The role of the European Commission in

European economic governance: a step closer to governmentalizing?

Dr Emmanuelle Schön-Quinlivan, UCCProf Raj Chari, TCDMarco Scipioni, RA

Theorizing the governmentalization of the European Commission

• RQ: Has the European Commission governmentalized between 1994 and 2014?

• Area of empirical analysis:– Economic policy coordination – European Semester– Fiscal surveillance: SGP– Financial assistance: Troika, ESM

• HI and critical junctures (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007, p. 348) – 1994 & 2014:– ‘relatively short periods of time during which there is a

substantially heightened probability that agents’ choices will affect the outcome of interest’

Why focus on the role of the Commission in a post-crisis situation?

• Puzzle – a look at the current literature:– MS largely against major concessions of powers to

Commission (Chang, 2013)– EU integration project has stalled for many. Enhanced

role of the European Council (Hodson, 2009; Schimmelfennig, 2015)

– Commission not anymore at the centre of political initiative in EU (Höing & Wessels, 2013)

– EMU demonstrates shift away from Community Method towards OMC (Bickerton, Hodson & Puetter, 2014)

And yet???

• Niemann & Ioannou, 2014 – integrative outcomes of the crisis

• Bauer & Becker, 2014 – Increase in breadth and depth of the role of the Commission

• Fabbrini, 2013 – limits to intergovernmentalism – dilemmas of collective action

The DV: theorizing governmentalization

• Core executive:– Rhodes: all organizations and procedures which

coordinate central government and act as final arbiters of conflict between different parts of the government machine.

– Goetz and Wollman: • Dominant force in policy formation, • Efforts to remould organizational structures and

procedures for effective exercise of executive authority• Organization of state administrative personnel

Theorizing the governmentalization of the European Commission

Governmentalization Collective Segmented Fragmented

Powers Policy formation, monitoring and sanction 3/3

Policy formation, monitoring and sanction 2/3

Policy formation, monitoring and sanction 1/3

Structures Creation of formal and informal structures across DGs

Creation of formal and informal structures intra DGs

No creation of new structures

Resources Active use of extra resources Passive use of extra resources No new resources

The Commission in post-crisis economic governance

Economic policy coordination Fiscal surveillance Financial assistanceEuropean Semester and Six Pack – . AGS. Commission’s recommendations as basis for guidance to MS. Commission assesses MT budgetary objectives. Commission to monitor MS, can issue warning, can carry out surveillance missions. Discretion in in recommendation of sanction to Council on grounds of ‘exceptional economic circumstances’.EDP – Commission draws up eco and financial indicators, monitor through Alert Mechanisms Reports, monitors implementation of Council’s corrective action plan

SGP and Two Pack – . Content of draft budgetary plans established by the Commission in cooperation with MS. MS to report on debt issuance to Commission & Eurogroup. Can ask for revised plan from MS. Council adopts an Economic Partnership programme on a Commission proposal, monitoring of programme by Commission.

Troika – . Commission to define the terms of the MoU with ECB. Commission monitors, quarterly visits.. Commission to decide on further installments

A governmentalization as a consequence of the crisis?

• Objective of this research:– Testing whether to what extent the functional

spillovers empowered the European Commission as a consequence the crisis

– Looking at the process of governmentalization of the Commission as a result of the critical juncture which is the crisis given the original design of the EMU.

• Governmentalization = process of becoming a core executive (Goetz & Wollman, 2001)

A first text analysis of the powers of the Commission post-crisis

Power Agenda-setting Implementation - monitoring

Evaluation - sanction

Economic policy surveillance

Fiscal surveillance

Financial assistance

The IV – What factors can explain governmentalization?

• Interest variable – large MS• EP variable – EP promoted the Commission’s role in eco

and financial reforms?• Market variable – source of pressure on MS and EU• Leadership variable – role of the Commission President

to solve crisis• Ideological variable – role of left/right positioning in

economic choices made• Organizational effectiveness – achievement of its

operative goals.

Hypotheses on powers• HYP 1: The more France and Germany consider their economic sovereignty

threatened, the more they oppose delegation of powers to the Commission.

• HYP 2: The more financial markets lose trust in the Eurozone, the more powers are allocated to the European Commission.

• HYP 3: The more disagreement between Member States on the solution to the economic crisis, the more powers are allocated to the European Commission.

• HYP 4: The stronger the political leadership of the European Commission President, the more powers are allocated to the European Commission.

• HYP 5: The more the European Parliament tries to increase its influence in economic governance, the more it supports the granting of economic and financial powers to the European Commission.

Hypotheses on ‘structures’• HYP 6: The more organizationally effective the Commission needs to be

as the supranational coordinator of European economic governance, the more central DG ECFIN becomes in the European Commission’s economic governance business.

• HYP 7: The stronger the leadership of the European Commission President, the more top-level political coordinating structures are created.

• HYP 8: The more Member States push for orthodox economic solutions to the crisis, the more procedures and rules are introduced to support this monetary agenda.

• HYP 9: The more organizationally effective the Commission needs to be as the supranational coordinator of European economic governance, the more across-DG coordinating structures are created.

Hypotheses on resources• HYP 10: The more organizationally effective the Commission needs

to be as the supranational coordinator of European economic governance, the more staff resources are allocated to DG ECFIN, DG MARKT, DG EMPL and DG COMP.

• HYP11: The stronger the political leadership of the European Commission President, the more flexible recruitment procedures become to allow for a fast response to the crisis.

• HYP 12: The more organizationally effective the Commission needs to be as the supranational coordinator of European economic governance, the more significant the level of expertise of officials becomes as a resource.

• HYP 13: The more organizationally effective the Commission needs to be, the more significant internal and external networks become.

Methodology and progress

• Survey questionnaires sent to officials in Commission, Eurogroup, Council, EP, ECB, national representations (Troika countries).

• Pilot study carried out in December in Brussels• Semi-structured interviews to follow analysis

of survey responses in April.• To date: Literature review in progress, survey

round just completed.

Thank you for your attention

• I look forward to your questions.• This project is generously financed by the Irish

Research Council.