La Teoría Del Juicio de Arendt-Stanford Enciclopedia

8/12/2019 La Teora Del Juicio de Arendt-Stanford Enciclopedia

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http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/arendt/

esquema para la teora del juicio de Arendt.

Hannah Arendt

First published Thu Jul 27, 2006

Hannah Arendt (190619!" #as one of the most influential political philosophers of the

t#entieth centur$. %orn into a &erman'e#ish famil$) she #as forced to lea*e &erman$ in19++ and li*ed in ,aris for the ne-t eiht $ears) #orin for a numer of e#ish refueeoranisations. n 1921 she immirated to the 3nited 4tates and soon ecame part of a li*el$

intellectual circle in 5e# or. 4he held a numer of academic positions at *arious

American uni*ersities until her death in 19!. 4he is est no#n for t#o #ors that had a

major impact oth #ithin and outside the academic communit$. 7he first) The Origins ofTotalitarianism) pulished in 19!1) #as a stud$ of the 5a8i and 4talinist reimes that

enerated a #ide'ranin deate on the nature and historical antecedents of the totalitarian

phenomenon. 7he second) The Human Condition) pulished in 19!) #as an oriinalphilosophical stud$ that in*estiated the fundamental cateories of the vita activa(laor)

#or) action". n addition to these t#o important #ors) Arendt pulished a numer of

influential essa$s on topics such as the nature of re*olution) freedom) authorit$) traditionand the modern ae. At the time of her death in 19!) she had completed the first t#o

*olumes of her last major philosophical #or) The ife of the !ind) #hich e-amined the

three fundamental faculties of the vita contemplativa(thinin) #illin) judin".

1. %ioraphical 4etch

. ntroduction

+. Arendt;s reedom) and ,luralit$

o 2. Action and 4peech as ?isclosure

o 2.+ Action) 5arrati*e) and @ememranceo 2.2 Action) ,o#er) and the 4pace of Appearance

o 2.! Action) 3npredictailit$) and rre*ersiilit$

!. Arendt;s 7heor$ of udment

o !.1 udment: 7#o =odels

o !. udment and the ita


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o !.! udment and the ita Acti*a

o !.6 udment and alidit$

6. Arendt;s rance and mo*ed to 5e# or #ith her husand andmother. n 5e# or she soon ecame part of an influential circle of #riters and

intellectuals athered around the journal&artisan $evie'. ?urin the post'#ar period she

lectured at a numer of American uni*ersities) includin ,rinceton) %erele$ and ") a second!en in "ar* Times(hereafter =?7") and a third Crises of the

$epublic(hereafter


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!ind) #hich #as pulished posthumousl$ in 19 (hereafter D=". 7he third *olume) on

Judging) #as left unfinished) ut some acround material and lecture notes #erepulished in 19 under the titleectures on .ant/s &olitical &hilosoph(hereafter DC,,".

2. Introduction

Hannah Arendt #as one of the seminal political thiners of the t#entieth centur$. 7he

po#er and oriinalit$ of her thinin #as e*ident in #ors such as The Origins ofTotalitarianism) The Human Condition) On $evolutionand The ife of the !ind. n these

#ors and in numerous essa$s she rappled #ith the most crucial political e*ents of her

time) tr$in to rasp their meanin and historical import) and sho#in ho# the$ affected

our cateories of moral and political judment. Bhat #as required) in her *ie#) #as a ne#frame#or that could enale us to come to terms #ith the t#in horrors of the t#entieth

centur$) 5a8ism and 4talinism. 4he pro*ided such frame#or in her oo on

totalitarianism) and #ent on to de*elop a ne# set of philosophical cateories that couldilluminate the human condition and pro*ide a fresh perspecti*e on the nature of political

life.

Althouh some of her #ors no# elon to the classics of the Bestern tradition of political

thouht) she has al#a$s remained difficult to classif$. Her political philosoph$ cannot echaracteri8ed in terms of the traditional cateories of conser*atism) lieralism) and

socialism. 5or can her thinin e assimilated to the recent re*i*al of communitarian

political thouht) to e found) for e-ample) in the #ritins of A. =acnt$re) =. 4andel)


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ecause it ma$ lead to areement or to a shared conception of the ood) ut ecause it

enales each citi8en to e-ercise his or her po#ers of aenc$) to de*elop the capacities forjudment and to attain $ concerted action some measure of political efficac$.

shall reconstruct Arendt;s political philosoph$ alon four major themes: (1" her

conception of modernit$) (" her theor$ of action) (+" her theor$ of judment) and (2" herconception of citi8enship.

3. Arendt's Conception of Modernity

n her major philosophical #or) The Human Condition) and in some of the essa$s

collected inet'een &ast and Future) Arendt articulated a fairl$ neati*e conception of

modernit$. n these #ritins Arendt is primaril$ concerned #ith the losses incurred as aresult of the eclipse of tradition) reliion) and authorit$) ut she offers a numer of

illuminatin suestions #ith respect to the resources that the modern ae can still pro*ide

to address questions of meanin) identit$) and *alue.

>or Arendt modernit$ is characteri8ed $ the loss of the 'orld) $ #hich she means therestriction or elimination of the pulic sphere of action and speech in fa*or of the pri*ate

#orld of introspection and the pri*ate pursuit of economic interests. =odernit$ is the ae of

mass societ$) of the rise of thesocialout of a pre*ious distinction et#een the pulic andthe pri*ate) and of the *ictor$ of animal laboranso*er homo faberand the classical

conception of man as1oon politi*on. =odernit$ is the ae of ureaucratic administration

and anon$mous laor) rather than politics and action) of elite domination and the

manipulation of pulic opinion. t is the ae #hen totalitarian forms of o*ernment) such as5a8ism and 4talinism) ha*e emered as a result of the institutionali8ation of terror and

*iolence. t is the ae #here histor$ as a natural processI has replaced histor$ as a faric

of actions and e*ents) #here homoeneit$ and conformit$ ha*e replaced pluralit$ andfreedom) and #here isolation and loneliness ha*e eroded human solidarit$ and all

spontaneous forms of li*in toether. =odernit$ is the ae #here the past no loner carries

an$ certaint$ of e*aluation) #here indi*iduals) ha*in lost their traditional standards and*alues) must search for ne# rounds of human communit$ as such.

7his is Arendt;s *ision of modernit$) a *ision #hich) at first siht) appears quite star and

unredeemin. t is #orth pointin out) ho#e*er) that Arendt;s neati*e appraisal of

modernit$ #as shaped $ her e-perience of totalitarianism in the t#entieth centur$) and thather #or pro*ides a numer of important insihts that ma$ help us to address certain

prolematic features of the modern ae. n her political #ritins) and especiall$ in The

Origins of Totalitarianism) Arendt claimed that the phenomenon of totalitarianism hasroen the continuit$ of Eccidental histor$) and has rendered meaninless most of our

moral and political cateories. 7he rea in our tradition has ecome irre*ocale after the

traic e*ents of the t#entieth centur$ and the triumph of totalitarian mo*ements Fast and

Best. n the form of 4talinism and 5a8ism) totalitarianism has e-ploded the estalishedcateories of political thouht and the accepted standards of moral judment) and has

there$ roen the continuit$ of our histor$. >aced #ith the traic e*ents of the Holocaust

and the &ula) #e can no loner o ac to traditional concepts and *alues) so as to e-plain


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the unprecedented $ means of precedents) or to understand the monstrous $ means of the

familiar. 7he urden of our time must e faced #ithout the aid of tradition) or as Arendtonce put it) #ithout a annister I (@,B) ++6". Eur inherited concepts and criteria for

judment ha*e een dissol*ed under the impact of modern political e*ents) and the tas

no# is to re'estalish the meanin of the past outside the frame#or of an$ tradition) since

none ha*e retained their oriinal *alidit$. t is the past) then) and not tradition) that Arendtattempts to preser*e from the rupture in modern time'consciousness. Enl$ $

reappropriatin the past $ means of #hat Arendt called the deadl$ impact of ne#

thouhtsI (=?7) 01" can #e hope to restore meanin to the present and thro# some lihton the contemporar$ situation.

