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El acto de la designacin lo que hace es traer una cosa extralingstica en tanto que ousa,

identificndola mediante un nombre que conviene a su modo de sersubsistente. Esto es,

traerla tanto en su capacidad de ser independiente, enfocndose en su individualidad

(substancia primera), o enfocndose en su especie (indicada por el eidos) o en uno de sus

gneros (substancia segunda).

Lo que Aristteles quiere decir es que, cuando traemos a colacin algo del mundo, por

enfocarnos sobre lo que primariamente o secundariamente es,es decir, no sobre lo que es

una caracterstica coincidencial suya la traemos de acuerdo al modo primario de

designacin. Por tanto, es claro que ousa refiere al ms propio (primario) modo de ser

subsistente o a sus secuelas inmediatas, i.e., los modos de ser representados por el eidos o el

gnero.

What Aristotle means to say is that, when we bring up

something of the outside world by focussing on what it primarily or

secondarily isthat is to say, not after one of its coincidental featuresit is brought up according to the primary way of designating

it. Hence it is clear that refers to the thing's most proper

(primary) mode ofsubsistentbeing or its immediate sequels, viz. the

modes of being conveyed by the names of its eidos or genera p.389

El intento llevado a cabo por Aristteles de identificarla el individuo (sustancia primera)

con la especie (sustancia segunda) en Categoras, es el recurso ms importante en la

polmica contra el platnico. Esto se evidencia en Cat.,2b 15-22 cuando el

estagirita afirma que la especie es ms ousa que el gnero. Sin embargo, esta tentativa de

Aristteles estar realizada en la Metafsica, libro Z, a travs de la distincin entre eidos,

hyle, ysynolon. Luego de la examinacin de estos tres candidatos al ttulo de ousa en el

sentido ms eminente, el eidos se mostrar como aquello que cumple todos los criterios en

sentido estricto, entonces; ser sustancia primera. Elsynolon tambin cumple con todos los

criterios, pero no del mismo modo que el eidos, pues su determinacin es provista por este

ltimo. De este modo,synolon es sustancia en un sentido que no es primario. En cuanto al

gnero y el universal, sern descartados como sustancias por su amplia indeterminacin;

diferencia notable en relacin con sustatus en Categoras.

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Diferencia en cuanto a la predicacin esencial y predicacin accidental:

El sustrato es el individuo, gnero y especie se dicen delindividuo como su sujeto, mientras

los accidentes se dicen en el individuo como su sujeto. Por tanto, aqu reside la diferenciaentre la predicacin kat tonoma y la predicacin kat lgon, en este ltimo tipo de

predicacin, la substancia primera puede serdefinicionalmente sustituida por la especie y elgnero. Esto no sucede en el caso de la predicacin segn el nombre, pues el accidente noes subsistente por s, y, por ende, no-substancial. De ninguna manera el accidente puede

sustituir al individuo, pues, este ltimo es sustancia en sentido primario; y resultara un

contrasentido sustituir lo sustancial por lo no-sustancial. As, tiene sentido la afirmacinaristotlica de que el accidente, en cierto modo, es slo un nombre.

Cat. 5, 3al5-21, 3a36-b2, 3b2-4, 3b4-5, 3b6-7, 3b7-8

As a matter of fact, unlike when you apply names signifying nonsubstantial

forms, such as '(being) white', in which case you are not

allowed to replace them with their definiens, when you make use of

names signifying secondary ousiai, the substitution is always valid. p.394

Cat.,3bl0-23: Naturaleza de la relacin desubsistencia (p.396)

The expression 'to signify a certain this' () calls

for further comment. As to the use of the verb , Ackrill (88)

is of the opinion that Aristotle is careless when he speaks as if it were

things (ousiai, 'substances'), and not names that signify, and so seemsto confuse the ontic and the linguistic domain. But such a charge

ignores what we have presented as one of the semantic Main Rules of

Aristotelian (Ancient) semantics, to the effect that names are significativeterms taken in thdr capacity of being significative of something,

and, accordingly, by nature also convey the 'thing' signified. Hence,

semantically speaking, the name used and the thing named tend toform an unarticulated unity. So it is understandable that there should

be an easy transition from e.g. 'white' used as a name to the property

whiteness referred to. p.397

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What, then, is meant by 'signifying a certain this'? It is explained at

3bl2-13 as 'revealing something as being an individual and numerically

one', and, some lines further on (3b 16-17) the one-ness isparaphrased in terms of lacking universal applicability, meaning that

what is 'a certain this' does not belong to the 'things said of asubstrate'. Thus to signify something as 'a certain this' comes to referringto it qua possessing oneness, definiteness and subsistence. From

Aristotle's anti-Platonic point of view, all this is clear enough. However,

what can we say about secondary ousiai, which are the specificand generic forms inhering in the primary ones? To Aristotle's mind,

they cannot possibly have the this-ness and definiteness the Platonic

Forms are supposed to have. Their ontic status must be looked for in

this world. p.397

Cat., 4al0-22: Identidad numrica de la sustancia, y capacidad de recibir a los contrarios.

4. 48 What does Aristotle mean by ? 403

El significado de ousa:

The focal meaning of is plain from its etymology: deriving as

*ont-ia from the root 'es', which is common to the verb and thenoun, it basically stands for 'being-ness' (medieval Latin 'entitas' or'natura essendi'). Its focal meaning comes about both intensionally

and extensionally. According to its intensional aspect, stands

for a thing's ontic determinant, i.e. that which causes it to be(something); extensionally, it refers to the thing thus determined,

(conceived of as) occurring in the outside world.p.403

Unlike Plato,125 to Aristotle the intensional and extensional aspecLs

are ontologically complementary: no intensional occurs without

its extensional counterpart, and the other way round. p. 403

[Cf.Met. 11, 1037a29-30 yMet. 16, 1040b23, Top. I, 9]

***Again, on this understanding it is easy to see why Aristotle

sometimes calls130 a genus in spite of his common doctrine thatbeing is not a genus.131 Speaking of as a genus, Aristotle has

the extensional aspect of the word's focal meaning in mind, to the

effect that a thing's subsistence or self-containedness is in the picture.

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When, on the other hand, he denies the status of genus to 'be-ing',

Aristotle is speaking from the intensional perspective by denying that

the intension, 'being' or 'being-ness' can be considered a generic

concept prior to 'being such and such'. In Aristotle's ontology,'being-ness' is always invested in some specific mode of being as

represented by the ten categories: necessarily, to be () is to besomething ( ) 404