7/23/2019 Asimetrica Reciprocidad.

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/asimetrica-reciprocidad 1/24

Asymmetrical Reciprocity: A Contribution to the Theory of Political Legitimacy [and

Comments and Reply]Author(s): Henry Orenstein, Claude Ake, Eugene Cooper, Carol S. Holzberg, Lawrence Krader,Donald V. Kurtz, John Liep, Kazunori Oshima and Dennis H. WrongSource: Current Anthropology, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Feb., 1980), pp. 69-91Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological

Research

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2741743 .

Accessed: 01/09/2013 10:52

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

 .JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of 

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

 .

The University of Chicago Press and Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research are collaborating

with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Current Anthropology.

http://www.jstor.org

7/23/2019 Asimetrica Reciprocidad.

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/asimetrica-reciprocidad 2/24

CURRENT

ANTHROPOLOGY

Vol.

21,

No.

1, February

1980

?

1979 by The Wenner-GrenFoundation for Anthropological Research

0011-3204/80/2101-0002$02.75

Asymmetrical

eciprocity:A

Contribution o

the Theory of Political Legitimacy1

by Henry Orenstein

WHEN AN ARMED THIEF

givesorders

o

his

victims,

e need

not

provide

reasons hat they houldobey. His

weapon is

reason

enough.ndividual riminal cts apart, suchpower ometimes

erupts

uring imes

f

violent

olitical

pheaval,

s

in

military

conquestsor coups, but it is

usually

transient.

onquerors,

f

theyremain o rule, nd

soldier-rebels,

f

they

win and

choose

to reign

penly-as they

arely

o

(Finer

1962)-almost always

voice some

compelling

easons

hat

they

hould be

obeyed,

n

the

hope,

often

ltimately

ewarded,

hat t least

the veneer f

not he

ubstance f heir

ubjects' ubmission

illbe "willing.

Among

these reasons there

will always be

some

notions,

"legitimizing

rinciples," earing

irectly pon the

"rightness"

of the

particular orm fdomination.

hese principles

shall

refer o as "political

deology" using

the term n a

narrower

sense

than s usual.)2

The topic of

political

egitimacys

indisputablymportant.

Max Weber uses a typology f legitimacy-his well-known

"traditional,"

charismatic," nd "rational"

types-as

a

point

of departure n

his mainwritings n

politics. n

anthropology

we have been

remiss.Apart

from

volutionary chemes nd

classificationsf

political

ystems,

ome

ofour

best efforts ave

been

on

the tactics and strategies f political truggle

e.g.,

Burling 974,Bailey 1969).

To

the extent hat nthropologists

have discussed egitimacy, hey have rarely considered he

content

f the

"reasons for domination."The reasons are

generally reated bstractly nd taken o be, at best,

imiting-

placingboundaries

bout the tactics nd strategieshat domi-

natorsmay employ. here are, for nstance, irth's

1964) ob-

servations

hat

political ominatorslways eek the

support f

the

dominated,

ence

re

always constrained y them;Balan-

dier's

1976) cogent

butgeneraldiscussion fthe nterrelated-

ness ofpower, oercion,

nd ideology; nd discussions f myths

as

"charters" orpolitical

uthoritye.g., Leach 1954,Bohan-

nan 1952). In such studies deology s viewed as

sustaining

persistent olitical ystems nd sometimes s restricting

he

actions

of

political eadership.The effects f the

content f

legitimizing rinciples

n the politicalprocesshave rarely, f

ever,beenconsideredn detail n anthropology.

I approach this topic under the influence f

Weber. My

concern

s

with the viability nd practical

effectiveness

f

political deology nd

with the degreeto which an ideology

may (or may not) coexistwithor replace nother,

ong-estab-

lished n a society. ike Weber, hold that political

deologies

often

entail

a potentialfor their own alteration

nd/or for

altering he social

and

politicalrelations hey

re intended o

sustain.

depart

fromWeber n

being

more

mphatically

unc-

tional.

ndeed, my

functionalisms of

a

fundamentalist

ort,

leaningheavilyupon

Durkheim n a concern or ocial solidar-

ity.3 his perspective ill uggest, mong

ther ses

n

theory,

a useful efinition

f

political egitimacy.

Political deologies

xist

n

almost

ll

societies. espite much

variationndetail, believe heyfall nto limited umber f

types.Examples

of

uch

typesmay

well

be all

or

some

of

those

used

by

Weber.

Here

describe

worelated

ypes-two

variants

on

a

single

modeof

thought-that

he does not

discuss.

The

two

are related

n

that

they

have their

ource

n

what

ppears

to be

a

panhuman

moral

predisposition,

he

norm of

reciprocity.

This

is

the

belief, imply

tated,

that a favorreceived

arries

with

t an

obligation

o

return

favor. n the

history

fWestern

thought,

he

universality

f

this

norm

was

first

uggested,

formally

nd

forcibly,y

Aristotle

1943:162): "People

seek to

return

.

.

good

for

good."

In

recent

imes t has been treated

HENRY

ORENSTEIN

s Professor

f

Anthropology t

Brooklyn

College

Brooklyn,N.Y.

11210,

U.S.A.)

and

the

Graduate

Cen-

ter

of

the

City

University

f

New

York.

Born n

1924,he was edu-

cated at the

University f California

t

Berkeley B.A.,

1950;

Ph.D., 1957).

He has

taughtat

Syracuse

University

1957-58)

and at

Tulane

University

1958-67).

His

research

nterests re

political

nd legal

anthropology,

tructural

nalysis,method

nd

theory

n

anthropology,

hilosophical

anthropology

especially

ethical

theory),

pplied

anthropology,

nd

South

Asia. His

publi-

cations

nclude Gaon:

Conflict

nd Cohesion n an

Indian

Village

(Princeton:

Princeton

University

Press,

1965);

"Accumulation

and

Disjunction

n

Ethnographic

Method"

(Humqan

rganization

30); "A

Preliminary

Application

of

Ethnological

Analysis to

Ethical and

Meta-ethical

Theory,"

n

Human Values

and

Natural

Science,edited

by E. Laszlo

and J.

Wilbur

New

York:

Gordon

and

Breach,

1970);

"The

Structure f

Hindu Caste

Values:

A

Preliminary

tudy

of

Hierarchy nd

Ritual Defilement" Eth-notogy); and "Death and Kinship n Hinduism:Structuralnd

Functional

nterpretations"

American

Anthropologist

2).

The

present

aperwas

submitted n final

form 5

xi

78.

I

I am

grateful

or he

assistanceof

many persons n

the

construc-

tion of

this

paper.

Aaron

Shotten'scriticisms nd

suggestions

ave

been

exceedingly

aluable.Jean

Orenstein ave me

both

encourage-

ment and

helpful

suggestions.

My

colleagues,John

Beatty and

Stephen

Wilde,made

many useful

omments.

n

particular, am in

debtto

Ned Polsky

forhisacute

criticisms f

another

version.

2

In the

past I

have used the

term

ideology" in the

usual way,

following

Mannheim

1936); see

Orenstein

1968:274-75).

I

Weber'sworkhas

been nterpretedn what seem to me

functional

terms by Parsons (1937),

but Bendix's (1960) synthesis

s quite

different. hile these re

matters est eft o the

decision

of

scholars

who have closely tudiedWeber's work,myown reading eadsme to

see it

much as

does Bendix.

This

is

especially rue

of Weber's

treat-

mentof typesof authority.

Vol. 21 * No. 1 February

980 69

This content downloaded from 186.9.135.139 on Sun, 1 Sep 2013 10:52:54 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

7/23/2019 Asimetrica Reciprocidad.

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/asimetrica-reciprocidad 3/24

as

universal

y many

students f

society e.g.,

Westermarck

1908:154; Hobhouse

1951:12;

Thurnwald

1932:106;

Simmel

1950

1908]:387;

Mauss 1954

1925];

evi-Strauss

969;

Homans

1958; Gouldner

1960).

Its

universalitymay

be

due

to

some

innate arithmetic

f the human

mind,"

r

it

may

be

that, n

Aristotelian

hrasing

1943:163),

"it is this

nterchange

hat

holds

society

ogether."

Whether

xplicit

r

implicit,

whether

innate

to the human

mind

or

a condition

ecessary

or

ocial

life, r

whetheras seems

ikely

o

me)

all

of

these,

eciprocity

is

a moral

mperative eeply

mplicated

n

many

actions

nd

beliefsn all human ocieties t all times.

While

I

believe

the

norm

s

universal,

suggest,

however

paradoxically,

hat some of

its most

mportant

onsequences

consist

n

its

socially pproved

violationn the

political

ife

of

communities.

repeat,

ocially

pproved;

do not mean ndi-

vidual

or group violations

or covert evasions

that

may

be

censured

if

discovered)

s

errors

r immoralities.

ather,

mean

violations f

the rule

that

are

contemplated

s

proper-

violations

hat

are

themselves

referredr

prescribed

y

rule

in

particular

political

conditions.

uch violations re often

understood s

one

of

the

main

reasons

or

ollowing

leader.

shall refer o them

s

instances

f

asymmetrical

eciprocity.

The

approved

deviations

may

be

in

either

f

two

directions.

The

leader

may

be

conceived s

giving

more n

goods

and/or

services

hanhe

receives-or, fyouwill, s giving y grace nd

receiving

s of

right; ence,

he eader s a

"creditor" nd

must

be

obeyedby his

constituency,

is

"debtors."

Alternatively,

the

constituency,

aving

elevated

one

of its

members o a

position fpolitical

minence,may now hold

him

n

its

debt

for hat

honor,

debt thathe can never

ully ischarge

s long

as

he

remains n

office; encehe must

comply or

appear

to

comply)

with their demands

for

goods

and/or

services.

n

either

orm,

he

flow

f

material

benefitss

thought

o be in

the

same

direction-from

he

center,

he

politically

minent,

to the

periphery,

he

constituency.

n

one

form, owever, he

demand-right

ies

with the

leader; commands manate from

the

center;

he

symmetry

s

centrifugal.n theother

orm,

he

demand-right

esides,

ot

with he

center,

he one

elevatedto

office,

ut with he

periphery,

is

constituency;

ence he sym-

metry s centripetal.4

"Violations"

ike these

do not

involve

suspension

f

the

norm

f

reciprocity.

n thecontrary,

he

nticipated

eviation

is

accompanied y

a

belief

n

the

propriety f the

norm. t is

the

persistence

f

this

belief hat

places

constraints

pon the

beneficiary

o

obey his

benefactor.

I

stress

hat

asymmetrical

eciprocitynd its

subdivisions

are

purely emic"

categories; hey

ubsume

peoples'

political

ideas

and

ideals. One

need not

treat them n

this way. For

instance,

Burrows nd

Spiro

(1953:173) point

out that

the

Ifaluk

viewthe

gifts iven

y their

hiefs s

"one-way ransac-

tions."

The

ethnographers

refer o

conceptualize he

process

differently.hey hold

that

reciprocity

s, in fact,

achieved

through

the

dignity

nd

authority

ccorded the

chiefs;

..

thenatives hemselves o notconnect hetwo.... It is only

to the

foreign bserver

hat the

two

seem

reciprocal." My

types

refer

xclusively

o

the

"native's"

perspective,

lthough

I

am

much

oncerned,n

addition,

with he

processes, micor

etic,

hat

are

related

o this

perspective.

My

subject

nd

economic

nthropology

verlap,but, as

the

examples

o

followwill

show, the

concepts

suggestdo

not

always coincide

with

hose

urrently sed

in economic

nthro-

pology.

Centripetality

r

centrifugality

an, and

the latter

often

does,

coincidewith

redistributive

conomies, ut

either

political

orm

an

coexist

with

reciprocal,

redistributive,

r

even a

market conomy. or example, f the political

deology

is centripetaln a redistributiveconomy,

he

demand-right

resideswith he

constituents,owevermuch r ittle heymay,

infact, ave

contributedo the entral tockpile.f thepolitical

ideology s centrifugaln a reciprocal conomic

ystem, oods

and services re exchanged rather han accumulated

nd re-

distributed),

ut

the demand-rights heldby the

eader,forhe

is believed o give more han he receives.

In

the

first

art of thispaper willdiscuss he main

charac-

teristics

f he

wokinds f

symmetricaleciprocity-to xpose

the bare bones of the opposition etween entrifugalitynd

centripetality.

n

the secondpart will examine

entrifugality

in

depth. It is by far he

morewidespread ind.) n the third

I

will uggest ome of

the mplications f the concept f asym-

metrical eciprocityor ractice nd theory. willgive

a num-

ber of hypotheses hat

believereliablebut that may be dis-

confirmedf

examined

t greater ength han a paper such as

this nd my imited

xpertise ermit.My purpose, insist, s

not to uphold this or that generalization s

confidentlyon-

firmed-they ll have

the virtue f beingdisconfirmable-but,

rather, o convince he

reader hat the conceptsput forward

here will help elicit

theoreticallymportant nd practically

useful ypotheses or n anthropologyf political ife.

CENTRIFUGALITY

AND CENTRIPETALITY

Centrifugality,ecently

ut to nterestingse by Sahlins 1963),

has been aptly

described y Mauss (1954

[1925]:72,

73):

Between assals

nd chiefs,etween assals nd their

enchmen,he

hierarchys establishedymeans f .. gifts. o give s to how ne's

superiority,o how hat

ne s something ore ndhigher,hat

ne

is magister.o acceptwithout eturningr repaying ore

s to face

subordination,o become

lient nd subservient,o becomeminister.

... In those arly ivilizationsne had interestsut they iffered

from

hose

f

ur ime. here,fonehoards,t s only o

spend

ater

on, oputpeople nder

bligationsnd towin ollowers.

Rural

India provides

good example f centrifugality.

he

caste that s

politically ominant

n

village ndia

is

usually

not

thehighestnritualrank.One of the reasons or ts dominant

position s that, n

theory

t

least, t owns

the

site

on which

others, he service astes including hoseritually igher

han

it), build theirhomes

e.g., see Srinivas1955, 1959,

1966:151-

52; Mandelbaum

1970:207-8; Orenstein 965:157).

The domi-

nant

group distributes gifts" besides residence

ites;

its

members rovide the largerpart of the finances eeded

for

village eremonies,

nd

they end

to be

the

most

frequent

nd

largest

onors f lms to

the villagepoor. Most

important,

he

dominant aste stands t

the

center

f

the

ajmani

system,

he

traditional

conomic

ystem

revalent

n much

of

rural

ndia.

In

this

system-as

found

n

Maharashtra

nd

probably

lse-

where

n

India-service castes

provide

the

dominant aste

(and

one

another) with

goods

and services

rope, pottery,

villagewatchmen, tc.) of limited ind no largerwaterpots,

for

nstance)

n

unlimited

uantities

n

exchange

or

roughly

understood

ercentage

f

theharvest

e.g.,

ee

Orenstein

962a;

1965:204, 24). The

system ieldsmuchpower

o thedominant

group,

so much that

some anthropologists

ave called

it

exploitative Lewis

and Barnouw

1958,

Beidelman

1959,

but

cf. Orenstein

962b).

Yet

the ideal

behind

the

system s,

as

expressed

n a

village

n

Mysore,

"Give

More,

Receive

ess"

(Ishwaran 1966:40).

As

is

recognized y

all

participants in

Maharashtra,

t

least),

the dominant aste

in fact

gives

far

more n

value, as comparedwith

what could

be had

in the

(readily vailable) marketplace,

n the

crops

t distributes

han

it receives n goods and services Orenstein

962a;

1965:225-

26). This is the main

reasonfor ts power; ervice astes

con-

struethemselves s debtors nd fearthe disaffectionfthose

fromwhom they seek

economicgain. Its power is

limited,

primarily ecause its ranks re tornby internal

ivalry

e.g.,

4

My use

of the

terms

centrifugal"

nd

"centripetal"

may

seem

odd to

some

readers.The

term

"centrifugal"

has been

applied to

societies n a senseimplying,s I interpret he intendedmeaning,"fragmenting"r,perhaps, falling part." My use

is

unrelated o

the

condition f

society;

t

focuses

on the

deas

regardinghe

rela-

tionship

f

the

center

leadership) o

ts

periphery

followers).

70

CURRENT

ANTHROPOLOGY

This content downloaded from 186.9.135.139 on Sun, 1 Sep 2013 10:52:54 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

7/23/2019 Asimetrica Reciprocidad.

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/asimetrica-reciprocidad 4/24

Orenstein:

SYMMETRICAL

RECIPROCITY

ee

Cohn

1955;

Lewis

1958;

Orenstein

965:188-97).

It

is,

however, y far the

mostpowerful

aste

in

the

village

nd

is

so perceived.

n

Maharashtra,

members

of

this caste

are

sometimes

ddressed r

referred

o

as

"owner"

mdlak),

be-

cause

they

wn the

village."

Their

position

s due

solely

o

the

fact hat

they

re

conceived s

the

village reditors.

Thus, we

find

entrifugality

n

nearlypure

form

n

village

India, where ocial

organization

s

elaborate

and

technology

relativelyomplex.

his

kind

of

deology

s

found,

owever,

t

virtually

very

level" of

technological

omplexity,

nd

it

may

dependupontheownershipr control fvirtuallynykindof

economic

ood.

To

make the

contrast

harp,

turn

to

some

tribes

f

Amerinds

f

northwestern

alifornia, eoples

with

"Mesolithic"

echnology.

mong

many

of

these

peoples,

most

notably he

Yurok

and

Hupa, therewere no formal

olitical

offices

nd, indeed,

veryfew

scribed,

anked

positions Gold-

schmidt

1951:509, 511,

512).

Leadershipwas

determined y

wealth. n these

ocieties,

therewere the

rich

nd the

poor,

class differentials

hich

represent continuum

f

status"

(p.

511). Wealth

could be achieved,

but it was

usually

nherited;

"authority ested

n

large measurewith

the

strong, nd .. .

this

trength as

fiscal trength"

p. 512).

Economicposition

was

the

determinant

f

political

power,

because

"owners of

resources nd

of wealth

could surround

hemselveswith a

greater

ody

of

personswilling

o

stand

by them t timesof

crisis.Directly, heowner fresources ould

support

larger

family.

ndirectly,

wealthy

man was

central n a

system

f

mutual

bligations,nd

lesserpersons

ound t

useful o stand

with him"

(p.

513). North of the

Yurok and

Hupa lived

the

Tolowa-Tututni, herewealth

was

so

important hatthe

"rich

man

functioned s a

state surrogate"

Du Bois

1936:54-55;

see

also Drucker

1937:245).

Althoughnone

of

these native

peoples

of

California

ad formal

hiefs, heyhad

firm eader-

ship,

men

who

dominated

thers ecause

heywere

he reditors

oftheir

ociety,while

thers

weretheir

ebtors.

Centrifugality,

ither n

pure

form r

supplemented

y other

political

deologies e.g.,

charisma

r

rationality), as an

im-

mensely

ide

distribution.o

widespreads t

thatwhen

come

upon a

little-known

ociety

anywhere

n

the world

I

am

tempted o assume t holds this deology ntil find ontrary

evidence. t is

foundnot

only n

Hindu ndia, but

also among

some

tribal

groups

of

the South

Asian

subcontinent

Orans

1965:24-25;

Barth

1954:48-49, 76-81,

108), as well

as in

Southeast

Asia

(Leach

1954). Among

Amerinds t

existed

n

the

Great

Plains, t least, s

well

s in

northwestern

alifornia

(Sahlins

1965:207).

Among

the

Yir Yoront

of

Australia,

he

ownership f

a

stone xe

was the exclusive

rerogative f older

males,

who could,

thus, reaffirm

heir

dominant

ositionby

allowing

othersto use it

(Sharp

1952:73-79). The

ideology

was

held

n

many-perhaps most-chiefdoms

nd

monarchies

in

traditional frica,

where t

often upplemented ther

deo-

logical

supportsfor

formal

political

positions

generally he

routinized

harisma

f

kingship) nd

where t was,

in

many

cases, thebulwarkof informaleadership e.g., see Richards

1939:135, 148,

150,

cited by

Sahlins

1965:213; Mair

1964:66-

67,

76-77, 96-97,

100-115; Maquet

1961). t is

also

an

impor-

tant

ideology mong

the peoples

of Oceania

(e.g., see

Duff

Missionaries

799:224-25,

Rodriguez

1919[1774], irth

1959:

133,

all

cited

by Sahlins

1965:208,

210-11;

Sahlins 1962;

Burrows nd

Spiro

1953:72-73).

This is

especially true of

Melanesia;

the

reader

may

have

recognized

n

centrifugality

the

eadership

deology

f

the

Melanesian

big

man"

(Sahlins

1963). Politics

n

traditional ri Lanka

are of

nterest; he king

distributed

and in

returnfor

specifically

efinedformsof

service,

ncluding he

obligation

o fight or

him

n

wartime

(Knox

1911:68-69). The

Sri Lankan

system s

reminiscentf

Western eudalism,

nd one scholar

Ryan 1953 45)

considers

the two systems trictly omparable.There are important

differences,ut

both are

examples f a verynearly

ure

type

of

centrifugality.

The quintessence f centripetalitys expressed y the apho-

rism whosoever fyou willbe

the hiefest,hallbe the ervant

of all" (Mark 10:44). In this

kind of ideology he leader is

thought o give by right nd receiveby grace. The ordinary

people,having levated ne of heirmembers o a superordinate

place, hold him n their ebt for

hat honor nd require imto

supply their expressedneeds.

What the leader gives to his

constituency

s their

ue; what

he

getsfrom hem-largely he

honor f high ffice-isby their race.

A

good example, irtually pure type, f this deology s in

Levi-Strauss's ccount of the

Nambikwara, unting-gathering

nomadswho do a bit of

desultory armingn a desolate and

impoverished art

of

Brazil.

Each littleband of Nambikwara

has a chief.The only "material" advantage accruing o the

chief

s the

right,

ot allowed o

other

men, o have more han

one wife Levi-Strauss

1961:302, 309). This right onstitutes

"the

means

put

at

the

disposition

f

their

hief n

order o help

him

carryout his duties" (p. 307). Women re economically

more mportanthan men pp.

278-79, 305-8), and polygyny

is essential

to a chief's

uthority.He must control urplus

goods,

for

when

an

individual, family

r

a band as a whole

wishes

or

needs

something,

t

is

to the

chief hat

an

appeal

mustbe made" (p. 304). The chiefneedsto be a good singer

and

dancer,

he better

o

entertain

is

people. He makes the

rubber alls they

se in

sports nd the rrow oison hey se in

hunting.

ll of

his kills, n

hunting,couting, nd

in

the

manu-

facture f goods,

re

at the disposal

of his

band (pp. 304-5).

For

example,

ne

chief ed his band via

a

roundabout oute

to

their esired estination;

s a

result, hey

were

delayed

nd

soon found hemselves ithout

ood.

nstead

of

pooling

heir

efforts

o

collect

food,

the

disgruntled

subjects" simply

at

back and rested,

s if

to

say,

"You

got

us into

this,

now

get

us

out." The chief,with the help of one

of

his

wives, pent

the

day collecting rasshoppers

or

he others

o

eat

(Levi-Strauss

1961:287-88). One is not surprised

o hear

that

men often

resist ccepting

he

office f

chief,

or

he Nambikwara hief

s,

indeed,

he

servant

f

his

people.

