sector between 1995 and 2000.

Multiplying sectoral shares by sectoral MFP growth rates, we can estimate that of

the 1.14 percent per year growth of MFP within the private nonfarm economy between

1995 and 2000, .45 percentage points originated in manufacturing, most of it due to the

IT producing industries, and .14 percentage points in distribution. Given the rest of the

PNE’s weight of .563, we can back out an implied MFP growth within it of .94 percent

per year contributing the remaining .53 percentage points. This “other” category includes

standout sectors such as securities trading as well as laggards such as construction and

trucking. Table 7 above summarizes these calculations.

Table 7 Sectoral Contributions to MFP growth, 1995-2000

Share of PNE Sectoral MFP Growth

Contribution to PNE MFP Growth

Share of PNE MFP Growth

Manufacturing .214 2.08 .45 .39 Trade .223 .70 .16 .14 Other .563 .94 .53 .47 TOTAL 1.00 1.14 Sources: Sectoral Shares: Note: Private Nonfarm economy excludes nonfarm housing, health, agriculture, and government, which leaves 72.4 percent of value added. This is approximately the BLS’s current definition of the PNE. MFP growth Manufacturing: see Table 2 MFP growth Trade: see text

Suppose now we credit all of the MFP growth in manufacturing between 1995 and

2000 to the enabling technologies of the IT revolution, and a third of that in distribution

37

and the rest of the economy 19 We would then conclude that .68 percentage points of the

1.14 percent MFP growth between 1995 and 2000 could be credited to IT innovations.

Thus, we would attribute about 28 percent of labor productivity growth between 1995

and 2000 (.68 / 2.46 percent per year) to the enabling technologies of the IT revolution.

How does this analysis compare with the recent decomposition by Jorgenson, Ho,

and Stiroh (2003)? First, the BLS data for the private nonfarm economy cover less than

three fourths of their aggregate. Jorgenson et. al. include what the BLS excludes: the

farm sector, government, housing, and (presumably) the non-profit sector.20 These

excluded sectors were slower growing, and as a consequence their output aggregate

grows at 4.07 percent between 1995 and 2000, vs 4.54 percent for the BLS private

nonfarm economy. Their hours series grows at 1.99 percent vs. 2.09 percent for the PNE.

Their labor quality adjustment is also lower, .22 percent vs .37 percent per year. Finally,

their MFP growth estimate is much lower (.62 vs 1.14) and their output per hour rises

more slowly (2.07 percent vs. 2.46 percent) (Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh, 2003, Table 2).

The difference in labor productivity growth rates is less than the difference in MFP

growth rates because their implied rate of capital deepening (3.88 percent per year) is

higher than for the BLS private nonfarm economy (3.28).

All of these comparisons speak to the extent to which the sectors excluded by the

BLS and added back in by Jorgenson et al. tended to be slower growing and, in the

aggregate, relatively unprogressive technologically.

19 The McKinsey study places a great deal of emphasis on the Wal-Mart effect, both in terms of its growing share of retail and through its role as an object of imitation by such firms as Target. But although it grants that much of the company’s success is based on advanced inventory control methods obviously enabled by IT investment, it also stresses that much is based on management innovations such as worker cross-training. In other words, within manufacturing it is defensible to credit virtually all of the MFP growth to IT; outside of manufacturing this is not defensible. Many of the productivity enhancing management improvements could and probably would have been implemented in the absence of new IT technology. 20 Their output measure also includes an estimate of the imputed service flow from consumer durables.

38

Of their 2.02 percent per year growth in labor productivity between 1995 and 2000,

they attribute .85 percentage points to IT capital deepening and .45 percentage points to

IT related MFP growth . In other words they “attribute” about two thirds of labor

productivity growth (1.30/2.02 = .64) to IT. Conceptually, their analysis is more

favorable to IT because, like Oliner and Sichel (2000), they credit the sector with a

(large) portion of the effect on labor productivity of capital deepening. But in another

respect their approach is less favorable than that advocated in this paper, because they

credit IT innovations with none of the MFP growth outside the IT producing sectors,

even though, in contrast to some of their earlier analyses, they now do acknowledge some

MFP growth in the rest of the economy. If one applied my framework to their data, one

would add the .45 percentage points of IT related MFP growth and a third of the “other”

MFP growth (.17/3 = .056) to obtain .51 out of a total of 2.02 percent per year

attributable to the enabling technologies of IT. This is approximately one fourth of the

total.

Comparing new economy economic growth with the MFP boom period of the

interwar years the following conclusions stand out. The 1920s, the 1930s and the 1990s

all saw contributions to MFP growth from manufacturing but the percentage point

contribution to PNE growth in the recent episode was much lower (.45 percentage points

per year vs. 1.24 percentage points per year between 1929 and 1941, and 1.71 percentage

points in the 1919-29 period. Although rapid MFP advance within manufacturing was

somewhat more localized in the 1930s than it has been in the 1920s, it was very narrowly

concentrated at the end of the century.

39

Distribution played an important role in both the 1930s and the 1990s, although its

percentage point contribution was three times larger in the Depression. Perhaps most

striking, however, in comparison with the 1930s, the 1990s lacked the broad based and

very rapid advance in transportation and public utilities which characterized the 1930s.

Although sectoral MFP estimates are not available across the board, labor productivity

data, such as that contained in the 2001 Economic Report of the President, show growth

rates declining, comparing 1995-99 with 1989-95, in trucking and warehousing,

communications, and electric, gas, and sanitary services. For trucking and warehousing,

labor productivity actually fell (2001 Economic Report of the President, Table 1.2).

Finally, we need to reemphasize that for the private nonfarm economy as a whole,

aggregate MFP advance in the 1929-41 period was more than twice as fast as 1995-2000,

more than three times as fast as 1989-2000. For the 1930s, the question of whether or not

to include a technology driven capital deepening effect on labor productivity is moot,

since there was effectively no capital deepening, at least in the private sector.

Taking the Measure of the IT Revolution

What has been incontrovertibly revolutionary about the IT revolution has been the

operation of Moore’s law: the ability to manufacture computers, peripherals, and

telecommunications equipment in such a fashion that output has risen much faster than

inputs conventionally measured. The plummeting costs of producing quality adjusted

CPUs, memory, mass storage and display devices have been for the late twentieth century

what spinning jennies and water frames were for the late eighteenth century in Britain,

although the rates of productivity advance have been far more dramatic. There is some

evidence that the rate of technical progress in semiconductors accelerated even further

40

after 1995, as the interval required to double performance dropped from 18 months to 12

months. The revolutionary character of what has been happening in the IT industries

shows up as higher and accelerating MFP and, perforce, labor productivity growth in SIC

35 and 36. Even allowing for the possibility of some overshooting in the estimate of

output growth resulting from the use of hedonic techniques, we can happily and

uncontroversially credit the revolution with these gains, which flow directly through to

improvements in the material standard of living.

It is also likely that some – although by no means all -- of the MFP advance in

wholesale and retail distribution, securities trading, and some other sectors of the

economy has been made possible by IT investments, and we should credit the enabling

technologies of the IT revolution with an appropriate share of these gains as well, where

we can demonstrate them. But because the IT producing sectors are small in relation to

the aggregate economy, and because the gains in the using sectors have been relatively

more modest, the boost to the growth of overall output per hour remains modest in

comparison, for example, with the impact of MFP growth in the 1930s

This accounting does not attribute a portion of the effect of capital deepening to IT

innovation – arguing that this is attributable to saving. An objection is that technical

improvement, whatever its sources, might have affected saving behavior by raising the

rate of return to incremental investments and thus, assuming there were a positive

elasticity of the saving rate with respect to the real after tax interest rate, an increase in

saving flows. Or because of a bias in technical change, capital’s share might rise, leading

to a redistribution of income to households with higher saving propensities. Versions of

these arguments have been made for the post Civil War period in the United States

41

where, it has been suggested, such innovations as the railroad and Bessemer/ Siemens

Martin steel elicited an upward surge in aggregate saving behavior which propelled the

economy on a “grand traverse” to higher labor productivity levels as predicted by the

Solow model (David, 1977; Williamson, 1973, p. 591).21

There was indeed an acceleration of gross capital formation in the last half of the

1990s, associated with a more than doubling of real investment in computers, telecom

equipment, and software between 1995 and 2000.22 And the national saving rate did

rise, barely, although no thanks to the private sector. It is doubtful that private saving

rates would have risen had tax rates not been raised, since saving rates have fallen

steadily in recent years through both deficit and surplus periods. No one claims that the

changes in fiscal policies were a response to IT innovations, as a rise in the private saving

rate might have been. Finally, the gap between private saving and national investment

not filled by the increase in government saving was filled by a diversion of saving flows

from outside the country towards the United States, not necessarily an augmentation of

the world saving rate.

These are the grounds for attributing the effect of capital deepening on labor

productivity largely to the forces of thrift rather than innovation. In the absence of IT,

21 David is clear that the nineteenth century traverse was “set in motion by Thrift, that is, by a pronounced rise in the proportion of output saved.” In some passage he appears to treat it as exogenous, as opposed to a response to an upward movement in the real interest rate. In Abramovitz and David (1973), the authors speak of “technologically induced traverses.” The implied argument seems to be that new blueprints lead to an increase in real returns to investment, which induces an upsurge in the saving rate, propelling one to a different steady state involving higher output per hour. In Abramovitz and David (1999) the authors suggest that the bias in technical change led to an increase in capital’s share, which redistributed income to households with higher propensities to save, and this is the mechanism that leads to the upsurge in the saving rate. Williamson’s 1973 paper is more explicitly based on analysis of the consequences of an upward shift in saving propensities: “For still unknown reasons the saving rate rose markedly during the Civil War decade” (1973, p. 593) 22 Some of this surge was driven by Y2K concerns, presumably a one time event. Some of it was wasted, or as in the case of fiber optic cable in the telecom sector, vastly overbuilt.

42

saving flows would have been congealed in a set of not quite as good capital goods, an

argument that can be, and has been made, for the railroad in the nineteenth century.

Many of the frameworks used to guide thinking about the impact of the IT

revolution were developed during a period of sustained stock market exuberance when

there was enormous pressure among academics and within government statistical offices

to resolve the Solow paradox (computers were showing up everywhere but in the

productivity statistics.) We need to make sure that our vision is not clouded by the

legacies of the IT public relations offensives of the 1990s.

One manifestation of the effectiveness of that campaign has been that a change in

the way government statistics on fixed assets are collected, classified, and presented. In

the BEA’s Fixed Asset Tables, the assets produced by information technology industries

are now listed first, in separate and detailed categories. But why are saving flows

congealed in IT goods and software more or less important than those congealed in

structures, machine tools, vehicles, nuclear fuel rods, or any of the other fixed asset

categories? One might reply, because IT is a special type of capital good, one with a

greater propensity to carry or embody or stimulate technical innovation within using

sectors. Perhaps this is true, although Field (2004b) suggests that, at least for the United

States, it is not necessarily so.23 To the degree that it is true, we will pick up this effect in

MFP growth within the IT using sectors.

Another intellectual legacy of the IT boom has been the widespread and largely

uncritical acceptance of the usefulness of the concept of a general purpose technology

(GPT) and the recognition of IT or computers as its principal instantiation (Bresnahan

23 For example, the rising share of equipment to structures in investment flows and the capital stock, which begins after the Second World War, coincides with a long term downward trend in MFP.

43

and Trajtenberg, 1995). While it is undoubtedly true that some advances are more

important than others, to call something a GPT has in many instances been to suggest

about a class of innovations or industries that there was more to them than apparently met

the eye, or showed up in aggregate statistics. The enthusiasm for the concept runs the

danger of placing too much emphasis on specific innovations awarded this coveted

designation.

One of the difficulties with GPTs is the potential multiplicity of candidates. Steam,

electricity, and IT are most frequently identified, but chemical engineering, the internal

combustion engine, radio transmission and the assembly line have also been mentioned.

The identification of one or several GPT’s often offers an appealing narrative hook, but

the criteria for designating them are not universally agreed upon, in spite of continuing

efforts to nail them down. For example, why isn’t the railroad also a GPT? Gordon

(2004) suggests that use by both households and industry is a criterion. This works for

electricity and the internal combustion engine. But steam?

Here is another concern. Bessemer and Siemens Martin processes were industry

specific, and would clearly not pass muster as GPTs. They offered, to use David’s

words, “complete, self-contained and immediately applicable solutions” (2004, p. 22).

This was not the case for the product whose production they enabled. Does that make

steel a GPT? It took Carnegie and others time to persuade users they should make

skyscrapers, plate ships, and replace iron rails with it. Cheap steel in turn encouraged

complementary innovations such as, in the case of taller buildings, elevators.

If one follows the impact of product and process innovations far enough through the

input-output table, one will eventually find products or technological complexes used as

44

inputs in many other sectors, with the potential to generate spillover effects in using

sectors. These processes, products, or complexes are the consequence of many separate

breakthroughs as well as learning by doing, much of which has been sector specific. IT

for example, has required advances in software, sector specific semiconductor

manufacturing, and the thin film technology and mechanical engineering that underlies

most mass storage.

Because of the potential for multiplying GPT candidacies and the lack of an

authoritative tribunal applying uniform rules passing judgment about which ones qualify,

economic and technological history may well be better off without the concept. Our

enthusiasm for GPTs suggests that we may still not have absorbed entirely the lessons of

the Rostow – Fogel – Fishlow debate about the “indispensability” of the railroad.

Whereas IT has probably been responsible for a larger increase in MFP growth between

1995 and 2000 than was the railroad in the 25 years after the Civil War (compare here the

estimate of .15 percent per year for the railroad with the .68 percent per year I attribute to

IT between 1995 and 2000), overall MFP advance at the end of the century was still

much slower than it had been during the 1930s.

It is important to distinguish between the proposition that it sometimes takes a long

time for the productivity benefits of new technological complexes to be reaped, and the

concept of a GPT. One can accept the former without necessarily embracing the

usefulness of the latter. The full benefits of IT may indeed involve considerable delays

before they are realized. My intent in this paper, however, has been to focus on what the

statistical record allows us to conclude has actually been achieved, not on what might

happen, or what we would like to believe will happen, in the future. The end of century

45

productivity revival needs to be understood on its own terms. We should give the IT

revolution its due, but not more than its due.

46

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NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES

THE US PRODUCTIVITY SLOWDOWN, THE BABY BOOM, AND MANAGEMENTQUALITY

James Feyrer

Working Paper 15474http://www.nber.org/papers/w15474

NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH1050 Massachusetts Avenue

Cambridge, MA 02138November 2009

I am grateful to Pete Klenow, Jon Skinner, Doug Staiger, Jay Shambaugh and participants at the PopulationAging and Economic Growth conference at the Harvard School of Public Health for their helpful commentsand advice. All errors are my own. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do notnecessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

© 2009 by James Feyrer. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs,may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given tothe source.

The US Productivity Slowdown, the Baby Boom, and Management QualityJames FeyrerNBER Working Paper No. 15474November 2009JEL No. E0,E25,J1,J11,O33,O4,O47,O51

ABSTRACT

This paper examines whether management changes caused by the entry of the baby boom into theworkforce explain the US productivity slowdown in the 1970s and resurgence in the 1990s. Lucas(1978) suggests that the quality of managers plays a significant role in determining output. If thereis heterogeneity across workers and management skill improves with experience, an influx of youngworkers will lower the overall quality of management and lower total factor productivity. Censusdata shows that the entry of the baby boom resulted in more managers being hired from the smaller,pre baby boom cohorts. These marginal managers were necessarily of lower quality. As the boomersaged and gained experience, this effect was reversed, increasing managerial quality and raising totalfactor productivity. Using the Lucas model as a framework, a calibrated model of managers, workers,and firms suggests that the management effects of the baby boom may explain roughly 20 percentof the observed productivity slowdown and resurgence.

James FeyrerDepartment of EconomicsDartmouth College6106 Rockefeller HallHanover, NH 03755-3514and [email protected]

Introduction

Annual productivity growth fell by approximately one percentage point in the 1970s

relative to the preceding decade. It was not until the mid 1990s that productivity

growth returned to the level of the 1960s. The causes of the slowdown and re-

covery have been much debated. Interestingly, discussions of the resurgence have

often failed to talk about what caused the slowdown in the first place. This paper

will investigate one potential cause of both the slowdown and subsequent recovery,

demographic change. The channel through which demographic change will impact

productivity is management quality.

The slowdown in the US roughly corresponds to the entry of the baby boom

into the workforce. The recovery occurred as the mass of the baby boom entered

their prime working years. Feyrer (2007) finds that there is a strong and robust

correlation between relative cohort sizes and total factor productivity. In particular,

the proportion of workers aged forty and older is positively correlated with total

factor productivity. The magnitude of the effect is an order of magnitude larger

than one would expect from the returns to experience measured at the micro level.

In other words, the social return to experience appears to be much larger than the

private return.

This paper looks to management quality as one possible source of externalities

to experience. The argument that follows formalizes and calibrates a mechanism

that was initially described in Feyrer (2008). Lucas (1978) proposes a model where

the quality of the manager of a firm maps directly into firm output differences.

Given the same quantity of labor and capital, firms with more talented managers

will produce more output. The effectiveness of management is also affected by the

scope of the enterprize. Given a firm with a particular manager, there are decreasing

2

returns to the scale of the firm.

If we assume some distribution of managerial talent those with the most man-

agerial talent will take managerial positions and those with less talent will become

workers. The heterogeneity in management talent combined with decreasing returns

to scale results in tension between firm size and managerial quality. In order to re-

duce the size of firms, additional managers are needed. The additional managers

will be lower quality than the existing managers.

Given this structure, it should be clear that an influx of workers that have low

levels of managerial talent will require changes on both margins. The number of

workers per manager will rise for existing managers – reducing their effectiveness

– and some workers will be drawn into the ranks of management. These marginal

managers will obviously lower the overall talent of management.

The entry of the baby boom into the US workforce presents us with precisely

this situation. When the baby boomers entered the workforce, they were not im-

mediately useful as managers, either through a lack of experience or institutional

restrictions on younger workers managing older workers. The managers for these

new workers necessarily came from the smaller and older cohorts of workers. This

dynamic is evident in the data.

An examination of census data shows that the entrance of the baby boom into

the US workforce caused significant changes in the age structure of management.

First, workers in cohorts born before the boom were drawn into management in

larger numbers. Second, workers in the baby boom cohort were called upon to

manage at earlier ages than in previous generations. This implies that from 1960

until 1980, firms had to go deeper into the management distribution causing a fall

in average management quality. This trend reverses by 2000. This implies falling

management quality from 1960 until 1980 and rising quality thereafter.

3

The timing of this change in management structure roughly parallels the slow-

down in US productivity growth. This paper examines how important the demo-

graphic change in management quality was compared to the overall US productivity

slowdown. Using the Lucas model as a framework, we calibrate a model of man-

agers, workers and firms and examine how changes in the observed age distribution

of workers in the US affects productivity. The results suggest that the management

effects of the baby boom may have caused productivity growth in the 1990’s to be

0.15-0.25 percentage points higher than in the 1970s. This represents roughly 20%

of the observed slowdown.

1 Background

Productivity growth slowed in the US and other industrialized nations during the

1970’s and remained below the earlier trend until the mid 1990’s. Figure 1 shows

yearly growth in output per hour in the nonfarm business sector for the US.1 The

yearly data are overlaid with a five year moving average. The fall in average growth

rates from 1975 until 1995 is obvious.

There has been enormous debate about the causes of the US productivity slow-

down and the recent resurgence in productivity growth. Interestingly, these two

events are treated somewhat separably in the literature. In a 1988 symposium on the

productivity slowdown in the Journal of Economic Perspectives, Fischer (1988) sug-

gests that the main causes were oil price increases, as argued by Jorgenson (1988) in

the same issue, and a slowdown in the rate of new technology production. Griliches

(1988) expresses skepticism of the latter view. Interestingly, the productivity resur-

gence debate is a bit disconnected from the slowdown literature. Debate has largely

1(Lazear, Baicker and Slaughter 2007)

4

Figure 1: Growth in US Labor Productivity 1960-2005

−2

02

4La

bor

Pro

duct

ivity

Gro

wth

(%

)

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010Year

Gray bars are yearly observations. Five year moving average in bold.

source: The Economic Report of the President 2007.Table B50 Growth in output per hour, nonfarm business sector.http://www.gpoaccess.gov/eop/2007/B50.xls

5

revolved around the role of computer technology.2

This paper will examine one potentially overlooked determinant of both the

productivity slowdown and resurgence, demographic change. To suggest that the

entry of the baby boomers into the workforce lowered labor productivity is hardly

a new idea. Standard Mincer regressions suggest that increases in experience result

in higher wages. The entry of the baby boomers into the workforce in the 1970s

certainly lowered average experience in the US. Insofar as simple labor productivity

measures do not account for the experience of the workforce, this may be causing

part of what we see in Figure 1. However, the impact of experience is relatively

modest and even accounting for it does not change the basic picture very much.

In addition, the baby boomers were more educated than their elders, offsetting the

change in experience. Baily, Gordon and Solow (1981) summarize the adjustments

one can make for demographics and finds that they generate relatively small effects.

It should be noted, however, that the standard Mincer regressions are based on

private returns to experience and will not be capable of detecting externalities to a

more experienced workforce. Feyrer (2007) and Feyrer (2008) show that the effect

of demographic change on aggregate output may be much larger than suggested

by the private returns to experience.3 The impact of an increase in the proportion

of experienced workers (aged forty plus) is found to have an effect an order of

magnitude larger than expected from the private return to experience. This paper

is an attempt to suggest a mechanism through which changes in experience may

2See Nordhaus (2002), Gordon and Sichel (2002), Oliner and Sichel (2000), and Fernald, Thip-phavong and Trehan (2007) among many others.

3Other work has also found a relationship between demographic change and output. Focusingon the dependency ratio, Bloom, Canning and Sevilla (2001) find that increases in the size of theworking age population can produce a “demographic dividend” to economic growth. Kogel (2005)finds a relationship between total factor productivity and the dependency ratio. Persson (2002)finds that the age structure of US states affects output. Sarel (1995) finds a significant effect ofthe age structure of the population on output in a cross section of countries. Bloom, Freeman andKorenman (1988) find that being a member of a large cohort leads to lower lifetime earnings.

6

generate large externalities.

2 Management Quality

One way in which the externalities to experience may matter is through management

quality.4 It is not unreasonable to think that lowering management quality will

have effects on productivity that go beyond the change in private returns. Good

management may also be important for the implementation of new technologies.

There is microeconomic evidence that age matters in the adoption of technology.

Weinberg (2002) finds that both experience and age matters for technology adoption.

Since schooling tends to be concentrated early in life, young managers have the

advantage of more recent human capital.5

Much of the current debate on the productivity resurgence revolves around

whether it is due to the falling cost of information technology capital (essentially

a capital deepening story) or through the ability of information technology to im-

prove productivity in all sectors. If management quality matters, it may be that

demographic shifts have had important effects on the ability of firms to implement

computer technology. If so, the proximate cause of the productivity resurgence may

be the implementation of IT, but the ultimate cause may be the enhanced ability

of management to take advantage of the new opportunities.

2.1 Changes in the US Workforce Age Structure

The baby boom in the United States generated significant changes in the age dis-

tribution of the population. Figure 2 shows the number of live births in the US

4This section draws on an argument originally made in Feyrer (2008).5Chari and Hoenhayn (1991) find that technologies diffuse slowly due to vintage human capital

effects.

7

from 1920 until about 2000. Peaking in the late 1950’s, the baby boom cohorts were

significantly larger than those preceding and following. Figure 3 shows the resulting

changes in the age distribution of the US workforce over time. The proportion of

twenty year olds in the workforce rose from 20 percent in 1960 to 30 percent in 1980

as the baby boom enters the workforce. In each ten year interval, this effect repeats

in the next age category. The number of thirty year olds peaks in 1990-1995 and

the number of forty year olds peaks in 2000.

Figure 4 shows the age distribution of full time workers in the US overlaid with

the age distribution of workers classified as managers for each census between 1960

and 2000. The underlying data for these histograms are from the Integrated Public

Use Microdata Series of the US census.6 The entire workforce distribution is the

solid line while the managerial workforce distribution is dashed. At the left hand

side of each distribution the dashed line falls below the solid line, illustrating that

workers in their twenties are managers at lower rates than older cohorts. In 1970,

the entry of the baby boomers into the workforce is very apparent in the worker

distribution, but barely discernable in the manager distribution. By 1980, however,

the presence of the baby boom in the managerial workforce is obvious. Figure 5

shows the evolution of the mean and median ages of US managers over time. Over

the decade of the 1970s the median age of managerial workers falls by five years.

Between 1980 and 2000 the baby boom begins to have enough workers in the over

thirty distribution to manage itself. By 2000 the two distributions have returned to

a pattern very similar to 1960.

If the baby boomers were entering the non-managerial workforce in large numbers

by 1970, who was managing them? The short answer is the older, smaller cohorts.

6http://usa.ipums.org/usa/. For 1980, 1990 and 2000, the data are a 5% sample. For the earlieryears a 1% sample is used. The sample is comprised of full time workers. Workers categorized as“Managers, Officials, and Proprietors” under the 1950 occupational coding are coded as managers.

8

Figure 2: Live Births in the US

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

4.5

1920 1940 1960 1980 2000

Live B

irth

s (m

illions)

source: National Center for Health Statisticshttp://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/births.htm

Figure 3: The Baby Boom and the Age structure of the US workforce

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

1940 1960 1980 2000 2020

Pro

portion o

f W

ork

force

Ages 20-29 Ages 30-39Ages 40-49 Ages 50-59

source: IPUMS, author’s calculations

9

Figure 4: Age Distribution of US Workforce categorized as managers, by year0

.01

.02

.03

.04

20 40 60 80

1960

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4

20 40 60 80

1970

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4

20 40 60 80

1980

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4

20 40 60 80

1990

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4

20 40 60 80

2000Den

sity

Age

Solid Line - Entire Workforce, Dashed Line - Managers


Figure 5: The Mean and Median Ages of US Managers, 1960-2000

35

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

43

44

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

Median Age 43 43 38 39 42

Mean Age 43.5 42.9 40.1 40.1 42

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000


10

Figure 6 shows the proportion of workers classified as managers by age group over

time. This data has been detrended by time to remove secular movements in the

proportion of workers classified as managers. From 1960 until 1980 the probability

that any given person enters management rises for all age groups. These are the

workers called into management ranks by the entry of the baby boom into the

workforce. From 1980 to 2000 this trend reverses as the baby boom itself provides

the managers.

It should be noted that this is not due to a secular increase in workers classified

as management – though this is also happening. As long as young cohorts manage at

a lower rate than older cohorts, it is possible for all cohorts to see an increase in the

proportion managing despite the management to worker ratio staying constant in

the aggregate. Imagine that there are two groups of workers, the old and the young.

The overall proportion of workers to managers is constant at 10 percent. In year one,

there are an equal number of young and old workers, but only the old workers take

on management roles, so 20 percent of the old cohort manages. In year two a large

cohort enters such that the young cohort is now twice the size of the old cohort. If

no one from the young cohort is allowed to manage, the proportion of the old cohort

managing will need to rise to 30 percent in order to keep the aggregate proportions

constant. The overall proportion of managers will remain constant despite the fact

that the proportion of managers went up in the older group.

Figure 7 shows the change in management proportions over time. The overall

numbers rise dramatically from 1960 until 1990 and subsequently fall. Nothing

discussed so far gives an answer to whether the entry of the baby boom should

ceteris paribus raise or lower the proportion of managers in the economy. It is almost

certainly true that the large rise is due to secular changes in the US economy or

changes in the way forms classify jobs. However, we will return to this question

11

Figure 6: Proportion of US Workforce categorized as managers (detrended), by agegroup

77.

58

8.5

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

20

11.8

1212

.212

.4

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

30

1414

.515

15.5

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

40

14.6

14.8

1515

.215

.4

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

50

13.5

1414

.515

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

60

Per

cent

age

Man

agin

g (d

etre

nded

)

Census Year


Figure 7: Proportion of US Workforce categorized as managers over time

810

1214

16P

erce

ntag

e cl

assi

fied

as m

anag

emen

t

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000Census year


12

with the calibrated model. In particular, we will look for suggestions that the fall

between 1990 and 2000 is related to the aging of the boomers.

Intuitively, the baby boomers were entering the workforce in large numbers and

needed to be managed by someone. Since young workers tend to be managers in

lower numbers than older workers, the additional managers needed to come from the

older and smaller cohorts. The additional managers are necessarily of lower talent

than the existing managers, otherwise they would have been managing already.

This leads to an overall drop in management quality and a fall in TFP. After 1980,

when the baby boomers enter the years when workers normally enter management

roles, the situation reverses. At this point the baby boom can manage itself and

has a relatively small group of young workers to manage. This results in a fall in

the proportion of 40 year old workers managing over time and an increase in the

overall quality of management. The following section will make this argument more

formally in an attempt to estimate how large these effects could be.

3 The Lucas Span of Control Model

This section presents a simplified version of the model from Lucas (1978) and is a

formalization of the arguments made in Feyrer (2008) and in the previous section.

By developing the model more completely it is possible to run calibration exercises

to determine the plausibility of the mechanism and possible magnitudes.

Each firm consists of a single manager and a number of homogeneous workers.

There is heterogeneity in management talent and management talent has a mul-

tiplicative effect on firm output. There are decreasing returns in the number of

workers employed by a firm.

More formally, a firm with a manager of quality x managing L workers and K

13

units of capital will produce the following amount of output,

Y (x) = xg[F (K(x), L(x))] (1)

where F () is a standard neoclassical production function, and g[] has decreasing

returns. The decreasing returns to g[] imply that larger firms will have lower per

worker output given a fixed level of management talent, x. As the ‘span of control’

of a manager gets larger, their effectiveness diminishes.

Assume a heterogeneous distribution of managerial talent, Γ(x). All individuals

will be either managers or workers. Individuals with the highest level of management

talent will become managers while workers of lower talent will be employed by

firms. Smaller firms are more productive, but since each firm needs a manager,

the additional managers needed to reduce firm size will be of lower quality. This

tradeoff drives the equilibrium level of firm size and management quality. There

will be a cutoff level of managerial talent, z, below which individuals will not be

managers. If the total quantity of labor is normalized to one and the quantity of

labor employed by a firm managed by a manager of talent x is L(x), the resource

constraint on labor is

1 − Γ(z) =∫

∞

zL(x)dΓ(x) ≤ 1. (2)

Total output is

Y =∫

∞

zY (x)dΓ(x). (3)

Firms choose levels of capital and labor to maximize profits subject to exogenous

wage and capital rental rates. The profit of a firm with a manager of talent x is

14

equal to the output minus the cost of inputs

π(x) = Y (x) − K(x)r − L(x)w (4)

where r is the real return to capital and w is the real wage. Firms maximize profits

subject to the first order conditions

dY (x)

dK(x)= r (5)

and

dY (x)

dL(x)= w. (6)

The production function F (K(x), L(x)) from (1) is taken to be Cobb-Douglas

with capital share of α ∈ (0, 1). Lucas shows that if firm size is independent of

firm growth rates (Gibrat’s Law), the function g[] must take on the following simple

parameterization,

Y (x) = x(K(x)αL(x)1−α)β, (7)

where β ∈ (0, 1) defines the degree of diminishing returns to firm size.7 The first

order conditions imply the following optimal capital labor ratio, which is identical

for all firms, regardless of management talent, x.

K

L=

α

1 − α

w

r(8)

Combining (8) with either of the first order conditions results in the following

optimal level of workers for any given level of management talent, x, wage rate, w,

7Lucas (1978), p. 514-515

15

and rate of return to capital, r.

L∗ = L(r, w, x) =

[(1 − α)β

(α

1 − α

)αβ

r−αβwαβ−1x

] 1

1−β

(9)

The number of workers for any given firm is increasing in the talent of management

and decreasing in the rental rate of capital and the real wage. Combining the profit

function with (8) and (9) you can solve for the profit level of a firm with management

talent x in terms of the real wage and real return on capital. For simplicity we can

assume that the real rental rate of capital is exogenously determined (US firms

can borrow in world markets). The wage, however is going to be endogenously

determined subject to the resource constraint (2). Consider the choice of a individual

between working for wages at an existing firm and managing their own firm. They

will choose to manage only when the profit of the firm will exceed their wages as

a worker. There will be some cutoff level of management talent where a worker is

indifferent between managing and working.

π(z) = w (10)

Where this cutoff falls will be a function of the distribution of management tal-

ent, Γ(x), and the resource constraint (2). The following section will outline the

parameterization of this basic model and the algorithm for a numerical solution.

4 A Numerical Solution

In this section we will take the basic structure outlined above and describe the

steps needed to generate numerical estimates of the behavior of the US economy

based on the model. To simulate the model we first must specify the distribution of

16

managerial talent. The basic method is to generate a large number of discrete agents

and aggregate. These agents are distributed into groups by age, with the number of

agents from each age group reflecting the observed workforce proportions in the US

(see Figure 3). Each age group has a different managerial talent distribution, Γi(x).

The overall distribution of management talent, Γ(x) is generated through summing

the distributions for each age group.

Each of these agents has a managerial talent, x, taken from an age specific

distribution of talent.8 Each agent takes the rental rate of capital, r, and the wage

rate, w, as given. The output for a firm headed by a manager of talent level x

can be calculated from (7) subject to the profit maximizing conditions (5) and

(6). Equations (9) and (8) give the profit maximizing levels of labor and capital.

Plugging these values into (4) gives the profit level of a firm headed by a manager of

talent x. If the profits are greater than the wage, the firm is viable and will operate

with L(x) employees and one manager with the manager receiving the profits. If

the profits are less than the wage, the agent will work for one of the viable firms.

Aggregate demand for workers at any given wage w can be determined by sum-

ming L(x)+ 1 over the agents where π(x) ≥ w.9 The solution of the model requires

finding the wage which equalizes supply and demand for workers. As the wage in-

creases, the labor demand will fall along two margins. First, a higher wage results in

a lower number of firms, since the profit threshold is higher. Second, any firm which

remains above the profit threshold will employ fewer workers. There is therefore a

downward sloping labor demand function with a fixed supply.

8These talent levels are deterministic and not stochastic. The solution technique should there-fore be seen as a numeric integration rather than a Monte Carlo exercise. To be more concrete, ifthere were 99 agents, the first would be assigned the first percentile cutoff of the distribution, thesecond the second percentile and so on to the 99 percentile.

9This is the numerical equivalent to performing the integration in equation (2) where z is afunction of a given wage and exogenous interest rate, r. The term L(x) + 1 is the number ofworkers plus the manager.

17

The equilibrium wage is the wage for which the total desired employment is

equal to the total number of agents in the economy. This can easily be found

numerically. Once the equilibrium wage, w∗, has been determined we can calculate

total output by summing up individual firm output. Other metrics are also easily

calculated including the proportion of managers from each age cohort and the profit

distribution of managers.

4.1 Parameterization of the Model

To complete the parameterization of the model we need to specify the coefficient on

capital in the production function, α, the degree of decreasing returns at the firm

level, β, the exogenous rate of return to capital, r, and the age specific distributions

of management talent.

The exogenous rate of return to capital is set to the risk free rate of return,

5%. We can rely on relative income shares to determine the production function

parameters, α and β. It can easily be shown that the following shares of total income

hold.

capital’s share = α × β (11)

nonmanagerial labor’s share = (1 − α) ∗ β (12)

managerial labor’s share = 1 − β (13)

We choose α and β to produce income shares that roughly match the actual

economy. We set capital’s share of income to match the standard figure from national

income and product accounts, 40 percent. Piketty and Saez (2003) show that the

wage share of the top 10 percent of wage earners ranges from 25-35 percent over the

period of interest. Since the proportion of managers in the dataset is 10-15 percent,

18

this implies that the share of labor income going to managers should be roughly in

the range of 35-45 percent. The share of labor income going to managers is

manager’s share of labor income =1 − β

1 − βα. (14)

Given a share of capital in total income and a managerial share of labor income

appropriate values of α and β can be calculated from (11) and (14).

To generate the distribution of management talent, agents in the economy are

split across five age groups, 15-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59 and 60 and older. The number

of agents from each group is generated such that the proportions match the data.

The variation in these proportions over time will generate our results. Within each

age group the distribution of managerial talent is Pareto, a distribution commonly

associated with the distribution of income. Since firm profits will be proportional

to management talent, a Pareto distribution of management talent will tend to

generate similarly distributed management income.

The Pareto distribution has pdf

pdf =kxk

m

xk+1. (15)

The shape parameter of the distribution, k, is common across all distributions and

is chosen so that the proportion of managers in equilibrium roughly matches the

observed proportions in the data overall given the values for α and β derived from

income shares. The lower support of the distribution, xm, will vary by age group.

Differences in xm result in proportional differences in the means of the resulting

distributions, so a 10% difference between the xm between two age groups shifts the

average managerial talent for that group by the same amount. These shifts in the

talent distribution will generate different proportions of managers from the various

19

age groups. Since the forty year old cohort has the highest proportion of managers

in the data, it is used as a benchmark with xm = 1 . The values of xm for each

of the other age groups are chosen so that the equilibrium proportion of workers in

management from each age group roughly matches the data.

With these parameters in place the observed age proportions can be run through

the model from 1960 until 2000. The only variables that change over time are

these age proportions. The calibration parameters k, α, β, and xm are all fixed

as the model is marched forward through time. For each year the model is solved

numerically and equilibrium wages, the proportion of managers in each group and

total output can be determined. The size of the changes in output generated by

these demographic shifts in the model should be informative about how large the

effects may have been in the real economy.

5 Results

Figure 8 shows the progression of income from 1960 to 2000 in the simulated economy

under three different parameter assumptions. The parameter sets were chosen by

first varying management’s share of labor income between 35 and 45 percent. The

value of the Pareto distribution shape parameter, k, was then adjusted until the

overall percentage of workers in management roles matched the data. The values

for the lower supports of each distribution, xm were then adjusted to get the relative

managerial proportions of the age groups correct. Output per worker is falling from

1960 until 1980 with the more dramatic fall happening between 1970 and 1980.

Since the simulated model has no underlying productivity growth this fall in the

growth rate should be interpreted as a deviation from some constant underlying

trend growth rate. Output per worker drops by 1 to 2 percentage points over

20

Figure 8: Simulated Response of output per worker to Demographically InducedManagement Changes (1960==100)

98.0

98.5

99.0

99.5

100.0

100.5

101.0

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

k=6.0, ms=0.35k=4.7, ms=0.40k=3.9, ms=0.45

source: IPUMS, author’s calculationsk is the shape parameter for the Pareto distribution.ms is managements share of labor income.Given ms, k is chosen to match the data illustrated in Figure 6.

21

this period. After 1980 this reverses with output per worker in 2000 higher than

in 1960 under all parameterizations. Table 1 shows the yearly effect on growth

rates simulated by the model under the three different parameters sets. The model

Table 1: Percentage Change in Growth Rate Relative to Trend

ms=0.35 ms=0.40 ms=0.45Year k=6.0 k=4.7 k=3.9

1960-1970 -0.034 -0.046 -0.0571970-1980 -0.077 -0.095 -0.1131980-1990 0.081 0.108 0.1351990-2000 0.064 0.081 0.099

source: Author’s calculations

generates a fall in yearly growth rates of 0.05-0.15 percent relative to trend from

1970 until 1980. From 1980 until 2000 the growth rates reverse and are 0.05-0.15

percentage points above trend. The simulated difference between growth rates in

the 1970’s and the 1990s is between 0.14 and 0.21 percentage points depending on

the specific parameterization. This compares to a swing in the actual data of about

one percentage point. The model is therefore generating effects that are 15 to 20

percent of the effect measured in the actual economy.

The most significant discrepancy with the model relative to reality is the timing.

The simulated economy predicts an increase in labor productivity growth in both

the 1980’s and 1990’s while the actual productivity slowdown continued into the

1980’s (though the 1970’s were certainly the low point). Part of the difficulty is

that the census years match poorly with turns in the productivity series and the

productivity series is quite noisy.

The model matches other moments of the economy reasonably well. Each of the

parameter sets were chosen such that the proportion of managers from each group

matches the detrended data from Figure 6. Figure 10 shows the proportions of each

22

group in management generated by the model for the central scenario overlayed with

the actual data. The model does a good job of matching the overall proportion

of managers from each group and also generates about a one percent increase in

the proportions managing from each group between 1960 and 1980. This compares

quite well with Figure 6.

The average proportion of managers from each group is a direct consequence

of the parameterizations and was intentionally designed to match the data. The

changes over time, however, are entirely the result of changing cohort sizes, The

fact that the changes over time match the data indicates that the model and pa-

rameterization are capturing some of the dynamics in a reasonable way.

The differences in average management proportions across the age groups are the

result of adjusting the lower support, xm of each group’s distribution. These values

are constant over time for each of the parameterizations. As mentioned earlier, the

lower support is proportional to the mean for the group, so a 10% lower value for

xm lowers the group mean by a similar amount. Table 2 shows the values of xm

for each of the parameterizations. The parameters necessary to generate the proper

Table 2: Relative Managerial Talent, by age group

Age ms=0.35 ms=0.40 ms=0.45Group k=6.0 k=4.7 k=3.915-29 0.927 0.907 0.88930-39 0.986 0.982 0.97840-49 1.000 1.000 1.00050-59 0.995 0.994 0.992

60 plus 0.994 0.993 0.992source: Author’s calculations

management proportions suggest that workers under the age of 30 have 7-11 percent

lower management talent than their elders. The 30-39 age group is about 2 percent

23

Figure 9: Simulated Manager Proportions, by age group

.092

.094

.096

.098

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

20

.134

.136

.138

.14

.142

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

30

.145

.15

.155

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

40.1

42.1

44.1

46.1

48.1

5

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

50

.142

.144

.146

.148

.15

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

60

Per

cent

age

Man

agin

g (d

etre

nded

)

Census Year


Figure 10: Simulated Manager Proportions, by age group

99.

29.

49.

69.

8

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

20

13.4

13.6

13.8

1414

.2

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

30

14.5

1515

.5

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

40

14.2

14.4

14.6

14.8

15

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

50

1414

.515

15.5

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

60

Per

cent

age

Man

agin

g (d

etre

nded

)

Census Year

solid – actual data, dashed – simulated


24

lower in talent than the older groups. There is no significant difference between the

over 40 groups.

6 Conclusions

This exercise obviously does not capture the US productivity slowdown perfectly,

though this is likely not a reasonable expectation. We can show that the Lucas

model is capable of generating movements in labor productivity that are large. This

suggests that there are external effects of changes in experience which are larger than

we should expect from an examination of micro returns to experience. Changes in

management talent due to demographic changes are potential factor contributing

to US productivity movements. The magnitudes suggest that these movements are

insufficient to explain the entire US slowdown, but may be causing one fifth of the

observed effect.

It is obviously true that the management story offered here is incomplete. The

composition of the US labor force changed in a number of dramatic ways during the

1970’s. In addition to the entry of the baby boom, participation rates for women

rose dramatically. If we assume that women were systematically barred from some

management roles during the 1970s is seems possible that there was an additional

drain on management quality in the 1970s which reversed as women took on more

management responsibility. If true, it may be that the effects in our simulated model

are understated.

Additionally, the experience level of managers was necessarily changed by these

demographic movements. In the 1970s, the marginal forty and fifty year old man-

agers had no managerial experience since they were only managing due to the entry

of the baby boom. Conversely, when the boomers hit these ages, the average man-

25

ager had more experience in management roles than in previous generations since

they had typically been called on to manage at earlier ages.

Understanding the role of demographic change in productivity movements is of

interest for more than historical reasons. Many developing countries have large

demographic bubbles in the wake of fertility declines. As these cohorts age, their

impact on productivity will be significant.

26

References

Baily, Martin Neil, Robert J. Gordon, and Robert M. Solow, “Produc-tivity and the Services of Capital and Labor,” Brookings Papers on EconomicActivity, 1981, 1981 (1), 1–65.

Bloom, David E., David Canning, and Jaypee Sevilla, “Economic Growthand the Demographic Transition,” NBER Working Paper, December 2001,8685.

, Richard B. Freeman, and Sanders D. Korenman, “The labour-marketconsequences of generational crowding,” European Journal of Population, 1988,3 (2), 131–76.

Chari, V. V. and Hugo Hoenhayn, “Vintage Human Capital, Growth, andthe Diffusion of New Technology,” Journal of Political Economy, 1991, 99 (6),1142–1165.

Fernald, John, David Thipphavong, and Bharat Trehan, “Will Fast Pro-ductivity Growth Persist?,” FRBSF Economic Letter, April 6 2007, 2007 (9).

Feyrer, James, “Demographics and Productivity,” Review of Economics andStatistics, February 2007, 89 (1), 100–109.

, “Aggregate Evidence on the Link Between Demographics and Productivity,”Population and Development Review, December 2008, 34 supplement, 78–99.

Fischer, Stanley, “Symposium on the Slowdown in Productivity Growth,” TheJournal of Economic Perspectives, 1988, 2 (4), 3–7.

Gordon, Robert J. and Daniel E. Sichel, “[Productivity Growth and the NewEconomy]. Comments and Discussion,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activ-ity, 2002, 2002 (2), 245–265.

Griliches, Zvi, “Productivity Puzzles and R&D: Another Nonexplanation,” TheJournal of Economic Perspectives, 1988, 2 (4), 9–21.

Jorgenson, Dale W., “Productivity and Postwar U.S. Economic Growth,” TheJournal of Economic Perspectives, 1988, 2 (4), 23–41.

Kogel, Tomas, “Youth dependency and total factor productivity,” Journal of De-velopment Economics, February 2005, 76 (1), 147–173.

Lazear, Edward P., Katherine Baicker, and Matthew J. Slaughter, Eco-nomic Report of the President, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,February 2007.

27

Lucas, Robert E., “On the Size Distribution of Business Firms,” The Bell Journalof Economics, Autumn 1978, 9 (2), 508–523.

Nordhaus, William D., “Productivity Growth and the New Economy,” BrookingsPapers on Economic Activity, 2002, 2002 (2), 211–244.

Oliner, Stephen D. and Daniel E. Sichel, “The Resurgence of Growth in theLate 1990s: Is Information Technology the Story?,” The Journal of EconomicPerspectives, 2000, 14 (4), 3–22.

Persson, Joakim, “Demographics, Human Capital, and Economic Growth: AStudy of US States 1930-2000,” FIEF working paper, February 2002.

Piketty, Thomas and Emmanuel Saez, “Income Inequality In The UnitedStates, 19131998,” Quarterly Journal Of Economics, February 2003, 118 (1),1–39.

Ruggles, Steven, Matthew Sobek, Trent Alexander, Catherine A. Fitch,

Ronald Goeken, Patricia Kelly Hall, Miriam King, and Chad Ron-

nander, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 3.0 [Machine-readable database] Minnesota Population Center 2004.

Sarel, Michael, “Demographic Dynamics and the Empirics of Economic Growth,”IMF Staff Papers, 1995, 42 (2), 398–410.

Weinberg, Bruce A., “Experience and Technology Adoption,” Ohio State Uni-versity working paper, May 2002.

28

El problema energético: análisis global

BOLETÍN ECONÓMICO DE ICE Nº 2967DEL 16 AL 30 DE JUNIO DE 2009

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4.1 El mundo

4.1.1. Las cifras del año 2008

En un mundo inmerso en una recesión econó-mica global, con menguantes beneficios empresa-riales, restrictivas condiciones crediticias, escasaliquidez y pesimistas perspectivas, muchas empre-sas han anunciado planes para disminuir la pro-ducción, despedir trabajadores y cortar gastos decapital, todo ello tiende naturalmente a reducir lainversión directa extranjera, cuyos flujos que al-canzaron la cifra récord de 1,8 billones de dólaresen 2007, han disminuido más de un 20 por 100 en2008.

A diferencia de la crisis financiera de 1997, quese inició en algunos países asiáticos en desarrolloy emergentes, la crisis actual empezó en el mundodesarrollado aunque se está extendiendo rápida-mente a las economías en desarrollo y en transi-ción. Los países ricos han sido ya directamentegolpeados, mientras que los efectos de la crisissobre las economías en desarrollo han sido indi-rectos, más lentos y con variados grados de severi-dad. Esto ha afectado al patrón de localización dela inversión directa y a sus flujos.

En países ricos, los flujos de inversión directahan caído un 33 por 100, y los flujos de entrada hansido especialmente bajos en Finlandia, Alemania,Hungría, Italia y Holanda, incluso comparándoloscon niveles de dos años antes. Las fusiones y adqui-siciones transfronterizas cayeron un porcentajesimilar. Aunque se ha producido una fuerte desace-leración del ritmo de crecimiento de los flujos inver-sores de entrada a los países en desarrollo de un 20

por 100 a un 4 por 100, estos han mantenido, en sumayoría, cifras positivas. Así en África se alcanza unnivel de 62 mil millones de dólares con un 16,8 por100 de crecimiento sobre el 2007 y en Latinoa-mérica y el Caribe el crecimiento es de un 13 por100 (142,3 miles de millones), como resultado de unfuerte aumento a Sudamérica, mientras Centroa-mérica y el Caribe muy dependientes de EstadosUnidos se van a ver afectados por una caída.Después del récord del año anterior y debido a unamenor demanda y precio de petróleo, la inversión enAsia Occidental va a caer por encima del 20 por 100(56,3 miles de millones), mientras se mantiene connúmeros positivos reducidos de crecimiento del 3por 100 el resto de Asia para alcanzar la cifra de256,1 mil millones de dólares de entradas de inver-sión directa este año. Finalmente las inversiones quese han dirigido a las economías en transición(Europa del Sureste y Estados Independientes de laURSS –CIS–) han registrado un incremento del 6por 100 superando los 91 mil millones de dólares.

En resumidas cuentas, aunque la caída inversorase ha dejado sentir con especial fuerza en los paísesdesarrollados, algunos en desarrollo, con sistemasfinancieros abiertos pero débiles se han mostradomuy vulnerables a los choques externos. Así las in-versiones directas han caído acusadamente en paí-ses como Indonesia, República de Corea, Pakistán,y Turquía.

Las perspectivas a corto plazo para 2009, nosllevan a creer que la severidad de la crisis actual su-perará posibles factores compensadores como elatractivo de las economías emergentes para la in-versión directa, las oportunidades de comprar ac-tivos a precios de saldo y el incremento de la �

CAPÍTULO 4

LA INVERSIÓN EXTERIOR DIRECTA EN 2008

estrategia de internacionalización de las empresas,de forma que predominará la tendencia negativa.Luego, una caída adicional de la inversión directapara 2009 puede esperarse, con la probabilidad deque las inversiones directas a los países en desa-rrollo, que han mostrado durante 2008 resistenciaal descenso, se desacelerarán más marcadamentede lo que lo han hecho hasta ahora.

