Nocion de Bioetica de Potter

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Potter's Notion of Bioethics

Henk A. M. J. ten Have

Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, Volume 22, Number 1, March 2012,

pp. 59-82 (Article)

Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press

DOI: 10.1353/ken.2012.0003

For additional information about this article

Accessed 12 May 2013 17:31 GMT GMT

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/ken/summary/v022/22.1.ten-have.html
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TEN HAVE POTTERS NOTION OF BIOETHICS

[ 59 ]Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal Vol. 22, No. 1, 5982 2012 by The Johns Hopkins University Press

Henk A. M. J. ten Have

Potters Notion of Bioethics

ABSTRACT: In 1970 Van Rensselaer Potter was the first to use the term bioeth-

ics in a publication to advocate the development of a new discipline to address

the basic problems of human flourishing. This article analyzes Potters notion

of bioethics in order to understand its origins, sources, and substance. In early

publications, Potter conceptualized bioethics as a bridge: between present and

future, nature and culture, science and values, and finally between humankind

and nature. In later publications, disappointed by a predominant focus on indi-

vidual and medical issues, and with a wish to underscore the need for a broader

perspective, Potter introduced the new term global bioethics, meant to tran-

scend ethics specialties and integrate them into a new interdisciplinary endeavor

to address global problems. A growing interest in global bioethics today means

that Potters original insights are more timely than ever.

INTRODUCTION: BIOETHICS AS BRIDGE

Bioethics, as a discipline combining scientific and philosophical

knowledge, originated forty years ago. It is not clear how the word

bioethics came into existence. Warren Reich concludes that it

had a bilocated birth in 19701971 with Van Rensselaer Potter and

Andr Hellegers, while Hans-Martin Sass attributes the origin of the word

to Fritz Jahr in 1927 (Reich 1994; Sass 2008). The controversy over the

coining of the term notwithstanding, the American cancer specialist Van

Rensselaer Potter was indisputably the first to publish a book on bioethics

(in 1971), using a bridge as a metaphor for the new discipline. In this book

and in subsequent publications he elaborates the notion of bioethics, a

notion that is different in many ways from the way bioethics is sometimes

conceived of today. The aim of this article is to analyze the substance of

Potters theory and the intellectual inspiration for his ideas.

Van Rensselaer Potter (19112001), son of a farmer in South Dakota,

was educated in biochemistry. After he obtained his PhD in 1938, he re-

ceived a postdoctoral fellowship and traveled to Sweden to work in the


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KENNEDY INSTITUTE OF ETHICS JOURNAL MARCH 2012

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Biokemiska Institutet in Stockholm. One year later he moved to England

intending to undertake a second year of research but just as he arrived, the

Second World War broke out. He went back to the United States where,

in 1940, he was appointed to the faculty of the University of Wisconsin.He worked for more than fifty years as a professor of oncology at the

McArdle Laboratory for Cancer Research at the University of Wisconsin

in Madison. Potter was an enthusiastic scientific researcher. Although he

was not involved in cancer therapy, he was one of the first biochemical

experts to study carcinogenesis. After his death, the memorial committee

of his faculty noted that he viewed science not as a job but as an ethi-

cal, passionate, and creative experience (Memorial Committee 2002).

Oncology, thought Potter, was essentially interdisciplinary; it cannot merely

focus on individual and medical perspectives, and he believed that the samedimension of social responsibility characterized other areas of research

(see Potter 1975b; Memorial Committee 2002). In the 1960s he began to

publish on issues outside his initial field of cancer research, such as the

concept of human progress, the interrelation between science and society,

and the role of the individual in modern society. These earlier publications

are included as chapters in his first book on bioethics, Bioethics: Bridge

to the Future, published in 1971. This broadening of scope owed, on the

one hand, to the limitations of the research in which he was fully engaged.Potter notes that progress has been made, but he also points out that the

goal of eliminating cancer was far away: we must be content with small

victories without expecting a breakthrough. There will be, he maintains,

some limited progress at the individual level (in terms of alleviation of

suffering and improved treatment), but he had come to believe that much

more could be accomplished at the population level (in terms of cancer

prevention).

On the other hand, Potter points out that his long-term preoccupation

with cancer research prevented him from realizing that there were moreimportant problems. He acknowledges that it took a long time before he

started to look around and take interest in the major problems of our

time (1971, p. 150). Although Potter does not systematically discuss

them, he organizes them into an alliterative list: population, peace, pol-

lution, poverty, politics, and progress. He regarded the consideration of

these issues as crucial to the survival of humankind, and their urgency

induced in him a growing concern regarding the future. What was neces-

sary, according to Potter, was a new science of survival: a new discipline

called bioethics.