Their political ideology nd practicehold perils for the

Nambikwara.

Although

man

is

selected

hiefbecause

he

is

thought

o be the most

ble in

his

band,

his

authority

s

feeble,

his powervirtually

onexistent.

e

is like

"a

politician trug-

gling

o

maintain

n uncertain

majority" Levi-Strauss

961:

303-4). He must

be

highly esponsive

o

the

expressed

ishes-

or whims-of

his

constituency,

nd

these,

s

the

grasshopper

incident llustrates, ay

be

as much he

consequence

f

pique,

prejudice, r the

ike

as

of considered oncern

or he

strategic

interests f

the

group.

Leadership"

acks

the

ndependence

o

permit redictable

nd

consistent

movement oward

ong-range

groupgoals. Moreover,

entripetality

esults n a

fragile

ocial

group.

f a band

udges ts chiefwanting,

he members

imply

drift

way

until he

group

s too

smallto fend or

tself,

here-

upon t dissolves nd mergeswith ther roups p. 300).

The

tendency

oward ocial

and

politicalfrailty

nder the

centripetal deology

s illustrated

n

a

societyvery

different

from

he Nambikwara.

n

contrast o

the

Nambikwara,

who

eke out an

existence ittle

above subsistence

primarily y

hunting

nd

gathering,

heAnuak of the Sudan

live in stable

villages

and

are

horticulturalists

ho

also

practice

animal

husbandry.

heirholdon

a

level

rather

much bove

subsistence

is

secure.Yet amongmany

Anuak-not

all, only mong

hose

I

willcall

"village

Anuak"-there

are

clear

similarities

o the

Nambikwara

n

political

deology

nd

practice.

The

village

Anuak

headman's

subjects"

assert hat

theyprefer

im

to be

"like

a

woman,"

utwardly

ubmissive

ut

covertly

irm.

hey

say theywant

a

strong-willed

an

but one

who

can

veil his

strength.ometimes, hough think nly arely, hey etwhat

they say they want (Evans-Pritchard940:-42;

Lienhardt

1957:350-51; but cf. Evans-Pritchard 947:43). In fact, the

Vol.

21

* No. 1 * February

980

71

This content downloaded from 186.9.135.139 on Sun, 1 Sep 2013 10:52:54 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

7/23/2019 Asimetrica Reciprocidad.

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/asimetrica-reciprocidad 5/24

main

criterion

sed in

picking

headman

is not so

much

strength f character

s

wealth

(Evans-Pritchard

940:43).

Once

selected,

heheadman

cquires

more

wealth;

number

f

his

followers ssist

him in

cultivating

is

fields, ookinghis

feasts,

nd

building

is huts

Evans-Pritchard

940:40,42,

44;

Lienhardt

1957:347).

These

helpers

serve

much the

same

purpose

s

the Nambikwara hief's

xtra

wives,

for

he

head-

man's position carries with t onerous

obligations"

Evans-

Pritchard

940:43-44),

and his

helpers rovide

he

assistance

necessary

o

meet them. He is

expected

to

distribute

oods

lavishlyfor his followers' ridewealthnd to give feasts for

them

frequently Evans-Pritchard

1940:43).

His

followers

"never eave

him n

any

doubt that

t is for

heirbenefit ..

that he is investedwith he

dignity

f

officend

the court

nd

its

ceremonies nd

social

entertainments

re maintained"

(Lienhardt

1957:350).

In

Lienhardt's words

(p.

349),

the

people

"receive

s of

right,

nd

give

and

serve

out of

grace."

While n individual eadman

may

have

power

n

some

cases,

it

does not

derive

fromhis

office. he

office estows none

(Evans-Pritchard

940:44).

Rather,

t

constitutes

point

of

mobilization or

ublic

pinion,

n

important unction

f

which

is

curtailing he

all

too

frequent

village

conflicts Evans-

Pritchard

940:43;

1947:94-95; Lienhardt

958:30-31).

Clear-

ly, the

office s

highly

ignificant or

village Anuak

social

organization.

Despite

the

mportance

f

the

office,

ts

occupant

s

in a

very

unstable

position.

He is not

a

private

person

but

a

village

functionary

nd

f

he

does

not ct

as

such,

ut

he

goes"

Evans-

Pritchard

940:43).

If he is to

meet

the

expectations

f

his

people,he

must gain and

again distribute o

themhis material

resources. o

frequent

re his

distributionshat his

wealth

s

soon

depleted.

At thispoint

he

s

ousted

Lienhardt

957:348).

"Revolutions," sually

bloodless,

re

frequent, orthe

people

stand to

gain from

he nstallation f

a

new

headman-that

is,

from

the new man's as

yet

unstrained

resources

Evans-

Pritchard

940:43;

Lienhardt

958:35).

Thus, among

the village

Anuak

we find ne

office

f

much

political ignificance

etfrequent

nd

often

apricious

isplace-

ment f ts

occupants.

This

may,

t

times, eprive

villageof

a headmanwho has thehighly rized virtueofinnerpsychic

strength. he

importance

f

the

office

s

indisputable;

nder

poor

headman

village can

be

completely ispersed

Evans-

Pritchard

940:48).

Even if

thisdoes

nothappen, he

frequent

rivalries

within he

village nd

the

uncertainty

urroundinghe

headman's

abilities

nd

tenureplace

the village n

jeopardy

(e.g.,

see

Evans-Pritchard

947:92-94).

In

these

xamples

we have two

ocieties,widely

eparated n

space

and

very

differentn most ther

espects, hat hold

much

the

same

political deology,with imilar

onsequences: eaders

who

have

ittle, f ny,

power,who

must ttend

o much o

the

immediate emands

f their

eople that

their apacity o

guide

their

group

nd

hold

t

together

s

eroded.

The

leader

cannot

act even "as

an

honestmotorman

riving

streetcar," orhis

riders'whimsmayrequirehim to departfrom hetracks-to

depart,

hat

s,

for

hort-run

easons,

rom

he

often

mplicit)

strategic oals

of

the

group s

a

whole.

This

weakness

s not

a

necessary

onsequence f

centripetal-

ity. When the

deology s

accompanied

y others,

uch as the

alleged

rationality f

the eader or

his

charisma, e may

have

considerable

olitical

ndependence. ther

factors

may invest

independent

ower n the

central

uthority nder

entripetal-

ity.

For

instance, t is

possible hat a

centripetal

elationship

existed n

the

Roman

Empirebetween

he residents

f Rome

and

their

emperor.

Within the

city of Rome, the

emperor

"supplied he

Roman

peoplewith

heir ood ndtheir

leasures.

They ikedto have

himwith hem

n Rome,where

he could

be

immediately

onscious

f their esires. f

he failed hem,

hey

could demonstraten theirmassesat the publicshows. t was

vital or

the

Empteror

o keep

his clients

ontented"

Mattingly

1957:40-41, mphasismine).

n most ities n the

empire

here

was

self-governmentf

some

kind,

while

n

Rome

itself he

emperorsmade

decisions orthe

people; but "Rome ...

was

their spoilt

child" (Rostovtzeff

960:231). The

emperors'

decisions

egarding he city

of Rome

weredetermined y

their

"subjects'"

demands, enceobviating

he need for too

many

"demonstrations."

Yet

theRoman emperor ad

muchpower.

Political trength,

I

hypothesize, ill

often ccompany he

deology nd

practice

ofcentripetality

hen most of the

activities f the eader

are

directed utward, way from he group o whichhe is respon-

sible; and even then the

constituencymust be

one that is

either gnorant f or ndifferent

o those

ctivities f ts

eader

that

do

not

directly ffect hem.This seems

to have been

true

of

ancient Rome, and it

may hold for other

societies, oo.

Nevertheless, believe these

are special

cases, explicable

exceptions o

the rule that

centripetality,f fullyput

into

practice,

tends to

result

in

weak

leadership

and a

fragile

social group.

This

seems to me

to explainwhy

centripetalitys so rare.

am

not certain hat

the centripetal

deologyfits he

Roman

case. I

know

of

very few cases apart from hose

discussed n

which his

deology

s

significant

ven s a

supplemento

others.

Some Plains

Indians

and

some

South AfricanBushmen

are

possible ontenders,utthedataare notclear e.g., ee Mandel-

baum 1940:222

and Hunter 1823:317,

both cited in

Sahlins

1965:207;

Thomas 1958:183).

We know hat

something

ike

this

kind

of

egitimization

as

appeared from ime to time n

Western

history. he ruler

re-

garded

s

the ervant fthe

ruled s, s

Weber 1954 1922]:

30)

sees t,

found n purest orm

n "immediate

emocratic dmin-

istration."

Examples

he

gives are

the

Swiss township,

ome

towns

n

the United

States,

nd

some

Western niversities.

Perhaps

t has

been

as

evident o the

reader

s

it has been

to

me

that the dea of

centripetalitys one

of the most mportant

constituentsf

modern

emocratic

deology.

As

Weber 1947a

[1922]:389)

observes,

he

electedofficial

n

America becomes

the

servant' f thoseunderhis

authority."

entripetality

s

an

important art of

the appeal for ffice

made at every evel in

democratic overnment,ut I think t is at theheartof the

appeal

and

importantlyffects he actions of

United States

congressmen.

n

Congress

he claim

to

"service"

very

nearly

overwhelms he

claim to

"statesmanship" i.e., substantive

rationality).

A

congressman's

onstituency

s not

comparable

to

an

Anuak

village;

t

s

rarely,fever, solidary

roup

nthe

first

lace,

and

it s

certainly

ot often n

aggregation

f

people

amongwhom

persistent elationships

to the extent hat

such

exist)dependupon

political eadership.

he

pull of

the

centrip-

etal dea s

strong, owever,

nd

t

deeply ffects

he

functioning

of the

officeholder-witness

he

frequency

f

pork-barreling.

t

goes beyond

that.

According

o the

ournalists

Anderson

nd

Kalvelage 1972:24-25):

For neight-centtamp,ny itizen anbuy he ervicesf $42,500-

a-year

ombination

egislator,

essenger,xpediter,

rouble

hooter,

travel

uide

nd

nformationureau. hese re

the orts

f

chores

routine o 435

Representatives

nd

100

Senators

ho

represent

he

home olks

n

Congress.

heir

onstituents'

equestsange

rom

list

of

"everything

hat

hasn'tbeen nvented

et"

to

information

n

"how

o build

pigpen."

A

typical ongressman

verages

bout100

etters

very

working

day

while

ongress

s

n

ession.

When

t's ut

he

gets

hem

t

home.)

He

may

ebel

t

playing

he rrand

oy heprefers

o

play tatesman),

but hemail

ives

im

n

nsight

nto hevoters'

hinking

nd

points

up problems

inor

egislation ight

emedy.

ven the rrands

re

worth

heir

eight

n

votes.

Apart

from he price of the stamp

and the size of the

salary,

this

tatements, believe, fairlyccurate description fthe

position f most ongressmen.

he congressman's

main

venue

to political ndependence

esides-as probablydid

the

Roman

72

CURRENT

ANTHROPOLOGY

This content downloaded from 186.9.135.139 on Sun, 1 Sep 2013 10:52:54 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

7/23/2019 Asimetrica Reciprocidad.

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/asimetrica-reciprocidad 6/24

Orenstein:

SYMMETRICAL

RECIPROCITY

mperor's-in

the

indifferencef his

constituency

oward

legislation hat

does not

directly

ffect

t,

although,

n

many

cases, he cannot

be sure

ust

how

much ndifference

xists

nd

about

what

ssues.

These,

then,

re

the two

forms f

political

deology

o

which

I

wish to draw attention.

f our attention

s to

be

rewarded,

we

must take care

at the outset

to avoid

confusing

hese

concepts

with

others f

a sort morefamiliar

o social

science.

Because

discern

ut

twovariants

f

symmetrical

eciprocity,

the

types

may

be confounded

with the trouble-laden

aired

concepts-genuinevs. spurious, radition s. modernity,nd

so on-that

have,

to

my

mind,

more ften

mpeded

han

ided

our

understanding

f

social relations.The

types

I

suggest

differ rom

ichotomies

f this

ort

n a

number f

ways:

1.

Polar dichotomiesn

social science

re

intended

o be

all-

inclusive.

All

societies

re seen as

falling

nto

one

or

the

other

type

or

somewhere

etween he two.

My

types

re

but two

of

a

number.

hey

are

variants n

a

single

general

ype,

ompa-

rable to

Weber's subdivision f

rational

uthority

nto

formal

and

substantive

ationality.

symmetrical

eciprocity ay

play

a

minor

ole,

ossibly

vennone t

all,

n

some

political

ystems.

For

example,

a

political

system

may

be

sustained

almost

exclusively

y

routinized

harisma

possibly

mperial

hina

or

Ptolemaic

gypt) or

by

substantive

ationality

possibly

ome

Plains ndians).2.

Dichotomous

oncepts

generally

re intended

o

charac-

terize

and

contrastwhole

societies.

For

instance,

he

terms

"folk"

nd

"traditional"

enotekinds f

behavior

nd

ways of

thinking hat are believed

to

characterize

many different

domains

f

culture-religion,

inship, rt,

politics,

nd so

on.

While am

much

concerned

with

the

effects

ach

of.

he

two

forms f

asymmetrical

eciprocity

may

have

upon

political

efficiencynd social

solidarity,

he

typology

recommend

subsumes

olitical

deology

lone, not

"total

social

systems."

Indeed,

under each

of

my

types we

find

societies

classed

together

hat

differ

widely

n

features

therthan

ideology

(something

f

a

methodological

dvantage,

n

that t

mayhelp

us

more

asily

o

solate

adhesions"

etween

kind

f

deology

and other olitical rsocialphenomena).

3.

In

most

olar

dichotomies

e find

t one

extreme

Western

society,

or

societies

much

affected

y the

West

("urban,"

"Gesellschaft,"

spurious,"

tc.), while

at

or

near

the

opposed

pole there

re "folk"

societies,

genuine"

societies, nd

the

like.

Most

such

dichotomies

mply

or assert

a

process of

development-a

movement, or

nstance, rom

tradition"

o

"modernity."

he

types

recommend

ave

nothing odo

with

this

sort

of

thinking.

While

centripetality

s

important

n

the

modern

West,

its

importance

s

quite

recent.

The

village

Anuak

and

Nambikwara,

ndisputably

ot "urban"

civiliza-

tions,

may for

ll

we

know

have

adopted

centripetalityong

before t

arose

n

the

West. The

types

here

described re

not

connectedyanyorderly istoricalrocess. pecifically,deny

that there s a

recent

istorical

endency

oward

ither

ype.

In all

or

mostof

the

usual

dichotomies

here s at

least

one

serious

hazard

(apart from

he

oversimplifications

nvolved):

the

preferencesf

the

observer re

likely

o be

implicated n

the

typology

nd

to

determine is

delineation

f ts

characteris-

tics.

T6nnies

1940:38)

has been

explicit n

this:

"[A]

young

man is

warned

against

bad

Gesellschaftsociety],

but

the

expression

ad

Gemeinschaft

community]

iolates

he

meaning

of the

word."

Like

Tonnies,

have my

biases-I am

drawn

o

the

centripetal

ype-but my

classification

s

sufficiently

imple

and

empirically

oncrete

o

circumvent

my

biases; and

this,

believe,will

be evident

hroughout

y

treatment

f the

types.

I

should

dd that,

hough

o consistent istorical rocess sintended

o connect

he types

suggest,

istorical

nd

political

processes

will

be hypothesized

n the

consideration

f ach

type.

CENTRIFUGALITY

A

persistent

deologywill lmost

nvariably e

accompanied y

an

appropriate

oliticalprocess.The

process

may

comprise

mere

gesturemade

from

imeto

timeby the

politically

omi-

nant.When

the

process s so

remote

rom he

professed,

find

nothing

f

nterest

n

the atter.

t is

commonplace

ypocrisy,

a

thin

disguise for

sheer

coercion,

ittle

different

romthe

commands fan armedbandit, nd that s an endof t.

Such

hypocrisies

re not

only

uninteresting,

ut

usually

ephemeral.

ar

more

widespread

nd

far

more

ntriguingre

conditions

herein

n

ideology

s

convincingnd

yet s

under-

mined

because

entangledwith

other

firmly

eld values

that

strip t of

much f ts

potential

or

ealizationn

political

ction.

This

may take

place

with

either

f

the

two

forms fasym-

metrical

eciprocity.

illustrate

with the

centrifugal

ype

as

found n

two

very

different

ocieties. n

both,

centrifugality

was

virtually he

sole

ideology

ustaining

olitical

ction. One

is

Western

eudalism,n

which he

centrifugal

deologywas

of

heroicproportions

ut

little

practical

efficacy.

he

other

s

Melanesia,

where

the

ideology

was

often

fully

manifestedn

practice.

My

intent s

to

suggest he

smallest

possible

differ-

ences-"lowest commondenominators," o to speak-that

help

explain

why

an

ideology s

effective

nd

what

happens

when t

is

ineffective

r

when

t

is

influenced

y other ocial

phenomena.f I can

make

plausible-ideally, provocative-

suggestions, hen even

if

they

are shown

to

be

not

entirely

correct

heywill erve s

evidence

or he

heuristic

alue

of

the

concepts here

propose.

WESTERN

FEUDALISM

Feudalism

n the

West has

been a

center f

attention or o

long

among

so many

scholars

hat the

account

give

below,

intended

s it

is for

comparative

nthropologicalurposes,

shouldbe

understood

s a

highly

ondensed

ketch f

number

of historians'nterpretationsf its mostsalientfeatures nd

failings.My

own

interpretation,n

even

more

abbreviated

form, illbe

given

n

my

omparison f

feudalwithMelanesian

politics.

While

Europe

in

the

heart

of

the

Middle

Ages

was

socially

no more

homogeneous

han would be

expected

f

so

large

nd

geographicallyaried

n

area,

therewere

distributed

ver

most

of

the

continent

ertain

eneral

eatures

f human

relations-

perhapsbetter alled

ideas

and

ideals

regarding

uman

rela-

tions-that we have

come

to

call

feudalism.

hese involved

"the

peculiar association of

vassalage

with

fief-holding"

(Stephenson

942:14).

Vassalage

consisted f

a

personal

rela-

tionship

etween

leader nd a

follower,

ne that

was held

to

bestow

highhonor

n

both

men

pp. 2-5,

10).

"The

vassal was

really servant, . . but thisposition fservantwas mingledwith a

sentiment f

comradeship

which, without

effacing

differences,reated

a

close

relationship f

mutual

devotion"

(Seignobos

1912:38). With

few

exceptions,

he

obligations

n-

volved

were

military; thevassal

was the

oldier

f

he

eigneur;

he

must

id

him n

his wars"

(p. 42).

The bond

between

ord

nd

vassal was

created

y

a

ceremony

usually

entailing he

grant f a

portion f

the

ord's

and,

the

fief-also

called

the

beneficium,

recarium,

r

Lekn

(Bloch

1961:164-65). The

vassal's

subordination

was

created and

sustained,

n feudal

theory, y

his

continued

cceptance

of

hegemony

ver the and

granted

o him.

"Since

the

grants

f

land were n

theory

emporary,

hehabit

developed

f

describ-

ing

them

by

a

term]

whose

meaning

was

'to

hand

over tem-

porarily,

o

end.'The

fief as

a

loan-Lehn"

(Bloch1961:167).The fiefwas,thus, militaryeneficeStephenson

942:12),

a

benefice n

the sense

that "it

was a boon

(beneficium)

n

the

part of

the grantor"

p.

7).

Vol. 21

*

No.

1

*

February

980

73

This content downloaded from 186.9.135.139 on Sun, 1 Sep 2013 10:52:54 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

7/23/2019 Asimetrica Reciprocidad.

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/asimetrica-reciprocidad 7/24

While control

ver a fiefwas

economically dvantageous, t

was

what

we

would term

political ontrol,

or

t

involved he

right

o administer

ustice,

o collect

ines,

nd

by

subinfeuda-

tion to create

vassals of one's own without he

consent f the

lord (Stephenson1942:7, 12-13, 29; Ganshof1962:144).

In

short, t involved ontrol verpeople's ives.

What

of

"the

people,"

the

people

who

actually

worked

he

land? Some of these, freemen,"ppear to have been bound to

their ords

by

ties

similar

o those

obtaining mong

the

ords

themselves.

he

freeman

ived

on

and

cultivated he

land of

his ord nd, n return, ad to givehim id and obedience. he

freeman

as

far

nferior

o his

ord,

but

he

was,

as

it

was then

understood, ree.

If

he

sold,gave away,or

abandoned

his and

to go and live elsewhere, othing ny longer ied him to the

lord fromwhom his plot was held" (Bloch 1961:265-66).

Relationsbetween ords

and

freemen ere without

nnobling

ceremonies, ut,

as in

relations

mong nobles,

the ties that

bound the partieswere suppliedby the ideology f centrifu-

gality.

The

serf

was

different.

is

was

not

a

contractual

ond to his

lord,but

a

bond

of

"blood";

he

was

"un homme e

corps." He

was

unfree,

n

the

thought

f

those

times.

He

served

his

ord,

not because

he

had

received

boon and

owed obedience

n

return, ut

because he was

the son

of omeone

who

had served

his ord'sfather Bloch 1961:261-65).

The

distinction etween

erf

nd

freemanwas, however,

n

fact f not in law, far from harp Seignobos 1912:5, 12-13;

Bloch 1961: chap. 19). Some modern historiansmake

no

distinction

etween

he

two

(e.g.,

see

Hay 1964:42-47). Serfs

were sometimes

freed"-to become

freemen-while

reemen

sometimescultivated and designated for serfs Seignobos

1912:5, 12-13; Bloch 1961:258-59, 65). Both erfs

nd

freemen

were simply villeins." Whether erfs r freemen, hey were

lumped ogethers a subservientnd socially nsignificantlass

(Green 1971:54), and open, violentrebellionwas exceedingly

rare-absent

prior

o

the 13th entury Hay 1964:45). It was

not until he 14th nd 15th enturies hat uch rebellions ook

place with any frequency Hay 1964:124). The relationship

between oble nd villein

eems o have been

firmnd clear-cut,

somuch o that"the rights fthe ord nd his peasantsdid not

disappear

s

genuine eudalism id, but survived n new forms

to a

much aterdate" (Hay 1964:42).

On first

lance,

t seems

that, apart

from

he serf

t the

bottomof the

social

order,Westernfeudalismwas knit to-

gether rimarily y the deology f centrifugality.his surely

was the

dea,

but

to

what extentwas it

acted on?

The

answer s

that, by

and

large, t was not. It was

not

merely hypocritical askfor oercive ower.Like all persis-

tent

deologies,

t

had

some

activity ppropriate

o

it;

the

dea

was

not

only sincerely eld, but highly onored. t served

s

the reason

given

for

political

ubordinationnd

coordination.