4.1.2. Características de las corrientesinversoras de 2008

La disminución de la inversión directa extranje-ra es el resultado de dos factores que han afectado ala inversión internacional y nacional: 1) La capaci-dad de las empresas para invertir se ha visto re-ducida por una caída en el acceso a los recursosfinancieros, internamente debido a menores benefi-cios empresariales y externamente debido a unamenor disponibilidad y a un más alto coste definanciación. 2) La propensión a invertir se ha vistoafectada negativamente por unas perspectivas muynegativas especialmente en el mundo desarrollado.La percepción muy alta del nivel de riesgo lleva alas empresas a cortar sus programas de inversiónpara hacerse más resistentes a un deterioro adicio-nal del clima de negocios. Esta situación ha afecta-do especialmente a las fusiones y adquisiciones enel exterior, cuyo valor ha declinado mucho en com-paración con el nivel histórico del año anterior. Almismo tiempo una caída a nivel mundial de más deun 40 por 100 en los mercados de acciones ha redu-cido las posibilidades de maniobra de las multina-cionales de utilizar las Bolsas para financiar susoperaciones, mientras que muchos proyectos de pri-vatización se detenían.

Si diferenciamos tres tipos de inversión segúnsus motivos: buscadora de mercados, buscadora deeficiencia y buscadora de recursos, sin duda la pri-mera es la que se ha visto afectada más seriamen-te por la crisis, especialmente la dirigida a los mer-cados desarrollados. El impacto de la situacióneconómica sobre los proyectos buscadores de efi-

ciencia es más difícil de valorar. Muchas empresaspueden estar obligadas a reestructurar sus activida-des internacionales cerrando instalaciones obsole-tas y no competitivas, a menudo localizadas enpaíses desarrollados pero abriendo instalacioneseficientes en costes en las economías emergentes.Finalmente, en lo relativo a proyectos buscadoresde recursos estos sufrirán a corto plazo por descen-sos en la demanda mundial y en los precios. Nor-malmente, siguen a los periodos de euforia, des-equilibrios en la demanda que impulsan los pre-cios y el lanzamiento de nuevos proyectos. Es pro-bable que estos desequilibrios vuelvan a apareceruna vez que la presente recesión termine, impac-tando positivamente en la inversión que se realizacon esta motivación.

En cuanto a las industrias en las que la crisis seestá cebando más fuertemente con importantesdescensos de inversión extranjera están: los servi-cios financieros, las industrias del automóvil, delos materiales de construcción y de bienes inter-medios. Sin embargo, los efectos de la crisis seestán extendiendo ahora a otras actividades desdeel sector primario a los servicios no financieros.

Antes de que la crisis apareciera, hubo algunossignos de actitudes restrictivas hacia la inversiónextranjera directa. Aunque la situación difieresegún regiones, el porcentaje de cambios regulato-rios negativos en comparación con los positivos seha incrementado significativamente desde 2003.Las diversas medidas adoptadas por los Gobiernospara afrontar la crisis han tenido efectos positivosy negativos sobre la atracción de inversiones. Entrelos primeros cabe mencionar los planes de garantíasy fianzas, los paquetes de rescate para el sectorfinanciero y la búsqueda activa de inversores ex-tranjeros para su participación directa en estos pa-quetes, programas de inversiones públicas, medi-das de estímulo fiscal o monetario, préstamos paralas filiales que operan en países en desarrollo, etcé-tera. Por el contrario, como medidas negativas parala Inversión Directa en el Exterior (IDE) se puedenseñalar: nacionalizaciones parciales o totales deempresas del sector financiero, restricciones en �


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El sector exterior en 2008

el pago de dividendos, medidas de ayuda a la in-dustria nacional con impactos negativos para lainversión en el exterior, etcétera. En conclusión,para tratar efectivamente esta crisis y sus conse-cuencias económicas es importante que los hace-dores de políticas mantengan un clima favorable alos negocios y a la inversión evitando caer en ten-taciones proteccionistas.

4.2. Inversiones extranjeras en España

La economía internacional ha intensificado sudeterioro durante 2008, especialmente en el segun-do semestre, cuando el colapso del sistema finan-ciero alcanzó proporciones sistémicas, con unfuerte impacto en la economía real que ha sumidoa las principales economías en una profunda rece-sión que se prevé duradera, según las autoridadeseconómicas nacionales y organismos internacio-nales, que han revisado sus previsiones a la baja. Apesar de los planes de salvamento del sector finan-ciero, unidos a políticas monetarias y fiscales fuer-temente expansivas, el PIB de las principales eco-nomías se ha contraído en los dos últimos trimes-tres de 2008 en proporciones históricas, con fuer-tes caídas en el consumo y en la inversión, aumen-to del paro, contención de precios y fuerte desca-pitalización de las empresas cotizadas en un con-texto de gran incertidumbre.

En España la crisis ha seguido un modelo simi-lar. Según datos de la Contabilidad Nacional el PIBcomenzó a contraerse en el tercer trimestre (-0,2),acelerando esta tendencia en el cuarto (-1,0) entasas intertrimestrales. En términos anuales la con-tracción del PIB –la primera en muchos años– fuedel 0,7 por 100. Dada la importancia del sector dela construcción en España, el deterioro del empleoha sido muy importante; también han sufrido lasfinanzas públicas, cuyo déficit se situó por encimade los límites de Maastricht después de registrarsuperávit en 2007. De los componentes del PIBsólo mejoró la contribución del sector exterior,registrándose importantes caídas tanto en el con-

sumo como en la inversión –al igual que en lainversión española en el exterior– en un marco demarcada estabilidad de precios, fuerte correccióntanto del déficit comercial como del de cuentacorriente en la última parte del año, en un escena-rio de poca disponibilidad de crédito y pérdidas oreducción de los beneficios empresariales.

Según datos de la Balanza de Pagos, que recogelos flujos en términos netos, en 2008 la inversióndirecta extranjera en España fue de 43.967 millo-nes de euros, un 4,17 por 100 más que en 2007,representando un 4,01 por 100 del PIB, igual queen 2007. La inversión directa de España en el exte-rior, que acusó más claramente el deterioro de laeconomía, alcanzó los 49.049 millones de euros, un46,5 por 100 menos que en 2007, lo cual supone un4,47 por 100 del PIB desde un 8,73 por 100 en2007.

La inversión extranjera en España y españolaen el exterior en participaciones de capital, que sonlos datos de flujos que elabora el Registro de In-versiones Extranjeras, han seguido una pauta muyparecida, como se detalla a continuación.

4.2.1. Evolución general

La inversión extranjera bruta en participacionesde capital ascendió a 37.715 millones de euros en2008, ligeramente por encima de 2007, siendoestas cifras las mejores desde 1993, con la excep-ción del 2000. Las liquidaciones cayeron casi un70 por 100 en relación a 2007 por lo cual la inver-sión neta aumenta un 26,7 por 100 situándose aniveles de récord histórico. Si descontamos lainversión en Entidades de Tenencia de ValoresExtranjeros (ETVE), la inversión en sociedades nocotizadas mantuvo buenos incrementos tanto entérminos brutos como netos, particularmente enestos últimos debido a las escasas desinversionesen relación con 2007, mientras que la inversión ensociedades cotizadas se contrajo y concentró lasliquidaciones presentando la parte más negativa(Cuadro 4.1).


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CAPÍTULO 4. LA INVERSIÓN EXTERIOR DIRECTA EN 2008

Los datos anteriores merecen ser matizados portrimestres debido a la contracción que empezó a ex-perimentar el PIB español a partir del inicio delsegundo semestre y que ha continuado hasta elfinal del periodo analizado, manteniéndose estatendencia durante el presente año. La inversión enlos dos primeros trimestres representó el 83 por100 del total anual, mientras que la cifra del tercertrimestre de este año cayó un 53,47 por 100 y ladel cuarto un 84,73 por 100 sobre los mismosperiodos de 2007. No obstante, hay que destacarque, la cifra del cuarto trimestre de 2007 fue unade las mejores de la historia y supuso el 75 por 100de la de todo ese año.

En resumen, excelentes cifras en 2008 debido ala continuación del impulso inversor del cuarto tri-mestre de 2007 y a las grandes operaciones que con-tinúan en los dos primeros trimestres del año si-guiente, escasas liquidaciones en el ejercicio en rela-

ción al anterior, concentrándose éstas en sociedadescotizadas y, por último, agotamiento de la actividadinversora en los dos últimos trimestres del año.

La cifra de inversión neta aumenta un 26,7 por100 sobre 2007, estableciendo un récord desde elinicio de la serie en 1993, mientras que la inversiónbruta aumenta sólo marginalmente pero alcanzacotas también históricas con la excepción del año2000. Hay que tener en cuenta que, en el año 2007se dan los mayores aumentos de las tasas de varia-ción interanual tanto en inversión bruta como enneta, impulso que prosigue en la mitad de 2008(Cuadro 4.2).

Las operaciones entre no residentes y reestruc-turaciones de grupo no constituyen inversión efec-tiva porque no implican variación de posiciónacreedora ni deudora de España frente al exterior ypor lo tanto, no se contabilizan en los flujos deinversión total del ejercicio. No obstante, el Re- �


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CUADRO 4.1INVERSIÓN TOTAL(Millones de euros)

2006 2007 2008

Bruta Neta Bruta NetaImporte

Porcentaje variación 08/07

Bruta Neta Bruta Neta

Inversión total en participaciones en el capital............. 13.774 3.469 37.554 27.261 37.715 34.543 0,4 26,7Inversión descontadas ETVE ....................................... 9.853 -232 29.538 19.342 28.793 25.679 -2,5 32,8

En sociedades no cotizadas................................... 9.272 -73 11.329 1.470 14.777 11.726 30,4 697,6En sociedades cotizadas ........................................ 581 -159 18.209 17.872 14.016 13.954 -23,0 -21,9

Inversión de ETVE........................................................ 3.920 3.700 8.017 7.919 8.922 8.864 11,3 11,9

Fuente: Registro de Inversiones Exteriores.

CUADRO 4.2INVERSIÓN EXTRANJERA EN ESPAÑA. SERIE HISTÓRICA

(Millones de euros)

Años Inversión bruta Porcentaje variación Inversión neta Porcentaje variación

1993 5.435 – 3.584 –1994 6.524 20,1 3.235 -9,71995 5.405 -17,2 3.564 10,21996 5.633 4,2 2.928 -17,91997 6.833 21,3 4.033 37,81998 9.331 36,6 4.158 3,11999 18.538 98,7 13.767 231,12000 38.385 107,1 29.451 113,92001 35.174 -8,4 28.207 -4,22002 32.748 -6,9 28.660 1,62003 18.305 -44,1 14.784 -48,42004 18.917 3,3 9.160 -38,02005 17.628 -6,8 10.842 18,42006 13.774 -21,9 3.469 -68,02007 37.554 172,7 27.261 686,02008 37.715 0,4 34.543 26,7


gistro recoge estas operaciones, que suponen flu-jos inversores y desinversores y que producencambios de grupos inversores extranjeros y cam-bios en el origen geográfico del inversor que afec-tan a las características de la posición inversora.

Las trasmisiones entre no residentes de distintogrupo han aumentado un 53,3 por 100 respecto a2007. También se han incrementado las operacio-nes de transmisión entre no residentes del mismogrupo en un 17 por 100. Asimismo se recogen eneste apartado, las operaciones de fusión y adquisi-ción que los grupos extranjeros inversores enEspaña llevan a cabo en el extranjero (Cuadro 4.3).

En otras operaciones de reestructuración seincluyen la transmisión entre no residentes de par-ticipaciones de empresas residentes del mismogrupo de la que se derivan reestructuraciones delos grupos extranjeros en España, pasos de unainversión directa a indirecta para una empresa yparalelamente de una inversión indirecta a directapara otra, así como fusiones de grupos extranjerosen España. En el origen de la operación está eldeseo de llevar a cabo una reestructuración econó-mica del grupo, o razones de conveniencia fiscal.

La compra-venta de acciones existentes frentea la compra o suscripción de acciones de nuevaemisión tiene diferentes resultados desde el puntode vista de impacto económico. Dentro del primertipo de operaciones hablamos de adquisiciones,que pueden suponer tomas de control (más del 50por 100) o tomas de participaciones minoritariasen empresas españolas por inversores extranjeros ydentro del segundo podemos distinguir: nuevasinversiones, ampliaciones de capital e inversionespara reestructuraciones financieras (para pago dedeudas o reducción de pérdidas). Naturalmente, estasúltimas no tienen el mismo impacto sobre la pro-ducción, ni sobre el incremento de activos de lasempresas residentes que el de las dos primeras.

En el Cuadro 4.4 se observa que siguen siendolas adquisiciones el tipo de operación predominan-te en 2008 con un crecimiento del 21 por 100,mientras que constituciones y ampliaciones regis-tran tasas de variación negativas, especialmente lasconstituciones que se desploman con una reduc-ción del 77,3 por 100 respecto a 2007.

Las desinversiones, excluidas las ETVE, se hanreducido fuertemente con una tasa de variación �


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CUADRO 4.3OTRAS OPERACIONES REGISTRADAS (1)

(Millones de euros)

2007 2008

Transmisiones entre no residentes de distinto grupo.................................................................................... 1.161 1.779Reestructuraciones de grupo

Transmisiones entre no residentes del mismo grupo ........................................................................................ 33.225 38.901Otras operaciones de reestructuración

Inversiones............................................................................................................................................. 3.301 3.607Desinversiones....................................................................................................................................... 8.164 5.162

(1) Operaciones entre no residentes que suponen un cambio en el titular de una inversión en España.Fuente: Registro de Inversiones Exteriores.

CUADRO 4.4INVERSIÓN EXTRANJERA BRUTA EXCLUIDAS LAS ETVE. TIPO DE OPERACIÓN

(Millones de euros)

2006 2007 2008

Importe Porcentaje Importe Porcentaje Importe PorcentajePorcentaje

variación 08/07

Nueva Producción ................. 6.402 65,0 9.800 33,2 4.906 17,0 -49,9Constituciones ................... 737 7,5 1.262 4,3 286 1,0 -77,3Ampliaciones ..................... 5.665 57,5 8.538 28,9 4.619 16,0 -45,9

Adquisiciones......................... 3.451 35,0 19.738 66,8 23.887 83,0 21,0

TOTAL ................................... 9.853 100,0 29.538 100,0 28.793 100,0 -2,5


cercana al 70 por 100 lo que explica que el creci-miento de la inversión neta haya sido mucho mayorque el de la bruta (Cuadro 4.5).

Las liquidaciones ya sean totales (quiebra, diso-lución) como parciales (reducción de capital) consti-tuyen el 15,9 por 100 del total de desinversionesexcluidas las ETVE, mientras que las ventas de par-ticipaciones de capital suman el 84,1 por 100 de lacifra total.

Las ventas se han contraído a un ritmo mayorque las liquidaciones. En general, se observa unacontracción generalizada de las desinversiones entodos los frentes y en todos los epígrafes.

4.2.2. Distribución geográfica

El origen de las inversiones está altamentecorrelacionado con las OPA o altas tomas de par-ticipación en el capital de grandes empresas espa-ñolas, por lo cual la distribución geográfica de lainversión extranjera en España, en un momentodado, está muy condicionada por el origen de lasempresas inversoras actoras en grandes operacio-nes durante ese periodo. El principal inversor en2008 fue el Reino Unido, que sustituyó a Italia,seguido de Alemania y Países Bajos. Por áreas noexistente variaciones significativas (Cuadro 4.6). �


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CUADRO 4.6INVERSIÓN EXTRANJERA BRUTA SIN LAS ETVE. PAÍS DE ORIGEN INMEDIATO

(Millones de euros)

País2007 2008 Porcentaje

variación 08/07Importe Porcentaje Importe Porcentaje

Reino Unido ................................................. 995 3,4 13.198 45,8 1.227,0Alemania...................................................... 840 2,8 7.492 26,0 791,9Países Bajos................................................ 2.796 9,5 2.552 8,9 -8,7Francia......................................................... 569 1,9 2.178 7,6 282,7Luxemburgo................................................. 3.331 11,3 1.220 4,2 -63,4Suiza............................................................ 709 2,4 391 1,4 -44,9Italia ............................................................. 18.141 61,4 272 0,9 -98,5Portugal ....................................................... 281 1,0 227 0,8 -19,1Estados Unidos de América ........................ 325 1,1 156 0,5 -51,9Bélgica ......................................................... 95 0,3 133 0,5 39,0México ......................................................... 120 0,4 103 0,4 -14,5Libia ............................................................. 100 0,3 100 0,3 0,0Dinamarca ................................................... 72 0,2 91 0,3 25,8Suecia.......................................................... 611 2,1 80 0,3 -86,9Andorra ........................................................ 35 0,1 62 0,2 76,6Egipto........................................................... 0 0,0 40 0,1 565.074,8Uruguay ....................................................... 37 0,1 40 0,1 8,5Polonia......................................................... 0 0,0 38 0,1 29.449,3India ............................................................. 10 0,0 35 0,1 237,1Austria.......................................................... 55 0,2 28 0,1 -48,8Resto ........................................................... 417 1,4 359 1,2 -13,9

Áreas geográficasPaís inmediato: OCDE ................................ 29.047 98,3 28.254 98,1 -2,7País inmediato: UE-27................................. 27.870 94,4 27.578 95,8 -1,0País inmediato: UE-15................................. 27.837 94,2 27.493 95,5 -1,2País inmediato: Latinoamérica .................... 284 1,0 229 0,8 -19,3País inmediato: Paraísos fiscales................ 168 0,6 198 0,7 17,6


CUADRO 4.5DESINVERSIÓN EXTRANJERA EXCLUIDAS LAS ETVE. TIPO DE OPERACIÓN

(Millones de euros)

2006 2007 2008

Importe Porcentaje Importe Porcentaje Importe PorcentajePorcentaje variación

08/07

Liquidaciones ........................... 990 9,8 1.047 10,3 495 15,9 -52,8Liquidación total ................... 105 1,0 588 5,8 87 2,8 -85,2Liquidación parcial ............... 885 8,8 459 4,5 407 13,1 -11,3

Ventas ...................................... 9.095 90,2 9.148 89,7 2.619 84,1 -71,4

TOTAL...................................... 10.085 100,0 10.196 100,0 3.113 100,0 -69,5


agua con un 27,3 por 100. Otros sectores relevan-tes, aunque en menor medida, son el de interme-diación financiera, banca y seguros, con un 9,4 por100 del total y las actividades inmobiliarias y deservicios, con un 6,8 por 100 (Cuadro 4.8).

A tenor de lo anterior, puede afirmarse que lainversión extranjera en España tuvo un alto índicede concentración ya que los sectores mencionadossuman un 90,5 por 100 de todas las entradas enparticipaciones de capital español, excluidas lasETVE.

Si ahora pormenorizamos por sectores, descen-diendo a una clasificación de cuatro dígitos de laCNAE, podemos afinar más el sector receptor de lainversión: el comercio al por mayor y producción detabaco y la producción de energía eléctrica son sec-tores muy destacados de los demás ya que entre ellosdos suponen el 68,8 por 100 del total invertido. Delresto de los sectores sólo otros tipos de intermedia-ción financiera supera los 1.000 millones de euros.A pesar de la alta concentración en esos dos secto-res, el resto de la inversión extranjera está bastanterepartida entre el resto de los sectores. �


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CUADRO 4.7INVERSIÓN EXTRANJERA BRUTA SIN LAS ETVE. PAÍS DE ORIGEN ÚLTIMO

(Millones de euros)

País2007 2008 Porcentaje

variación 08/07Importe Porcentaje Importe Porcentaje

Reino Unido ................................................. 1.358 4,6 13.344 46,3 882,4Alemania ...................................................... 1.014 3,4 7.560 26,3 645,3Francia ......................................................... 654 2,2 2.250 7,8 243,9Países Bajos ................................................ 732 2,5 1.181 4,1 61,4España ......................................................... 340 1,2 880 3,1 158,7Luxemburgo ................................................. 877 3,0 558 1,9 -36,3Suiza ............................................................ 171 0,6 499 1,7 191,0Estados Unidos de América......................... 1.816 6,1 448 1,6 -75,3Italia.............................................................. 18.929 64,1 272 0,9 -98,6Portugal........................................................ 292 1,0 225 0,8 -22,9Bélgica ......................................................... 62 0,2 195 0,7 216,3Suecia .......................................................... 581 2,0 163 0,6 -72,0Canadá......................................................... 76 0,3 134 0,5 76,8Libia.............................................................. 100 0,3 100 0,3 0,0México.......................................................... 735 2,5 99 0,3 -86,6Dinamarca.................................................... 72 0,2 77 0,3 6,4Japón ........................................................... 35 0,1 73 0,3 105,7Andorra ........................................................ 34 0,1 63 0,2 82,1Mauricio........................................................ 1 0,0 48 0,2 3.211,5Egipto ........................................................... 0 0,0 40 0,1 565.074,8Resto............................................................ 1.656 5,6 584 2,0 -64,7

Áreas geográficasPaís último: OCDE....................................... 28.037 94,9 28.134 97,7 0,3País último: UE-27 ....................................... 25.034 84,8 26.844 93,2 7,2País último: UE-15 ....................................... 25.010 84,7 26.764 93,0 7,0País último: Latinoamérica........................... 866 2,9 229 0,8 -73,5País último: paraísos fiscales ...................... 176 0,6 323 1,1 84,0


Como países de origen último de la inversión,el Reino Unido con un 46,3 por 100 confirma suposición de liderazgo que obtenía como país inme-diato, seguido de Alemania con un 26,3 por 100.Sin embargo, en tercera posición aparece Franciaque desplaza a los Países Bajos, país que es utili-zado como tránsito en algunos casos. La apariciónde España con un 3,1 por 100 de la inversión totalse debe a que inversiones realizadas es Españadesde otro país son realizadas por filiales de em-presas españolas en el extranjero (Cuadro 4.7).

A destacar la caída de la inversión desde Italiadebida a una fuerte inversión de carácter puntual rea-lizada por una empresa de ese país; también caen lasinversiones desde Estados Unidos que pasa de ocu-par el segundo puesto en 2007 al octavo en 2008.

4.2.3. Sectores de destino

Destaca el sector comercio con una inversiónque supone el 47 por 100 del total del año, y la pro-ducción y distribución de energía eléctrica, gas y


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CUADRO 4.9INVERSIÓN EXTRANJERA BRUTA SIN LAS ETVELOS VEINTE PRIMEROS SECTORES DE DESTINO

(Millones de euros)

CNAE Sector de destino2007 2008

Importe Porcentaje Importe Porcentaje

5135 Comercio al por mayor prod. del tabaco ............. 0 0,0 12.616 43,84011 Producción de energía eléctrica .......................... 41 0,1 7.198 25,06512 Otros tipos de intermediación monetaria ............. 1.495 5,1 1.068 3,76603 Seguros no vida................................................... 0 0,0 783 2,77011 Promoción inmobiliaria por cuenta propia ........... 548 1,9 567 2,06601 Seguros de vida................................................... 127 0,4 507 1,86420 Telecomunicaciones............................................. 84 0,3 444 1,54100 Captación, depuración y distribución agua.......... 2 0,0 429 1,57012 Compraventa bienes inmobiliarios cta. pro.......... 242 0,8 298 1,07020 Alquiler bienes inmobiliarios cta. propia............... 316 1,1 253 0,96522 Otros tipos de actividades crediticias .................. 92 0,3 236 0,84523 Construc. autopistas, carreteras, vías férr........... 3 0,0 213 0,74010 Produc. y distribución energía eléctrica............... 18.537 62,8 194 0,77414 Consulta y asesor. sobre dirección y gest ........... 89 0,3 171 0,66030 Transporte por tubería ......................................... 0 0,0 168 0,65155 Comercio al por mayor productos químicos ........ 19 0,1 162 0,67032 Gestión y admon. propiedad inmobiliaria ............ 195 0,7 153 0,57484 Otras actividades empresariales.......................... 88 0,3 147 0,59220 Actividades de radio y televisión.......................... 98 0,3 136 0,55211 Comercio por menor, predominio alimentos ........ 0 0,0 132 0,5

Resto.................................................................... 7.562 25,6 2.918 10,1


CUADRO 4.8SECTOR DE DESTINO EXCLUIDAS LAS ETVE

(Millones de euros)

CNAESector de destino

(Clasificación Nacional de Actividades Económicas)

2006 2007 2008

Inversiónbruta

Inversiónbruta

Inversión bruta

Importe PorcentajePorcentaje

variación 08/07

01 al 05 Agricultura,ganadería, caza, selv. y pesca ................ 70 58 61 0,2 4,48

40 al 41Produc./distrib. eléctrica, gas y agua.........................

40 Produc.y distrib.energía eléctrica, gas.............41 Captación, depuración y distrib. agua .............

1777899

18.58218.580

2

7.8647.434

429

27,325,81,5

-57,68-60

20.087

10 al 14 y 23 Indust. extractivas, refino petróleo............................. 166 29 93 0,3 226,23

15 al 16 Alimentación/bebidas y tabaco .................................. 299 702 60 0,2 -91,51

17 al 19 Industria textil y de la confección............................... 86 21 35 0,1 68,86

21 al 22 Industria papel, edición, artes gráficas ...................... 357 502 31 0,1 -93,78

24 al 25Ind. química y transf. caucho y plásticos...................

24 Industria química.............................................417341

1.050995

196127

0,70,4

-81,37-87

20 y 26 al 37 Otras manufacturas ................................................... 791 1.405 370 1,3 -73,6

45 Construcción .............................................................. 143 1.397 412 1,4 -70,50

50 al 52Comercio....................................................................

51 Comercio mayor e intermed.comercio............52 Comercio por menor, exc.vehículos motor ......

1.05587789

479283172

13.54213.134

346

47,045,61,2

2.728,054.542

102

55 Hostelería................................................................... 538 335 216 0,7 -35,6

60 al 64

Transportes y comunicaciones ..................................60 Transporte terrestre; transp. por tubería..........64 Telecomunicaciones.........................................63 Actividades anexas a los transportes ..............

2.28111

1.456675

67832784

221

783234444103

2,70,81,50,4

15,37-28425-53

65 al 67Intermediación financ., banca y seguros ...................

65 Banca y otros interm. financieros ....................66 Seguros y planes pensio., exc. seg. social......

61952883

1.9151.684

127

2.7051.3721.290

9,44,84,5

41,24-19915

70 al 74 (excepto 7415)

Actividades inmobiliarias y servicios..........................70 actividades inmobiliarias.................................72 actividades informáticas .................................

2.3871.476

92

1.9931.303

106

1.9641.274

141

6,84,40,5

-1,42-233

75 al 93Resto

92 Activid. recreativas, culturales y deport ...........467403

393159

462288

1,61,0

17,6081

TOTAL........................................................................................................... 9.853 29.538 28.793 100,0 -2,52



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CUADRO 4.10INVERSIÓN EXTRANJERA BRUTA, EXCLUIDAS LAS ETVE, POR COMUNIDAD AUTÓNOMA DE DESTINO

(Millones de euros)

Comunidad Autónoma2006 2007 2008

Importe Porcentaje Importe Porcentaje Importe Porcentaje Porcentaje

variación 08/07

Comunidad de Madrid ......................... 4.218 42,8 22.714 76,9 23.803 82,7 4,8Cataluña .............................................. 2.593 26,3 2.598 8,8 2.124 7,4 -18,2En todo el territorio nacional................ 1.386 14,1 183 0,6 1.131 3,9 519,1Islas Baleares ...................................... 117 1,2 144 0,5 505 1,8 249,5Comunidad Valenciana........................ 163 1,7 1.740 5,9 256 0,9 -85,3País Vasco........................................... 306 3,1 1.351 4,6 240 0,8 -82,3Andalucía............................................. 244 2,5 246 0,8 196 0,7 -20,2Región de Murcia ................................ 113 1,1 42 0,1 189 0,7 346,5Aragón ................................................. 91 0,9 209 0,7 99 0,3 -52,6Castilla-La Mancha.............................. 262 2,7 22 0,1 89 0,3 299,8Cantabria ............................................. 4 0,0 59 0,2 47 0,2 -21,7Castilla y León..................................... 36 0,4 23 0,1 46 0,2 97,1Galicia.................................................. 96 1,0 50 0,2 23 0,1 -55,0Islas Canarias...................................... 41 0,4 128 0,4 18 0,1 -86,3Navarra ................................................ 137 1,4 10 0,0 16 0,1 65,1Principado de Asturias......................... 33 0,3 8 0,0 7 0,0 -16,3Extremadura ........................................ 4 0,0 4 0,0 5 0,0 32,5Ceuta y Melilla ..................................... 9 0,1 3 0,0 1 0,0 -75,9La Rioja ............................................... 1 0,0 3 0,0 0 0,0 -86,2

TOTAL ................................................. 9.853 100,0 29.538 100,0 28.793 100,0 -2,5


La alta concentración sectorial es debida a opera-ciones de compra de importantes empresas españo-las en los sectores citados por empresas extranjerasradicadas en países que también ocupan el ranking depaís de origen último de las inversiones (Cuadro 4.9).

4.2.4. Distribución por comunidades autónomas

Al realizarse el reparto de los flujos inversoresextranjeros según la sede social de las empresas ob-jeto de inversión receptora (grandes empresas quehan sido objeto de grandes operaciones de adqui-sición o toma de participación mayoritaria) la con-centración en la Comunidad de Madrid alcanza un82 por 100 del total. Ya en 2007 su porcentaje departicipación casi había duplicado su participaciónrespecto al año anterior por idénticos motivos a losseñalados anteriormente (Cuadro 4.10).

4.3. Inversiones españolas en el exterior

4.3.1. Evolución general

La inversión bruta española en participacionesde capital en el exterior ascendió a 38.636 millo-

nes de euros con una caída del 64,6 por 100 res-pecto a 2007, año que fue excepcionalmente posi-tivo con cifras récord (Cuadro 4.11). Esta contrac-ción es la mayor desde que se elaboran estos regis-tros. La inversión española en el exterior se man-tiene por encima de la extranjera en España comoha venido siendo habitual desde 1998, recuperan-do una tendencia que se quebró en el primersemestre de este año. No obstante, las cifras de2008 suponen sólo un 2,44 por 100 más que lainversión extranjera en España, desde un 290,8 por100 de 2007.

Las liquidaciones se han concentrado en las em-presas no ETVE siendo porcentualmente mayoresen las sociedades cotizadas. No obstante, la mayorconcentración (64,1 por 100 del total) y también lamayor contracción (73 por 100) de los flujos inver-sores se ha dado en las sociedades no cotizadas.

El análisis por trimestres arroja tasas de varia-ción negativas en todos ellos respecto a igualperiodo del año anterior. Las mayores caídas seconcentran en el segundo y cuarto, donde se tienenregistros negativos por encima de la media.

En resumen, la inversión española en el exteriorse ha contraído de forma aguda en términos anua-les en todos los epígrafes analizados desde el ini-cio de 2008. �

Las tasas de variación trimestrales anualizadasson todas fuertemente negativas especialmente apartir del segundo trimestre, concentrándose lasinversiones en sociedades no cotizadas.

En el Cuadro 4.12 se sigue la evolución de lainversión española en el exterior desde 1993. Enestos dieciséis años España ha multiplicado suinversión exterior extraordinariamente, convirtién-dose en emisor neto en 1997 y manteniendo esasituación hasta el presente.

La cifra de inversión bruta del ejercicio 2008cae por debajo de los niveles alcanzados en 2006,presentando la tasa de variación negativa inter-anual más alta de toda la serie desde 1993 tanto entérminos brutos como netos, aunque la caída esmayor en este último epígrafe.

Como indicábamos al hablar de las inversionesextranjeras estas operaciones no alteran la posi-

ción de España frente al resto del mundo, no incre-mentan sus activos en el exterior, ni mejoran suposición acreedora. Las transmisiones entre resi-dentes de distinto grupo que comportan una inver-sión (adquisición del nuevo inversor) y una desin-versión (venta del anterior titular), registraron unincremento del 14,65 por 100.

Las trasmisiones entre residentes del mismogrupo experimentaron una fuerte contracción –el61,2 por 100– respecto de 2007, mientras que el restode las operaciones registradas de reestructuraciónaumentaron fuertemente durante el ejercicio analiza-do, respondiendo estas últimas al deseo por parte delos inversores españoles de lograr una estructura desus inversiones que permita una mayor optimizaciónfiscal y de gestión empresarial (Cuadro 4.13).

Por tipo de operación y dentro del marco contrac-tivo antes señalado, las adquisiciones de acciones �


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CUADRO 4.12EVOLUCIÓN DE LA INVERSIÓN ESPAÑOLA EN EL EXTERIOR, SERIE HISTÓRICA

(Millones de euros)

Años Inversión bruta Porcentaje variación Inversión neta Porcentaje variación

1993 1.879 – 828 –1994 4.236 125,4 3.117 276,41995 5.991 41,4 2.941 -5,71996 5.015 -16,3 3.372 14,71997 10.513 109,6 9.082 169,31998 15.410 46,6 12.277 35,21999 51.528 234,4 43.751 256,42000 60.278 17,0 48.500 10,92001 47.860 -20,6 43.041 -11,32002 46.967 -1,9 31.384 -27,12003 31.712 -32,5 25.752 -17,92004 49.283 55,4 43.345 68,32005 34.197 -30,6 26.558 -38,72006 65.457 32,8 55.019 26,92007 109.212 66,8 91.109 65,62008 38.636 -64,6 30.819 -66,2


CUADRO 4.11INVERSIÓN TOTAL(Millones de euros)

2006 2007 2008

Inversión bruta

Inversión neta

Inversión bruta

Inversiónneta

ImportePorcentaje variación

08/07

Inversiónbruta

Inversiónneta

Inversiónbruta

Inversiónneta

Inversión total en participaciones en el capital ............. 65.457 55.019 109.212 91.109 38.636 30.819 -64,6 -66,2Inversión descontadas las ETVE.................................. 61.201 54.290 95.712 80.253 28.903 22.018 -69,8 -72,6

– En sociedades no cotizadas ................................. 30.968 25.399 91.016 75.864 24.801 19.851 -72,8 -73,8– En sociedades cotizadas ...................................... 30.232 28.891 4.696 4.389 4.102 2.166 -12,7 -50,6

Inversión de las ETVE .................................................. 4.256 730 13.499 10.857 9.734 8.802 -27,9 -18,9

No incluye ni transmisiones entre residentes ni reestructuraciones de grupo.Fuente: Registro de Inversiones Exteriores.

existentes se han contraído por encima del total,mientras que las inversiones de nueva producción lohan hecho por debajo del mismo, a la vez que hanaumentado su porcentaje de participación sobre eltotal siendo esta la tendencia general en los tres últi-mos años. Las constituciones presentan la menortasa de variación negativa (Cuadro 4.14).

La desinversión en 2008 ha sido menos de lamitad de la registrada en 2007, predominando lasventas de acciones existentes que caen por encimade la media, frente a las liquidaciones, sean éstastotales por quiebra o disolución de la empresa par-ticipada, o parciales, por reducción del capital(Cuadro 4.15).

4.3.2. Distribución geográfica excluidas las ETVE

La distribución geográfica de las inversionesespañolas en el exterior –al igual que la de las inver-siones extranjeras en España– está condicionada porlas grandes operaciones puntuales que se hayan pro-ducido durante el periodo analizado, así como por laspreferencias de países y áreas de los inversores espa-ñoles. Como consecuencia de esos dos factores, losEstados Unidos se sitúan en cabeza de la lista, segui-dos del Reino Unido y Países Bajos, siendo estos trespaíses, aunque en distinto orden, los que estaban a lacabeza de la lista en 2007 (Cuadro 4.16).

La distribución por áreas geográficas o grupos �


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CUADRO 4.14INVERSIÓN ESPAÑOLA BRUTA EN EL EXTERIOR EXCLUIDAS LAS ETVE POR TIPO DE OPERACIÓN

(Millones de euros)

2006 2007 2008


variación 08/07

Nueva Producción ................. 18.168 29,7 40.025 41,8 13.361 46,2 -66,6Constituciones ................... 4.558 7,4 1.388 1,5 1.095 3,8 -21,1Ampliaciones ..................... 13.610 22,2 38.637 40,4 12.265 42,4 -68,3

Adquisiciones......................... 43.032 70,3 55.688 58,2 15.542 53,8 -72,1

TOTAL ................................... 61.201 100,0 95.712 100,0 28.903 100,0 -69,8


CUADRO 4.15DESINVERSIÓN ESPAÑOLA EN EL EXTERIOR EXCLUIDAS LAS ETVE POR TIPO DE OPERACIÓN

(Millones de euros)

2006 2007 2008

Importe Porcentaje Importe Porcentaje Importe PorcentajePorcentaje variación

08/07

Liquidaciones ........................... 1.870 27,1 2.997 19,4 1.809 26,3 -39,6Liquidación total ................... 596 8,6 759 4,9 76 1,1 -90,0Liquidación parcial ............... 1.274 18,4 2.239 14,5 1.733 25,2 -22,6

Ventas ...................................... 5.041 72,9 12.462 80,6 5.076 73,7 -59,3

TOTAL...................................... 6.911 100,0 15.460 100,0 6.885 100,0 -55,5


CUADRO 4.13OTRAS OPERACIONES REGISTRADAS

(Millones de euros)

2007 2008

Transmisiones entre residentes de distinto grupo ......................................................................................... 1.453 1.666Reestructuraciones de grupo

Transmisiones entre residentes del mismo grupo................................................................................................ 10.558 4.092Otras operaciones de reestructuración

Inversiones............................................................................................................................................... 9.516 19.642Desinversiones ........................................................................................................................................ 11.491 16.679



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CUADRO 4.17SECTORES DE DESTINO EXCLUIDAS LAS ETVE

(Millones de euros)

CNAE Sector de destino

2006 2007 2008

Inversiónbruta

Inversiónbruta

Inversión bruta


variación 08/07

01 al 05 Agricultura,ganadería,caza,selv.y pesca ...................... 138 280 91 0,3 -67,5

40 al 41Produc./distrib. eléctrica, gas y agua............................

40 Produc. y distrib. energía eléctrica, gas .............1.485

95121.03221.017

4.9284.798

17,016,6

-76,6-77,2

10 al 14 y 23 Indust.extractivas, refino petróleo................................. 396 142 16 0,1 -88,6

15 al 16 Alimentación/bebidas y tabaco ..................................... 1.418 1.323 97 0,3 -92,7

17 al 19 Industria textil y de la confección.................................. 95 52 19 0,1 -63,5

21 al 22 Industria papel, edición, artes gráficas ......................... 944 211 29 0,1 -86,2

24 al 25 Ind. química y transf. caucho y plásticos...................... 1.332 1.456 121 0,4 -91,7

20 y 26 al 37Otras manufacturas ......................................................

26 Fabricación otros prod. minerales no metál. ......2.754

9306.1112.415

2.6352.118

9,17,3

-56,9-12,3

45 Construcción ................................................................. 2.928 1.928 379 1,3 -80,4

50 al 52Comercio.......................................................................

52 Comercio por menor, exc. vehículos motor ........51 Comercio mayor e intermed. comercio..............

1.656795859

2.045684

1.305

2.1141.0791.024

7,33,73,5

3,457,7

-21,555 Hostelería...................................................................... 962 1.116 129 0,4 -88,5

60 al 64 Transportes y comunicaciones ..................................... 30.463 15.208 446 1,5 -97,1

65 al 67Intermediación financ., banca y seguros ......................

65 Banca y otros interm. financieros .......................66 Seguros y planes pensiones, exc. seg. social....

9.5988.678

683

41.36838.925

2.011

15.02411.2933.465

52,039,112,0

-63,7-71,072,3

70 al 74(excepto 7415)

Actividades inmobiliarias y servicios.............................70 Actividades inmobiliarias.....................................

4.1233.359

2.9932.542

2.6412.123

9,17,3

-11,8-16,5

75 al 93 Otros ............................................................................. 2.909 448 234 0,8 -47,7

TOTAL........................................................................... 61.201 95.712 28.903 100,0 -69,8


CUADRO 4.16DISTRIBUCIÓN GEOGRÁFICA DE LA INVERSIÓN ESPAÑOLA EN EL EXTERIOR EXCLUIDAS LAS ETVE

(Millones de euros)

País2007 2008

Porcentaje variación 08/07Importe Porcentaje Importe Porcentaje

Estados Unidos de América ............... 9.820 10,3 6.516 22,5 -33,6Reino Unido........................................ 29.987 31,3 4.652 16,1 -84,5Países Bajos....................................... 23.252 24,3 3.564 12,3 -84,7México ................................................ 2.412 2,5 3.306 11,4 37,1Grecia ................................................. 909 0,9 1.116 3,9 22,7Portugal .............................................. 825 0,9 1.042 3,6 26,3Francia................................................ 2.447 2,6 966 3,3 -60,5Bélgica................................................ 309 0,3 837 2,9 171,0Hong Kong.......................................... 35 0,0 738 2,6 2.012,7Austria ................................................ 6 0,0 696 2,4 12.316,9Turquía ............................................... 1.120 1,2 651 2,3 -41,9Brasil................................................... 3.054 3,2 573 2,0 -81,2Marruecos........................................... 142 0,1 551 1,9 287,2Italia .................................................... 4.894 5,1 372 1,3 -92,4Perú .................................................... 89 0,1 366 1,3 313,0Luxemburgo........................................ 180 0,2 282 1,0 56,7Alemania............................................. 2.931 3,1 222 0,8 -92,4Rusia .................................................. 332 0,3 197 0,7 -40,7Colombia ............................................ 157 0,2 193 0,7 22,6Uruguay .............................................. 146 0,2 190 0,7 29,9Argentina ............................................ 489 0,5 161 0,6 -67,0Resto .................................................. 12.177 12,7 1.711 5,9 -85,9

TOTAL ................................................ 95.712 100,0 28.903 100,0 -69,8

Áreas geográficasOCDE ................................................. 89.266 93,3 24.806 85,8 -72,2UE-27 ................................................. 74.617 78,0 14.234 49,2 -80,9UE-15 ................................................. 66.436 69,4 13.805 47,8 -79,2Latinoamérica ..................................... 6.824 7,1 5.056 17,5 -25,9Paraísos fiscales ................................ 218 0,2 974 3,4 349,8


de países muestran una caída de la participación delos países de la UE en favor de Latinoamérica, mien-tras que se observa un fuerte aumento del flujoinversor hacia los paraísos fiscales que, aunque suparticipación sobre el total sigue siendo pequeña, hadejado de ser marginal.

4.3.3. Sectores de destino y de origen

Los Cuadros 4.17 y 4.18 explican la distribu-ción del flujo inversor español en el país de recep-ción o destino. En el primer caso a dos dígitos dela clasificación CNAE y en el segundo a cuatro.Correspondiéndose con las operaciones de compramás cuantiosas del año, son los sectores de banca,energía eléctrica y seguros los destinos principalesde la inversión española en el periodo.

Los cinco primeros sectores o subsectores refe-renciados acaparan casi el 70 por 100 del total dela inversión española del periodo, estando pues lainversión española en el exterior bastante concen-trada en unos pocos sectores de destino.

Si clasificamos los sectores según las empresasde las que procede la inversión española e incluimoslas sociedades holding y también las ETVE, tene-mos el reparto total por sector en origen del total dela inversión bruta. Vemos ahora que este nuevo sec-

tor de holdings domina la distribución en origen loque viene a significar que la actividad inversora queha tenido como destino un sector productivo deter-minado se ha instrumentado en algunos casos a tra-vés de una sociedad holding. No obstante, esta clasi-ficación debe corresponderse a grandes rasgos conla clasificación por destino ya que resulta lógicopensar que las empresas que están especializas en unsector en el mercado nacional realizan su actividaden el mismo sector en el mercado exterior al queacuden (Cuadro 4.19).

4.3.4. Comunidades autónomas de origenexcluidas las ETVE

Cuatro comunidades autónomas concentran el86,4 por 100 de la inversión total emitida. El ordende importancia de las comunidades emisoras tienepocas variaciones respecto a 2007, con excepción deCataluña, que asciende del cuarto al segundo lugar.Hay que tener de nuevo en cuenta la sede social delas grandes compañías inversoras para explicar ladistribución por comunidades autónomas.

Es significativo que estas cuatro comunidadesven decrecer fuertemente sus cifras de inversión enel exterior, siendo Cataluña la que lo hace a tasasmás moderadas y de ahí su ascenso en la clasifi- �


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CUADRO 4.18PRINCIPALES SECTORES DE DESTINO EXLUIDAS ETVE

(Millones de euros)

CNAE Sector de destino

2007 2008

Importe Porcentaje Importe PorcentajePorcentaje

variación 08/07

6512 Otros tipos de intermediación monetaria .............................. 22.171 23,2 6.147 21,3 -72,34011 Producción de energía eléctrica............................................ 1.275 1,3 4.766 16,5 273,86523 Otros tipos de intermediación financiera............................... 16.358 17,1 4.091 14,2 -75,06603 Seguros no vida .................................................................... 954 1,0 3.106 10,7 225,42651 Fabricación de cemento ........................................................ 2.149 2,2 1.862 6,4 -13,46522 Otros tipos de actividades crediticias.................................... 111 0,1 1.055 3,6 854,17011 Promoción inmobiliaria por cuenta propia............................. 1.741 1,8 1.035 3,6 -40,67020 Alquiler bienes inmobiliarios cta.propia................................. 266 0,3 853 3,0 220,55211 Comercio por menor, predominio alimentos ......................... 136 0,1 719 2,5 428,96602 Planes de pensiones ............................................................. 25 0,0 359 1,2 1.344,65242 Comercio al por menor prendas de vestir............................. 495 0,5 319 1,1 -35,75137 Comercio al por mayor café, té, cacao y espec.................... 0 0,0 313 1,1 No consta6321 Otras activid. anexas al transporte terrestre ......................... 164 0,2 310 1,1 89,42742 Produc. y transformación aluminio........................................ 0 0,0 184 0,6 245.971,57414 Consulta y asesor. sobre dirección y gestión........................ 81 0,1 162 0,6 99,3

Resto ..................................................................................... 49.786 52,0 3.623 12,5 -92,7

TOTAL ................................................................................... 95.712 100,0 28.903 100,0 -69,8

Fuente: Registro de Inversiones Exteriores


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CUADRO 4.20COMUNIDADES AUTÓNOMAS DE ORIGEN EXCLUIDAS LAS ETVE

(Millones de euros)

Comunidad Autónoma2006 2007 2008


variación 08/07

Comunidad de Madrid ......................................... 44.616 72,9 34.450 36,0 9.370 32,4 -72,8Cataluña .............................................................. 6.224 10,2 6.908 7,2 5.898 20,4 -14,6Cantabria ............................................................. 4.573 7,5 21.208 22,2 5.225 18,1 -75,4País Vasco........................................................... 2.735 4,5 28.243 29,5 4.483 15,5 -84,1Islas Baleares...................................................... 395 0,6 1.464 1,5 1.425 4,9 -2,7Comunidad Valenciana........................................ 260 0,4 747 0,8 1.311 4,5 75,5Galicia.................................................................. 1.236 2,0 1.525 1,6 644 2,2 -57,7Andalucía............................................................. 433 0,7 483 0,5 156 0,5 -67,7Castilla y León..................................................... 71 0,1 102 0,1 126 0,4 22,9Castilla-La Mancha.............................................. 11 0,0 157 0,2 90 0,3 -42,8Región de Murcia ................................................ 148 0,2 107 0,1 65 0,2 -39,8Aragón................................................................. 79 0,1 150 0,2 50 0,2 -66,3Islas Canarias...................................................... 77 0,1 5 0,0 48 0,2 877,5Navarra................................................................ 206 0,3 16 0,0 5 0,0 -67,1Principado de Asturias......................................... 120 0,2 15 0,0 4 0,0 -75,8Extremadura ........................................................ 10 0,0 131 0,1 2 0,0 -98,8La Rioja ............................................................... 4 0,0 1 0,0 1 0,0 -44,5Ceuta y Melilla..................................................... 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 -

TOTAL ................................................................. 61.201 100,0 95.712 100,0 28.903 100,0 -69,8


CUADRO 4.19SECTORES DE ORIGEN

(Millones de euros)

CNAE Sector de origen

2006 2007 2008

Inversiónbruta

Inversiónbruta

Inversión bruta


variación 08/07

Persona física.......................................................... 98 408 195 0,5 -52,3

01al 05 Agricultura, ganadería, caza, selv. y pesca ............ 147 92 109 0,3 18,2

40 al 41Produc./distrib. eléctrica, gas y agua ......................

Produc. y distrib.energía eléctrica, gas...............1.229

81719.76919.753

4.6234.529

12,011,7

-76,6-77,1

10 al 14 y 23 Indust. extractivas, refino petróleo .......................... 265 154 105 0,3 -31,415 al 16 Alimentación/bebidas y tabaco ............................... 937 846 392 1,0 -53,617 al 19 Industria textil y de la confección ............................ 434 320 222 0,6 -30,621 al 22 Industria papel, edición, artes gráficas ................... 484 48 321 0,8 563,524 al 25 Ind. química y transf. caucho y plásticos ................ 854 1.309 130 0,3 -90,1

20 y 26 al 37Otras manufacturas.................................................

Fabricación otros prod. minerales no metáli. ......Fabric. otro material de transporte ......................

1.67358732

2.328819412

2.6401.527

923

6,84,02,4

13,486,5

124,045 Construcción............................................................ 1.096 455 443 1,1 -2,6

50 al 52 Comercio ................................................................. 1.184 1.034 427 1,1 -58,755 Hostelería ................................................................ 557 131 821 2,1 527,6

60 al 64 Transportes y comunicaciones................................ 27.022 14.655 333 0,9 -97,7

65 al 67Intermediación financ., banca y seguros ................

Banca y otros interm. financieros........................7.3696.984

23.30823.273

6.9156.835

17,917,7

-70,3-70,6

70 al 74 (excepto 7415)

Actividades inmobiliarias y servicios .......................Actividades inmobiliarias .....................................

2.8352.561

2.1341.772

2.3351.702

6,04,4

9,4-4,0

7415Gestión de sociedades y tenencia de valores ........

Empresas tenencia val. extranjeros ....................Holdings de sociedades ......................................

16.7174.256

12.461

42.07513.49928.575

18.5579.7348.824

48,025,222,8

-55,9-27,9-69,1

75 al 93 Otros........................................................................ 2.556 146 67 0,2 -53,8

TOTAL ..................................................................... 65.457 109.212 38.636 100,0 -64,6


cación. De las comunidades con más de 50 millo-nes de euros de inversión emitidas sólo dos, la Co-

munidad Valenciana y Castilla y León mejoran lascifras del ejercicio precedente (Cuadro 4.20). �


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NOTA SOBRE METODOLOGÍA

Inversión Directa

De acuerdo con las directrices y prácticas recomendadas a nivel internacional por el 5º Manual de Balanza dePagos, se consideran operaciones de inversión exterior directa, aquellas en las que el inversor pretender conseguirun control o influencia en la dirección y administración de una empresa que opera fuera del territorio en el que resi-de. En la práctica se estima que se consigue ese control cuando la participación del inversor en el capital de laempresa alcanza o supera el 10 por 100.