7he hermeneutic strate$ that Arendt emplo$ed to re'estalish a lin #ith the past is

indeted to oth Balter %enjamin and =artin Heideer. >rom %enjamin she too the idea

of a framentar$ historioraph$) one that sees to identif$ the moments of rupture)displacement and dislocation in histor$. 4uch framentar$ historioraph$ enales one to

reco*er the lost potentials of the past in the hope that the$ ma$ find actuali8ation in the

present. >rom Heideer she too the idea of a deconstructi*e readin of the Besternphilosophical tradition) one that sees to unco*er the oriinal meanin of our cateories and

to lierate them from the distortin incrustations of tradition. 4uch deconstructi*e

hermeneutics enales one to reco*er those primordial e-periences (rphaenomene" #hichha*e een occluded or forotten $ the philosophical tradition) and there$ to reco*er the

lost oriins of our philosophical concepts and cateories.

%$ rel$in on these t#o hermeneutic strateies Arendt hopes to redeem from the past its

lost or forotten treasure)I that is) those framents from the past that miht still e ofsinificance to us. n her *ie# it is no loner possile) after the collapse of tradition) to sa*e

the past as a #holeJ the tas) rather) is to redeem from oli*ion those elements of the past

that are still ale to illuminate our situation. 7o re'estalish a linae #ith the past is not an

antiquarian e-erciseJ on the contrar$) #ithout the critical reappropriation of the past ourtemporal hori8on ecomes disrupted) our e-perience precarious) and our identit$ more

fraile. n Arendt;s *ie#) then) it is necessar$ to redeem from the past those moments #orth

preser*in) to sa*e those framents from past treasures that are sinificant for us. Enl$ $means of this critical reappropriation can #e disco*er the past ane#) endo# it #ith

rele*ance and meanin for the present) and mae it a source of inspiration for the future.

7his critical reappropriation is facilitated) in part) $ the fact that after the rupture in

modern time'consciousness the past ma$ open up to us #ith une-pected freshness and tellus thins no one has $et had ears to hear I (%,>) 92". 7he reado#n of tradition ma$ in

fact pro*ide the reat chance to loo upon the past #ith e$es undistorted $ an$ tradition)

#ith a directness #hich has disappeared from Eccidental readin and hearin e*er since@oman ci*ili8ation sumitted to the authorit$ of &ree thouhtI (%,>) 9".

Arendt;s return to the oriinal e-perience of the &reepolisrepresents) in this sense) an

attempt to rea the fetters of a #orn'out tradition and to redisco*er a past o*er #hich

tradition has no loner a claim. Aainst tradition Arendt sets the criterion of enuineness)aainst the authoritati*e that #hich is forotten) concealed) or displaced at the marins of

histor$. Enl$ $ operatin aainst the rain of traditionalism and the claims of con*entional


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historioraph$ can the past e made meaninful aain) pro*ide sources of illumination for

the present) and $ield its treasures to those #ho search for them #ith ne# thouhtsI andsa*in acts of rememrance.

Arendt articulates her conception of modernit$ around a numer of e$ features: these are

'orld alienation) earth alienation) the rise of thesocial) and the *ictor$ of animallaborans. Borld alienation refers to the loss of an intersujecti*el$ constituted #orld ofe-perience and action $ means of #hich #e estalish our self'identit$ and an adequate

sense of realit$. Farth alienation refers to the attempt to escape from the confines of the

earthJ spurred $ modern science and technolo$) #e ha*e searched for #a$s to o*ercome

our earth'ound condition $ settin out on the e-ploration of space) $ attemptin torecreate life under laorator$ conditions) and $ tr$in to e-tend our i*en life'span. 7he

rise of the social refers to the e-pansion of the maret econom$ from the earl$ modern

period and the e*er increasin accumulation of capital and social #ealth. Bith the rise ofthe social e*er$thin has ecome an oject of production and consumption) of acquisition

and e-chaneJ moreo*er) its constant e-pansion has resulted in the lurrin of the

distinction et#een the pri*ate and the pulic. 7he *ictor$ of animal laboransrefers to thetriumph of the *alues of laor o*er those of homo faberand of man as1oon politi*on. All

the *alues characteristic of the #orld of farication K permanence) stailit$) durailit$ K

as #ell as those characteristic of the #orld of action and speech K freedom) pluralit$)solidarit$ K are sacrificed in fa*or of of the *alues of life) producti*it$ and aundance.

Arendt identifies t#o main staes in the emerence of modernit$: the first) from the

si-teenth to the nineteenth centur$) corresponds to #orld alienation and the rise of the

social) the second) from the einnin of the t#entieth centur$) corresponds to earthalienation and the *ictor$ of animal laborans. 4he also identifies a numer of causes: the

disco*er$ of America and the correspondin shrinin of the earth) the #a*es of

e-propriation started durin the @eformation) the in*ention of the telescope challenin the

adequac$ of the senses) the rise of modern science and philosoph$ and susequentl$ of aconception of man as part of a process of 5ature and Histor$) and the e-pansion of the

realm of the econom$) of the production and accumulation of social #ealth.

Arendt;s interpretation of modernit$ can e critici8ed on a numer of rounds. #ill focusm$ attention on t#o cateories emplo$ed $ Arendt) those of nature) and thesocial. Bith

respect to the cateor$ of nature) Arendt oscillates et#een t#o contrastin accounts.

Accordin to the first account) the modern ae) $ ele*atin laor) the most natural of

human acti*ities) to the hihest position #ithin the vita activa) has rouht us too close tonature. nstead of uildin and preser*in the human artifice and creatin pulic spaces for

action and delieration) #e are reduced to enae in the acti*it$ of sheer sur*i*al and in the

production of thins that are $ definition perishale. Accordin to the second account)ho#e*er) the modern ae is characteri8ed $ a ro#in artificialit$) $ the rejection of

an$thin that is not man'made. Arendt cites the fact that natural processes) includin that of

life itself) ha*e een recreated artificiall$ $ means of scientific e-periment) that ournatural en*ironment has een e-tensi*el$ transformed and in some instances entirel$

replaced $ technolo$) and that #e ha*e searched for #a$s to o*ercome our natural

condition as earth'ound creatures $ settin out on the e-ploration of space and

en*isain the possiilit$ of inhaitin other planets. All this leads to a situation #here


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nothin around us #ill e a naturall$ i*en e*ent) oject) or process) ut #ill instead e the

product of our instruments and the #ill to refashion the #orld in our imae.

7hese t#o accounts are difficult to reconcile) since in the former #e ha*e nature intrudinupon and e*en destro$in the human artifice) #hile in the latter #e ha*e art (techne"

e-pandin upon and replacin e*er$thin natural or merel$ i*en. 7he result is to endo#nature #ith an amiuous status) since in the former case the *ictor$ of animal laboransindicates our sujection to natural processes) #hile in the latter case the e-pansion of

scientific no#lede and of technoloical master$ indicates the o*ercomin of all natural

limits. 7he modern #orld #ould thus appear to e too natural and too artificial) too much

under the dominance of laor and the life'process of the species) as #ell as too much underthe dominance of techne.

Bith respect to the second cateor$) that of the social) Arendt #as unale to account for

certain important features of the modern #orld. Arendt identifies the social #ith all thoseacti*ities formerl$ restricted to the pri*ate sphere of the household and ha*in to do #ith

the necessities of life. Her claim is that) #ith the tremendous e-pansion of the econom$from the end of the eihteenth centur$) all such acti*ities ha*e taen o*er the pulic realm

and transformed it into a sphere for the satisfaction of our material needs. 4ociet$ has thusin*aded and conquered the pulic realm) turnin it into a function of #hat pre*iousl$ #ere

pri*ate needs and concerns) and has there$ destro$ed the oundar$ separatin the pulic

and the pri*ate. Arendt also claims that #ith the e-pansion of the social realm the tripartitedi*ision of human acti*ities has een undermined to the point of ecomin meaninless. n

her *ie#) once the social realm has estalished its monopol$) the distinction et#een laor)

#or and action is lost) since e*er$ effort is no# e-pended on reproducin our materialconditions of e-istence. Esessed #ith life) producti*it$) and consumption) #e ha*e turned

into a societ$ of laorers and joholders #ho no loner appreciate the *alues associated

#ith #or) nor those associated #ith action.