However,

t was

deprived f muchof ts substance n practice

by

a

deeply

held value

of

another ind-that

of

the nviolable

proprietyfpatrilinealnheritance, social rulefarolderthan

feudalism

Ganshof 964:10). Fiefswere nherited.

In

medievalviews, the tie [between assal and lord] asted

.so long

as

the two lives whichbound t together, ut as

soon

as

one

or the other

of

thesewas terminated y death

t

was

automatically

dissolved"

(Bloch 1961:147, 175).

"The

contract ..

excluded

any

idea

of

heritability" Ganshof

1964:46).

This was

the deal,

and

the deal was not

to

be cast

aside

as

of no

account.

For instance, he

vassal was

always

under ome

constraint o pay homage

o his

lord,

n wartime

to

help ecurehis fief nd in peace to attend ourt Stephenson

1942:23; Bloch 1961:190). Vassalage,moreover, ad

some

force

in law. True, f a deceasedvassal had a male heir,his ord, n

the eyes of feudal aw, had

to accept the heir'soath of fealty

(Bloch1961 190); but ftherewereno heir, hefief everted o

the ord,

who could within nderstoodimits ispose f t much

as he wished Bloch 1961: 28-29; Stephenson 942: 4; Ganshof

1964:97-98).

Centrifugalityven

had

sufficient

orce

o

affect

patriliny.

eudal law

contemplated

ndivisible

iefs,

husfixing

the

responsibilities

f vassals; hence

t stimulated

tendency

toward

rimogeniture

r

systems aving

imilar ffects

parage,

joint

holdings,

tc.). One

might erm ll

such systems

focused

inheritance"

nd

distinguish

hemfrom

diffusenheritance,"

such as

was found

n manyparts

ofEurope,

where he fief

was

divided

mongheirs nd

payments

"relief")

given o the

fief's

grantor

Bloch

1961:205-8).

Still,

he njury

nflicted y

patriliny

n political

deals was

grave.Political ontrol ver erritoryas crucial n nheritance.

When the

bond of vassalage

nvolved

orms f payment

ther

than and, we

find hat the

bond terminated,

s law

required,

at the death

of either arty

Ganshof

964:101).

On some

few

occasions

n

the early

phases

of feudalism,

he territorial

iefs

of "felons"-vassals

who had

violated

theiroaths-reverted

to their rstwhile

ords, ut

eventhen he

fiefs ere

distributed

to

someone

of

"proper

blood" (Bloch

1961:195).

As early

as

the

9th century,

harles he

Bald attempted o rupture

is tie

with

a vassal and retake

possession

f "his" land.

He failed

(Bloch

1961:193).

n byfar he

majority fcases,

felons-more

than ikely

enying

he ppellation-refused

o

relinquish

heir

fiefs

e.g.,

ee

Ganshof

964:99). Vassalage

nvolved,

bove

all,

military ervice;

yet we

find nfant

ons,far too

young o

heft

a swordorride

a

horse,

ndertakinghomage"

to

their ords

(Bloch

1961:201).

In the absenceof a male heir, daughters

inherited

iefs. heirspouses

could

fight,

s was required,

ut

this

was

not the

ntensely ersonal

ond

vassalage

nticipated.

Worse,

we

find

men,

urely

or

ersonal

ain,

becoming

assals

of more han

one

ord.

For whom

hould uch men

fightf one

of

heir

ords ought

nother?

See

Bloch

1961:235-36;Stephen-

son 1942:34, 38;

Ganshof 1964:102). Thus

there arose

the

concept

f

"liege

homage,"

what

we

might all primary

om-

age-homage

owed more

firmly

o

one lord

than to others.

Then

theserelationships

hemselves

roliferated,

nd

one man

might

we liege homage

to

many

ords (Bloch

1961:211-18

Ganshof 964:103-4).

These

are

but

a

few xamples

f theways

in

whichpatrilineal

nheritance

f the

Lehn entailedpractices

that

denied

ts

contingent

nd

temporary

haracter.

he con-

sequencewas that, nfactthough ot n law or ideals,"fealty

became

an

object

of trade"

Bloch

1961:210).

Other

actors

weakened entrifugality.

f

these,

econd

only

in

importance

o

patrilineal

nheritance

was the

ideal of

a

perfect

yramid

f

authority

mbracing

he

"world"

i.e.,

the

Christianworld),

feudal

hierarchy

scending

rom

base

of

peasants

through

assals-often

themselves

aving

subinfeu-

dated

vassals-to lords

to

"liege

ords"

to

kings,

ulminating

in

an

enduring mperor.

his

aspiration

tood n

stark ontrast

to the

only slightly

more

realistic)

heory

hat

contemplated

Christendom

n

its

secular

aspect

as

properly

ivided nto

a

plurality

f

independent

ingdoms.

oth

ofthese

deals were

accepted

by

differentchools

of medieval thought

Taylor

1914:304-6;

Cantor

1963:375),

but

there

s

little

doubt that

the deal ofempire-inheritedromRome,stimulated y the

Carolingian

uccess

however

phemeral),

nd

possibly

modeled

on the

sacred

realmof

the

Church-was

the

dominant

heory

and,

more mportantly,

he

main motivation

or

he

aggressive

militarism

f

many

nobles e.g.,

ee Strayer

nd Nunro1959:41,

60;

Brooke

1963?:375;

Parkes

1970:15,

29-30, 95, 172;

Bloch

1961:390-91).

mperial

mbitions nfected

many

nobles, spe-

cially

but not

exclusively

talian

ones,

nd

a

number

f

nobles

were

ctually

rowned

mperor y

the

pope (Bloch

1961:377).

Few,

however,

ere

cknowledged

s such

by other

nobles,

nd

none, part

from harlemagne,

as able

fully

o act

as such.

The

emperor

was

an

idea,

not

a

person,

nd

certainly

ot

an

office ccupied

by

a

genealogically

istinct

ine

of

persons.

Apart

from he brief eign

f the Carolingians

nd the

rather

ineffectualttonian ffort,he emperor as a fiction. he post

was, n fact,

up forgrabs,"

nd whilemany

grasped, o

man,

certainly

o family ine,

could hang on

for ong.

74

CURRENT

ANTHROPOLOGY

This content downloaded from 186.9.135.139 on Sun, 1 Sep 2013 10:52:54 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

7/23/2019 Asimetrica Reciprocidad.

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/asimetrica-reciprocidad 8/24

Orenstein:

ASYMMETRICAL

RECIPROCITY

ings

had their

fiefs,

hey

had

chrism,

nd

they

had

the

idea of oyal

ords,

but most

had little

more.Too few

would

rest atisfied

ultivating

heir

ardens

t

home;

thusthere

was

frequent

ivision

nd diffusionf

authority

nd

deep dissatis-

factionwithin

king's

ealm.

n

Burgundy, ings

eemed

never

"to

have seen

in their lands

...

anything

but

a

convenient

starting oint

for

..

Italian

conquest,"

and

this

attitude,

through

nternal eakness

onsequent

pon

attentions

irected

outward, way

from

heir own

lands,

was

probably argely

responsible

or

heir

ultimate

ncorporation

nto

the

Ottonian

Empire Bloch 1961:378-79). ndeed,becauseofthe ntensity

of

effort

pplied

beyond

their wn

borders,

nternal

olitical

chaos was

prevalent

mong

the

Ottonians

themselves

see

Strayer

nd

Nunro

1959:155;

Brooke 1963?:

165;

Bloch

1961:

427-29).

In

contrast,

hen

kingly

ine did

not have

imperial

ambitions, t

often

had

firmer

uthority

within

ts borders.

Western

rancia,

for

xample,

oon

abandoned the

quest

for

empire-probably

because of

geographical

emoteness

rom

Rome-and

achieved

ar

more

tability,

n

particular

nder

he

late

Capetians,

han

xisted

mong

ts

eastern

eighbors.

uch

the ame

was true

f

Norman

ngland

see

Bloch

1961:377-78;

Strayer

nd

Nunro

1959:177-94;

Cantor

1963:247,

339-47,

462-63,

476-77).

Such

cases,

however,

were

not

the rule.

European

kingdomswere

usually very

nsecure;

orders luc-

tuated;

the

authority

f

the

king

was

often

masculated, ndkings ad toexpendmuch ffort erelyn

suppressing

ebellions

within heir

wn

fiefs

Bloch

1961:408-9).

In

some

nstances

kingship as so

meaningless

hat,

despite

he

king's hrism,

e

had no more

uthority,

nd

sometimes

ess

power,

han some

of his own

vassals.

n

one

case-unusual,

I

admit,

but nstruc-

tive-a

king

became the

vassal of his own

vassal

(see

Brooke

1963?:98-99;

Strayer nd Nunro

1959:175-76;

Cantor

1963:

225,

235, 244,

247, 460-61,

475-76).

Lords were

often n a

similarly

mbiguous

osition

especting heirvassals.

Instead

of

centralized

uthority,

herewas

onlyprivate

power,

which

exercised

overlapping

urisdiction

n

a

crazy

patchwork

f

decentralized

uthority"

Cantor

1963:244).

The feudal

pyra-

mid

was

a

purely

mic deal

whose

onsequencewas mainly

o

fire

further

he

ambitions f

anyone who

thought

he had a

decentshot at a moreelevatedstatus-a status for which

virtually

nyone

of

noble birth ould

dredge

up from

roadly

defined

enealogies ne

oranother laimto

propriety.

The

result

f

he

doubly ompromised

deologywas an

unsafe

world

of

unpunished

rigandage nd

murder,

onstantminor

uprisings,nd an

ever present

resentiment,

ortifiedy per-

sistent

preparation nd

frequent

practice,

of war

(Bloch

1961:

hap. 30).

The ideology

was so

feeble hat at

least one

historian

Brown

1974) has

argued that the

very term

feu-

dalism"

should be

discarded.

The ideal

of

centrifugalityas

reshapedby

patriliny nd

by the

feudalfiction f

a perfect

pyramid

f

authority. Like

Victorian

irgins

ubbing

n

their

nightgowns,"eudal

nobles

mmersed

hemselvesn

thecentrif-

ugal deology ut

rarely

roubled o give

their owns,

et alone

themselves, thorough ash.

The

only

lear

and

firm ond n

feudalism

as that

between

the

fief

older

nd

his

peasantry. ere,

despite hefact

hat he

right

o

inherit

and

detracted rom

ure

centrifugality

Bloch

1961:130-32)-indeed, I

believe, n

partbecause

of t-the

po-

litical

tie between

men was

upheld.The reasons

or his,

which

will

also

help us to

understand he

chaotic

relations

mong

nobles,

ad bestbe

discussed

ater, fterwehave

ooked nto

he

politics

f a

people far

differentnd far

removed n

time and

place

from

eudal

Europe.

MELANESIA

Among

he

Kapauku Papuans

of New Guinea

the most

mpor-

tantfactors ontributingo political minence re wealthand

generosity

Pospisil

1958a:45-46).

The Kapauku

headmnan's

"extension

f credit

onstitutes he

primary venue

of

social

control. People

usually

follow

decisions of

a

wealthy

man

because they re his debtors

nd are afraid f

being sked

to

return

hat they we,or

out of gratitude or ast financial

id

or because they xpect

uture inancial avors. o

comply

with

the requests

nd decisions f

a

wealthy

man means

economic

security."

o create political

followers ne

distributes

wealth

and extends redit; o apply anctions

ne withdraws

r refuses

credit.

Political ituations imilar othis re found hroughout ost

of Melanesia.

Here we

find

numerous ocieties

wherein en-

trifugality

tands

nearly lone,

virtually ncontaminated

y

other

olitical deas, and thereforet is herethat we can

come

close

to

isolating

he

political

mpact

of

the

dea, in particular

the

mount

f

power

t

can

yield

nd

the onditions

nderwhich

thatpower

may

be

limited

r

expanded.

hose conditions

ear

some resemblance,

n an

abstract evel,

to the ideas that

compromised

eudal

ideology; hence they

may help us to

understand

ot only Western

eudalism, ut,

because of the

magnitude

f the differences

etween he cultures,

he general

significance

f

centrifugality

nd

the factors

hat affect ts

political

potency.

herefore

will

now

brieflyurveyMelane-

sian politics.

An

intensive xamination ould

be out of place

in a paper of this sort

and, more mportantly,

eyond my

present

ommand f the data.

The

Kapauku "big

man" has

impressive

owers.

n

virtually

all

societies,

the

rules

regulating

inship

nd marriage re

among

hosemostresistant

o rapid change,

specially hange

instigated

y

a

single

ndividual;yet one

Kapauku "big

man"

abolished

ome

f

hisgroup's ong-standing

ules

f xogamy

nd

substituted

ew nd very ifferent

nes.His motivewas simple:

he wantedmany

wives

nd found urdensomeheweight

f

he

old

rules

egulating arriage.

e decided o violate

herules

nd

to

cloak

hisbehaviorwith egitimacy

y promulgating

ew,

ess

restrictive

ules

of exogamy.

Followinghis precedent

nd

by

his

command,

is

new

ruleswereobeyed,

lbeitwith

muttered

protests

Pospisil1958b: 32-34).

To

facilitate

he

operation

f

one of his new rules-that people

from

pposite

ides of the

village formerly holly xogamous) ould marry-he further

ordered

hat the village,

n

irregular

rrangement

f

houses,

be reorganizedntotwo

traight

inesofhouses,

ne ine to

the

north,

he other o the

south. Such

a

change

would

create

a

sharp, ocalized

moietyorganization

pp. 834-35).

The per-

sonal

whims

of a

politically owerful

womanizer,

veritable

Papuan Henry

VIII, thus

threatened

drastic

eorganization

of an

entire ocial system.

There reother

xamples

f

powerful

big

men"

n

Melanesia.

In

anotherNew

Guinea society,

he Chimbu,

"big

man"

murdered wo of his wives

on two separate

occasions.

With

impunity,

ut with no

moral or legal right,

he same

man

killed hose fhis followers

hoopposedhim.

Equally contrary

to law and

custom,

he

confiscated

is followers' roperty

nd

beat them severely f they protested Salisbury1964:227).

Powerful

big

men" seem

to exist n anotherpart

of New

Guinea Hogbin 1951:150-63;

for nterpretation,

ee

Salisbury

1964:237)

and amongthe Kaoka-speaking

eoples

of Guadal-

canal

(Hogbin

1964:63).

Examples

of

thiskind

re not unusual,but

even

more ften

the

ethnographies

escribe

Melanesian "big

men"

as

having

little

power.

n

one

society

n

the

Solomons he

actions

of the

"big

man" are said to

be curbed

by the fact

hat

his

position

depends

n

the goodwill nd help

of his followers.

e

dare

not

incur

heir

ispleasure

r they

may refuse

o work

orhim

nd

go

ive elsewhere."

n

this ociety he big

man"

s

an

organizer

who

is

responsive

o

the wishes

of his

followers,

ot

a

despot

(Hogbin

1939:74, 81).

It

is

much

the

same

among

the

Mae

Enga ofNew Guinea Meggitt 965:97).Among heKumaand

Siane

of New Guinea, "big men"

initiate he labor of

work

teaims

by

consm)iciioislv ettinz

about the tasks

themselves,

n

Vol. 21

*

No.

1

*

February

980

75

This content downloaded from 186.9.135.139 on Sun, 1 Sep 2013 10:52:54 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

7/23/2019 Asimetrica Reciprocidad.

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/asimetrica-reciprocidad 9/24

the

hope,

usually rewarded,

hat others

will follow heir

ead

(Reay

1959:129; Salisbury

1962:28-30,

52-54, 56-57,

60).

"Big men" in one

group

have so little ctual

power

that

the

ethnographer

efers o them s

"managers"

Burridge

960:

75-

80; 1969:38).

"Big

men" have

been so often bserved

o

be

leaderswithout

ower

hat

one scholarhas

argued,

ncorrectly

it

seems,

that

all instancesof

"big-man"

despotism

re

a

consequence

f contact withthe West

(Brown

1963,

but

cf.

Salisbury 964).

Thus we have two

contrasting

escriptions;

ne

depicts

despots, he othermildmanagers. he difference,believe, s

due to

a limitednumber f

conditions. ome

may

be

more

apparent

han actual,

nvolving

thnographic

echnique

ather

thanpersistent

olitical

ractice;

hese

need

not

be

discussed.5

Some

are

relevant; hey

have to do

withthe

amount

of

effort

a

"big

man"

must

expend

n

order

to

raise

and

sustain a

following,.e.,

with

he

ntensity

f

competition

or

position.

The

amount feffort eeded o

get

followers

epends

n

arge

part on rulesof

nheritance.

f

a

well-off

an

has

an

heir

who

inherits

ll or

most

of his

wealth,

ncluding

redits nd

liquid

assets-that is,

if

nheritance

s

focused-then his

heir has

a

head

start ver hose

f

ess

wealthy

men.He can

more

uickly

establish

bodv

of followersnd

expend

muchof his

time

nd

effort

n

consolidating

is hold over

them

nd/or

n

expanding

hissway. f,on thecontrary,here s diffusenheritance,here

willbe

a

tendency

or

veryone

o

start t

about the ame

point

in

the race

forposition.

n

such

circumstanceshere

s

likely

to

be

intense

ompetition

mong bigmen,"

who will

have

to

expend

much effort

n

wooing ollowers,

r,

alternatively,ry

to

reach a

modus vivendi

that allows

leadership roles to

several

men, ach

role

carrying

ith

t

less

power

han

would

be

held by any one

"big

man"

standing lone.

The

Kapauku "big

man"

mentioned

arlier

robably

had a

head

start. n this

group,while dead man's and is

generally

divided

mong

his

sons,

the

eldest

on

gets

a

larger

hare

and

first

hoice

(Pospisil

1963a:736).

With

qualifications,

e

in-

herits most of

the

liquid assets

of

the

deceased-pigs and

chickens,

manufactured

tems, nd,

significantly,ully

0%

of

his

father's hell

money

Pospisil

1963a:212, 220,

296, 357).

Furthermore, e inherits he "total financial tatus" of the

deceased,

ll

ofhis

debts

nd credits

p. 357).

In

the

pursuit f

positions f

power mong the

Kapauku

Papuans,

some have

marked

dvantages ver

others.

The

Kuma,

who

have

weak

"big men,"

may serve

as a

contrastingxample.

When

Kuma

man

dies,

his

heirs

divide

his

ands

and

liquid assets

equally.

Moreover, ome of

his pigs

are

slaughtered,nd

many f his

valuables re

destroyed t his

funeral

Reay

1959:9,

96-97).

In

this

group, as

might be

expected,

umerous

eaders ompetewith

one another;

more

than half

the

Kuma

men

become

eaders t

some time,"

nd

"nearly third

f the men

.. are either

uthorized r spon-

taneous

eaders

t any given

ime" Reay

1959:116).

Similarly,

in

the Solomon

slands

group

have mentionedn

which he

"big men"wereweak, much of the wealth of the dead was

distributed

t their

unerals

Hogbin1939:73).

My impressions

that n

much of

Melanesia the

wealth of

"big

men"

s

destroyed

r

dispersedwhen hey

die. f this s

so,

one would

expectfew

Melanesian

despots. am

not, however,

here

uggesting

n

inflexibleule.

For instance,

where ustom

prescribes

hat wealth

be

destroyed r

dispersed t funerals,

one

can

still

have

powerfulbig men,"

or ther

ocial onditions

can

stimulate

eople

to

circumventheir

ustoms, nd

inheri-

tance,

n

effect,an be

focused.

Among heTolai of

New Britain,

ix eaders

re discussed y

the

ethnographers,

nd of

these three

have

impressive ower

(Salisbury 970:313,

315-22). Yet in

thisgroup,

s appears to

be the

case among

manyother

Melanesians, t is

customary o

distribute

much of the

wealth of

the deceased

at his funeral

(Epstein 1968:26).

The

explanation eems o me

to be thatthe

Tolai are

matrilineal;

man's sister's on

customarily

nherits

what

remainsof his

wealth after

the funerary

istribution.

Consequently,t seems

o me and,

infer, o one

ethnographer

(Salisbury

1970:329) that

men are

prompted o give to

their

own sons

during heir

ifetimes

s

much as they

can of their

wealth norder o circumventheruleof nheritancee.g., see

Salisbury

970:307-8).

Of

the six

leaders

mentioned,

ourhad

been

started n

their

areersby their

athers p.

330); "none

was born

poor" (p.

313).

The

situation

mong

the matrilineal

Busama

of

Guadalcanal appears

very similar,

hough bit

morecomplex n

that a man's

son is entitled

o a partial

inheritance

f

his

estate,

ncluding redits

nd debts

Hogbin

1951:122; 1963:17,

41, 112).

If

this

explanation olds,

t should

pply, as a

tendency, o

all the

matrilineal

ocieties

fMelanesia.

am by no

means ure

of

myself, owever,

nd, indeed,

this is not

my reason for

discussing he

ubject. have done

o because

wish o empha-

size what

think

s an

essential

ondition

wherebymuch

power

can

be

wielded

nder

he

aegis

of

centrifugality.

his

condition

is connected otdirectlywith nheritanceules,but with the

absence of ntense

ompetition or

positions f

political

ower,

to

which,

n

turn,

ppropriatenheritance

ules an

contribute.

One

might

ay that

politicalpower

depends, n part,

on the

supply

f

eaders:

f

t

is

large,power

will be

modest;

f

small,

powerwill be

greater.

Another ondition

ffects he power of

the

"big man,"

however:

the

supply

of

followers.

We

must

look

at

both these

onditions

ogether.

A

"big

man"

usually

has

littledirect

olitical ole

beyond

small

group,

which will call his

"primary

rena,"

but

he

can

get

renown

hroughout is

entire

ribe,possibly

beyond,by

means of

widespread

distributions

f goods, for

example, n

competitive

easting

Hogbin

1964:70;

Oliver

1955:388-94).

His

followers ork o help

spread

his

reputation

n

return or

the "reflected

enown" is

reputation

asts

upon

them

Oliver1955:390,408,409). It isevident hat he arger his secondary

arena" and

the

more

he

prestige

ought

within

t,

the

greater

will

be

the

need of

the

"big

man" for

material

goods

to

dis-

tribute.

All

such

goods

are drawnfrom is

primary

rena.

Yet

success

or

failure

n the

quest

for

restigewithin

he

econdary

arena

has

little

irect

nd

immediate ffect

n his

power

within

his own

group Oliver

1955:394-95).

It

may

have

an

important

ong-range

ffect,

however.

According

o

Sahlins's

(1963:289-94)

analysis,

well-estab-

lished

econdary

rena

nsures llies

n

case of

war,

whichwas

endemic

n

Melanesia,

and

it

attracts

both

women,

who are

economically

ost

mportant

n Melanesian

ocieties,

nd

stray

men,

who are

potentialwarriors.

ut,

Sahlins

points

out,

the

quest

for

enown

ften

eads

the

big

man"

to tax

everely

he

re-

sources fhispeople,which an ead to genuinematerial epri-

vation,

esentmentf

the

"big

man,"

and

even

revolt

gainst

him.