En la Balanza de Pagos de España las operaciones de inversión exterior directa se clasifican según la natura-leza del instrumento en que se materializa la inversión en: acciones y otras formas de participación, beneficios rein-vertidos, financiación entre empresas del grupo y inversión en inmuebles.

Los datos, que recoge este Registro de Inversiones Exteriores (RIE) son los declarados por los inversores deacuerdo con lo establecido en la legislación sobre inversiones exteriores: RD 664/1999, OM de 28 de mayo de 2001y Resolución Ministerial de 21 de febrero de 2002, donde se fija para su presentación, el plazo máximo de un mescontado a partir de la fecha de la formalización de la inversión. Por lo tanto, registramos todas las formas de parti-cipación en el capital de las empresas (acciones y otras formas de participación), pero no incluimos: la financiaciónentre empresas, los beneficios reinvertidos (excepto cuando se capitalizan los préstamos y/o los beneficios) y lainversión en inmuebles.

Las inversiones recogidas se asignan al período correspondiente de acuerdo con la fecha de realización de lasmismas. No obstante, como consecuencia de indeseables retrasos en su presentación, en las actualizaciones tri-mestrales, se modifican datos correspondientes a períodos anteriores como resultado de operaciones declaradasen el último período pero cuya realización corresponde a un período anterior.

Téngase en cuenta que, aquí, estamos midiendo flujos de inversión que representan las aportaciones al capi-tal social de las empresas y que nos proporcionan la historia de la inversión a lo largo del periodo, que debemosdiferenciar de la posición (stock) de las inversiones extranjeras directas en España y de las inversiones españolasdirectas en el exterior en un momento determinado.

Inversión Bruta

En el caso de la inversión extranjera en España recoge las operaciones de no residentes que supongan:

• Participación en sociedades españolas no cotizadas.

• Participación superior al 10 por 100 en sociedades españolas cotizadas.

• Constitución o ampliación de dotación de sucursales de empresas extranjeras.

• Otras formas de inversión en entidades o contratos registrados en España (fundaciones, cooperativas, agru-paciones de interés económico) en las que el capital invertido sea superior a 3.005.060,52 euros.

En el caso de la inversión española en el exterior recoge las operaciones de residentes que supongan:

• Participación en sociedades no cotizadas domiciliadas en el exterior.

• Participación en sociedades cotizadas domiciliadas en el exterior (superior al 10 por 100 del capital).

• Constitución o ampliación de dotación de sucursales.

• Otras formas de inversión en entidades o contratos registrados en el exterior (fundaciones, cooperativas,agrupaciones de interés económico) en las que el capital invertido sea superior a 1.502.530,26 euros.

Inversión Neta

Es el resultado de restar a la inversión bruta las desinversiones, por causa de transmisiones entre residentes yno residentes, liquidaciones parciales (reducciones de capital) o totales (disoluciones o quiebras).


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Entidades de Tenencia de Valores Extranjeros. Operaciones tipo ETVE

Las Entidades de Tenencia de Valores Extranjeros son sociedades establecidas en España cuyo «principal»objeto es la tenencia de participaciones de sociedades situadas en el exterior. Las ETVE son sociedades instru-mentales cuya existencia obedece a estrategias de optimización fiscal dentro un mismo grupo empresarial y enmuchos casos sus inversiones carecen de efectos económicos directos.

Las operaciones de inversión llevadas a cabo por este tipo de sociedades generalmente consisten en la trans-misión dentro de un mismo grupo empresarial de participaciones en sociedades radicadas fuera de España.

Formalmente la transferencia a una sociedad domiciliada en España de la titularidad de una empresa radicadaen el exterior genera simultáneamente dos anotaciones en el Registro: una inversión extranjera en España al pro-ducirse un aumento de capital no residente equivalente al valor de los activos financieros aportados, y una inver-sión española en el exterior por la misma cuantía, al adquirir una empresa domiciliada en España la titularidad deunos activos situados en el exterior.

En un principio se optó por separar las operaciones de inversión de las ETVE del resto de las inversiones, sinembargo, al irse modificando la normativa fiscal la separación entre las ETVE y el resto de empresas ha ido per-diendo significado. Por una parte, las ETVE pueden ampliar su objeto social hacia actividades más allá de la meratenencia de valores y, por otra parte, empresas no ETVE llevan a cabo operaciones de transmisión de tenencia departicipaciones empresariales al poder acogerse a las ventajas fiscales inherentes a este tipo de operaciones.

Por este motivo se han diferenciado las inversiones atendiendo no solamente al tipo de empresa sino tambiéna la naturaleza de la operación. Se separan así las operaciones tipo ETVE, del resto de las operaciones de inver-sión, clasificándose como tales:

• Operaciones de transmisión no dinerarias (por ej.: acciones) dentro del mismo grupo empresarial de partici-paciones del grupo en empresas extranjeras, sean o no llevadas a cabo por empresas fiscalmente acogidasal régimen de ETVE.

• Todo tipo de operaciones llevadas a cabo por empresas fiscalmente registradas como ETVE, cuando la acti-vidad de la empresa sea únicamente la tenencia de valores extranjeros.

Las operaciones de ETVE controladas por residentes en España no se incluyen bajo este epígrafe.

Conviene separar las operaciones tipo ETVE porque pueden tener un valor efectivo muy elevado y un resultadoeconómico muy limitado. Una operación de esta naturaleza puede valorarse en miles de millones de euros y al mismotiempo no generar inversión en activos fijos ni puesto de trabajo alguno en el país que figura como receptor.

Otras operaciones registradas

Se incluyen en este apartado una serie de operaciones que implican cambio de titularidad de la inversión peroque no suponen variación en la posición inversora frente al exterior.

En el caso de la inversión extranjera son operaciones como las siguientes:

• Transmisiones entre no residentes, de activos o participaciones en empresas residentes.

• Reestructuración de activos en España dentro de un mismo grupo empresarial cuya matriz es no residente.

En el caso de la inversión española en el exterior son operaciones como:

• Transmisiones entre residentes, de activos o participaciones en empresas no residentes.

• Reestructuración de activos en el exterior dentro de un mismo grupo empresarial dominado por una empre-sa residente.

Sector

El sector de inversión corresponde al sector de actividad de la empresa receptora de la inversión.

En el caso de la inversión española en el exterior se especifica también el sector de origen que corresponde alsector de actividad de la empresa inversora española.

Los sectores se clasifican según la Clasificación Nacional de Actividades Económicas (CNAE).

Las inversiones en/o desde cabeceras de grupo o holdings empresariales se han asignado, en la medida de loposible, al sector de destino final.


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País

En la inversión extranjera en España se diferencia entre:

País inmediato: país donde reside el titular directo de la inversión.

País último: país de residencia del titular último de la inversión, es decir, en el que se agota la cadena detitularidad.

En la inversión española en el exterior se hace referencia a:

País inmediato: país de primer destino de la inversión.

Comunidad autónoma

La inversión extranjera en España se asigna a la comunidad autónoma donde está previsto se lleven a cabo lasactividades generadas por la inversión. Las inversiones de ámbito general se asignan al apartado «Todo el territo-rio nacional».

La inversión española en el exterior se atribuye a la comunidad autónoma donde radica la sede social de laempresa inversora.

Diferencia con los datos publicados por el Banco de España

Los datos sobre inversión directa publicados en la Balanza de Pagos por el Banco de España difieren de losdatos del Registro de Inversiones en los siguientes aspectos:

• Los datos de la Balanza de Pagos incluyen, como ya hemos dicho: reinversión de beneficios, inversión departiculares en inmuebles y flujos de financiación entre empresas relacionadas. Estos conceptos no estánincluidos en los datos del Registro.

• En la Balanza de Pagos se contabiliza la inversión a medida que se producen los desembolsos: pagos eingresos. El Registro contabiliza la inversión de una sola vez en el momento de formalizarse la operación, esdecir, de acuerdo con el principio del devengo. La forma de financiación de una operación de inversión direc-ta puede implicar diferencias temporales entre la contabilización de las operaciones por su devengo y su liqui-dación efectiva.

• En la Balanza de Pagos no se diferencian las operaciones de inversión en función de su naturaleza (ETVEy no ETVE). En cuanto a la asignación geográfica y sectorial, el Banco de España utiliza siempre el país ysector de primera contrapartida, mientras que el Registro obtiene datos de la inversión extranjera en Españaen función del país de primera contrapartida y en función del país del inversor final. Para la inversión espa-ñola en el exterior también se utiliza el país de primera contrapartida o inmediato. En lo que se refiere a lossectores la inversión española al exterior dispone de información sobre el sector de origen de la empresaespañola inversora y sobre el sector de destino de su inversión en el exterior, mientras que en la inversiónextranjera en España sólo se conoce el sector de la empresa participada es decir el sector de destino.

En la Balanza de Pagos, los datos recogen sólo las transacciones netas-adquisiciones por residentes de acti-vos frente a no residentes, menos sus ventas y sus amortizaciones, en los activos y las adquisiciones por no resi-dentes de activos emitidos por residentes, menos sus ventas y sus amortizaciones, en los pasivos. El Registro reco-ge valores brutos y a través del conocimiento de las desinversiones calcula los valores netos.

Para ver estas diferencias en la práctica hagamos un análisis de las cifras.

Veamos para la inversión extranjera en España:

CUADRO 1INVERSIÓN EXTRANJERA EN ESPAÑA

(Millones de euros)

2006 2007 2008

Importe Importe Importe

Inversión neta en participaciones en el capital según el RIE ....................... 3.469 27.261 34.543*Inversión neta en participaciones y beneficios reinvertidos de BE............... 11.748 26.535 33.581*Inversión neta directa total según el BE ....................................................... 21.434 42.205 43.967*

* Datos estimados.


100

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En el Cuadro 1 hemos estimado cantidades netas del RIE para permitir una comparación con las del BE.Lógicamente todas las cifras de las estadísticas del BE superan a las del RIE pues su cobertura es más ampliacomo señalábamos anteriormente. Lo interesante sería contar con un elemento común que nos permitiera la com-paración entre las estadísticas del BE y las recogidas de datos del RIE de las declaraciones de las empresas espa-ñolas. Desgraciadamente, no es así, pues mientras el RIE calcula el componente «acciones y otras formas de par-ticipación» el BE separa «otras formas de participación» de las «acciones» e incluye aquellas con los beneficiosreinvertidos. No obstante, si a la cifra de inversión neta total del BE le restamos la financiación a empresas relacio-nadas y la inversión en inmuebles, las diferencias ahora, entre las cifras del BE y RIE sólo radicarían en que lasprimeras recogen también los beneficios reinvertidos y deberían ser mayores en su cuantía.

En 2007 y 2008 las cifras de cualquier tipo de participación en el capital del RIE superan a las del BE que inclu-yen además de esa participación, los beneficios reinvertidos. Estas diferencias pueden deberse a que el RIE contabi-liza la inversión de una sola vez en el momento del devengo mientras que el BE lo hace en el momento en que seproducen los desembolsos y puede haber importantes diferencias temporales entre la contabilización de la operacióny su liquidación: Por otra parte el RIE recoge todas las participaciones en sociedades no cotizadas, mientras que elBE sólo cuando el importe de la participación es igual o superior al 10 por 100 de la sociedad emisora.

Las cifras para la inversión española en el exterior son:

Aquí llama la atención la cifra muy superior del RIE para el año 2007 de 91.109 millones que hace un año erade 73.996 millones ya un récord absoluto en la inversión española en el exterior. Pues bien, ésa importante dife-rencia se explica por operaciones muy cuantiosas que tuvieron entrada en el Registro después de que se cerrarael plazo para la medición de los flujos de ese periodo anual. No obstante, la cifra recogida por el RIE supera amplia-mente la calculada por el BE para ese año.

INFORMACIÓN EN INTERNET

A través de la página web de la Secretaría de Estado de Comercio www.comercio.es es posible acceder a losdatos históricos sobre inversiones exteriores desde 1993.

La dirección URL completa para la consulta de dichos datos es: http://www.comercio.es/comercio/bienvenido/Inversiones+Exteriores/Estadisticas/pagEstadisticas.htm

Tanto los datos que aquí se presentan como los incluidos en la página www.comercio.es tienen carácter provi-sional y por lo tanto pueden sufrir modificaciones como resultado del permanente proceso de depuración e incor-poración de nueva información.

CUADRO 2INVERSIÓN ESPAÑOLA EN EL EXTERIOR

(Millones de euros)

2006 2007 2008

Importe Importe Importe

Inversión neta en participaciones en el capital según el RIE ....................... 55.019 91.109 30.819*Inversión neta en participaciones y beneficios reinvertidos de BE............... 76.463 84.627 42.287*Inversión neta directa total según el BE ....................................................... 79.913 91.722 49.049*

* Datos estimados.

Undécima Sesión

La globalización de la producción. Empresas transnacionales.

Economía política internacional.Merigg 2009-10

Empresas transnacionalesPosiblemente, uno de los “rasgos” más identificativos de la globalizaciónDefinición: “una empresa transnacional es una firma que tiene poder para coordinar y controlar operaciones en más de un país, aún sin poseerlas”Las importancia de las TNC descansa en tres características básicas:

Capacidad para coordinar y controlar varios procesos y transacciones dentro de sus redes de producción, tanto dentro de un país como en diferentes paísesCapacidad potencial para aprovechar las ventajas de las diferencias geográficas en la distribución de los factores de producción (mano de obra, recursos naturales…) como de las políticas estatales (impuestos, barreras comerciales…)Potencial flexibilidad geográfica: capacidad para modificar sus recursos y operaciones, incluso a escala global.

¿Por qué la “transnacionalización” y no sólo la “exportación” de bienes?

Según la teoría microeconómica tradicional, el objetivo de cualquier empresa es: maximizar beneficios (ingresos –gastos).

Según lo anterior, para mejorar los resultados existen varias opciones:A) aumentar los ingresosB) reducir los gastosC) ambas

La transnacionalización facilita cualquiera de dichas vías. Además la economía es cada vez más competitiva.

ENFOQUE MACRO: internacionalización del capital

Se basa sencillamente en explicar la internacionalización de la actividad económica como un paso más del proceso de desarrollo del capitalismo; por tanto, el fin es buscar maximizar beneficios y acumular capital (a través de la apropiación del excedente de producción, visión “marxista”).El circuito del capital sería, aproximadamente:

Dinero (capital) Capital productivo (mano de obra, materias primas…) Tras la utilización en el proceso productivo el capital inicial incrementa su valor bienes de capital …

Desde esta perspectiva se enfatiza que FINANZAS, PRODUCCIÓN Y COMERCIO de ciertos bienes están totalmente INTERCONECTADOS.

ENFOQUE MICRO: teorías diversas

Hymer: pionero

Vernon: el ciclo de vida del producto(conducta oligopolística de las ETN)

Dunning: paradigma ecléctico

Tipos de producción transnacional

Producción “market-oriented”

Producción “asset-oriented”

Producción Market-oriented

Tiene en cuenta:El tamaño del mercado (medido por nivel de renta per cápita, por ejemplo)La diferente estructura de la demanda (elasticidad renta) según la renta de los países.

Producción Market-oriented



Producción Asset-oriented (1)

Tiene en cuenta la diferente localización de los activos necesitados por las empresas.

Las mejoras en tecnología y transportes han reducido la importancia de la localización de los recursos, pero sigue siendo crucial la localización de la:Mano de obra con capacidades y conocimientos diversos.

Producción Asset-oriented (2)

En la mano de obra influyen:Costes salariales

Productividad Posibilidad de control

Menor movilidad…

Comercio y Cooperación al desarrollo

1

MERIGG, 2009MERIGG, 2009--1010

EL PROBLEMA ENERGÉTICO. ENERGÍA Y GEOPOLÍTICA.

ALGUNOS CONCEPTOS PREVIOS (I)

Energía primaria / secundariaEnergía primaria / secundariaUnidades de medición– Energía: Julios– kJ = 103J– kWH = 36·105J– Potencia: Vatios– CV = 736 W

kW 103W

2

– kW = 103W– MW = 106J– GW = 109J– TW = 1012J

2

ALGUNOS CONCEPTOS PREVIOS (II)

Otras unidadesOtras unidadesPoder energético: kcal/kg, tec (tonelada equivalente de carbón) y tep (tonelada equivalente de petróleo, 4,18710J)

Formas de la energía (química, térmica, mecánica, nuclear...)Fuentes de energía

3

Renovables (no agotables por su uso)No renovables (agotables por su uso)

Dónde encontrar información general

h // i /http://www.iea.org/http://www.eia.doe.govhttp://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/energy_transport/index_en.html

4

3

EL PROBLEMA ENERGÉTICOEL PROBLEMA ENERGÉTICO

Creciente demandaCreciente demandaOferta concentrada geográficamente (hidrocarburos)Imposibilidad almacenamiento (electricidad)

5

( )Mercados regionalesDependencia energética

ENERGÍA PRIMARIA

ALGUNOS DATOS

6

4

Primary energy consumption per capita

Consumo mundial de energía primariaConsumo mundial de energía primaria

8

5

Patrón de consumo por regionesPatrón de consumo por regiones

PETRÓLEO

10

6

Reservas probadas de petróleoReservas probadas de petróleo

11

Distribution of proved (oil) reserves 1986,1996, 2006Distribution of proved (oil) reserves 1986,1996, 2006

,

12

7

Oil consumption by areaOil consumption by area

13

8

Oil reserves-to-production (R/P) ratios

- - ( / )

Precios del petróleoPrecios del petróleo

-

16

9

Refinery utilisationPercentage

( )

10

GAS NATURAL

19

20

11

,

21

22

12

23

( )

13

Carbón, nuclear e hidroelectricidad

25

(

26

14

27

Nuclear energy consumption by area

28

15

Hydroelectricity consumption by area

29

Los ciclos energéticosLos ciclos energéticos

Las fuentes energéticas se han idoLas fuentes energéticas se han ido sustituyendo a lo largo de la historiaCiclos conocidos: madera, carbón, petróleo, gas natural¿Cuál será el próximo?

30

¿C p

16

Evolución (1973Evolución (1973--2003) de la oferta de energía primaria total 2003) de la oferta de energía primaria total mundial por combustible (Mtep). AIE.mundial por combustible (Mtep). AIE.

32

17

33

GEOPOLÍTICA Y ENERGÍAGEOPOLÍTICA Y ENERGÍA

ANÁLISIS POR FUENTES ENERGÉTICAS

34

18


La visión geopolítica de lasLa visión geopolítica de las relaciones internacionalesLa importancia de la energía en la sociedadNecesidad de diversificación de abastecimiento para algunas fuentes

35

abastecimiento para algunas fuentes principalmenteEl papel clave en petróleo y gas

Alg nos conceptos pre ios


Algunos conceptos previos– Discontinuidad e interrupciones– Riesgos físicos, económicos, sociales y

medioambientales.– Sistema de confianza

36

– Crisis energética

19

Crisis energética definida en términos

El caso de la UEEl caso de la UE

Crisis energética definida en términos de petróleo y gas

Seguridad de suministro/seguridad energética

Posibles causas de crisis

37

os b es causas de c s s

Geopolítica de Estados Unidos (I)Geopolítica de Estados Unidos (I)

Estados Unidos es unaEstados Unidos es una superpotencia también en términos energéticosSus relaciones internacionales están continuamente motivadas por cuestiones relativas a la energía

38

cuestiones relativas a la energía...... Bajo la apariencia de “lucha contra la tiranía”

20

GeopolíticaGeopolítica de Estados Unidos (II)de Estados Unidos (II)

Los aliados “iniciales” de USAArabia SaudíIránIsrael

El auge de la OPECLas crisis del petróleo

39

pDiversificación (Caspio y Rusia)

Geopolítica de Estados Unidos (III)Geopolítica de Estados Unidos (III)

• EE. UU. clasifica los países según su nivel de amistad, independientemente del nivel de democracia o falta de ella

• Actualmente sus objetivos son unos 13 países (Cuba, Myanmar, Siria, Sudán Argelia Malasia Bielorrusia

40

Sudán, Argelia, Malasia, Bielorrusia, Zimbabwe, Somalia, Yemen, Indonesia, Filipinas y Corea del Norte)

21

LA POLÍTICA ENERGÉTICA DE EE.UU.

LA GUERRA DE IRAK

41

COMPETENCIA

LA POLÍTICA ENERGÉTICA DE LA UE

COMPETENCIA

SEGURIDAD

42

MEDIO AMBIENTE

22

Políticas de demandaFiscalidad + armonizaciónAhorro energético


Ahorro energéticoReestructuración del sector de transporte...

43

Políticas de ofertaEstudio energía nuclearFomento renovablesInterconexión...

• Predominio de las políticas internas frente a las externas • Poca influencia en la


a las externas• Mayor competencia en

los mercados mundiales

• Necesidad de una política energética común

geopolítica de la energía

44

• Tiempo de actuar y no de debatir (libro blanco, verde, etc.)

LA ENERGÍA EN INTERNET Directorio de páginas web

ALEJANDRO V. LORCA CORROMARÍA ANGELES FERNÁNDEZ LÓP

ENRIQUE SAN MARTÍN GONZÁGrupo de Trabajo Energía en el Mediterra

Doctorado de Economía y Relaciones InternacionUniversidad Autónoma de Ma

NSEZ

LEZneoalesdrid

Grupo de Trabajo Energía en el Mediterraneo - DERI (UAM) A. Lorca, M.A. Fernández, E. San Martín

1

LA ENERGÍA EN INTERNET Directorio de páginas web

INTERNACIONAL

1. Información general sobre la energía http://www.energy.gov/ Department of Energy del gobierno de los Estados Unidos. A este departamento pertenecen la OTT y la EIA de cuyas páginas hablamos más adelante. En esta página se encuentran un buen número de enlaces con las dos abajo mencionadas así como bastante información sobre las diferentes fuentes de energía, incluyendo las alternativas renovables. http://www.eia.doe.gov Energy Information Administration del Department of Energy del gobierno de los Estados Unidos. Información abundante y exhaustiva sobre energía tanto de Estados Unidos como a nivel mundial. Análisis de situación a corto y largo plazo. Toda la información es de libre acceso. Destacan el International Energy Outlook 2020, las cronologías de acontecimientos relacionados con la energía, así como otros muchos estudios e informes sobre el sector. http://www.iea.org/ Agencia Internacional de la Energía. Los últimos anuarios de esta agencia no son de libre acceso, no están colgados en la red, aunque los de años anteriores sí. Ofrece bastante información mensual, así como estadísticas mensuales. Destacan el World Energy Outlook 2000 Highlights (versión resumida de la publicación completa) así como las Key World Energy Statistics 2001. http://www.shared-analysis.fhg.de/Pub-fr.htm Pagina de un proyecto de la Comisión Europea sobre estudios relacionados con la energía en la UE. Destaca el European Union Energy Outlook to 2020. http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy_transport/en/public.html Publicaciones del Directorado General de la Energía y el Transporte. Publicaciones diversas y resúmenes de otras publicaciones. Destacan los datos estadísticos de la UE y el Libro Verde de la Energía en Europa. http://www.encharter.org/ Energy Charter Treaty. Tratado internacional para lograr unos mercados energéticos abiertos, eficientes, sostenibles y seguros. Han ratificado el tratado prácticamente toda Europa, mientras que Australia, Japón y Rusia lo tienen pendiente de aprobar por el Parlamento. USA no forma parte de él. Información relativa al tratado e informes sobre su aplicación, donde destacan los relacionados con la eficiencia energética (datos de la IEA). También hay una tabla interesante donde se destacan todas las normas del tratado que son incumplidas por los países firmantes (Blue Book).

http://www.energy.gov/

http://www.eia.doe.gov/

http://www.iea.org/

http://www.shared-analysis.fhg.de/Pub-fr.htm

http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy_transport/en/public.html

http://www.encharter.org/


2

http://www.eccj.or.jp/index_e.html The Energy Conservation Centre Japón. Información y presentaciones sobre la situación y el futuro del abastecimiento energético en Japón. http://www.ferc.fed.us/ Federal Energy Regulatory Comission. En esta página se publican diariamente las decisiones de este organismo que es el que regula a nivel federal el sector energético de USA. También dispone de algunos informes propios sobre temas relacionados con la energía. http://www.iiasa.ac.at/ The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. No se dedica exclusivamente a la energía pero dispone de unos cuantos informes relacionados con ella, sobre todo relacionados con el cambio climático. Sin embargo, lo más destacado de esta página es la posibilidad de consultar on line y de forma interactiva el executive summary y los gráficos del informe de 1998 Global Energy Perspectives, con escenarios sobre la evolución del sector energético hasta el 2100. http://lfee.mit.edu/ Laboratory for Energy and the Environment del Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Artículos de opinión sobre temas de actualidad energética y medioambiental como puede ser el cambio climático o la desregulación de los mercados eléctricos. http://web.mit.edu/ceepr/www/ Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research del Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Tiene bastante documentos de libre acceso sobre temas energéticos en general. Lo más destacable es la importancia de la sección referida a permisos de emisión negociables. http://www.stanford.edu/group/EMF/ Energy Model Forum de la Universidad de Standford. La mayor parte de la documentación no está en formato electrónico, pero los últimos documentos publicados sí. La mayor parte de ellos se refieren a los marcados eléctricos. http://www.platts.com/ Esta dirección sustituye a www.ftenergy.com. Portal sobre la energía con abundantes informes diarios y semanales sobre los mercados energéticos. La mayoría de los artículos o informes especiales son de pago, pero existen algunos artículos libres sobre la OPEC. Lo mejor de esta página es la amplísima sección de enlaces, tanto internacionales, nacionales o empresariales. http://www.energyreview.com/ Energy review. Portal sobre noticias de la energía con enlaces a sitios exclusivos de las diferentes fuentes energéticas. http://www.iaee.org/en/index.asp International Association for Energy Economics. En Recursos dispone de un amplio listado sobre páginas web de empresas e instituciones relacionadas con la energía. Todos los contenidos son mediante suscripción.

http://www.eccj.or.jp/index_e.html

http://www.ferc.fed.us/

http://www.iiasa.ac.at/

http://lfee.mit.edu/

http://web.mit.edu/ceepr/www/

http://www.stanford.edu/group/EMF/

http://www.platts.com/

http://www.ftenergy.com/

http://www.energyreview.com/

http://www.iaee.org/en/index.asp


3

http://www.nera.com/ National Economic Research Associates (NERA). Consultora que le dedica una atención especial al sector energético y de la que se pueden consultar unos cuantos documentos sobre temas energéticos de actualidad, como por ejemplo sobre la liberalización del sector energético en Europa. http://www.global-competition.com/main_fs.htm The site for international competition policy and regulation. Informes especiales sobre temas relacionados con la liberalización y la competencia –no sólo de energía -específicos por países y noticias de última hora. Para algunos temas legales relativos a la competencia reenvían a http://www.gettingthedealthrough.com/home.cfm http://www.me3.org/projects/dereg/nonmn.html Minnesotans for an energy-efficient economy. Aparece un listado de organizaciones que forman parte del mercado eléctrico (por áreas geográficas) así como información relativa a utilities. Disponibles muchos datos y ranking (pero casi todos de EIA). En algunos casos reenvía a la página de la EIA (http://www.eia.doe.gov/bookshelf/consumer.html). Links a gobiernos, asociaciones (de comercio, estadísticas internacionales) y compañías energéticas. Bastante completa.

http://relcom.website.ru/wfs-moscow/eng/

Energy centrer, worl federation of scientists. Página del Energy Center, organización semi-autónoma dentro del World Federation of Scientists (WFS). Elabora informe sobre energía, problemas futuros, perspectivas, etc. y el papel de Rusia en este entorno. http://www.worldenergy.org/wec-geis/ World energy council. Organización con más de 90 países miembros, localizada en Londres. El último informe de previsión disponible on-line es de 1998 (con una proyección hasta 2020). El último realizado es de 2001 (pero no es de libre acceso). Diversos papers con temas interesantes. Tratan todas las fuentes de energía. http://www.ecn.nl/main.html Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands. Informes y publicaciones sobre los distintos tipos de energías “limpias” (solar, biomasa, eólica, renovables y nuclear). Enlace a diversos sitios web sobre energía (energy on the internet). Muy completo. http://www.energy.ru Moscow Centre for Energy Policy. Para temas de energía en general. Trata la posición de Rusia principalmente en temas medioambientales y de tecnologías “limpias”. Pocos datos, informes, etc. Algunos de los artículos en colaboración con la IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency). Página pobre en contenidos.

http://www.nera.com/

http://www.global-competition.com/main_fs.htm

http://www.gettingthedealthrough.com/home.cfm

http://www.me3.org/projects/dereg/nonmn.html

http://www.eia.doe.gov/bookshelf/consumer.html

http://relcom.website.ru/wfs-moscow/eng/

http://www.worldenergy.org/wec-geis/

http://www.ecn.nl/main.html

http://www.energy.ru/


4

2. Petróleo http://www.opec.org/ Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Cuontries. Gran cantidad de información sobre la OPEC, incluyendo historia, acuerdos, estadísticas y anuarios, así como publicaciones mensuales electrónicas de libre consulta. http://www.opec.com/ Sitio con noticias de la OPEC y de la energía en general, recopiladas de otras fuentes. http://energy.usgs.gov/ Página de la energía del United States Geological Survey. Información exhaustiva y detallada sobre los yacimientos petrolíferos. Estimaciones sobre las reservas de petróleo existentes y por descubrir por campo de petróleo o por país. Te puedes descargar a Excel la mayor parte de las tablas de datos, aunque los campos petrolíferos vienen referidos por nombre o código, lo que dificulta su uso a nivel país. El principal problema de esta información es que se centra mucho en los aspectos geológicos. http://www.ott.doe.gov/ Office of Transportation Tecnologies del Department of Energy del gobierno de los Estados Unidos. Información exhaustiva y de libre acceso referida al transporte y al desarrollo de nuevas tecnologías de transporte. Destacan las más de 150 hojas informativas sobre cuestiones relacionadas con el transporte, que incluyen numerosas referencias al petróleo, así como varios informes y presentaciones relacionadas con la evolución futura de los mercados petrolíferos. http://www.api.org/ American Petroleum Institute. Tiene bastantes documentos con análisis del sector petrolífero estadounidense, así como bastantes datos estadísticos de USA e informes sobre problemas relacionados con la energía (protocolo de Kyoto), No obstante, parece que los temas se tratan de forma superficial, lo que puede ser debido a que los informes de libre consulta son extraídos de unas publicaciones más detalladas que no se encuentran disponibles en Internet. http://www.petroleum.co.uk/ United Kingdom Institute of Petroleum. Lo más interesante de este sitio son los artículos del pasado año de su revista mensual Petroleum Review que se pueden consultar libremente y cubren una amplia gama de temas tanto técnicos como económicos o geopolíticos. El resto de la información existente es previa suscripción. http://www.ifp.fr/ Instituto Francés del Petróleo. Empresa de servicios petrolíferos. Tiene mucha información sobre las actividades y servicios que realiza pero dispone de muy escasa información de interés de libre acceso. http://ekofisk.stanford.edu/ Petroleum Research Institute de la Universidad de Standford. En esta página hay un buen número de documentos técnicos sobre extracción de petróleo y métodos de exploración.

http://www.opec.org/

http://www.opec.com/

http://energy.usgs.gov/

http://www.ott.doe.gov/

http://www.api.org/

http://www.petroleum.co.uk/

http://www.ifp.fr/

http://ekofisk.stanford.edu/


5

http://www.fe.doe.gov/education/index.html Página educativa sobre combustibles fósiles. Descripción sencilla y fácil de entender de los procesos de producción de petróleo, carbón y gas natural. http://www.cges.co.uk Centre for Global Energy Studies. A pesar de su nombre se dedica casi en exclusiva a petróleo y gas. Elabora estudios y análisis de mercado muy interesantes, aunque sólo las publicaciones periódicas atrasadas están disponibles en la red. También tiene una buena muestra de artículos de opinión sobre el sector de libre disposición. http://www.hubbertpeak.com/ Página sobre la presunta crisis del petróleo en ciernes. Multitud de enlaces y artículos de opinión sobre el agotamiento de los recursos petrolíferos. Bastante interesante. http://hubbert.mines.edu/ M. King Hubbert Center for Petroleum Supply Studies. Informes de expertos sobre el mundo del petróleo relacionados con los puntos de vista de Hubbert. Muy interesante. http://www.halcyon.com/duncanrc/index.html Heuristic Oil Forecasting Method World Oil Forecasting Program. Te puedes descargar un programa de ordenador con predicciones acerca de cuando el mundo alcanzará el pico máximo de producción de petróleo. También te permite jugar con algunas variables para realizar tus propias predicciones. http://www.rferl.org/nca/special/caspian/ Energy Politics In The Caspian And Russia de Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty. Noticias, comentarios y artículos sobre los desarrollos energéticos del Mar Caspio. Algunos muy interesantes. http://www.slavweb.com/eng/Russia/econ-e.html Enlaces con páginas sobre la energía en Rusia. http://www.bp.com/ British Petroleum. Hay colgados unos anuarios estadísticos sobre para el mundo y para los Estados Unidos. Además es posible bajarse los datos de los anuarios en formato Excel para poder trabajar con ellos. http://www.shell.com Royal Dutch Petroleum Company (Shell). Entre las publicaciones del grupo se encuentran proyecciones sobre el mundo de la energía a largo plazo (2020 y 2050), aunque son más cualitativas que cuantitativas. Las dos publicaciones se llaman: People and Connections - Global scenarios to 2020 y Energy Needs, Choices and Possibilities - Scenarios to 2050. http://www.chevrontexaco.com/ Crevron-Texaco. Información a nivel compañía principalmente. Destaca un artículo en la revista de la empresa sobre la energía en el Caspio.

http://www.fe.doe.gov/education/index.html

http://www.cges.co.uk/

http://www.hubbertpeak.com/

http://hubbert.mines.edu/

http://www.halcyon.com/duncanrc/index.html

http://www.rferl.org/nca/special/caspian/

http://www.slavweb.com/eng/Russia/econ-e.html

http://www.bp.com/

http://www.shell.com/

http://www.chevrontexaco.com/


6

http://www.exxonmobil.com Exxon-Mobil. Muy orientada a la empresa. Lo único de interés es alguna comunicación sobre temas energéticos. http://www.statoil.com/ Compañía Noruega de Petróleo. Se puede acceder a bastantes números de la revista así como a las comunicaciones de los directivos sobre temas energéticos de interés. http://www.pemex.com/ Petróleos de México. Información estadística de la compañía y comparaciones internacionales con otros países. http://www.pdvsa.com/ Petróleos de Venezuela. Únicamente hay información relacionada con la empresa. http://www.totalfinaelf.com Total – Elf. Únicamente hay información relacionada con la empresa. http://www.eni.it ENI italiano. Anuario estadístico sobre Gas y Petróleo bastante completo (World Oil & Gas Review 2001). En ingles e italiano. http://www.nioc.com/ National Iranian Oil Company. Anuarios sobre la industria iraní del petróleo. http://www.saudiaramco.com Compañía de Petróleos de Arabia Saudi. Numerosas revistas y libros que se pueden consultar en Internet. No están exclusivamente dedicados al mundo del petróleo y también tienen publicaciones sobre el mundo árabe en general. http://www.knpc.com Kuwait National Petroleum Company. Únicamente información sobre la compañía. Página web extremadamente lenta. http://www.meed.com/ Middle East Economic Diggest. Servicio de noticias sobre Oriente Medio. No es una publicación centrada exclusivamente en la energía, aunque esta es bastante importante. Menos las noticias todos los demás servicios e informes necesitan suscripción. Tiene informes sobre el sector petrolífero por países.

http://www.exxonmobil.com/

http://www.statoil.com/

http://www.pemex.com/

http://www.pdvsa.com/

http://www.totalfinaelf.com/

http://www.eni.it/

http://www.nioc.com/

http://www.saudiaramco.com/

http://www.knpc.com/

http://www.meed.com/


7

http://www.mees.com/ Middle East Economic Survey. Noticias sobre petróleo y gas centradas en la OPEC. De forma gratuita tan sólo se puede acceder a lo que son las noticias, además de a datos de producción de petróleo y precios de la OPEC de los últimos años. http://www.nymex.com/ New York Mercantile Exchange. Mercado de futuros sobre metales y productos energéticos. Datos sobre los últimos precios de los productos energéticos (petróleo, gas y carbón) así como las conferencias y charlas que se pronuncian allí sobre mercados, regulación, perspectivas, etc. http://www.barchart.com/ Portal financiero con información sobre mercados de valores y de bienes. Prácticamente toda la información es de pago, aunque los últimos datos se pueden visualizar. http://www.ipe.uk.com/ International Petroleum Exchanges. Mercado londinense sobre futuros del petróleo. Se pueden consultar de forma gratuita los valores de futuros y opciones dándose de alta. Interesante si se trabaja en mercados financieros de futuros sobre la energía. http://www.slb.com Schlumberger. Compañía de servicios técnicos para el sector petrolífero. Tiene una gran cantidad de enlaces con instituciones y empresas, así como con revistas especializadas. La mayor parte del contenido disponible en la red se enfoca a aspectos técnicos. http://www.oillink.com Se ha convertido en un portal comercial con noticias sobre Gas y Petróleo y poco más. Sin interés.

3. Gas natural http://www.igu.org/ International Gas Union. La información más relevante en esta página web son los informes existentes sobre el desarrollo mundial del sector, aunque tampoco son muy detallados. http://www.ifp.fr/cedigaz Cedigaz. Asociación internacional dedicada a estudiar el gas natural, fundada en colaboración con el Instituto Francés del Petróleo. Tiene unos anuarios interesantes sobre el sector pero no están disponibles en la red. Así mismo, dispone de una breve reseña sobre el sector en el año 2000, que puede ser útil a modo de resumen. También posee una sección de noticias sobre temas relacionados.

http://www.mees.com/

http://www.nymex.com/

http://www.barchart.com/

http://www.ipe.uk.com/

http://www.slb.com/

http://www.oillink.com/

http://www.igu.org/

http://www.ifp.fr/


8

http://www.ofgas.gov.uk/ Office of Gas and Electricity Market del Reino Unido. Tiene muchísima información sobre el funcionamiento de los mercados domésticos de gas y electricidad, aunque los informes se refieren a cuestiones excesivamente específicas. http://www.igt.org/ Institute of Gas Technology. Dispone de una buena cantidad de documentos técnicos relacionados con el gas, aunque no son de libre acceso. También dispone de un análisis bastante detallado del sector del gas en estados unidos, y aunque no se puede acceder a la publicación completa existen resúmenes de libre acceso bastante detallados. http://www.ngsa.org/ Asociación de empresas productoras y distribuidoras de gas de USA. En esta página se encuentran los principales datos del sector en USA, aunque a un nivel muy básico y resumido. http://www.gazprom.ru/eng/default.htm Gazprom. La mayor empresa rusa de hidrocarburos. No hay mucha información pero ofrece los principales datos de la empresa. Da la impresión de que el sitio está vacío de contenidos por haber sido desarrollado relativamente hace poco tiempo.

4. Carbón http://www.wci-coal.com/web/bl_content.php?menu_id=0.0 World Coal Institute. Amplia información de todos los temas técnicos relativos al carbón, medioambiente, usos, etc. Informes con datos globales sobre reservas, etc. de libre acceso (pero sin mucho detalle, casi todos los datos son de fuentes que también estamos utilizando –BP, IIASA, etc.-) Enlaces a organizaciones del carbón, por países. http://www.abare.gov.au Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics Agencia de investigación y consultoría económica de carácter oficial (depende del Department of Agriculture, fisheries and Resource Economics (http://www.dpie.gov.au). Datos sobre todos los sectores energéticos en Australia. Publicación de informes pero la mayoría no son gratuitos. Enlaces a numerosos sitios relacionados. http://www.iea-coal.org.uk/iea1.htm IEA Coal Research. The clean coal centre. Vende publicaciones sobre todos los temas relacionados (prospecciones, medioambiente, política, etc.) de los distintos países. Parece que sí es de libre acceso el “Clean Coal Compedium”, pero se necesita clave de acceso. La página no es demasiado interesante. Links a un amplio número de organizaciones relacionadas.

http://www.ofgas.gov.uk/

http://www.igt.org/

http://www.ngsa.org/

http://www.gazprom.ru/eng/default.htm

http://www.wci-coal.com/web/bl_content.php?menu_id=0.0

http://www.abare.gov.au/

http://www.dpie.gov.au/

http://www.iea-coal.org.uk/iea1.htm


9

http://www.energy.ru Moscow Centre for Energy Policy. Para temas de energía en general. Trata la posición de Rusia principalmente en temas medioambientales y de tecnologías “limpias”. Pocos datos, informes, etc. Algunos de los artículos en colaboración con la IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency). Página pobre en contenidos. http://www.rosugol.ru Página específica del carbón. Informes con datos y estadísticas (supuestamente), pero con precio (acceso vía Internet con suscripción). http://www.eia.doe.gov Energy Information Administration Información completa y accesible de todos los temas relacionados con el carbón en USA. Fácil de usar, bien organizada, con buscador, por temas, etc. Muy buena. http://d1.dir.dcx.yahoo.com/business_and_economy/business_to_business/energy/coal/ Información sobre sitios de la web relacionados con el carbón, así como directorios.

5. Electricidad http://www.etso-net.org/ European Transmission System Operators. Pertenece a ella Red Eléctrica Española. Centrada exclusivamente en este campo de la energía y en temas relacionados con el mercado energético Europeo. Hay abundantes documentos sobre la posición de la Asociación en temas relacionados con el mercado eléctrico. Lo más interesante es la cuantificación de las transferencias energéticas de los estados europeos. http://www.theapex.org Association of Power Exchanges. Asociación de empresas que participan en intercambios de energía, ya sea produciéndolos o financiándolos. A ella pertenece OMEL (Operadora del Mercado Español de Electricidad). Abundante documentación sobre mercados eléctricos, transacciones de energía y las reformas existentes para liberalizar el sector. También hay exposiciones de la situación del sector eléctrico en algunos países (Australia y Argentina, por ejemplo). http://www.efet.org The European Federation of Energy Traders (EFET) Asociación de empresas europeas para fomentar el intercambio de energía. Entre las empresas españolas están asociadas Unión Fenosa, Endesa, Iberdrola e Hidrocantábrico. Abundantes documentos sobre la liberalización del sector energético en Europa y la posición de esta organización. http://www.eurelectric.org Eurelectric. Es una asociación europea, con socios a nivel mundial, que trata de crear una industria eléctrica única en Europa. Entre sus miembros de pleno derecho, por España, UNESA.

http://www.energy.ru/

http://www.rosugol.ru/

http://www.eia.doe.gov/

http://d1.dir.dcx.yahoo.com/business_and_economy/business_to_business/energy/coal/

http://www.etso-net.org/

http://www.theapex.org/

http://www.efet.org/

http://www.eurelectric.org/


10

Informes de libre acceso on-line sobre un variado conjunto de temas relacionados con la electricidad: mercados, redes, medioambiente, harmonización fiscal, entre otros. http://www.ucte.org The union for the Co-ordination of Transmission of Electricity. Es la organización que coordina la transmisión de energía en más de 20 países, por lo que sus informes y documentos son los relativos a dicha transmisión. También datos de intercambio de energía eléctrica, consumo, producción, etc. Links a las páginas de los miembros en los distintos países (por España REE) http://www.electricity.org.uk/ Página de la asociación de empresas eléctricas de Reino Unido. Toda la información –estadísticas, informes, etc. –que es de libre acceso parece limitada (algunos datos son de publicaciones que venden). Información general sobre la industria –historia, miembros, mercados, organización –en Reino Unido. Dirigida a ciudadanos, para la divulgación de información general. http://www.open.gov.uk Información y servicios on-line del gobierno de Reino Unido. Muy general. Información difícil de encontrar. A partir de la página puede encontrarse otra dirección mucho más útil (http://www.dti.gov.uk/epa/) donde hay información estadística de energía (en general), muy completa, sistematizada y de libre acceso. http://www.energysearch.com/ Página del EPRI (Electric Power Research Institute). Algunos artículos son de libre acceso, pero la mayor parte de las publicaciones requieren contraseña (sólo disponible para miembros de EPRI) y además no son gratuitas. http://www.ferc.fed.us Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Información de la Comisión reguladora relativa a oil, energía hidroeléctrica, eléctrica en general y gas: requisitos, procedimientos de actuación en mercados, regulación relativa a cada uno de los sectores, etc. Enlaces a otros sitios relacionados. http://dir.yahoo.com/Science/Energy/ Direcciones de organismos, publicaciones, etc. clasificados por fuentes de energía (incluida eléctrica, pero también otras) http://www.cba.ufl.edu/eco/purc/ Public Utility Research Centre. (Escuela de negocios de la universidad de Florida) Acceso a numerosos working papers y documentos relativos a temas variados: desregulación y política, en electricidad, pero también, petróleo, cambio climático, etc. Herramienta de búsqueda de artículos en colaboración con otra universidad. Muy académico. http://www.aeecenter.org/ The Association of Energy Engineers Artículos disponibles por suscripción, resúmenes de libre acceso. Casi toda la información disponible es relativa a la organización, poco interesante. Gran número de enlaces a otras páginas.

http://www.ucte.org/

http://www.electricity.org.uk/

http://www.open.gov.uk/

http://www.dti.gov.uk/epa/

http://www.energysearch.com/

http://www.ferc.fed.us/

http://dir.yahoo.com/Science/Energy/

http://www.cba.ufl.edu/eco/purc/

http://www.aeecenter.org/


11

6. Energía Nuclear http://www.wano.org.uk/ World Association of Nuclear Operators Tiene interesantes datos sobre la energía nuclear a nivel mundial, así como una publicación bianual de libre acceso sobre la energía nuclear en el mundo. A esta asociación pertenece UNESA. También posee un amplio directorio de páginas web relacionadas con la energía nuclear. http://www.world-nuclear.org/ World Nuclear Association Dispone de un amplísimo fondo documental de editoriales y artículos de opinión, así como explicaciones acerca del funcionamiento de las centrales nucleares y el papel de la energía nuclear en el mundo. Muy completa. http://www.iaea.org/ International Atomic Energy Agency Dispone de abundante información sobre la energía atómica a nivel mundial, incluyendo anuarios de libre consulta en muchos idiomas (castellano incluido). También dispone de los acuerdos auspiciados por esta organización a nivel mundial, artículos, publicaciones periódicas, y explicaciones sobre las aplicaciones de la energía nuclear, todo ello de libre acceso. http://www.iaea.or.at/programmes/a2/ Power Reactor Information System Programa de la International Atomic Energy Agency donde se ofrece información sobre las centrales nucleares en funcionamiento en el mundo. Lo más destacable de esta página es que puedes seleccionar un país y te muestra todas sus centrales nucleares con sus principales datos y estadísticas de producción de energía eléctrica. http://www.nea.fr/ Nuclear Energy Agency de la OCDE Dispone de un buen número de publicaciones anuales, periódicas, informes, regulación etc., la mayoría de ellos de libre acceso. http://www.foratom.org/ European Atomic Forum Patronal europea del sector. Dispone de unas cuantas publicaciones de libre acceso, pero lo más destacado de esta página es una buena cantidad de artículos donde se expone la opinión de la industria nuclear europea ante cuestiones que afectan al sector, como pueda ser el cambio climático o la seguridad en el abastecimiento energético. http://www.nei.org/ Nuclear Energy Institute Sitio con bastante información sobre energía nuclear, sobre todo en USA. Además de los artículos e informes relacionados con el sector en USA destacan una serie de presentaciones donde se describe el funcionamiento de las centrales nucleares y otros temas relacionados. Bastante interesante.

http://www.wano.org.uk/

http://www.world-nuclear.org/

http://www.iaea.org/

http://www.iaea.or.at/programmes/a2/

http://www.nea.fr/

http://www.foratom.org/

http://www.nei.org/


12

http://web.mit.edu/canes/ Center for Advance Nuclear Energy Systems del Massachusetts Institute of Technology Hay poca información que consultar. Lo más destacado es el informe del Simposium Internacional sobre el papel de la energía en el desarrollo sostenible. También ofrece una serie de enlaces con páginas dedicadas a la energía nuclear, aunque se centra casi exclusivamente en USA.

7. Energías alternativas http://www.crest.org/index.html Renewable energy policy project (Centre for renewable energy and sustainable technology) Temas de política, implicaciones gubernamentales (países en desarrollo), impacto medioambiental, fuentes de generación, etc. Bien organizada, enlaces por materias. Buscador bastante útil (por materia, zona geográfica y tipo de consulta). Parece las estadísticas y datos son muy escasos. http://www.geothermal.org/ Geothermal resources council (depende del DOE) Prácticamente la totalidad de las publicaciones no son gratuitas. Enlaces a otras páginas. http://www.seia.org Solar Energy Industries Association Información relacionada con la asociación y links a otras páginas. Poco interesante. http://www.igc.org/igc/gateway/index.html Institute for Global Communications Artículos de opinión y noticias sobre temas relacionados con el medioambiente, de ámbito internacional (y otros temas, algo cajón desastre). No muy interesante. (además de pocos recientes) (Problemas para acceder a algunas zonas de la página) http://www.eia.doe.gov/fuelrenewable.html Ya comentada, muy buena. http://www.worldenergy.org/wec-geis/ Worl Energy Council El último informe general no es gratuito. Página ya comentada en el apartado general. http://www.ecn.nl/main.html Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands Página muy interesante, comentada en el apartado general.

http://web.mit.edu/canes/

http://www.crest.org/index.html

http://www.geothermal.org/

http://www.seia.org/

http://www.igc.org/igc/gateway/index.html

http://www.eia.doe.gov/fuelrenewable.html

http://www.worldenergy.org/wec-geis/

http://www.ecn.nl/main.html


13

NACIONAL

1. Información general sobre la energía http://www.cne.es/ Comisión Nacional de la Energía. Recoge toda la legislación relativa a electricidad, petróleo y gas. Dispone de muchas estadísticas, informes, organización de mercados (agentes que participan, funciones, empresas, funcionamiento, ...), etc. de los tres sectores antes mencionados. Muy completa. También dispone de una serie de enlaces a sitios de interés.