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POTTERS EUREKA EXPERIENCE

In an interview in 1992 Potter remarks that the word bioethics just

came to him in a eureka moment (Reich 1994, p. 322), eureka itself being

a concept he ended up analyzing in connection with bioethics (see Potter

1975b). He defines eureka as the result of a new idea, concept, insight,

action plan, or experimental approach being formed subconsciously and

then erupting into our consciousness. The eureka moment has three prop-

erties: (a) suddenness; it cannot be willed and its occurrence is unpredict-

able; (b) euphoria; it is accompanied by a feeling of elation; (c) fallibility;

the idea itself is inherently capable of being in error. The second property

explains why new ideas often workthe accompanying euphoria invites

action, action leads to experience, and experience can lead to wisdom.The first and third properties lead to the recognition that the basic char-

acteristic of bioethics ought to be, as Potter formulates it, humility with

responsibility (1975b, p. 2297; 1975a, p. 18). Because there is always

the possibility of error, scientists ought not assume that their own area of

expertise will provide the entire answer to a complex problem. In order

to make recommendations for public policy, scientists should develop a

realistic understanding of the relevant data, steering a course between

optimistic and pessimistic evaluations so that the most feasible policy will

result. They should also maintain a sense of the limitations of the dataand processes at hand, looking both to interdisciplinary collaboration and

empirical testing of ideas as a corrective measure.

A NEW DISCIPLINE

For Potter, bioethics was the name of a discipline combining science

and philosophy, with wisdomknowledge of how to use knowledge

about human survival and flourishingas its goal (1970, p. 127). Wisdom

is action oriented. When there are competing possible policy outcomes

and priorities are uncertain, biological knowledge must be combined

with value judgments. In these circumstances, one can only proceed with

humility. At the same time, caution requires assessment mechanisms and

feedback so that one can learn from experience. For Potter, bioethics is a

sciencethe science of survivaland ought to employ scientific methodol-

ogy: testing ideas in peer groups and in experiments and building on what

has been learned from previous investigation. What is new for bioethics

is the interdisciplinary nature of this approach. We should transcend the

boundaries between disciplines to develop ideas that are susceptible to


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objective verification in terms of the future survival of man and improve-

ment in the quality of life for future generations (1970, p. 132).

The two basic featurescombining various categories of knowledge

and the need for continuous testing and assessingare reflected in thedefinition of bioethics that Potter provides a few years later: a new dis-

cipline that combines biological knowledge with a knowledge of human

value systems in an open-ended biocybernetic system of self-assessment

(1975b, p. 2299). Although the basic ideas were present in previous work,

they were now associated with and included in the notion of bioethics.

BRIDGE TO THE FUTURE: THE INSPIRATION OF MARGARET MEAD

In the opening sentence of the preface of his first book Potter empha-

sizes that he wants to contribute to the future of the human species. He

observes that part of the reason why the future is in danger is that the

two cultures of modern society, namely, the sciences and the humanities,

are not communicating. This concept had been developed by C. P. Snow

in his widely read 1959 lecture The Two Cultures. In modern Western

society common culture had been lost, and with his book, Potter intended

to answer this challenge: the new discipline of bioethics could build a bridge

between the two cultures and strengthen future-oriented problem solving.

In the preface he remarks that he had noticed that during his thirty years ofcancer research a growing philosophical concern about the future was a

constant thread of unity in my extra-curricular activities (1971, p. viii).

He also mentions that his concern about the future was in fact instigated

by the publications and activities of Margaret Mead (19011978). She

was one the first anthropologists to use anthropological analysis to study

the future of human civilization, arguing for the importance of assessing

possible cultural outcomes on the basis of adequate information and

knowledge. If we want to be able to determine what oughtto happen in

human society, we must determine what couldhappen and what is likelyto happen under controlled circumstances. In developing these visions of

the future, we must use two methods of approach, that of the humanities

and that of the sciences. Usually, Mead notes, negative visions are stronger

than positive ones, so to reverse this trend we need to deliberately develop

vivid utopias to guide our thought. In an age when the survival of hu-

manity is threatened by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,

the possibility of nuclear war, and the danger of ecological catastrophes,

this need for positive visions of the future was all the more pressing. Mead

even advocates that universities have special scholarschairs of the fu-


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turewho would apply humanistic and scientific tools in the service of

securing a livable human future (see Mead 1957).

Potter references this proposal several times in his own work, including

in his 1971 book (chap. 6) as well as in a 1965 publication with a verysimilar theme. Potter was troubled by what he saw as an unfortunate

divide between knowers (science) and doers (technology): knowledge is

accumulating faster than the wisdom to manage it, which makes knowledge

potentially dangerous (as vividly illustrated, for example, in the case of

thalidomide).1Further, policy decisions in most political systems tend to

focus on short-term effects, while longer-term perspectives are neglected

(1971, p. 78). Finally, complex decisions about a collective human future

involve facts as well as valuescommunication between the two cultures.

To remedy these deficiencies, Potter proposes the formation of a Councilon the Future, an independent institution that would be charged with

predicting the consequences and interactions that might result from the

application of new knowledge (1971, p. 77). The council should be

interdisciplinary and include experts from the natural and social sciences

and the humanities, and be balanced by a democratic forum, open to

outsiders and public debate on social problems. These mechanisms, he

states, could help bridge the gaps between knowing and doing, between

values and facts.In the 1960s, the future became a serious subject of public and scholarly

interest. In 1965, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences initiated

the Commission on the Year 2000, the forerunner of what became the

field of futurism. Margaret Mead was one of its members. Rather than as-

suming that the future can be predicted, the commission aimed to identify

structural changes in society with long-term social impact. In 1967, the

World Future Society was established in the United States; within 12 years

its membership increased from a few hundred to 60,000. One year later,

the Club of Rome was founded. Its report Limits to Growth, publishedin 1972, analyzing the interaction between the growing world population

and limited natural resources, argued that many key resources for the

survival of humanity will ultimately be depleted.