>rom this rief account it is clear that Arendt;s concept of the social pla$s a crucial role inher assessment of modernit$. #ould arue) ho#e*er) that it linds her to man$ important

issues and leads her to a series of questionale judments. n the first place) Arendt;s

characteri8ation of the social is o*erl$ restricted. 4he claims that the social is the realm oflaor) of ioloical and material necessit$) of the reproduction of our condition of

e-istence. 4he also claims that the rise of the social coincides #ith the e-pansion of the

econom$ from the end of the eihteenth centur$. Ho#e*er) ha*in identified the social #ith

the ro#th of the econom$ in the past t#o centuries) Arendt cannot characteri8e it in termsof a susistence model of simple reproduction. 4econdl$) Arendt;s identification of the

social #ith the acti*ities of the household is responsile for a major shortcomin in her

anal$sis of the econom$. 4he is) in fact) unale to acno#lede that a modern capitalisteconom$ constitutes a structure of po#er #ith a hihl$ as$mmetric distriution of costs and

re#ards. %$ rel$in on the misleadin analo$ of the household) she maintains that all

questions pertainin to the econom$ are pre'political) and thus inores the crucial questionof economic po#er and e-ploitation. >inall$) $ insistin on a strict separation et#een the

pri*ate and the pulic) and et#een the social and the political) she is unale to account for

the essential connection et#een these spheres and the strules to redra# their oundaries.

7oda$ man$ so'called pri*ate issues ha*e ecome pulic concerns) and the strule for


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justice and equal rihts has e-tended into man$ spheres. %$ insulatin the political sphere

from the concerns of the social) and $ maintainin a strict distinction et#een the pulicand the pri*ate) Arendt is unale to account for some of the most important achie*ements

of modernit$ K the e-tension of justice and equal rihts) and the redra#in of the

oundaries et#een the pulic and the pri*ate.

. Arendt's !heory of Action

Arendt;s theor$ of action and her re*i*al of the ancient notion ofpra3isrepresent one of the

most oriinal contriutions to t#entieth centur$ political thouht. %$ distinuishin action

(pra3is" from farication (poiesis") $ linin it to freedom and pluralit$) and $ sho#in

its connection to speech and rememrance) Arendt is ale to articulate a conception ofpolitics in #hich questions of meanin and identit$ can e addressed in a fresh and oriinal

manner. =oreo*er) $ *ie#in action as a mode of human toetherness) Arendt is ale to

de*elop a conception of participator$ democrac$ #hich stands in direct contrast to theureaucrati8ed and elitist forms of politics so characteristic of the modern epoch.

shall focus on some of the e$ components of Arendt;s theor$ of action) such as freedom)

pluralit$ and disclosure. #ill then e-amine the lins et#een action and narrati*e) the

importance of rememrance) and of #hat call communities of memor$.I #ill then sho#the connection et#een action) po#er and the space of appearance. Dastl$) #ill loo at the

remedies for the unpredictailit$ and irre*ersiilit$ of action) namel$) the po#er of promise

and the po#er to fori*e.

.1 Action" #reedo$" and %lurality

Action) the onl$ acti*it$ that oes on directl$ et#een men #ithout the intermediar$ of

thins or matter) corresponds to the human condition of pluralit$ L this pluralit$ isspecificall$ the condition K not onl$ the conditio sine 4ua non) ut the conditio per 4uam

K of all political life I (H


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the differentia specificaof human eins) that #hich distinuishes them from oth the life

of animals (#ho are similar to us insofar as the$ need to laor to sustain and reproducethemsel*es" and the life of the ods (#ith #hom #e share) intermittentl$) the acti*it$ of

contemplation". n this respect the cateories of laor and #or) #hile sinificant in

themsel*es) must e seen as counterpoints to the cateor$ of action) helpin to differentiate

and hihliht the place of action #ithin the order of the vita activa.

7he t#o central features of action are freedo$and plurality. %$ freedom Arendt does not

mean the ailit$ to choose amon a set of possile alternati*es (the freedom of choice so

dear to the lieral tradition" or the facult$ of liberum arbitrium#hich) accordin to


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re*olt of 19!6. n all these cases indi*idual men and #omen had the courae to interrupt

their routine acti*ities) to step for#ard from their pri*ate li*es in order to create a pulicspace #here freedom could appear) and to act in such a #a$ that the memor$ of their deeds

could ecome a source of inspiration for the future. n doin so) accordin to Arendt) the$

redisco*ered the truth no#n to the ancient &rees that action is the supreme lessin of

human life) that #hich esto#s sinificance to the li*es of indi*iduals.

n the oo On $evolutionArendt de*otes much attention to the redisco*er$ of this truth $

those #ho participated in the American @e*olution. n her *ie# the >oundin >athers)

althouh the$ miht ha*e pretended that the$ loned for pri*ate life and enaed in politics

onl$ out of a sense of dut$) made clear in their letters and recollections that the$ haddisco*ered une-pected delihts in action and had acquired a taste for pulic freedom and

for earnin distinction amon their peers.

%lurality) to #hich #e ma$ no# turn) is the other central feature of action. >or if to actmeans to tae the initiati*e) to introduce the novumand the une-pected into the #orld) it

also means that it is not somethin that can e done in isolation from others) that is)independentl$ of the presence of a pluralit$ of actors #ho from their different perspecti*es

can jude the qualit$ of #hat is ein enacted. n this respect action needs pluralit$ in thesame #a$ that performance artists need an audienceJ #ithout the presence and

acno#ledment of others) action #ould cease to e a meaninful acti*it$. Action) to the

e-tent that it requires appearin in pulic) main oneself no#n throuh #ords and deeds)and elicitin the consent of others) can onl$ e-ist in a conte-t defined $ pluralit$.

Arendt estalishes the connection et#een action and pluralit$ $ means of an

anthropoloical arument. n her *ie# just as lifeis the condition that corresponds to the

acti*it$ of laor and 'orldlinessthe condition that corresponds to the acti*it$ of #or) sopluralitis the condition that corresponds to action. 4he defines pluralit$ as the fact that

men) not =an) li*e on the earth and inhait the #orld)I and sa$s that it is the condition of

human action ecause #e are all the same) that is) human) in such a #a$ that nood$ ise*er the same as an$one else #ho e*er li*ed) li*es) or #ill li*e I (H


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coordinate the actions of a pluralit$ of aents.


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ailities and talents K their 'hat. Ho#e*er) #hile enain in speech and action

indi*iduals can ne*er e sure #hat ind of self the$ #ill re*eal. Enl$ retrospecti*el$) thatis) onl$ throuh the stories that #ill arise from their deeds and performances) #ill their

identit$ ecome full$ manifest. 7he function of the stor$teller is thus crucial not onl$ for

the preser*ation of the doins and sa$ins of actors) ut also for the full disclosure of the

identit$ of the actor. 7he narrati*es of a stor$teller) Arendt claims) tell us more aout theirsujects) the NheroO in the center of each stor$) than an$ product of human hands e*er tells

us aout the master #ho produced itI (H


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o*ercome and made to outlast the li*es of their doers and the limited life'span of their

contemporaries.

Ho#e*er) to e preser*ed) such narrati*es needed in turn an audience) that is) a communit$of hearers #ho ecame the transmitters of the deeds that had een immortali8ed. As

4heldon Bolin has aptl$ put it) audience is a metaphor for the political communit$ #hosenature is to e a communit$ of rememranceI (Bolin 19) 9". n other #ords) ehind theactor stands the stor$teller) ut ehind the stor$teller stands a communit of memor.

t #as one of the primar$ functions of thepolisto e precisel$ such a communit$) to

preser*e the #ords and deeds of its citi8ens from oli*ion and the ra*aes of time) and

there$ to lea*e a testament for future enerations. 7he &reepolis) e$ond mainpossile the sharin of #ords and deeds and multipl$in the occasions to #in immortal

fame) #as meant to remed$ the frailt$ of human affairs. t did this $ estalishin a

frame#or #here action and speech could e recorded and transformed into stories) #heree*er$ citi8en could e a #itness and there$ a potential narrator. Bhat thepolisestalished)

then) #as a space #here organi1ed remembrancecould tae place) and #here) as a result)the mortalit$ of actors and the frailit$ of human deeds could e partiall$ o*ercome.