2. Petróleo http://www.cores.es/ Corporación de Reservas Estratégicas de Productos Petrolíferos. Órgano dependiente del Ministerio de Economía encargado del mantenimiento de las reservas estratégicas españolas de petróleo. Edita el Boletín Estadístico de Hidrocarburos, publicación imprescindible para conocer el consumo de productos petrolíferos en España. http://www.repsol.es Página web muy comercial, con una gran cantidad de contenidos que no siempre están relacionados con el petróleo y el sector energético, y que hace la navegación un poco complicada. Dispone de una gran cantidad de información sobre la empresa, pero se echa en falta más información sobre coyuntura y perspectivas del sector a escala mundial. Posee una serie de publicaciones interesantes derivadas de la celebración de congresos y conferencias, aunque no se encuentran disponibles en la red. Por último, el Instituto Superior de la Energía dependiente de la Fundación Repsol-YPF tiene una biblioteca especializada en petróleo a la que se puede acceder previa solicitud. http://www.cepsa.es Existe abundante información sobre la empresa, tanto a nivel de actividades como a nivel financiero, de productos y servicios, pero al igual que le sucedía a Repsol, se echa de menos algún tipo de informe estratégico que sitúe a la empresa en el contexto internacional del sector. http://www.clh.es/ Compañía Logística de Hidrocarburos. Compañía heredera del monopolio de CAMPSA que se dedica exclusivamente al transporte de hidrocarburos, ya sea por oleoducto o por otros medios. En esta página existe abundante información referida a las infraestructuras y medios de transporte de la compañía, así como información sobre los servicios que presta y su funcionamiento.

http://www.cne.es/

http://www.cores.es/

http://www.repsol.es/

http://www.cepsa.es/

http://www.clh.es/


14

3. Gas natural http://www.gasnatural.com Además de tener una gran cantidad de servicios para los clientes disponibles en la red, dispone de abundante información en el sitio corporativo, presentando de forma clara, sencilla y resumida las perspectivas del sector en España y en el mundo, las ventajas del gas frente a los otros combustibles fósiles, las principales aplicaciones, la tecnología que se está utilizando, las implicaciones medioambientales, etc. Bastante completa para una aproximación inicial al sector. Empresas eléctricas La mayor parte de las empresas eléctricas que vamos a tratar a continuación tienen ofrecen datos sobre sus actividades relacionadas con el gas.

4. Carbón http://www.hunosa.com/ Información detallada de la compañía pudiendo bajar hasta el nivel de pozo, pero poco más. http://www.incar.csic.es/ Instituto Nacional del Carbón. Consejo Superior de Investigaciones científicas. La página está aún en construcción, por lo que apenas tiene contenido. Aparece un listado de las publicaciones pero sólo es accesible la “Memoria Anual” que tiene información únicamente del propio instituto. Tampoco funcionan los enlaces.

5. Electricidad http://www.omel.es Compañía Operadora del Mercado Español de Electricidad. En esta página se encuentra toda la normativa y regulación relacionada con el mercado eléctrico, incluyendo estructura, agentes y funcionamiento. También se puede acceder a todos los informes mensuales sobre el funcionamiento de los mercados así como a los precios negociados en el prácticamente a tiempo real. http://www.ree.es/ Red Eléctrica Española. Además de la preceptiva información sobre la compañía, dispone de un amplísimo número de publicaciones que pueden ser consultadas electrónicamente de forma gratuita. Entre estas publicaciones destacan los Informes Anuales sobre Operación del Sistema Eléctrico y los Boletines Estadísticos Mensuales editados en colaboración con el Ministerio de Economía. También es de destacar que la mayoría de los datos estadísticos de sus publicaciones se pueden obtener en formato Excel. Imprescindible para conocer el sistema eléctrico español, ya que este se aborda desde una perspectiva integral, que no tiene cada empresa por separado.

http://www.gasnatural.com/

http://www.hunosa.com/

http://www.incar.csic.es/

http://www.omel.es/

http://www.ree.es/


15

http://www.unesa.es Asociación Española de la Industria Eléctrica. Tiene una gran cantidad de información disponible electrónicamente de forma gratuita, organizada en diversas publicaciones, entre las que se cuentan las revistas Electricidad, Cuadernos Jurídicos de la Electricidad, Energía Eléctrica Informe Internacional, Boletines Informativos, Memorias Estadísticas Anuales, Producción Anual de Centrales Nucleares, etc. Esta página tiene información muy valiosa, tanto desde un punto de vista estadístico, como jurídico o de opinión, aunque a veces los contenidos son demasiado superficiales. http://www.endesa.es/ La mayor parte de la información de la página web está orientada únicamente a proporcionar datos de la compañía. Las principales excepciones a este hecho se encuentran en la descripción de la tecnología PLC que permite la transmisión de datos a través de las líneas y cables eléctricos, lo que constituye el último escalón de las eléctricas en su posicionamiento en el sector de telecomunicaciones. Es curioso que no exista ninguna mención en la página web sobre el debate existente a nivel europeo sobre la liberalización del sector eléctrico. http://www.iberdrola.es Dispone de bastante información sobre la compañía, productos y servicios. En su informe anual realiza un análisis muy esquemático de los principales acontecimientos ocurridos en el sector, tanto a nivel nacional como internacional, pero lo más interesante es la posibilidad de acceder a las intervenciones de los directivos de la compañía en diferentes foros, explicando sus posturas relativas a hechos de actualidad del sector, como la liberalización del sector energético en Europa. http://www.unionfenosa.es/ Tiene una gran cantidad de información bastante detallada sobre la empresa, pero escasa información sobre el sector eléctrico en general. En la memoria se menciona brevemente la situación actual del sector eléctrico enmarcándolo en la economía nacional y mundial. http://www.h-c.es Hidrocantábrico. La página no tiene excesiva información excepto en lo relativo a sus actividades de generación, donde si que vienen bastante detalladas sus instalaciones. Por lo demás, lo más destacable es el resumen del sector energético que aparece en la memoria. http://www.viesgo.es/ La página web de esta sociedad es la que menos información tiene de las grandes eléctricas, aunque esto se debe principalmente al poco tiempo transcurrido desde la venta de la compañía por Endesa al grupo ENEL italiano (Enero 2002).

6. Energía Nuclear http://www.csn.es/ Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Nuclear. Esta página web no se encuentra actualmente disponible, posiblemente debido a la saturación del servidor provocada por el envío masivo de correos electrónicos sugerido por Greenpeace como protesta por el mantenimiento en funcionamiento de la central nuclear de Zorita a pesar de sus problemas técnicos.

http://www.unesa.es/

http://www.endesa.es/

http://www.iberdrola.es/

http://www.unionfenosa.es/

http://www.h-c.es/

http://www.viesgo.es/

http://www.csn.es/


16

http://www.foronuclear.org/ Foro de la industria nuclear al que pertenecen las empresas relacionadas con el uso de la energía nuclear con fines pacíficos. Tiene unas cuantas publicaciones de libre acceso con información general sobre energía y específica de centrales nucleares, y también dispone de un centro de documentación abierto al público. Además tiene bastantes enlaces con páginas relacionadas.

7. Energías alternativas Empresas eléctricas La mayor parte de las empresas eléctricas tratadas con anterioridad ofrecen datos sobre sus actividades en el campo de las energías alternativas o renovables.

Madrid, 26 de Abril de 2002

http://www.foronuclear.org/

Decimocuarta Sesión

ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY – FIRST PHASE (Electricity)

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b. ELECTRICITY

I. Introduction

Figure 38

Electricity prices on the rise all over EuropeWholesale electricity price developments 2000-2006

year-ahead base load in €/MWh

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

Jan-00 Jul-00 Jan-01 Jul-01 Jan-02 Jul-02 Jan-03 Jul-03 Jan-04 Jul-04 Jan-05 Jul-05 Jan-06 Jul-06

€/M

Wh

Germany

The Netherlands

UK

France

Nord Pool

UK

The Netherlands

Nord Pool

France

Germany

Source: information received within the scope of the Sector Inquiry from Argus Media, Platts184, andNord Pool.

(315) Following market liberalisation, electricity wholesale prices were initially relativelystable185.

(316) Around the summer of 2003, however, electricity wholesale prices started to rise on mostmarkets. Not only did prices increase, they also diverged strongly between Member States suggesting a lack of market integration. Price rises have been strong especially since the beginning of 2005.

(317) As wholesale prices directly impact supply prices offered to final customers (especiallyto industrial users) in a number of Member States, their increase gave rise to wide-spreadconcerns about the overall functioning of the electricity markets. In addition manyindustrial consumers complained about the difficulties to secure competitive offers by different suppliers. These and other concerns expressed by market participants triggered the initiation of the Sector Inquiry into the European electricity sector.

184 Data from Platts a division of The McGraw-Hill Companies 2006- all rights reserved.185 Prices for certain end users even showed a downward trend after 2000.


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I.1. Main market features

I.1.1. Overview

(318) During 2003, the countries today forming EU25 consumed 2605 TWh of electricity. This represents approximately 19.4 % of all final energy consumption in the EU186. Thelargest markets are, respectively, Germany, France, the UK, Italy and Spain. Less than0.2% of the electricity required to meet this consumption was imported from outside the EU. In contrast to gas, the EU is thus essentially self-sufficient in the production of electricity and increasingly so as net imports decreased 81% over the period 1990-2003.Primary fuels for electricity generation are of course often imported.

(319) Within the EU, cross-border trading of electricity is more important than exchange withthird countries. Luxembourg, Latvia and Hungary have net imports of respectively 62%,51% and 22% of their domestic consumption. At the other end of the spectrum sit theCzech Republic and Estonia that have net exports amounting to 31% and 41% of theirdomestic consumption whereas Lithuania’s net exports are, at 106%, even higher than its domestic consumption. In terms of volumes the largest net exporter of electricity is France, which exported 67 TWh in 2003, 4 times more electricity than the next largestnet exporter, the Czech Republic, whose exports, however, have grown 23-fold since 1990. Poland is third in this ranking. Italy was by far the most important net importer of electricity, importing approximately three times as much as the Netherlands with Swedenbeing the third largest net importer.

(320) A clear and important link between the functioning of the gas and electricity marketsexists. The prices for gas significantly affect electricity price levels, since in many Member States, gas-fired power plants are responsible for setting the price level ofelectricity, in particular during peak hours. Moreover, a considerable and increasing quantity of gas is used in thermal power plants. During 2004, gas fired power plants in EU25 consumed approximately 4000 PJ GCV (gross calorific value) of gas corresponding to 22,1 % of the entire consumption of natural gas in the EU187. Hence, electricity generators rely heavily on competitive gas markets. Malfunctioning gas markets thus adversely affect the price of electricity.

I.1.2. Essential features of electricity markets

(321) The electricity industry chain involves five main activities: (1) the production or generation of electricity, (2) the transport of electricity on high voltage levels (transmission), (3) its transportation on low voltage levels (distribution), (4) the marketing of electricity to final customers (supply), and (5) the selling and buying of electricity on wholesale markets (trading). Sometimes services such as metering are mentioned as additional activity.

(322) Prior to liberalisation, vertically integrated companies executed these activities serving exclusively certain regions or even a whole Member State, and prices were regulated. This has profoundly changed with European-wide market opening and the electricitybusiness has been split up into regulated and competitive segments. Because transport

186 Eurogas, Annual Report 2004-2005, p. 27.187 Eurogas, Annual Report 2004-2005, p. 28.


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activities are considered to be a natural monopoly, they remain regulated. However, generation, wholesale trading, and retail supply have been progressively opened tocompetition. A number of Member States have, however, retained regulated supply tariffs.

(323) Like the gas industry, the electricity sector is a network industry. Without access to the network customers cannot be reached. Third Party Access to the network is thusessential. The existing network is often a natural monopoly that cannot be duplicated in an economic manner and/or in a reasonably short time frame.

(324) An important feature of electricity is that, unlike gas, it cannot be stored economically once produced. In order to ensure network stability electricity generation and consumption have to be in balance at all times. Electricity demand fluctuates significantlyduring the day and seasonally. Also the price elasticity of the electricity demand is verylow, especially over the short term, i.e. price fluctuations do not give rise to large changes in electricity consumption.

(325) A specific feature of electricity production is that it can be produced by using a large variety of technologies and on the basis of different fuels resulting in different cost structures (nuclear, hydro, coal, gas, renewables etc.). Cost structures have importantimplications for the price formation on short term electricity markets (concept of a marginal plant setting the price).

(326) All these features render electricity markets vulnerable to the exercise of market power, be it through withdrawing generation capacity or be it by pricing above competitivelevels at times when the generator is indispensable to meet demand (for further details see below chapter B.b.II.1).

(327) As electricity cannot be stored, balancing and reserve regimes exist to settle market participants’ real-time imbalances resulting from discrepancies between scheduled and actual electricity demand, and production188. Although the volumes involved arerelatively small compared to overall consumption, properly operating balancing marketsare crucial for proper functioning of the electricity market as a whole. These markets tend to be as or more concentrated as the underlying wholesale markets, as balancing requires additional technical characteristics of plants that some plants are not equipped to meet.As such, balancing markets are potentially exposed to the exercise of market power asmuch as wholesale markets, although the exercise of market power in balancing markets may be considerably more complicated, since oversupply is potentially as costly as undersupply. The balancing markets will be analysed in more detail in the chapter C.c.II.

(328) Various business models as well as various structures due to the liberalisation process exist on electricity markets in the EU, ranging from stand-alone generators and independent supply companies to fully integrated utilities. In more recently liberalisedMember States vertically integrated companies, or very strong ownership and/or contractual links between generators and suppliers, are predominant. In areas that were liberalised earlier, such as the UK and Nord Pool, business strategies seem to be somewhat more diverse. In the UK, as well as the larger integrated companies, a number of independent generators with their own business strategies exist. On the Nordic

188 Producers can create imbalances as well as consumers if the supply more or less than they have scheduled in advance.


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market(s) consisting of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark independent suppliers are relatively important.

(329) Typically, within fully integrated utilities, specialised affiliates are dedicated to the different activities, such as generation, trading, supply and network operations. Usually, the entire output of the generation affiliate is sold under intra-firm arrangements to the affiliated trading entity189 which in turn manages the undertaking’s overall portfolio i.e.sells electricity to the supply affiliate(s) and sells it to or buys it from third partiesthrough bespoke bilateral contracts or traded wholesale markets. Integrated companies can produce more or less electricity than is required for their own customer portfolio. The larger integrated companies often generate more electricity than they need for their final customers.

I.2. The regulatory framework

(330) EU energy policy pursues three objectives: (1) the achievement of an efficient and competitive integrated energy sector (higher growth rates and increased competitiveness);(2) maintaining an adequate level of security of supply; and (3) increasing the effectiveness of environmental protection. The creation of the internal market is expected to contribute strongly to all of these objectives and this section provides a brief description of the relevant EU legislation in this area.

I.2.1. Liberalisation

I.2.1.1. The beginning of the liberalisation process:

(331) The first important piece of Community legislation aimed at liberalising the electricitysector was Directive 96/92/EC190 (“First Electricity Directive”). The Directive removedlegal monopolies by requiring Member States gradually to allow large electricitycustomers to choose their suppliers (concept of “eligibility”). It also obliged verticallyintegrated companies to grant third parties access to their transmission and distributionnetworks (“third party access”). Furthermore, for vertically integrated companies activein generation, transmission and supply it finally mandated a minimum level of separationof the network business from the other activities (“unbundling”). In a nutshell the Directive introduced the distinction between a regulated part of the market (network) and competitive parts of the market (generation and supply).

(332) The gradual market opening introduced by the First Electricity Directive resulted in significant differences between Member States regarding the level of market opening. The existence of negotiated third party access regimes, the limited level of unbundlingobligations and the lack of an obligation to establish a national energy regulator were alsoviewed as obstacles to creating competitive markets. To address these concerns, furthermeasures were proposed by the Commission leading to the adoption of Directive2003/54/EC191 (“Second Electricity Directive”) and Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003192

(“Cross Border Electricity Trading Regulation”).

189 Important exceptions are Spain and to some extend Italy and the Nordic markets around Nord Pool. In all these cases there is an obligation or incentive to trade through the pool (see further section B.b.I.3.4).

190 Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity (OJ 1997 L 27/20).

191 Directive 2003/54/EC European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 96/92, (OJ 2003 L 176/37).


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I.2.1.2. The Second Electricity Directive

Full market opening

(333) The Second Electricity Directive aimed at complete market opening. It required that allnon-household electricity customers became eligible by 1 July 2004. This will befollowed by the opening of the electricity markets for all household customers by 1 July 2007193. This approach will remove the discrepancies in the level of market opening between Member States.

(334) Market opening by legislation does not, however, automatically lead to the introductionof competition in supply markets dominated by incumbent players. Whilst the Second Electricity Directive is silent on the issue, some Member States introduced (temporary)measures such as market share caps for incumbent operators to address concentrationwhile others (Italy) went so far as to require capacity divestiture. In the UK, the existingstate owned generation company was split up into competing undertakings, which facilitated the creation of competitive markets.

Regulated third party access and creation of regulators

(335) The Second Electricity Directive obliges Member States to introduce a “regulated third party access” regime under which third parties have a right to access the network in a non-discriminatory manner based on published tariffs. The Directive removes the possibility of negotiated third party access regimes, which were considered not to sufficiently mitigate the market power of networks owners, vis à vis the alternative ofregulated third party access regimes.

(336) In order to ensure efficient and constant supervision of fair network access, the Second Electricity Directive mandates the appointment of a national regulator that is independent from the electricity industry (but not necessarily independent from governments). The regulators must monitor the overall activities of the network companies, deal withcomplaints, and control network tariffs194, a key element in creating competitiveconditions.

(337) Some market participants raised concerns that, despite this, the powers of regulators varyand that there are significant differences in market design. The regulators recognised the need for close cooperation – in particular for cross border trade – and formed anassociation for discussion and the development of common positions (CEER). They play an essential role when it comes to the creation of an efficient third party access regime.They also give advice to the Commission on legislative and other projects through ERGEG.195

192 Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges of electricity, (OJ 2003 L 176/1).

193 Several Member States have already opened their markets for all electricity customers.194 The regulator must approve the terms and conditions for network connection and tariffs, or at least the method of

calculation the tariffs, prior to their entry into force. This power also exists with regard to balancing services.195 Commission Decision 2003/796/EC of 11 November 2003 establishing the European Regulators Group for

Electricity and Gas (OJ 2003 L 296/34).


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Unbundling

(338) In order to limit further the risks of discrimination and cross subsidies associated with the existence of vertically integrated companies the Directive requires legal unbundling - inaddition to accounting and management unbundling - between network activities(transmission and distribution) and all other activities. In practice this means that transmission and distribution system operators must be independent in their legal form, organisation and decision making. However a holding company is still entitled to approve the annual financial plan and to set global limits on the level of indebtedness.

(339) The Directive permits the postponement of legal unbundling of distribution companiesuntil 1 July 2007 and allows Member States to exempt them from the legal unbundling obligation altogether if the distribution companies serve less than 100,000 connected customers.

(340) The Directive does not impose that the network operator must own the network assets or that there is ownership unbundling196 from the affiliated supply activities. Nevertheless, several Member States have introduced ownership unbundling for transmission systems arguing that only this form of unbundling removes the incentives in vertically integrated companies for the transmission branch to favour the supply branch.

(341) The issue of structural integration between generation and retail is also not addressed in the Second Electricity Directive. The same applies to long-term power purchase agreements, which can also lead to a reduction of liquidity of wholesale markets. However, this form of vertical integration may violate EC competition law (antitrust rules or state aid rules).

Conclusion

(342) The Second Electricity Directive, where Member States have properly implement it – notonly in form, but also in spirit, has significantly contributed to the creation of a commonelectricity market. The Commission is actively pursuing the lack of adequate implementation of the Directive in certain Member States.197

(343) On the other hand it is worth recalling that the Directive only contains minimumrequirements, leading to different market designs between Member States. Some market participants raised concerns in this respect as the differences in market design can amount to entry barriers and undermine the level playing field for operators located in different Member States.

I.2.1.3. The Cross Border Electricity Trading Regulation

(344) The legislative measures for electricity adopted in 2003 included a second element: the Cross Border Electricity Trading Regulation. This Regulation addresses issues relating to cross-border trading in electricity, such as harmonised principles for payments between transmission system operators and for tariff setting as well as congestion management

196 Ownership unbundling means that a supply company is prevented from owning an entity that operates a network.197 IP/06/430 of 4 April 2006 and MEMO/06/152 of the same day.


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and the allocation of cross border capacity. The Regulation entitles the Commission toadopt and amend legally binding guidelines for more detailed rules.

(345) The Regulation’s rules on congestion management198 are of central importance, as mechanisms to allocate congested interconnection capacity play a crucial role in market integration199. The Regulation requires that congestion problems on interconnectors be addressed through non-discriminatory, market-based solutions. The Guidelines on congestion management200 have recently been amended, and the new Guidelines identify both explicit and implicit auctions as methods complying with this requirement201. The Preliminary Report’s chapter on market integration examines these methods in more detail.

(346) The Regulation also contains provisions to allow private investment in interconnectors (“merchant lines”), as the existence of sufficient interconnector capacity is essential for the development of an integrated market. To this end, new interconnectors (DC lines only) may be exempted from the rules on how revenues from capacity allocation are spent as well as from provisions relating to non-discriminatory network access. For the exemption to be granted, it must be shown that the interconnector enhances competitionand that the investment would not take place in the absence of an exemption. Whereas in the gas sector several applications for an exemption of a similar type were notified to the Commission, the Commission has so far received only one notification regarding anexemption for an electricity interconnnector (a second is under preparation).

I.2.2. Security of Supply

(347) EU energy policy also aims at maintaining a high level of supply security. Security ofsupply comprises of two elements: the need for system security as well as the need for balance between supply and demand of electricity in the medium and the long term. Whilst the issue of security of supply is already addressed in the Second ElectricityDirective and in the Cross Border Electricity Trading Regulation, in 2003 the Commission made a proposal for a more comprehensive set of rules regarding this matter.

(348) The recently adopted Directive on Electricity Security of Supply and Infrastructure (2005/89/EC) requires Member States to ensure that an appropriate level of networksecurity is maintained202 and that stable and transparent market based rules are in place regarding any action taken to balance supply and demand. In addition, networks must set

198 Regulators are also given tasks under the Second Electricity Directive regarding cross-border electricity trading asthey must monitor rules on the allocation of interconnector capacity in cooperation with the other regulators of Member States connected by the interconnector.

199 Congestion problems are aggravated by long-term contracts for capacity reservations on interconnectors which were concluded before liberalisation. In a recent judgment (C-17/03, Vereiniging voor Energie, Milieu an Water) the ECJ stated that preferential access based on such contracts amounted to discrimination prohibited by the First ElectricityDirective and was, as such, contrary to EC law. The Member States concerned in this case had not applied under Article 24 of the First Electricity Directive for a derogation from relevant provisions of that Directive.

200 Guidelines on the management and allocation of available transfer capacity of interconnections between national systems, (OJ 2003 L 176/9).

201 In an explicit auction, market participants bid for available interconnector capacity which is purchased separately from the electricity that is the subject of the transaction. In an implicit auction, interconnector capacity would be made available to the power exchanges, and a market clearing procedure would determine the most efficient use of such capacity. Explicit auctions are already provided for in the existing Guidelines.

202 Operational security rules for TSOs on continental Europe are also described in the Union for the Co-ordination ofTransmission of Electricity (UCTE)’s Operation Handbook


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performance objectives and the regulatory framework must provide appropriate signals for network development and facilitate appropriate network maintenance. The Directivewill enter into force in February 2008.

I.2.3. Environmental protection

(349) Last but not least EU energy policy must take into account the need to improveenvironmental protection and sustainable development. To that end, and to help complywith the Kyoto Protocol, the EU has adopted a number of important legislative measures.

(350) Pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC203 (the “Emissions Trading Directive”), Member States must ensure that all plants with a rated thermal input exceeding 20MW emitting CO2only operate if they have greenhouse gas permit. Member States decide periodically in national allocation plans about the number of allowances allocated for free to each plant.Allowances are normally allocated free of charge although a small proportion may be sold in an auction process. The Directive established the European Union Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS), which, since 1 January 2005, serves as a trading framework for emission allowances. Plants emitting below the level ofallowances allocated can sell their excess, and those exceeding their allocation mustpurchase additional allowances. The ETS which allows for internalising external costs and in particular the alleged effects on electricity prices is discussed below in the chapter on price formation.

(351) Directive 2001/77/EC204 (the “Renewable Electricity Directive”) is an important step in the development of power generation from renewable sources. It mandates that Member States set national targets to meet the Community target of increasing the share ofelectricity consumption from renewable sources to 21% by 2010205. It also encourages Member States to apply various support mechanisms206 in favour of green electricityproduction. The Directive permits Member States to require priority access to the grid for producers of green electricity and mandates that priority is given to green electricitywhen dispatching electricity as the operation of the national systems permits. Directive2004/8/EC on the promotion of cogeneration207 contains provisions on network access for such electricity similar to those in the Renewable Electricity Directive. Electricityproduced from a renewable source or from cogeneration is also promoted by the Community guidelines on State aid for environmental protection208, which explains the conditions under which such State aid will be deemed to be compatible with the commonmarket. Some market participants claimed that electricity produced from renewablesources lead to new challenges for network operations.

203 Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC, (OJ 2003 L 275/32).

204 Directive 2001/77/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September 2001 on the promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy sources in the internal electricity market (OJ 2001 L 283/33).

205 An analysis of progress reports of Member States shows that measures currently in place will probably lead to a 19% of renewable share on electricity by 2010. Report on the progress in renewable electricity of 10 January 2007.

206 These support schemes include green certificates, feed-in tariffs, tendering and tax incentives.207 Directive 2004/8/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 on the promotion of

cogeneration based on useful heat demand in the internal electricity market and amending Directive 92/42/EEC (OJ 2004 L52/50).

208 OJ 2001 C 37/3.


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(352) In 2006 the Community adopted a Directive on energy end-use efficiency and energy services209 to address environmental concerns relating to energy consumption. According to the Directive, Member States will be required to achieve an overall national indicative energy savings target of 9% for the ninth year following the entry into force of theDirective by measures improving energy efficiency.

I.3. Electricity wholesale markets

(353) Wholesale trading, which is the main focus of this report, is the selling and buying ofelectricity in bulk. On wholesale markets generators can sell their output and suppliers can source the energy they need to supply end consumers. Trust in properly functioningwholesale mechanisms and the prices formed on these markets is of the utmostimportance, not just for generators and suppliers, but also for electricity consumerswhose energy bills are strongly affected by the prices formed on these markets.

I.3.1. The benefits of competitive wholesale markets

(354) Competitive wholesale markets generate efficiencies in the overall performance of theelectricity sector by providing price signals to market participants210. In particular, the main benefits of efficient wholesale markets are:

1. effective competition in generation and retail, because competitive wholesalemarkets reduce the entry barriers for independent generators and retailers.Otherwise new entrants might be obliged to enter both the generation and the retail markets at the same time;

2. efficient investment and improved security of supply, because competitivewholesale markets provide price signals for both demand and supply and, forexample, encourage new investment when necessary and give the signals to potential investors on the type of investment (e.g. base-load or peak) or choice of technology that is most required in the market;

3. efficient operation, because well-functioning wholesale markets will give signals to the market to dispatch low cost plant and to plan maintenance at times with the lowest demand. On the other hand price signals can encourage flexiblecustomers to reduce their demand at times of peak consumption etc;

4. efficient risk management, because wholesale markets allow suppliers andconsumers to hedge their portfolio of electricity at a minimum volume and price risk if markets have sufficient depth; and,

5. efficient use and expansion of transmission infrastructure, because competitive wholesale markets provide the price signals necessary for the TSO and regulatory agencies to identify when market participants should transmitenergy from one zone to another and furthermore to identify when and where additional interconnection capacity would be cost effective.

209 Directive 2006/32/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2006 on energy end-use efficiency and energy services.

210 See for example, EFET Position Paper: Transparency and Availability of Information in Continental European Wholesale Electricity Markets, July 2003.


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6. unsustainability of subsidies and other inefficiencies as the decision making process is driven by economic considerations.

I.3.2. Basic features of wholesale markets

I.3.2.1. Wholesale market participants

(355) There are different reasons to be active on electricity wholesale markets. Generally speaking, market participants can be divided in two groups: players with inherent physical positions (generators and suppliers) and participants without inherent physical positions (traders).

(356) The interest for generators to trade stems mainly from the need to sell their generationoutput and optimise the operation of their generation portfolio. In a number of Member States this selling is predominantly executed on forward markets, whereas optimisationof the power plant portfolio is carried out on spot markets i.e. day-ahead or within-the-day markets. By selling electricity forward, generators can hedge themselves against spot price drops.

(357) Retailers, on the other hand, trade on wholesale markets to procure the electricity needed for their customers. The vast majority of the electricity is contracted forward in a number of Member States. By doing so, retailers limit their risk exposure that would arise fromrises in spot prices.

(358) In comparison to generators and retailers, (financial) traders buy and sell to exploit pricedifferences, e.g. between two geographical areas (arbitrage). Traders also may takespeculative positions, aggregate and disaggregate purchases and sales over different time horizons, or locations, thus offering to others the chance to manage their risks.

(359) Our analysis shows that larger electricity companies take part in active trading for all the reasons mentioned above. They do not just sell their surplus generation or cover their supply commitments but engage in arbitrage deals or take speculative positions. On the other hand smaller companies tend to be active on the wholesale market only to optimise their physical portfolios.

I.3.2.2. Market places

(360) The inquiry has looked at wholesale trading in standardised contracts which takes place on two different marketplaces. Transactions are either executed via power exchanges or over the counter (‘OTC’).

(361) Power exchanges are organised and standardised marketplaces. Market participantstransact anonymously using the exchange as central counterparty. Trades are cleared by the power exchange or its appointed clearing house, thereby greatly reducing counterparty risk, i.e. the risk that a party defaults on its contractual obligations. Power exchanges that have gained some significance include Nord Pool, EEX in Germany, APX in Holland, Powernext in France, OMEL in Spain and GME in Italy.

(362) Unlike exchange trading, OTC transactions do not per se involve organised marketplaces. Rules governing the trade are typically derived from practice and based on industry


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agreements.211 Transactions are carried out bilaterally and counterparty risk is born by the market participants. Increasingly, transactions on traded OTC electricity markets are alsocleared by third parties, such as brokers or power exchanges, thus helping liquiditydevelop. Most standard transactions are facilitated by brokers’ telephone or screen-basedservices. The main brokers included in the inquiry are GFI, ICAP, Prebon, Spectron and TFS. The prices of such transactions are reported/estimated on an anonymous basis by industry price reporting companies.

(363) Apart from standardised exchange and OTC trading there are also bespoke bilateral transactions. These deals can be very different in terms of products delivered or services included ranging from back-up agreements to full supply contracts including volumeflexibilities and balancing energy. The prices for these types of transactions are usually not reported.

Table 14

Power Exchange OTC

anonymity of trading yes no

counterparty central counterpart bilateral trading

counterparty risk no yes (if not cleared)

spot trading single auction continuous trading

price and volume transparency directly indirectly

Selected features of power exchange and OTC markets

Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006

I.3.2.3. Traded products, time horizons

(364) Depending on the delivery period, bulk electricity can be traded on spot or forward markets. Spot markets are mainly day-ahead markets on which electricity is traded one day before physical delivery takes place. On forward markets, power is traded for delivery further ahead in time.

(365) Typical spot products on continental European markets are single hours or groups of hours, whereas forward products include weekly, monthly, quarterly and yearly products. Forward electricity can either be traded as a ‘base’ or a ‘peak’ contract. The term ‘base’ implies a continuous delivery throughout the delivery period (e.g. a month), whereas ‘peak’ typically only involves a delivery on business days from 08:00 till 20:00. The definitions and contract specifications may differ between countries.

(366) Electricity for spot and forward delivery can be traded on both power exchanges and OTC markets. Standardised forward contracts traded on exchanges are called futures.212

Contract specifications of exchange traded and OTC products are in practice very similar or identical allowing for efficient arbitrage. To illustrate this, Table 15 shows the different spot and forward/futures contracts which can be traded on Powernext, the French power exchange, and the French OTC market.

211 e.g. ‘Standard Electricity Contract’ of the European Federation of Energy Traders.212 Depending on the contract specification of the power exchange in question, futures contracts can be settled physically

or financially. The later means that during the delivery period of the contract no physical electricity delivery takes place but a difference is paid between the prevailing spot price and the contract settlement price.


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Table 15

Powernext French OTC market as assessed by platts

day-ahead 24 single hours and 11 different blocks of hours base & peak

week-end - base

week-ahead - base & peak

months 3 consecutive months, base & peak 3 consecutive months, base & peak

quarters 4 consecutive quarters, base & peak 2 consecutive quarters, base & peak

years 3 consecutive years, base & peak 2 consecutive years, base & peak

Traded contracts on the French electricity wholesale market

Source: Platts213, Powernext

(367) As a result of continuous arbitrage, prices of identical products traded on differentmarketplaces (i.e. on power exchanges or OTC markets) develop in parallel. Indeed, Figure 39 shows that, for instance, prices for day-ahead baseload delivery observed onthe EEX, the German power exchange, and the German OTC market are very closelycorrelated both in terms of development and levels.

Figure 39

Prices on exchanges and OTC markets go hand in handDay-ahead baseload prices observed on the EEX and the German OTC market in €/MWh

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

Jan-05 Feb-05 Mar-05 Apr-05 May-05 Jun-05 Jul-05 Aug-05 Sep-05 Oct-05

€/M

Wh

OTC day-ahead base EEX day-ahead base

Source: EEX, Argus Media

I.3.2.4. Price formation on short term markets

(368) As noted above electricity can be produced in many ways using a variety of fuels and applying different technologies. This diversity also results in different cost structures. Generation technologies that use low-cost fuels (e.g. nuclear fuel, lignite) often require relatively large capital investments214. On the other hand, generation technologiesrequiring relatively expensive fuels (e.g. gas turbines) have relatively low fixed costs. These differences in cost structures have important implications for the price formationon short-term electricity markets.

213 Data from Platts a division of The McGraw-Hill Companies 2006- all rights reserved.214 Including run-of-river plants that do not use fuels to generate electricity


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(369) On 'perfectly competitive' short term (day ahead/spot) markets, and in absence ofgeneration capacity constraints, economic theory suggests that prices would be set by the short run marginal cost (‘SRMC’) of the plant producing the last unit of electricityrequired to meet demand at that time of day. SRMC are mainly the fuel costs and someother, less substantial, variable production costs. The last, or marginal, unit needed to meet demand is also the one with the highest SRMC of all units running at a given pointin time. The logic of this process ensures that only those power plants operate that have the lowest SRMC among all generation units available to operate215. As a consequence, it can be expected that nuclear or lignite fired power plants will be dispatched continuously and serve as base load units. They may set prices at off-peak period, for example during the night. For other periods the marginal and therefore price setting units – depending on the market in question, would be expected to be fuelled by natural gas, light fuel oil, orblack coal.216

(370) In this respect it is important to underline that the SRMC of the price setting unitdetermines not only the revenues of the owner of the marginal plant, but also of all other operators with e.g. nuclear, lignite or run-of-river units. Whilst their marginal costs are often significantly lower, it is generally argued that they need a higher price than the marginal costs to recover the higher fixed costs217 associated with base load generation.Figure 40 also explains this concept graphically using a schematic ‘merit order’.218

Figure 40

hydronuclear lignite

coal

CCGT

GT

Capacity

Mar

gina

lCos

t

Prices are set by the marginal plantPrice formation on competitive short-term electricity markets

Market price

Demand

hydronuclear lignite

coal

CCGT

GT

Capacity

Mar

gina

lCos

t

Prices are set by the marginal plantPrice formation on competitive short-term electricity markets

Market price

Demand

Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006Note: This graph is only an abstract representation. It does not necessarily reflect actual cost relations between different types of generation and equally does not include the value of CO2 allowances.

215 This price mechanism only applies for short-term markets and not for the price formation on forward markets.216 In some markets, such as the Nordic market, hydro storage plants might often be on the margin. The SRMC of these

plants is based on the alternative value of the water in storage217 As regards fixed costs, some comments made in the public consultation point to the “specific situation” of peak

plants operating during a limited number of hours. They argue that the price at which the power of such plants should be offered could not be strictly based on the marginal costs of the plants but should take in account that the fixed costs can only be amortised during those hours where these plants are among the last one called along the merit curve.

218 The term ‘merit order’ refers to the sequence of generating units according to their SRMC.


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(371) Spot prices on power exchanges are usually set in auctions, separately for 24 individual hours.219 Each market participant hands in price-quantity pairs for its selling and purchasing plans, from which the exchange derives aggregate supply and demand curves. The market price and the corresponding clearing quantity are then set as a result of the matching process. Prices and volumes for the individual hours are publicised and made available by the power exchange. In this respect it is important to note that generators may decide to offer electricity from their plants also at price levels other than SRMC.

(372) In comparison, on OTC markets spot transactions are carried out in continuous trading. Bids and offers are communicated to the market by brokers, usually by entering them into brokers’ internet-based trading platforms. Since trading is done by using a number of brokers or directly between parties, prices are not directly known to all participants. Pricediscovery is the work of price reporters, such as Argus or Platts, which assess the market based on market participants’ voluntary reporting of prices and traded volumes. A varietyof these assessments and indices are sold to the wider public.

I.3.2.5. Price formation on forward markets

(373) Wholesale electricity prices are influenced by both supply and demand factors. However, factors influencing prices in the short run can be somewhat different from those in the long run. According to the answers of market participants in the Sector Inquiry, short term prices are mainly influenced by plant availability, fuel prices, precipitation, wind speed, interconnector availability, temperature and, since 2005, CO2 certificate prices.Prices in the long run are predominantly determined by forward fuel prices, (new) cost of generation capacity (or capacity retirement), water reservoir levels, weather trends, interconnector capacities, CO2 prices and economic growth.

(374) Whereas forward prices are or should be primarily influenced by supply-demandfundamentals that are expected to prevail in the future, spot prices are determined by the out-turn of these fundamentals. In this way forward prices can give an indication of the overall market expectation about future spot prices220. The role that individual expectations play in the setting of forward prices also implies that no explicit price benchmark (similarly to the one that was introduced in the chapter B.b.I.3.2.4. for short-term markets) can be used to determine what the price of a certain forward product should be at a given point in time.

(375) In addition, forward prices are not only influenced by the expected supply-demandbalance. Sellers and buyers engage in forward contracts because they prefer price certainty to unknown spot prices in the future. Therefore forward prices will also include a risk element. Depending on whether buyers or sellers attach a higher value to price certainty this will be a premium or a discount – though in practice it appears often be a premium. The buyer’s willingness to pay for price certainty depends – amongst otherfactors – on the volatility of spot prices. The more volatile spot prices are, the fewerbuyers will be likely to rely on spot transactions and turn to forward markets instead.

(376) Therefore, generators with market power on spot markets have ample opportunity to alsoexercise their influence on forward prices. For example dominant operators could

219 On most of the power exchanges different blocks of hours can be traded as well.220 This does not mean of course that forward prices should at any time necessarily be equal to out-turn prices.

Expectations as regards future fundamentals might be very different from their outcome.


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withhold a part of their generation capacity. This would not only raise spot prices but also change market participants’ expectations of the development of this fundamental supply side factor resulting in higher forward prices. Generators could also increase the volatilityof spot prices (without changing the overall level of prices), which would increase the value of hedging them in advance on the forward market and may raise the premium offorward prices over expected spot prices. While pursuing these strategies might seem costly for generators, it could be outweighed by higher revenues on their total portfolio.

I.3.3. Wholesale market outcome and end-customer pricing

(377) Especially in Member States where generators sell a considerable part of their generationmonths or even years ahead of actual delivery and where traded forward markets exist(e.g. Germany, France, UK, The Netherlands), it is a common practice for suppliers tooffer fixed price supply contracts to their large business or industrial customers. Fixed price contracts also appear to reflect industrial energy users’ preferences.

(378) The inquiry shows that suppliers have fairly similar ways to set prices for fixed term contracts. The prospective consumers’ hourly consumption over the contract duration (most often 1 to 2 years) is estimated on the basis of past consumption patterns assuming that these are indicative also for the future. The cost to serve this expected consumptionis assessed with the help of an hourly forward price curve derived from relevant forward wholesale price quotations prevailing at the time the offer is prepared. The result is the actual cost of covering forward the customer’s consumption on the wholesale market. The final price quoted to the customer will in addition contain other cost components such as expected cost of balancing or the supplier’s own margin.

(379) The described pricing practice applies irrespective of whether the customer will in realitybe supplied from the supplier’s own generation portfolio or covered by electricitypurchases on the market. Business units (i.e. generation and supply units) of integrated electricity companies generally act as profit centres and their performance is measured against the best alternative opportunity on the market.


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I.3.4. Traded volumes on spot markets

Figure 41

Spot volumes are developingDevelopment of spot traded volumes on selected power exchanges

as a percentage of national consumption

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

14%

16%

18%

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Powernext APX EEX

Source: Powernext, APX, EEX

(380) Figure 41 shows the development of traded spot volumes relative to the consumption in the relevant geographical area for some selected markets. Over the whole period, traded volumes developed positively.221

Table 16

Power exchanges OTC brokered

OMEL - Spain 84,02% negligible

GME - Italy 43,67% n.a.

Nord Pool - Nordic region 42,82% n.a.

EEX -Germany 13,24% 5,40%

APX - The Netherlands 11,88% 5,90%

Belgium no power exchange 0,04%

Powernext - France 3,37% 1,50%

EXAA - Austria 2,96% n.a.

UKPX - UK 2,17% 8,60%

Pol PX - Poland 1,28% n.a.

Spot traded volumes as a percentage of national electricity consumption (June 2004 - May 2005)

Source: exchanges’ and brokers’ dataNote: This table does not contain an exhaustive list of all power exchanges in Europe. OTC brokered numbers refer to volumes reported to us by major energy brokers.

(381) Table 16 shows spot volumes traded on power exchanges and on OTC markets relative to electricity consumption in the relevant geographical area. It is evident that large differences exist between geographical areas. These differences are partly the result ofdiverging national wholesale market frameworks. According to their design, powerexchanges can be divided into two broad groups. In the first group members of power exchanges have some kind of obligation or incentive to trade via the exchange (OMEL,

221 Some respondents noted that the (temporary) decrease in traded spot volumes on APX during 2003, was to be ascribed to the distrust of market participant after strong price spikes had occurred when some power plants shut down due to cooling water constraints in the summer


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GME, Nord Pool).222 In the second group exchange members have no such incentives orobligations. In this group EEX and APX saw significantly higher spot volumes traded than Powernext, EXAA, Pol PX and the UKPX. For reasons mentioned above, a directcomparison between the two groups of exchanges is not reasonable.

(382) From this table it also emerges that traded spot volumes on exchanges are larger thanbrokered spot markets in most of the Member States examined. Thus market results on power exchanges seem to be setting the pace for the overall traded spot market.

I.3.5. Traded volumes on forward markets

(383) As can be seen from Table 17, total traded volumes in standardised forward contracts show large variations among countries, suggesting varying degrees of marketdevelopment. Yet again, market design appears to be an important factor. Forward trading in Spain is insignificant, reflecting the de facto mandatory nature of the pool system on OMEL223. In contrast, the Dutch and German OTC forward markets traded byfar the highest volumes (relative to consumption) on the continent as data received frombrokers suggest.

Table 17

power exchanges OTC brokered power exchange + OTC

OMEL - Spain no exchange trading negligible n.a.

GME - Italy no exchange trading n.a. n.a.

Nord Pool - Nordic region (2005) 196% 327%* 523%

EEX -Germany 74% 565% 639%

Endex - The Netherlands (since dec. 2004) 39% 509% 548%

Belgium no exchange trading 22% 22%

Powernext - France 6% 79% 85%

EXAA - Austria no exchange trading n.a. n.a.

Pol PX - Poland no exchange trading n.a. n.a.

UKPX - UK 0% 146% 146%

Traded volumes in futures/forward contracts as a percentage of national electricity consumption (June 2004 - May 2005)

Source: exchanges’ and brokers’ dataNote: OTC brokered numbers refer to volumes reported to us by major energy brokers.

* This figure only includes bilateral contracts cleared by Nord Pool

(384) Figure 42 depicts the development of total traded volumes as a proportion of nationalelectricity consumption. The figures are derived from assessments of respondents in the Sector Inquiry that actively trade on European wholesale markets. In terms of trades a number of continental markets saw their volumes rise. Especially, the German and the Dutch markets experienced increasing OTC volumes.

222 In the period reported upon, in Spain only electricity traded via OMEL was entitled to receive capacity payments.The situation has changed in the meantime and new rules have resulted in a lower percentage of total consumption being traded on Omel at the time of publication of this report. In Italy the Single Buyer (Acqirente Unico) apparently covers an important share of its energy requirements to supply the captive market segment on GME. This contributed largely to a rise in spot traded volumes from 29 % in 2004 to 64% in 2005 (January – May). On the Nordic market there is a need for market participants to transact via Nord Pool once crossing different price areas, since the market mechanism applied there is also implicitly used to allocate limited transmission capacities between different priceregions.

223 Only some minor transactions are executed one-year ahead of generation or more. This concerns output from cogeneration and renewable unit. Some generators reported however that also this electricity is increasingly sold day ahead.


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Figure 42

Forward trading has developed differently across countriesDevelopment of total traded volumes on OTC forward markets as a multiple of national electricity consumption

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

mu

ltip

le o

f n

atio

nal

ele

ctri

city

co

nsu

mp

tio

n

Germany France UK Netherlands Belgium Spain

Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006.

(385) The UK is the only market in the comparison where traded volumes have significantlydeclined during the last two years. This is often ascribed by respondents to ongoing vertical reintegration of the industry, i.e. the trend to bring independent generation and supply businesses into a single operation under the same ownership. Volumes continue to be quite low in France and in Belgium owing to the high level of concentration and vertical integration in these countries.

I.3.6. Number of market participants

(386) Wholesale markets do not only need electricity for their functioning but also a large number of market participants trading actively. The numbers in Table 18 are based on thedata received from major brokers.

Table 18

total number of participants trading

local generators pure financial traders

Nord Pool 36 16 8Germany 34 8 10UK 23 12 7France 20 2 4The Netherlands 18 5 5Belgium 5 1 0

Number of active market participants on forward and futures markets

Source: exchanges’ and brokers’ dataNote: The number of participants in the table represents companies that are reported to have traded yearly or seasonally benchmark contracts over the period January-May 2005 and represented at least 0.5 % of the total volumes traded in those contracts.


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(387) The total number of participants in the comparison given in the table includes not only local utilities and financial players but also trading affiliates of incumbents established in other Member States and major oil and gas companies. All market participants act on the market as both sellers and buyers. The number of active participants on the power exchanges (EEX, Powernext) trading futures products is significantly lower than on the respective OTC markets.

(388) Nord Pool, together with the German OTC forward market, has the highest number of participants and also attracts the largest number of financial traders, followed by the UK, France, Netherlands and Belgium. The number of pure financial traders is a usefulindicator, since such traders only enter markets once they are comfortable with the levelof activity and consider that they can get in and out of trading positions relatively easily.

(389) It is interesting to note that although the total number of trading participants is verysimilar in the UK and France, the UK forward market has six times as many localgenerators and suppliers as the French. In France there are also relatively few pure financial traders. These relations suggest that in France trading is mostly pursued by affiliates of incumbents in other European countries and – to some extent – by oil and gas companies active in the electricity business.

Table 19

Number of sellers Number of buyers

Germany - EEX 35-26 31-36France - Powernext 27-28 29-32The Netherlands - APX 23-24 24-22Austria - EXAA 21 22Sweden - Nord Pool 24 7Denmark West - Nord Pool 19 16Finland - Nord Pool 14 9Denmark East - Nord Pool 7 7

UK - UKPX 18-19 15-19Spain - OMEL 15-13 6-7Italy - GME North 15-14 26-21Italy - GME Sicily 7-8 9

Number of active market participants trading electricty day-ahead on selected power exchanges

Source: power exchanges’ dataNote: The number of participants in the table represents companies that are reported to have traded spot electricity over the period January-May 2005 and represented at least 0.5 % of the total volumes traded. The values are given in ranges, since the number of participants change depending on the hourly product in question. The first values in the range represent the number of participants traded ‘Hour 3’, the secondones the number of participants traded ‘Hour 12’. For data availability reasons no such distinction is made for EXAA and Nord Pool

(390) The number of market participants trading spot electricity on power exchanges is presented in Table 19. The number of participants trading in spot markets compares wellwith those trading forward contracts on OTC markets. On most power exchanges the vast majority of participants act in general as both sellers and buyers of electricity. It is important to note that on most power exchanges a relatively small number of marketparticipants accounts for a large part of the overall spot volume traded on both the selling and buying side. This is especially true for OMEL of Spain, GME of Italy and Denmark West on Nord Pool. Reference is also made to the chapter B.b.II.1.


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II. Issues

(391) Whilst the electricity markets underwent significant changes over recent years (e.g. creation of power exchanges in many Member States) and some significant progress has been made in the creation of a single market place, it is currently the overall perception of many market participants, policy makers, professional observers and analysists, thatsignificant efforts are still needed to create a competitive common market for electricity.

(392) It is not the purpose of this report to downplay the progress made in the liberalisationexercise, but to analyse where many market participants currently see major deficiencies that still need to be overcome. The focus is thus on problem identification. As for gas the issues identified by market participants can be grouped into five large areas:

1. concentration and market power,2. vertical foreclosure,3. lack of market integration,4. lack of transparency, and5. prices.

II.1. Concentration and market power

II.1.1. Introduction

(393) One of the main concerns expressed by market participants in the Sector Inquiry is theconcentration in national wholesale markets (whether in terms of ownership of generationassets or in terms of trade in a given product) which gives scope for exercising marketpower. In general the larger generators in a given national market found that the market was competitive whereas smaller generators, retailers without generation, traders and industrial customers found that there was scope for exercising market power and disputed that the prices were at competitive levels.

(394) The following customers’ views on the functioning of the spot and forward markets illustrate their concerns and allegations about concentration:

Customers’ views on the functioning of spot and forward markets

“There is an oligopoly on the supply side (…) accounting for 80% of generation output.”

“French and Belgian markets are dominated by single players – thus distortions can easily occur there.”

“Forward and futures prices [at the power exchange] do not react to supply and demand.A very dry summer such as 2003 drives up prices, the end of the dry period should thus result in a price decrease. However a downward trend after a price peak is not observable. Obviously the few players at the power exchange are able to prevent price decreases by limiting the offer.”

(395) The Sector Inquiry was launched to carry out a competitive assessment of electricitymarkets notably in order to investigate the above allegations and to assess the reasons for rigidity in prices. This chapter starts the competition assessment of electricity markets by


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looking, in line with traditional competition assessment, at levels of concentration using conventional indicators such as market shares. However, due to the characteristics of theelectricity markets such indicators are insufficient to assess the scope for market power. Hence, this chapter will present results from a set of additional indicators that could reveal to what extent players are able (unilaterally or collectively) to influence prices. This set of indicators does not exclude the use of other possible indicators and further indicators related to concentration and its impact on price formation are provided in chapters B.b.II.1 and C.c.III.