Potter paid tribute to Meads publication on vivid utopias in his 1971

book. Her ideas directed his attention toward the heuristic role of visions

of desirable futures in the development of culture, as well as the need to

bring together sciences and humanities for such visions to emerge. But

in contrast to Mead, who has no particular future in mind, Potter works

with a specific vision of the future: acceptable survival of the human spe-


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cies. He elaborates this vision more clearly in a later publication, singling

out the survival of humankind as the vivid utopia and general goal of

bioethics, attainable only by forging compromises between sanctity of

life and quality of life and between individual interests and the socialgood (2001, p. 20). Meads ideas also enabled Potter to articulate some

specific topics on the bioethics agenda early on: his 1971 book highlights

the problem of dangerous knowledge, related to what we today call

dual use. Scientific knowledge is not inherently good; bioethics is needed

to provide the wisdom to manage dangerous knowledge and to assist in

policy decisions concerning the impact of new scientific knowledge by in-

tegrating facts and values (1971, pp. 7677). These early ideas, presented

in an elementary way by Potter, would be more extensively elaborated by

others at a later stage. Potter was somewhat more specific in one of his lastpublications where he identifies the specific goals of bioethics: promoting

public health and womens rights, preventing overpopulation, protecting

the environment and biodiversity, and transforming society in such a way

as to achieve the common good. Bioethics can only reach its general goal

of global survival in the long term by addressing these particular issues

(see Potter 2001).

BRIDGE BETWEEN NATURE AND NURTURE

The future, argues Potter, cannot take care of itself. Human beings

need to take their destiny into their own hands. Only by bridging the gap

between the sciences and the humanities can we hope to build a bridge

to the future (1971, pp. 15051). This bridge between the present and

the future enables the creation of another bridge. Bioethics, as the science

of survival, can also forge connections between biological and cultural

evolution. Between these two processes many parallels and analogies

exist; both are directed toward survival; both are susceptible to external

guidance (see Potter 1975b). Potter elaborated his ideas in a publicationon human progress in a 1962 essay (included in his 1971 book) in which

he questions the general assumption, especially in the American context,

that progress toward a worthy social goal will take place on its own.

We need, argues Potter, the new discipline of bioethics to safeguard the

survival of humankind.

In this connection, Potter distinguishes between three concepts of prog-

ress. The religious concept considers progress as transcendent; it is the

transition from this world to the world to come. The materialistic concept

of progress is immanent; it focuses more on what already exists and on


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knowledge of the sciences and of the humanities that we can bridge nature

and culture and therefore build a bridge to the future.

TEILHARD DE CHARDIN

An important intellectual source of inspiration for Potter, especially

in his early publications, was the work of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin

(18811955). Potter references his work in the preface of his 1971 book,

explaining that he began to study it in 1964, and mentions Teilhards

books at the end of his 1970 article. In 1968, Potter published an article

on Teilhard, later included as chapter 2 in his 1971 book. He recognized

that Teilhard, too, was interested in the problem of human progress. They

share the view that human progress is the goal of the universe, that we

should try to bring about the best possible future, and that the best way

to do this is to combine the science of biology with human values. Potter

therefore took it for granted that he could regard Teilhards work as a

corroboration of some of his basic ideas.

Still, there are significant differences between the two mens views.

Although both employ an evolutionary point of view, their objectives are

different. Potters approach is pragmatic; he is primarily interested in solv-

ing problems. Teilhards emphasis is on developing a vision of the future

oriented around the question of humanitys place in the universe. For thefirst time in its history, humankind is aware that it is part of a process of

evolution, that it is itself evolving. This predicament explains the uneasi-

ness, the discontent, the disquiet of modern humankind and the uncertainty

about its role in the world. The sciences, according to Teilhard, almost

never address this basic question; they focus instead on separate and iso-

lated issues but never pay attention to the whole picture. He is impressed

by the discrepancy between the accumulation of scientific knowledge and

the ability to create a responsible perspective of life, world, and history

on the basis of this knowledge. Potter shares this concern; in his view, thesciences are too specialized and lack a general perspective. But instead of

developing a new encompassing vision, Potter primarily emphasizes the

need for interdisciplinary cooperation on the basis of which new visions

may be created (see Potter 1964 and 1970).

The challenge, for Teilhard, is to outline a vision of the world that

emerges from the accomplishments of science and that takes into account

the role of human values. Teilhard takes the notion of evolution as the

starting point for such an endeavor. He believes this biological notion can

clarify all dimensions of the human condition: matter, life, and mind (see


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Teilhard 2004). Teilhard suggests that the ongoing evolution of humankind

will reach an ultrahuman phase characterized by greater complexity and

consciousness. In Teilhards view, humanity was becoming more unified,

more interdependent, and increasingly cooperative and would eventuallyconverge into a cosmopolitan community. Growing unification within

complex diversities and an increasing feeling of solidarity between human

beings are stages in the process of evolution that will lead to what he calls

the planetization of mankind (1975, p. 252). The world population

grows while the surface of the earth remains the same; therefore, people

will be forced to cooperate even more intensely: We can progress only

by uniting (2004, p. 66).