. Action" %o+er" and the Space of Appearance

7he metaphor of thepolisrecurs constantl$ in the #ritins of Arendt) and sa$ metaphor

ecause in emplo$in this term Arendt is not simpl$ referrin to the political institutions of

the &ree cit$'states) ounded as the$ #ere to their time and circumstance) ut to all thoseinstances in histor$ #here a pulic realm of action and speech #as set up amon a

communit$ of free and equal citi8ens. 7hepolis) properl$ speain) is not the cit$'state in

its ph$sical locationJ it is the orani8ation of the people as it arises out of actin and

speain toether) and its true space lies et#een people li*in toether for this purpose) nomatter #here the$ happen to eI (H


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Bhere*er people ather toether) it is potentiall$ there) ut onl$ potentiall$) not necessaril$

and not fore*erI (Hor Arendt) po#er is asui generisphenomenon) since it is a product of action and rests

entirel$ on persuasion. t is a product of action ecause it arises out of the concerted

acti*ities of a pluralit$ of aents) and it rests on persuasion ecause it consists in the ailit$

to secure the consent of others throuh unconstrained discussion and deate. ts onl$limitation is the e-istence of other people) ut this limitation) she notes) is not accidental)

ecause human po#er corresponds to the condition of pluralit$ to ein #ithI (Hor her po#er needs no justification) ein inherent in the *er$ e-istence of

political communitiesJ #hat it does need is leitimac$ ... ,o#er sprins up #hene*er peopleet toether and act in concert) ut it deri*es its leitimac$ from the initial ettin toether

rather than from an$ action that then ma$ follo#I (


15/35

of appearance) that pulic space #hich arises out of the actions and speeches of indi*iduals.

ndeed) for Arendt) po#er is #hat eeps the pulic realm) the potential space ofappearance et#een actin and speain men) in e-istence.I Die the space of appearance)

po#er is al#a$s a po#er potential and not an unchaneale) measurale and reliale entit$

lie force or strenth L PitQ sprins up et#een men #hen the$ act toether and *anishes

the moment the$ disperseI (H


16/35

certaint$ the outcome and end of an$ action is simpl$ that action has no endI (H


17/35

partiall$ the processes #e ha*e started) #e #ould e the *ictims of an automatic necessit$

earin all the mars of ine-orale la#sI (Hall of 190 (DC,,") an

essa$ entitled 7hinin and =oral ) 62". Ho#e*er) these #ritins do not present a unified theor$ of judment ut)

rather) t#o distinct models) one ased on the standpoint of the actor) the other on the

standpoint of the spectator) #hich are some#hat at odds #ith each other. Arendt;s #ritinson the theme of judment can e seen to fall into t#o more or less distinct phases) an earl$

one in #hich judment is the facult$ of political actors actin in the pulic realm) and alater one in #hich it is the pri*ilee of non'participatin spectators) primaril$ poets and

historians) #ho see to understand the meanin of the past and to reconcile us to #hat hashappened. n this later formulation Arendt is no loner concerned #ith judin as a feature

of political life as such) as the facult$ #hich is e-ercised $ actors in order to decide ho# to

act in the pulic realm) ut #ith judment as a component in the life of the mind) thefacult$ throuh #hich the pri*ileed spectators can reco*er meanin from the past and

there$ reconcile themsel*es to time and) retrospecti*el$) to traed$.

n addition to presentin us #ith t#o models of judment #hich stand in tension #ith each

other) Arendt did not clarif$ the status of judment #ith respect to t#o of its philosophical

sources) Aristotle and Cant. 7he t#o conceptions seem to pull in opposite directions) theAristotelian to#ard a concern #ith the particular) the Cantian to#ard a concern #ith

uni*ersalit$ and impartialit$.

t #ould appear) therefore) that Arendt;s theor$ of judment not onl$ incorporates t#omodels) the actor;s K judin in order to act K and the spectator;s K judin in order to

cull meanin from the past K ut that the philosophical sources it dra#s upon are

some#hat at odds #ith each other.


18/35

,.2 udg$ent and the 0ita Conte$plati(a

Arendt;s concern #ith judment as the facult$ of retrospecti*e assessment that allo#s

meanin to e redeemed from the past oriinated in her attempt to come to terms #ith the

t#in political traedies of the t#entieth centur$) 5a8ism and 4talinism. >aced #ith the

horrors of the e-termination camps and #hat is no# termed the &ula) Arendt stro*e tounderstand these phenomena in their o#n terms) neither deducin them from precedents

nor placin them in some o*erarchin scheme of historical necessit$. 7his need to come to

terms #ith the traumatic e*ents of the t#entieth centur$) and to understand them in amanner that does not e-plain them a#a$ ut faces them in all their starness and

unprecedentedness) is somethin to #hich Arendt returns aain and aain. Eur inherited

frame#or for judment fails us as soon as #e tr$ to appl$ it honestl$ to the centralpolitical e-periences of our o#n timeI (3,) +9". F*en our ordinar$ common'sense

judment is rendered ineffecti*e) since #e are li*in in a tops$'tur*$ #orld) a #orld #here

#e cannot find our #a$ $ aidin $ the rules of #hat once #as common senseI (3,)

++".

7he crisis in understandin is therefore coe*al #ith a crisis in judment) insofar as

understandin for Arendt is so closel$ related to and interrelated #ith judin that one

must descrie oth as the susumption of somethin particular under a uni*ersal ruleI (3,)++". Ence these rules ha*e lost their *alidit$ #e are no loner ale to understand and to

jude the particulars) that is) #e are no loner ale to susume them under our accepted

cateories of moral and political thouht. Arendt) ho#e*er) does not elie*e that the loss of

these cateories has rouht to an end our capacit$ to judeJ on the contrar$) since humaneins are distinuished $ their capacit$ to ein ane#) the$ are ale to fashion ne#

cateories and to formulate ne# standards of judment for the e*ents that ha*e come to

pass and for those that ma$ emere in the future.

>or Arendt) therefore) the enormit$ and unprecedentedness of totalitarianism ha*e notdestro$ed) strictl$ speain) our ailit$ to judeJ rather) the$ ha*e destro$ed our accepted

standards of judment and our con*entional cateories of interpretation and assessment) e

the$ moral or political. And in this situation the onl$ recourse is to appeal to theimagination) #hich allo#s us to *ie# thins in their proper perspecti*e and to jude them

#ithout the enefit of a pre'i*en rule or uni*ersal. >or Arendt) the imaination enales us

to create the distance #hich is necessar$ for an impartial judment) #hile at the same timeallo#in for the closeness that maes understandin possile. n this #a$ it maes possile

our reconciliation #ith realit$) e*en #ith the traic realit$ of the t#entieth centur$.

Arendt;s participation at the trial of Fichmann in the earl$ si-ties made her once morea#are of the need to come to terms #ith a realit$ that initiall$ defied humancomprehension. Ho# could such an ordinar$) la#'aidin) and all'too'human indi*idual

ha*e committed such atrocitiesM 7he impact of the trial also forced her to raise another

prolem concernin judment) namel$) #hether #e are entitled to presuppose anindependent human facult$) unsupported $ la# and pulic opinion) that judes ane# in

full spontaneit$ e*er$ deed and intent #hene*er the occasion arisesI (,@?) 1".