(396) The organisation of this chapter is as follows. After explaining in section 2 how the Commission traditionally defines electricity markets, section 3 will present concentration in generation using conventional indicators. Results of similar indicators in the level ofconcentration in trade on forward markets and power exchanges are presented in section 4. Subsequently, section 5 presents additional indicators for power exchanges and generation aimed to assess in more detail the extent to which electricity markets are vulnerable to manipulation based on market power. A conclusion ends this chapter.

II.1.2. The relevant markets

II.1.2.1. Product market

(397) The relevant product market in this analysis is wholesale trade in electricity. Previousanalysis of the Commission224 has defined wholesale supply of electricity to cover theproduction of electricity at power stations and the import of electricity throughinterconnectors for purpose of resale to retailers or, to a lesser extent, directly to large industrial end-users.

(398) Some market participants have indicated that product markets could be further narrowed according to the time of delivery. For instance, one could distinguish between peak and off-peak periods because of the different nature and level of demand in those periods. Others suggested even narrower markets down to hourly markets. However, for the purpose of this report it is not necessary to take any position on further refinements of therelevant product market.

(399) When analysing whether operators have market power giving them scope to influence prices, the Commission looked in particular at two specific products (one year forward products and day ahead products) sold on power exchanges and brokers’ platforms sincethey provide the main public price indicators in electricity markets. In this respect, it isimportant to underline that these contracts are analysed below as different segments of the same product market i.e. do not constitute a relevant market under EC competitionlaw.

224 See i.a. cases COMP/M.3440 EDP/ENI/GDP, COMP/M.3696 E.ON/MOL, COMP/M.3729 EdF/AEM/Edison, COMP/M.3867-Vattenfall/Elsam and Energi E2.


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II.1.2.2. Geographic market

(400) As regards the geographic market, despite efforts by the Community to reduce barriersbetween the different markets in the EU, the Commission has usually found that the geographic markets are most of the time national in scope225, but that they maysometimes be smaller226 or larger227.

(401) Relevant elements which support the existence of a smaller or larger market include system design, the existence of congestion at points in the grid, the existence of price correlations and price differentials and the differing nature of supply and demand on both sides of congestion points (in particular the existence of an operator that is indispensable to meet demand228).

(402) Annex A that is attached to this report includes a preliminary analysis of the regionalscope of certain wholesale markets. A complete analysis would have to include further assessment of supply and demand substitution, in particular the systematic assessment of whether there are operators who are indispensable to meet demand (calculation ofresidual demand). Given the need to do such an assessment on a very detailed basis, it was possible to do such an assessment only for some markets, without prejudice to the conclusions that could be reached by further investigation in individual cases on these and other markets. All in all, on the basis of the analysis carried out for this report (including analysis detailed in chapter B.b.II.1 and the corresponding annex), all markets will be considered to be national in scope, except Denmark and Italy, where sub-nationalregional markets clearly exist.

II.1.3. Concentration in generation

(403) Many market participants complain about price distortions linked to the degree of concentration in generation. It is often argued that generators’ ability to influence the electricity price levels are due to the characteristics of electricity - the non-storability ofelectricity, the high inelasticity of demand, a very wide spectrum of costs of production and a price equal to the most expensive of the offers selected in power exchanges. According to market participants generators can influence prices in two main ways229:

• either by withdrawing capacity (which may force recourse to more expensive sources of supply); or,

• by imposing high prices when they know that their production is indispensableto meet demand.

225 See i.a. cases COMP/M.3440 EDP/ENI/GDP, COMP/M.3696 E.ON/MOL.226 See case COMP/M.3729 EdF/AEM/Edison227 See cases COMP/M.3268 Sydkraft Graninge and COMP/M.2847 Verbund/Energie Allianz.228 An operator is theoretically indispensable to meet demand if total demand (D) in the area is larger than the sum of the

capacity (SC) of the other generators in the area and of the import capacity (IC) of the area. Given the little flexibility of demand and provided that the capacity of this operator is much larger than (D-SC-IC), such an operator would be able to raise prices without constraint.

229 This does not preclude other practices: some comments in the public consultation underline that dominant operators can also deter entry by selling at low prices or even below costs during certain hours in the day to affect the prospects of a business case for a new power plant. Obviously, one can also not exclude the possibility of anti-competitiveagreements by market participants to raise prices or efforts by market participants to increase prices by purchasing significant volumes at times when the market is expected to be tight (see section on forward markets).


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(404) In the first scenario, the withdrawal of capacity is profitable if the “loss” on electricitynot being produced is exceeded by the increase in profit for the remaining electricity sold.Large capacity portfolios (in particular large low marginal cost generation capacityportfolios) can have such an effect because the higher price that results from thewithdrawal of capacity will more than compensate the lost profit from not running a plant230 and create substantial additional profits from the generation assets being used.Assessing overall concentration of generation assets thus helps to identify the scope for such profitable withdrawals of capacity.

(405) In the second scenario, it is possible to raise prices (“excessive pricing”) even with a relatively small portfolio because the structure of the generation assets and indispensability of certain assets to meet demand at parts of the merit curve, or in certain locations in the network. The higher the concentration in the relevant parts of the meritcurve concerned the greater is the scope for influencing prices231 (as presented in chapterB.b.I.3). Comments made in the public consultation point at the level of concentration ofcertain categories of plants (by fuel and technologies) in certain market, as these will represent a specific segment of the merit curve. This will be elaborated later in this chapter.

(406) Although the extent to which generators may successfully influence the price level, may not (always) correlate with the level of concentration, it is a necessary element of theanalysis of electricity markets across Member States. Figure 43 shows the share ofavailable capacity and of effective generation of the main operators in France232 andSpain. Charts for other Member States can be found in annex B.

230 The plant which is not run will likely not be one of the cheapest plants but a more expensive one (typically some mid-merit plant) to minimise the cost of the withdrawal.

231 Some comments in the public consultation also note that when generation is concentrated in the hands of a single or few operators, then such operators can also impose directly higher prices in the bilateral contracts that are negotiated outside of the power exchange.

232 For France the VPPs are plotted separately since this share is not controlled by the major generator. That being said,it is unclear to what extent VPPs limit the scope of market manipulation.


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Figure 43France

Available installed capacity

86,7%

2,5%

8,2%0,5%

2,2%

Undertaking A

Undertaking B

Undertaking C

Undertaking D

Otherundertakings

France2004 Effective generation

75,4%

1,5%

7,9%

7,8%

7,4%

Undertaking A

Undertaking B

VPP

Undertakingsowning drawingrights in plantsof undertakingAOtherundertakings

SpainAvailable installed capacity

35,6%

32,7%

3,4%

6,5%3%

14,7%

4,1% Undertaking A

Undertaking B

Undertaking C

Undertaking D

Undertaking E

Undertaking F

Otherundertakings

Spain2004 Effective generation

48,3%

2,6%

2,4%

2,2%

28%

10,4%

6,1% Undertaking A

Undertaking B

Undertaking C

Undertaking D

Undertaking E

Undertaking F

Otherundertakings


(407) The charts show that the production assets remain largely in the hands of one or a few large operators. This stems from the pre-liberalisation concentration of generation, which was rarely mitigated by decisions to force divestitures of the incumbent operators. Further, the strong position of incumbent operators has not been eroded in a significant way by investments in generation by new entrants. Indeed, there has been little new build of generation facilities across Europe233, especially in the initial liberalisation phase. Inthe past few years some new gas-fired plant has been constructed in Italy, Spain and the UK and investment of this type is now being planned in other Member States. In addition, some new wind and other renewable generation facilities have shown significant growth in Spain, Italy, Germany, and Denmark.234

(408) The charts also point to the possibility that companies with a limited share in generationcapacity might have market power at certain moments. For instance, in Spain, the second largest operator has almost the same size of installed capacity as the largest one (and both of them represent one third of total capacity respectively). However, the second largest one accounts only for a quarter of the effective output of the largest operator (while the two of them represent three quarters of the total production). This is because the main operator predominantly operates base load plants (essentially nuclear and coal), as can be seen in Figure 44, whilst the second largest operator is likely to serve more peak load demand (especially with hydro plants). Whilst further analysis would certainly be necessary, this indicates that the largest producer might have scope for profitable withdrawals of capacity according to the first scenario mentioned above, whereas the

233 Some market participants have noted that a number of factors contribute to a lack of investment: the lack of visibilityon the long-term for the EU ETS mechanism, the availability of sites, etc.

234 New wind power represents 33% of the new electricity generating capacity in the EU.


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second largest operator might rather have scope for charging high prices at times of peak load235.

Figure 44

Production portfolios of generators can differ substantially (example: Spain)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Undertaking A Undertaking B Undertaking C Undertaking D Undertaking E Undertaking F

Other

Wind

Hydro

Fuel oil

Mix Fuel-gas

Gas

Coal

Nuclear


(409) The different possibilities to influence prices by the two generators concerned can be further explained by recalling the analytical concept of the merit order explained inchapter B.b.I Figure 44 shows the technologies used in the portfolios of the different generators. As regards the largest operator, most of its plants will be on the left of the merit curve, representing generation with low marginal costs. If it withdraws capacity(i.e. limits its production), the curve will shift to the left and force recourse to more expensive plants to meet demand. Given its very large portfolio, this operator maycompensate fully the lack of production with the increase in prices.

(410) The example of the second largest operator shows on the other hand the scope for market power resulting from control over fewer plants which are more on the right of the curve or which are based on hydro. If an operator owns most of the plants on the right of the curve, then it can increase prices with little risk of being replaced by another operator. It is precisely for this reason that the distribution of the power generation technologies becomes relevant. It is, however, important to underline that having scope for influencingprices does not automatically mean that market power is being abused in an anticompetitive manner, as many market participants claim. Rather, this first step in the analysis serves to identify possible scope for influencing prices.

235 The operator concerned has commented in the public consultation that it would not have market power, but its statement cannot be reconciled with the results of the analysis of bidding on the power exchange, as will be shown in section cII.1.5.1.


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II.1.4. Concentration in trade

II.1.4.1. Introduction

(411) Analysing concentration in traded forward and spot markets is important because many retailers wish to procure their demand through these markets, be it partly or entirely. Similarly, many generators wish to secure their sales through these forward markets. In addition forward (and sometimes spot prices) established on observable markets (broker’s platform and power exchanges) provide an index for bilateral wholesalecontracts and for retail sales to large users. Further, the spot market outcome is decisive for the forward market according to a number of market participants, as it constitutes the market of last resort for purchases of electricity236 and will thus set the direction forforward prices. So these markets serve as an important means of sale and purchase and develop reference prices.

(412) Below we analyse first forward trading and then spot trading.

II.1.4.2. Forward markets

II.1.4.2.1. Degree of concentration in forward markets

(413) The most traded product by far on forward markets is the yearly contract for base load hours. An exception is the UK market where products for different seasons are the mosttraded products237. Figure 45 shows for example the proportion of trade of the different forward products in Germany. Further, the yearly forward prices are the main forward price indicator in all markets, for both wholesale and downstream retail contracts.

(414) Thus, it seems that yearly base load products are a good candidate to investigateconcentration in trade in forward markets. For this purpose the Sector Inquiry hascollected and aggregated the sales and purchases per operator on all OTC trading platforms and on the power exchanges which trade forward products. Buying and selling have been assessed separately.

236 This is true for many new entrants who are short of electricity (i.e. they have less electricity generation capacity than they need to supply to final customers) as is shown in the chapter cII.2.

237 This was also the case in Nord Pool until 2004 when yearly forward products started to be traded much more.


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Figure 45

Germany: monthly trade of all categories of forward products

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(415) Figure 46 illustrates for France and Germany in 2004 the trade in yearly forward contracts (indicating the shares of the main sellers and the main buyers separately238).Charts for other forward markets can be found in Annex C. The charts represented here and in the annex show that, except for Belgium, the degree of concentration is not comparable to that in generation. Given the many transactions that take place, the tradingaffiliates of main generators in any given market usually represent together between 30% and 40% of all sales. Furthermore, trading affiliates of the main generators represent together between 20% and 30% of all purchases. The other large market participants are usually the trading arms of the large European generators located in other markets as well as some “pure traders” (i.e. operators without generation assets). The top five players onthe selling side are usually the top five players on the buying side, though not in the same order.

(416) That being said, it is important to note that in all markets (except Belgium) there are at least two participants without generation assets and without retail activity in that market,which can be found among the top five players. Further, at least one of these two players is a “pure trader”239. This may suggest that some “pure traders” have reached a sufficient degree of knowledge and confidence in the markets to provide liquidity and arbitrage in the markets.

238 Note in that respect that the same colour does not correspond to the same undertaking in both pie charts (for sellers and buyers).

239 In one market, this pure trader is even the biggest trader overall (in terms of total and purchases).


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Figure 46France 2004

Shares of the main SELLERS of yearly foward products

13%

12%

12%

10%

7%6%

5%

4%

4%

3%

3%

3%

7%

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1%1%1%

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France 2004Shares of the main BUYERS of yearly foward products

14%

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Germany 2004Shares of the main SELLERS of yearly foward products

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Germany 2004Shares of the main BUYERS of yearly foward products

8%

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29%

Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006Note: The pattern represents in each Figure the category “other undertakings”, i.e. the aggregation of all undertakings which have not been represented individually in the Figures.

(417) An important result, shown in the charts, is that shares in trade do not reflect shares in generation. Furthermore, for the markets analysed, almost no trading platform has been identified where operators systematically have a dominant position on supply or demand as is claimed by a number of market participants240.

II.1.4.2.2. Evolution of concentration in forward trade over time

(418) Whilst the overall concentration levels may look reassuring in the yearly forward market contract, at certain moments in time there may be a high level of concentration which is not shown in the static presentation in the previous chart. Figure 47 therefore shows the monthly evolution of sales and purchases in Germany during the period January 2004 –May 2005 (see Annex D for all other forward markets). Though more detail may be required for a more thorough analysis, such as hourly evolution, it gives a preliminaryinsight into concentration at different times.

240 In that respect, it is important to note that in most markets, there are more than ten very active participants which trade on all platforms and can thus arbitrage between them. Thus even if there had been a main operator on a given platform, it would have been arbitraged against other platforms. That being said, if there had been a main trader behind a given platform it might have been able to give signals through its bids and offers on that platform: that is the reason why it was useful to check this allegation.


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Figure 47

Germany - monthly sales of the main SELLERS of yearly forward products

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Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006Note: The pattern represents in each Figure the category “other undertakings”, i.e. the aggregation of all undertakings which have not been represented individually in the Figures.

(419) The monthly evolution of relative trading positions for the annual contract during the period January 2004 – May 2005 shows that, except in Belgium241 and in the Netherlands at certain moments in time, there does not seem to be concentration at a monthly timescale. In Germany the relative proportions of trade on both sides of the market per player

241 The charts for Belgium cannot be shown given the very few operators actively involved: it would reveal the strategy of those operators.


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remain rather constant, though in December 2004 and April 2005 the evolution of themarket shifts significantly. As regards December 2004, this decrease is due to the factthat at the end of the year the trading of the product of the following year stops. As regards April 2005, this peak may be related to the change that occurred in CO2 trading. The Nord Pool market is growing fast because of the replacement of the seasonal products by yearly products, though this has hardly altered the relative proportions oftrade per player. The UK market on the other hand is drying up and trade of all operators seems to be reducing similarly. In France, there are important variations but trading shares of most operators change accordingly. In the Netherlands on the other hand, at times of decreasing trade, the main sellers are becoming fairly important and the two main sellers can reach up to 50% of total sales, which is a fairly high level and creates room for those operators to move the market. In Belgium, the concentration can becomeeven more acute in certain months than the figures in the preceding section suggest.

(420) It is also clear from the data gathered that in the beginning of the year 2005 a number of new pure traders entered the market. An increase of trading activity by some of the main players was also observed in that period.

(421) In addition, the evolution of the net position (sales minus purchases) of the main operators active on each forward market was studied, as it shows their underlying sales and buying strategies (e.g. financial traders avoiding large open positions). For obvious confidentiality reasons, the corresponding graphs cannot be reproduced here242. However it can be said that in certain markets the main generators have so far been able to take much larger net positions in the forward market than all other participants. ChapterB.b.II.2 confirms that only a limited number of operators have excess generationcompared to their retail sales (they have a “long position”) and thus control the supply ofthe market. It remains to be seen if the generators in those markets could affect the trade in forward products by changing abruptly their net positions.

II.1.4.3. Concentration in spot markets

(422) Power exchanges, where one can trade day-ahead on an hourly basis, often functions as a last resort to close an open contractual position before gate closure. Alternatively one may be exposed to balancing market prices that in some Member States are highly unpredictable and are reported as (economically) punitive by certain market participants243. Hence, in contrast to forward markets, there are fewer possibilities to substitute away from the product concerned, e.g. by delaying the purchase. Therefore high levels of concentration on power exchanges may indicate substantial scope for exercising market power. Some market participants have also claimed in their answers

242 The inquiry has in particular studied the evolution of the cumulative net position up to the moment of delivery, for instance the cumulative net positions (sales-purchases) of each operator in yearly forward products all through the year 2004 until all Calendar 2005 products have either been physically delivered or turned into shorter-term contracts. The graphs presenting the evolution of the cumulative net positions show three categories of operators in all markets during 2004: first there were a number of operators (usually retailers with or without generation) who gradually increased their net buying position during the year, second there were a few operators (usually generators) who increased gradually their net selling position during the year, and thirdly there were a number of operators whose net position varied in bothdirections but who remained (except for a few of these “traders”) in absolute terms usually far below the cumulative net value of the operators in the two other categories. This seems to indicate that there was a rather cautious approach on both the buying and selling side during 2004, which avoided the rush that would happen if for instance all buyers had increased their net purchases at the same time. That being said, some of the net positions in trading did not correspond to the net positions studied in the chapter B.b.II.2 on vertical foreclosure. Further, in a number of markets, the categories and the behaviours were much less straightforward in the first half of 2005.

243 See section C.c.II on electricity balancing mechanisms.


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that generators may “dictate prices” on power exchanges. Thus, this section measures the level of concentration on power exchanges.

(423) As explained above, it is important to keep in mind that not all power exchanges withspot markets have the same underlying design. Some thrive on regulatory constraints(OMEL, GME, Nord Pool), others are of a more voluntary nature (APX, EEX, Powernext). Thus the volumes traded on the respective market places might varyconsiderably. Figure 48 shows the degree of concentration of the various power exchanges in 2004 and during the first five months of 2005 (further graphs in Annex E).

Figure 48APX - Shares of spot sales in 2004

17%

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Undertaking A

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Other operators

APX - Shares of spot sales in January-July 2005

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Omel - Shares of spot sales in 2004

41%

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Omel - Shares of spot sales in January-August 2005

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(424) In the first category of power exchanges (Spain, Italy and Nord Pool) the concentration in generation finds – with one exception (Italy’s North zone) - direct expression in a ratherstable equivalent concentration in the power exchanges244. This situation does not reduce the concerns that there is scope for market power.

244 For this analysis, it is necessary to take into account the electricity sold by TSOs on certain exchanges (TSOs appear as a separate undertaking in the corresponding graphs). Electricity is sold by TSOs on exchanges in particular in Italy and Denmark. Regulation in Italy mandates the TSO to sell on the power exchange the large amounts of electricity under regulated pre-liberalisation contracts (so-called “CIP 6” contracts). In Denmark, the TSOs sell wind power on the exchange: the corresponding amount of electricity has varied substantially between 2004 and 2005.


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(425) In the second category of power exchanges (France, Germany and Netherlands) the power exchanges display a lower level of concentration and also less correlation withconcentration in generation. Also the stability of the shares is low in these power exchanges for the different operators245. However further assessment in the form ofadditional indicators is necessary.

II.1.5. Additional indicators

(426) In this section a more detailed analysis is presented of the scope for market power on power exchanges (possible excessive pricing) and generation (possible withdrawals ofcapacity)246.

(427) In this respect it should be kept in mind that there are a number of objective factors that may influence electricity prices (cost of fuels, pricing-in of CO2 certificates, constraints on interconnections, etc), as explained in other chapters. These factors and constraints make it more difficult to identify the final effect of an anti-competitive practice as someof these constraints are reported to have a very large impact on prices. The assessmentthat follows does not at this stage aim to quantify the impact of such practices, but tries to identify whether they were possible.

II.1.5.1. Possible scope for excessive pricing

(428) As indicated above, a relatively low market share on a power exchange does not necessarily mean that an operator cannot influence the price level. Indeed, it all depends on the price level of offers of the other operators. For instance, if one operator owned most of the more expensive plants required to meet demand at times of higher demand(concentration in the right of the merit curve), this operator would make most of theoffers determining the clearing price at times of peak demand and would face fewcompetitive constraints247. In other words, the residual demand is supplied by a few or just one operator. The focus of the assessment below aims to identify for all exchanges whether some operators are in such a position. Accordingly, it is the aim at this stage to identify if the operators had the scope for excessive pricing but not to check if they actually used it.

245 It shows in particular in the difference of aggregated shares between 2004 and 2005. It has also been checked that variations month by month and the variations of shares of sales of generators month by month are larger in this second category of power exchanges.

246 As indicated earlier, some market participants note that the scope for excessive pricing may also exist outside exchanges in case a single generator dominates the market and is able to impose directly higher prices in contracts negotiated bilaterally with other operators. Such comments by market participants particularly relate to markets which do not have a power exchange or whose exchange represents only a low percentage of total consumption.

247 In that respect it is important to note that the merit curve will not be perfectly reflected in the power exchanges: especially in smaller exchanges, it is only a very small part of the merit curve that is reflected by the offer curve in the power exchange. However, since generators usually try to optimise their most expensive plants on the basis of spot prices, the right of the merit curve will be much better reflected in the offer curve on the power exchange than the left of the merit curve. Further, some market participants underlined in the public consultation that the price of the offers made by generators on an exchange may not be exactly equal to the marginal cost of the plant (operatingcosts including fuel cost) that they intend to run as some plants may have high start-up costs to be added to the marginal costs or may benefit from some subsidies: this is taken into account in the analysis presented because it deals with offers made rather than the underlying costs.


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II.1.5.1.1. Price setting frequency

(429) As a first rough measurement of concentration at the right end of the merit curve, in all exchanges for each operator the number of hours were identified when this operator “set the clearing price”, meaning the hours when its selling bid was equal to the clearing price248. This does not mean that this operator has unilaterally set the price of the market (which is determined by the aggregated supply and demand curves249) but this gives an indication of how often an operator makes selling bids at the clearing price. Hypothetically, if only one operator “sets the price” most of the time, it means that there are very few, if any, alternative offers around the clearing price most of the time. The operator builds-up knowledge about the inelasticity of demand on a specific part of the supply curve where he operates by comparing his bids with the exchange clearing price.If demand is relatively inelastic, he can increase his selling price without the risk (or withlittle risk) of being replaced by another operator.

(430) The frequency of price-setting on the main EU exchanges has been checked month by month for 2004 and for the first eight months of 2005. Table 20 shows the frequency of price setting of the three main “price-setters” in each of the exchanges (or area of the exchange when the relevant market is smaller) in the first eight months of 2005; thenumber of operators with an average frequency above 5%; as well as the maximumpercentage of the most frequent price setting company in any given month during 2005. For zones in Nord Pool and GME, the frequency is calculated only on hours during which the zone is isolated from other zones250. This naturally produces higher figures than for other exchanges. In order to provide a complete picture for Nord Pool, the calculation has also been made for the most common aggregation of zones (all zones together), which leads to lower percentages.

(431) This indicates that in EEX, APX and Powernext, there are a fairly large number of operators making offers of electricity resulting in setting the clearing price. The figures for 2004 in those exchanges further show that the shares of the main operators vary over time and that even the positions of the main operators have varied. The figures presented in the above table are usually similar but sometimes higher when only including peak hours251. The fact that there are many operators involved in price setting despite concentration in generation is possible because there are smaller generators which apparently have “marginal plants” and because a number of market participants have bought electricity from the main generators in VPP auctions or own drawing rights in

248 Depending on the clearing system used by the power exchange, the price for a given hour may be established by interpolation between selling bids. In such cases, the “operator setting the price” was defined as the operator(s) whose selling bid had a price closest to the clearing price. It may also be possible that several operators had the same selling price equal to the clearing price or were as close to the clearing price: this leads to totals exceeding 100% in a few cases. Finally, during some hours all sellers who had been selected had made offers at zero (the price was then not equal to zero because of interpolation with the first bid at a non-zero price): in those cases no operator was identified.

249 In that respect, there is also a “price setter” in the same meaning on the demand curve, i.e. an operator buying energy whose price bid is equal to the clearing price of the market. The analysis in this chapter is focused on the supply curve.

250 The zones selected are the ones in the EU which are most often isolated (Sweden is almost never isloated) as well as South Norway (another often-isolated zone) for comparison purposes.

251 Peak hours have been defined for that purpose as the hours covering the period 8:00-20:00 on working days.


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plants of the main generator(s)252. Also, some of the price-setters are traders which arbitrage between market segments such as spot exchanges and OTC trade. This measurement does not indicate thus that there was a single operator very muchinfluencing the spot price in those markets, although the situation may need some further monitoring, particularly for Powernext. In addition, it would be important to verify also the buying side as generators may also influence the price through purchases253.

Table 20

N°1 N°2 N °3Number ofoperatorsabove 5%

Maximumpercentage in

one month

Omel 32% 25% 10% 5 44%

GME Nord 86% 5% 5% 3 100%

GME Centre South 96% 2% 1% 1 97%

GME Sardinia 80% 19% 1% 2 98%

GME Sicil ia 87% 10% 2% 2 98%

Nord Pool W DK 50% 10% 2% 2 89%

Nord Pool EDK 60% 3% 1% 1 100%

Nord Pool SNO 40% 30% 21% 10 63%

Nord Pool FIN 85% 12% 3% 2 100%

Nord Pool al l zones together 34% 35% 27% 15 57%

EEX 17% 13% 11% 8 25%

APX 15% 14% 9% 8 18%

Powernext 20% 15% 12% 7 33%

Frequency of "price setting" in the m ain exchanges in 2005

Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006Note: all percentages are rounded, totals can exceed 100%.

252 These operators are different from traders who do not have any retail business in a given market. Such traders, have to sell the electricity that they still have remaining the day before delivery (e.g. if they have bought that electricity in the forward market), either in the spot trading of the market where they bought it or in the spot trading of a neighbouring market if they can export the electricity or sell it OTC. Accordingly, such traders are present in the statistics of price-setting usually less than in those of shares of sales presented in B.b.II.1.3, depending on the possibilities of arbitrage between markets.

253 Indeed, generators often combine buying and selling bids as part of their optimisation process: for instance, an undertaking A with a 50MW plant of a marginal cost of 15 €/MWh, a 50MW plant of a marginal cost of 35.1 €/MWh and needing 150 MW for its retail needs would place a buying bid for 100MW up to the price of 35MW and 50MW above. In other words, that operator would make no selling bids. If the clearing price was (due to interpolation), say, 35.05€/MWh, the measurement above will determine that it is another operator that “set the price”, whereas at least both operators influenced the price.


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(432) On the other hand, in all macro-zones of GME, in West Denmark, East Denmark, andFinland, when they were isolated, there was in 2005 one operator which set the clearing price almost all the time254, meaning that there was very little alternative offer around the clearing price. With one exception (Sardinia) the figures were roughly the same for 2004. The same statistics were also calculated for the period of peak hours and it provided similar results255. This means that there might be room for the main price-setter in each zone to increase its price without having the fear to be replaced by another operator, in other words there seems scope for market power. In the case of Omel, as expected in the section on concentration in generation, the largest price setter happens to be the second largest operator in terms of total capacity, i.e. the one with by far the largest amount of hydro power. Furthermore, the percentage of price setting of this operator reached highproportions (up to 58%) during the summer months of 2005. This would at least give some scope to this operator to exercise market power.

(433) All in all, the price setting frequencies indicate a substantial scope for influencing the prices on certain power exchanges.

II.1.5.1.2. Quantity offered around the clearing price

(434) In addition to analysing who set the clearing price, the Sector Inquiry analysed in moredetail which operators placed bids around the clearing price. For this purpose the interval +/-10 percent around the clearing quantity along the power exchange supply curve was analysed to establish whether any operator offered more than 50% of the quantity in thatinterval. This goes further than the previous measurement by checking how much the largest operator on the right of the merit curve controls of the bids. This approach is rather conservative given that the +/-10 percent interval represents 20% of the clearing quantity and that some of these exchanges represent a fairly large part of total consumption. For zones in Nord Pool and GME, the frequency is calculated only onhours during which the zone is isolated from other zones. This naturally produces higher figures than for other exchanges. In order to provide a complete picture for Nord Pool,the calculation has also been made for the most common aggregation of zones (all zones together), which leads to lower percentages.

(435) The results shown in Table 21 confirm that the largest price setters in Omel, in the Nord Pool zones included in the table when they are isolated, and in all GME zones except Sardinia are also those placing most bids around the clearing price. At certain levels ofdemand (particularly in certain months), the main price-setter seems to be in a position to raise prices, provided that it can forecast well enough the separation of zones in the cases of Nord Pool and GME256.

254 The percentages for the main price setter are much higher than the largest share of trade (seen in 2.4.1.3). This is possible because other participants have less expensive plants (as explained in the Spanish case under 2.1.3), or because some other participants even bid at zero (so-called “price takers”). Bids at zero maybe due to the fact that a plant is heat-driven or due to regulatory constraints (the TSO sells into the power exchange wind-power in Denmark and the TSO sells into the power exchange the large amounts of electricity produced under regulated legacy contracts“CIP6” in Italy).

255 The proportion remained the same between operators but, in certain zones the percentage of the main operator in “peak hours”could be one or two points above or below that for “all hours”.

256 In general, it can be said that such a forecast is easier when the isolation of the zone occurs frequently (e.g. more than 45% of the time for West Denmark, Sardinia or Sicilia) than when it occurs less frequently (8% of the time for Finland and 11% of the time for East Denmark in 2005).


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(436) The same analysis was also carried out on other exchanges. It revealed that in EEX, the concentration around the clearing price has been increasing rapidly in 2005, reaching levels of up to half of the peak hours in a month. This may be a sign that the growth of EEX is now leading to similar characteristics as discussed for OMEL where a larger part of the “peak plants” are being optimised through power exchanges. A similar trend seemsto be occurring in Powernext, though at much lower level as the largest price-setter there started in the summer 2005 to offer more than 50% of the quantity around the clearing price for a non-negligible percentage of the time (up to 17% of peak hours).

Table 21

Maximum in a month in 2004

Monthly average in 2004

Maximum in a month in 2005

Monthly average January-August 2005

GME Nord 68% 42% 66% 28%

GME Centre South 100% 100% 100% 100%

GME Sardinia 79% 41% 11% 4%

GME Sicilia 55% 36% 56% 40%

Omel 50% 17% 66% 33%

Nord Pool WDK 100% 80% 100% 87%

Nord Pool EDK 100% 74% 100% 92%

Nord Pool SNO 83% 32% 88% 50%

Nord Pool FIN 73% 27% 95% 31%

Nord Pool all zones together 63% 25% 100% 50%

APX 12% 6% 10% 5%

EEX 25% 11% 52% 25%

Powernext 1% 0% 17% 6%

Percentage of peak hours when the largest "price setter" controlled more than 50% of the offers of electricity offered at a price around the clearing price

Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006Note: all percentages are rounded.

II.1.5.2. Impact of generation on prices: a preliminary assessment of the possibilities to withdraw capacity

(437) Generators, due to the characteristics of electricity markets, may also be able to influence prices through withdrawals of physical capacity. This can be done by fully withdrawing a plant or, more discreetly, by making it produce at less than its capacity (partial withdrawals).

(438) The analysis focuses thus on the level of utilisation of power plants of the main generators over a sufficiently long time period. Disregarding special circumstances one would expect plants with relatively low marginal costs to run all hours and plants with


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relatively (very) high marginal costs only to run at (super) peak hours. If this relationbetween marginal costs and utilisation does not appear from the data one may suspect that competitive pressure is too low, and that (partial) withdrawal of generation to manipulate the price level during some hours must be further investigated.

(439) In order to identify plants, which are not run at their maximum capacity (partialwithdrawals), so-called load factors have been calculated (see the definition below) of themain generators for a number of years in Germany and France. In order to identify full withdrawals, a similar calculation has been done257. It has produced graphs similar to those below (please see annex I) but their interpretation is less straightforward as one must take into account the maintenance schedules of the plants.

(440) The load factor of a plant is the ratio between effective production and the maximumamount of electricity that this plant could have produced in a period, all market terms remaining equal. For this purpose, for each plant and in each period, the number of hours were calculated when it was generating electricity. Multiplying these effectively operational hours with the plant’s maximum capacity yields the maximum potentialoutput258. The load factor is then equal to the effective measured output during the period divided by its (potential) maximum.

(441) Figure 49 shows the results of the calculations for the main operators in Germany and cover the years 2000, 2004 and the first trimester of 2005. The year 2000 corresponds to the beginning of liberalisation, the year 2004 and the first trimester of 2005 represent the situation after liberalisation and before the full effects of CO2 emission trading were felt.The first line which starts low and increases continuously is the aggregated merit order of all plants of the four main German generators, i.e. the line ranking the marginal costs of all the existing plants. The second line shows the load factor for each plant in the order of their marginal cost (so that points on both curves correspond to one another vertically).The horizontal axis provides the aggregated value of capacity of the plants in the order of their marginal cost.

(442) Figure 49 indicates that the correlation between marginal costs and load factors has increased overall throughout the period investigated. Especially, the load factor of the relatively low marginal cost plants is overall on the rise.

(443) Figure 49 shows that within the groups of plants with marginal costs usually below the spot market level (on average around 28-30€/MWh in 2004 and around 36-38€/MWh in the first trimester of 2005) some were used extensively whilst others were characterisedby low load factors. In other words, some plants ran significantly more than other plantswith similar or higher marginal cost. There is a variety of possible explanations for this phenomenon: for instance, a plant may be producing heat as well as electricity and needs to run according to the need to produce heat.

257 Whilst the calculation of load factors for full withdrawals have been made in relation to “all hours of each year”, thepartial withdrawals calculations were made on “working hours” only.

258 This maximum capacity is usually the capacity stated by the generator in its answer to DG COMP questionnaires. However, in a number of cases (especially the cheap plants), the plant is run for a very large number of hours above the nominal capacity. In those cases, the maximum capacity the maximum output of the plant during the period is taken.


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Figure 49Load factors 2000 on working hours - Plants of four main operators in Germany

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Load factors 2004 on working hours- Plants of four main operators in Germany

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(444) Figure 50 shows the same calculations as those in Figure 49, but it plots the marginal costs to compare the merit curve across the years (with on the horizontal axes the accumulated capacity for the main German operators). One should keep in mind that, in this chart the plants on the horizontal axis need not necessarily be the same for all years.

Figure 50

Marginal costs for accumulated capacity from main German generatorsfor the years 2000, 2004 and first trimester 2005

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(445) As regards the shifts to the left of the merit curve over the years, the evolution of theportfolio of the main generators has been studied. It is interesting to note that the total generation capacity of the four main German generators decreased between 2000 and early 2005 by 2149MW (addition of 960MW of capacity, and retirement of 3109MW ofcapacity). The retirement of a plant may be explained by the age of the plant and the need for an operator to replace its old plants. In that respect it is to be noted that in the preceding years some new plants were switched on by these operators, although net additions in the preceding years were still of a lesser scale than these retirements259. Inany event, this decrease of total capacity is likely to have had an adverse effect on the balance of supply and demand. Furthermore, out of all the plants which have been retired,most of the capacity retired (2679MW) had low variable costs. This had an impact on themerit curve. At the same time – according to Eurostat - there was an increase in overall demand in Germany from 2000 to 2004 of approximately 5.5%.

(446) Similar graphs have also been prepared for France. However these graphs cannot be reproduced as there is one main operator and the graphs would reveal its costs. Theyshow a similar situation in terms of increased usage of the plants but are different in terms of the overall merit curve due to the specificity of the operator’s portfolio. Somerespondents in the public consultation note in that respect that this operator has retired

259 In the year 1999, the four operators added little net capacity, but in 2000 they added around 1500MW.


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some less expensive coal-fired plants in the period 2000-2005 while de-mothballing somemore expensive fuel oil fired plants.

(447) More generally as regards withdrawals of capacity, some comments made in the publicconsultation argue that certain power exchanges may have enough resilience to withstand a withdrawal of capacity. In that respect, one power exchange computed that 500MW ofadditional demand during a given winter month (January 2006) would have generated an averaged increase of a bit less than 4€/MWh. Whatever conclusions are drawn from thisfigure, it could be useful for regulators and competition authorities to know what kind of resilience power exchanges have in order to identify the scope for withdrawals ofcapacity.

(448) Further indices are presented in chapter C.c.III.

Conclusion

Customers have little trust in the functioning of wholesale markets. They suspect market manipulation on the spot and forward markets by large generators to be the main reason for recent price increases. Concentration is a key factor in the proper analysis of the price developments. Other factors are the developments in fuel prices and the impact of the EU Emission Trading System.

Most wholesale markets have remained national in scope. The level of concentration in generation has remained high in most Member States giving generators scope for market power. The level of concentration in trading markets is less striking than in generation,particularly on forward markets where electricity can be traded several times before delivery. However, all spot and forward markets, even the most developed forward markets, remain dependent on the few players which enjoy a net excess of generation compared to their retail supplies.

Further, an analysis of who determines the clearing price at certain power exchanges indicates that there is scope to directly influence prices by excessive bidding prices foroperators in Italy, Spain and Denmark. Possibilities to move prices might also exist in other markets.

In addition to excessive bidding, large operators can push up prices by withdrawingcapacity. In that respect, it appears that load factors of generation units have increased over time in Germany and in France suggesting higher efficiency levels and a tightersupply/demand balance. However, significant generation capacity – most of it with lowmarginal costs – was retired in Germany despite slowly increasing demand. Also, certain plants with rather low marginal costs did not operate fully at all times.


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II.2. Vertical foreclosure and vertical integration260

(449) Vertically integrated electricity companies have traditionally been active in generation,network and retail activities. This chapter assesses the effects of this vertical integration.It starts with vertical integration of generation and retail activities and continues withvertical integration of network and supply activities. The Sector Inquiry confirms that both forms of vertical integration, whilst also bringing about certain economic benefits, have adverse effects for the liberalisation process. The magnitudes of these adverseeffects are empirically assessed.

(450) Exclusive long-term contracts may also result in vertical foreclosure. They have similar effects to vertical integration of generation and retail activities, as independent suppliers have (almost) no access to uncommitted generation and independent generators cannot supply electricity directly to the wholesale market. This will also be assessed.

II.2.1. Vertical integration between generation and retail activities

II.2.1.1. Introduction

(451) Vertical integration of generation and retail within the same group reduces, all other things being equal, the need to trade on wholesale markets. In turn, this can lead to a reduction of liquidity of wholesale markets. In a market without any vertically integrated companies, all electricity will necessarily be traded between generators and suppliers. In contrast, when all companies are vertically integrated, each vertically integrated group in the sector would meet (part of) its respective demand from final customers with own generation capacity and so would have less need to enter into wholesale transactions261.

(452) Lack of liquidity can have many negative effects, such as: high volatility of prices, which increases costs for hedging (this can be an important barrier to entry) and a lack of trust that the exchange price reflects the overall supply and demand balance in the wholesalemarket (reduced reliability of the price signal).

(453) A lack of liquidity may also initiate a vicious circle by creating further incentives to vertical integration because operators do not want to rely on the wholesale market for their electricity supply. New entrants face higher risks when markets are volatile and consequently may not be able to match, at least not in the short run, market offers fromtheir vertically integrated competitors and may only be able to attract capital at higher costs. Similarly, incentives to integrate vertically may result from balancing marketswhere the regime foresees an economic penalty for imbalances. In such cases, incentivesfor self-balancing (i.e. to vertically integrate) also exist. Thus, vertical integration limitsexposure to volatile wholesale markets and balancing markets.

260 The title was chosen in order to ensure consistency with the gas part. Contrary to gas the chapter mainly deals withvertical integration.

261 Vertically integrated companies continue to have incentives to trade on the wholesale markets, in particular to optimise their generation portfolios. A vertically integrated company that owns the generation capacity to produce allthe electricity needed to cover its customers requirements will benefit from buying instead of producing electricity if the wholesale market electricity price is lower than the short run marginal cost of the last generation unit in the merit order of its own generation capacity. For “pools” see footnote 263 below.


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(454) Cross-border entry in electricity markets is facilitated to an important degree if entrants do not have to enter as vertically-integrated companies acquiring simultaneously generation capacity and a customer portfolio, but can choose to enter as purely a supplycompany or generation company. This reduces the risks and costs of entry. However, this is only possible if a liquid wholesale market exists. Liquid wholesale markets are therefore key for the erosion of incumbent’s market power.

II.2.1.2. Comparison of net positions

(455) An undertaking can have a long or a short position, meaning that it, respectively, produces more electricity than is required to supply its retail customers or, less. In both cases a company will have to trade262 in order to balance its position. The sum of longand short positions (“net positions”) of all market participants represents the minimumamount of sale and purchase transactions that must be concluded in order for all short and long positions to clear.263

Figure 51

Net positions vary considerally across the EU

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(456) Figure 51 shows that the aggregated net positions vary significantly from Member State to Member State. At one extreme there is the German market with some 25 TWh/monthof positions that need to be closed. At the other extreme there is Belgium, where this volume has been below 2 TWh/month for most of the period analysed. It must be noted

262 The analyses here cannot be directly translated to the manner in which contracts are traded (OTC, power exchange, bespoke bilateral contracts) or the time horizon over which contracts are traded (a given long or short position can be closed immediately before gate closure or any time before.)

263 The design of certain wholesale markets, in particular the Spanish organised market OMEL and to a lesser extent the Italian organised market, GME and Nord Pool result in vertically integrated companies trading all or part of the their generation output through the (organised) wholesale market only to purchase subsequently on the same market the amounts needed for their retail operations. For this reason, the analyses performed in this chapter are not pertinent for these market places.


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that the existence of the French VPP programme contributes strongly to liquidity on theFrench market. Indeed, the auctioned 6000 MW capacity translates into about 3.5 GWh/month.

(457) To demonstrate the real extent of vertical integration between generation and retail per Member State, the figures on net positions have been compared with the total size of respective national markets (see Figure 52). The inquiry reveals that in countries such as the Czech Republic264, Netherlands, Germany and United Kingdom, the positions that need to be cleared by trading electricity represents 25-40% of the market. In Belgium and France, this percentage is substantially lower.

Figure 52

Different levels of vertical integration in Member States

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(458) In Poland, the positions to be cleared by trading almost equal the total size of the Polishmarket, i.e. hardly any generators were selling to final customers. This is however primarily due to the Government’s previous policy not to allow vertical integration. The same comment can be made as regards the markets in Hungary and Slovakia, wheregeneration companies are, in general, not active at the retail level (for further commentson these markets see below). For Portugal, the picture is disturbed due to the existence of a single buyer regime at the wholesale level.

(459) In a closed system, where neither imports nor exports take place, one would expect to observe that the total amount of long positions equals the total amount of short positions.In a liberalised market with cross border flows this equilibrium no longer exists. However, undertakings in the exporting countries need to have overall larger positions

264 In its comments to the Preliminary Report, CEZ a.s., the Czech incumbent, informed that as of 1 January 2006 its generation and retail activities are carried out by two separate entities: CEZ a.s. and CEZ Prodej s.r.o., respectively. The latter entity is acting as a retail arm of CEZ a.s. and maintained that it would source, on an independent basis, all its electricity needs from the wholesale market. However in the context of the Sector Inquiry it was not possible to verify whether the separation is effective in practice.


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because (a part of) this energy will flow to foreign customers. For the importing countries, the opposite is true. In many instances, this theoretical pattern is confirmed by the Figure 53. The pattern is visible in Member States like France and the Czech Republic, which are large exporters, or Belgium, where substantial quantities of energyare sourced from abroad. On the other hand, some of the existing discrepancies in Figure53 can be explained by the fact that the Commission inquiry did not cover entities falling below certain thresholds.265

Figure 53

Cross border flows can have a considerable impact on national markets

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(460) The impact of vertical integration on the net positions can be demonstrated by the Czech example. In 2003 the Czech incumbent, CEZ, acquired control over five of the seven retail companies active at the time. The integration of long (CEZ) and short positions(retail companies) within the same group led to a 40-50% drop in the net positions. On the other hand, the widely held belief by market participants that the drop in wholesalemarket liquidity in the United Kingdom is related to an increased vertical integrationcould not be confirmed by this analysis.

(461) The current discussion in Poland about the envisaged vertical integration is another interesting example. It shows that that the level of net positions would drop dramatically(40%) if the planned restructuring around the two largest groups active predominantly in generation goes ahead (see Figure 54).

265 Suppliers with the annual sales to final customer below 1TWh were not obliged to reply to the questions relevant for this chapter. This in particular means that small retailers in countries like Germany (for instance, smaller ‘Stadtwerke’) or small independent generators from the UK are not included in the study.


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Figure 54

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II.2.1.3. Market participants

(462) Vertical integration not only reduces the overall volumes of net positions but may alsohave an impact on the number of actively trading companies and the size of long or short positions of the remaining active participants. This is important because, as a general rule, it can be said that the more actively trading players on the supply and demand side of the electricity wholesale market the more liquid the wholesale markets. Moreover,non-physical or financial players are, all other things being equal, more inclined to participate in markets with higher numbers of physical participants.

Figure 55

The number of companies trading actively varies substantially across the EU

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(463) Figure 55266 provides a first indication how entrants might evaluate the risks that they would be exposed to when entering a market by assessing the number of establishedgenerators and suppliers operating with short or long positions in the market. From Figure 55 it may be deduced that the situation in the UK is relatively favourable, whilstfor Germany the situation is less advantageous for new suppliers, in particular due to the lack of independent generators.

(464) The likelihood that an undertaking has an interest in increasing electricity prices on spot markets also depends on whether it is long or short as a group. A group that is normallyshort has to source part of its own supplies from the electricity wholesale markets. Therefore, if an integrated company is net short, its generating branch has less or noincentives to increase artificially wholesale prices as the company as a whole would not benefit from such a strategy. Figure 55 illustrates that, ultimately, the number of companies in a given market that may have incentives to raise prices above the competitive level is fairly limited267.

(465) An even better indicator for new entrants to assess their risks when entering new markets is the “concentration levels” in net positions, in other words an analysis that not only takes into account the number of players that are short or long, but also the degree to which they are long or short. In this respect it goes without saying that a high degree of concentration in long positions is not a favourable condition for competitive wholesalemarkets. A high concentration in short positions is also not conducive to competitivemarkets although the impact of ‘buying power’ may be of less immediate concern from apure competition point of view.

(466) For the purpose of calculating the concentration levels, indices based on sums ofsquares268 have been calculated on total production and retail sales as well as the long and short positions of market participants. In almost all cases, the indices calculated on the basis of market positions have higher values than the respective indices calculated on the basis of generation or retail shares (see Figure 56). On the supply/long positions side, the most striking is the effect of this analysis in Belgium and Slovakia. It must also be noted that this analysis affects strongly the German situation. On the demand/short positionsside of the market, the effects on the Czech, French, Dutch and Portuguese269 marketsstand out. Furthermore, it should be noted that due to the capacity auctioned under the VPP, the index calculated for long positions in France dropped considerably.

266 Figure 55 does not include suppliers with the annual sales (to final customers) below 1TWh and those of independent generators which have less than 250MW of capacity.

267 This observation depends on downstream contractual relations. The disincentive for vertical integrated companies to use market power in spot markets disappears if retail prices are largely dependent on short-term wholesale prices. However, although spot market indexed supply agreements exist, the Sector Inquiry shows that contracts with final customers normally have a fixed price. Moreover, no strong link between wholesale prices and those for final consumers can exist where retail prices for non-eligible customers remain regulated.

268 The mathematical formula used is the same as in the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (‘HHI index’). Indices have therefore the well-described mathematical properties of the HHI index and can take values from 0 to 10,000, where the latter value indicates that all “observations” are attributed to one source. The term ‘HHI’ has however been avoided in the main text as the indices are here used in a context where they are usually not applied. Moreover concentration and therefore the HHI index is not a very appropriate indicator for the electricity sector, where, forreasons explained elsewhere, market power can exists at lower levels of concentration then in other industries. Having said that the figures presented here can certainly provide guidance about a Member State’s relative position. For the use of HHIs in the context of competition law application, see the Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings, (OJ C 031 , 05/02/2004 p.5-8) which provide some guidance as to the meaning that can be attached the value of the index.

269 As regards Portugal, the present situation can be explained by the existence of the single buyer at the wholesale level.


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Figure 56

High levels of concentration in actual market positions in many Member States

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II.2.1.4. Long-term power purchase agreements

(467) Long-term power purchase agreements (PPAs) are another factor which may affect the volumes that are traded on a regular basis on wholesale markets. Clearly, electricity soldunder longer term contracts270 is also traded. But it has only a limited effect on the price formation process on spot electricity wholesale markets. In certain countries PPAs are believed to be among the main causes for the low volumes of electricity traded on the wholesale markets. The effects of such agreements were therefore analysed for a selection of countries (see Figure 57).

(468) First of all, it must be noted that not just the existence but also the nature of long-termcontracts plays a role here. Long-term contracts between parties with opposite marketpositions in the same Member State will always tend to reduce the amount of open long and short positions that need to be closed by wholesale market trading. Import and export contracts however will add or reduce the amount of electricity that is available for trading in a given Member State. Import contracts may therefore mitigate the effects of domesticcontracts whereas long-term export agreements may aggravate them. In the table below these distinctions are therefore analysed. In particular the Belgian and Dutch markets,considering their size, benefit from imports under long-term contracts, mitigating the effects long-term contracts may have on these countries. In France, the opposite is true.

270 For the purposes of this analysis, long-term contracts were taken to mean contracts of a duration longer than three years and/or that are tacitly renewed.


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Figure 57

Long-term contracts also reduce liquidity of wholesale markets

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(469) In France the bulk of long-term contracts are export contracts, which further increased the impact of the domestic contracts. As such a large proportion of potentially traded volumes in France are apparently unavailable for the price formation process, the volumes auctioned under the VPP remain the only significant source of liquidity on this market.

(470) In Portugal, Rede Eléctrica Nacional (‘REN’) is the single buyer at the wholesale level. It purchases electricity mainly on the basis of long-term ‘PPAs’ signed with the domesticgenerators. This energy is sold to non-eligible clients connected predominantly to the distribution network of the EDP group. As long as the present situation prevails, the scope for wholesale trading in Portugal will remain very limited.