For Potter, this view of evolution is too optimistic. Recall his view of

the fatal flaw of evolution: natural selection is based on short-termconsiderations; it aims at survival in terms of the present environment. It

does not take into account the fact of a continuously changing environ-

ment; as soon as the organism is adapted to its specialized environment, it

is increasingly vulnerable to changes. Both natural selection and cultural

evolution, which appreciate ideas for their present rather than future value,

are incapable of seeing into the future (Potter 1971, p. 109). Given

these conditions, as we have seen, Potter argues that the key concept in

evolutionary thinking should be adaptability.Potter also blamed Teilhard for blurring the distinction between biologi-

cal and cultural evolution (see Potter 1971). Indeed, for Teilhard, these

two types of evolution are one and the same process in different stages;

such progress encompasses the whole of reality and thus there is continuity

between cosmic, biological, human, and cultural evolution. In his view,

progress is a force; it is built into living matter and human beings bring it

into culture (see Teilhard 2004). For Potter, there is no progress in matter:

biological evolution often goes into the reverse direction, leading to extinc-

tion. According to Potter, the crucial actors are human beings, who shouldcontinuously strive to build a better future society. A sustained effort is

required since, according to Potter, the ultimate destiny of humankind is

unknown. Potter criticizes Teilhard for not considering the desirability of

multiple alternative evolutionary pathways; he believes, in Potters words,

that humankind can know where [evolution] is going and how to get

there (1971, p. 30). This is possibly a misunderstanding of Teilhards

thinking, which is generally not characterized by nave optimism. The

ultimate completion of evolution, in the perspective of Teilhard, is only

a possibility not a certainty; an almost limitless field of action lies open


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to us in the future ( 2004, p. 63). Humankind itself will evolve into a

cosmopolitan phase only if we use our knowledge diligently and wisely.

Teilhard argues that since humanity has the capacity for reflection, we

can give direction to our own evolution, collaborating with and ulti-mately shaping this ongoing process. Seeing to the progress of the human

world is, for Teilhard, the foundation of ethics. Humankind is at a critical

crossroads; we may choose a future orientation: progress, retrogression or

decline (see Teilhard 1975). If Potters criticism of Teilhard as naively opti-

mistic was slightly misplaced, it is only because Teilhard, too, emphasized

the possibility of self-correction in the progression of human development.

Finally, Potter criticizes Teilhard for being too positive about science.

Scientific knowledge is not always reliable; it can lead to undesirable ap-

plications and unintended results. As we have seen, Potter was especiallyconcerned with the issue of dangerous knowledge, a key instance of

which he took to be the problem of the population explosion. This is

perhaps also an underlying reason for disagreement with Teilhard. As a

Jesuit, he is for Potter a representative of so-called primitive religion,

believing in revelation, prophecy, and an afterlife that he regarded as more

important than earthly life. Religious ideas, in Potters view, help to main-

tain the unlimited growth of populations (1971, p. 85). Still, Teilhard is

also a critical representative of religion. In a note Potter added to Bioeth-ics, he expresses the expectation that Teilhard, had he been living then,

would have supported the goal of zero population growth (1971, p. 29).

Regardless of the differences, it is clear that Potter shares many ideas

with Teilhard: the necessity of adopting an evolutionary perspective, the

importance of progress, a concern for the future, the need to combine

scientific knowledge and values. Above all, they share the belief that evolu-

tion cannot be explained from its starting point; it can only be understood

by focusing on the endpoint, the human being, and the possibilities for

the future.

THE INFLUENCE OF PRAGMATISM: JAMES AND DEWEY

As we have seen, Potters views on bioethics are characterized by a

mixture of theoretical perspectives, especially evolutionary thinking and

a concern with the future. But they are also developed within a theoreti-

cal context that is less explicit: the philosophy of pragmatism. Several

of the basic ideas of Potters conception of bioethics are connected with

pragmatism, although Bioethics refers only once to a specific pragmatist

work (1971, p. 146) and mentions the names of key thinkers without


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going into details (1971, pp. 80, 113, 135). An influential philosophy

during the first half of the twentieth century, pragmatism is perhaps best

understood as an ambitious effort to synthesize scientific knowledge and

methods with ethical judgment, an attempt to integrate knowledge andvalues long before Snows lecture (Thayer 1973). Pragmatism is centered

on several ideas that are seminal in Potters thinking: rejection of dualisms,

orientation toward the future, and a concern with notions of progress

and responsibility.

Pragmatism anticipated the midcentury angst over the division between

cultures. It envisaged itself as a mediator between what William James

(18421910) called the tough-mindedness of science and the tender-mind-

edness of religious and moral values. In his history of modern philosophy,

John Passmore actually refers to Jamess devotion to bridge-building(1968, p. 104). John Dewey (18591952) was even more outspoken in

his rejection of dualisms in all the forms that they have occurred: science

versus values, acting versus thinking, theory versus practice, mind versus

body, human beings versus nature, organism versus environment. In the

view of these pragmatists, the separation of moral values and scientific

knowledge had been characteristic of modern thought since the seven-

teenth century. The historical mission of pragmatism was to reconcile

or bridge these separations. This is the main thread in Deweys longphilosophical career: Certainly one of the most genuine problems of

modern life is the reconciliation of the scientific view of the universe with

the claims of the moral life (1931, p. 43).