As I

see

it,

thisprocess

s

not

automatic.

A

"big

man" s

like

any

eader

nywhere;

e is

not

an

automaton ut

can

and

does

make

ritical hoices

egardinghenature f

his ctions is-a-vis

his

primary nd

secondary renas.This

pointmay

best

be

seen

ifwe

view the

choices

f

"big

men" as

if

at

oppositepoles

of

a

continuum.

t

one

extreme,

"big

man"

can,

fhe

chooses, o

all the

way

in

attempting

o

maximize is

position

within

is

secondary

rena. Then he

will

end

up taking

much

from is

followers-more,

erhaps,

n

their

abor,

han he

can

return

o

them

n

material atisfactions

nd reflected

enown. n

this

case he willprobably

isk evolt nd

deposition. t the

opposite

extreme, emay choose o gnore issecondary rena a course

I believeno one

willfollow ully).

This policywillyield

neffec-

tual leadership,

or n due time

t may result n

desertions

nd

I

Because an

ethnographer's

esidencewith

a

group s

of

rather

limited

uration, e or

shemay

have

the

opportunityo

observe

nly

"bigmen"who, fter rolongedffort,aveachievedmuchpower;or

the

thnographer

ay

be

exposed to

conditions

nderwhich

number

of

potential

or

actual

"big men"

are in

the

process

of

competing or

power,

hence re

able to

wield ittle

more

than

managerial

uthority.

76 CURRENT

ANTHROPOLOGY

This content downloaded from 186.9.135.139 on Sun, 1 Sep 2013 10:52:54 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

7/23/2019 Asimetrica Reciprocidad.

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/asimetrica-reciprocidad 10/24

Orenstein:

SYMMETRICAL

RECIPROCITY

t

no time s

t

ikely o attract ecruits

r

allies. t will

probably

result n thereplacementfthe "big

man,"

the

gradual

disinte-

gration f his group,or the group's

destruction

n battle.

A

"big

man"

need choose neither

xtreme. nly

the

very

mbi-

tious

would select the

first

nd,

I

think,

he

very

foolish he

second.

Thus,

t seems o

me,

n

effectivetrategy ould

be to

tread

a delicate middle

ground

between

"expansionist"

nd

"isolationist" olicies.

A

"big

man"

on

this

course would

try

to extract

rom

is

group

ufficient

abor

to

accumulate

nly

s

much enown

s was necessary o keepfollowersrom

efecting

and to gaina few llies andperhaps omerecruits. hat is, he

would

ttempt

o maintain is

position

within is

group

without

closing

his

eyes

to the

mportance

f his

secondary

rena

and

without

rying

o

go

all

the

way

to

greatness

within

t. From

the perspective

f his

followers, conjecture,

he

"big

man"

who

successfully

aneuvered ithin hismiddle

ground

would

be

the most

atisfactory.

is

position, hypothesize, ould

be

among

he most table.

FEUDALANDMELANESIANOLITICS OMPARED

One can

easily

notice esemblances

mongvery

differentinds

of societies

f one's interests re well

enough

and

broadly

enough

defined.Melanesia

and

feudal

Europe

are

similar

because

their

olitical deologies

were

nearly urely

entrifugal.

In addition, oth wereverywarlike.The differencesetween

the

two

are farmore

vident,

o

much

o

that mention

nly

one forthe

present,

nd that

only

to

forestall

premature

criticism.

olitical

relations n

Europe

nvolved

tatus

distinc-

tions,

while

n

Melanesia, by

and

large, political differences

were

purelypersonal.

set aside this

differencet

the

outset

for

wo

reasons.

One

s

that ts

mportancean

be

exaggerated.

In

Europe

there

were

numerous

tatus

distinctions

mong

nobles

nd

a

theoreticallyharp

tatus

differenceetween

ings

and other

nobles,

ut these

had

little

eal

political mportance.

The

other s that t will

facilitate

omparison

etween

he two

societies

f

we look

at

the

differences

etween

eudal

ord

and

feudal

peasant

in the

light

of

the

concept

of

centrifugality

rather han

n

terms f status.

The magnitude f thedifferencesetween he twosocieties

requires

hat

comparison mployhighly

bstract

premises.

suggest

hat

we view

political

onditions

n

both

ocieties

much

as

we

have

Melanesian

politics,

s

depending pon variations

in

the ntensity

f

competition

or

eadership.

he

greater he

competition,

he

less

power

a

leader will

have,

for

the

effort

required

o

gain and/or

retain

power

will

detract from he

power

he

can

exert over his followers.

onversely, he less

effort eeded o hold

power, he

more an be

applied to control

constituents' ehavior.6

I

can be clearer

n

employing

his

premise

f

bring p

two

matters ow

that

willbe

important

ater.

These are the

goods

involved

n

centrifugal

istributions

nd

the

way they

are

transferredrom

ne

generation

o

the

next.

Becausecentrifugalitynvolves he distributionfgoods,we

must

onsider ot only he quantities

f

goods

nd

the number

of

people

holding

nd

distributinghem, ut

also the kindsof

goods

nvolved.

Goods

can have

different

olitical alues,

values

only ndirectly

elated

o their

conomicworth.

Thus,

a

con-

stituency

an

be maintained

y

distributingoods

the

larger

part

of

which

s

directly

onsumed

roast pork at

a

feast, or

instance),

hough

ome of

which live sows, for xample) can

produce

more

goods i.e.,

more

pigs).

The

latter

re

economic

capital, but,

however

mpressive

heir

conomic

worth,

heir

political

value is

precarious

nd

onlypotential.

A

sow may be

cooked nd

consumed oon after

istribution;

hen t

provides

little

benefit

eyond

the

actual

eating-plus, perhaps,

few

fellow-feasters

rateful or he food. f it is not directly

on-

sumed, t has

to

be fed, ared for,

nd thenmated n order o

produce iglets,whichwill n turn,

equire he sametreatment

as the nitial ift

igbefore ssuming olitical alue.

This takes

time, ime

duringwhich he recipient emains nder

bligation

to thedonor,who,

ll

thewhile,

an continue o make distribu-

tions hat strengthen is politicalposition. ood consumed

t

a feast s at one

endof he ontinuumfpolitical alue;

however

great ts economicworth, ts politicalworthfor the eater is

miniscule. t the

opposite nd s the outright rant

f political

power.

A

territorialief n feudalEurope was such

a "gift." t

had

invested n

it the means

whereby he recipient ould

directly xercise owervia the right, ften xercised,

f sub-

infeudation.

The otherfactor hat can affect ompetitions inheritance.

In discussingMelanesia, have suggested

hat f nheritances

focused, oods will generally e

concentratedn thehands of

veryfewpersons,

who will,hence,have an advantage

n com-

peting

or

ower.

Competition or eadership s likely

o be less

intense, ence

eaders

will morefrequently ave

morepower.

Where nheritance

s

absent

or,

n some circumstances, here

it

is

diffuse,

he opposite ffect, elatively eeble eadership,

s

to be anticipated.

Ideology nd political tability.

n Melanesia, the goods dis-

tributed usually

had

little

political

worth.

Where diffuse

inheritance

as

practiced,

he

consequencewas authorityittle

more than managerial.Now, if

we recall that virtually ll

Melanesian

men

were,

ike

feudal

nobles, ighting

en,we can

see the analog

of

their situation

among the

nobles. Most

vassals

were the

recipients

f

goods

that

had immediate

political

worth.

A

vassal

invested n his fief; aving nhanced

the

fief's

value,

he

would resist

alienation

and

encourage

inheritance.

nce nheritance

as

accepted, he

fief

older

was

all

the

more

secure

in his

holding

and

could

risk, urther

increasing

ts

political

worth.

Where

money iefs

ere

requent,

the central

authority

was

far

stronger

han

elsewhere;

ee

Bloch

1961:174-75.) Consequently,he position

f the

vassal

was littledifferentrom hat of his lord.Thus, the hold of

superior

ver

inferior as

very

weak

both

in feudal

Europe

among

nobles

and

in

Melanesia

wherever iffuse

nheritance

was

practiced.

The

political

alue of thefief

was

not

crucial

n

itself;

t was

the

right

of

inheritance

hat made it so.

At the outset

of

feudalism,

nder

Charles,

fiefs

were

more often

uccessfully

recalledby their

donors han ater,

n

classic

feudalism.

nce

territorial

iefswere

nherited,

he

potential quality

of

donor

and

recipient

as insured

Bloch

1961:chap. 16).

While

nheritance as

essential n

weakening olitical

ties

among nobles, he

kind

of

nheritance oes

not

seem

to have

been

important.

t mattered ittle whether

nheritance

was

focused

r

diffuse.When

n

any

region

nheritance

as

diffuse,

in general t was diffusen thefamilyinesofboth ords and

vassals;

hence

there

tended

to

be numerous

ompetitors

or

power,

each

having

ittle

power

with

which

to

compete

for

more.

f inheritance as focused

n

both lords'

and vassals'

family ines,

there were fewercompetitors,

ut

they

had

stronger ositions,

lbeit about

equal force,

with

which

to

struggle.

ompetition

ended

to be

equally

ntense

under

he

two

forms

f

inheritance, hough

he

number

f

competitors

differed.

Risking

edundancy, emphasize

hat

nheritance

fbenefits

is

simply

ne side

of

the

coin

of

political railty;

he

tendency

toward

political frailty

s

pronounced

nly

when

goods

of

political

alue

are

nherited. he inheritance

f

conomic

oods,

by itself,

eed not have this

effect.

easants

as well

as lords

had theright o inheritnEurope,butpolitical nstability as

marked nly among the atter.

Peasants inherited urely co-

nomicgoods, nd relations mong

themdo not seem to have

6

My way of treating he relationshipbetween competitionfor

political

position and the exercise

of powerhas been

influenced y

some

features fBailey's approach

to political

anthropology, spe-

ciallyhis

StratagemsndSpoils

(1969).

Vol. 21

* No.

1

* February

980

77

This content downloaded from 186.9.135.139 on Sun, 1 Sep 2013 10:52:54 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

7/23/2019 Asimetrica Reciprocidad.

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/asimetrica-reciprocidad 11/24

been

unusually nstable.

Relations etween

easants

nd

lords

were quite

secure and stable.

Further,

hose

nobles

having

money iefs ouldnot

easilypass

them

n to

their

ffspring,

nd

these

noblesweremore

losely

ound o their ords.

n

England,

where

money

iefs

ereused

earlier

nd

more

frequentlyhan

elsewhere, olitical

tability

was

greatest,

nd it

was

here

that

there rose

the first

uropean

nation-state f

modern

imes

(Bloch

1961:174-75;

Ganshof

1964:114-15;

Strayer

1970:28,

29). It is the combination

f

the distribution f

goods

having

political alue

and

the

nheritance

f

such goods that

produces

political nstability.

Thus,

despite

he

differences

etween

he

two

societies,

we

may

conclude that

political

conditions n

Melanesia under

diffusenheritance re

comparable

n

kind

withthose

among

feudal

nobles.

Amongboth

peoples

the

hold of

superior

ver

inferior as

feeble.

However,

hereremains

large difference

in

degree

etween he

two n their

olitical

ondition.Melane-

sian

politics ntailed

uthority hat

ften ad

shiftingersonnel

and

was quite

frail, ut relations

mongfeudal

nobleswerefar

less

stable,

ndeed,virtually

narchic.The

explanation f

this,

I

believe, s to

be

found n

the fact that

n

Melanesia

political

ideology

was, by

and

large,

observed n

practice,

while in

Europe it was

very often vaded. In

Melanesia

constituents

accepted the

authority f their

big

men"-if

not of

one

par-

ticularman, hen f nother, erhaps aised opower ia revolt.In Europethe vassal

who asserted

qualitywith

his lord vio-

lated his oath.

Centrifugality

as bypassedby

fear, hreat, r

the

exercise

f

rmed

might. urther,

vassal

often ad vassals

of his

own;his

example

is-a-vis

is ord

could

serve s

a

guide

to his

ownvassals.

When he

recipient f fief

ouldclaim

t for

his

family ine and

redistribute

ortions f

it, the process

of

redistribution

ould

be,

and was,

continued o the

point

where

we find

ut

the

ghost

f

a

hierarchy,

nsubstantial ecause

ts

substance-the

power of the

giver over

the

receiver-was

destroyed

n

the

giving.

ach link nthe

chain, xcept

ossibly

the

bottom

ne, had the

ame flaw s

thefirst; he

upper ould

always be turned

round o

become he

ower.

In

Melanesia

centrifugality,

n theory

nd practice,

was

channeled

within

distinctly efined

rimary renas. Within

thesediscrete oundariesherewasoftenmuch ompetitionor

power but little

bloodshed.

Within the

secondary rena

the

struggle

or

power

and renown

ften

nvolvedwarfare, s is

true

of

many

ntergroup

elations-including resent-dayn-

ternational

elations.

f

thequestfor

enown as too

ambitious,

the

resources f

thecommunity ithin

which he

"big man"

exercised irect

ontrol

ouldbe so

much trained

hatreflected

renown

would

no

longer

ompensate

ormaterial

deprivation.

The

outcome

was

often

evolt,

ut t was

revoltwithin

clearly

circumscribed

rimary rena.

The too

ambitious big

man"

was

simply

eplaced y

another,

deally ne more

restrained

n

foreign

elations.

Struggle

or

owerwithin

he

Melanesianprimary rena

was

conceived s

appropriate nly

f

under he

egis

of

the

deology

of centrifugality.t took place in conformity ith deology;

hence,within

mostMelanesian

ommunities

t rarely

nvolved

armed

combat.

n

contrast, ecause

feudal

deology licited

little

more than

formaldeference,

he

distinctions etween

primary

nd secondary

renaswere

lurred,nd

there emained

only

individual

nobles with

overlapping

urisdictions. his

blurring

f

borders s

directly

ssociated with

the fact that

virtually

ll

political

ontestswere

potential r

actual armed

conflicts,

hether

within

r

among the

(amorphous) olitical

entities f

Europe.

Political

egitimacy

s

founded pon

people's

cceptance

f

a

leader's

rule

because they

accept the

reasons for t. These

reasons

must be sufficiently

nacted

to be convincing.

his

clearly

depends upon

the way a leader

behaves toward

his

followers;ut talso depends, lthough o a lesserdegree, pon

the extent

to which

a leader's followers

elieve

neighboring

political

groupscontemplate

im as

worthy f political

emi-

nence.

His renown eflects

pon them.

f outsiders o

not think

of him as a

worthy lly or

antagonist, he

people themselves

will

often

come

to doubt

the propriety f

his leadership.

Legitimacys bestowed

romwithin

group, ut its

bestowal

often

epends, t least

n part, n theperceptions

fforeigners.

In Melanesia

these perceptions

were easily

understood. n

feudalEurope,

members f the

nobility erefrequently

nsure

who recognized

heir eader to be worthy,

ecause they

hem-

selveswere ometimes

ncertain ho

their eaderswere

or who

others' eaders were. The

distinction etween

nternal nd

externalvalidationof authoritywas shaky. Hence, warfare

knew

no boundaries.

Melanesianswere

warlike,

ossibly ven

more o thanfeudal

nobles,

but Melanesian"big men" existed

formany

purposes

apart

fromkilling

nd raiding. n

contrast,warfare

was the

sole

raisond'etre

f a

feudal

noble.Feudalism

was exploitative

in

Schumpeter's

1955) sense

of the term, n that

t was able to

persist

s itdid

only

because the political ntities t

subsumed

werenothing

more han

machines

or wagingwar.

Extralegal

(not llegal)

cceptance f political

ontest y

mutual ffortst

murder ervaded

olitical elations

within nd

amongpolitical

entities-to the extent hat

such entities ould

be delineated.

The reason

or

his

ay, n argepart,

n an ineffectual

olitical

ideology.

Centrifugality,tatus, nd political tratification.p to this

point

our

comparison

as included feudal

nobles and those

Melanesianswho

practiced

diffusenheritance.

here remain

to be considered

easant-noble

elations,

n the one hand,

nd,

on

the other, elations

etweenMelanesians

nd those

of their

"big

men"

who

had benefited rom ocused

nheritance. he

similarity

s

almost elf-evident.

"big

man" whohas been the

recipient

f

focused nheritance,

iewed gainst

background

of

relativelympotent

otential ompetitors,

as

in

hand goods

of

political

alue.

His

possession

f

uch goods

does

not disturb

relations

etween uperior

nd

inferior

s amongfeudal

nobles,

because

he is

the only one,

or one

of

veryfew,

holding uch

wealth

within

clearly

defined

rimary

rena. Within

this

arena, ompetition

or

highposition

s more ikely

o be

guided

by

centrifugality

han armed combat.

The

position

f such

a

"bigman"vis-a-vis is fellow illagers s,hence, heanalogof

that

of the noble

vis-a-vis

his

peasants.

Noblemen,

ike these

"big

men,"

hold

goods

of

political

value;

their

peasants,

ike

the

followers

f these

big men,"

do not.

The

existence

f tatusdifferences

n

feudalism

s

historically

important,

f

ourse,

ut t

s not ssential

nour

omparison

ith

Melanesian olitics.

tatus

distinctions

mong

eudal

obleswere

of

ittle

olitical ignificance

ecause most

not ll)

noblesheld

and

inherited

oods

f

political

worth.

Nobles

of

high

tatusdid

not

necessarily

ave

power

verthose

f

ow

status,

ut

nobles

did dominate

easants,

or

he atter

did

not

have

such

goods.

Hence t was

not so much

tatus

that

gave power

s the

kinds

of

goods

nvolved

n

the

centrifugal

elationship.

n

this

regard

a

Melanesian

big

man"

who

had

received

focused

nheritance

was ina

position

omparable othatof feudalnoble.He may

have had

even

more

power

over

his followers

han

did the

noble over

his

peasantry.

As

I

have

pointedout,

some

"big

men"

had

positions

o

despotic

that

they

could

kill

thei

followers

ith

mpunity.

n

the

Kapauku

case,

a

"big

man"

was

able more

horoughly

o

reorganize

is

society

han could

a feudalnoblethe ives

of his

peasants.

In

any event,

n

classic

feudalism

here

existed

a

sharp

distinction etween

oble

nd

peasant,

nd

the

cutting dge

of

the distinction

ependedupon

the

inheritance

y

nobles

of

territorialiefs

nd

the

nheritance

y peasantsonly

of tillable

land. This distinction rovided

continuity

nd

stability

n

relations etween

ersons. he freeman's

ight o eave his

and

and quit himselfof his obligations o his lord was rarely

exercised. istributions

f goods having

only economic

worth

by donors

olding oodsofpolitical

alue meant hat

thenoble

78

CURRENT

ANTHROPOLOGY

This content downloaded from 186.9.135.139 on Sun, 1 Sep 2013 10:52:54 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

7/23/2019 Asimetrica Reciprocidad.

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/asimetrica-reciprocidad 12/24

Orenstein:SYMMETRICAL

RECIPROCITY

ould

rest

assured

that his

peasants'

sons

would

remain

the

peasants

of

his sons.

Centrifugality

ay subsume

elations

f status or

relations

ofcontract

etween ersons.

here s a

possibility

f

change

n

either

irection

e.g.,

see Leach 1954), lthough

t seemsto

me

that

once

statusrelationswere stablished

t wouldbe

difficult

to

convert hem

nto

personal,

ontractual

nes.

Western

eudalism

itnessed shift n the reverse

irection

from

hat

adumbrated

n

Henry

Maine's

general

volutionary

theory-not,

must

dd,

to

the

credit f thatfinemind,

n

his

interpretationffeudalismtself.7While differencesf status

existed

n

Europe prior

o

feudalism,

hese

were

probably

not

based upon centrifugality.

assalage

n

Merovingian

imeswas

contractual.

he term

vassal" in thesetimes

nd even ater,

in early

feudal imes,

ad pejorative onnotations;

he

oath

of

commendation

eems

to have

implied

demeaning

orm

of

servitude

Ganshof

964:6-12,23-25).

Only ater, nder lassic

feudalism, id the

title

of vassal

assume an aura

of

honor.

think t quite possible

hat

family

inesof omewho

undertook

oaths

of

fealty

n the Merovingian

eriod ended

as villeins

while hose

fothers nded

s noblevassalswhen

eudalism as

in

full

flower see

Ganshof

1964:9-12, 19-20,

23-25, 27, 28,

32).

The rise of

feudalismnvolved

change

n

relations,

or

some

but

not

ll donors

nd

recipients,

rom

ontract

o status.

Steps alongthese ines seemto have takenplace in parts

of

Melanesia. Among

some

Melanesians

there were what one

might erm

ristocraticineages,

ineagesholding

he exclusive

privilege

f upplying

big men"

Burridge 960:139).

n other

groups,

we

find even closer approximations

o noble lines

(Malinowski

922:62-65).

The movement

rom

ontract

o status is always possible

when

some

persons

hold

and

inherit

goods

having political

value

under

entrifugality.

t will

most

ikely ppear

when

hese

persons

re donors

f

goods

having

ittle

olitical

worth.

t

can

also

come

bout n the

equivalent

ituation,

s

may

have

hap-

pened

in Melanesia, where

there

s

focused

nheritance f

goods,

he analog

of goods

havingpolitical alue.

Centrifugality,

he centralization

f power,

nd the rise

of

kingship.

o far

have

emphasized

he

supply

f

eaders-i.e.,

the intensityf competitionmong eaders-as a majorde-

terminant

f the

amount of

power

a

leader can wield

under

centrifugality.

turn,now,

to the

supply

of followers.

mong

feudal

nobles his

s

not

relevant;

he

ine between eader

and

follower

as not

clear,

nd

virtually

ll

nobleswere

potential

or actual competitors.

imilarly,

n Melanesia where

diffuse

inheritancexisted,

ll

able-bodied

males were

potential om-

petitors.

Where

there s

a

clear

division etween

eaders

and

followers,

owever,

he

number

f

oyal

followers an

make

a

difference.t

is

plausible

that,

n

most cases,

the larger

the

number

f

subjects, he

stronger ill

be thecentral uthority.

This

poses

another

roblem

or

he

politically

mbitious

man

whereverhe

centrifugal

deology

xists.

Obviously,

he

must

not

distribute oods

of politicalworth,

ut difficulties

emain;

the mount fgoodshe can distributes not unlimited. ven if

everyone,

ncluding he

eader,produces

oods for he

eader's

storehouse,

he amount he can distribute

s limited

by the

productive

apacityof the

total work

orce t his disposal.

He

would

ike

to

be able to

strengthen

is hold

on,

or

increase he

number

f, his followers,

ut he cannot

giveout more goods

than

they

produce.

One

way

this

problemmay

be resolved

s

by conceptually

redefining

he

leader's

rights nd

capacities.

These may

be

conceived

s

symbolic

r

supernatural,

bviating

he need

to

acquire

material oods

for istribution.

he chiefmaybe

viewed

as having

he apacity

o benefit

ispeople

by bringingain;

his

physical

well-being

aybe seen

s bestowing similar

ondition

upon

his

people;

he may be thought

f as having n

intrinsic

right

o

all of henatural esources

fhis ocietynd "allowing"

his people

to

use those

resources.