19/35

,.3 udg$ent and the ind of !hought

Arendt returned to this issue in The ife of the !ind) a #or #hich #as meant to

encompass the three faculties of thinin) #illin) and judin. n the introduction to the

first *olume she declared that the immediate impulse to #rite it came from attendin the

Fichmann trial in erusalem) #hile the second) equall$ important moti*e) #as to pro*ide anaccount of our mental acti*ities that #as missin from her pre*ious #or on the vita activa.

t #as Fichmann;s asence of thinin) his thouhtlessness)I that struc her most) ecause

it #as responsile in her *ie# for his inailit$ to jude in those circumstances #herejudment #as most needed. t #as this asence of thinin)I she #rote) that a#aened

m$ interest. s e*il'doin L possile in default of not just Nase moti*esO ... ut of an$

moti*es #hate*er L =iht the prolem of ood and e*il) our facult$ for tellin riht from#ron) e connected #ith our facult$ of thouhtMI (D=) *ol. ) 2!".

Arendt attempted a repl$ $ connectin the acti*it$ of thinin to that of judin in a

t#ofold manner. >irst) thinin K the silent dialoue of me and m$self K dissol*es our

fi-ed haits of thouht and the accepted rules of conduct) and thus prepares the #a$ for theacti*it$ of judin particulars #ithout the aid of pre'estalished uni*ersals. t is not that

thinin pro*ides judment #ith ne# rules for susumin the particular under the

uni*ersal. @ather) it loosens the rip of the uni*ersal o*er the particular) there$ releasinjudment from ossified cateories of thouht and con*entional standards of assessment. t

is in times of historical crisis that thinin ceases to e a marinal affair) ecause $

underminin all estalished criteria and *alues) it prepares the indi*idual to jude for him

or herself instead of ein carried a#a$ $ the actions and opinions of the majorit$.

7he second #a$ in #hich Arendt connected the acti*it$ of thinin #ith that of judin is

$ sho#in that thinin) $ actuali8in the dialoue of me and m$self #hich is i*en in

consciousness) produces conscienceas a $'product. 7his conscience) unlie the *oice of&od or #hat later thiners called lumen naturale) i*es no positi*e prescriptionsJ it onl$tells us #hat notto do) #hat to a*oid in our actions and dealins #ith others) as #ell as

#hat to repent of. Arendt notes in this conte-t that 4ocratesO dictum t is etter to suffer

#ron than to do #ron)I and his proposition that t #ould e etter for me that m$ l$re ora chorus directed should e out of tune and loud #ith discord) and that multitudes of men

should disaree #ith me) rather than that ) being one) should e out of harmon$ #ith

m$self and contradict me)I deri*e their *alidit$ from the idea that there is a silent partner#ithin oursel*es to #hom #e render account of our actions (7=


20/35

actions) judment represents the outer manifestation of our capacit$ to thin criticall$. %oth

faculties relate to the question of riht and #ron) ut #hile conscience directs attention tothe self) judment directs attention to the #orld. n this respect) judment maes possile

#hat Arendt calls the manifestation of the #ind of thouhtI in the sphere of appearance.

,. udg$ent and ant's Aesthetics

7he foreoin account has e-plored the #a$ in #hich Arendt attempted to connect the

acti*it$ of thinin to our capacit$ to jude. 7o e sure) this connection of thinin and

judin seems to operate onl$ in emerencies) in those e-ceptional moments #here

indi*iduals) faced #ith the collapse of traditional standards) must come up #ith ne# onesand jude accordin to their o#n autonomous *alues. 7here is) ho#e*er) a second) more

elaorated *ie# of judment #hich does not restrict it to moments of crisis) ut #hich

identifies it #ith the capacit$ to thin representati*el$) that is) from the standpoint ofe*er$one else. Arendt called this capacit$ to thin representati*el$ an enlared mentalit$)I

adoptin the same terms that Cant emplo$ed in his 7hird or Cant determinant judments #ere coniti*e) #hilereflecti*e judments #ere non'coniti*e. @eflecti*e judment is seen as the capacit$ to

ascend from the particular to the uni*ersal #ithout the mediation of determinate concepts

i*en in ad*anceJ it is reasonin aout particulars in their relation to the uni*ersal rather


21/35

than reasonin aout uni*ersals in their relation to the particular. n the case of aesthetic

judment this means that can understand and appl$ the uni*ersal predicate of eaut$ onl$throuh e-periencin a particular oject that e-emplifies it. 7hus) upon encounterin a

flo#er) a unique landscape) or a particular paintin) am ale to sa$ that it is an e-ample of

eaut$) that it possesses e-emplar$ *alidit$.I

>or Arendt this notion of e-emplar$ *alidit$ is not restricted to aesthetic ojects or toindi*iduals #ho e-emplified certain *irtues. @ather) she #ants to e-tend this notion to

e*ents in the past that carr$ a meanin e$ond their sheer enactment) that is) to e*ents that

could e seen as e-emplar$ for those #ho came after. t is here that aesthetic judment

joins #ith the retrospecti*e judment of the historian. 7he American and >rench@e*olutions) the ,aris or Arendt it is the spectators #ho ha*e the pri*ilee of judin impartiall$ anddisinterestedl$) and in doin so the$ e-ercise t#o crucial faculties) imaginationand

common sense. maination is the facult$ of representin in one;s mind that #hich has

alread$ appeared to one;s senses. 7hrouh the imaination one can represent ojects thatare no loner present and thus estalish the distance necessar$ for an impartial judment.

Ence this distancin has occurred) one is in a position to reflect upon these representations

from a numer of different perspecti*es) and there$ to reach a judment aout the proper*alue of an oject.

7he other facult$ that spectators ha*e to appeal to is common sense orsensus communis)

since #ithout it the$ could not share their judments or o*ercome their indi*idual

idios$ncrasies. Cant elie*ed that for our judments to e *alid #e must transcend ourpri*ate or sujecti*e conditions in fa*or of pulic and intersujecti*e ones) and #e are ale

to do this $ appealin to our communit$ sense) oursensus communis.

7he criterion for judment) then) is communicabilit) and the standard for decidin #hether

our judments are indeed communicale is to see #hether the$ could fit #ith thesensuscommunisof others. Arendt points out that the emphasis on the communicailit$ of

judments of taste) and the correlati*e notion of an enlared mentalit$) lin up effortlessl$

#ith Cant;s idea of a united manind li*in in eternal peace. 4he arues that t is $ *irtueof this idea of manind) present in e*er$ sinle man) that men are human) and the$ can e

called ci*ili8ed or humane to the e-tent that this idea ecomes the principle not onl$ of

their judments ut of their actions. t is at this point that actorandspectatorecome

unitedJ the ma-im of the actor and the ma-im) the Nstandard)O accordin to #hich thespectator judes the spectacle of the #orld) ecome oneI (DC,,) !".

n her reflections on Cant;s 7hird


22/35

,., udg$ent and the 0ita Acti(a

Arendt presented a model of judment in the essa$s 7he


23/35

acquired and tested in a pulic forum #here indi*iduals ha*e the opportunit$ to e-chane

their opinions on particular matters and see #hether the$ accord #ith the opinions ofothers. n this respect the process of opinion formation is ne*er a solitar$ acti*it$J rather) it

requires a enuine encounter #ith different opinions so that a particular issue ma$ e

e-amined from e*er$ possile standpoint until) as she puts it) it is flooded and made

transparent $ the full liht of human comprehensionI (%,>) 2". ?eate and discussion)and the capacit$ to enlare one;s perspecti*e) are indeed crucial to the formation of

opinions that can claim more than sujecti*e *alidit$J indi*iduals ma$ hold personal

opinions on man$ suject matters) ut the$ can form representativeopinions onl$ $enlarin their standpoint to incorporate those of others. As Arendt sa$s: ,olitical thouht

is representati*e. form an opinion $ considerin a i*en issue from different *ie#points)

$ main present to m$ mind the standpoints of those #ho are asentJ that is) representthem L 7he more people;s standpoints ha*e present in m$ mind #hile am ponderin a

i*en issue) and the etter can imaine ho# #ould feel and thin if #ere in their place)

the stroner #ill e m$ capacit$ for representati*e thinin and the more *alid m$ final

conclusions) m$ opinionI (%,>) 21". Epinions) in fact) are ne*er self'e*ident. n mattersof opinion) ut not in matters of truth) our thinin is trul$ discursi*e) runnin) as it #ere)

from place to place) from one part of the #orld to another) throuh all inds of conflictin

*ie#s) until it finall$ ascends from these particularities to some impartial eneralit$I (%,>)2". n this respect one is ne*er alone #hile formin an opinionJ as Arendt notes) e*en if

shun all compan$ or am completel$ isolated #hile formin an opinion) am not simpl$

toether onl$ #ith m$self in the solitude of philosophical thouhtJ remain in this #orld ofuni*ersal interdependence) #here can mae m$self the representati*e of e*er$od$ elseI

(%,>) 2".