The task of philosophy is thus reconstructive: to bridge the separation

between science and values, to forge continuity. The pragmatist solution to

this apparent gap was the theory of knowledge as valuation. Both valuing

and knowing are logically common modes of intelligent action; knowing

is itself an evaluative activity. Scientific knowledge is a paradigm of moral

activity. For Potter, this intrinsic link between thinking and acting is at-tractive as a bridge between science and values. Ethics, in Deweys view,

is nothing more than the placing of physical, biological, and historical

knowledge in a human context as a means of guiding human activities.

Ethics is not different from science; both use the same methodology.

Bridging the gap between knowledge and action allows us to use scientific

knowledge in the formation of moral standards and ideals. That is why

Potter argues that bioethics must be based on modern concepts of biology

and not on unsupported introspection (1971, p. 4).


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The pragmatic theory of knowledge is also intrinsically oriented toward

the future. Knowledge is successful practice. James characterizes ideas

and beliefs as plans of action (1907, p. 32). Theories and concepts are

instruments, not answers to enigmas; they have the capacity to lead us tofuture facts and experiences. Dewey shares this emphasis on the future:

Pragmatism . . . does not insist upon antecedent phenomena but upon

consequent phenomena, not upon the precedents but upon the possibilities

for action (McDermott 1973, p. 50). Judgments of facts and judgments of

value have the same orientation: both are predictions concerning the future.

The implication is that in ethics one should use the same methodological

approach as in science: ethical principles, standards, and rules should be

regarded as hypotheses. They are, in Deweys words, intellectual instru-

ments to be tested and confirmedand alteredthrough consequenceseffected by acting upon them (McDermott 1973, p. 592).

Potter clearly reiterates these ideas. He repeatedly argues that all ideas

are tentative and subject to evaluation (1971, pp. 110, 164; 1975b).

Ethical concepts are not fixed but evolving (see Potter 1977). The new

discipline of bioethics is characterized by fallibility (see Potter 1975b).

Therefore, continuous testing and assessment are imperative. First, we

have to determine what the consequences of an action will be. Second, the

consequences have to be assessed. This requires empirical investigation(for the first level of activity) as well as evaluation of the meaning and

value of the consequences (for the second level of activity). What is new

in bioethics is that disciplinary boundaries are crossed: the two levels of

activity will necessarily combine scientific knowledge and knowledge of

human values (see Potter 1970).

But bioethics is also innovative in its focus on action (1971, p. vii). Since

we can no longer be satisfied with the contemplation of nature but are

challenged to modify and improve it, the traditional spectator perspective

of knowledge is inadequate. In the new discipline of bioethics, ethics isnot an isolated, theoretical activity: it is not speculative or meditative but

rather strives to change and improve the world. Ethics only has a meaning

when we are involved actors. This possibly motivates Potter to close his

two books with a bioethical creed presenting five statements of belief

each followed by a commitment to action (see Potter 1971 and 1988). The

focus on action is promoted by a pragmatist interpretation of the notion

of progress. As already noted, Potter is careful and critical with this no-

tion, having criticized Teilhard for being too optimistic about progress.

He argues for a middle road between optimism and pessimism about the


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future: the world can be improved, although we have no guarantee that it

will be improved (see Potter 1975a). As long as evolution is not finished

and the universe is still plastic (Dewey 1931, p. 25), improvement is

possible. This is what Potter calls long range pragmatism: ideas andaction should aim to ensure the long-term goal of the survival of human-

kind (1962, p. 3).

Finally, Potter builds on another basic tenet of pragmatism: responsibil-

ity. He characterizes bioethics as a morality of responsibility (1988, p.

153), and like James, he assumes that the starting point for ethics is the

moral experience of responsibility for action (see James 1907). This expe-

rience of responsibly choosing requires that choices are free, that the free

acts of human beings introduce novelty in the world: these acts determine

the future of an underdetermined cosmos. Exercising our freedom can thusbe decisive for the future of the world and the survival of our species (see

Potter 1988). Scientific knowledge and biological science in particular can

help us in making these responsible choices, as Dewey argues: we have a

responsibility to use advanced knowledge and technology to control the

social consequences of the application of science. But where do we find

guidance, directive standards, if we no longer can rely on familiar and

traditional values? Deweys answer is in the findings of natural science. The

separation between knowledge and action has deprived scientific knowl-edge of its proper service as a guide of conduct (McDermott 1973, p.

589). However, if we canas Potter arguesreconnect science and eth-

ics, we can also relate our value judgments to the conclusions of science.

The interrelation between progress and responsibility and between

science and philosophy is echoed in Potters characterization of bioethics

as an enterprise combining humility with responsibility. Since we have

freedom of choice, we are responsible for the future, but at the same

time the possible outcome is always uncertain. The only thing that the

evolving morality of bioethics can do is work to continuously developthe best possible understanding of the world and humankinds place in

it (1990, p. 90).