These

beliefs entail

the

centrifugaldea,but they ranscendt; a leaderwithqualities

and capacities

ike these

will be contemplated

s an

awesome

being,

as

something

more than ordinarily

uman. One

who

possesses

uch capacities

bestows

benefits,

ot as

an ordinary

creditor,

ut as

a

symbol f

his society.His

legitimacy

ests

more

n routinized

harisma

hanon centrifugality.

his

topic,

however mportant,

oes beyond

he subject

underdiscussion

in

this

rticle.

Another olution

o the problem

one

that could,

but need

not, eventually

esult

n charismatic

uthority)

esides

not

n

the

quality

r

kindof

benefits

he eaderdistributes,

ut

n the

way

he

apportions

is

distributions.

e can

select

fraction f

his followers

or pecial ttention.

o them

he can

make heavy

distributions,eaving

ittle

or nothing

or others.

f this

is

carried o extremes,hemajority f thesocietywillbe denied

any

incentive

o obey; the

fraction s

likely to

becomehis

faction,

grouphe

can use to

coerce thers nto

bedience.

his

process

may

have taken place

among

some peoples

in New

Guinea e.g.,

see Barnett

959:1014;Hogbin

1951:150-63).

n

such

cases the

dea

of

centrifugality

s abandoned

s

respects

everyone

n

a

leader's

group

xcept

his faction.

This

process

s not peculiar

o Melanesia.

The

Eskimos,

or

instance,

re generally

n

egalitarian eople.

Yet among

ome

Eskimos

bordering

n the Bering Strait,

unusually

wealthy

men-owners

fumiaks--chose

o

distribute

heir xcess

wealth

not

among

the villagers

t large,

but only

among

a

small

group

of

physically

trong

young

men. These

recipients

on-

stituted

he

leaders' factions,

irtuallyprivate

armies,

who

exacted

obedience

from

thers

under

the

threat

of

physical

harm r death Weyer1967:9).

The

building-or

buying-of

a limited

clientage

of firm

loyalty

n

place

of

a

larger

onstituency

ith

ooser oyalties

s

familiar

rom

ast

and

from

resent

imes.

t

is

a

major

means

for

tightening

ontrol

of the central

uthority

ver

a

large

group.

t is

a

part

of

the process

nvolved

n the

rise

of the

nation-state

n

Europe.

The central

authorities

sed

their

wealth

to bind

particular

ersons

directly

o

themselves

nd

used such

persons-the

baillis,

he sheriffs-to

ypass

vassals

and asserttheirpersonal

upremacy

hroughout

heir

ealms.

By

the

12th

nd 13th enturies

n

England

and

France,kings

were

ble to

employ

heirresources

n

this

way,

and

it is

in

these

regions

hat

we

find he

beginnings

f

the

state in

the

West

(see

Cantor 1963:477-78;

Bloch

1961:425, 430;

Strayer

1970:28,29, 33-35, 50-51). The power f theking ncreased s

his

"faction" rew

maller

nd its

dependence

pon

him

greater

(Strayer

970:92).

"Clientage,"

s Mair

(1964:166)

has

observed, may

wellbe

the

germ

romwhich

tate

power prings."

f this

s so-as

I

think

ikely-I

would

wish

to see

clientage

understood

s

a

special

case

of

centrifugality,

herein

patron's

clients

om-

prise,

not

necessarily

ll of his

people,

but

a

favored ew-his

court-whom

he

can

use

to overawe

he rest.

ASYMMETRICAL

RECIPROCITY

AND

ANTHROPOLOGICAL

THEORY

Asymmetricaleciprocityubsumes deologieswhose study

makes sense

in a number

f political

processes, ut

not

all

political

processes.

Centrifugality

nd centripetality

o

not

7

Maine's interpretationf feudalism aries n his differentubli-

cations. He

held

that feudalismmay have evolved from he

"pure

lines" of "primitive" ocieties

1875:166;

1876 [1871]:141-42, 144-

46). Elsewherehe suggested hat,once feudalism ad developed, he

recipient f a benefit rom chief underwent n alteration n social

and politicalposition;the effect was to produce not merely con-

tractual iability, ut a status" (see 1875: 154-61,

163;

but cf. 1883:

305; 1954

[1861]:304).

I discuss this matter t greater ength lse-

where Orenstein 968:267-68).

Vol.

21

* No.

1

* February

980

79

This content downloaded from 186.9.135.139 on Sun, 1 Sep 2013 10:52:54 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

7/23/2019 Asimetrica Reciprocidad.

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/asimetrica-reciprocidad 13/24

exhaust all

political ideologies.

The

process

accompanying

others an

be

quite

differentrom hosediscussed

ere.

For example,

have

agreed

with Mair that

clientage s

probablynecessary

or herise of the state.

Clientage,

have

suggested,

s a

special

kind

of

centrifugality

hat confers

much

power

nthe central

uthority.

et the

practice

fthiskindof

centrifugality

ntails ts

partial

bandonment.

hus

centraliza-

tion

of

power among

some Eskimos

and

some

Melanesians

involved

constriction

f

entrifugaluthority;

t was

exercised

over a minority

f

followers,

hile

thers

were

ubject

to

pure

coercion.Similarly,with the rise of the state in the West,

centrifugality

ost

importance

or

everyone

xcept

the imme-

diate

agents f the

king;

his routinized harisma ustained

his

position

with he

majority.

While

uch hiftsn

deology

nd

political racticemay

take

place

in

any kind

of

group, hey

must

ake

place

in

the

nation-

state.Neither

ind f

symmetrical

eciprocity,naccompanied

by

other

egitimizingrinciples,

an be effective

n

large-scale

societies.

he

creditor-leader

ith vast

number f

debtors

s

all too

likely

to be seen

by

them as

an

abstract, mpersonal

creditor-much

s

many

of us

perceive

he nternal

Revenue

Service-to

whom

bligations

re felt s less

binding

han

they

wouldbe felt o

a known

uman

being.

The

situation s similar

with

centripetal uthority.

"servant

of

the

people"

whom

peoplerarely xperiences a tangible erson s likely o incur

distrust,

o

find

that his

constituents

iew the services

he

performs

nd

the

benefits

e

distributes

s

insufficient

ustifica-

tion

forhis elevation o

eminence

witness

he

ritual

disparage-

ment

f

politicians

n

the

West,

where he

very

erm

politician"

is

often sed pejoratively).Consequently,

n

the

nation-state

we

will

lwaysfind ther egitimizing

rinciples,s well s some

coercion,

ide

by

side

with

symmetricaleciprocity.

Differentrocesses

ccompany ifferentdeologies.

or

exam-

ple,

problems egarding he supply of

followers hange when

the

sustaining deology s, as

in

all

kingdoms, he ruler's

routinized

harisma.

nder

entrifugality

he

quantity

f

oyal

followers-constituents

ho

are

not

primarily bjects of

coer-

cion-is

limited

y

the

total

productive apacity

of

the

work

force.

o

increase he

oyalty

f

clients, he

rulermust ncrease

their emunerationydecreasingheirnumber.Where haris-

masustains

uthority,

he

pecialposition

f

the eader s more

evident nd

more

awesome

when the

number

f

followers

s

increased see Shils 1965).

While

I

believe other

kinds

of

ideology

an

profitably

e

analyzed

n

a

manner imilar

o

that

attempted

n

this rticle,

the

concept

of

asymmetrical

eciprocitylone can contribute

much

to an

understandingf politics.

have shownhow the

centrifugaldeology,

f

neffectively

mplemented,s

in

Western

feudalism, ay

result

n

political

haos.

My

use

of

entrifugality

has

suggestedhow political domination

by persons can be

converted

nto

political

tatusheld by a group.We have

seen

how,

under one

form

of

centrifugality,lientage

unequal

apportionment

f

benefits)may helpcentralize olitical

ower.

This astprocess, lientage,mayhave an analog n one found

in

centripetality.hus, f

am correct bout the position f

the

Roman

emperor, he theory ehindhis

authority equired hat

the

demand-right

ie with

he citizens fRome. n fact,how-

ever,

o

long

s he

satisfied heir emands, ispower,

xtending

as it

did

far

beyond

Rome's borders,was impressive.t

was

secure

only

if

he

met their

demands; hence,while they

may

have

been

a

rather assive "faction,"

heir cceptanceof his

supreme

uthority reed

him

to deal as

he wishedwiththose

living outside the city.

The power he exercised eyond

the

borders

f

he

citywas

sustained y neither four twoforms

f

asymmetrical eciprocity,

tut

y

routinized harisma nd/or

coercion.

Whether

reciprocity s

centrifugal r centripetal,

restricted, elective

allocation of resources an lend

much

independence o thecentral uthority.

Beyondthis,the processes

ccompanying he two forms

f

asymmetrical

eciprocity ay be quite different.or

instance,

centripetality

s

probably

ess sensitive

o

inheritance ules.

do not think entripetality ill be much ltered n practice o

long as the benefitsnherited nd distributedre not extraor-

dinarily arge; the coffers f

an

affluenteadership, uch as

existed mongthe village Anuak,will be too readilydepleted

by constituents' emands. In large-scale ocieties, uch as the

modernWest, vast differencesn amounts f nheritedwealth

do, of course, eeply ffect olitics, ut differenceso large re

likely to have grave political effectsrrespective f political

ideology.)

Why, hen, lace the twoforms fasymmetricaleciprocity

under the

same

rubric?One

reason

have mentioned: oth

have their source in the same

panhuman predisposition o

reciprocate enefits. aradoxically, nother eason ies in the

very act

f heir

pposition

o

one

nother. uthorityustained

by routinized

harisma

nd, think,

lso

rational uthority an

be

accompanied y

either orm f

symmetricaleciprocity,or

these deologies

do

not,

of

necessity, lash with either f its

variants.

The

two

forms

f

asymmetrical eciprocityre ideo-

logically ncompatible recisely ecause theycomprise evia-

tions

from henorm n

totally pposeddirections.

If,

for

nstance,

we

find

entrifugality

n

the interstices f

political emocracy,

e

generally xpress isapproval.We may

refer

o

the creditor-leaderss

"crookedpoliticians," owever

cynicallywe may contemplatehem s "partofthesystem."

This is

why

bossism s

so

widely condemned

n

the United

States.

t

is

not

egitimate.

t involves

ranting avors, sually

material enefits,

n

return orwhich he boss expects olitical

loyalty Merton 1949:70-81). The demand-righties withthe

boss.

It is

centrifugality,

hich

n

the United

States

s

usually

covert

r,

f

vert,

estricted

n

geographiccope.

The

dominant

political

values

of

the

country

re

democratic, nd thisentails

centripetality. entrifugality

annot

persistfor ong

in

this

context

without

liciting ngrydenunciationsnd, frequently,

reform

movementsntended o

"cleanse the

body politic."

Evidence

for

the oppositionbetween the two formsof

asymmetricaleciprocitynd for he general sefulness f the

concept

an

be seen in

present-day olitics

he

world

over-

assuming hat "current

vents"

are not to be disqualified

s

evidence imply ecausethey re current. have discussed he

particulars f its contemporaryelevance n some detail else-

where

1979)

and

will attend o it here

onlybriefly.

Western-styleemocracy,

o

which

entripetality

s

essential,

is prestigious hroughouthe modernworld.Yet virtually ll

contemporaryations,

he new

nation-states,"

s well s those

not so

new,

have

either iscarded e

facto

democracy

r

never

troubled

o

try

t n thefirst

lace; and their nhabitants,part

from

hose ew mong hem

who

have been thoroughly estern-

ized, do

not

protest vermuch.My discussion

f

asymmetrical

reciprocity rovides

two

plausible

reasons

for this state

of

affairs. ne

I

have alluded

to

already: centripetality

s

politi-

cally

inefficient.

his

charge

has

been

so often directed

t

democracy

hat t is

banal,

but banal ornot t seemsto me to

holdevenmore ruth handemocracy'setractorsmaybelieve.

The inefficiency

f

centripetality

annot be attributed

lone

to the

complexity

nd

large

scale

of

modern

ation-states.

t

was about

equally

inefficient

or

the

Nambikwara and

the

village

Anuak.

It

tends

to

be

inefficient

rrespective

f

the

scale

or

complexity

f

the

ociety

n

which t exists.

One

reason

that eaders

of

new

nations

have

rejected

de

facto

democracy

is that they, possibly along

with their

followers,

ense

its

politicalweakness.

eaders

may

want

to

"get

the

ob

done."

Followersmaywant trongeaders

whocan

do

this.

Confronted

with ocial

and

economic

roblems

ar

more

erious

han we

in

the West

face,

these

people generally-not nevitably-have

been effectivelyempted ypotentiallynd often ctuallymore

efficientolitical ystems han democracy. hus new nation-

statesrarely hoosedemocracy.

The choice of centrifugality akes most sense from the

perspective f the leadership. Indeed, for some leaders the

80

CURRENT

ANTHROPOLOGY

This content downloaded from 186.9.135.139 on Sun, 1 Sep 2013 10:52:54 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

7/23/2019 Asimetrica Reciprocidad.

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/asimetrica-reciprocidad 14/24

Orenstein:SYMMETRICAL

RECIPROCITY

hoice s

not

between ne

or

the other

kind

of

asymmetrical

reciprocity s a

way

of

achieving egitimacy,

ut

between

legitimate ule,

n

the

one

hand, nd unimpeded ower nd its

perquisites,

n the

other.) Assuming

hat leaders choose

to

legitimate heir

ositions

ia

centrifugality,here emains he

questionwhy

followers

o

readily cquiesce.

This

brings

me

to

my secondreasonfor

holding hat the ascendancy

f

centrifu-

gality s

to

be anticipated mongnon-Western

eoples.

have

just argued hat

the

two variants

n

asymmetrical

eciprocity

oppose one

another; rom his

t

follows hat the existence f

one will act as a barrier o the diffusionf the other.Among

most, though not all, societies prior to

very recent times,

centrifugality

as

been

accepted

without

uestion.

Choice

did

not exist,

because centripetality as either unknown r as

remote nd

exotic

s for s

would

be

the dea

of

governance y

an

awesome, bsolute "Orientaldespot."

Now,

most new na-

tions ubsume

single ociety

r a

number f

different

ocieties

forwhom

entrifugality,hilenot always

the sole deology,

s

one very important

nd pervasive way of thinking bout

politics.Because centrifugalityeems

elf-evident,

he

absence

of

democracy s not felt s a deprivation.

ts presencewould

more ikely e

felt s a peculiarity, ossibly s an absurdity.

Oneform f

symmetricaleciprocityannot eadily upplant

the other s

if

by amputation nd

grafting.When

a

people

contemplate

heir

eader as

a

creditor, hey are

not

likely,

without thoroughgoingrainwash, bruptly o transpose im

into

an

obedient ebtor;no morewould a

people (such as we

of he

Western

world)

who

re flattered

o

believe leader eads

only

n

order

o

servethem

bruptly nd openly vow

him to

be

their ord. The

secure

escape

from

reedom"

rovidedby

the oneand the

prideprovided y the

alternative deology o

not easilymix.

The

preceding iscussion s intended s a

contributiono an

anthropologicalerspective n political

deas and processes

n

the

past and

at the

present ime.

However,

the

way we ap-

proach

ny

compartment

f

culture-whether olitics, inship,

economics,

r

religion-usually mplies general heory rans-

cending

hat

compartment,nd

it

has

implications

or

other

theories.

I have beendiscussing he impact f a particular eature f

society,

ts

political deology, pon the

goals

of

a society

nd

itsviability. hat is to say,my pproach s

functionalnalysis-

no longer ashionable, know,but

perhaps because fashion's

fortunes ften

hinge

on

matters

ranscendingither

eason

or

fact.

suggest

hatwe

think fthe

concept

f

functionmuch

s

did

the

founder

f

this

approach,

Emile

Durkheim.

By

func-

tionalism meanthe

study

f

society

whose

entral

oncern s

group solidarity. t is a way of studying

ociety that takes

fully

nto

account how

customary ctions may enhance

or

enfeeble

olidarity.

The

approach

I

suggest

should

not be

understood

n

thesophomoricensethat

n

every ulture or

even

in

most

cultures) "everything

s

related

to

everything

else."

Quite

the

contrary.

or

instance,

entripetality

s found

in societies s differents theNambikwara, he Anuak, the

contemporary est,and possibly mperialRome. It is not

a

consistent

onstituent f

any particular type

of

"organic"

whole.

The really nterestinghing bout

t is that t seems o

have

similar

onsequences n

extraordinarilyifferenttotal

social

ystems.")Moreover, unctionalism,s

I

see t (following

Durkheim),

does

not

imply changelessnesssee also Cancian

1968).

It

does not necessarily ocus on

the ways whereby

antagonisms

re

resolved; olidaritytself lmost

lways

entails

antagonisms,

s

Durkheim

made clear (1947[1893]:266-68,

365;

see

also

Gluckman

956). Nor do

functional

tudies,

n

the

sense

in

which use

the

term, roperly ircumambulate

he

far

broader

oncept

f ocial

cohesion. ohesion an be as

much

a product f

pure coercion r raw,narcissisticelf-seekings

of

socialsolidaritye.g., see Gluckman 956: hap.6). Functional

analysisrightly

ocuses n solidarity, he sense people have

of

being

"as one" with others in their crroin-

others

with

whom

they

mayconflictnd

sideby side

withwhom heymay

change.

One feature

f Durkheim's

unctionalismas

been, to my

mind,

given far too

littleprominence,

specially n

social

anthropology.

his is his

view of crime.

As Durkheim

aw it

(1939[1895]:xxxviii;

1947[1893]:

1-74, 81-89,

102, 108-9),

crime s

a "normal" ccurrence

n a society. hat

is to say, t s

an activity equired

by a society f the

society s to

remain

"healthy"

solidary). n large

part agree,

but I would

prefer

to extend hefamiliarmeaning ftheterm crime" as used by

Durkheim)

somewhat

metaphorically

eyond

the contentof

penal

codes much

f

which would,nfact, xclude)to

include

all

deviations

rom

evoutly eldbeliefs

nd customs.

Moreover,

I would dd that

crime" s so necessary

or ocial

health hat t

is sometimes nstitutionalized.

Criminal" deviations

an

be

encouraged

n

virtually

ny domain

f

culture.

or example, n

Western

music cordatura

see

Trainor 1972:31) requires

hat

the musicians

n

string nsembles eliberately

nd systemati-

cally

"mistune"

one

or more

strings

f

their nstruments

n

order

o achieve pecial

ffects. his contrasts

ith ccordatura

wherein

he ultimate

esthetic spiration

s perfect

armony

(the

analog,perhaps,

of

perfect eciprocity).

n scordatura

musician an

mistune ownward

n

the

scale, trying, erhaps,

for groaning, eeping esonance,

r he can mistune

pward o

achieve

shrill,

tartling

hriek.

n

neither ase

does scordatura

allow

impromptu

nnovations, s

in

syncopation

n

jazz

(and,

similarly,

n

anticipated,

but uninstitutionalized,

eviations

from

norms

n

aspects

of

culture

ther han music,

crimes"

that are

expected

but not

"orchestrated").

Scordatura s

planned.

t is

purposive.

he

composer

sets thetune"-sets it,

so

to

speak,

n

deliberate efiance

f "the

concept

f

the

perfect

fifth."

cordaturas

a

"source of mmense reative otential,"

because

t

serves

s

a

medium

f

"escape

from he bondage

of

the conventional."

ts

purpose

s to

"strengthen

he

mpact

of

the total

composition."8

Institutionalized

crime" s widespread.

t is

fairly

requent

in religious

ehavior.For

example, he

Hopi hold a ceremony

that is

to

them highly acred,

yet they

anticipate-indeed,

provideand plan for-a simultaneous eremony hat is a

grotesque, arcical

mockery

f

its

sacred counterpartTitiev

1971).

The

farce

eems acrilegious;

t

shocks nd offends

any

Hopi.

The

offensiveness

f the farce

serves

to

enhance,by

contrast,

the

significance

nd

solemnity

of the

authentic

ceremony.

he sacred

ritual

s set side

by

side

with,

hence

n

striking

ontrast

o,

that

which

mocks

t;

thus

t is the

less

likely o

become routinely

nacted

itual,

taken

for

ranted"

by

participants

r

observers.

Moreover,

he

offense

s

shared;

hence

the

solidarity

f

the devout,

the

empathy

hey

feelfor

one

another,

s intensified.

similar

ffect

s attained

hrough

all rituals

f rebellion

Gluckman

954)

or

of

conflict

Norbeck

1963).

Functionaldeviations

from

outine, ay-to-day

ways

need

not consist nlyofrebellions r conflicts. s in thescordatura

effect, ny

sort

of

highly

visible

or audible

irregularity

ay

servethe

same

purpose.

This is evident

n

political

ystems.

If

people

are

to have sharedgoals,

hence

social

solidarity,

they

must

have

leadership-not

necessarily

o

push

them his

way or that

toward trategic oals,

but

at

the east

to

serve

s

a

focus

or

irectives r,

ometimes,

s a concrete

ymbol

f

the

group's

nity.

ocial

solidarity

annot

xist

without

eadership,

formal

or

informal,

nd

the

group

cannot

remain

solidary

unless

t has

some

reason(s)

for

ccepting

ts

leader

(e.g.,

see

8

The

relevance

of the

concept

of

scordatura

or asymmetrical

reciprocity

asbrought

o

my ttention

yJeanOrenstein.

ts

poten-

tial

as a

metaphor

or

ocial

conditionss,

I

think, mpressive.

ntire

culturesmight e conceived s tending ither oscordatura

r

accorda-

tura

much s RuthBenedictcharacterizedertain ulturess Diony-

sian

or

Apollonian.

use

it in a

limited

ense,

as but

one

instance

of the

function

f

nstitutionalized

crime"

n

a culture.

Vol.

21 * No.

1 *

February 980

81

This content downloaded from 186.9.135.139 on Sun, 1 Sep 2013 10:52:54 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

7/23/2019 Asimetrica Reciprocidad.

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/asimetrica-reciprocidad 15/24

Sherif

1952;

de Grazia

1948:74-75,

110-13, 189;

Friedrich

1968;

Bernard 1961:636, 639,

641). The

reason-what

I

call

political

deology-may be a belief

n

the charisma or the

rationality f the

political uthority.t

may be seen, s

I

have

said,

as

residing

n

the

way

the

eaderdeviates, y

rule,

rom

firmly

eld and felt ule.

An

illustration ifferentrom

he

one

I

have dweltupon n

thispaper may

make my meaning lear.

Incest s a crime

n

all societies, ut

n

a few

ocieties he eader

can-or even

should-commit ncest

Murdock

1949:13).

This

"crime"

encourages

he view

that the

eader's charisma s as

thatofthegods,beings o awesome hat theordinary ulesof

ordinary

mortals

ught not

to

restrain hem.