,. udg$ent and 0alidity

7he representati*e character of judment and opinion has important implications for thequestion of *alidit$. Arendt al#a$s stressed that the formation of *alid opinions requires a

pulic space #here indi*iduals can test and purif$ their *ie#s throuh a process of mutualdeate and enlihtenment. 4he #as) ho#e*er) quite opposed to the idea that opinions

should e measured $ the standard of truth) or that deate should e conducted accordin

to strict scientific standards of *alidit$. n her *ie#) truth elons to the realm of conition)

the realm of loic) mathematics and the strict sciences) and carries al#a$s an element ofcoercion) since it precludes deate and must e accepted $ e*er$ indi*idual in possession

of her rational faculties. 4et aainst the pluralit$ of opinions) truth has a despotic character:

it compels uni*ersal assent) lea*es the mind little freedom of mo*ement) eliminates thedi*ersit$ of *ie#s and reduces the richness of human discourse. n this respect) truth is anti'

political) since $ eliminatin deate and di*ersit$ it eliminates the *er$ principles of

political life. As Arendt #rites) 7he troule is that factual truth) lie all other truth)peremptoril$ claims to e acno#leded and precludes deate) and deate constitutes the

*er$ essence of political life. 7he modes of thouht and communication that deal #ith truth)

if seen from the political perspecti*e) are necessaril$ domineerinJ the$ don;t tae intoaccount other people;s opinions) and tain these into account is the hallmar of all strictl$

political thininI (%,>) 21".


24/35

Arendt;s defense of opinion is moti*ated not just $ her elief that truth lea*es no room for

deate or dissent) or for the acno#ledment of difference) ut also $ her con*iction thatour reasonin faculties can onl$ flourish in a dialoic conte-t. 4he cites Cant;s remar that

the e-ternal po#er that depri*es man of the freedom to communicate his thouhts pulicl$

depri*es him at the same time of his freedom to thin)I and underlines the fact that for Cant

the onl$ uarantee of the correctness of our thinin is that #e thin) as it #ere) incommunit$ #ith others to #hom #e communicate our thouhts as the$ communicate theirs

to usI (%,>) +2!". 4he also quotes =adison;s statement that the reason of man) lie man

himself) is timid and cautious #hen left alone) and acquires firmness and confidence inproportion to the numer #ith #hich it is associatedI (%,>) +2".

7he appeal to Cant and =adison is meant to *indicate the po#er and dinit$ of opinion

aainst those thiners) from ,lato to Hoes) #ho sa# it as mere illusion) as a confused or

inadequate rasp of the truth. >or Arendt opinion is not a defecti*e form of no#lede thatshould e transcended or left ehind as soon as one is in possession of the truth. @ather) it is

a distinct form of no#lede #hich arises out of the collecti*e delieration of citi8ens) and

#hich requires the use of the imaination and the capacit$ to thin representati*el$.I %$delieratin in common and enain in representati*e thininI citi8ens are in fact ale

to form opinions that can claim intersujecti*e *alidit$. t is important to stress that Arendt

does not #ant to dismiss the philosophersO attempt to find uni*ersal or asolute standards ofno#lede and conition) ut to chec their desire to impose those standards upon the

sphere of human affairs) since the$ #ould eliminate its pluralit$ and essential relati*it$.

7he imposition of a sinle or asolute standard into the domain ofpra3is#ould do a#a$

#ith the need to persuade others of the relati*e merits of an opinion) to elicit their consentto a specific proposal) or to otain their areement #ith respect to a particular polic$.

ndeed) for Arendt the imposition of such a standard #ould mean that indi*iduals #ould no

loner e required to e-ercise their judment) de*elop their imaination) or culti*ate anenlared mentalit$)I since the$ #ould no loner need to delierate in common. 4trict

demonstration) rather than persuasi*e arumentation) #ould then ecome the onl$

leitimate form of discourse.

5o#) #e must e careful not to impute to Arendt the *ie# that truth has no leitimate roleto pla$ in politics or in the sphere of human affairs. 4he does indeed assert that All truths

K not onl$ the *arious inds of rational truth ut also factual truth K are opposed to

opinion in their mode of assertin *alidit$I (%,>) +9") since the$ all carr$ an element ofcompulsion. Ho#e*er) she is onl$ preoccupied #ith the neati*e consequences of rational

truth #hen applied to the sphere of politics and collecti*e delieration) #hile she defends

the importance of factual truth for the preser*ation of an accurate account of the past andfor the *er$ e-istence of political communities. >actual truth) she #rites) is al#a$s related

to other people: it concerns e*ents and circumstances in #hich man$ are in*ol*edJ it is

estalished $ #itnesses and depends upon testimon$ L t is political $ nature.I t

follo#s) therefore) that facts and opinions) thouh the$ must e ept apart) are notantaonistic to each otherJ the$ elon to the same realm. >acts inform opinions) and

opinions) inspired $ different interests and passions) can differ #idel$ and still e

leitimate as lon as the$ respect factual truth. >reedom of opinion is a farce unless factualinformation is uaranteed and the facts themsel*es are not in dispute. n other #ords)


25/35

factual truth informs political thouht just as rational truth informs philosophical

speculationI (%,>) +".

7he relationship et#een facts and opinions is thus one of mutual entailment: if opinions#ere not ased on correct information and the free access to all rele*ant facts the$ could

scarcel$ claim an$ *alidit$. And if the$ #ere to e ased on fantas$) self'deception) ordelierate falsehood) then no possiilit$ of enuine deate and arumentation could esustained. %oth factual truth and the eneral hait of truth'tellin are therefore asic to the

formation of sound opinions and to the flourishin of political deate. =oreo*er) if the

record of the past #ere to e destro$ed $ orani8ed l$in) or e distorted $ an attempt to

re#rite histor$) political life #ould e depri*ed of one of its essential and staili8inelements. n sum) oth factual truth and the practice of truth'tellin are essential to political

life. 7he antaonism for Arendt is et#een rationaltruth and #ell'rounded opinion) since

the former does not allo# for deate and dissent) #hile the latter thri*es on it. Arendt;sdefense of opinion must therefore e understood as a defense of political delieration) and

of the role that persuasion and dissuasion pla$ in all matters affectin the political

communit$. Aainst ,lato and Hoes) #ho denirated the role of opinion in politicalmatters) Arendt reasserts the *alue and importance of political discourse) of delieration

and persuasion) and thus of a politics that acno#ledes difference and the pluralit$ of

opinions.

. Arendt's Conception of Citi4enship

n this last section #ould lie to reconstruct Arendt;s conception of citi8enship around t#o

themes: (1" the pulic sphere) and (" political aenc$ and collecti*e identit$) and to

hihliht the contriution of Arendt;s conception to a theor$ of democratic citi8enship.

.1 Citi4enship and the %u*lic Sphere

>or Arendt the pulic sphere comprises t#o distinct ut interrelated dimensions. 7he first is

thespace of appearance) a space of political freedom and equalit$ #hich comes into ein#hene*er citi8ens act in concert throuh the medium of speech and persuasion. 7he second

is the common 'orld) a shared and pulic #orld of human artifacts) institutions and settins

#hich separates us from nature and #hich pro*ides a relati*el$ permanent and duraleconte-t for our acti*ities. %oth dimensions are essential to the practice of citi8enship) the

former pro*idin the spaces #here it can flourish) the latter pro*idin the stale

acround from #hich pulic spaces of action and delieration can arise. >or Arendt the

reacti*ation of citi8enship in the modern #orld depends upon oth the reco*er$ of a

common) shared #orld and the creation of numerous spaces of appearance in #hichindi*iduals can disclose their identities and estalish relations of reciprocit$ and solidarit$.