THE INFLUENCE OF ALDO LEOPOLD

Another theoretical perspective Potter draws on is environmental eth-

ics, a field that burgeoned in the 1960s as worries about nuclear warfare,

the impact of pesticides, pollution, and the rapid depletion of natural

resources came into public focus. During this same period, policy makers

as well as the general public became more aware of the significance of


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the environment. In 1970, American environmental activists organized a

nationwide day called Earth Day to raise awareness about environmental

issues; in the same year, the U.S. government established the Environmental

Protection Agency, and in 1971 the United Nations proclaimed the annualcelebration of an international Earth Day.

During the same period, biology was rapidly expanding, with the emer-

gence of ecology as a new discipline that studies the interrelations between

plants, animals, human beings and the physical environment. Public

awareness of the fact that the natural environment of humankind is not

limitless was increasing. Although environmental ethics as a philosophical

discipline emerged later in the 1970s, new approaches to ethics that would

take account of environmental problems were advocated earlier (Attfield

2003). Aldo Leopold (18871948) played an especially influential role.He worked in forestry and wildlife management before being appointed

professor of game management at the University of Wisconsin-Madison

in 1933. Leopold was a staunch advocate for the preservation of wildlife

and wilderness areas. He had a strong and early influence on the ecologi-

cal movement with a book published in 1949 shortly after his death. In

this publication he introduces the notion of a land ethic, which extends

the notion of community from human community to a community that

includes soil, waters, plants, and animals. The land should be regardedas one living organism, a system of interdependent parts, an ecosystem,

of which human beings are merely a part. Leopold formulates a central

tenet of this ethic as follows: A thing is right when it tends to preserve

the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong

when it tends otherwise (1949, pp. 22425).

Potter dedicates his first book on bioethics to the memory of Aldo Leo-

pold, who anticipated the extension of ethics to Bioethics (1971, p. v).

He quotes Leopold in arguing that there are three stages in the develop-

ment of ethics. The first stage concerns the relation between individuals,the second stage the relation between individual and society, and the third

stagewhich does not yet existthe relation of human beings to their

environment: the land and the animals and plants growing on it. Potter

was convinced that his new discipline of bioethics would be the realization

of Leopolds third stage of ethics (see Potter 1988). I had continued Leo-

polds line of thought, he writes (1987, p. 158), though he later admitted

that he was unaware of Leopolds existence when they were colleagues in

the same university (see Potter 2000). Notably, he added the dedication

to Leopold when the 1971 book was ready for publication but he did not


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include any references to Leopolds work. Potters second book, Global

Bioethics, published in 1988, more fully recognizes Leopolds influence

(2000, p. 89).

From the beginning, Potters primary concern was to bridge the dividebetween humankind and nature. He argues that human ethics cannot be

separated from a realistic understanding of ecology in the broadest sense

(1971, p. vii). His criticism of evolutionary thinkingthat it does not take

into account the central notion of adaptationis intrinsically linked to

his appreciation of the significance of an environment that is continuously

and rapidly changing. The concept of an optimum environment plays

a central role in chapters 8, 9 and 10 of his book. The environment is

changing, mostly owing to human influences. Rethinking ethics is neces-

sary since the survival of the total ecosystem is at stake. In the end, thequestion is what kind of environment will be able to sustain and improve

the civilized world (1971, p. 130). That is why ethics should be enlarged

or extended, including in its scope not only individual and social issues

but also environmental issues. This requires that we reflect on the long-

term consequences of science as well as develop a common value system

with our obligations to future generations as a core element (1971, p.

192). Two challenges are particularly highlighted: peaceful preservation

of our earthly environment and achieving a balance between populationand environment.

In Potters view, it is evident that ecological problems arise from hu-

man population growth (1971, p. 179). In his list of major problems of

our time, population is at the top. Potter highlights two aspects of the

problem (1971, pp. 15455): first, that population-level interventions

have contributed more to advancing human welfare than individualized

medicine. There is effective and available knowledge that is currently

not applied but shouldbe applied to whole populationsfor instance,

vaccination for infectious diseases. If we really want to use scientificknowledge for improving the human condition, the focus should be on

survival as a species rather than on prolongation of individual life. But

the advancement of science has also contributed to out-of-control nature

of the world population. More effective public health interventions will

only exacerbate the population problem.

Secondly, Potter notes that the usual ethical approach of moral persua-

sionappeals to individual consciencewill be insufficient to solve the

population problem (1971, p. 155). It is not clear how Potter himself be-

lieved the problem should be addressed, though he suggests that mandatory


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GLOBAL BIOETHICS

Although Potter reiterates many of his earlier ideas in Global Bioethics,

what Potter wanted to accomplish with this new volume was twofold.

First, we need an ethics that seeks a better balance between humankind

and the natural world; the ecological perspective should be included in

bioethics. The strong emphasis in this book on Leopolds ideas underlines

the significance of the environmental point of view for ethics: Potter singles

Leopold out as the first bioethicist (1988, p. xiii). Second, if bioethics

has the long-term goal of survival of humankind, it should take a broad

view, relating medical concerns to social and environmental issues. It

should overcome the divides between nature and culture, science and

values, humankind and nature. In order to better articulate this broaderapproach Potter introduces the concept of globalbioethics. The word

global suggests what should be newthe approach should be unified

and comprehensive as well as worldwide in scope 1988, p. 78).