Supported

by

such

routinized

harisma,

he

leader's

position

s

such

that,

whilehe may

ymbolize hewholegroup,

e serves, t the ame

time, s a pointwith

which

he

group ees tself s

contrasted.

Ordinary eople can

more

eadily

ensetheir

ommon

ualities

and see their moral rules

as

all

the

more

binding

on

their

ordinary

aw-abiding

ives when

they

ontemplate hemselves

in

contrast o their

xtraordinary,wesome

verlord.

It is similar

with asymmetrical

eciprocity, hough the

"crime"

need not, nd usuallydoes

not,

nvest

he eaderwith

much

harisma-certainly ot harisma f

he ikes f hat f he

pharaohs

f

Ptolemaic gypt.Asymmetrical

eciprocitypposes

debtor

and

creditor.

n

centrifugality

he

"law-breaking"

leader

erves s the one to whom ll others reopposed

n

theircommon

urden

f

debt

and

in

their

hared

recognition

f his

havingviolated the rule of

reciprocityhat

theymust accept

as correct or

elations

mong

hemselves.

e

draws

he

group

together y

symbolizing

he

group; hey artake

fhis

reflected

renown. t the

ame

time,

e

stands

n

opposition

o the

group;

by

virtue f

the

contrast,

e

draws hem

ogether.

This

contrasts also

present

n

centripetality,

ut thedistinc-

tion between

eader and led

is now

often

light;

the credit

commoners hare

in

their

common debtor-their leader-

would

not rate highwith

"community" f bankers.

o this

must be

added the weakness

mentioned arlier-that

such

leadership an and often oes

nvolve nearly

ropistic

ollow-

ing of its followers'

ead. We are left

with a people whose

persistence s

a

solidarygroup must often

be

in

peril.

Cen-

tripetalitys frequentlyysfunctional.

It is old

hat-though ittleworn-that the

functionalist ust

look both

ways.

Centrifugality ay also be

functional

r

dysfunctional.

t

may

have been

dysfunctional

n

some

Melane-

sian

groups.

ither

entrifugality

r nheritance

ules,

ossibly

both,

may

have been

dysfunctional

n

feudal

Europe.

Cen-

tripetality

eems not

to have

been

dysfunctional

n

the

Swiss

township

r

in

the

Athens

of

antiquity.

However

much

or

little

ocial

solidarity btains

n

modern

America, think en-

tripetalityoes essen he

political ffectiveness

f

some

organs

of

American

government: he

House, probably;

maybe

the

Senate;possibly,

hough

o a

lesser xtent-how

much

depends

upon

the

ncumbent-the

residency

tself.

I

am

currently rying

o

resolve

nd clarify

ome

of these

questions. hope to "swell a progress"here and there.

recognize

hat

ome

nvolve

roblemswithwhich

may

not

be

able

to

cope,

but

they

re

problems

worth

ttempting

o

cope

with.Theyare

questions hat riseout of

functional erspec-

tive

on

political egitimacy, ut of a

search

for he

functions

and

dysfunctions

f

customary eliefs nd

behavior, nd they

are

important

uestions.Asymmetrical

eciprocityhould be

interpreted

unctionally;nd thisorientation-glib

ritics

o

the

contrary

otwithstanding-movess not to bypass

prob-

lems

of

ulture

hange r social

conflict,ut,rather, o focus n

them.

Asymmetrical

eciprocity,ike scordatura,

hould

not be

viewed

n

isolation

from ts effects n

social solidarity. ike

scordatura,

t

can

serve to "strengthenhe

mpactof the total

composition" nd by

so doing to endowpolitical

power

with

legitimacy.f theterm legitimacy"s tobe used n a manner

founded

n fact,yet neither rbitrary or

audatory, his s

one

reasonably

meaningful ay to

do so.

Comments

by

CLAUDE

AKE

School f ocial

Sciences,University

f

PortHarcourt,

.M.B.

5323,

PortHarcourt,

igeria.21

vii

79

I

have

many difficulties

ith this thoughtful

nd

interesting

paper,

but

I

will concentrate

n those associated

with

its

major

concepts,centrifugality

nd centripetality.

o begin

with,

he relationbetween

eader and

followers escribed

y

these concepts

s theclassic market

elation, nd the

nterac-

tionsbetween hem re essentiallymarket ransactions. oods

and

services re givenfrom alculations

f self-interestn

the

expectation

hat other

goods and services

will be received

n

return. he obligation

rising rom

his exchange elationship

is

only

the legal obligation

f contractual

rrangements.

he

relationship

ntails no moral

obligation nd

indeed excludes

any such obligation.

Therefore

t cannot

engender olitical

legitimacy.

Even

if

the

relations f asymmetrical

eciprocity

ere also

to entail moral obligation,

heconcepts f

centripetalitynd

centrifugalityould

still be grossly

nadequate for

xplaining

political egitimacy.

he question

fpolitical

egitimacyannot

be

reduced

to how leaders

and followers

eel about their

reciprocal bligations.

o personalize

t in this way

is to miss

itsessence.The legitimacyf a socialor political rderhas less

to do with

whatpeople feel

bout particular

eaders hanwith

the

acceptance

of the prevailing

norms,values,

institutions,

and

ideology

using the term

more conventionally).

his is

why

political stability

s possible

even when the

political

leadership

s highly

npopular. he

case of charismatic

uthor-

ity, n which

egitimacys personalized,

s an

exception, ut

it

is an exception

which roves

he rule;as Weber hows,

haris-

matic

uthoritys an

unstable nd transitional

henomenon.

The

concepts

f centifugality

nd centripetality

re highly

suspect as

meaningful ays

of looking t

the world. n the

case

of

centrifugality,he

leader

is

conceived

s "creditor,"

giving

more n goods

and services

han he gets from

his fol-

lowers.

n

the

case ofcentripetality,

t s the

reverse; he eader

is "debtor" and is obligated o serve.Can we meaningfully

talk

n

these terms? t

is

quite mpossible,

xcept

n

the very

shortrun,

for the balance

of the flowof

goods and

services

between eader

and followers

o

be

such that

the eader

gives

more

hanhe

receives.A leaderwho

givesmore han

he

receives

will

oon havenothingeft o

give and will ose

his eadership.

If

this

s

correct,

he

concept

f centrifugality

s

really

con-

tradiction

n terms.

The

example

of rural

ndia

brings

he

point

home.

Here,

the

politically

ominant

aste

is

said

to be

in

a

relation f centrifugal

symmetry ith

the

other astes.

It

gives

heothers

the

ervice astes) building ites,

istributes

gifts

o

them,

onates o

the

poor,

contributes

he bulk

of

the

expenditure

f

village

ceremonies,

tc.

How

is this

possible?

How can the dominant aste

continue

o

give

so much

more

than it gets and still remain economically ominant?The

jajmani system

nsures

he flow

f

goods

nd

services rom

he

lower castes

to the

dominant

ne.

The

system

yields

much

power

o thedominant

roup,

o

much

that

some

anthropolo-

gists

have called

it

exploitative."

The

leadershipgives

only

what

t has taken away-or,

betteryet,

only part

of

what

it

has taken

way.

The same

criticism

pplies

to the

concept

of

centripetality.

In

the case

of centrifugality,

e assume

unequal

exchange

between

he

political

enter

nd

the

periphery

n favour

f the

periphery-a

situation

which,

have

argued,

s

impossible.

In

the

case

of

centripetality,

e assume

unequal

exchange

between

he

center nd

the

periphery

n

favour

f the

center,

which s highly lausible.

The problem ere s that the

posited

conditions f egitimationf power t the centerdemandthe

acting

out of the eader's debtor tatus-that

is, the

unequal

exchange fgoods

nd services etween he enter

nd periphery

82

CURRENT

ANTHROPOLOGY

This content downloaded from 186.9.135.139 on Sun, 1 Sep 2013 10:52:54 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

7/23/2019 Asimetrica Reciprocidad.

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/asimetrica-reciprocidad 16/24

Orenstein:

SYMMETRICAL

RECIPROCITY

n favour f the

periphery.

his means return o the

xchange

conditions

f

centrifugality,

hich have been shown to

be

impossible.

These criticismsssume

that the

concepts

f

centrifugality

and centripetalityre

supposed

to be

describing

he

actual

patterns

f flowof

goods

and services.

t

may

well be-the

paper

is

not

clear on

this-that

what

they

are intended

o

describe

s not the actual

pattern

of

exchanges

but rather

perceptions, owever istorted,

f these

patterns.

f

that

s

the

case, the charge that

these

conceptsdescribe

n

impossible

situationno longerholds.However,we are then reducedto

explaining olitical egitimacy urely

n termsof false con-

sciousness.

by

UGENE

COOPER

Department

f

Sociology, niversity

f

HongKong,HongKong.

16

vii

79

Orenstein's roposed lassification

f societies n the basis of

asymmetrical

eciprocities oes astray

largely

because his

centripetal/centrifugalichotomy

s

based

on

ideology lone,

divorced

ompletely

rom

he structure

f social

relations.

y

his

own admission, his eads

to

a classing ogether

f

societies

which differ idely n features therthan ideology" nd in

which he resultant

ypes "are not connected y any orderly

historical rocess."Far from eing "methodologicaldvan-

tage," as Orenstein laims, his sort of classificationeems to

me neither

articularly sefulnor particularly roductive

f

the

kinds f results

which nthropologyenerally

eeks.

Surely, very

ruling lass

in the

history

f class

society

has

justified

ts

position

with

an ideology

which

claims

to

render

services emanded

by the ruled. mperialChina produced n

ideologywhich,

f

taken at face value, ncorporated he right

of

the

peasantryto

rebel,

a

right ustifiedby

success.To

characterize

mperial

ome

or imperial hina as centripetal

n

ideological ype s meaninglessf t does not differentiatehese

two

classic ivilizations rom

he

village

Anuakor Nambikwara

or from

he

contemporary nitedStates.

Orenstein's

entripetal/centrifugal

lassification

s

vaguely

reminiscentf Sahlins's 1963) distinction etween big man"

societies nd

cniefdoms,lthough,

he

taxonomy

erived iffers

substantially. or

Sahlins, he dynamic

f a chiefdom

s

one

involving xtraction

rom he population t large

n

favorof

the

chiefly

action

apparently

entrifugal

n

Orenstein's las-

sification, r

perhaps what

he

would

call

clientage),

while n

"big

man"

society hedynamic

s one of

extraction

rom

he

faction

f

he

big

man"

n

favor f distribution

o

the

popula-

tion t

arge apparently entripetal

n Orenstein's

lassification,

although

he classifies

big man" societies as centrifugal).

Sahlins characterizes

he "big man'

as

a prince mong

men

who s constantly orced o validate his claims to charismatic

powerby

distributiono an

ever

greedy opulation centripe-

tal?), while he chief s as the Prince f

Danes,

whose

ncipient

bureaucratic owerderives rom is office nd giveshim right

of

command centrifugal?).

Sahlins eems

o be

using

Orenstein's weak

big

man" as

his

archetype,whereasOrenstein akes the

Kapauku "strong ig

man" as his.

Orenstein

oes

on

to note

that a "big

man"

normallymust

strike

balance between

xpansionistnd solationist olicies-

he

cannot

push

his

own faction oo hard,but mustmake some

effort

o validate his

prestige hrough istribution utside.

This

appears o

me

to be striking balance between entrifugal

and

centripetal endencies,

which

Orenstein'spurely emic

categories llow himto overlook.

Generally, prefer he

typology ielded y Sahlins's nalysis

(a) because it is more closely tied to

the structure f social

relations fthe ocieties n question nd (b) because t produces

a classificationf societies onnected y an orderly istorical

nrocess.

In his discussion f

the Tolai, Orensteinmisinterprets

he

distributionfwealth

which ccurs t thefuneral

f deceased

"big man" as a means

of dissipation esigned

o circumvent

the demands

f matrilinealnheritance.

Were he familiarwith

Rosman

nd Rubel's work 1970, 1971),

he wouldhave realized

that this pparent issipation

s

nothingmore han

a potlatch-

like

distribution

hich alidates he

uccession f the SiSo and,

ratherthan circumventing

atriliny,s perfectly

onsistent

with t.

Finally,Orenstein's

iscussion f centripetality

nd centrif-

ugality

n

themodern

worldmakes mockery f

contemporary

world olitics. t is ironic

hat a paper which urports

o be a

scientifictudy f deology

ouldmake uch deologically

oaded

statements s

"Because centrifugality

eems self-evident,he

absence

of

democracy

s

not felt s a deprivation" r "When

a

people contemplate

heir eader as a creditor,

hey are not

likely,without thoroughgoing

rainwash, bruptly

o trans-

form

him

nto

an

obedient

debtor." Not only do such state-

ments ivert

ur attention rom he

nstitutionaltructures f

world apitalismwhich

upport ppressive egimes

hroughout

the ThirdWorld, ut

they re beliedby the truggles

f ibera-

tion movements ighting

o achieve the democracy

hat Oren-

stein rgues newnation-statesarely hoose."

by

CAROL S.

HOLZBERG

Erindale College,University

f

Toronto,Mississauga,

Ont.,

Canada

L5L

1C6.

24

vii

79

"Asymmetrical

eciprocity

.. can

serve

to 'strengthen

he

impact

f hetotal omposition'nd

bysodoing ndow olitical

power

with

egitimacy."

his statement

n Orenstein's onclu-

sion

best

summarizes

he

major

thrust f

his

article-a func-

tional nterpretation

f

the role

of

ideology

s it sustainsor

legitimizes

olitical eadership

n

any given

ociety.

Orenstein

deserves

redit

for

elaborating

n the

concept

of

reciprocity.

He has

made a worthwhilend suitable

ttempt t clarifying

why t s notreciprocity

er e, but "asymmetrical

eciprocity,"

the"socially pprovedviolation" f a reciprocal elation, hat

is

of

paramount

mportance

n a

discussion f

political rocess.

One wonders, owever,

ow

he

can

conclude

hat both entrifu-

gality

nd

centripetality

the opposing

irections

hat

socially

approved

violations f

reciprocitymay take)

can

strengthen

social solidaritywhen centripetality

s

inherentlyocially

di-

visive.AsOrenstein imself

otes,

n

centripetalocieties,

uch

as

those

organized

n the basis of

democratic

deology,

where

the

"demand-right"

or he flow f

goods

nd

services

ies with

the

constituency

ather

than

with the

political

centre,

the

system

results not

only

in "weak

leadership,"

but

also

in

"social

and political railty." entripetality

s "dysfunctional"

to the central

ower.

Hence

it

is

"inefficient."

ow, then,

an

it

endow

he

eader

with

egitimacy?

Orenstein houldbe commended orhisuseful ontribution

toward n understandingf

the "meaning"

f

egitimacy,

ne

that he

emphasizes

s

decidedly

emic" and hence

devoid

of

researcher

ias.

His

argument

s

persuasive

though

t

some

points

onceptually onfusingnd

hencenot

entirely

onvinc-

ing.

For example,

while he realizes that

a

series of

political

ideologies routinized

harisma, atrilineal

nheritance, ing-

ship,coercion,

nd rationality)might

oexist

r

even

compete

with ne another, e

seems o suggest hat

society

s charac-

terized

by

a

dominant

deology.

This is

true both

for feudal

Europe

and for he

"big

man"

societies

f

Melanesia,

but

is

it

true

of the

complex

ocieties

f

the

"modern

West," composed

of

plurality

f ocial

nd cultural

egments?

omplex

ocieties

are

not

structured

y

a

single and/or

dominant

political

ideology. o see them s suchwouldsuggest hat ocal-level

(community,

illage,neighbourhood)

alues

or

those

of differ-

ent racial, ethnic, nd social-classgroupings

were all of the

Vol.

21

* No.

1

February 980

83

This content downloaded from 186.9.135.139 on Sun, 1 Sep 2013 10:52:54 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

7/23/2019 Asimetrica Reciprocidad.

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/asimetrica-reciprocidad 17/24

same

ideological

mold-a

conclusion ot borne

ut

by

a

great

deal

of

ethnographyAronson

976,

Gonzalez

1970,Magubane

1969,Rubin

1960,

Smith

1965).

Even in

small-scale, irtually

homogeneousocieties

ike

he

Nambikwara,

he

thnographer's

depiction

of the "dominant"

political

deology

mightdiffer

depending pon

which

party faction)

n

the

politicalrelation

he/she

as consultedwith-the

"big man" or his

constituency.

Orenstein

uggests, erhaps

omewhat

ncorrectly,

hat

the

two versions f

asymmetrical

eciprocity

re

mutually ncom-

patible-"because

they omprise

eviations rom

he

norm

n

totally pposeddirections." his doesnot seemto be thecase

precisely

n

those ituations ustained

y

the

opposing olitical

ideologies f

centripetality

nd

centrifugality.

ere

centripetal-

ity

s neither

ysfunctional

or

nefficient.refer o the

sup-

posedly

contradictory olitics

of

"democratic

ocialism,"

a

political

deology

ound

n

developing

ations ike

Jamaica

nd

Tanzania

in which

he

state must be

obeyed

because

"it

sees

itself s givingmore

goods nd services

han t

receives,"

while

the

constituency

iews the

state as

the

servant

f

the

people,

bound

to

theirmaterial ocial

support

nd

in

power

by

virtue

of their

race Holzberg

1977).

t is

not so

much

he

frailty

f

the

democratic

deology

which s

at

stake,

but

the

frailty

f

centrifugality

n

the face

of

the

polarization

f classes n the

society.The masses are

free

o

orchestrate seriesof

strikes,

peacefully emonstrate,nd make public theiracts of civil

disobedience

through

ormal

nd

legal

politicalchannels)

n

order o

ensure

hat

their

asic

rights

re

maintained.

Basically, am

in

agreement ith

Orenstein's

eneralwork-

ing assumptions.

t is

important hat "ideas and

ideals" be

taken

nto account

n

a

consideration

f

human

relations.

t is

also mportant

hat

deology

e

examined s

a

sustainingharter

rather

han

merely

s

a

restraining

r

imiting orce.

Certainly

one cannot

dispute hefact hat

deology

as a

built-in

apacity

for

ccommodating

hange

as

well

as

for

ts

own

alteration;

but

to generalize rom

symmetrical

eciprocityo

the

"con-

tent"

of

political

egitimacy

hen

reciprocity

ay

be

only

one

of the

operatingpolitical

ideologies

makes

for

conceptual

ambiguity nd exaggeration ather

han

clarity

n

our

under-

standing fpolitical

egitimacy

n

society.

by

AWRENCE

KRADER

Institute

fEthinology,

ree

University

erlin,

riimmerstrasse

52, Dahlem,

Berlin 3. 17

vii

79

Orenstein as taken

up

analogies

between

entripetality

nd

centrifugality,reditor

nd

debtor, nd

medieval European

and

modern

Melanesian

political

systems

n

the

typology f

power.

Feudalism

n

this

regard

ppears

to

be a

much

bused

word

nd

is

here

represented ith

respect o ideological

aral-

lels.

Thought

ought to be

given, however, o

relations of

bondage nd to

andownership,irculation

ther han

xchange,

and relations

furban

nd

rural

ife, s

well s to the ize

of

the

political

nit.Thenthere

would

be a

widerbasis for

udgment

as to whetherheanalogy s apt or is morethan an analogy.

The

fundamentalaw

set down by

Orenstein s the

law of

reciprocity,nd

it

is

described s

a panhuman

isposition. he

matter s

more

omplicated han wouldappear

from is com-

ments,

or eciprocitys

distinguishedy

Aristotlen

connection

with

exchange

nd with

distribution;ittle

doubt s left s to

his

meanings, or

he introduced

othphilological

nd economic

precisions

n

regardto

them. These

reciprocal elations

re

further

onnected

to

distributiveustice and

right and to

commutative

ustice and

right,

espectively.The thirdkind

of

justice in

Aristotle's

ystem,

orrective, alls

outside our

purview.)

t

is

the

relation etween

istributiveustice,right,

and

reciprocity

hich s at issue

n

thenorm ited

by

Orenstein.

However, his s

unclear rom is

usage. t would ppear

from

his treatment f asymmetricaland by implication f sym-

metrical)reciprocity

hat he has commutative

eciprocity

n

mind, but the latter

has to do with

the principle f

equal

reciprocitynd its breach by the asymmetrical elation nd,

further,

ith

qualityof exchange, ontract f exchange, nd

equivalence

n

exchange arried ut in society. he arithmetic

calculationsOrenstein efers o are of central mportance n

theserelations. istributive eciprocity,ustice, nd right re

of anotherkind from he commutative nd are not connected

to any relations f this sort or to the calculations ertaining

to it.

There

s

a

second difficulty

n

the treatment f this funda-

mental aw, for the principle f ustice and right ears upon

the polis, ccording o Aristotle. hus references made to the

city-statend to complex,nternally ivided ociety. ut many

people do not ive n a polis; they ive nstead n

communities,

called

koinonia,

r in

community-likeonditions, hichmight

be takento correspond o life n a clan, a clan-village, tribe,

or the ike. The system f ustice developedby Aristotles at

the same

time a system f right, istory, conomics, olitics,

and

society.

hese

are

takenup by

him

n

his variousworks n

ethics, olitics, nd economics. have discussed hem lsewhere

(Krader 1976: chap. 1; 1979: chap. 4), where have dealt with

the relations etween he

various ocial conditions f the polis

and the community,tc., and shown them to have intercon-

nectionswithdifferentelations f ustice,right, uman ocial

development,nd social theory.

by

ONALD

V.

KURTZ

DepartmentfAnthropology,niversityfWisconsin-Milwau-

kee,Milwaukee,Wis. 53201,U.S.A. 26

vii

79

Orensteinmakes a valuable contribution o the analysis of

political legitimacy, n

uncommon

nthropological oncern.

His identification f ideologies derived from asymmetrical

reciprocity

eserves

ttention.

t is

gratifying

hat the

analysis

is

grounded

n

empirical ata and applied

to

stateless

ocieties

as well as

states,

wo other ncommon

spects

n

the

study

of

legitimacy. ven though functional olidarity rovides the

theoretical

remise

f the

paper, nsight s provided

nto the

role deology lays n the nstitutionalizationfpower hrough

redefinitionf authority odes, clientage, nheritance,nd so

forth. ince Orenstein ees this analysisas preliminary,he

following

ommentaries re offered o accommodatefuture

research.

Although

Orenstein

rgues

that the

polar oppositions

hat

centripetal

nd

centrifugalsymmetrical eciprocityepresent

are not to be

confounded

ith ther rouble-laden

ichotomies,

he

also argues

hat

the existence

f one

precludes

he

existence

of the

other. This

is the

dilemma,

because

it

impedes

the

analysis

of

process.

Even

though

Orenstein

rgues

that func-

tionalismdoes not

imply changelessness,

t

is

the

nature

of

change

that

s at

issue.

He

suggests

hat movement

rom

ne

level

of

solidarity

o another

s

possible.