(471) In Poland, the long-term arrangements have predominantly a domestic character. A large number of long-term contracts exist, which were signed mainly in the 1990s between generators and the former national incumbent company, Polskie Sieci Energetyczne (‘PSE’). PSE resells this energy to the local distribution companies, who are under obligation to buy each year from PSE a certain percentage of their own sales to non-eligible customers. The fact that power is sold on a long-term basis to the incumbent downstream operators means that the relatively favourable picture drawn above as regards volumes available for wholesale trading must be qualified. Even if the degree ofvertical integration in Poland stays for the time being very low, ‘PPAs’ restrict severely the volume of electricity that contributes to the price formation process. Hence, they maywell constitute a significant barrier to the development of the Polish wholesale market, even if the currently discussed vertical integration should be abandoned.

(472) A similar situation exists in Hungary, where Magyar Villamos M• vek (‘MVM’) is the public utility wholesaler and acquires electricity by means of long-term PPAs that is subsequently sold to the local retailers. The Hungarian PPAs cover the vast majority of


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the Member State’s electricity needs (see Figure 57), which may have effects on wholesale trading similar to, or even going further than, those described above in the context of the Polish wholesale market.

(473) Potentially traded volumes appear to be less affected by the long-term contracts signed in Member States like the Czech Republic or United Kingdom. However, in the former case, such a conclusion may be partly misleading. The Czech PPAs were concluded between the vertically integrated incumbent and independent generators, and their impactwas further upstream. Consequently, although these contracts do not immediately affect the volume of electricity that needs to be traded they do affect the number and degree of parties with long positions and add to the already high degree of concentration at the generation level, as is shown by Figure 58271.

Figure 58

Long-term contracts can de facto increase concentration(Example: Czech Republic)

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II.2.2. Vertical integration between supply and network activitiesInefficient unbundling

(474) Effective access to the existing network is considered indispensable for competition todevelop. This is due to the fact that the network generally constitutes a natural monopoly that is uneconomic to duplicate. Competitors thus need effective access to the existingnetwork.

271 In the public consultation of the Preliminary Report, CEZ a.s., the Czech incumbent, informed that, in 2006, the electricity volumes tied in its upstream PPAs with the independent power producers decreased by 24 per cent in comparison with the year 2005. CEZ also referred to two contracts signed for indefinite periods that must be extended for the following calendar year by means of a revision. In the company’s view, these two contracts should not be classified as long-term PPAs. As regards of the Sector Inquiry analysis, the exclusion of the two contracts in question would only result in a slight shortening of the two bottom bars in Figure 58 and thus would not alter the paragraph’s general conclusion.


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(475) A company active in electricity generation and/or supply that owns at the same timetransmission or distribution network assets has, however, an incentive to use its monopoly position as network owner to prevent or limit competition in other areas of the value chain. This can happen in many ways such as: raising rivals’ costs, price squeezes, withholding essential information and by providing the information only to affiliated companies. All of these practices distort a level playing field and render market entry more difficult. This in turn can reinforce the market power of incumbent generators/suppliers. With the same token the market power of incumbent operators can be prolonged through the failure to invest in network expansion.

(476) It is to limit the risk of such behaviour from occurring that the Second ElectricityDirective contains unbundling rules for transmission and distribution networks. The transmission system operator (‘TSO’) must be independent at least in terms of its legalform, organisation, and decision making from other activities not relating to transmission.For distribution system operators (‘DSO’) the rules are similar. However, Member States are not obliged to implement fully the unbundling rules until 1 July 2007. They can alsodecide not to impose certain unbundling obligations on distribution companies that have less than 100.000 customers.

(477) Unbundling requirements for gas and electricity companies are essentially the same. To avoid further repetition, reference is therefore made to the Chapter on vertical foreclosure in the gas part, which contains a more detailed description of what full implementation ofthe unbundling rules entails.

(478) As regards TSOs most Member States have by now implemented the Second ElectricityDirective’s requirements for unbundling. Approximately half of them have gone further than the legal obligations and implemented forms of ownership unbundling. As regards DSOs, compliance is less advanced272. It is true that Member States only have to complyfully with the unbundling requirement for DSOs by 1 July 2007. However, at the time when the Preliminary Report was written a significant number of Member States still hasnot introduced accounting and management unbundling. Management unbundling was supposed to be implemented by 1 July 2004 whereas accounting unbundling was already required by the First Electricity Directive of 1996 and had to be implemented by 19 August 1999 by most Member States273. For those Member States, for which the Commission reached the view that they had not respected the obligations under the Directive, infringement procedures were launched in April 2006.

(479) It is interesting to note that the conduct discussed in more detail below concerns withoutexception TSOs and DSOs that have, even if unbundled in accordance with the legalrequirements, remained part of a vertically integrated group. Indeed, unbundling measures may render discriminatory practises in the exploitation of the network monopoly more difficult, but do not eliminate the incentives for vertically integrated companies to engage in such conduct. The experiences of full ownership unbundling suggest that it significantly changes the behaviour of the network undertaking: fully unbundled Transmission System Operators (‘TSOs’) and Distribution System Operators

272 Source: Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: 2005 Report on the Implementation of the Gas and Electricity Internal Market.

273 See Art. 27 of Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity. (OJ L 027 30/01/1997 p. 20, - 29).


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(‘DSOs’) will no longer have the incentive to favour affiliated companies –since there are none-, but can focus on optimising the use of the networks.

(480) This chapter mainly describes the obstacles to effective unbundling as reported by marketparticipants in reply to the Commission’s information requests of summer 2005. In reaction to the Preliminary Report certain operators – particularly vertically integrated companies opposing ownership unbundling - claimed that the information presented in the report is outdated taking into account that the unbundling provisions under the Electricity Directive were only implemented into national law shortly before the Inquiry. Accordingly it is also maintained that only little experience existed with the new unbundling regime and more time should be given to prove that the unbundling regime foreseen in the Second Electricity Directive works in practice.

(481) In this respect it suffices to say that the Commission services continued to gatherinformation about existing unbundling practices also after the Preliminary Report. The new information confirmed the earlier assessment that the current level of unbundling isinsufficient (for details see below). In certain areas the concerns expressed earlier were even reinforced. It is therefore submitted that the behaviour described below still reflects current realities.

(482) This subsection is structured as follows: In its first part it sets out a number of practical problems with unbundling as reported to the Commission. The chapter then goes on to describe the obstacles for market participants with new generation projects to connect their power plants to the net (essentially to the TSO network). It concludes that vertically integrated companies have an incentive to delay market entry and in practice take certain measures leading at least to delays for new power projects. The third part deals withaccess to the network from the perspective of network users (e.g. traders). Again the incentive structure for vertically integrated companies is at the heart of the findings. The fourth part deals with obstacles to switching at the distribution level. For all parts (as well as the parts described in other chapters) it transpired from the analysis that the currentlevel of unbundling is not satisfactory and calls for further action.

II.2.2.1. Practical problems in the implementation of the unbundling provisions

(483) Taking into account the historic development of vertically integrated electricitycompanies it is not surprising that legal and functional unbundling of network activitiesand supply/generation activities is taking significant time and effort to implement in practice. There are a number of obstacles of a practical nature.

(484) For example, the Sector Inquiry confirmed that the unbundled network and supply branches are - in many instances - still located in the same building. This also means that the personnel of the supply branches have “better access” to the employees working in the network branch. The employees of these branches still share a large number ofcommon facilities. For instance they go to the same company restaurant, which allows for an informal exchange of views. They also attend the same training programmes/facilitiesallowing for the same exchange of information. In certain companies network and supply/generation branches also share the same IT services274. All these seemingly small

274 Vertically integrated companies maintain however that Chinese Walls exist within the IT system. As a consequence employees of the supply branch do not have access to the data stored for the network business.


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factors contribute to the continuation of a close cooperation between the formally unbundled branches (special relationship). In some instances it has been confirmed that the “special relationship” leads to a (systematic) copying of e-mails to the other formally unbundled, but affiliated branch (lack of “information unbundling”), whilst obviously third parties do not get access to such information or only at a later stage.

(485) Another important concern stems from the fact that the personnel still perceives themselves as employees of one and the same group, and that there are a number offactors reinforcing the group identity. It was thus brought to the attention of the Commission that in certain companies the head of TSOs systematically participates in the strategic discussions of the holding company. Accordingly he/she is well informed about the group’s generation and supply interests and can/will report about them to his colleagues in the network business. At the same time the management of these verticallyintegrated companies are not limited in their career prospects to the branch, for which they currently work. Moving from one affiliated branch to the other seems to be current practice and will have an impact on the decision making process in the network branch. It will certainly not give the management in the network operation the incentive to take decisions, which are likely to harm the generation and supply interests of the group orfavour new entrants over the affiliated branches. The obligation to have compliance programmes and annual reporting in place has not adequately changed the assessment.

(486) In the light of the above described practical problems regulatory oversight is very difficult. Particularly in Member States with a high number of transmission and distribution companies it is virtually impossible for the regulator to verify in all companies that the unbundling provisions are fully respected, even if the Directive is correctly implemented into national law. Generally the regulator will simply not have the resources to ensure that unbundling requirements are complied with.

II.2.2.2. Grid connection for new power plants

(487) In order to replace Europe’s ageing generation facilities significant investments into new power plants will be needed in the coming years. Taking into account that in many Member States the Sector Inquiry has confirmed a high degree of concentration in generation, it would clearly be preferable for the future market structure if new power projects were not only developed by incumbent operators, but also – or even primarily -by new entrants275. However the Sector Inquiry has confirmed the existence of a number of obstacles to connecting new plants to the TSO network. When the network is owned and operated by vertically integrated electricity companies, the TSO is unlikely to have an incentive to connect potential competitors in the generation/supply business to theirnetwork.

(488) The actual number of network access applications by owners of new generation assets was relatively low during the period investigated (2000 to 2005). In fact, during this period only few investment projects in generation capacity were undertaken and so only a few applications for network access were submitted. With this qualification, it is fair to say that blatant refusals for access to networks appear rare. In this respect it is important

275 For the avoidance of doubt it should be underlined that the investment into a new power plant located in Member State A by incumbent from Member State B would also be considered to be a market entry by a “new entrant”.


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to underline that network operators can only refuse access to their networks if no or insufficient capacity exists.

(489) This does not mean however that the access to networks is unproblematic. Despite an obligation to motivate such refusals, the existence, location, and degree of congestion is often not transparent. Respondents in Belgium, Ireland, and Germany claimed that it was impossible to verify whether and to what extent the congestion that was claimed to exist by the network operator was real.

(490) When constraints exist in the network, applicants can often only be connected if they are ready to compensate the network operator for the costs of reinforcing the net, measures that have allegedly be introduced by certain vertically integrated TSOs. Costs for reinforcing networks can be substantial when compared with the overall investment ingeneration capacity and may render any project unviable. The request by a TSO for compensation for network reinforcements is particularly problematic, if the alleged congestions cannot (exclusively) be attributed to the new plant(s).

(491) Evidently, a lack of transparency as regards network constraints combined with theobligation on applicants to contribute to network reinforcement creates considerable leeway for vertically integrated companies to raise their rivals costs for bringing new capacity online or even to make this de facto impossible without an outright refusal ofnetwork access. In principle, it is a task of national regulatory and competition authoritiesto address these issues.

(492) Nonetheless the Sector Inquiry confirmed that in a Benelux country a project to build generation capacity was abandoned solely because the compensation demand from the developer to remedy capacity constraints rendered the project unviable. Allegedly, no insight was however provided by the TSO as to the causes of this congestion. Similar allegations have been made against German TSOs as well as one regional networkoperator.

(493) Obstacles can also stem from delays in the grid connection process caused by/attributable to the TSO. Market participants have reported that TSOs require significant documentation before a first application for grid connection for the new power plant can be made. This is time consuming and cost intensive at an early stage of a project. Others have maintained that grid connection can only be applied for once all necessaryadministrative permits have been received. It has also been reported that the assessment of the first application can take many months (up to 18 months), which delays the planning process. Finally it has been maintained that TSOs only agree to the final connection of the new plant to the network after all congestion is removed, even if the generation company has paid the required amounts in this respect. These delaying tactics are of a particular concern in the light of the fact that new power plants are reported insome countries to receive free emissions allocations only if they are up and running by the end of 2012 (end of NAP II).

(494) Often the works related to building new network connections can only be undertaken by the network operator itself, who also chooses the best geographical location of the grid connection. A vertically integrated network operator has no incentive to choose the shortest connection or to make attractive offers for building network extensions and reinforcements that will serve its competitors. Indeed, concrete examples from Ireland


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suggest that costs for network connections by the network operators were significantly,(between 17 and 51%) higher compared to earlier connection offers or offers to execute the building works made by third companies. Repeatedly respondents made calls for rendering the building of network extensions and reinforcements contestable, i.e. providing the applicant for a network connection with a choice to contract constructionwork with a third party. A network operator’s ability to raise costs for its rivals would then be curtailed by the existence of competing bids276.

(495) Whilst the main focus of this chapter was connection to TSO networks it should be stressed that similar issues have been raised with regard to the connection to distributionnetworks. In this respect it needs to be underlined that decentralised generation capacity(linked to distribution networks) which permits a certain degree of auto-productionhaving also a stabilising effect on grids, is expected to increase in the coming years.

II.2.2.3. Access to the TSO networks

(496) Article 20 of the Second Electricity Directive lays down the requirements for non-discriminatory access to networks at regulated tariffs. A refusal to grant access is only possible in case of capacity constraints and must be duly substantiated. Third party accessis thus a statutory obligation, which can only be refused under specific conditions.However it should not be forgotten that TSOs also have other means than straightforward refusals which can amount to obstacles for other network users to use the existing network.

(497) Supply companies and traders complained in particular about problems relating to interconnectors. Issues brought to the attention of the Commission services in the framework of the Sector Inquiry included: (1) the lack of adequate investments into interconnectors; (2) use of allocation procedures that do not bring about maximum use of interconnector capacity; and (3) long-term capacity reservations in favour of incumbentoperators. These issues are reported in more detail below, but the examples demonstratethat vertically integrated network operators, in practice, appear to favour the interests of the affiliated generation/supply interest.

(498) A particular problem is related to the lack of incentives for vertically integrated TSOs to remove bottlenecks in the network (most prominently at cross-border points), if these bottlenecks are assumed to favour the supply branches of the network operator. Following the adoption of the Preliminary Report a number of examples were brought to the attention of the Commission services demonstrating this. Amongst other things it wasmaintained that certain interconnector expansions did not take place or were delayed despite repeated requests from third parties to expand the capacity. The situation only changed after the vertically integrated supply branch itself expressed an interest in interconnector expansion. The expansion which was previously reported to be impossible was then achieved within a few months. It has also been suggested that vertically integrated companies carry out a detailed study on the financial implications of anyexpansion for its affiliate supply business.

276 Experience in the UK has shown that, in order for this to function properly, arrangements have to be made to ensure that TSOs (and DSOs if connections are at medium or low voltages) provides technical information concerning the point of connection (needed to design the network extensions) and design approvals in a non-discriminatory manner. (See for instance, SP Manweb – Decision to accept the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority to accept commitments pursuant to section 31A(2) of the Competition Act 1998 of 27 October 2005.


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(499) Traders/network users also expressed concerns with respect to the provision ofinformation. It was argued that information was only available to vertically integrated companies or was made available to them at an earlier stage, which undermined the levelplaying field and/or increased risks for new entrants. Obviously these concerns could be addressed by stricter unbundling rules. For further details on transparency reference ismade to the chapter B.b.II.4 below.

(500) Concerns were also raised with respect to allegedly excessive access tariffs, which raise competitors’ costs. In this respect it is noteworthy that network tariffs differ significantlybetween Member States, even though they are subject to regulatory oversight. Even if in some instances there might be a valid explanation for the discrepancies, it would appear unlikely that the differences can be fully explained by them. The fact that tariffs have historically been too high has also been confirmed by the decisions of regulators to reduce the tariffs submitted for approval by TSOs. For example, the German regulator reduced the requested tariffs of the German TSOs by up to 18% in summer 2006.

(501) Finally reference is made to the issues set out in the next section dealing with thedistribution networks. The issues raised there apply mutatis mutandis to transmissionnetworks.

(502) It seems fair to conclude from the above that vertical integration of network and supply activities strongly influences the incentive structure for network operators. Despite the obligation not to discriminate between network users there is a risk that investments do not take place if they would favour competitors of the affiliated supply branch. For a concrete example see the ENI case referred to in chapter B.a.II.2. Vertically integrated TSOs also have an incentive to favour their affiliated supply branch when it comes to the provision of information (transparency) or the fixing of network charges.

II.2.2.4. Access to distribution networks

(503) Problems with respect to effective unbundling between network and supply also exist at the distribution level. This is also reflected in the relatively low level of switching rates.

(504) In the framework of the Sector Inquiry, DSOs were asked to provide information on the new connections to their networks during 2004. The Sector Inquiry confirmed that the vast majority of these customers, which happen to be the most likely to accept offers from alternative suppliers due to low "switching costs”, concluded a supply contract with the affiliated supply branch of the network operator.


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Table 22

% of new connections contracting with a supply company affiliated to the DSO

Member State

97,5% - 100% France, Poland, Slovakia, Luxembourg, Greece, Ireland, Estonia

95% - 97,5% Austria, Germany, Spain

90% - 95% Italy

< 90% Netherlands, United Kingdom

Even new customers conclude supply contracts with the supply branch of the DSO

Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006Note: The figures in this table cannot be compared with those published in Commission Communication of progress in creating the internal gas and electricity market, COM (2005) 568 and technical annex (SEC(2005) 1445) as the latter are cumulative and use different customer categories.

(505) Even if the figures in Table 22 should be taken with some caution, it is clear that the “switching rates” are very low. Only in the UK, and to a lesser extent, the Netherlands, did newly connected customers chose suppliers unaffiliated to the DSO to which it wasbeing connected.

(506) Low switching rates can be due to various factors. Indeed, in the chapter on prices below it will be discussed how the co-existence of regulated tariffs with market based prices may eliminate probably the most important incentive to switch supplier: price. The lowrates reported here may well be attributed to this factor. In this respect it is emphasised that in view of these low switching rates, any barrier, even those that do not immediately appear to be significant, may nonetheless have significant effects on entrants’ ability toacquire customers. It is therefore very important that switching procedures work properly and do not impose barriers to customer changing supplier.

(507) In a number of Member States, however, substantial problems have been reported with respect to the exchange of customer data needed for switching. In particular, informationneeded for connection and billing purposes was not provided within the statutory deadlines or not at all, or was simply wrong in a significant number of cases. Such problems have been reported for many countries, including Finland, Spain, Italy, theNetherlands, Belgium, and Germany. Such problems may be inevitable to a certain degree during a transition to liberalised markets, especially in the mass market segments.

(508) Many German respondents reported very heavy administrative procedures, informationexchange protocols and payment conditions, so onerous in certain cases that they appear designed to increase switching costs. Procedures of a voluntary nature existed that were claimed to be inadequate and, in addition, widely disregarded by DSOs. The legislationthat was recently adopted in Germany provides powers to the German energy regulator to impose data exchange procedures and protocols, which should help to improve the situation.

(509) Even if rules exist, however, they may not be sufficient. Most Member States have legislation on, for instance, the maximum duration of switching procedures and the respective responsibilities of parties. For example, such rules exist in Belgium. However, contractual relationships are geared towards the interest of the network monopolies in ways that effectively mean that non-compliance does not have any consequences for the


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DSO and shifts the associated costs and risks to suppliers. As a result, even if statutory rules exist, much metering data in Belgium is still communicated later than the statutory deadlines or is wrong. Many Belgian respondents complain and have substantiated that for a significant number of connection points no metering data is received before the statutory deadline. In reaction to these complaints, the network operators in Flanders have now committed to performance standards.

(510) Respondents have also expressed significant concerns about discriminatory conduct in switching procedures. In Belgium and Germany, but also Finland and Austria, there are allegations about preferential information for affiliated supply companies. Repeatedly, respondents complain that affiliated supply companies approach customers withimproved offers when their intention to switch is reported to the network branch. The lack of Chinese walls between the supply and network branch was also largely criticisedin the public consultation.

(511) Examples have also been provided where distribution companies appear to have deliberately withheld historical consumption data to companies competing with theirsupply affiliates. In the Walloon region of Belgium, many DSOs still have subcontracted operational matters to a subsidiary of the incumbent. The latter manages these operations on the same IT systems that are used by its supply affiliate which therefore currently hasprivileged access to information on customers, even those of its competitors. A similar situation continues to exist in Germany. Information advantages can also be abused in other ways. Late, or even, no announcements of changes on network charges to competing suppliers also unduly increase administrative costs and commercial risks for competitors. Such practices have been reported in Belgium and Germany277.

(512) German, Polish and Czech respondents also report cases where network related charges were increased when a customer switched or where, which amounts to the same thing,customers were not invoiced the entire network charges due as long as the customer was supplied by the supply company affiliated to the DSO.

(513) German and Portuguese respondents mention practises rendering it difficult if not impossible for customers that are new to the network to be supplied by parties other than the supply company affiliated to the DSO. These practices may be particularly harmful as they concern customers that may be more easily acquired by entrants.

(514) Inadequate unbundling also maintains the incentives for vertically integrated companies to raise costs for competitors. Respondents have provided detailed information on a verysubstantial number of German distribution network companies that are said to cross-subsidise supply activities with revenues from (monopoly) network charges. On the basis of the new energy law the German regulator (including the regional regulators) should however now have adequate powers to set appropriate network tariffs which would remedy this situation.

277 The new German energy law should limit these possibilities in future.


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(515) The fact that of the approximately 150 supply companies that entered the German market when customers became eligible in 1999 only a handful have survived until now was attributed by a market participant to the damaging impact of the various practices on the German market reported above.

II.2.2.5. Way forward

(516) It is fair to conclude that unbundling measures required under the current Directives mayrender discriminatory practices in the exploitation of the network monopoly more difficult, but do not eliminate the incentives for vertically integrated companies to favour the affiliated supply branch in network issues (including investment decisions). Indeed, it must be noted that the conduct described above concerns without exception TSOs and DSOs that have remained part of a vertically integrated company. Moreover, it regularly concerns DSOs and TSOs that are already unbundled in accordance with therequirements in the Second Electricity Directive.278

(517) Respondents to the questionnaires therefore often argued that changing DSO’s and TSO’s incentive structures by introducing ownership unbundling would be the preferred solutionto address the issues. A number of respondents from, for instance, Belgium (where vertically integrated and ownership unbundled DSOs coexist) confirmed that the DSOs that are ownership unbundled perform significantly better in facilitating competition279

than those that are still part of a vertically integrated company.

(518) Similarly some network companies have expressed the view that ownership unbundling contributed to clarifying their role and purpose as grid operators towards market players. Through ownership unbundling, independent network operators would indeed have greater incentives to maximise the use of their infrastructure and to invest into further expansions. They would have less incentive to favour certain network users over others.Only incumbent operators contest this view, whilst a number of regulators support the call for full ownership unbundling.

278 Two of the three TSOs referred to are unbundled in accordance with the Second Electricity Directive. Six out of the ten Member States from which allegedly unfair conduct by DSOs was reported have already completely transposed the unbundling requirements for DSOs.

279 Belgium’s transposition of the Second Electricity Directive has not postponed the implementation of legal unbundling for DSOs until 2007. Similarly Belgium did not make use of the 100.000 connections threshold to exempt smaller DSOs from the unbundling requirements. For more details see: Newbury (2005) Electricity Liberalisation in Britain: The quest for a satisfactory wholesale market design. The Energy European Special Issue, IAEE, 2005.


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Conclusions

Vertical integration of generation and retail reduces the incentives to trade on wholesalemarkets. This might lead to a drying up of wholesale markets. Illiquid wholesale marketsare a barrier to entry as they are characterised by higher price volatility. Volatilewholesale markets might oblige new entrants to enter as a vertically integrated generator and supplier, which is more difficult.

The degree of vertical integration between generation and retail differs significantlybetween Member States. In most Member States there are few companies with longpositions leading to high “levels of concentration”. VPPs (auction of electricity) assist in some Member States (e.g. France) to improve the level of concentration. Long-termpower purchase agreements (PPAs) have similar effects to vertical integration.

Vertical integration of supply and network (transmission and distribution alike) reduces the economic incentives for the network operator to facilitate third parties access and to expand the network in the interest of all network users. In the views of many respondents the existing rules on legal unbundling do not ensure that vertically integrated companies do not engage in practices favouring their supply affiliates to the detriment of their competitors.

With respect to transmission networks, a number of respondents raised concerns asregards obstacles to connect new power plants to the network. No means exists to verify whether claims of congestion or costs for network reinforcements are valid. With respect to the distribution networks, respondents reported amongst other things inappropriate switching procedures, a lack of Chinese walls between network and supply branches and discriminatory access tariffs.


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II.3. Market integration

II.3.1. Introduction

(519) Interconnectors are essential for market integration. Through interconnectors generators and suppliers on both sides of the border are exposed to an additional source of competition. Imports should drive prices down to the level of the minimum required cost to serve the required electricity in all EU Member States. However, as illustrated in Figure 59, prices differed substantially during 2005 between geographical regions. The figures for 2006 also reflect significant divergence.

Figure 59

More than 51 Euro 41 – 50 Euro 31 – 40 Euro Under 30 Euro NA

Day ahead price levels 2005

Overview of price differences in EU member state countries, 01 January - 15 November 2005

More than 51 Euro 41 – 50 Euro 31 – 40 Euro Under 30 Euro NA

Day ahead price levels 2005

Overview of price differences in EU member state countries, 01 January - 15 November 2005

Source: Platts280, Power exchanges.

(520) Imports should also play a role in eroding the market shares of major generationcompanies in wholesale electricity markets. However, in most Member States the incumbent’s market shares have remained high. The need for imports is even more important knowing that market entry by new players who started supply or generationactivities in countries in which they were previously not present has, as yet, hardly beenobserved in EU Member States.

280 Data from Platts a division of The McGraw-Hill Companies 2006- all rights reserved.


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(521) The Sector Inquiry leads to the preliminary findings that the lack of electricity marketintegration281 mainly results from:

- insufficient interconnecting infrastructure between national electricity systems,- insufficient incentives to improve cross border infrastructure,- inefficient allocation of existing capacities, and- incompatible market design (e.g. differences between balancing regimes,

nomination procedures, differences in opening hours of power exchanges) between TSOs and/or spot market operators.

II.3.2. Institutional setting

(522) Before liberalisation, integrated companies, who where responsible for supply ofcustomers and their electricity grids, decided to connect their grids through cross borderlinks (interconnectors) in order to be able to assist one another in case of temporary shortages caused by unexpected high demand or generation outages. For continental Europe the UCTE-synchronous282 area includes 22 countries (also non-Member States).Another synchronous zone is the NORDEL area in Scandinavia. Additional DC-links(direct current-links) connect (other) grids further.

(523) Today the role of interconnectors has changed significantly. Under third party accessrules, participants must now be able to access interconnector capacity in order to deliverpower in neighbouring countries, trade on wholesale markets in other Member States andhence potentially benefit from price differentials between regions. In order to facilitate the use of cross border capacity by participants several procedures have been introduced. This topic will be examined later.

(524) It is important to remember that the overall flow load pattern in the EU integrated synchronized network is not determined by the contractual arrangements but results from production and consumption locations, and network topology. The combined decisionsmade by generators, traders, suppliers and consumers result in electricity transports fromone region to another. TSO manage these flows through a set of administrative rules, most importantly requesting players in the market to report in advance their expected production and load schedules, as well as the extent to which they intend to use interconnectors. This enables the TSOs to manage commercial transactions and physical flows in a secure manner in the high voltage grids.

(525) The TSOs’ main task is to provide a secure and stable grid facilitating the integrated electricity market. This includes activities to balance the equilibrium between supply and demand in their so-called control area and between control areas of other TSOs. Ensuringthat the TSOs perform their work at minimum cost is commonly the task of regulators who are part of the institutional setting in the EU. Clearly, any change in the (administrative) rules may alter the extent to which cross border trade in the EU is possible.

281 At this stage cross border market power issues have not yet been assessed.282 Synchronous meaning that all members of UCTE work on the same 50 Hz frequency.


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II.3.3. Insufficient interconnecting infrastructure

(526) Since the liberalisation of the electricity markets the need for interconnector capacity has increased substantially. This is of particular importance for players who have enteredother markets and become active in cross border trade. Their arbitrage activitiesconstitute buying (in low price regions) and selling (in high price regions) of electricity indifferent markets. This process will shift the generation pattern in the grid toward lowercost production facilities.

(527) Demand for interconnector capacity at many borders has increased and often exceeds the available transmission capacity. This level congestion is illustrated in the subsequent Figure 60 per border. The bars, for each border, show the number of hours (sorted in ascending order) reported by TSOs when capacity requested exceeded the available capacity as a percentage of all hours in the period January – May 2005. Note that thissituation can be independent from the physical flows in the grid.

(528) Figure 60 reveals that almost all borders are congested to some degree, except a small number of borders such as e.g. IT to FR, BE to FR and DE to AT. Congestion depends of course on the direction since there is a clear incentive for traders to deliver electricityfrom low to high price regions. Some borders were congested in all hours during the first five months of 2005. Examples are the interconnectors from SK to HU, DE to DK, NL to BE and FR to CH.

Figure 60Estimated hours of congestion as a percentage of all hours, Jan - May 2005

0

25

50

75

100

SK

- H

U

FR

- C

H

DE

- D

K

NL

- B

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UK

- F

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PL

- S

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ES

- P

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PL

- C

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CZ

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SK

- C

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- I

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Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006.Note: Most TSOs reported congestion per interconnector, but some TSOs reported congestion aggregatedover several interconnectors between adjacent markets. In some cases the reported data deviate per border between TSOs. This means that the involved TSOs do not have a common clear statement whether the requested capacity exceeded the available capacities or not. This suggests that the approach to capacity allocation is not sufficiently coordinated and needs improvement. (1) Refers to an average of more than one interconnector between two adjacent borders.

(529) Congestion has increased on most borders. Table 23 compares the percentage of congested hours in the first five months in 2004 with 2005. Congestion increased on almost 60 percent of the listed borders. The cause of increasing congestion has to be further studied.


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(530) It is likely that persistent price differences between Member States markets are amongstthe main causes for congestions. Changes in wind speed can also cause unforeseen flowsthat might reduce the capacity available and increase congestion.

Table 23

2004 2005

Jan-May Jan-May

SK --> HU 100,0 100,0FR --> CH 100,0 100,0DE --> DK 99,3 100,0NL --> BE 96,4 100,0FR --> UK 94,6 95,6DE --> NL (1) 87,9 90,1FR --> ES 34,6 81,1CZ --> DE 69,2 68,0NL --> DE (1) 62,9 63,9BE --> NL 63,3 63,1DE --> FR (1) 0,0 41,3CZ --> AT 0,0 37,0DE --> CZ (1) 30,0 35,7UK --> FR 31,5 35,0FR --> DE 48,4 33,3ES --> FR (1) 30,0 32,8PL --> SK 0,0 19,1ES --> PR 7,8 17,5PL --> CZ 15,8 16,1PR --> ES 26,7 11,7FR --> BE 30,4 11,0CZ --> PL 0,2 10,1SK --> CZ 1,4 6,6CZ --> SK 2,1 1,1DE --> CH (1) 0,0 1,0FR --> IT 0,7 0,8AT --> CZ 0,0 0,3CH --> FR 0,0 0,0IT --> FR 0,0 0,0BE --> FR 0,0 0,0DE --> AT 0,0 0,0

Hours with congestion as a percentage of all hours(selection of borders)

Border

Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006.Note: Hours when requested capacity exceeded available cross border capacity as a percentage of all hours. The arrows indicate the direction per border, in some casesreported by different TSOs.(1) Refers to an average of more than one interconnector between two adjacent borders.


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(531) At some borders the increase of congestion has been dramatic. For instance, from theGermany to France congestion has increased from almost 0% in January 2004 to 100% in the month May 2005. Figure 61 shows this development of congestion per month between January 2003 and May 2005. Further investigation is required to explain the differences in the level of congestion between the period before and after January 2005.

Figure 61

Congestion from Germany to France, as a percentage of all hours, Jan 2004 - May 2005,including data from two German TSOs

0

25

50

75

100

Jan 04 Feb 04 Mar 04 Apr 04 May 04 June 04 July 04 Aug 04 Sept 04 Oct 04 Nov 04 Dec 04 Jan 05 Feb 05 Mar 05 Apr 05 May 05


(532) The consequence of the substantial and increasing congestion on interconnectors between Member States is that many electricity markets are separated from each other. As a result imports are limited and their ability to counter market concentration in national markets and exert competitive pressure on (dominant) generators is reduced and consumers pay more for their electricity than strictly necessary.

(533) The questions that arise from the above are:

- Is existing interconnector capacity used efficiently?- Are incentives to invest in new interconnector capacity set properly and what

are other obstacles to increasing interconnection capacities?- How can the problem of lengthy and bureaucratic authorisation procedures be

solved?

II.3.4. Level of interconnector capacity

(534) Investing in the expansion of interconnector capacity is one way to lower congestion on the borders between Member States. At present the level of interconnectors as a percentage of installed capacity is listed in Table 24.


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(535) The Barcelona Council 2002 set a broad target for (import) interconnector capacity of atleast 10% of production capacity per Member State by 2005. Using the Sector Inquirydata the current percentages for some MS have been calculated. The results (average 2004 NTC value as a percentage of installed generation capacity) are shown in Table 24.It confirms earlier reporting by the Commission that several countries, such as Italy283,Portugal, Spain, Ireland and UK, do not meet the 10% threshold. However, meeting the “Barcelona target” does not necessarily result in resolving congestion and concentrationin generation. For instance, the Dutch interconnector remains congested though the import capacity is 17%. Neither does this target resolve concentration in generation. For instance, Denmark, which has a relatively high level of interconnection, still has in somecircumstances high levels of concentration in generation and scope for the exercise ofmarket power as shown in the chapter Concentration and Market Power.

Table 24

Country %

UK 2

Italy 6

Spain 6

Ireland (1) 6

Portugal 9

Poland (1) 10

Greece (1) 12

Finland (1) 14

France (2) 14

Germany (3) 16

Netherlands (1) 17

Czech Republic (1) 23

Austria (1) 24

Belgium 25Sweden (1) 29Hungary (1) 38Slovakia (1) 39Denmark (1) 50Estonia (1) 66

Slovania (1) 68Luxembourg (1) 90

Average hourly total import capacity NTCrelative to installed generation capacity

for a selection of countries, 2004

Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006, UCTE and ETSO.Note :(1) NTC values from ETSO used for calculation

(2) For Italian-French NTC value is estimated(3) For Polish-German NTC and Czech-German NTC is estimated.

(536) Availability interconnector capacity is related to the performance of TSOs who are responsible for system integrity in their control area and hence calculating the NTC (Net Transport Capacity) for import and export. Figure 62 illustrates that the values have

283 Import capacity from Switzerland is excluded.


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remained almost unchanged over the last 30 months. The movements of the curve relate to expected capacity in summer and winter periods. NTC values may also change on a short term basis as a result of production factors such as changes in wind speed, outages and (unforeseen) maintenance of power plants or internal grid outages. In additionconsumption factors, such as changes in demand, may affect the level of NTC values.

Figure 62

Indexed quarterly aggregation of hourly NTC values for a selection of 38 interconnectors (2003Q1=100)

75

100

125

2003Q1 2003Q2 2003Q3 2003Q4 2004Q1 2004Q2 2004Q3 2004Q4


(537) NTC-levels may be affected by the way TSOs manage grid congestion in their control area. At this stage no assessment has been made of TSO’s behaviour regarding the different treatment of congestion on internal lines and interconnectors. Table 25 shows at first glance that such an assessment may be relevant since a low level of congestion on internal lines may be indicate that the problem is being pushed to the border. It is unclear at this stage if TSO’s relieve congestion on their internal lines at the expense of lowercross border capacity and, if so, whether it is done for sound cost efficient reasons.


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Table 25

CountryNumber of lines congested for more than 10% of the hours in one calendar year during 2003 -

May 2005Austria noneAustria (1) 4Denmark noneDenmark n.aFrance noneGermany noneGermany noneGermany noneGermany noneItaly (2) 5Netherlands noneSpain noneUnited Kingdom none

Congestion of lines other than interconnectors, selection of TSOs

Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006.Note: Some countries appear more than once because they have several control areas.

(1) 2003. (2) April 2004 – March 2005.

(538) During relative cold months, ignoring other factors, NTC values may increase comparedto relatively warm periods due to the physical characteristics of electricity wires. Several TSOs explain this in their answers to the questionnaires. Figure 63 demonstrates that the performance of TSOs to maximise the amount of cross border capacity delivered to the market differ substantially between TSOs. For instance the difference in the NTC value for the Spanish – French border between winter and summer month exceeds 55 percent. This is positive for the market as during relatively cold periods more capacity is available for cross border trade. However, at some borders (marked area in Figure 63) the NTC values seem to be insensitive to temperature changes and remain at the same levelthroughout the year.


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Figure 63NTC values in summer and winter per interconnector

DE - AT

DE - AT

FR - DEDE - NL

CZ - DE

AT - HU

CZ - AT

SL - AT

HU - SK

DE - DK

DE - NL

NL - DECZ - SL

CZ - AT

DK - DE

HU - AT

CZ - DE

SL - HU

CZ - DE

PL - SLCZ - PL

AT - DE

NL - DE

CZ - PL

FR - ES

FR - IT

BE - NLAT - IT

IT - AT

FR - BE

SL - IT

NL - BE

FR - DE

DE - FR

DE - FRNL - DE

ES - FR

-40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60

Sele

cti

on

of

inte

rco

nn

ecto

rs

Average NTC value for hours in December, January and February minus the average NTC value for hours June, July and Augustas a percentage of the average observed NTC value during these months (including 2003 and 2004)

Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006.Note: Differences between the average Net Transport (NTC) in relative cold and warm months relative to the average NTC value in % - 2003 and 2004. In some cases borders appear two or three times in Figure63 which is due to the fact that each TSO reports on export and import NTC values per interconnector.

(539) The results for some interconnectors in the marked area of Figure 62 are difficult to explain. They seem to suggest that there was very little difference in the level of NTC values between summer and winter. The results of negative bars (below the marked area in the figure) are also difficult to explain since they show that during winter periods the NTC values are lower than in summer periods. However, it is important to note that there are also other factors than outside temperature that affect NTC levels. For instance, maintenance on the network occurs often off winter periods. Additionally as is explained above, local generation and consumption events play an important role determining NTClevels. These may have a stronger effect than the temperature. However, the figuresillustrate that the differences between the performances of the TSOs are substantial.Clearly, on borders where high price differences persist the need to optimise the level ofavailable interconnector frequently is more important than elsewhere.

II.3.5. Incentives for TSOs to build more capacity

(540) A precondition for building additional interconnector capacity is that incentives to expand the net are properly set by regulators both for “regulated” and “merchant lines”(unregulated lines) which may arise from estimated future revenues primarily reflecting the absolute price differences between adjacent geographical wholesale markets.

(541) TSOs, who in the past had a monopoly on building additional interconnectors, are likelyto be the main developer of new or additional interconnection, especially for regulated lines, and hence it is important that TSOs have correct incentives. For example, Article 6 (6) of the Regulation 1228/2003 states that revenues resulting from the allocation ofcongested interconnector capacity shall be used for: (a) guaranteeing the actual availability of the allocated capacity; (b) network investments maintaining or increasing interconnector capacities, or; (c) as an income to be taken into account by the regulatory


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authorities when approving the methodology for calculating network tariffs, and/or in assessing whether tariffs should be modified. Table 26 shows that many TSOs obtain congestion revenues284 and that these revenues are not fully invested on projects to increase interconnector capacity.

Table 26

TSO

Congestion Revenues(2001 - 06/2005)

Interconnection Investments(2001 - 06/2005)

A 200-300 25-35

B 0-20 0-10

C 80-150 0-10

D 200-300 0-10

E 200-300 50-100

F 80-150 0-10

G 20-80 0-10

H 80-150 80-150

J 0-20 10-40

K 0-20 10-40Total 1000-1300 200-300

Congestion revenues and total investments in interconnectors during 2001 - 2005 in mln-euro

Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006.Note: Excluding spending on congestion relief.

(542) The table shows that only about one quarter of the congestion revenues is used to build new interconnections or to reinforce existing grid elements. This result from the Sector Inquiry demonstrates that incentives need improvement.

(543) According to answers from TSOs these revenues are mainly used to reduce national grid tariffs. Since the existing interconnections were financed in the past by tariffs paid by the local consumers it could be justified to allocate the welfare resulting from auctions to these consumers. On the other hand consumers in the importing Member States wouldalso profit from increased generation efficiency gained from additional cross border trade and enhancement of the markets. That being said, it should be clear that based on current (cross border electricity) regulation TSOs are allowed to spend congestion revenues on lowering transmission tariffs for electricity in their control area.

(544) In the Sector Inquiry some TSOs also provided information on recent studies on new interconnection lines. Most of these studies conclude that building a new line is a difficultand lengthy procedure and in some cases the impact on the available interconnector capacity would be low compared to the efforts required. The replies to the Sector Inquiryalso confirmed that planning procedures for building new interconnectors are complicated, not least due to local resistance as regards visual impact and fears ofelectro-magnetic fields. This is partly due to the fact that in many cases increasing the level of cross border capacity also requires substantial internal grid reinforcements.

284 Congestion revenues refer to the additional revenues (e.g. auction proceeds) the TSOs receive due to congestion for the interconnectors.


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Congestion revenues of German TSOs in 2001 to 2005 and use of the revenues

In the period 2001 to 2005 three German TSOs managing interconnectors generated congestion revenues of [400-500] million Euro. Of these revenues only [20-30] millionEuro were used to reinforce/build new interconnectors (one TSO said that it does not know how much of the investment into the net had the effect of reinforcing interconnectors). All TSOs maintained that the remaining revenues were used to reduce the transmission tariffs. One TSO declared that the extension of a 380 KV line with a length of 50 km and a capacity of 1400 MVA costs [1-10] million Euros. The building ofnew lines or subsea cables is significantly more expensive.

II.3.5.1. Utilisation of existing interconnector capacity

(545) The congestion mechanisms to allocate existing interconnector capacity play an important role in market integration. The word (congestion) mechanism refers to a set of actions and measures that are applied to handle network access in the presence of congestion. Table 27 lists from the questionnaires the most commonly used mechanisms and divides them into market based and non-market based methods. Table 27 alsoexplains briefly the different mechanisms.

Table 27Overview of the most common interconnector allocation mechanism

Not market based,discriminatory and often

not transparent methods

First-come-first-served (Priority list)Capacity is allocated according to the order in which the transmission requests have been received by the TSO. Starting from the earliest request, all requested amounts of capacity are fully granted until the available capacity is used up.Pro-rata rationingAll requests are partially accepted so that each applicant is granted a fixed share of his requested capacity amount, the share being equal to the amount of available capacity divided by the sum of all requested capacity amounts.Retention A proportion of the available capacity is granted in long-term contracts (also) based on grand father rights

Market based and non-discriminatory methods

Explicit auctionAlong with the requested capacity amount, the applicants have to declare how much they are willing to pay for this capacity. Thesebids are ordered by price and allocated starting from the highest one until the available capacity is used up. Usually the price for the capacity is set to the bid price of the lowest allocated bid.Alternatively, each successful bidder pays the amount bid.Implicit auctionTransmission capacity is managed implicitly by two or more neighbouring spot markets: network users submit purchase or sale bids for energy in the power exchange in the geographical zone where they wish to generate or consume, and the market clearing procedure determines the most efficient amount and direction of physical power exchange between the market zones. Hence, separate allocation of transmission capacity is not required, cross border capacity and energy are traded together.



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II.3.5.2. Non market based mechanisms

(546) Mechanisms that allocate interconnection capacity which are not market based, discriminatory and not (always) transparent result in inefficient use of interconnector capacity. This is due to the fact that in contrast to auctions, first-come-first-served, pro-rata rationing and retention do not necessarily allocate capacity to participants that value interconnection capacity the highest. Partly it could be allocated to some who do not value it at all. For example, responses from some large energy consumers indicate that they would be interested in booking capacity on interconnectors. However, most customers consider that transaction costs are too high for them to become directlyinvolved in cross-border trade.

(547) Quite a number of questionnaire responses criticize the existence of non-market based mechanism not only because they are not market based and discriminatory, but alsobecause they are often not transparent resulting in unclear allocation and sometimesfavouring incumbents. In addition these methods are anyway incompatible withRegulation 1228/2003, but still seem to be practised for certain interconnectors as is shown in Table 28. This table lists the different allocation mechanisms per interconnector through which existing interconnector capacity is commonly allocated to the market –excluding long-term contracts.


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Table 28

Allocation m echanism Border

Explicit auction Denmark - Germany

United Kingdom - France

G erm any - Netherlands

G erm any - France

Poland - Germ any

Poland - Czech RepublicCzech Republic - Austria

Czech Republic - G erm any

Austria - Hungary

Austria - Slovenia (1)

France - Italy (2)

Belgium - Netherlands

France - BelgiumIm plicit auction Sweden - Finland

Denmark - SwedenFrance - Spain (3)

First com e - first serve France - Switzerland (4)

Overview of allocation mechanismof the main EU interconnectors - selection

Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006.Notes:(1) On this border Slovenia has been exempted from Regulation 1228/2003 (requiring that cross

border capacity is to be allocated using a market based method) until 2007. The explicit auction here is just conducted for the Austrian half of the interconnection capacity.(2) For the French - Italian border there does not exist a joint capacity allocation. The explicit auction is just conducted for the French half of the interconnection capacity.(3) Per January 2006 the allocation mechanism has been changed from “first come first serve” to an explicit auction principle. It will be coordinated with the Spanish TSO before the end of the first semester of 2006 according to RTE.(4) This relates to a border between the EU and a third country. It is planned to implement an explicit auction by the end of 2006.

(548) In addition, Table 29 illustrates that a significant proportion of existing interconnector capacity is still allocated on the basis of priority rights or “pre-liberalisation” contracts. These capacity reservations often relate to some of the most congested interconnectors.

Table 29

Border France-Spain

Spain -France

France -Italy

Czech Rep. -Austria

Austria -Italy

Czech Rep. -Germany

Poland -Slovakia

Slovakia - Hungary

Current NTC value (1) [1-1000] [1-700] [1-2300] [1-600] [1-190] [1-950] [1-800] [1-1000]

Long term contracts as % NTC 60-70% 70-80% 60-70% 60-70% 50-60% 20-30% 40-50% 30-40%

Long term reservations on a selection of interconnectors, 2005

Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006.Note: (1) The NTC values used for percentage calculation represent 2004 data, since for 2005 they were not available for the entire year

(549) From a legal point of view these ongoing grandfathered capacity rights are problematic.The ECJ stated in a recent case (C-17/03, Vereniging voor Energie, Milieu en Water, judgment of 7 June 2005) that a preferential treatment for pre-liberalisation capacityreservations is incompatible with the Electricity Directive 96/92/EC if the Member State


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concerned failed to request an exemption pursuant to Article 24 of that Directive. Pre-liberalisation contracts may also be assessed under Articles 81 and 82 EC.

(550) It cannot be excluded that long-term contracts could result in efficient allocation as secondary trade could in theory employ efficient redistribution means. However theholder of the contract would still profit from the money paid in the secondary market and, more importantly, the conditions to obtain these long-term contracts in the past were largely unequal. Also it is often not transparent who “owns” the capacity and how long the underlying contracts last. This raises search cost (transaction costs) for any player interested in buying this interconnector capacity, since “secondary capacity markets” remain immature. This raises barriers to entry and may harm liquidity in severalwholesale markets. Hence, both the Court and the Commission has concluded that long-term contracts should, with certain exceptions, be disqualified as a method for allocatingscarce interconnector capacity. In April 2006 the Commission launched a number of infringement cases against Member States which were still allocating capacity on the basis of long-term reservations. Recent reports indicate that efforts to dismantle thesecontracts are in progress. For example, the Netherlands have directly reacted to the ECJ decision and the French Regulatory Authority decided not to grant priority rights any more for long-term contracts on the interconnection with other EU Member States. Asimilar decision has now been taken in Germany.

II.3.5.3. Market based methods

(551) On many congested interconnectors TSOs make use of explicit auctions for allocations.Examples of interconnectors that are explicitly auctioned are listed in Table 28 andinclude e.g. NL – DE and FR – UK. This mechanism is considered not to be satisfactoryby a number of respondents in the Sector Inquiry, because it suffers from the time lag between capacity allocation and wholesale market clearance.

(552) Figure 64 focuses on these comments. It shows for each hour in 2004 the spot pricedifferences between the Netherlands and Germany, e.g. APX price minus the EEX price(horizontal axis) and correlates the sum of nominations from Germany toward the Netherlands (vertical axis). Each dot in the figure represents a unique hour with a price difference and the result of the nomination. It reveals that in many hours (40 percent of all observed hours) during 2004 capacity was nominated from Germany to the Netherlands while prices in Germany where higher than in the Netherlands. This result is intuitively not rational since the wholesale electricity price in the Netherlands is typically higher than in the German wholesale market. Such an arbitrage ‘mistake’ is shown in the upper left area (diagonally marked) in Figure 64. All markers in this area constitute an irrational (non-economic) outcome. The area in the bottom-right (also marked) alsorepresents irrational outcome.


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Figure 64

Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006, ECB Exchange rate Pound vs Euro.

(553) One of the explanations for these economically inefficient outcomes is that the deadline for the day-ahead interconnector auction ends before the German (EEX) and Dutch (APX) energy market clears. A similar coordination issue occurs on the interconnector between France and the UK (England and Wales), where the deadline for interconnector nominations occurs after the French (Powernext) energy market clears, while the UKPX (the leading UK power exchange) is open and prior to gate closure in respect of the UK balancing mechanism. The consequence is that explicit auctions do not lead to an optimal use of scarce interconnector capacity especially if allocation sessions are not co-ordinatedwith the deadlines for trading.


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(554) From the responses from the questionnaires market participants confirm that they face uncertainty due to the fact that they have to place auction bids based on expected wholesale market prices. As intraday and balancing markets (after the day-ahead stage)are often illiquid, players cannot if the outcome is different to that expected easily resell acquired electricity in the market A where they initially had bought the electricity, andbuy in the market B where they would have liked to use the acquired electricity. This would be desirable if, for example, they had anticipated a positive price difference in an hour between two markets, but after market closure it turned out that the price difference was negative.

(555) In addition, although it might appear to be unreasonable for transactions to be nominatedin two directions if the price spread between the two energy markets was small,participants might even prefer to transfer electricity from the high to the low prices markets in order to avoid exposure to balancing prices. This is particularly relevant where interconnectors connect relatively illiquid markets.