The dimension of globalization is, curiously, not articulated in Potters

conception of bioethics in the 1970s. There is no explicit mention of the

global scope of problems or the global nature of required solutions.2This

is remarkable since what we call globalization today plays an important

role in the work of Teilhard de Chardin, already cited as one of Potters

chief intellectual influences. Owing to the processes of planetary com-pression (intensified communication, travel, exchanges through economic

networks) and psychic interpenetration (increased interconnectedness

and a growing sense of universal solidarity) humankind will be involved

in an irresistible process of unification, according to Teilhard (2004, pp.

106ff). Shortly after the Second World War, Teilhard wrote that even in-

cidental recurrences of racism and nationalism do not have importance in

the overall process of cultural and social evolution of the planet; they are

disastrous for individuals but compel us sooner or later to come together on

the basis of human solidarity (2004, p. 108). Leopold, too, emphasized the

need for a global perspective in ethics. The fact that many environmental

problems have a global nature will require a rethinking of ethics on the

basis of notions like global community and global citizenship.

At the same time, we might say that the global dimension was always

implicit in Potters work. Bioethics basicproblems, such as population

growth and poverty, affect all of humankind. Bioethicsgoalof survival

is global since what is at stake is the survival of humanity. And bioethics

methodsare global in the sense that they combine all available intellectualresources for long-term approaches. In the closing pages of his 1971 book.


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Potter expresses the hope that bioethics will create a worldwide move-

ment (1971, p. 194). However, there was a specific reason why Potter in

the late 1980s and 1990s promoted the new name of globalbioethics.

POTTERS DISSATISFACTION

Potter notes, disapprovingly, in Aldo Leopolds Land Ethics Revisited,

that the original term bioethics . . . was restricted to the medical applica-

tion by the people at Georgetown University (1987, p. 159), a point he

had already made, not long after he introduced the term in the early sev-

enties (Potter 1975b). He was surprised that its meaning had migrate[d]

from its initial usage (1996, p. 2) in his own work to a restrictive emphasis

on medical ethics (1975b, p. 2300), redefined as clinical ethics (1996a,

p. 1). The problem, in Potters view, is not so much that bioethics focused

on medical issues but rather that it elaborated an ethics of individuals and

individual relations (Leopolds first stage of ethics) and therefore neglected

ecological, population and social problems. The Georgetown approach

to bioethics took a short-term view (1987, p. 159) rather than focusing

on the continued existence of the human species. Finally, it considered

old problems (abortion, euthanasia) rather than problems that really

matter for the survival of humankind ( 2000, p. 89). Potter also criticizes

environmental ethics; it went its own way, separated from bioethics (seePotter 1995), becoming an ethics specialty without a broader perspective

(see Potter 1977 and 1999). Potters broad vision of bioethics had, in this

divergence, become an orphan (1995, p. 369). By rebranding his vision

as global bioethics, he hoped to reintegrate the two domains.

Potter indicates several times that there were also personal reasons for

his dissatisfaction. He did not feel recognized by the bioethics community,

observing that his books were not read by most scholars (see Potter 2000).

He notes that when the Institute for Human Reproduction and Bioethics

at Georgetown University was founded, all mention of his books wasomitted (see Potter 1995). While he was successful in cancer research,

he wondered why he was so unrecognized in the U.S. when I began

to write about ethical questions (1996, p. 3). He seemed to regret that

professors of philosophy had taken over the field of bioethics, turning

it into an ethics specialty, noting that he himself was without credentials

in philosophy (see Potter 1987, 1996, and 1999). Like Teilhard, Potter did

not want to be philosopher. The emphasis on philosophy also tended to

downplay Potters scientific experience as a cancer researcher, along with

the lessons about trade-offs between individual and global perspectives


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he drew from it (see Potter 1988, 2001). Potter passionately believed that

environmental and future-oriented concerns could not be separated from

a medical perspective, since all are necessary to secure for human health.

Bioethics cannot be reduced to biomedical ethics (see Potter 1987).Reich (1995) offers several explanations as to why Potters ideas about

bioethics were marginalized, some of which relate to Potters own work.

For instance, the 1971 book is actually a compilation of mostly journal

articles published during the previous nine years. The connection between

the chapters in the book is not always obvious, and so it is difficult for

the reader to summarize Potters theory by the close of the volume. The

writings are complicated and eclectic; they are a mixture of components

from various theories and scholars, difficult to articulate in a coherent

and systematic way. This eclecticism means that his expositions have littleappeal as a vision. One also gets the impression that he at times seems

to present his own ideas through the work of others, using long quota-

tions, leaving the reader to implicitly assume that they reflect the thinking

of Potter himself. Reading Potters early work produces a kaleidoscopic

feeling. The various bridges that he wanted to construct are the result of

bricolage; they are the outcome of trying, testing, and tinkering rather

than the result of a conventional, analytical style of solving problems.

Drawing upon future-oriented thinking, evolutionary science, pragma-tism, and ecological philosophy, he further introduced ideas from systems

theory and molecular biology in order to address the pressing problems of

his time. The 1988 book is more readable but has similar heterogeneous

characteristics: many issues are discussed, but it is difficult to highlight

the main ideas. The book presents many practical issues and dilemmas,

but the analysis is often brief and inconclusive.