Yet the functionalist

paradigm

till

tends to

structure

tructure

Coult 1966)

so as

to

impede

he

analysis

of

decision-makingrocesseswhich,

o

my thinking,s critical orpolitical hange.Also,theconcepts

tend to

preclude analysis

of

process because, despite

their

laudable

neutrality,

he

more ntricate

he behavior

nvolved

in

the

process

he

ess

capable

the

concepts

re

of

responding

heuristically;

s

presented hey

do

not

provide

the

flexibility

for

nalyzing rocess hat,

for

xample,

he

concepts

fnorma-

tive

and

pragmatic

ules

provide Bailey 1969).

Regarding

he

"emic"

categories

he

deologies epresent,

wonder romwhosepoint

of view

theymay

be

analyzed

most

fruitfully-that

f the rulers

r that

of

the ruled-and

under

what

specific

ituations.

Legitimacy

s effected

hrough

complex rocess Kurtz 1978,n.d.),

one critical

spect

of

which

is the inculcation nto the ruled

by the

rulersof

a

political

ideology hat s compatiblewith he rulers' oals Cohen 1969,

Kurtz 1978). Especially n states,rulers re likely o act out

one ideology nd espouserhetoricallynother epending pon

the situation. n the United States, cannot a congressman

84

CURRENT

ANTHROPOLOGY

This content downloaded from 186.9.135.139 on Sun, 1 Sep 2013 10:52:54 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

7/23/2019 Asimetrica Reciprocidad.

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/asimetrica-reciprocidad 18/24

Orenstein: SYMMETRICAL

RECIPROCITY

nvolve

himself

n

both

deologies

when

he

represents,

n

the

one hand,the nterests fhis constituencydebtor/centripetal-

ity) and, on

the other,

vested interest

roups

for whom he

provides avors nd/or argesse

n

exchange

or

upport credi-

tor/centrifugality)?

Finally,

Orenstein

eeds to

clarify

he

relationship

etween

material nd ideological

xplanations egarding

he

behavior

associated

with

the

ideologies.

He seems to favor

deological

explanations; et,

t

times,

e

implies

material

ausality

or

behavior. Another contributionmight

be to

specify

more

precisely he implications f material nd ideologicalfactors

for pecific spects

f

political rocesses

nd situationsn which

their ffect pon processmay

be

either

ongruent

r

divergent.

Orenstein as made

a

good

start

n a

difficult

roblem

rea;

he

should ontinue

his ine

of

nquiry.

by

JOHN

LIEP

InstituteorEthnology

nd

Anthropology,

niversityfCopen-

hagen, Frederiksholms

anal 4, DK-1220 CopenhagenK,

Denmark. 9

vii

79

Orenstein's

iscussion

f

reciprocity

s an element f

political

legitimacy

s useful

nd interesting,

ut sociological ypes

so

spacious

as

to make

room for

Nambikwara

chiefs,Roman

emperors,

nd

U.S.

congressmen

re too

general

or

my taste.

The cultural ontent fpolitical deologies nd their imiting

conditionsmust be specified

n more

detail

if

meaningful

explanations

retobe arrived t. Orenstein ttempts o do

this

for feudal

Europe

and Melanesia.

He

concentrates

n

the

variable

of

inheritance.

A realistic

nalysis

of

the

place

of

ideology

n a social formation

ould, however,

believe,

need

to take account of

more social and economic actors. nheri-

tance

may

be

the

significant

actor n

feudalism,

ut I do not

think

t is

the

primary

determinant

or

political

power

in

Melanesia

see below).

I

do

not

accept Orenstein's

haracterizationf centrifugal

reciprocity

s a

violation

f

the

norm f

reciprocity.

o me,

t

is

preciselymaking olitical

use of the

obligation

o

repay.

f

recipients

re

unable

to fulfill his obligation, hey re placed

in an inferiorosition.This is a consequence f theprinciple

of reciprocity

hich

Mauss spellsout

in the

passage

Orenstein

quotes Mauss 1954[1925]:72, 3). Centripetal

eciprocity,

n

theother

and,may

ndeed

be a

negation

fthenormal

ules

f

reciprocity. his,

at least,

is

Clastres's (1977) opinion.

He

describes ow

South

American

ndians

prevented

heir hiefs

from

xercising

uthority y placing

them n the

positionof

debtors.

his

is

dysfunctional,ays

Orenstein. lastres

rgues

that the Indians maintained communal

orms of

political

solidarity

while

they

abhorred ts

authoritarian orm. y

the

way, Clastres hows hatthe principle f the eader s servant

was

widespread mong

he

South American

orest eoples nd

inNorthAmerica s well. Thus the centripetal orm s not as

rare s

Orenstein tates.

Orenstein ightly oints to the significance f the goods

involved

n

centrifugaleciprocity,ut it is not

clear from is

discussion

what, exactly,

he

politically trategic

oods

are in

Melanesia.

t

is

not

easy

to assess the

relevance f

nheritance

rules

f

the

goods nd

their osition n the system f reproduc-

tion are

not

specified.

pace does

not

permit

me to take

the

subjectup

at

length. uffice

t

to say that "big

men" may play

two roles

ccording

o the bases of their ositions. his has to

do with two

economic

actors

n Melanesia. Firstly,Melane-

sians

place great mphasis

n successfulubsistence roduction.

The

"strength"

of individuals nd groups is expressedby

conspicuous

distribution f

subsistence

wealth.

Accordingly,

men

may

acquire standing n their ocalityby

generous is-

tributions. s representativesf their roups heymay become

managers f communal istributionsis-a-vis thergroups. n

this way theymay come to exert ome nfluence, ut there s

not much enduring ower to be had by the manipulation f

goods that everybody

roduces.This typeof "big man" is the

feast-maker. econdly,

n

large areas of Melanesia

another

factor nfluenceshe social economy.Here durable

representa-

tions of wealth n more general

forms

valuables, "primitive

money") have evolved.

When these formsof wealth have

penetrated

he

regulation

f

ocial relations hrough irculation

of bridewealth, loodwealth, tc.,

a

more ndependent

medium

of power has

been created.

Such

wealth

may

be monopolized

by a restrictedection f the population. ndebtednessmay be

more ystematically

xploited, ecause people need valuables

to

reproduce

their social existence

to get married,fulfill

kinship obligations,

tc.). Here the "big man" becomes a

financier.

Where

the

process

has

gone farthest,

xchanges f

durable

wealth are

de facto

arranged

between

powerful big

men,"

while he restof the people are continually orking ff

their ebts

Pospisil

1963b, arnett1959,

Kamma

1970). Here

centrifugaldeology

has become a mask for

exploitation

nd

even despotism.

ntense

competitionmay prevail n this

form

of

political conomy.Any single big

man" may have only

a

limited following,

ut

as

a

category big men" may

exert

considerable

ocial control.

ower

is

not simply

proportional

to the

number ffollowers.

he

extent f

power

ny eader

can

wield also has to do with the degree of social dependency

evolved n the ocioeconomicelations mong eople

n general.

The

development

f certain formsof

social capital,

which

constitute

more ontrollablend effectivefund fpower,"

s

the decisive

factor

n

traditional

Melanesian

politics,

rather

than nheritance

s such.

As

a

matter

f

fact,

he

Busama (Hogbin 1951, 1963)

are

in

the Huon

Gulf,

New

Guinea,

not on

Guadalcanal.

by

KAZUNORI

OSHIMA

Doshisha University,0-23 Horiike-cho, zumasa,

Ukyo-ku,

Kyoto 16, Japan. 9

viii

79

It

seems to me that

Orenstein's rgument

or

centrifugality

bypasses

one

important roblem

that the free world

faces

today,namely, heproblem f whethert can avoiddespotism.

Orenstein's

ssertion hat

"political egitimacy

s

founded

pon

people's acceptance

of

a leader's rule becausethey ccept

the

reasons

for

t" needs

qualification.

olitical

egitimacy

n na-

tions uchas the

Union

of

Soviet SocialistRepublics

nd the

People's Republic

of

China

s

not ounded pon

people's accep-

tance

of their

political institutions;

heir

supreme

political

powers

ave

notbeen

lected

reely y

the

people.Furthermore,

these

countries

ave

only

one dominant

olitical

party.

f the

people theredid

not like their

political

nstitutions, ould

it

be

possible

for

hem o

change

to

centripetality?

he answer

has

to

be

no,

because

the

upreme

uthorities

ouldnot

permit

them to do

so.

The

whole

question, herefore,

oils downto

this:

can

centrifugality

e

prevented

rom

degenerating

nto

despotism? thinknot. Of many cases in history, would

mention wo notorious

ecent

nes:

Japan's

fascism 1931-45)

and

nazism

1933-45).

Both were

entrifugal

nd

powerful,

ut

we

cannot say that

they were politically fficient. or this

reason find

t

hard to

agree

with

Orenstein's

tatement hat

"the choice of

centrifugality

akes most

sense from the

perspective

f the

eadership."

Democracy

s not

politically trong,

ut

t

can

keep eadership

fromdegeneratingnto despotism.

t

prevents

power

from

goingbeyond

ts

rightful

imits.

believe

that

centripetality

means neither he denial of

government's ower

nor freedom

from

overnmentuthority. entripetality

s well as centrifu-

gality

eeks

trong overnment;

t

attempts

o

choose

for tself

those

who

can set

up

such

government.

he

elected

uthority,

ofcourse,eads on the basisofthepower ntrustedo it.

I do not think hat the political ffectiveness

f some organs

of Americangovernment

s beyond criticism. owever,that

Vol. 21 * No.

1

* February 980 85

This content downloaded from 186.9.135.139 on Sun, 1 Sep 2013 10:52:54 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

7/23/2019 Asimetrica Reciprocidad.

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/asimetrica-reciprocidad 19/24

government

as established n the

basis ofthe deas and ideals

expressed

n

the

Declaration

f

ndependence

nd the Constitu-

tion.Any mprovement

n

it,

unless

ccomplished y violence,

must be made piecemeal by

the

appropriate rgans,

which

consist fpersons

lected

by

the American

eople.

s

there

ny

other rogram or hanging o centrifugalityn order o ncrease

its

political

ffectiveness?

by

DENNIS H. WRONG

Drakes Corner d., Princeton, .J. 08540,U.S.A. 7 viii 79

Orenstein's

hrase "asymmetrical eciprocity"

mounts vir-

tually

o a definitionf

power

s a social

relationship.

e

defines

asymmetrical eciprocity

ore

narrowly, owever, onceiving

of t as a "legitimizingrinciple"

n

Weber's

ense and even as

"political deology," xplicitly mitting

rom ts

scope

both

coercive

ower

nd absolutist orms

njoining

bedience

"rou-

tinized harisma"

n

his

terms, gain followingWeber)

which

do

not

expressly

ntail he dea of

reciprocal bligations.

think

that

his

definition

s too

narrow nd

that this ccounts or he

difficulties

have in

accepting

ome of his

applications

f

the

concept.

Orenstein

roperly

xcludes oercion

nderstood

s the use

of

force,

ut the hreat fforce

r the

apacity

o

applynegative

sanctionss often he basis of stablepower relations nd,as

Simmel

(1950[1908]:182-83) acutely perceived,

ncludes

an

element f "contract" r

reciprocity

ven

n

themostunilateral

and

oppressive elationshipsfor

xtended

iscussion,

ee

Wrong

1979:24-28,41-44).

As for

outinized harisma,

he

obligation

to

obey may

be stated

unconditionally,

ut there

s

usually

n

implicit orrespondingbligation n the part of the authority.

The

very dea of fatherhood, or example,on which the pa-

triarchal

heory

f

kingship

as based carries he

suggestion

f

protectionnd service s well s of uthority. his s so even

n

the

case of God's authorityndis a major ssue nthe problem

of

theodicy aced by all theistic eligions Weber 1968[1922]:

518-29).

I

would hereforeroadenOrenstein's ypologynto a

continuum

ncompassing oth coercive uthoritybut not the

actual

employment

f

force) nd routinized harisma s

forms

of asymmetrical eciprocity.his is consistentwithWeber's

inclusive oncept of "domination," s most translators ave

rendered

is

Herrschaftsee Wrong1970:54-58; 1979:36-38).

Orenstein's wo

types

of asymmetrical

eciprocity

re

richly

suggestive,

s is his

comparison f Melanesianpolitical rgani-

zation with

European feudalism, ut he seems to me to be

comparing atterns

f

social structureather han ideological

principles.

The

crisscross etwork f mutual obligations n

European

feudalism

ndeed pproximates is centripetal ather

than

his

centrifugal

orm

f symmetricaleciprocity.

t there-

fore

ontradicted

n

reality he stress n centrifugality

n the

dominant

deology

f

the

Great Chain of Being that provided

ultimate egitimation f the feudal order. The complex of

feudal onds

onsisted fparticular ights nd duties.

Orenstein,

infact, quates asymmetricaleciprocity ith he distribution

of

material

oods

and

resulting reditor-debtorconomic ela-

tions, nd he explicitly xcludesnot only coercion, ut also

purely ymbolic enefitsnd mputed ualities rom is concep-

tionof centrifugaleader-followeries. Social structure,nclud-

ing conomic elations,ertainlyonsists fmutual xpectations

possessing ormative uthority. o equate thesewithpolitical

ideology, owever,

s

to efface he distinction etween deology

and social

structurend rule

out the possibility hat

the atter

contradicts he

former, aking t an example f whatMarxists

call

"false consciousness." his is, to be sure, point that a

sociologistmightbe expected o make to an anthropologist.

No doubt

the fit etween

deology nd social structure

s

much

tighter n the kindsof societies, ncluding hose of Melanesia,

that anthropologiststudy han t was in medieval urope.

There are clearly lements f centripetalityn representative

institutions, nd they are indeed often dominant n urban

machine olitics

nd in congressman-constituent

elations; ut

these

xamples re scarcely

xhaustive

f democracy,

s Oren-

steinpractically

oncedes.

op political eaders

re expected o

act

like statesmen,

iterally state's

men," and demand

acri-

fices.

Churchillpromised

nothing but

"blood, sweat,

and

tears"-in

the

midst f a war

for urvival, rue, ut

peacetime

American

residents ave

echoed him

in enjoining ask not

what

your ountry

an do foryou.

. ." and n calling

he energy

crisis the "moral

equivalentof

war." Orenstein rovides

an

interesting

ew version f

the argument

hat democracy

s not

suitedto the newstates,but their ack of a strong tatewith

an established

laim on its citizens' oyalty

s morecrucial

to

their

light

han

the

form

f the state.

State authority

n the

West,

fter ll,antedated emocracy. he American

resident,

as

was

widely

recognized y constitutionalists

t the time

of

Watergate,

s the

18th-centuryritish

kingwithout he

royal

trappings.

or do the "centrifugal"

ne-party

r military

ic-

tatorships

f the new states ook

very table or

effective-not

even Maoist totalitarianism,

s we have recently

earned.

Reply

by

HENRY ORENSTEIN

New York,N.Y.,

U.S.A.

15 x

79

Some

parts

f

my

rticle re

erroneous.

ome re

unclear. his is

apparent,

or nstance,

romHolzberg's

houghtfulomments.

She

and

Liep

indicate

hat view centripetalitys

inherently

divisive;

nd it may be

that overemphasizehis,

ormy data

on the Anuak and the Nambikwara,

where

have the most

detailed nformationn

the matter, ear

on this point.

How-

ever, do

assert n the article

hat this

s notnecessary-that

centripetality

may

be functional,

s in ancient

Rome,

or

dysfunctional.

do, indeed,hypothesize

hat politicalfrailty

tends

to accompany

his form f ideology,

nd Wrong,

with

Holzberg,

questions

his. The absence

ofa strong

tate

that

elicits ts citizens' oyalties,

e says, s more

rucial, specially

for the new nation-states,han the particular deology hat

sustains he central uthority.

My point

s

that

a

strong

tate

is less

ikely nder

entripetal

hanunder entrifugal

uthority.

Yet these

questions

ead

me to

conclude

hat

have

failedto

maketwo mportant

istinctions.

ne s between

he

ocial

and

political

ffects f

the

deology,

s

Liep

and

Holzberg

bserve.

Social

solidarity

learly

an

persist

long

with

political

neffi-

ciency.

his

I

merely

int t

in

myconclusion,

hereas

ought

to have been farmore explicit.

ndeed, solidarity

xists

in

"tribes withoutrulers";

formalpolitical

offices

though

not

informal

eaders)

are not

mandatory

or

solidarity.

Another

distinction

as

to do

with

hekind

of

centripetality

nticipated

in a

society.

The

central uthorities

an be

answerable

o

its

citizenry egarding

ocial

and

economic

onditions

n

general

rather han on this or that particular ssue. In the United

States,

for

nstance,

his tends

to

hold

most

for he

president,

less for

enators,

east

formembers

f

he

House.

One

may

have

"generalized

entripetality"

with apologies

for

yet

another

neologism,

n this case

ad

hoc)-"state's

men,"

following

Wrong,

n

place

of

passive,

nearly

tropistic

servantsof

the

people."

Still,

many

f

Wrong's

omments,

long

with

hose

f

others,

apply

to

democracy

n a broad

sense,

nd

I

openly

ssert

hat

centripetality

s

only

one

feature f

democracy.

do

not

dwell

on the

topic

n this

rticle,

owever

xplicit

may be,

but

do

in

another,

ot

yet

published Orenstein

979).

Contemporary

democracies

ften

ave

charismatic

residents,

nd

they lways

entail

rational authority

s well as centripetality.

ndeed,

thoughWeber says that electedofficialsn the U.S. are often

"servants"

f heir onstituencies,

e also says,

uite ccurately

I think,

hat elected fficials

nd party eaders

n the Western

86

CURRENT

ANTHROPOLOGY

This content downloaded from 186.9.135.139 on Sun, 1 Sep 2013 10:52:54 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

7/23/2019 Asimetrica Reciprocidad.

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/asimetrica-reciprocidad 20/24

Orenstein:

SYMMETRICAL RECIPROCITY

orld

in general are

not

infrequently harismatic

Webei

1947a:386-87;

1974b:80, 96).

Holzberg, oo,

nterprets e as

believing hat there

mustbe

but

one dominant

deology n

any

one

society.Her

misinterpre-

tation

s

probably ttributable

o my choiceof Melanesia

and

Western

eudalism

or

detailed

reatment.

selected hese

twc

deliberately,s

I

say

in

the

article,

recisely ecause centrifu-

gality s nearly

not quite)

unadulterated

n

them

nd therefore

one

may more

readily solate the effects f

the

ideologyon

other

features f social

life. n such

societies here s

but one

predominantdeology, ut I do not knowwhether e willfind

many

more xamples.

Holzbergsays I

generalize oo

much-from

asymmetrical

reciprocityo all other

deologies-in

claiming as I

understand

her) that the

legitimacy f a political

deology

dependsupon

whether

r not t s

functional. do, n

fact, uggest

his, nd I

give anotherexample

employing

outinized harisma

n

my

concluding

heoretical emarks.

ut this s a

tentative ugges-

tion

regarding sage, not a

definitive

onclusion which,

contend,

s

nonexistent

n any

science). My reason

for

recom-

mending he

conceptofasymmetrical

eciprocitys

precisely

that

t may open

the way to

such questions.

More

important,

she

makeswhat

ppears to mea

strange oint n

arguing hat

when

he two

forms f

asymmetrical

eciprocityre present n

the

samesocietywe will mostoften ind hatcentripetalitys

neither

ysfunctional

or nefficient.

he refers o

democratic

socialism n

Tanzania

and Jamaica. am

ignorant fconditions

in

those

nations.

assert,

owever, t the outset

hat am not

discussing conomic

edistribution.his

may

accompany

en-

tripetality.Within the

framework f

the concepts have

suggested,

we can

readily onsider uch

contemporary

tates

as

Britain r

Sweden, oth

of

whichhave

givenmuch fforto

economic

redistribution,oth

unequivocallydemocratic-so

much o

that the

direction nd, as we

have recently

een, the

amount

f

redistributions

subject

to

constituents'

ishes.

But

here, oo,

Holzberg's emarks re

helpful.

contend hat

one, nd

only ne,of

the

two

forms f

symmetrical

eciprocity

can

be the

fficialdeology fformal

uthority.f

the entripetal

ideology

s

accepted

as

appropriate o the

central

uthority,

then tsbranches-cities n theUnitedStates,fornstance,re

cited n

the

article-must take the same

position r

be

con-

demned

by the

population

t

large

as

illegitimate.

owever,

Holzberg

s

quite correct

n

indicating

hat

groups

with

no

formal

ond to the

central

uthority, uch

as

ethnic

groups,

may have

differentolitical

deologies. he

central

uthority

under

entripetality

s

often

nswerable, ot

only

o

ndividuals,

but also to

groups-perhaps

n

the modern tate

primarily

o

groups-each

having

ts

own

interests

nd

its own formof

political

deology. ocial relationswithin uch

groups

s

well

as

among

ndividuals

may

be

centrifugal,

hile

centripetality

remains the

ideology

of the

government

nd its

formally

affiliated

ranches.AncientRome is

one

example Mattingly

1957: 0-41);

social relations

n some

American cities are

anotherWarner ndLunt 1941:140-41). Holzberg's oint s a

good

one, well

taken.

In

contrast

o

Holzberg's ontentionhat assume

centripe-

tality

is

necessarily

eeble, other

commentators, ith less

justification,

ttribute

o

me

the

position hat

centrifugality

s

necessarily

trong,

ven

despotic.

Oshima

touches

one

matter

and is

rightly ritical;

remark, lbeit

fleetingly,

hat

egiti-

macy

s

founded

n

the

willing ubmission

f subjects.

This

is

an

initial

implification,

ater

ualified.

Moreover, deliberately

do notdiscuss

oercion, xcept

n

passing; my

topic precludes

it. t

may

be

true

hat itizens f

he

U.S.S.R. and

contemporary

China obey

because

of

fear nd

fear

lone.

Reports

rom hese

nations,

specially rom

he Soviet Union,

re contradictory.

reserve

udgment.

Oshima's misinterpretations understandablen light fmy

initial tatement,

ut his conclusion

hat centrifugality

ust

become

despotic,

and once despotic

cannot turn

back,

is

incorrect.

s the article

ndicates,

feudal ord

often ad little

controlover

his vassals, and

many "big

men" were

mere

managers, ar

fromdespots.

At the moment

f this

writing,

China may

be moving way from espotism.

et this may

be

merehope

founded pon

a fewhints.

ndeed, one

ofmy main

points,

partly

consistent

with Oshima's

remarks, s that

the

two forms

of asymmetrical

eciprocity

esist one

another.

China

may have become

ess despotic

n recent

imes,but

I

know fno evidence hat t sabandoningentrifugality.agree

with

Oshima

that the

Nazi regime

nd probably

hat of pre-

WorldWar

I Japanweredespotic,

ut these

egimeswerenot

centrifugal. he

dominant deology

n the

Third Reich

was

individual harisma;

n Japan it

was routinized

harisma.

believethat both

were egitimate

egimes,

owever

much one

may detest them.

I do agree

with Oshima

that,

whatever

ideology

people

hold, they

often-not

always; witness

con-

servative hought

n theUnited States-crave

strong overn-

ment see,

for nstance,

my discussion

f the Anuak).