(556) Due to the arbitrage errors systematically made by the market participants, incorrectsignals prevail regarding the value of interconnector capacity. This also leads to incorrectincentives to attract new investments into interconnector capacity.

(557) Table 30 shows that the financial loss resulting form underutilisation plus incorrect utilisation (wrong sign nominations) of interconnector capacity is significant per border. For instance, in 2004 capacity worth almost 50 million Euro was not utilised in the Dutch - German border which is 46 percent of the total value (107 million Euro) of this interconnector capacity. Due to the relatively high Dutch spot price volatility in 2003 the result in 2003 was more than 20 million euro higher. A similar calculation is done for the French-UK border. The results are presented in Table 30.

Table 30

Borders 2004 2003

NL to DE49,4 70,8

UK to FR64,4 (1) …

FR to ES41,8 140,3

Estimated value of unused cross border capacity (selection) in mln. euro

Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006.Note: The estimated amounts are calculated as follows. For each hour the estimated day ahead available

import capacity is reduced with nominations. This is the estimated unused capacity. Summed with wrong sign nominations they are multiplied with the absolute hourly spot market price difference.NTC values day ahead used in this figure represent an ex-ante estimation of the seasonal transmission capacities of the joint interconnections on a border between neighbouring countries, assessed through security analyses based on the best estimation by TSOs of system and network conditions for the referred period.(1) Includes July 2004 – May 2005. Also this result does not include cost of the losses of the DC transfer nor cost for balancing.


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(558) Furthermore, there remain a few borders where the allocation of interconnector capacityis not carried out according to a harmonised and economic-based mechanism. The French – Spanish border is an example and Table 30 shows that financial loss is also significanton this border.

(559) The result of the above analyses illustrates that, although explicit auctioning is theoretically and with perfect foresight an efficient mechanism and it is in practice compatible with Regulation 1228/2003, it has efficiency deficits compared to implicitauctioning especially where intraday and balancing markets are illiquid. With implicitauctions results of trade are less likely to have economically irrational use of the interconnector capacity as is the case for explicit auctions as demonstrated in Figure64.285

(560) An additional advantage of implicit auctions is that netting, which has not been discussed in this chapter, will become more feasible. For instance, on the Dutch – German border import and export capacity is auctioned separately. Hence, introducing implicit auctionsmay increase the available capacity significantly.

II.3.6. The need for harmonization

(561) One of the key complaints from the respondents in the Sector Inquiry is that partiesinvolved in arbitrage between borders face important differences between the administrative rules underlying the electricity markets. For instance the imbalance settlement period (for TSOs to balance the market) limits the possibility to alterschedules. These differences in settlement periods result into increased risks and are therefore barriers to trade. The different time periods for which imbalances are settled are shown in Table 31.

285 In this context is should be mentioned that new important congestion management guidelines are currently being discussed(see http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy/electricity/legislation/doc/congestion_management/cm_guidelines_en_v1.pdf)


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Table 31

Country, responsible TSO(s) Time unit

Netherlands (TenneT)Italy (GRTN)

Austria (APG, TIRAG, VKW-UNG) 15 minutesGermany (EnBW TNG, E.On Netz, RWE TS, Vattenfall ET)

Belgium (Elia)

Luxembourg (Cegedel)

France (RTE) 30 minutesEngland & Wales (NGT)

Poland (PSE-Operator)

Sweden (SK) 60 minutes

Norway (Statnett)Denmark (Energinet.dk)

Slovenia (ELES)Spain (REE)

Greece (HTSO/DESMIE)

Different time windows in which imbalances are settled by control area - 2004

Source: ETSO (2004), DG Comp.

(562) The rules for nominating transactions and the rules relating to changes (if needed) ofnominations before gate closure also differ between countries. Because of thesedifferences, nominations for cross border transactions - if possible - require separate administrative procedures per border. Conditions for nominations also differ between countries. These differences increase the complexity for market players to trade across borders and may reduce the scope for competition.

Conclusion

Imports do not yet adequately play their role to counter market concentration in nationalmarkets and exert competitive pressure on incumbent operators. Hence consumers may pay more for their electricity than strictly necessary. Important reasons for inadequate market integration include:

- Insufficient levels of cross border capacity,- Inefficient congestion management methods (including explicit auctions),- Important differences in rules that manage the electricity markets administratively

within and between control areas,- Long-term cross border capacity reservations, partially given under discriminatory

conditions, and- Lack of adequate incentives to invest in additional capacity.


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II.4. Transparency

(563) Efficient wholesale electricity markets can bring significant benefits to the electricitysector, in terms of greater operational efficiency, improved signals for investment, greater security of supply, better allocation of risks and increased scope for competition.

II.4.1. Transparency is needed for electricity markets to develop

(564) For efficient wholesale markets to develop it is essential that all market participants have access to the information considered necessary to trade, in particular as regards expected demand, supply and network issues. The Sector Inquiry confirms, however, that there isa lack of transparency in most Member States. There is a general perception thatgeneration data of vertically integrated incumbents is first shared with affiliates and not necessarily at all with other market participants, which undermines confidence in the wholesale markets. The inquiry also revealed examples where operators seem to have withheld information regarding generation outages until after markets have closed, which may have allowed them or their affiliates to trade on electricity markets on an unfair basis.

(565) More transparency is needed essentially for three reasons. First the publication of moreinformation would allow all players to take informed action on the markets, which minimises their commercial risks and reduces entry barriers. Secondly it ensures a levelplaying field by avoiding a situation where certain parties have access to commercially sensitive information (e.g. from generation affiliates), but others do not. If the transparency obligations are not sufficiently strong, some market participants will be able to profit unfairly at the expense of other market participants. Thirdly, lack oftransparency undermines the trust in the wholesale markets and with it its price signals as a reliable benchmark.

(566) The need for transparency to promote the development of the wholesale markets is notonly the view of the European Commission but has been widely recognised, both in answers to the questionnaires and outside the context of the Sector Inquiry. For example, the Florence Forum286 concluded at its September 2005 meeting that “participants also highlighted the need for increased transparency, in view of creating a functioning and fair market”. Specific action to improve transparency was agreed following the meeting in September 2006 and there is a growing consensus on this subject.

(567) European Energy Regulators (CEER) emphasise that the transparency of informationabout the physical situation of the European electric system is one of a number of conditions that must be met to facilitate the development of a single energy market, as specified by the directive of 26 June 2003. Although some initial progress has been recorded in many Member States, the degree of transparency of information about thephysical situation of the European electric system remains weak.

(568) Eurelectric state287 that “the development [of wholesale electricity markets] must be underpinned by solid involvement by all market participants and by a common body of available information. (…) It is essential that market places fulfil at least the following

286 Conclusions of the Florence Forum of 1-2 September 2005, section 2(d), page 4.287 Eurelectric report of June 2005 “Integrating Electricity Markets through Wholesale Markets: Eurelectric Road Map

to a Pan-European Market”.


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criteria: (…) provide transparent access to common sets of market information.” In the same report it went on to say “another prerequisite for the development of liquid wholesale markets is the trust of the market participants in the market. Therefore, market transparency and information exchange in the wholesale markets must be harmonised to ensure that all market participants have the same information at their disposal”.

(569) The European Transmission System Operators (ETSO) published a paper on transparency288 which focuses on the provision of information to TSOs to allow them to manage the network as efficiently as possible. However, in the paper it also states that “ETSO believes that data from generators and market participants is of particular importance to achieving improvements in transparency and facilitating fair and efficient markets”. It should be noted in this context that the full implementation of the congestionmanagement guidelines that are currently being adopted should increase transparency as regards cross-border congestion.

(570) The European Federation of Energy Traders (EFET) state289 “an efficient wholesalemarket for power is crucial to meeting the aims of liberalisation and offers the prospect of considerable benefits to consumers. The development of an efficient wholesale market, however, is currently being hindered by the lack of information being released to the market”.

(571) Barclays Capital, an important electricity trader, stated in its reply to the Sector Inquiryquestionnaires “information release is the key non-structural measure that could be implemented to improve competition in EU electricity markets. Greater informationrelease would allow participants to understand the underlying supply and demand events that drive prices which in turn facilitates better price forecasts, increased liquidity and hence an increased ability for a wider range of participants to compete to supply customers. Greater information release will also result in better price signals for maintenance, closure and investment decisions which in turn enhances system reliabilityand security of supply”. It further went on to say that “the cost to EU energy consumers of poor information transparency alone is therefore likely to run into tens of billions ofEuros”. This figure seems very high at first glance, but it represents just over 5 percent ofthe total turnover in the electricity sector in the EU of approximately €180 billion in 2004 (and with significant increases since).

II.4.2. The risk of collusion does not outweigh the advantages of more transparency

(572) It has been noted that there is a risk that excessive transparency, particularly in an oligopolistic market as many electricity markets are, could facilitate collusion between the major suppliers. However, given the current state of the electricity markets and the low level of transparency in many markets, this does not in practice appear to be a likelyat this stage. Indeed, the principal problem at the moment is that the lack of transparencyin most markets undermines the development of the wholesale markets. In any case, the risk of facilitating collusion could be reduced by only publishing figures on an aggregated rather than individual basis (at least in advance of trading). Therefore, in the current state of the electricity markets and as long as, where necessary, information is

288 ETSO paper “List of data European TSOs need to pursue optimal use of the existing transmission infrastructure” of December 2005.

289 EFET Position Paper: “Transparency and Availability of Information in Continental European Wholesale Electricity Markets”, July 2003.


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published to all market participants on an aggregated basis, the risk of facilitatingcollusion – whilst requiring monitoring- does not outweigh the benefits of moretransparency.

II.4.3. The level of transparency varies widely between Member States

(573) Despite the widespread recognition of the need for transparency in order for wholesalemarkets to develop, the Sector Inquiry has provided evidence that the level oftransparency in the wholesale markets in the EU is not satisfactory. It is also widelydivergent. In the context of the Sector Inquiry national regulators were asked whether adequate information was made publicly available in their Member State on 49 precise issues290 covering:

- technical availability of TSO network (10 issues covering inter alia frequencyand causes of congestion, net and available transfer capacity, prices and physical flows)

- technical availability of interconnectors (11 issues addressing similar issues to those asked regarding the TSO network)

- load (5 issues covering inter alia day ahead and week ahead aggregated load forecasts and actual load)

- balance and reserve power (5 issues covering inter alia demand for balancing power, system balance status and actual use of reserve power)

- generation (production) (4 issues covering inter alia actual generation and outages)

- generation (capacity) (14 issues covering inter alia production portfolios).

(574) 21 national regulators replied. According to the regulators, information is published in the Member States on between zero and 38 of these issues. On average information was published on just under 20 issues. Table 32 shows the range of information published in the Member States according to the regulators.

(575) It can be seen from Table 32 that the markets in which most information is published (eg Nord Pool and the UK) are generally perceived as more competitive than those where little information is published.

290 The list of 49 issues is attached in annex H.


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Table 32

Member State Issues for which information is published (out of 49)

UK 38

Spain 34

Denmark 31

Finland 30

Sweden 27

Portugal 26

Poland 25

Lithuania 24

Germany 23

Slovenia 21

Italy 20

Hungary 18

Czech Republic * 17

Belgium 17

Netherlands 16

Greece 16

France 14

Ireland 13

Austria 12

Slovakia 8

Estonia 1

Latvia 0

Luxembourg -

Cyprus -

Malta -

Number of issues for which information is published by Member state

Source: Energy Sector Inquiry 2005/2006Note: * Information received from the Czech Republic following the publication of the Preliminary Report

II.4.4. Market participants not satisfied with level of transparency

(576) In the Sector Inquiry, suppliers were asked about the information that must be available to trade within acceptable risk levels on electricity wholesale markets. For each of the 49 issues suppliers were asked whether information was made publicly available, and were asked how important this issue was. Table 33 summarises their replies:

Table 33

suppliers saying that "indispensable" information was not available 43%

suppliers saying that "important" information was not available 16%

suppliers saying that "useful" information was not available 25%

suppliers saying that "all useful" information was not available 17%

Suppliers' views on whether information is available


In a nutshell more than 80% of market participants are not content with the current level of transparency arguing that indispensable, important and useful information is not madeavailable.


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II.4.5. The information that market participants believes ought to be published

(577) The replies to the Sector Inquiry indicate the broad types of information that market participants believe should be made public. The questionnaires sent in the context of theSector Inquiry to generators, traders and suppliers (“suppliers”) asked them to identifyhow they assess the importance/relevance of different issues to trade. Table 34summarises291 their replies (on the same of a comprehensive analysis of the replies to Sector Inquiry).

Table 34Importance of information according to suppliers

indispensable important useful not usefulTSO network 36.1% 24.5% 34.6% 4.8%Interconnectors 30.5% 30.8% 30.5% 8.2%Load 24.8% 32.9% 36.9% 5.5%Balancing 22.2% 30.1% 38.4% 9.3%Generation (production) 20.0% 33.5% 32.7% 13.8%Generation (capacity) 26.7% 29.9% 37.5% 5.9%

Source: Energy Sector Inquiry2005/2006

(578) Table 34 suggests that for market participants the issues on which information is mostimportant are (in decreasing order):

1. Technical availability of interconnectors2. Technical availability of TSO network3. Generation (capacity)4. Balancing and reserve power5. Load6. Generation (production)

(579) It is surprising that generation (production) is stated to be the least important issue. This could be because currently this information is not widely available and so market participants are not used to receiving it. Another possible explanation is that the information is perceived as commercially sensitive by the generators concerned. In this respect it is interesting to note that almost all suppliers who said that generation(production) information was “not useful” were local or regional incumbents, who might be expected to be able to benefit from the refusal to release the information, whilstpossibly sharing relevant information between affiliates.

(580) In a similar vein, some market participants have stated that they should not be required to publish confidential information. Instead they propose that in advance they should only reveal the information to a third party (normally the TSO or a power exchange) who should publish the information in an aggregated form combining similar informationfrom parties in the same position. Disregarding the situation of a tight oligopoly (risk ofcollusion) this would not seem to pose a problem as long as more detailed information on a disaggregated basis was published once the trading had taken place. In any event, there is a strong presumption that as much information as possible should be published, because otherwise market participants possessing market sensitive information would beable to profit from this information. As this profit would be at the expense of other

291 Information on the views of suppliers on the importance of each of the 49 precise issues is attached in annex H.


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market participants, acceding to the request not to publish this information wouldincrease risks for market participants and confuse the price signals from the market.

(581) It should be noted that in the most liquid and efficient wholesale electricity markets,including in particular Nordpool and the UK, the transparency requirements are high and so commercially confidential information is limited. It should also be noted that in Nordpool (as stated below) market participants with insider information are not allowed to trade until the relevant information has been disclosed to the market. This suggests that if an exemption for confidential information is to be allowed it must be very restricted. It could, for example, be to allow some very sensitive information to be published in aggregated form in advance and the detailed information to be published following an appropriate delay rather than in real time. This would still allow the possessor of the information to benefit from it, but replies to the Sector Inquiry indicate that even delayed publication of information is of importance to market participants as it allows them to understand price movements in the past and so to model price movements in the future.

II.4.6. Responsibility for publication of information

(582) Responsibility for revealing relevant information should primarily lie on the market or network participant responsible for the relevant activity. For example, generators should ensure that the required information on generation capacity and actual generation is revealed, and TSOs should ensure that the required information on congestion is revealed. However, in some cases, it might be appropriate for a third party to be responsible for the publication of the information. For example, if it was decided that information on generation schedules should only be published in an aggregated form before gate closure then generators might be made responsible for providing the TSO or another third party with their generation schedule and the TSO would be responsible for publishing aggregated figures. This issue should be further considered by the European Commission and the market participants during the discussions on precisely which information should be published and when.


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II.4.7. The transparency requirements under EC law

(583) EC financial services rules, in particular the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID)292, the Prospectus Directive293, the Transparency Directive294 and the Market Abuse Directive (MAD)295 and its implementing rules296, impose various transparencyobligations on financial markets.

(584) The aim of these Directives is to regulate the trade of securities, including derivatives on commodities, and related financial services. Commodity trading, including electricity and gas trading, is generally not covered by these Directives unless it is considered to be trading in derivatives on commodities. Some but not all power exchanges and brokers platforms in the EU are covered by the national rules implementing these directives. For example, in the Netherlands the APX exchange is not seen as falling within the scope of the directives, while Endex297 is.

(585) Furthermore, the sector-specific rules only impose limited transparency obligations on electricity wholesale markets or their participants.

II.4.8. Transparency requirements under national law or market conditions

(586) In addition to the requirements under EC law, there exist transparency requirementsunder national law or self-imposed transparency requirements in individual markets (e.g.it can be a condition of trading on the market concerned to subscribe to certain transparency rules).

(587) The following examples from the most important wholesale markets are representative.

• Trading in Nord Pool is subject to regulation both by the authorities in accordance with national law and by Nord Pool pursuant to the private law market conditions. In particular, Nord Pool prohibits insider trading under its

292 Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC (OJ 2004 L 145/1). The MiFID allows investment firms, banks and exchanges to provide their services across borders on the basis of their home country authorisation. The Directive also harmonizes the requirements for the provision of investment services and the operation of regulated markets by imposing several pre-trade and post-trade transparency requirements..

293 Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading and amending Directive 2001/34/EC (OJ 2003 L 345/64). The Prospectus Directive lays down several requirements for the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading on a regulated market.

294 Directive 2004/109/EC on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market and amending Directive 2001/34/EC (OJ 2004 L 390/38). The Transparency Directive covers periodic and ongoing information requirements for issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market.

295 Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and marketmanipulation (market abuse) (OJ 2003 L 96/16). The main aim of the MAD is to establish harmonised rules prohibiting market abuse, in particular insider dealing and market manipulation which harm the integrity of financial markets and public confidence in securities and derivatives.

296 In particular Commission Directive 2003/124/EC of 22 December 2003 implementing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the definition and public disclosure of inside information and the definition of market manipulation (OJ 2003 L 339/70) and Commission Directive 2004/72/EC of 29 April 2004 implementing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards accepted market practices, the definition of inside information in relation to derivatives on commodities, the drawing up of lists of insiders, the notification of managers’ transactions and the notification of suspicious transactions (OJ 2004 L 162/70).

297 Endex European Energy Derivatives Exchange operating an electricity futures exchange.


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conditions to trade on the financial market. Market participants must notify Nord Pool of any insider information, which is defined as “any matters related to the relevant entity’s business in the electricity markets that is likely to have a substantial impact on the prices in listed products”. This is further specified to include any planned outages or maintenance concerning more than 200MW. Participants possessing such information may not trade on Nord Pool until therelevant information has been disclosed to the market by Nord Pool298.

• In the UK the main transparency requirements are imposed in accordance with the Grid Code and the Balancing and Settlement Code. Compliance with thesecodes is a condition for obtaining a licence as generator or supplier.Implementation is monitored by the regulator OFGEM. The existing rulesrequire market participants to publish information such as intended generation,contractual positions and outage plans to National Grid Company (NGC), the TSO. Most of this information is circulated to market participants via the internet. NGC also circulates its outage plans to market participants. Withrespect to unplanned events, participants must provide an oral and written account, the latter within two hours of receiving original notification of theevent.

• In Germany it appears that the main transparency requirements as regards trading on EEX are due to national legislation (national competition law and the German Securities Trading Act supervised by the EEX trade monitoring office, the State Ministry for the Economy and Labour in Saxony and the GermanFinancial Supervisory Authority (BaFin)). The TSOs also impose transparency obligations including use of interconnectors and congestion problems.

• In France, the national and EC legislation on market abuse is not applied toPowernext. However, Powernext has inserted provisions into its market rules toprohibit market abuse. Furthermore, the national legislation has recently been amended to grant the regulator the power to carry out surveillance of “transactions carried out on organised electricity markets as well as on the interconnectors”299.

(588) Experience of enforcement of these rules appears to be extremely limited, with the exception of Nord Pool which has carried out eight detailed investigations since 2000,and in a number of cases found that the rules had been breached. In the UK there have been no formal investigations in the generation market relating to competition law or OFGEM’s regulatory controls since 2001 (although there were previous investigationsinto the Pool prices). The Financial Services Authority investigated the trading activityof an energy producing and trading company in 2003 but found that allegations that its conduct in the short term power markets may not have been for legitimate commercial purposes were unsubstantiated. In France there have been no allegations of breaches ofrules on proper market conduct. In Germany no formal investigations have been carriedout.

298 Nord Pool Market Conduct Rules (in particular, section 4.1) and Disclosure Rules (in particular, section 2.1). Furthermore, Nord Pool Ethical Guidelines state that market participants shall never compete in an unfair manner.

299 Article 3 of the Law of 10 February 2000 on the modernisation and development of the public service of electricity as modified by article 51 of Law 2005-781 of 13 July 2005 on the orientation of energy policy.


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II.4.9. Developments since the Preliminary Report was prepared

(589) Since the Preliminary Report was prepared, there have been significant developments in transparency in electricity wholesale markets due to the revised congestion management guidelines, the revised EC financial sector rules, voluntary initiatives from electricitygenerators, and an intensive exchange of views between market participants, TSOs and regulators on precisely what information should be published, when and at what level ofdetail.

(590) The Commission Decision C(2006)5303 of 9 November 2006 amended the annex to Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 on conditions for access to the network for cross-borderexchanges in electricity. The amended annex obliges TSOs to provide significant information to the market including: network availability, access and use; a report on where congestion exists and the methods applied to manage the congestion; cross-bordertransmission capacity available to the market; total capacity allocated and an indicationof prices paid; total capacity used; aggregated commercial and physical flows; information on planned and unplanned outages; forecast and actual demand; forecast and actual generation. Market participants shall provide TSOs with the relevant data where necessary.

(591) Implementing provisions for the MiFID were adopted in August 2006. CommissionRegulation (EC) No 1287/2006, in particular in Articles 37 and 38, will help to clarify the scope and effect of the MiFID and related financial service legislation with regard to electricity wholesale markets.

(592) On a voluntary basis, the four largest electricity generators in Germany decided to publish information on installed capacity, available capacity and actual quantitiesgenerated each hour at the EEX electricity exchange from April 2006. Even though this step was widely seen as a progress, it was claimed that it is still not sufficient as the information is only published in an aggregated form and not complete for all of the country but only for a part of generation. In June 2006, the conference of German Economics Ministers in both the Federal and Länder Governments welcomed the publication of this information and called for further work on the issue of transparency in the electricity wholesale markets. In September 2006 it was announced that Austrian electricity generators would publish at the EEX similar information to the German electricity generators.

(593) Finally, ETSO300, Eurelectric301, ERGEG302 and EFET303 have all published detailed proposals for the information that they believe should be published by market participants, the time at which it should be published (eg in advance, in real time, or afterwards) and the appropriate level of aggregation. The Florence Forum of 7 and 8 September 2006 concluded that the Commission would organise a working group to discuss guidelines on transparency, on the basis of the ERGEG proposal, and how best to

300 List of data European TSOs need to pursue optimal use of the existing transmission infrastructure of December 2005.301 Eurelectric Position Paper on market transparency of 16 February 2006.302 ERGEG Guidelines for Good Practice on Information Management and Transparency in Electricity Markets of 15

March 2006.303 EFET updated position on transparency of information about the availability and use of infrastructure and the

promotion of competition in European wholesale power markets of May 2006.


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implement them quickly, possibly on a voluntary basis at first. The working group met for the first time in November 2006.

(594) The voluntary publication of information in Germany and Austria and the rapid development of a detailed debate on the precise information that need to be published show how the issue of transparency in electricity wholesale markets has received greater priority since the launch of the Sector Inquiry and in particular since the preliminaryreport was published. This is a welcome first result of the Sector Inquiry and it is hoped that further improvements, for example the adoption of guidelines on transparency, will occur soon.

Conclusions

The need for greater transparency is widely recognised and has been identified as the key non-structural measure that could improve competition in EU electricity markets. Lack of transparency amounts to an entry barrier, undermines the level playing field between market participants and adversely affects trust in the functioning of the wholesalemarkets.

In practice in most Member States the level of transparency remains low. There are also significant differences between Member States undermining the level playing field. More than 80% of all market participants are not satisfied with the current level of transparencyarguing that not all indispensable, important and/or useful information is made public. More information should be published on technical availability of interconnectors and TSO networks, on generation, balancing and reserve power and load.

The EC financial services legislation, even when it applies to electricity wholesalemarkets, imposes only limited transparency obligations on these markets or their participants. The same applies to the sector-specific rules.

The transparency requirements under national rules or market conditions appear to be widely divergent, with for example only Nord Pool explicitly banning trading before the relevant information has been passed to the market. Furthermore, experience withenforcement of the national rules and the market conditions are even more divergent, with only Nord Pool having a broad experience enforcing its rules

There is therefore an urgent need to ensure that all market participants publish more information, which may require Community legislation (e.g. clarification or modificationof existing legislation or new legislation), also in line with the recent ERGEG advice on that issue in October 2006. Transparency requirements can also have a role as remedies in competition cases, given that improved transparency can help to limit the possibility toabuse market power.

Since the Preliminary Report was prepared, there have been significant developments in transparency in electricity wholesale markets. Some of these improvements appear to be a result of the Sector Inquiry, and it is hoped that further improvements, for example the adoption of guidelines on transparency, will occur soon.


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II.5. Price issues

(595) Whilst the formation of electricity prices on wholesale markets has already been explained in some detail in this report, three issues relating to the overall price level ofelectricity deserve particular attention. First, it needs to be analysed which external factors might explain – wholly or in part – the price increases over the last years such as increases in fuel costs or the introduction of the CO2 emission trading scheme (ETS)304.Secondly, the effects of publicly set supply tariffs for competitive electricity wholesaleand retail markets need to be assessed. And thirdly, special support schemes – currentlyunder consideration in certain Member States - to support large energy intensive users are presented and assessed.

II.5.1. External factors possibly explaining price increases

II.5.1.1. Electricity prices and fuel price developments

(596) Coal and natural gas are commonly used primary energy sources to generate electricitythroughout Europe. It can therefore be expected that their price development will affectelectricity prices.

(597) Recent strong price increases of natural gas (themselves subject of the Gas SectorInquiry) had a significant impact on wholesale electricity prices especially in the UK, where natural gas constitutes the fuel that is predominantly used by generators on the margin. Figure 65 demonstrates this relationship showing the development of the UKforward natural gas and electricity prices. It is characterised by a high correlationbetween the price levels.

Figure 65

Gas prices push UK power pricesWholesale electricity and gas price developments in the UK

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304 For further details on this issue see also chapter C.c.III on the Electricity Study305 Data from Platts a division of The McGraw-Hill Companies 2006- all rights reserved.


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(598) In other parts of Europe coal (instead of gas) plays a major role in electricity generation.It is generally understood that coal is often used by generators operating on the margin(e.g. in Germany). Thus coal price developments – all other factors being equal – shouldhave a major impact on electricity prices. However, this was not the case in recent years.Whereas the relevant benchmark coal price has decreased (from 63 €/t in July 2004 to 51€/t in September 2006), the year-ahead base load electricity price has risen significantlyin Germany (from 34 €/MWh in July 2004 to 56 €/MWh in September 2006). Although electricity prices are also influenced by factors other then fuel prices (e.g. CO2 prices, trade with other countries) the reasons for this development require some explanation(see also C.c.III Electricity Study). This is all the more important since the German market lacks the transparency that would allow market participants to identify themarginal generator or take an informed view on the development of supply fundamentals. Figure 66 shows the development of forward electricity and coal prices in Germany.

Figure 66

German power prices do not follow coal pricesWholesale electricity and coal price developments in Germany

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II.5.1.2. Electricity prices and CO2 certificates

(599) In addition to rising natural gas prices, generators – as they explain in their answers –have started to factor in the value of CO2 allowances in their pricing decisions as an additional factor of production.

(600) There is no consensus yet among analysts to what extent prices for CO2 allowances are included in wholesale prices and/or whether in all Member States the same developmentscan be observed. Most argue however that the value of the allowances is at least partiallypriced in. A study by the Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands307 concluded that in the Netherlands between 39% and 44% of the value is priced in at peak times and

306 Data from Platts a division of The McGraw-Hill Companies 2006- all rights reserved.307 ‘CO2 price dynamics: The implications of EU emissions trading for the price of electricity’, Energy Research Centre

of the Netherlands, September 2005.


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between 47% and 55% at off-peak times. In Germany between 42% and 46% of the value is priced in during off-peak times and between 69% and 73% during peak times. Other studies reached higher figures showing pass-on rates of up to 100% which is in line withthe statements received from generators in the context of the Energy Sector Inquiry.

(601) The European Commission Directorate-General for Environment closely follows the overall impact of the EU Emission Trading Scheme. It commissioned and published two corresponding studies in this respect.308 The Commission also adopted a communicationwith the title: Building a Global Carbon Market – Report pursuant to Art. 30 of Directive2003/87/EC309, which summarises the first experiences with the ETS.

(602) The possible impact of CO2 certificates trading on power prices – all other factors beingequal – can be demonstrated using the concept of spark spreads (see also Chapter C.c.III).The spark spread is the difference between the price of one unit of electricity and the price of the same unit of gas adjusted for plant efficiency. It gives an idea about the revenue of generators burning gas and selling the generated electricity on the market. As long as gas constitutes the marginal fuel in a market one would expect a relatively stable development of the spark spread (apart from possible price distortions or short term supply/demand imbalances). A spark spread graph thus allows isolating the impact of the gas price on the electricity price.

Figure 67

CO2 allowance prices influence electricity pricesDevelopment of the spot spark spread and the CO2 price in the UK

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308 ‘Review of EU Emissions Trading Scheme: Survey Highlights’, European Commission Directorate-General for Environment, McKinsey & Company, Ecofys, November 2005.‘Interactions of the EU ETS with Green And White Certificate Schemes’, European Commission Directorate-GeneralEnvironment, NERA Economic Consulting, 17 November 2005.

309 COM(2006) 676 final of 13 November 2006.


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(603) Figure 67 shows that the spot spark spread in the UK remained low and relatively stable (apart from a short period with tighter margins between demand and available capacity)during 2004 and started to rise from the beginning of 2005. This is also when the 1st

phase of the EU Emission Trading Scheme began. It can be observed that the spark spread followed the pattern of the CO2 certificates price development suggesting thatgenerators – at least to some extent - include the value the CO2 allowances into their pricing decisions.310

(604) CO2 allowance prices rose sharply during the first half of 2005 tracking the developmentof rising gas prices relative to coal prices. Because of high gas prices generators preferredto burn coal instead of gas to produce electricity. Since power plants using coal emitapproximately twice as much CO2 as those burning gas as primary fuel, increased coal usage raised the demand for additional CO2 allowances. This in turn resulted in rising CO2 certificate prices as can be seen in Figure 67. The prices remained high, at close to 30€ per ton, until April 2006, when they suddenly fell sharply to around 12€ per ton. The reason was the publication of emission data for 2005 by Member States, which were lower than expected. Subsequently prices for CO2 allowances have fallen below 10€ per ton CO2 (state of play November 2006).

(605) The practice of including the value of CO2 allowances in the cost calculations is seen -by certain industrial customers - as evidence for generators’ market power (predominantly in Germany) and the non-functioning of electricity markets. The criticsunderline that companies subject to global competition are not able to pass on costsassociated with CO2 allowances to their customers (e.g. steel or aluminium producers)whilst electricity producers can do so. Industrial companies also request a differentiatedallocation between sectors, with a view to taking into account the external aspects ofcompetitiveness. Critics mention that the vast majority of the allowances were given for free to generators. Customers claim further that generators would not only benefit fromhigher electricity prices for their marginal plant but for their entire production portfolioresulting in ‘windfall profits’.

(606) Furthermore companies that intend to enter the generation market are concerned that the current allocation scheme favours incumbents over new entrants, for example if oldplants (normally owned by incumbents) are closed and replaced by a new plant with less emissions, this may lead to an excess of allocations. However it needs to be mentioned in this context that the allocation plans of all 25 Member States as approved by the Commission for the period 2005-2007 contain new entrant reserves. This implies that new power plants will be given free allowances in accordance with the rules governing these reserves. New entrants argue, however, that some insecurity still persists in someMember States as to the extent of the allocation methods and the likely amounts to be attributed.311 In the public consultation on the preliminary report it was also underlined by a number of commentators that the period post-2012 is crucial for any investment decision in new generation, and that therefore further clarity on this aspect is important. Moreover some commentators called for a harmonisation of rules between Member States to ensure a level playing field. Finally, some commentators argued for a change in the allocation procedure. A possible alternative would for example be the full auctioning

310 Similar trends can be observed when analysing forward spark spreads.311 The new national allocation plans for the period 2008 to 2012 which are in the process of being reviewed/approved

by the Commission should address these concerns.


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of CO2 allocations for the post-2012 period.312 All these issues will be addresses in the EU ETS review.

(607) In the view of electricity generators and traders, CO2 allowances are like any othervariable factor of production. As such, CO2 allowance prices have to be included in the short run and long run marginal cost calculation of the generating units. In this context –generators argue - it would not matter whether CO2 allowances were allocated for free or had to be bought on the market. It is claimed that the market value of the allowance is what ultimately matters. If the value of the CO2 allowance would not be taken into consideration the generator on the margin would lose revenues that it could realise if itdecided not to generate but sell the CO2 allowances and buy the electricity instead (opportunity cost principle)313. In any event pricing in costs for CO2 allowances would be in line with the objectives of the EU ETS.

(608) It can be noted in this respect that the German competition authority is currently investigating whether German electricity producers are entitled to pass on the price for CO2 allowances to their customers or whether such pricing practice amounts to an abuse of dominant position. No final decision has, as of 10 January 2007, been taken.

(609) The Commission will continue to monitor the effects of the EU ETS (including the effectof the ETS on electricity prices), which is a major element in its strategy to achieve the Kyoto obligations. It also takes note of the recommendations of the High Level Group on competitiveness, energy and the environment on the issue of the EU ETS314 in the context of the ongoing EU ETS review process. In this respect it supports in particular the requests of new entrants that the EU ETS must not create barriers for market entry.

II.5.2. Regulated supply tariffs

(610) In a number of markets that have been examined, the liberalised supply market with its freely negotiable energy prices between suppliers and customers coexists with a system of regulated final customer tariffs315 (e.g. Portugal, France, Italy, Spain, Hungary, Poland). Parallel regimes are no threat to a liberalised supply market and its participantsas long as regulated energy prices are comfortably above the level implied by wholesalemarket price levels. This differential allows for (new) suppliers without any localgeneration to source on the wholesale market and make attractive supply offers comparedto the regulated energy tariff.

(611) However, Member States could be tempted – especially in periods of rising wholesaleprices – to set the supply tariffs below the corresponding wholesale benchmark to ensure lower price levels for customers. Whilst there may be short run benefits to (certaincategories of) consumers, such supply tariffs have adverse effects for competition and

312 The Commission will pay particular attention to put in place a more harmonised allocation method beyond 2012. See in this context the Commission Communication “Building a Global Carbon Market” COM(2006) 676 final of 13 November 2006.

313 This argument is not entirely convincing as it takes a rather static approach. The generator has to consider that it will also need allowances for the next period. If all allowances were sold during the reference period, the generator would be obliged to buy new allowances in the subsequent period. In addition, if all generators were to sell simultaneously their allowances on a large scale, this would have a depressing impact on the price of the allowances given that theelectricity sector represents more than half of total CO2 allowances.

314 http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/environment/hlg/hlg_en.htm315 See also Second Electricity Directive, Art.3, Public service obligations and customers protection. Another issue is the

exclusive rights or compensation granted to incumbents to supply within regulated markets.


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thus for consumers in the longer run. New suppliers with no access to own generation are effectively squeezed out from the market, as they can no longer market electricitypurchased on wholesale markets. Accordingly no competition based on merits can take place for these customers freezing the market position of incumbent operators. Also the tariffs distort the necessary price signals for investment into new generation capacity and are consequently damaging to security of supply. Many commentators in the public consultation as well as electricity suppliers, in particular from Spain and France, complained about the level of regulated tariffs being too low and their effects for the wholesale markets316.

(612) In May 2006 the UK operator Centrica, which had gained significant market share in the eligible customer segment in Spain, lodged a formal complaint to the Commissionconcerning the regulated electricity tariffs in Spain, and the corresponding tariff deficitsystem (compensation scheme for loss making local distributors supplying on the basis ofpublic tariffs). In the view of Centrica, the Spanish system has squeezed out their Spanish subsidiary and other newcomers from the electricity supply market. The Commission is currently analysing whether any violations of state aid or antitrust rules have taken place.

(613) In April 2006 the Commission opened infringement proceedings against a number of Member States for failure to correctly implement the Second Electricity and Gas Directives317. The inexistent or inadequate justification for regulated tariffs – in particularfor eligible customers – was one of the key elements for certain of these infringementprocedures. Taking into account the adverse effects of regulated tariffs for competitionin particular for the non-household segment, it is recommended that these tariffs are discontinued without delay.

316 It can be noted that the French Constitutional Council on 30 November 2006 declared non-conform with the French Constitution the Amendments to the Energy Sector law 13 July 2005 with respect to regulation of energy and gas prices.

317 Commission Press Release IP/06/430 of 4 April 2006.


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Figure 68

Regulated supply tariffs are below wholesale pricesComparison of Spanish regulated electricty tariffs for certain large industrial customers with Spanish wholesale prices

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

June July August September October November December January February March April May

2004 2005

€/M

Wh

average final price - OMEL regulated bundled tariff for large customers - G.4

Source: OMEL, CNE (Spanish Regulator)Note: The G.4 bundled tariff depends on a capacity and consumption element and also includes network usage

II.5.3. Special support schemes for energy intensive users

(614) In the light of increasing electricity prices a number of Member States are alsoconsidering special support schemes for large energy intensive users. Whilst a number ofdifferent concepts seem to exist, one of the most advanced relates to the formation of purchasing consortia for energy intensive users under criteria set by national legislation.The consortia would enter into long-term supply contracts with electricity producers.Essentially the consortium would make a significant initial down payment corresponding to the investment costs for a new power plant in return of continuous supplies of base load electricity on a marginal cost basis. These purchasing consortia may give rise toantitrust and possibly also state aids concerns.

(615) From an antitrust point of view the main questions are: a) Do the long-term contractshave foreclosure effects? This may be the case if the companies which acquire electricityunder long-term contracts account –together with other customers- for a good part of theoverall electricity demand in the market concerned and if the selected supplier has a dominant position in the market (for further details on this issue cf. chapter C.c.I.b). Arethe participants in the consortia free to market the electricity? The electricity supplier orthe consortium might have an interest in preventing the buyers from marketing unused electricity at low prices (as a quid pro quo to the electricity generator). However, such a use restriction may also raise competition concerns.

(616) The major concerns as regards state aid are that any such aid exceeding the de-minimisthresholds would be viewed as operating aid which is normally not compatible with EUstate aids rules. It would in any case not be possible for the Commission to authorise suchaid based on any existing State aid guideline. It can also be questioned whether there


205

would be a need to provide such aid since the mere effect of the establishment of a consortium is supposed to trigger a reduction in price.

(617) Further analysis will be required as regards these special support schemes.

Conclusion

In certain Member States the recent increases of electricity prices can be explained by therise of gas prices used in marginal plants. However coal prices have remained relativelystable thus not explaining the price increases observed. Analysts cannot yet agree to which extent the value of CO2 allowances is priced into electricity prices. It needs to be ensured that the ETS does not amount to an entry barrier for companies that want to become active in power generation.

Industrial users claim that electricity producers should not be entitled to factor in the value of CO2 allowances, as they were largely distributed for free. Generators claim thatthe value of CO2 allowances is an opportunity cost, which can be factored in legitimately.An antitrust investigation is ongoing in Germany dealing with this question.

Public tariffs for electricity supply have adverse effects for the development of competitive markets if set very low compared to wholesale prices and if they cover a large part of the eligible customer market. Support schemes for large energy intensive users – currently considered in a number of Member States – need to be compatible withantitrust and state aid rules.

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1

UNIVERSIDAD AUTÓNOMA DE MADRIDUNIVERSIDAD AUTÓNOMA DE MADRIDMERIGG, 2009MERIGG, 2009‐‐1010

REGULACIÓN Y COMPETENCIA. EL SECTOR ELÉCTRICO

ESPAÑA Y EUROPA

• Producción

EL SECTOR ELÉCTRICO ESPAÑOL

– Régimen ordinario

– Régimen especial

• Transporte

• Distribución – venta final

MONOPOLIO‐LIBRE COMPETENCIA

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2

–CARACTERÍSTICAS- Oferta = Demanda- No identificable- No dirigible- Demanda variable a lo largo de diversos horizontes temporales (valle-pico)

–“ Servicio público”

Esquema funcionamiento

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3

Generación

• TIPOS DE TECNOLOGÍAS– Régimen ordinario

– Régimen especial

• POTENCIA INSTALADA

• BALANCE ENERGÉTICO

CURVA DE CARGA• CURVA DE CARGA

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4

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5

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6

Evolución potencia instalada. SEE.

Año 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

MW % MW % MW % MW % MW % MW %

Tecnología

Hidráulica 16.586 28,37% 16.657 27,21% 16.657 24,34% 16.657 22,52% 16.658 21,15% 16.658 18,36%

Evolución potencia instalada SEE 2002‐07

, , , , , ,

Nuclear 7.816 13,37% 7.876 12,86% 7.876 11,51% 7.867 10,64% 7.716 9,80% 7.716 8,51%

Carbón 11.565 19,78% 11.565 18,89% 11.565 16,90% 11.424 15,44% 11.934 15,15% 11.867 13,08%

Fuel/gas 10.288 17,60% 6.930 11,32% 6.930 10,13% 6.647 8,99% 9.425 11,97% 8.758 9,65%

Ciclo Combinado 0,00% 4.934 8,06% 8.258 12,07% 12.224 16,53% 16.410 20,84% 22.097 24,36%

Total Régimen ordinario 46.255 47.422 51.313 54.829 62.144 67.096

Eólica 0,00% 5.361 8,76% 8.351 12,20% 9.800 13,25% 11.279 14,32% 13.606 15,00%

Resto Régimen especial 0,00% 8.440 13,79% 8.761 12,80% 9.342 12,63% 9.669 12,28% 10.021 11,05%

Total Régimen especial 12.214 13.801 17.112 19.142 23.626

Total 58.469 100,00% 61.223 100,00% 68.425 100,00% 73.970 100,00% 78.754 100,00% 90.722 100,00%

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7

Variación potencia instalada

Crecimiento anual potencia instalada

Año 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007% 03/02 % 04/03 % 05/04 % 06/05 %07/06

TecnologíaHidráulica 0,43% 0,00% 0,00% 0,01% 0,00%Nuclear 0,77% 0,00% -0,11% -1,92% 0,00%Carbón 0,00% 0,00% -1,22% 4,46% -0,56%Fuel/gas -32,64% 0,00% -4,08% 41,79% -7,08%

Ciclo Combinado 67,37% 48,03% 34,24% 34,66%Eólica 55,77% 17,35% 15,09% 7,97%

Resto Régimen especial 3,80% 6,63% 3,50% 20,63%Total 4,71% 11,76% 8,10% 6,47% 3,64%

Balance eléctrico nacional (2002‐07)

Balance eléctrico nacional

Año 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007GWh % GWh% GWh % GWh % GWh % GWh %

TecnologíaHidráulica 22 560 10 08% 38 774 16 11% 29 777 11 59% 19 170 7 13% 25 330 9 13% 26 381 9 21%Hidráulica 22.560 10,08% 38.774 16,11% 29.777 11,59% 19.170 7,13% 25.330 9,13% 26.381 9,21%Nuclear 63.016 28,15% 61.875 25,70% 63.606 24,76% 57.539 21,41% 60.126 21,68% 55.046 19,21%Carbón 82.310 36,77% 75.796 31,48% 80.097 31,18% 77.393 28,80% 69.326 25,00% 74.946 26,15%Fuel/gas 30.286 13,53% 17.703 7,35% 17.912 6,97% 10.013 3,73% 14.432 5,20% 10.771 3,76%Ciclo Combinado 0,00% 14.990 6,23% 28.974 11,28% 48.840 18,17% 67.012 24,16% 72.461 25,28%

Régimen ordinario 198.172 88,52% 209.138 86,87% 220.365 85,79% 212.955 79,24% 236.226 239.606- Consumos en generación -9.155 -4,09% -8.886 -3,69% -9.550 -3,72% -9.080 -3,38% -9.770 -3,52% -9.460 -3,30%Eólica 0,00% 12.140 5,04% 15.916 6,20% 20.377 7,58% 22.924 8,27% 27.026 9,43%Resto Régimen especial 34.858 15,57% 28.351 11,78% 30.143 11,73% 29.987 11,16% 27.959 10,08% 29.416 10,26%

G ióGeneración neta 223.875 240.743 256.874 268.756 277.339 286.588- Consumos en bombeo -6.957 -4.678 -4.605 -6.709 -5.261 -4.421+ intercambios internacionales 5.329 1.264 -3.027 -1.343 -3.280 -5.803Demanda 222.247 237.329 249.242 260.704 268.799 276.365En % de demanda se refleja el crecimiento respecto al año anterior

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Variación anual por tecnologías y demanda

Variación anual por tecnologías y demanda

Año 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007Año 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

% 03/02 % 04/03 % 05/04 % 06/05 %07/06

Tecnología -38,47% 32,13% 32,13% 4,15%

Hidráulica 71,87% -23,20% -35,62% 32,13% 4,15%

Nuclear -1,81% 2,80% -10,42% -10,42% -8,45%

Carbón -7,91% 5,67% 44,13% 44,13% 8,11%

Fuel/gas -41,55% 1,18% 37,21% 37,21% -25,37%

Ciclo Combinado 93,29% 10,93% 10,93% 8,13%

Eólica 31,10% 12,50% 12,50% 17,89%

Resto Régimen especial -18,67% 6,32% -6,76% -6,76% 5,21%

Demanda 6,79% 5,02% 3,11% 3,11% 2,81%

Curva Monótona de carga

Nuclear Carbón Fuel-GasCiclo Combinado Hidráulica Régimen EspecialImportaciones Demanda

10 00015.00020.00025.00030.00035.00040.00045.000

p

05.000

10.000

horas

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9

Puntos a destacarPuntos a destacar:

1. la potencia instalada de un determinado tipo detecnología será fundamental a la hora deasegurar la efectiva atención de la demanda

2. pero la cobertura de la demanda dependerá dela posibilidad de utilización de esa tecnología, locual, por su parte, depende de factoresincontrolables como la climatologíaincontrolables como la climatología(fundamental para la energía hidráulica y eólica)

TRANSPORTE

Km de circuito 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

400 kV15.782 16.308 16.547 16.808 17.005

220 kV y menor

11.219 11.243 11.308 16.288 16.498

Total27.001 27.551 27.855 33.096 33.503

Cuestiones clave del transporte:‐El problema de la propiedad de las líneas‐El sistema de tarificación de peajes

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Comercialización vs. distribuciónMarco Jurídico

Fecha efecto Niveles de consumo Apertura Mercado

Ley 54/1997 01/01/1998 Superior a 15 GWh 26%

700 suministros

RD 2820/1998

01/01/1999 Superior a 5 GWh 33,4%

2.300 suministros

01/04/1999 Superior a 3 GWh 37%

3.800 suministros

01/07/1999 Superior a 2 GWh 39,6%

5.600 suministros

01/10/1999 Superior a 1GWh 43,4%

10.000 suministros

RD-L 6/1999 01/07/2000 Tensión de suministro superior a 1000 V 52,3%

65.000 suministros

RD-L 6/2000 01/01/2003

Todos los consumidores

100%21.500.000 suministros

Cadena energética en el caso de mercado a tarifa (distribuidor)

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11

Cadena energética en el caso de mercado libre (comercializador)

Anterior a la leyREE Ordenación por costes

Cambio de sistema; problemas para la introducción de competencia

O de ac ó po cos esLiquidación (generación y distribución)

Situación actual: Mercado mayoristaPujas de compra/venta (agentes) OMEL(casación económica) REE (casación(casación económica) REE (casacióntécnica) OMEL (liquidación)

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12

EL MERCADO ESPAÑOL DE PRODUCCIÓN ELÉCTRICA: FUNCIONAMIENTO Y POSIBILIDADES DE COMPETENCIA

Objeto del trabajo:Objeto del trabajo: Análisis del comportamiento del mercado eléctrico con el fin de determinar la existencia de competencia y factores limitadores de la misma.

D í iDatos empíricos: Publicaciones OMEL Pujas presentadas de adquisición y venta de energía para cada sesión del mercado (MWh y c€/kWh)

SITUACIÓN ANTERIOR A LEY 54/97

REE

El mercado español de producción eléctrica...

Ordenación costes

Liquidación (producción y distribución)

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13

SITUACIÓN ACTUAL.

MERCADO MAYORISTA


OFERENTES: RÉGIMEN ORDINARIO YOTROS

DEMANDANTES: DISTRIBUIDORES,COMERCIALIZADORES Y OTROS

PUJAS DE COMPRA/VENTA (Pr y cantidad)

Variable estratégica: Precio mercado


OMELCasación Económica (pr. eq. = marginal)

REE Casación Técnica

OMEL Liquidación

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14

Hora Fecha Unidad Tipo Energía Precio Ofert/


Hora Fecha Unidad Tipo Oferta

Energía Compr/Venta

Precio Compr/Venta

Ofert/Casada

1 14/01/03 BPC01 C 0,4 18,03 O

1 14/01/03 ABO1 V 220 0 O

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01/11/2010

16

Organización: I Marco teórico


I Marco teóricoII Comportamiento de la ofertaIII La demandaIV El mercadoV ConclusionesV Conclusiones

Modelo teórico: Modelo de Sweezy o de demanda


yquebrada.