Another factor is that although both of his monographs are on bioethics,

the ethical component is rather underdeveloped. Potter says little about

ethics itself. The role of ethics is not articulated even as the need for a newethical perspective is continuously underlined. Rather than elaborating

the substance of a new ethics, Potter prefers to dwell on the procedures

that might be used to develop bioethics. This is perhaps consistent with

his image of the bridge. The important feature of bioethics is its inter-

disciplinarity. Bioethics is a kind of hyperscience; it should use scientific

methodology (generating new ideas, testing them in peer groups, in ex-

periments, and in discussion with the literature) while at the same time

crossing the boundaries between disciplines. The best way to proceed is

therefore to establish groups of experts from various disciplines in which


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scientific competence is combined with humility. Because bioethics is a

branch of science, in Potters view, the bioethicist is first of all a biologist.

Bioethics is a new holistic biology that includes the social sciences and

humanities. Potter argues that we need a new breed of scholars trainedin the humanities and social sciences but in particular in molecular biology

(1964, p. 1022; 1971, p. 66). He explicitly rejects a bioethics based on

unsupported introspection (1970, p. 130). He does not explain what

he means, but presumably he refers to philosophical and ethical reflec-

tion. How the wisdom that Potter advocates will emerge in the practice of

interdisciplinary activities is not clear. If biological science is a source of

value judgments, the risk is that bioethics will only reproduce the values

already implicit in science itself.

Instead of engaging in theoretical reflections concerning ethics, Potterdemonstrates a pragmatic approach, as mentioned. Both monographs end

with a bioethical creed for individuals, listing five beliefs and commit-

ments in 1971 and seven in 1988. This approach to ethics is not unusual

for scientists. Academies of science are used to making codes of conduct,

and researchers commit themselves to some ethical rules of engage-

ment. Formulating a creed demonstrates that for Potter ethics is a matter

of conviction and action rather than reflection and argumentation. His

work is filled with practical proposals, charts, diagrams, and lists: twelvefundamental biological concepts for the development of bioethics and

seven principles for an optimum environment (1971, p. 105), as well as

charts and schemes to illustrate processes, interactions, and developments

(e.g., 1971, p. 111; 1988, pp. 15960). This is in line with his pragmatist

philosophy that the value of new ideas is in their application, and that

the goal of reflection is problem solving. But it also suggests that the new

bioethics is like an empirical science; as long as we use clear methodologies

and procedures that have proven their value in the domain of science, we

will reach new solutions to ethical dilemmas.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

Potters concept of global bioethics is attracting more attention today

than in the past, when Reich could only identify a modest legacy for

Potter (1994, p. 322). His work has received more recognition outside

the United States in particularfor example, in Colombia (Osorio 2005),

Croatia (Segota 1999) and Italy (Furnari 2002). In 2000 Potter was

awarded the first Bioethics Prize of the International Society of Bioethics

(convening in Gijon, Spain). More importantly, the idea that biomedical


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ethics should broaden its mission has been gaining support (Brock 2000;

Daniels 2006; Holm and Williams-Jones 2006; Turoldo 2007; Dwyer

2009; Gruen and Ruddick 2009; Ross 2010; Verkerk and Lindemann

2011). In Global Bioethics, Potter argues that global bioethics providesthe bridge between medical and ecological bioethics; in the 1996 Real

Bioethics and the 1999 Fragmented Ethics and Bridge Bioethics, he

includes agricultural ethics, social ethics, organizational, and religious

ethics.3Echoing this shift, there has recently been much more attention

paid to global issues in bioethics, including issues such as global health

(Wikler and Cash 2009), population control (Callahan 2009), and global

justice and poverty (Pogge 2010).

Potter also had noticed that the search for a global scope for ethics had

been undertaken by world religions, especially through the activities ofHans Kng (see Potter 1994, 1995). In one of his last publications, Potter

advocates for the involvement of the United Nations in bioethics and even

for the establishment of a Bioethics Development Section in the orga-

nization (2001, p. 29). Today, UN agencies as WHO and UNESCO have

sections for bioethics, and member states of UNESCO have unanimously

adopted the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (An-

dorno 2007; Ten Have and Jean 2009). Potters idea of global bioethics

is reflected in the principles of this declaration, which is concerned withhealth care, the biosphere and future generations, and social justice.

The first drafts of this paper were written during a visit as the Oscar M. Ruebhausen Visiting

Professor in the Department of Bioethics at Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland,

Ohio. I am grateful for the support of the Greenwall Foundation and the assistance of my

colleagues in Cleveland. I would particularly like to thank my Duquesne colleague Gerard

Magill for helping to improve the text.

NOTES

1. Thalidomide, a sedative drug introduced in the late 1950s, was withdrawn

from the market in 1961 after it was proven to be the cause of congenital

deformities such as phocomelia in thousands of patients, mostly in Europe.

The case stimulated the introduction of more stringent legislation requiring

tests for safety during pregnancy for new drugs.

2. In his early publications, Potter only mentions once that bioethics is address-

ing global problems (1977, p. 251).

3. Potter used the name real bioethics for this comprehensive category, which

embraces agricultural, environmental, medical, organizational, and religiousethics globally (1996b, p. 182).


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