7here are three features of the pulic sphere and of the sphere of politics in eneral that are

central to Arendt;s conception of citi8enship. 7hese are) first) its artificialor constructedqualit$J second) itsspatialqualit$J and) third) the distinction et#eenpublicandprivate

interests.


26/35

As reards the first feature) Arendt al#a$s stressed the artificialit$ of pulic life and of

political acti*ities in eneral) the fact that the$ are man'made and constructed rather thannatural or i*en. 4he rearded this artificialit$ as somethin to e celerated rather than

deplored. ,olitics for her #as not the result of some natural predisposition) or the

reali8ation of the inherent traits of human nature. @ather) it #as a cultural achie*ement of

the first order) enalin indi*iduals to transcend the necessities of life and to fashion a#orld #ithin #hich free political action and discourse could flourish.

7he stress on the artificialit$ of politics has a numer of important consequences. >or

e-ample) Arendt emphasi8ed that the principle of political equalit$ does not rest on a theor$

of natural rihts or on some natural condition that precedes the constitution of the politicalrealm. @ather) it is an attriute of citi8enship #hich indi*iduals acquire upon enterin the

pulic realm and #hich can secured onl$ $ democratic political institutions.

Another consequence of Arendt;s stress on the artificialit$ of political life is e*ident in herrejection of all neo'romantic appeals to the vol*and to ethnic identit$ as the asis for

political communit$. 4he maintained that one;s ethnic) reliious) or racial identit$ #asirrele*ant to one;s identit$ as a citi8en) and that it should ne*er e made the asis of

memership in a political communit$.

Arendt;s emphasis on the formal qualities of citi8enship made her position rather distant

from those ad*ocates of participation in the 1960;s #ho sa# it in terms of recapturin a

sense of intimac$) of #armth and authenticit$. >or Arendt political participation #as

important ecause it permitted the estalishment of relations of ci*ilit$ and solidarit$amon citi8ens. 4he claimed that the ties of intimac$ and #armth can ne*er ecome

political since the$ represent ps$choloical sustitutes for the loss of the common #orld.

7he onl$ trul$ political ties are those of ci*ic friendship and solidarit$) since the$ maepolitical demands and preser*e reference to the #orld. >or Arendt) therefore) the daner of

tr$in to recapture the sense of intimac$ and #armth) of authenticit$ and communal

feelins is that one loses the pulic *alues of impartialit$) ci*ic friendship) and solidarit$.

7he second feature stressed $ Arendt has to do #ith thespatialqualit$ of pulic life) #iththe fact that political acti*ities are located in a pulic space #here citi8ens are ale to meet

one another) e-chane their opinions and deate their differences) and search for some

collecti*e solution to their prolems. ,olitics) for Arendt) is a matter of people sharin acommon #orld and a common space of appearance so that pulic concerns can emere and

e articulated from different perspecti*es. n her *ie#) it is not enouh to ha*e a collection

of pri*ate indi*iduals *otin separatel$ and anon$mousl$ accordin to their pri*ateopinions. @ather) these indi*iduals must e ale to see and tal to one another in pulic) to

meet in a pulic'political space) so that their differences as #ell as their commonalities can

emere and ecome the suject of democratic deate.

7his notion of a common pulic space helps us to understand ho# political opinions can eformed #hich are neither reducile to pri*ate) idios$ncratic preferences) on the one hand)

nor to a unanimous collecti*e opinion) on the other. Arendt herself distrusted the term

pulic opinion)I since it suested the mindless unanimit$ of mass societ$. n her *ie#representati*e opinions could arise onl$ #hen citi8ens actuall$ confronted one another in a


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pulic space) so that the$ could e-amine an issue from a numer of different perspecti*es)

modif$ their *ie#s) and enlare their standpoint to incorporate that of others. ,oliticalopinions) she claimed) can ne*er e formed in pri*ateJ rather) the$ are formed) tested) and

enlared onl$ #ithin a pulic conte-t of arumentation and deate.

Another implication of Arendt;s stress on the spatial qualit$ of politics has to do #ith thequestion of ho# a collection of distinct indi*iduals can e united to form a politicalcommunit$. >or Arendt the unit$ that ma$ e achie*ed in a political communit$ is neither

the result of reliious or ethnic affinit$) not the e-pression of some common *alue s$stem.

@ather) the unit$ in question can e attained $ sharin a pulic space and a set of political

institutions) and enain in the practices and acti*ities #hich are characteristic of thatspace and those institutions.

A further implication of Arendt;s conception of the spatial qualit$ of politics is that since

politics is a pulic acti*it$) one cannot e part of it #ithout in some sense ein present in apulic space. 7o e enaed in politics means acti*el$ participatin in the *arious pulic

forums #here the decisions affectin one;s communit$ are taen. Arendt;s insistence on theimportance of direct participation in politics is thus ased on the idea that) since politics is

somethin that needs a #orldl$ location and can onl$ happen in a pulic space) then if oneis not present in such a space one is simpl$ not enaed in politics.

7his pulic or #orld'centered conception of politics lies also at the asis of the third feature

stressed $ Arendt) the distinction et#eenpublicandprivateinterests. Accordin to

Arendt) political acti*it$ is not a means to an end) ut an end in itselfJ one does not enaein political action to promote one;s #elfare) ut to reali8e the principles intrinsic to political

life) such as freedom) equalit$) justice) and solidarit$. n a late essa$ entitled ,ulic @ihts

and ,ri*ate nterestsI (,@," Arendt discusses the difference et#een one;s life as anindi*idual and one;s life as a citi8en) et#een the life spent on one;s o#n and the life spent

in common #ith others. 4he arues that our pulic interest as citi8ens is quite distinct from

our pri*ate interest as indi*iduals. 7he pulic interest is not the sum of pri*ate interests) northeir hihest common denominator) nor e*en the total of enlihtened self'interests. n fact)

it has little to do #ith our pri*ate interests) since it concerns the #orld that lies e$ond the

self) that #as there efore our irth and that #ill e there after our death) a #orld that findsemodiment in acti*ities and institutions #ith their o#n intrinsic purposes #hich miht

often e at odds #ith our short'term and pri*ate interests. 7he pulic interest refers)

therefore) to the interests of a pulic #orld #hich #e share as citi8ens and #hich #e can

pursue and enjo$ onl$ $ oin e$ond our pri*ate self'interest.

.2 Citi4enship" Agency" and Collecti(e Identity

Arendt;s participator$ conception of citi8enship pro*ides the est startin point for

addressin oth the question of the constitution of collective identitand that concerninthe conditions for the e-ercise of effecti*epolitical agenc.

Bith respect to the first claim) it is important to note that one of the crucial questions at

stae in political discourse is the creation of a collecti*e identit$) a #eI to #hich #e can


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appeal #hen faced #ith the prolem of decidin amon alternati*e courses of action. 4ince

in political discourse there is al#a$s disareement aout the possile courses of action) theidentit$ of the #eI that is oin to e created throuh a specific form of action ecomes a

central question. %$ enain in this or that course of action #e are) in fact) enterin a

claim on ehalf of a #e)I that is) #e are creatin a specific form of collecti*e identit$.

,olitical action and discourse are) in this respect) essential to the constitution of collecti*eidentities.

7his process of identit$'construction) ho#e*er) is ne*er i*en once and for all and is ne*er

unprolematic. @ather) it is a process of constant reneotiation and strule) a process in

#hich actors articulate and defend competin conceptions of cultural and political identit$.Arendt;s participator$ conception of citi8enship is particularl$ rele*ant in this conte-t since

it articulates the conditions for the estalishment of collecti*e identities. Ence citi8enship is

*ie#ed as the process of acti*e delieration aout competin identities) its *alue resides inthe possiilit$ of estalishin forms of collecti*e identit$ that can e acno#leded) tested)

and transformed in a discursi*e and democratic fashion.