Función de demanda con punto de vértice y distintas elasticidades

Distinta actuación de oligopolistas ante subidas o bajadas de precios

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17

Adaptación del modelo de Sweezy al mercado eléctrico español


OA

P (c€/kWh)

Pmax

P

OA’

Pα

D

q (MWh)qα

D’

q’α

Marco teórico


Marco teórico Comportamiento de la oferta

La demandaEl mercadoConclusiones

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18

Análisis de la industria


Agentes vendedoresDatos agregados:

• Elevado número de agentes• Volumen mayor de ofertas no casadas

en horas de baja demandaen horas de baja demanda

Unidades de producción• Comportamiento observado• Tipología por tecnologías

Tipología de comportamiento


ParticipaciónNúmero de ofertasPreciosVariabilidad de preciosNúmero de ofertas casadas

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1ParticipaciónNuclear


0

0,5Nº de ofertasOfertas casadas

PreciosVariabilidad precios

1ParticipaciónHidráulica


0

0,5Nº de ofertasOfertas casadas

PreciosVariabilidad precios

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20

Marco teórico


Marco teórico Comportamiento de la oferta

La demandaEl mercadoConclusiones y nuevas líneas de

investigación

Análisis de la demanda


Análisis de la demandaAgentesCaracterísticasDatos empíricos y forma de la curvaConsideraciones sobre el punto de quiebro

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21

C. de demanda hora 22 (24-03-03)


5

10

15

20

00 5.000 10.000 15.000 20.000 25.000 30.000 35.000


P (c€/kWh)

OA

OA’

Pmax

Pα

D’D

qα q’α q (MWh)

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Marco teórico Comportamiento de la ofertaLa demanda

El mercadoConclusiones y nuevas líneas de

investigación

El mercado:


Datos de clientes y energíaCaracterísticasFuncionamiento

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Factores que limitan la existencia de i (I)


competencia (I):Concentración horizontalForma de la curva de demandaSeparación precios de mercado‐tarifasLímites artificiales al precio de

equilibrio: Los CTCs

Factores que limitan la existencia de i (II)


competencia (II):Disminución del margen de reservaAsimetría de información. Integración

en grupos empresarialesEl d d l dEl operador de la red

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24


Marco teórico Comportamiento de la ofertaLa demandaEl mercado

Conclusiones

Conclusiones

Numerosos factores limitadores de la competencia


competencia

Necesidad de establecer cambios profundos en la organización y funcionamiento del mercado

La coexistencia de dos sistemas en ventaLa coexistencia de dos sistemas en venta minorista debe ser transitoria

Medidas para fomentar cambios en la demanda

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EL PASO A UN MERCADO SUPRANACIONAL:

El MERCADO ELÉCTRICO EUROPEO,

PROBLEMAS PARA LA INTEGRACIÓNINTEGRACIÓN

Mercado eléctrico europeo

GuiónGuión: 1.1. El mercado de electricidadEl mercado de electricidad2.2. Problemas para la integraciónProblemas para la integración3.3. Conclusiones y perspectivas de Conclusiones y perspectivas de futurofuturo

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GuiónGuión: 1. El mercado de electricidad2.2. Problemas para la integraciónProblemas para la integración3.3. Conclusiones y perspectivas de Conclusiones y perspectivas de futurofuturo


Mercado eléctrico

-Obligación servicio público yprotección al consumidor

-Gestión red de transporte

-Disociación contableDisociación contable

-Apertura del mercado y reciprocidad

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1.1. El mercado de electricidadEl mercado de electricidad2. Problemas para la integración3.3. Conclusiones y perspectivas de Conclusiones y perspectivas de futurofuturo

Mercado eléctrico europeo¿Por qué no se logra la integración?

-Falta de interconexión internacional

-Falta de competencia a nivel nacional

-Protección de “sectores estratégicos”

-El grado de cumplimiento nacionalDocumentos relativos al mercado eléctricohttp://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/energy/inquiry/full_report_part2.pdf- Investigación de conformidad con el artículo 17 del Reglamento (CE) n° 1/2003 en los sectores europeos del gas y la electricidad (Informe final) {SEC(2006) 1724}

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¿Por qué no se logra la integración?g

-Falta de interconexión internacional

-VENTAJAS DE LA INTERCONEXIÓN

-INFORMES UCTE ESTADO ACTUAL-INFORMES UCTE. ESTADO ACTUAL

-PROYECTOS PRIORITARIOS UE

Proyectos prioritarios interconexión UE

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¿Por qué no se logra la integración?

-Problemas de falta de competencia a nivel nacionalnacional

Obstáculos Estados Cambio de compañíapor parte de grandesusuarios

Sin problemas importantes Suecia, Finlandia,Dinamarca, Noruega yReino Unido

Más del 50%

Desregulación/ regulación Luxemburgo, Austria, Entre 10% y 35%Alemania

Estructura del mercado o falta deintegración

Francia, Bélgica, Grecia,Irlanda, España,Holanda, Italia

Entre 0% (Grecia) y35% (Holanda)

Acuerdos de compra de energía alargo plazo/precios al consumoregulados

Portugal


País

Austria

Número de empresas de transporte

Número de emrpesas de distribución

3 133AustriaBélgicaDinamarcaFinlandiaFranciaAlemaniaGreciaIrlandaItaliaLuxemburgoPaíses BajosPort gal 1 11

2 111 20

1 11 170

4 9501 1

1251 1041 166

3 1331 272

PortugalEspañaSueciaReino Unido Noruega

Fuente: UE, Infrome de la Comisión (2004) 863

1 150

1 1802 15

1 111 308

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PaísApertura mercado

Tamaño del mercado

abeierto en TWh

Umbral de cualificación

Transporte DistribuciónAustria 100 55 Jurídica JurídicaBélgica 90% aprox 60 Jurídica Jurídica

Separación redes


Bélgica 90% aprox. 60 Jurídica JurídicaDinamarca 100 33 Jurídica JurídicaFinlandia 100 80 Propiedad ContableFrancia 70 275 ND Jurídica GestiónAlemania 100 500 Jurídica ContableGrecia 62 29 ND Jurídica NoIrlanda 56 12 1GWh Jurídica GestiónItalia 79 225 ND Propiedad JurídicaLuxemburgo 57 3 20 GWh Gestión GestiónPaíses Bajos 100 100 Propiedad JurídicaPortugal 100 42 Propiedad ContableEspaña 100 210 Propiedad Jurídicap pSuecia 100 135 Propiedad JurídicaReino Unido 100 335 Propiedad JurídicaNoruega (1) 100 110 Propiedad Jurídica/contable

(1) Se hace el análisis para la UE-15 más Noruega por tener un mercado único con los países nórdicos



¿Por qué no se logra la integración?g

-La protección de sectores estratégicos

-El diverso grado de cumplimiento nacional

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PaísApertura mercado

Tamaño del mercado

abeierto en TWh

Umbral de cualificación

Transporte DistribuciónAustria 100 55 Jurídica JurídicaBélgica 90% aprox 60 Jurídica Jurídica

Separación redes


Bélgica 90% aprox. 60 Jurídica JurídicaDinamarca 100 33 Jurídica JurídicaFinlandia 100 80 Propiedad ContableFrancia 70 275 ND Jurídica GestiónAlemania 100 500 Jurídica ContableGrecia 62 29 ND Jurídica NoIrlanda 56 12 1GWh Jurídica GestiónItalia 79 225 ND Propiedad JurídicaLuxemburgo 57 3 20 GWh Gestión GestiónPaíses Bajos 100 100 Propiedad JurídicaPortugal 100 42 Propiedad ContableEspaña 100 210 Propiedad Jurídicap pSuecia 100 135 Propiedad JurídicaReino Unido 100 335 Propiedad JurídicaNoruega (1) 100 110 Propiedad Jurídica/contable

(1) Se hace el análisis para la UE-15 más Noruega por tener un mercado único con los países nórdicos


Grandes consumidores industriales cualificados

Pequeñas empresas/hogares


CAMBIO DE SUMINISTRADOR

PaísAustriaBélgicaDinamarcaFinlandiaFranciaAlemaniaGreciaIrlandaItaliaLuxemburgo

3%19%5%

No conocido

6%

1%0%

>50%15%10%

Desde la apertura del mercado22%35%

>50%>50%22%35%

gPaíses BajosPortugalEspañaSueciaReino Unido Noruega


0%No conocido

>50%>50%

35%1%

>50%>50%

30%9%

18%>50%

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GuiónGuión: 1.1. El mercado de electricidadEl mercado de electricidad2.2. Problemas para la integraciónProblemas para la integración3. Conclusiones y perspectivas de futuro

ES ES

ES

ES ES

COMISIÓN DE LAS COMUNIDADES EUROPEAS

Bruselas, 10.1.2007 COM(2006) 851 final

COMUNICACIÓN DE LA COMISIÓN

Investigación de conformidad con el artículo 17 del Reglamento (CE) n° 1/2003 en los sectores europeos del gas y la electricidad (Informe final)

{SEC(2006) 1724}

ES 2 ES

COMUNICACIÓN DE LA COMISIÓN

Investigación de conformidad con el artículo 17 del Reglamento (CE) n° 1/2003 en los sectores europeos del gas y la electricidad (informe final)

1. INTRODUCCIÓN

1. Unos mercados de la energía que funcionen correctamente y garanticen el suministro seguro de energía a unos precios competitivos son clave para el crecimiento y el bienestar de los consumidores de la Unión Europea. Para lograr este objetivo la UE decidió abrir a la competencia los mercados del gas y de la electricidad de Europa y crear un mercado único europeo de la energía. El proceso de apertura del mercado ha modificado considerablemente el funcionamiento de los mercados, ha ofrecido nuevas oportunidades de mercado y ha dado lugar a la introducción de nuevos productos y servicios. La competencia provocó inicialmente un descenso de los costes de la energía en Europa en línea con las condiciones de mercado.

2. Sin embargo, aunque han hecho progresos, todavía no se han alcanzado los objetivos de la apertura de mercado. A pesar de la liberalización del mercado interior de la energía, subsisten obstáculos a la libre competencia. Las subidas significativas de los precios al por mayor del gas y la electricidad, que no se explican exclusivamente por los mayores costes primarios del petróleo y las obligaciones de índole medioambiental, las reiteradas denuncias sobre los obstáculos a la entrada y las limitadas posibilidades de elección para los consumidores llevaron a la Comisión a iniciar en junio de 2005una investigación del funcionamiento de los mercados europeos del gas y la electricidad. Esta investigación, basada en el artículo 17 del Reglamento 1/20031 relativo a la aplicación de las normas de competencia del Tratado, pretendía evaluar las condiciones actuales de competencia y establecer las causas del incorrecto funcionamiento del mercado. El Informe final (Comunicación de la Comisión) resume los resultados de la investigación, que se presentan más detalladamente en el Anexo técnico2 del Informe final.

3. Si bien la investigación del sector se inició con la sensación de que los consumidores no se beneficiaban plenamente de la liberalización, debe subrayarse desde el principio que el objeto de la investigación no era describir los avances logrados en el proceso de liberalización y las ventajas que de él se derivaban. Los logros son muchos y, en aquellos mercados en los que la liberalización se ha efectuado con éxito, los consumidores son unos de los que se benefician de la mayor posibilidad de elección entre proveedores y servicios. También pagan – en comparación con los consumidores de otros Estados miembros – unos precios que por término medio corresponden más a los costes. La Comisión sigue pues convencida de que no hay alternativa al proceso de liberalización. Es, por lo tanto, esencial velar por que las

1 Reglamento (CE) n° 1/2003 del Consejo, de 16 de diciembre de 2002, relativo a la aplicación de las normas sobre competencia previstas en los artículos 81 y 82 del Tratado CE (DO L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1), tal como fue modificado por el Reglamento (CE) n° 411/2004 (DO L 68, 6.3.2004, p. 1).

2 Documento de trabajo de los servicios de la Comisión, Informe de la DG Competencia sobre la investigación del sector de la energía SEC (2006) 1724.

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directivas de liberalización existentes se transpongan de forma completa y efectiva3.Sin embargo, aún queda por hacer antes de que los consumidores puedan obtener el máximo beneficio.

4. La investigación del sector de la energía se ha centrado en la identificación de las áreas en donde la competencia todavía no funciona bien y de los ámbitos en los que hay que intervenir cuanto antes para que la liberalización dé sus frutos. Con vistas a la investigación, los aspectos fundamentales se agruparon en los siguientes temas (1) concentración de mercado/poder de mercado, (2) exclusión vertical del mercado (fundamentalmente desagregación inadecuada de la red y del suministro), (3) falta de integración del mercado (incluida la falta de supervisión normativa de los aspectos transfronterizos), (4) falta de transparencia, (5) formación de precios, (6) mercados en sentido descendente, (7) mercados de equilibrado y (8) gas natural licuado (GNL).

5. Las deficiencias identificadas en estos ámbitos fundamentales hacen necesario actuar de forma urgente en cuatro ámbitos que deben considerarse prioritarios: (1) lograr la desagregación efectiva de las actividades de red y suministro; (2) eliminar las diferencias reguladoras (en especial en los aspectos transfronterizos); (3) resolver la concentración del mercado y los obstáculos a la entrada y (4) incrementar la transparencia de las operaciones de mercado. La Comunicación de la Comisión sobre "Perspectivas del mercado interior del gas y la electricidad"4, que se presenta paralelamente al Informe final, define las intenciones de la Comisión por lo que se refiere a las propuestas reguladoras necesarias a este respecto.

1.1. Contexto de la investigación

6. La introducción de la competencia en los mercados del gas y la electricidad de Europa es parte integrante de la política energética europea que pretende lograr tres objetivos estrechamente relacionados: un sector de la energía competitivo y eficiente, la seguridad del suministro y la sostenibilidad. Todos los consumidores europeos, es decir, los hogares, los usuarios comerciales y los usuarios industriales, dependen en gran medida del suministro seguro y fiable de energía a precios competitivos. Asimismo, la consecución del objetivo de la Unión de proteger de forma adecuada el medio ambiente es de importancia fundamental tal como demuestra el compromiso de reducir la emisión de gases de efecto invernadero en aplicación del Protocolo de Kioto. Por lo tanto, la investigación del sector debe situarse en este contexto político de mayor alcance.

7. La política energética europea se estableció en la Comunicación de la Comisión al Consejo Europeo de primavera de 20065 referente a la estrategia renovada en favor del crecimiento y el empleo. Esta Comunicación sitúa la creación de una política energética eficiente e integrada en el centro de las prioridades de la Comisión. Este objetivo se volvió a subrayar en el Libro Verde de la Comisión "Estrategia europea

3 La Comisión ha iniciado procedimientos de infracción a este respecto contra varios Estados miembros – para más detalles véase la Comunicación de la Comisión sobre las perspectivas del mercado interior del gas y la electricidad, mencionada a continuación.

4 COM (2006) 841, Comunicación de la Comisión, Perspectivas del mercado interior del gas y la electricidad.

5 Ha llegado la hora de acelerar – Informe anual de situación en materia de crecimiento y empleo, 25 de enero de 2006.

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para una energía sostenible, competitiva y segura"6 adoptado por la Comisión en marzo de 2006.

8. El informe final de la investigación sectorial se presenta en paralelo con la Revisión estratégica del sector de la energía de la UE de la Comisión7 y con el paquete de medidas en el sector de la energía que incluye la Comunicación "Perspectivas del mercado interior del gas y la electricidad" antes mencionada y el seguimiento del Libro Verde. También se tiene en cuenta el trabajo realizado en el Grupo de alto nivel sobre competitividad, energía y medio ambiente, que, en su primer informe adoptado en junio de 2006, destacó la necesidad de que los mercados de la electricidad y el gas funcionen mejor.

9. De todos estos documentos se desprende que los tres objetivos políticos de "competitividad, seguridad del suministro y sostenibilidad" están estrechamente relacionados y son complementarios. Los mercados competitivos ofrecen las señales necesarias para la inversión, que lleva a la seguridad del suministro de la manera más rentable. Del mismo modo, la creación de un mercado interior competitivo permitirá a las empresas energéticas de la Unión operar en un mercado más amplio, que mejorará su capacidad de contribuir a la seguridad del suministro. Al mismo tiempo, las fuerzas del mercado obligan a los operadores europeos a utilizar los métodos de producción más rentables, que, en un marco regulador apropiado, pueden contribuir a la sostenibilidad. Los consumidores podrán elegir entre distintos proveedores y modalidades de contrato y de esta manera podrían reducir sus costes de electricidad y adaptar su consumo a la evolución del mercado. Unos precios competitivos que reflejen los costes de producción contribuirán a fomentar el rendimiento energético, lo que puede reducir la dependencia de los proveedores exteriores y contribuye al objetivo de la Unión de sostenibilidad y seguridad del suministro.

10. El Informe final se centra en los aspectos de competencia de la política energética de Europa y en los obstáculos que subsisten para crear un mercado único europeo de la energía. Si bien este aspecto merece por sí mismo un análisis exhaustivo, la prioridad también procede del marco normativo (Reglamento 1/2003), que constituyó el telón de fondo de la investigación. Esto no significa que, por ejemplo, no se tengan en cuenta los objetivos de la seguridad de suministro al evaluar los probables efectos beneficiosos y perjudiciales para la competencia en el contexto de la aplicación de las normas comunitarias de competencia en casos individuales. Efectivamente, un mercado interior competitivo es un instrumento clave para la consecución de este objetivo. Sin embargo en el contexto de la investigación sectorial se ha prestado especial atención a la competencia.

1.2. Procedimiento hasta la adopción del informe

11. La investigación del sector de los mercados europeos de la energía se puso en marcha el 17 de junio 2005. Los resultados iniciales se presentaron en un documento de discusión publicado el 15 de noviembre de 2005. Tras la publicación del informe preliminar el 16 de febrero de 2006 la Comisión inició una consulta pública. En sus contribuciones los interesados acogieron con satisfacción el informe, elogiando por lo general su objetividad así como la riqueza de la información. Las contribuciones

6 COM (2006) 105 final, 8.3.2006, SEC (2006) 317. 7 COM (2007) 1, Comunicación de la Comisión, Una política energética para Europa.

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procedían de empresas del sector, ya fueran operadores tradicionales como nuevos participantes, reguladores nacionales, autoridades de competencia, empresas consultoras, despachos de abogados, comerciantes de energía, operadores de red, clientes, asociaciones industriales y organismos públicos nacionales.

12. La mayoría de los interesados está de acuerdo con las conclusiones, aunque existan variaciones en la evaluación de la gravedad de la situación y de si esta está o no mejorando. Por lo que se refiere a las posibles maneras de avanzar hubo división de opiniones en cuanto a las ideas presentadas en el informe preliminar tales como la desagregación estructural, mientras que algunos abogaron por unas soluciones aún más radicales. Hablando en términos generales, las empresas tradicionales integradas verticalmente no eran favorables a otras medidas, mientras que los consumidores, los comerciantes y los nuevos participantes así como las autoridades apoyaron la propuesta de iniciativas legislativas.

2. CONCLUSIONES

13. Las principales conclusiones de la investigación del sector pueden agruparse - según se ha indicado antes - en ocho epígrafes. Aunque hay algunas diferencias obvias entre los sectores del gas y de la electricidad, las numerosas semejanzas y correlaciones entre ambos sectores respaldan una presentación común.

2.1. Concentración del mercado

14. Al nivel mayorista, los mercados del gas y la electricidad siguen siendo de alcance nacional y mantienen por lo general el alto nivel de concentración del período anterior a la liberalización. Esto ofrece un margen para ejercer el poder de mercado.

15. El comercio mayorista de gas se ha desarrollado lentamente y los operadores tradicionales siguen siendo dominantes en sus mercados tradicionales, gracias en gran parte a que controlan las importaciones ascendentes de gas y/o la producción nacional de gas. Los operadores tradicionales sólo venden una pequeña proporción de su gas en intercambios de gas ("hubs"). Dado que se producen pocas entradas nuevas en los mercados al por menor, las posibilidades de elección de los consumidores son limitadas al igual que lo es la presión competitiva. El marco general para los nuevos participantes se caracteriza por la dependencia de los operadores tradicionales integrados verticalmente para los servicios en toda la cadena de suministro.

16. Aunque el comercio de electricidad está más desarrollado, las ventas en los mercados al por mayor de electricidad reflejan por lo general el importante nivel de concentración en la generación de electricidad. El análisis del comercio de las bolsas de energía muestra que, en algunos de ellos, los generadores tienen margen para ejercer su poder de mercado subiendo los precios, preocupación que también expresaron muchos clientes. El análisis de las posiciones de negociación en los mercados a plazo, que por lo general muestran una menor concentración, demuestra que los mercados de la electricidad dependen de pocos proveedores con posiciones largas (es decir, producen más de lo que revenden). El análisis de las carteras de producción también muestra que los principales productores pueden retirar capacidad para provocar una subida de precios.

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17. En el contexto de la investigación, se ha llevado a cabo un estudio de los niveles de concentración en el sector de la electricidad8. Un análisis de la concentración por horas muestra que, incluso durante las horas valle, los mercados están muy concentrados y los niveles de concentración, incluso en los mercados menos concentrados, alcanzan niveles significativos en las horas punta. El análisis basado en la medición de la estructura del mercado en cada hora también revela que, en ciertos mercados, los contratos a largo plazo y, en menor medida, los requisitos relativos a las reservas pueden reforzar los niveles de concentración. Además, el análisis muestra que el nivel de capacidad de interconexión existente no es suficiente para reducir considerablemente la concentración.

2.2. Exclusión vertical

18. El nivel actual de desagregación de la red y el suministro tiene repercusiones negativas en el funcionamiento del mercado y en los incentivos para invertir en redes. Esto constituye un obstáculo importante para la nueva entrada y también amenaza la seguridad del suministro.

19. Los nuevos participantes carecen a menudo de acceso efectivo a las redes (en el sector del gas, esto vale también para el almacenamiento y los terminales de gas natural licuado) a pesar de las disposiciones sobre desagregación existentes. Se sospecha que los operadores de redes e infraestructuras favorecen a sus propios asociados (discriminación). La integración vertical también da lugar a que las decisiones operativas y de inversión no se tomen en interés de las operaciones de red o infraestructura, sino en función de los intereses de suministro de la empresa integrada (incluida la conexión a la red para las centrales eléctricas competidoras) lo cual es sumamente perjudicial para la seguridad del suministro.

20. Se descubrió que existía otra forma de exclusión vertical consistente en la integración de la generación o de las importaciones con los intereses de suministro en un mismo grupo. Esta forma de integración vertical reduce los incentivos para los operadores tradicionales de comerciar en los mercados al por mayor y lleva a niveles deficientes de liquidez en estos mercados. En especial, el predominio de contratos de suministro a largo plazo entre los productores de gas y los importadores tradicionales hace muy difícil que los nuevos participantes tengan acceso a gas en los mercados ascendentes. Del mismo modo, las instalaciones de producción de electricidad están en manos de algunos proveedores tradicionales o controladas indirectamente por estos mediante acuerdos a largo plazo de compra de energía que dan a los operadores tradicionales el control de los insumos esenciales en los mercados mayoristas. Los bajos niveles de liquidez constituyen un obstáculo a la entrada tanto en el mercado del gas como en el de la electricidad.

2.3. Integración del mercado

21. Las ventas transfronterizas no imponen actualmente ninguna presión competitiva significativa. Los operadores tradicionales casi nunca se introducen en otros mercados nacionales como competidores. La insuficiencia o indisponibilidad de capacidad transfronteriza y los diversos modelos de mercado obstaculizan la integración del mercado.

8 Este aspecto se presenta en un capítulo aparte del Anexo técnico del Informe final.

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22. En el sector del gas, la capacidad disponible en los gasoductos de importación transfronterizos es limitada. Los nuevos participantes no están en condiciones de garantizar capacidad de transporte en las rutas clave ni capacidad de entrada en los nuevos mercados. Muy a menudo, la capacidad primaria en los gasoductos de tránsito está controlada por los operadores tradicionales merced a contratos heredados anteriores a la liberalización que no están sujetos a las normas habituales sobre acceso de terceros. Los operadores tradicionales tienen escasos incentivos para expandir la capacidad con objeto de satisfacer las necesidades de los nuevos operadores. Esto queda reforzado por unos mecanismos ineficaces de gestión de la congestión, que hacen difícil garantizar en el mercado secundario incluso pequeños volúmenes de capacidad a corto plazo interrumpible. En muchos casos, los nuevos participantes ni siquiera han podido obtener una cantidad suficiente de capacidad en los casos en que se ha registrado un crecimiento de la capacidad de los gasoductos de tránsito. Por lo general las expansiones se han realizado a la medida de las necesidades de las actividades de suministro de los operadores tradicionales.

23. En el sector de la electricidad, la integración se ve obstaculizada por la insuficiente capacidad de interconexión y por la falta de incentivos adecuados para invertir en capacidad adicional para eliminar los cuellos de botella existentes desde hace mucho tiempo. Además, en ciertas fronteras, aún existen reservas de capacidad a largo plazo anteriores a la liberalización a pesar de la sentencia del Tribunal de Justicia de las Comunidades Europeas según la cual estas reservas no son compatibles con el derecho comunitario, a menos que se hubieran notificado conforme a la Directiva 96/92/CE. La mejora del acceso a los interconectores existentes necesita unos mejores métodos de gestión de la congestión. Sin embargo, a menudo la mejor gestión de la capacidad no interesa a los operadores de red integrados verticalmente.

2.4. Transparencia

24. Falta una información fiable y oportuna sobre los mercados

25. Los usuarios de la red necesitan una mayor transparencia que vaya más allá de los actuales requisitos mínimos fijados en la legislación de la UE. Son especialmente importantes los datos relativos a la disponibilidad de la red, en particular para las interconexiones de electricidad y gas y los gasoductos de tránsito. Los datos sobre el funcionamiento de la capacidad de generación y sobre el almacenamiento de gas también deben ser accesibles más ampliamente. Para la electricidad, concretamente, se observó que las normas sobre supervisión y comportamiento adecuado en el mercado difieren considerablemente entre los Estados miembros, pues hay poca armonización de los requisitos de transparencia a nivel de la UE.

26. Para garantizar unas condiciones de competencia equitativas, es necesario que todos los participantes en el mercado dispongan de la información en igualdad de condiciones y a tiempo. Actualmente existe un desequilibrio informativo entre los operadores tradicionales integrados verticalmente y sus competidores. Una mejor transparencia reduciría los riesgos para los nuevos operadores del mercado con lo que disminuirían los obstáculos a la entrada y mejoraría la confianza en los mercados al por mayor y en las señales de precios. Evidentemente hay que garantizar que no hay colusión alguna basada en la información publicada y, aunque la confidencialidad comercial sea importante, no se debe permitir que menoscabe la transparencia efectiva si se le da una interpretación demasiado amplia.

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2.5. Información sobre precios

27. Es necesario que la formación de precios sea más eficaz y transparente con objeto de que los consumidores se beneficien plenamente de la apertura del mercado. Muchos usuarios tienen una confianza limitada en los mecanismos de formación de precios, mientras que las tarifas de suministro reguladas por debajo de los precios de mercado disuaden a los nuevos participantes.

28. Los contratos de importación de gas utilizan índices de precios vinculados a los derivados del petróleo (por ejemplo combustible ligero o combustible pesado) razón por la cual los precios han reflejado la evolución de los mercados del petróleo. Esta vinculación da lugar a unos precios al por mayor que no pueden reaccionar a los cambios en la oferta y demanda de gas, lo cual es perjudicial para la seguridad del suministro. No puede observarse en los contratos de importación a largo plazo una tendencia clara hacia unos mecanisos más basados en los precios de mercado. Es fundamental garantizar la liquidez para mejorar la confianza en la formación de precios en los centros gasistas, lo que hará posible que la vinculación con el petróleo se relaje.

29. La formación de los precios de la electricidad es compleja. Indudablemente, los aumentos del precio de los combustibles primarios han influido en las últimas evoluciones de los precios de la electricidad, especialmente en las instalaciones marginales. Sin embargo esto no parece explicar por completo las recientes subidas de precios. Del mismo modo, todavía no está del todo claro el efecto del sistema de intercambio de emisiones de CO2 en la UE sobre los precios de la electricidad.

30. En varios Estados miembros, las tarifas reguladas han generado efectos nocivos para el desarrollo de unos mercados competitivos, puesto que se han fijado en unos niveles muy bajos en comparación con los precios de mercado y abarcan una gran parte del mercado, lo que da lugar a una nueva regulación. Del mismo modo, en varios Estados miembros se han examinado unas medidas especiales para reducir las facturas de electricidad de las industrias grandes consumidoras de energía. Estas medidas deben ser compatibles con las normas sobre competencia y sobre ayudas estatales.

2.6. Mercados descendentes

31. La competencia al nivel minorista suele ser limitada. La duración de los contratos al por menor para los clientes industriales y las empresas locales de distribución puede tener un impacto sustancial en las oportunidades de que los proveedores alternativos se incorporen con éxito al mercado.

32. El efecto acumulativo de las largas duraciones de los contratos, de los contratos de duración indeterminada, de los contratos con cláusulas de renovación tácita y períodos largos de vencimiento puede ser fundamental. El análisis muestra que los clientes industriales están ligados a largo plazo con los proveedores obligatorios en muy diferente medida según los Estados miembros.

33. Los consumidores desean que los proveedores no obligatorios realicen unas ofertas más competitivas y lamentan la falta de ofertas de suministro paneuropeas. El número de ofertas competitivas que reciben los consumidores es particularmente

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insatisfactorio en algunos Estados miembros que se caracterizan por un alto nivel de concentración.

34. Para el gas, las restricciones del modo en que los clientes pueden utilizar su gas, en combinación con las prácticas restrictivas de los proveedores relativas a los puntos de entrega, restringen la competencia e impiden que estos clientes se aprovechen de las eficiencias. En el sector de la electricidad, ciertos contratos tipo contienen restricciones que también pueden plantear problemas de competencia.

2.7. Mercados de equilibrado

35. Actualmente, los mercados de equilibrado suelen favorecer a los operadores tradicionales y crean obstáculos para los recién llegados. El tamaño de las zonas de equilibrio actuales es demasiado pequeño, lo que lleva a costes cada vez mayores y protege el poder de mercado de los operadores tradicionales.

36. Para el gas, el pequeño tamaño de las zonas de equilibrio actuales aumenta la complejidad y los costes del transporte de gas en Europa. Los costes aumentan debido a las normas muy complejas y divergentes de cada zona y a la obligación de reservar capacidad en cada punto fronterizo. Estos problemas se ven agudizados por el factor temporal: cuanto menor es el período de compensación, mayor es el riesgo de desequilibrio para el proveedor. Todos estos aspectos crean obstáculos importantes para la incorporación al mercado de nuevos proveedores, obstáculos que los operadores tradicionales integrados verticalmente tienen poco interés en eliminar. Además, las tarifas de compensación, los costes de equilibrio y las multas no son transparentes y a menudo las multas son injustificadas, lo que beneficia a los operadores tradicionales. La desagregación efectiva es necesaria para crear unas condiciones de competencia equitativas en los mercados de equilibrio y para reducir los obstáculos a la entrada.

37. En el sector de la electricidad, los mercados en los que los operadores de sistemas de transmisión tienen que adquirir la energía de equilibrio y de reserva están muy concentrados, lo que da a los generadores un margen para ejercer su poder de mercado. Esto puede dar lugar a obstáculos a la entrada para los nuevos proveedores que se enfrentan a un considerable riesgo de encontrar altos precios de desequilibrio y/o altas tarifas de red (en la medida en que los costes de equilibrio están incluidos en los costes de la red). La concentración en los mercados de equilibrado podría reducirse si se ampliase el tamaño geográfico de las áreas de control. La armonización de los regímenes de equilibrado del mercado sería un paso importante para aumentar el tamaño de dichas áreas, para mejorar la integración del mercado y para simplificar el comercio. En algunos Estados miembros la relación estructural entre los gestores de redes de transporte y la empresas de generación afiliadas a éstos ofrece un incentivo para que el gestor de redes de transporte compre una capacidad de reserva excesiva y/o pague precios elevados, lo que beneficia a su filial de producción. Los resultados indican que el volumen de reservas de capacidad compradas difiere sustancialmente según los gestores de redes de transporte.

2.8. Mercados del GNL

38. Los suministros de GNL amplían la base de proveedores ascendentes de Europa y por lo tanto son importantes tanto para la seguridad del suministro como para

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la competencia entre proveedores ascendentes. Aún no se ha aprovechado la posibilidad de que los suministros de GNL beneficien a los mercados en sentido descendente menos concentrados.

39. Tradicionalmente el GNL ha sido importado por los operadores tradicionales nacionales que también poseen terminales de GNL y esta situación ha impedido que las importaciones de GNL incrementen la competencia en sentido descendente. Sin embargo, las últimas tendencias apuntan a que llegará más capacidad a los nuevos participantes y a los propios productores. Es probable que esto tenga un impacto positivo que incentive la competencia en sentido descendente a menos que tales efectos se vean frustrados por normas o conductas anticompetitivas. Se ha realizado una fuerte inversión en terminales de GNL y se prevé que continúe en los próximos años. Las inversiones en algunos terminales de GNL han gozado de exenciones de obligaciones de acceso de terceros merced a una prueba efectuada por los reguladores nacionales con la supervisión de la Comisión. Esta prueba intenta lograr un equilibrio entre los incentivos previos a la inversión y la competencia una vez efectuada la inversión. Aunque la experiencia es positiva en gran medida, todavía cabe mejorar.

3. REMEDIOS

40. Para resolver el funcionamiento incorrecto del mercado puesto de manifiesto en la investigación sectorial y mejorar perceptiblemente el alcance de la competencia, es esencial aplicar soluciones tanto en términos de competencia como de regulación. La aplicación de la normativa de competencia puede contribuir de forma significativa, aunque no suficiente, a abrir los mercados y resolver todas las deficiencias descubiertas por la investigación del sector: por lo tanto, también son necesarias diversas medidas reguladoras.

3.1. Aplicación de la normativa de competencia

41. La utilización plena y combinada de los poderes de la Comisión en virtud de las normas en materia de antitrust (artículos 81, 82 y 86 CE), de operaciones de concentración (Reglamento 139/2004)9 y de control de las ayudas estatales (artículos 87 y 88 CE) es necesaria para obtener el máximo impacto de la acción de la Comisión en aplicación del derecho de competencia. La Comisión persigue con denuedo las infracciones del derecho comunitario de competencia (antitrust) allí donde lo exige el interés comunitario, en estrecha colaboración con las autoridades nacionales de competencia.

3.1.1. Concentración del mercado

42. La concentración del mercado resulta ser una traba importante para el éxito del proceso de liberalización. El poder de mercado de los monopolios existentes antes de la liberalización se mantiene intacto. Esto hace que sea esencial la acción comunitaria conforme al reglamento sobre operaciones de concentración a fin de garantizar que la estructura competitiva de los mercados de referencia (que actualmente son como mucho de alcance nacional) no se deteriore más. En recientes

9 Reglamento (CE) n° 139/2004 del Consejo, de 20 de enero de 2005.

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asuntos de concentraciones se han aplicado remedios tales como desinversiones y cesiones de contratos y/o de gas. Además, ha cobrado importancia el aspecto de la repercusión de los contratos ascendentes a largo plazo sobre la concentración en sentido descendente.

43. Los programas de cesión de energía (es decir, las subastas en «centrales eléctricas virtuales» y los programas de cesión de gas) son un medio para desarrollar la liquidez de mercado y aumentar las oportunidades de entrada. Constituyen remedios adecuados para las preocupaciones de competencia no sólo en el campo de las operaciones de concentración sino también con arreglo a las normas antitrust. Para ser plenamente eficaces deben estar bien concebidas y ser de gran alcance. Las autoridades de competencia y reguladoras a nivel nacional (por ejemplo en España, Francia, Austria, Alemania) y la Comisión Europea (en casos de concentraciones) han obtenido gracias a estos programas una experiencia sustancial que ha hecho posible que las autoridades eviten errores y garanticen su eficacia. Para el gas, estos programas de cesión tienen la ventaja adicional de que es probable que aumenten la liquidez de los centros gasistas lo que contribuye a la introducción de señales de precios no afectadas por el vínculo de precios entre el gas y el petróleo.

44. En ciertas circunstancias la legislación antitrust aplicable también permite aplicar medidas estructurales de mayor alcance como remedio para las infracciones de las normas de competencia. Esto ocurre cuando los remedios que se refieren a la conducta sean menos eficaces para poner fin a la infracción, cuando exista un riesgo sustancial de que la infracción dure o se repita derivado de la propia estructura de la empresa, o cuando los remedios referentes a la conducta sean más gravosos10.

3.1.2. Exclusión vertical

45. Siempre que la integración vertical del suministro y la generación, y la infraestructura de las empresas y la insuficiente desagregación faciliten las infracciones de competencia, es necesario aplicar con toda su fuerza los poderes de la Comisión para impedir abusos futuros.

46. La investigación sectorial también ha confirmado que la vinculación vertical de los mercados debida a los ratos descendentes a largo plazo constituye una prioridad al examinar los asuntos conforme a la ley de competencia y para proporcionar orientación cuando sea necesario. Cuando tales contratos concluidos por empresas dominantes dan lugar a una exclusión del mercado pueden constituir una infracción del artículo 81 u 82 CE a menos que existan unas eficiencias que actúen como contrapeso y beneficien a los consumidores11. Del mismo modo, los acuerdos de compra de energía en el sector de la electricidad pueden tener efectos de exclusión.

47. Además, la concentración de los contratos de importación de gas en manos de unos pocos operadores tradicionales es una de las razones principales por las que no despega la competencia en el nivel comercial siguiente. Aunque esto no cuestiona en

10 Véase el artículo 7, apartado 1, y el considerando 12 del Reglamento 1/2003. 11 En el análisis de los contratos a largo plazo, se tienen en cuenta las inversiones a fondo perdido, en caso

de que las partes hayan hecho alguna; véanse las Directrices de la Comisión relativas a la aplicación del artículo 81, apartado 3, del Tratado (DO C 101 de 27.4.2004, p. 97, punto 44).

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sí mismo los contratos ascendentes existentes y futuros, es necesario prestar atención a sus efectos en los mercados descendentes.

3.1.3. Integración del mercado

48. La exclusión puede también producirse en otros niveles de la cadena de valor, sobre todo por lo que se refiere al acceso a la infraestructura (redes de transmisión y distribución y/o instalaciones de almacenamiento), particularmente cuando afecta al acceso transfronterizo, lo que impide la integración del mercado. Dicho acceso puede quedar bloqueado por contratos a largo plazo de transmisión y debido al riesgo asociado de acumulación de capacidad. La acción en este ámbito debería incluir un análisis de los efectos desde el punto de vista de la competencia de los contratos a largo plazo anteriores a la liberalización y de la compatibilidad de tales contratos con las normas de competencia.

49. Además, la falta de inversión o su aplazamiento por parte de las empresas de transporte que tienen empresas de suministro integradas verticalmente son otras fuentes graves de preocupación. Cabe recordar que una autoridad nacional de competencia descubrió que un operador de red integrado verticalmente detuvo deliberadamente un proyecto de inversión para beneficiar a su empresa de suministro privando a los competidores de tener acceso a más capacidad12.

50. La división del mercado sigue siendo uno de los obstáculos más importantes para la integración del mercado. La lucha contra la colusión entre operadores tradicionales sigue siendo una prioridad de las medidas de aplicación en materia de antitrust y responde a la prioridad general de la Comisión de luchar contra los intentos de las empresas de coordinarse en lugar de competir.

3.2. Aspectos estructurales y marco regulador procompetitivo

51. Los resultados de la investigación del sector permitirán que la Comisión centre su acción de aplicación en los aspectos más preocupantes puestos de manifiesto en el informe. También contribuyen a que la Comisión identifique más fácilmente los remedios eficaces que permiten resolver los problemas de competencia identificados en asuntos concretos.

52. Sin embargo, los aspectos claves relativos a la estructura del mercado y al marco regulador tendrán que examinarse en paralelo, para poner remedio al funcionamiento incorrecto de los mercados demostrado en la investigación.

La investigación sectorial ha identificado las siguientes principales deficiencias fundamentales de la estructura competitiva de los mercados actuales de la electricidad y el gas:

– Conflictos de interés estructurales: un conflicto sistémico de interés causado por la insuficiente desagregación de redes de las partes del sector sujetas a la competencia;

12 La autoridad italiana de competencia ha tomado recientemente medidas contra la táctica de un operador tradicional consistente en aplazar la expansión de un importante gasoducto de importación.

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– Vacíos del marco regulador; un vacío regulador persistente particularmente en lo que respecta a aspectos transfronterizos. Los sistemas reguladores vigentes tienen cabos sueltos que no se atan

– Falta crónica de liquidez, tanto en el mercado mayorista de la electricidad como en el del gas: nuestros mercados carecen de dinamismo y se mantiene el poder de mercado de los monopolios anteriores a la liberalización;

– Falta general de transparencia en las operaciones de mercado en el sector.

En su comunicación sobre las "Perspectivas del mercado interior del gas y la electricidad" la Comisión examina las distintas posibilidades de acción reguladora a nivel de la CE. Los resultados de la investigación del sector y las deficiencias resultantes antes señaladas apoyan y confirman el análisis presentado por la Comisión en dicha Comunicación.

3.2.1. Desagregación

53. La investigación del sector confirma la conclusión de que es esencial resolver el conflicto sistémico de interés inherente a la integración vertical de las actividades del suministro y de red, que ha dado lugar a una falta de inversión en infraestructura y a una discriminación. Es crucial garantizar que los propietarios y/o los operadores de red no tengan incentivos falseados por los intereses de sus empresas de suministro. Esto es particularmente importante en un momento en que Europa necesita inversiones muy importantes para garantizar la seguridad del suministro y crear mercados integrados y competitivos.

54. Para lograrlo, será necesario reforzar con decisión el actual nivel inadecuado de desagregación. Esto, a su vez, facilitaría también la cooperación entre los operadores de red.

55. Las pruebas de índole económica demuestran que la plena desagregación de la propiedad es el modo más eficaz de garantizar la posibilidad de elección de los usuarios de la energía y de fomentar la inversión. Ello se debe a que las empresas de red separadas no se ven influidas por los intereses de suministro y generación a la hora de decidirse a invertir. También evita una regulación excesivamente detallada y compleja y unas cargas administrativas desproporcionadas. El sistema de operadores independientes mejoraría la situación actual pero exigiría una regulación más detallada, más rígida y más costosa y sería menos eficaz a la hora de resolver los desincentivos a la inversión en redes.

56. Además, la consulta pública no ha revelado ningún efecto de sinergia importante relacionado con la integración vertical. En efecto, cuando se ha procedido a la desagregación de la propiedad, la experiencia muestra que tanto la actividad de red como la de (producción y) suministro continúan prosperando tras la separación.

3.2.2. Marco regulador

57. Si bien la desagregación de la propiedad contribuiría sustancialmente a reducir los problemas de poder de mercado y de falta de liquidez, está claro que también se necesitarán otras medidas. Tal como queda confirmado en la investigación del sector, Europa necesita reforzar sustancialmente los poderes de los reguladores y una

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mayor coordinación a escala europea. Esto concuerda con los resultados presentados por la Comisión en su Comunicación sobre "Perspectivas del mercado interior del gas y la electricidad". Solamente un marco regulador reforzado puede proporcionar el marco transparente, estable y no discriminatorio que el sector necesita para que la competencia se desarrolle y para que se realicen las inversiones futuras.

58. Los principales elementos de este marco reforzado deberían ser:

– mayores poderes para los reguladores nacionales independientes de la energía,

– coordinación reforzada entre los reguladores nacionales de la energía,

– cooperación reforzada entre los gestores de redes de transporte, y

– incremento considerable de la coherencia de la regulación en temas transfronterizos.

59. La coordinación reforzada entre los reguladores nacionales de la energía, con una supervisión mayor de la Comunidad que vele por los intereses del mercado interior, particularmente por lo que se refiere a los problemas y aspectos transfronterizos más críticos para la entrada en el mercado, será necesaria para superar el actual vacío regulador transfronterizo que no puede solucionarse con la simple aplicación de las normas de competencia. Las opciones de medidas reguladoras se examinan en la Comunicación sobre "Perspectivas del mercado interior del gas y la electricidad".

3.2.3. Falta crónica de liquidez

60. Unas normas más estrictas sobre desagregación y en especial un mejor marco regulador de los aspectos transfronterizos deben, a medio plazo, reducir sustancialmente los problemas de poder de mercado y de falta de liquidez de forma duradera, introduciendo suministros adicionales en los mercados nacionales concentrados. Sin embargo, subsisten graves problemas a corto plazo por lo que se refiere a la falta de liquidez suficiente y al poder de mercado sostenido en los mercados al por mayor, que dan lugar a unos precios más elevados en los mercados al por menor justo en vísperas de la liberalización completa que debe realizarse el 1 de julio de 2007.

61. Como ya se indicó antes, la aplicación del derecho de competencia será una herramienta importante para hacer frente a cualquier conducta anticompetitiva en este aspecto, aunque puede que no sea suficiente. Como los niveles de concentración en los mercados del gas y la electricidad han seguido siendo altos, reflejando a menudo los monopolios anteriores a la liberalización, los reguladores nacionales de la energía deberían analizar las condiciones imperantes en sus respectivos mercados en cooperación con las autoridades de competencia y presentar las propuestas apropiadas. Entre las medidas tomadas en el pasado por varios Estados miembros figuran los programas de cesión, (es decir, las subastas en «centrales eléctricas virtuales» y los programas de cesión de gas).

62. También cabe recordar que ciertos Estados miembros han introducido en su derecho nacional unos límites a la propiedad de la producción eléctrica y al control de

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contratos ascendentes de gas a largo plazo (importaciones y producción nacional), como medida eficaz para reducir rápidamente el poder de mercado. Para la electricidad, unas medidas de esta índole podrían consistir en desinversiones o permutas de activos de centrales eléctricas a escala europea. Para el gas, podrían consistir en cesiones de contratos, permutas de contratos y/o desinversiones de plantas nacionales de producción, tal como se han aplicado en casos recientes de operación de concentración. Si se ampliasen las zonas de los pequeños gestores de redes de transporte y se implantasen procedimientos de licitación más abiertos y flexibles para equilibrar la energía se podrían reducir los elevados niveles actuales de concentración de los mercados de equilibrado y eliminar los obstáculos a la entrada, lo que a su vez produciría un efecto positivo en los mercados al por mayor.

63. Además, la investigación sectorial ha destacado la importancia de aumentar la posibilidad de entrada en el mercado mediante la inversión en nueva infraestructura de importación y producción de gas así como mediante la aplicación estricta de las disposiciones por las cuales o se utilizan la infraestructura y las instalaciones de producción adecuadas o sino se pierden ("use it or lose it").

3.2.4. Falta de transparencia de las operaciones de mercado

64. Se admite de forma general que el acceso a la información de mercado debe mejorar. Toda la información de mercado relevante debería publicarse a tiempo permanentemente. Cualquier excepción debería limitarse muy estrictamente a lo necesario para reducir el riesgo de colusión. Las directrices y la supervisión y eventual adaptación de la regulación vigente deberían servir en último término para aumentar la transparencia en el sector del gas y de la electricidad. Las propuestas previstas se resumen en la Comunicación sobre "Perspectivas del mercado interior del gas y la electricidad".

3.2.5. Otros aspectos importantes

65. Además de estas cuatro áreas fundamentales, hay que tener en cuenta otros aspectos relacionados con un entorno de mercado procompetitivo. La Comunicación de la Comisión sobre "Perspectivas del mercado interior del gas y la electricidad" presenta sugerencias específicas de acción reguladora a nivel de la CE referentes a estos aspectos.

66. Las tarifas minoristas reguladas pueden producir importantes efectos de falseamiento y en ciertos casos impedir la creación de mercados liberalizados. Es de importancia crucial evaluar el impacto sobre el desarrollo de la competencia de las tarifas de suministro reguladas que aún subsisten y eliminar los falseamientos13.

67. Para lograr que el acceso a las nuevas infraestructuras no se vea restringido indebidamente, la Comisión debería continuar velando por que las exenciones de las disposiciones de acceso no perjudiquen el desarrollo de la competencia. Es importante seguir examinando los proyectos uno por uno aplicando estrictamente los principios de competencia que permiten logran un equilibrio adecuado entre los

13 En el segmento del mercado doméstico, es necesario lograr un equilibrio adecuado entre la competencia y las obligaciones universales de servicio público.

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incentivos a la inversión a priori y la competencia a posteriori, y simplificar los procedimientos de exención.

68. Para llegar a una red europea única desde la perspectiva del usuario de la red, es necesario armonizar convenientemente el patrón de mercado, especialmente en lo que respecta a los métodos que surten un efecto en el comercio transfronterizo.Hay que tomar medidas allí donde la capacidad actual sea insuficiente para desarrollar la capacidad de interconexión como condición necesaria para el desarrollo de la competencia y la integración de los mercados. Estos objetivos solamente pueden lograrse mediante una cooperación cada vez mayor entre los reguladores nacionales que induzca a incrementar la cooperación entre los gestores de redes de transporte por encima de las fronteras nacionales en un marco procedimental bien definido.

69. Para introducir más capacidad de transporte de gas en el mercado, será importante aclarar la posición legal de los contratos a largo plazo de transmisión de gas anteriores a la liberalización conforme a la segunda Directiva del gas14, que ya están sujetos a normas estrictas de aplicación del principio "use it or lose it" y a la normativa del derecho de competencia.

70. Se necesitan nuevos cambios en el método de asignación de la capacidad de interconexión limitada. Para la electricidad se deberían fomentar lo más posible las subastas implícitas con un día de antelación o las medidas equivalentes para velar por la máxima utilización posible de los interconectores. Los gestores de redes de transporte también deberían tener incentivos para poner a disposición del mercado la máxima cantidad posible de capacidad transfronteriza15.

71. Para ofrecer unas garantías suficientes de acceso efectivo, debe revisarse el acceso de terceros a las instalaciones de almacenamiento de gas a fin de lograr un equilibrio adecuado entre la necesidad de acceso efectivo y la de mantener los incentivos para desarrollar nuevas instalaciones de almacenamiento.

72. Un sistema de supervisión del comercio en los mercados mayoristas (por ejemplo las bolsas de energía) aumentaría la confianza en el mercado de los participantes en él y limitaría el riesgo de manipulación del mismo. Los reguladores deberían estar autorizados para recopilar e intercambiar la información conveniente a este respecto. Deberían estar facultados para recomendar medidas de aplicación de la normativa o para aplicarla ellos mismos.

4. CONCLUSIÓN

73. La investigación del sector ha puesto de manifiesto varias deficiencias graves que impiden que los usuarios y los consumidores europeos de energía se beneficien plenamente del proceso de liberalización. Los resultados de la investigación

14 Directiva 2003/55/CE, de 26 de junio de 2003, sobre normas comunes para el mercado interior del gas natural por la que se deroga la primera Directiva del gas.

15 Por ejemplo la escasa capacidad que los gestores de redes de transporte guardan en reserva para situaciones de urgencia puede ofertarse en el mercado como capacidad interrumpible y puede readquirirse cuando sea necesario, utilizando por ejemplo los ingresos procedentes de la congestión transfronteriza.

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corroboran las conclusiones de la Comunicación sobre "Perspectivas del mercado interior del gas y la electricidad", presentada por la Comisión como secuela del Libro Verde y en el camino de la preparación de la Revisión estratégica del sector de la energía de la UE. Estas iniciativas exponen las intenciones de la Comisión en cuanto a las propuestas de reforma de la regulación, destinadas a lograr un mercado interior de la energía que contribuya a la continuidad, competitividad y seguridad del suministro. Además, y paralelamente, el Informe final también presenta conclusiones en cuanto a las medidas de aplicación del derecho de competencia de la CE. Ambos documentos pretenden identificar y suprimir los obstáculos a la creación de un mercado único europeo de la energía, en el que los consumidores se beneficien plenamente de la apertura de los mercados a la competencia.

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