Bith respect to the second claim) concernin the question of political aenc$) it is

important to stress the connection that Arendt estalishes et#een political action)understood as the acti*e enaement of citi8ens in the pulic realm) and the e-ercise of

effecti*e political aenc$. 7his connection et#een action and aenc$ is one of the central

contriutions of Arendt;s participator$ conception of citi8enship. Accordin to Arendt) theacti*e enaement of citi8ens in the determination of the affairs of their communit$

pro*ides them not onl$ #ith the e-perience of pulic freedom and pulic happiness) ut

also #ith a sense of political aenc$ and efficac$) the sense) in 7homas efferson;s #ords)of ein participators in o*ernment.I n her *ie# onl$ the sharin of po#er that comes

from ci*ic enaement and common delieration can pro*ide each citi8en #ith a sense of

effecti*e political aenc$. Arendt;s strictures aainst political representation must e

understood in this liht. 4he sa# representation as a sustitute for the direct in*ol*ement ofthe citi8ens) and as a means #here$ the distinction et#een rulers and ruled could reassert

itself. As an alternati*e to a s$stem of representation ased on ureaucratic parties and state

structures) Arendt proposed a federated s$stem of councils throuh #hich citi8ens couldeffecti*el$ determine their o#n political affairs. >or Arendt) it is onl$ $ means of direct

political participation) that is) $ enain in common action and collecti*e delieration)

that citi8enship can e reaffirmed and political aenc$ effecti*el$ e-ercised.

Bi*liography

orks *y Arendt

PDAQ "er iebesbegriff bei #ugustin. %erlin: ulius 4priner erla) 199. 7ranslationasove and 5aint #ugustine) #ith an interpreti*e essa$ $ oanna . 4cott and

udith


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192. eldman. 5e#or: &ro*e ,ress) 19.

PD=Q The ife of the !ind. 5e# or: Harcourt %race o*ano*ich) 19.

PDC,,Q ectures on .ant/s &olitical &hilosoph. Fdited and #ith an interpreti*e essa$ $

@onald %einer.


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,areh) %.) 191)Hannah #rendt and the 5earch for a (e' &olitical &hilosoph.

Dondon: =acmillan.

,asserin d;FntrS*es) =.) 1992) The &olitical &hilosoph of Hannah #rendt. Dondon:

@outlede.

,itin) H.) 199) The #ttac* of the lob Hannah #rendt/s Concept of the 5ocial.


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Uno de aguantar contribuciones de Arendt' el pensamiento poltico de sdebe ser encontrado en sus reflexiones en el juicio que eran ocupar losaos pasados de su vida. Junto con la teora de la accin, su teorainacabada del juicio representa su erencia central al pensamiento poltico

del vig!simo siglo. "xplorar! algunos de los aspectos claves de su teoradel juicio, # examinar! su lugar en el arquitectnico de Arendt' teora de s dela poltica. $.% Juicio& os modelos Arendt' la teora de s del juicio nunca fuedesarrollada tan sistem(ticamente o extensivamente como su teora de laaccin. "lla se prepuso terminar su estudio de la vida de la mentededicando el tercer volumen a la facultad de juicio, pero no poda acer tandebido a su muerte prematura en %)*$. +u! ella dej era un nmero dereflexiones dispersadas en los primeros dos volmenes en el pensamiento #querer -/, vol. 01 vol. 002, una serie de conferencias en 3ant' la filosofapoltica de s entregada en la nueva escuela para la investigacin social en la

cada de %)*4 -3552, un ensa#o dio dereco a 6pensamiento # a lasconsideraciones morales7 escritos cuando ella compona la vida de la mente-8/9, :%*;:, %)*;??, ??*;


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spectator' s ; jugando para entresacar el significado a partir del pasado ;pero eso las fuentes filosficas que dibuja sobre es algo en desacuerdo conuno a. $.? Juicio # el Bita 9ontemplativa Arendt' la preocupacin de s con el

juicio como la facultad de gravamen retrospectivo que permite que elsignificado sea redimido a partir del pasado origin en su tentativa de venir

a los t!rminos con las tragedias polticas gemelas del vig!simo siglo, delnaismo # del estalinismo. Ceco frente con los orrores de los campos dela exterminacin # qu! aora se llama el gulag, Arendt se esfor entenderestos fenmenos en sus propios t!rminos, ni deduci!ndolos de precedentesni poni!ndolos en un cierto esquema overarcing de la necesidad istrica."sta necesidad de venir a los t!rminos con los acontecimientos traum(ticosdel vig!simo siglo, # de entenderlos de una forma que no los explica lejossino les ace frente en todo su starDness # unprecedentedness, es algo a elcual Arendt vuelve repetidas veces. Euestro marco eredado para el juicionos falla 6tan pronto como intentemos aplicarlo onesto a las experiencias

polticas centrales de nuestro propio tiempo7 -"E90/A ", F*)2. 0nclusonuestra sentencia ordinaria del buen sentido se pronuncia inefica, puestoque 6estamos viviendo en un mundo revuelto, un mundo donde no podemosencontrar nuestra manera respetando por las reglas de cu(l estaba una veel sentido comn7 -"E90/A ", FGF2. a crisis en la comprensin es por lotanto coeval con una crisis en el juicio, en cuanto es la comprensin para

Arendt 6as que estrecamente vinculado a # correlacionado con el juicioaqu!l debe describir ambos como el subsumption algo particular bajo reglauniversal7 -"E90/A ", FGF2. Una ve que estas reglas an perdido suvalide podemos no m(s entender # jugar los detalles, es decir, podemos

no m(s incluirlos bajo nuestras categoras aceptadas de pensamiento moral# poltico. Arendt, sin embargo, no cree que la p!rdida de estas categorasa trado a un extremo nuestra capacidad de jugar1 en el contrario, puestoque su capacidad distinguen a los seres umanos de comenar de nuevo,pueden formar nuevas categoras # formular nuevos est(ndares del juiciopara los acontecimientos que an venido pasar # para los que puedanemerger en el futuro. 5ara Arendt, por lo tanto, la enormidad # elunprecedentedness del totalitarismo no an destruido, en realidad, nuestracapacidad de jugar1 algo, an destruido nuestros est(ndares aceptados del

juicio # nuestras categoras convencionales de interpretacin # degravamen, sean ellas morales o polticas. H en esta situacin el nicorecurso es apelar a la imaginacin, que permite que veamos cosas en superspectiva apropiada # que las juguemos sin la ventaja de una regla o deun universal pre;dada. 5ara Arendt, la imaginacin nos permite crear ladistancia que es necesaria para un juicio imparcial, mientras que al mismotiempo tiene en cuenta la proximidad que ace la comprensin posible. eesta manera ace posible nuestra reconciliacin con realidad, incluso con larealidad tr(gica del vig!simo siglo. Arendt' la participacin de s en el ensa#o


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de "icmann en el principio de los aos


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sentencia de @crates 6!l es mejor sufrir mal que acer mal,7 # su asuntoque 6sera mejor para m que mi l#re o un estribillo que dirig debe estarfuera de consonancia # ruidoso con discordia, # que las multiplicidades deombres deben discrepar conmigo, algo que eso 0, siendo uno, debe estarfuera de armona conmigo mismo # contradecirme,7 deriva su valide de la

idea que a# un socio silencioso dentro de nosotros mismos a qui!nrendimos la cuenta de nuestras acciones -8/9, ?);F41 F$2. +u! tememos lama#ora es la anticipacin de la presencia de este socio -es decir, nuestraconciencia2 que nos aguarde en el final del da. Arendt tambi!n comentaque el pensamiento, como la actualiacin de la diferencia dada en elsentido, 6no es una prerrogativa del pocos sino de una facultadomnipresente en todos1 de la misma manera, la inabilidad de pensar no esun fall del mucos que carecen energa de cerebro, solamente de unpossibil omnipresente

La Teoría Del Juicio de Arendt-Stanford Enciclopedia

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