Cooper

lso

confuses entrifugality

ith

trong

overnment-

but, then,

he

appears

thoroughly onfused

hroughout.

e

contends hat

my categories-emic

ategories,

hichhe seems

to

think rrelevant or

politics-result

n

my overlooking

matter boutwhich have much o say: a beliefn the eader-

as-creditor an

have different

tic effects.

As I indicate,

follow

ahlins

n

much

f

mydiscussion

fMelanesia.

According

to

Sahlins,

"big

man" can

undermine

is

position y

trying

too much to

maximize t

(etically).

n contrast,

f he neglects

his

prestige,

e is likely o lose followers.

ooper's

remarks n

the

Tolai are

especially

dd. Following pecialists

n

Melanesia,

I

argue

that wealthy

man

n

a matrilineal

ociety

may try o

circumventocial convention y giving

s

much

of his

wealth

as he can to

his son before

e dies.The funerary

istributionn

either matrilineal

r patrilineal

ocieties may

be

one

such

convention.

Liep objects

to my

characterization

f centrifugality

s

a

violation

f the

normof

reciprocity.

do not

know

why;

he

does notexplainwhy.

At the

outset,

n

defining

he

term, say

that thenormpersists espite hebelief n its violation.The

definition,repeat,

s emic.The

subject

distinguishes

etween

the

goods

nd services

e

receives

nd

his

consequent

bligation

to

obey;

he conceives

heformer

s a violation

fthe norm

hat

is to his

advantage.

Centripetal

uthority

s a violation

fthe

norm n much the

same

sense-though

the

direction

f

the

demand-right

s herereversed.

He objects

further

hat

I

do

not

specify

what

exactly

are

the

strategic oods

distributed

n

Melanesia,

lthough

e

does

mention

hat

consider he

mportance

f the

kind

as well

as

the

amount of

goods

involved

n

distributions.

am

by

no

means

specialist

n Melanesia-hence

my

error

egarding

he

Busama.

My

discussion

fthe

political

value

to the

recipient

of

distibuted

goods

is

intended

to

apply

to all

centrifugal

systems, ot to Melanesia in particular. hus, moneywould

have

high political

value for

the

recipient

n

Melanesia

but

relatively

ittle

n feudal

Europe

n contrast

o landed fiefs.

He considers

my

emphasis

n

Melanesian

nheritance

ules

incorrect.

y

sources

ndicate hat

am

correct-Liep's

paper

is not available

to

me-but

I

do

not

nsist.On

the

contrary,

explicitly

tate that

Melanesian

inheritance

s of

secondary

concern-that

the

most

important

actor

s

probably

the

number

f

persons

n

a

position

to

compete

for

"big

man"

status.

The entire

matter

s

discussed,

not

in

order

to make

generalizations

bout

Melanesia,

but

in order

o illustrate

ow

asymmetrical

eciprocity

an

be

put

to

use.

I

thought

had

made

this

quite

clear

n

the

article.

Liep implies

hat

believe

he

amount

f

power

held

by

the

central uthoritys increasedwhenthe number ffollowerss

greater. his

s a misunderstanding

orwhich am

responsible.

In

the sectionentitled Centrifugality,

he centralization

f

Vol.

21

* No.

1

February

980

87

This content downloaded from 186.9.135.139 on Sun, 1 Sep 2013 10:52:54 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

7/23/2019 Asimetrica Reciprocidad.

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/asimetrica-reciprocidad 21/24

power, nd the riseof kingship," he sentence eginning

It is

plausible

.. ."

should properly have been put "It may appear

plausible-howeveretically mprobable-that,

n most

cases,

the larger the number f subjects, the stronger

will be

the

central uthority."His point

s

the very one

I have made

a

centralpart

of

my theoretical iscussion.

hus

in

the

subse-

quent section

say

"To increase the loyalty

of

clients,the

ruler must increase their remuneration y decreasing

heir

number"-a

conclusion

erived

rom

my

earlier

iscussion.

I

must thankLiep for mentioningdditional

cases of cen-

tripetality. hey are welcome for personaland professional

reasons.Personally, prefer emocracy. rofessionally,

feel

I had too few ases of centripetality. onetheless,

he bulk

of

the

ethnographic

iterature

ndicates

hat t

is far ess

frequent

than centrifugality.

Ake and Oshima bserve hat overpersonalizesymmetrical

reciprocity-that,

n

effect,

fail to

distinguish

ffices nd

forms

f

governance

rom

ersons.

do this

only

n

comparing

Melanesia with Westernfeudalism;

do it

deliberately,

x-

plainingwhy

t

is

useful

or his

particular omparison.

Nor-

mally,

intended he

concepts

o

apply

to forms f

governance;

this

s

implied y

the

very

fact

that offer

n

explanation

or

an

unusual

pplication.

Ake, ike Cooper,

dislikes mic

categories. ndeed,

he seems

todisregardhefact hat define hetwokinds f symmetrical

reciprocity

s

ideological orms,

or

he

criticizes

hem

s

if

they

were lways

ctual

exchange rocesses.He

is incorrect ven

n

his

own etic terms.

He refers

o the

ajmani system

n

India

to

show

that the

system

annotwork.

n

the

past,

I

have shown

how the ajmani system

nvolves

overpayment, tically

and

emically Orenstein 962; 1965:224-28).

The

spirit

n which Kurtz's

criticisms re

offered

s

very

welcome.

His

remark

hat

I

favor

deological xplanations

s

helpful.

his

may

well be a

defect

n

the article. t was

not

my ntent;

material

nd ideological xplanations re relevant,

and

I

offer

oth. Because

my point

of

departure

s

ideology,

may

have

overemphasized

t.

I must take care

to

avoid

such

biases

n

the

future.

Along

with

Holzberg,

Kurtz asks from

whoseviewpoint

he

categories pply, hatof theruler rthatof the ruled. briefly

mention

onditionswherein

he ruler's deology

s

merely

hypocriticalmask, disguising purely coercive system.

I

identify

uch

conditions

with

coercive

domination,

which

hope

to

discuss

n

ater

publications. hey were

not

the subject

of

this

one,

and

theirramifications

re

too numerous nd

complex

o

bring p

in this

place. I mightmention, owever,

thatbothforms f

symmetricaleciprocityan be

anticipated,

etically,

n

politicalrelations, lthough nly

one

will be

con-

sideredproper n any one society.For the United States, for

instance,

bossism"

s

mentionedn the rticle.Other xamples,

I am

sure, xist,

ut

suggest hatthey re all viewedmuch s

is the

politicalmachine-withdisapproval, empered, erhaps,

with

ynicism. he legitimatedeology s centripetal.

There remainmisunderstandings.he kind of functionalism

I

espouse

eems o

be elusive

o many nthropologists-possibly

because we have

taken oo muchfrom adcliffe-Brown'snter-

pretation

f

Durkheim, oo littlefrom urkheim's wn work.

(I

have not

read Coult's article; will do so.) Why s decision

making n politics nhibited y solidarity? t is anomie that

often

eaves the

ndividual, olitician r otherwise,n a position

wherein ecisions re difficulto make (apart, perhaps,from

the

decision o take one's ife).

According o Kurtz, my position n the two typesof asym-

metrical

eciprocity-that hey are incompatible nd act as

impedimentso one another-hampers he analysis f process.

But I

discussprocessrepeatedly.Within he centrifugalype,

for nstance, take up the rise

of

dominant

tatus groups nd

the rise of the state in the West. Kurtz and I must mean

differenthings y the term

'process."~

My use of the concepts

put forward ere is intended o

supplement

ork uch as Bailey's,

not to substitute

or t.

I

intendthe

concepts

to help

us

discern

distinctions

mong

cultures

within

which

different

stratagems"

may be

more

effectively

mployed.

The comments

by

Wrong

make a number

of

important

pointsbut

many of

them o

briefly

hat I have difficulty

n

grasping

is

fullmeaning.

have

discussed ne

of them

arlier,

where

foundhim

argely

orrect.

emphatically

ispute

his

contention

hat

mydefinition

s too narrow-that,

or

nstance,

reciprocity

xists

even in the most coercive

and

absolutist

regimes. is referenceo Simmeldoes not clarify hematter.

Simmel

merely

tates

that

such

regimes

lways allow

their

subjects

at least some

personal

freedom,

owever ittle.

The

coercive

uthority

n such cases

gives nothing; t simply

re-

frains

rom

too much?)

killing

nd

allows a

small quantity

f

spontaneity,

or

whicht extracts

price.

n such

ircumstances,

gratitude

or

hefavor

estowed-the

"gift"

f refraining

rom

murder?-is

unlikely;

fear produces

obedience.

The

conse-

quences

re thoroughly

ifferent

rom hose

we have

discussed.

My response

mustbe the same

as that

made

to Kurtz:

it is

a

differentnd

complex

opic,

one that

I hope

to discuss

at

a

later date (after

having

read

Wrong's

book,

I might

dd).

Even

ifwe construe

oercive

egimes

s entailing

omereciproc-

ity, hey re

not relevant

or

hisparticular

iscussion,

which

entails the belief hatreciprocitys asymmetrical.f cases

of

this

sort are to be included,

he

subjects

would

believe

they

receive

more

from heir overeign

han they

give

to him-a

most

mprobable

elief n

coercive

egimes.

Wrong

suggests

we broaden the concept

yet

further

nd

include

ruler's ymbolic

ifts

nder

symmetrical

eciprocity.

I briefly iscuss

the

kind

of ruler

who is

believed

to bestow

rain,

o

maintain

eneral

well-being

y

virtue

fhis

own

bodily

well-being,

o sustain

nd

symbolize

ociety

tself.

hese

rulers

are

not

ooked

upon

as

lordswere ookedupon

by

their

assals

or

as a

Melanesian

big

man" was viewed

by

his constituency.

They are

conceived

as

extraordinary,

odlike

givers.

The

attitudes

generally

nvolve

awe;

the ideology

s routinized

charisma.

f we

so wish,

t is

almost

always possible

to find

some resemblances

mong

things;

hus

we may

classify

hem

underthe same heading,perhapsto form gradient.Yet I

believe

t far more

profitable

o draw

boundaries-not

arbi-

trarily,

ut

on the basis

of both

the

differences

e find

mong

phenomena

nd

the probable

effects

f

those

differences.

or

instance,

outinized

harisma ntails

different

eliefs

nd feel-

ings

from

those

involved

in

asymmetrical

eciprocity.

n

centrifugality

he leader

s

one's

creditor,

uman

ike

oneself.

His authority

s sustainedby

credit,

not

charisma.

And

the

effects

f

the

two

deologies

iffer.

he size

of the

population

subject

to each

kind

of leader

affects

im

in

opposite

ways.

Routinized

harisma

s

strengthened

hen he eader

s but

one

among

multitude;

entrifugality

s weakened

when he

eader

has

so

many

debtors

that he

is,

like the

Internal

Revenue

Service,depersonalized.

f we

classify

ocial

phenomena

s

I

suggest,we can more readilyformulateestable disconfirm-

able) hypotheses.

have discussed

his

topic

at

greater

ength

elsewhere

Orenstein

971).

It eludes me

why

Wrong

views asymmetrical

eciprocity

s

a feature

of social

structure

ather

than

an

ideology.

It

appears,

ometimes,

hat

he well

understands

hat

mean

by

asymmetrical

eciprocity-in

laces

even overemphasizing

ts

purely ognitive,

deological

ontent

in

the

symbolic

ift,

or

instance).

Yet elsewhere

e confounds

t with

ocial

structure

(orderly

nteraction,

uch

n the

manner fRadcliffe-Brown?).

I do

not.

The ideology

f Western

eudalism,

or

xample,

was

unequivocally

entrifugal,

s

Wrong ays.

In actual

relations

among nobles,

however,

t did not work that

way.

"Social

structure"

ntailed

ocial

and economic

haos, s I have

shown.

Whatwas there hat wouldbring ne to conceive t as in any

way centripetal?

Which ord

viewedhis

vassal as properly

is

creditor,

which vassal

viewed

his lord as

a debtor?

I

have

88

CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY

This content downloaded from 186.9.135.139 on Sun, 1 Sep 2013 10:52:54 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

7/23/2019 Asimetrica Reciprocidad.

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/asimetrica-reciprocidad 22/24

Orenstein:

SYMMETRICAL

RECIPROCITY

entioned ne possibility,he noble who became the

vassal of

his vassal.)

Wrong sserts hat

one-party entrifugal

tates nd

military

dictatorships

re often

ighly

nstable. he

latter

re,certainly

(Finer 1962),

but

single-party entrifugal tates, especially

those whose eaders believe

they

are

Marxists,may

well be

more table than

other

tates, ncluding

ew

democracies of

which here re so few).The leadershipn such new statesmay

well

be less cynical

nd

more edicated

han

ther uthoritarian

leaders, ossiblymore edicated han heir

emocratic

ounter-

parts. They believea highly ational ciencesupports hem.

Even

those

of

us

who think

Marxism

a

pseudo-science,

he

bulwark

f n authoritarianorm f

ocialism,

must

dmit hat

Marx put

forward

highly

ational

ystem-at

least as rational

as

the belief

n

an

original

ocial

compact that,

at one

time,

was the ubstantive heory ehind emocracyOrenstein 979).

Krader criticizesmy terminology: y referenceo Aristotle

should ightly e to

his

"commutative eciprocity" r, alterna-

tively, "commutative ustice," which, Krader says, would

render asymmetrical eciprocity" contradiction. he term

"commutative"

ppears

nowhere

n Aristotle. t is

Aquinas's,

interpretingristotle-anddoing o

in

a

manner

hat,with

he

exceptionof his treatment f barter, does not render my

usage a contradictionAquinas 1964[1271-72]:400-401, 18).

Reference o a saint moves me to contemplate he place

of faith in

anthropology.

Marx's often

quoted statement

(1884[1844]:42)regarding he medicinal roperties f religion

is, n fact, uotedout

of

context. t is preceded y the entence,

"Religion

s the

sigh

of

the oppressed reature,

he

heart

ofa

heartlessworld and the soul of a soulless condition."'Some

political eaders

and

some

of

theirfollowersmay be greatly

aided by this ortof faith, specially hose n the new nation-

states; a faiththe faithful ontemplate s the True Faith is

conceived y them s truth, ot faith. f anthropologistsver

require uch convictions-as Cooper and Ake seem to think-

our

requirements ay be, I fear, consequence f njunction.

Such

maybe

our

fate,

n

the ongrun.For thepresent, erhaps

fettered

y bourgeoisdeology, mayfail o recognize ecessity,

and, workingn short uns,withinwhat believe s theforesee-

able future, conceive of a numberof possible alternative

truths. am unsure. may be out of tep withhistory-not o

speak of "the kinds of resultswhich anthropology enerally

seeks." My conclusions, owever entative,may be "ideologi-

cally oaded." In thefinal nalysis, may be a living xemplifi-

cation of false consciousness, oping gainst others' hopes-

what have been the "objective" consequences f such hopes

thus

far-that the analysiswillnot be a Solution.

Referencesited

ANDERSON, ACK, nd C. KALVELAGE. 972. Americangovernment

(like t s). New York:

WarnerBooks.

AQUINAS, . 1964

1271-72).

Commentaryn theNicomachean

thics.

Vol. 1. Translated

by

C.

I.

Litzenger.Chicago:

HenryRegnery.

ARISTOTLE. 943.Nicomachean thics.

ranslatedby

J.

Wilson.

New

York:

Walter Black.

ARONSON,

AN R. 1976."Ethnicity as

a cultural ystem:An intro-

ductory

ssay," in Ethnicityn theAmericas.

Edited by

Frances

Henry,

pp. 9-19. The Hague: Mouton. [CSH]

BAILEY, F. G. 1969.

Stratagems nd spoils. New

York: Schocken

Books.

BALANDIER,

G. 1970. Political

anthropology.ranslated by A.

Sheridan

Smith.New York:

Pantheon.

1

Of

course,

Marx

and

Engels

have

generallv

been

antipathetic

o

religion, s

theyhave beento the social

and economic onditionwith

whichtheythink t necessarily ssociated,but those familiarwith

their

writings ouldanticipate

mbivalence.They also attacked

the

irreligiousntellectual

nd,

indeed,

viewed religion

n a way quite

similar

o that

of Durkheim Marx and

Engels 1964: 41, 71, 84).

BARNETT,H. G. 1959. Peace

and progress n New Guinea.

Amnerican

Anthropologist1: 1013-19.

BARTH,F. 1959. Political

eadershipmong

he watPathans.

London

School of Economicsand

Political Science Monographson Social

Anthropology 9.

BEIDELMAN, THOMAS 0.

1959. A comparativenalysis of

the

ajmani

system. ssociation

orAsian

Studies

Monograph8.

BENDIX, REINHARD. 1960.

Max Weber: An

intellectiual

ortrait.

GardenCity: Doubleday.

BERNARD, CHESTER. 1961.

"The theory f authority," n Thaeoriesf

society:Foundations fmodern ociological heory. dited by T.Parsons et al. Glencoe: FreePress.

BLOCH,

MARC. 1961.

Feiudal

society.Translated by L. Manyon.

London: Routledge nd Kegan Paul.

BOHANNAN,

L. 1952. A genealogical harter.Africa22:301-15.

BROOKE, C. 1963? Europe in the centralMiddle

Ages,

962-1154.

New York: Holt, Rinehart nd Winston.

BROWN, ELIZABETH. 1974.

The tyranny f a construct:Feudalism

and historians f

medieval Europe. American Historical Review

79:1063-88.

BROWN, PAULA. 1963. Fromanarchy to satrapy.

American

Anthro-

pologist 5: 1-15.

BURLING, ROBBINS.

1974.The passageofpower.New York: Academic

Press.

BURRIDGE,

K. 1960. Mambu:

A

Melanesianmillennium. ondon:

Methuen.

.1969. Tangu traditions.xford:ClarendonPress.

BURROWS,

E.

G.,

and

M.

E. SPIRO. 1953.An

atoll utlture:

thnography

of faluk n theCentral arolines. Behavior Science Monographs.)

New Haven: Human Relations AreaFiles.

CANCIAN,

F. 1968. "Functional

analysis of change," in Theory f

anthropology: soutrcebook.

dited

by

R.

Manners and D. Kaplan.

Chicago: Aldine.

CANTOR, NORMAN. 1963. Medieval

history.

ew

York: Macmillan.

CLASTRES,

P. 1977. Society

gainst he tate.Oxford:Basil Blackwell.

[JL]

COHEN, Y. A. 1969. Ends

and

means

in

political control: State

organization nd thepunishment

f

adultery, ncest, nd violations

of

celibacy.AmericanAnthropologist1:658-87. [DVK]

COHN, BERNARD

S.

1955.

The

changing

tatus of

a

depressed aste,"

in

Village ndia. Edited by M. Marriott. Chicago: University f

Chicago

Press.

COULT, A. 1966.

The

structuring

f

structure.

A

merican

A

nthro-

pologist 8:438-43. [DVK]

DE GRAZIA,

S.

1948. The politicalcommunity: study of anomie.

Chicago: University

f

Chicago

Press.

DRUCKER, PHILIP.

1937. The Tolowa

and their Southwest Oregon

kin.

Universityf California

ublications

n

Archaeology

nd

Ethnology

36:221-300.

Du BoIs, CORA. 1936.

"The

wealth

concept

s an

integrative

actor

in

Tolowa-Tututni

Culture,"

n

Essays

in

anthropologyresented

to A. L.

Kroeber.

erkeley:University

f

California

ress.

DUFF MISSIONARIES. 1799.

A

missionary oyage

o

the outhern

acific

Ocean

performed

n

the

years

1796,

1797,

1798 n

the

hip

Duff.

London:

T.

Chapman.

DURKHEIM,

E. 1939

(1895).

The rules

of sociological

method.

rans-

lated

by S. Solovay

and

J. Mueller.

Glencoe:

Free Press.

. 1947

(1893).

The division

of

abor

n

society.

ranslated

by

G.

Simpson.

Glencoe:

Free Press.

EPSTEIN, T. S.

1968.

Capitalism,

rimitive

nd modern.

Manchester:

ManchesterUniversity

ress.

EVANS-PRITCHARD,

E. E.

1940. The

political

ystem f

the

Anuak

of

the

Anglo-Egyptian

udan.

London

School

of

Economics

and

Political

Science

Monographs

n

Social

Anthropology

.

1947. Furtherobservations n the political systemof the

Anuak. Sudan

Notes nd Records

8:62-97.

FINER,

S.

E. 1962. The

man on

horseback:

he role

of

the

military

n

politics.

ondon:

Pall

Mall Press.

FIRTH,

R.

1959.

The economics

f

he

New

Zealand

Maori.

Wellington:

R.

E.

Owen,

Government rinter.

. 1964.

Essays

on

social

organization

nd

values.

London:

Athlone.

FRIEDRICH, CARL, 1968. Some

thoughts

n

the

relation

of

political

theory

to

anthropology.

American

Political Science Review

62:

536-45.

GANSHOF,

F.

L.

1964. Feudalism.

Translated

by

P.

Grierson.

New

York:

Harper

and

Row.

GLUCKMAN,

MAX.

1954. Rituals

of

rebellion

n South-East

Africa.

(Frazer Lecture,1952.)

Manchester:

Manchester

University

ress.

.

1956.

Custom

nd

conflict

n

Africa.

Oxford:

Basil Blackwell.

GOLDSCHMIDT,

W.

1951.

Ethics

and

the

structure

f

society:

An

ethnological ontributiono thesociology fknowledge.American

Anthropologist

3: 506-24.

GONZAL.EZ,

NANCIE . 1970.Social function f Carnival n a

Domini-

can city.Southwesternournal

fAnthropology6:328-42. [CSHI

Vol.

21

* No.

1 *

February

980

89

This content downloaded from 186.9.135.139 on Sun, 1 Sep 2013 10:52:54 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

7/23/2019 Asimetrica Reciprocidad.

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/asimetrica-reciprocidad 23/24

GOULDNER,

. 1960. The norm of

reciprocity:

preliminary tate-

ment.American

ociological

Review

5:161-78.

GREEN,

V. H. H. 1971. Medieval civilization

n Western

urope.

London:

Arnold.

HAY, DENYS. 1964.

Themedievalenturies.

ondon:

Methuen.

HOBHOUSE,

L.

T.

1951.

Morals in

evolution:

study

n

comparative

ethics.

ondon:

Chapman

and

Hull.

HOGBIN, IAN. 1939.

Experimentsn

civilization.

ondon:

Routledge

and Kegan

Paul.

-

. 1951.

Transformation

cene:

Thte hanging

ulture

f

a

New

Guinea

village.

ondon:

Routledge

nd

Kegan

Paul.

-

. 1963.

Kinship

and

marriage

n a

New

Guinea

village.

London:

Athlone.

-.

1964.A Guadalcanal ocie y:TheKaoka-speakers. ew York:

Holt,

Rinehart nd

Winston.

HOLZBERG, AROL . 1977. Social

stratification,

ultural

nationalism,

and political

conomy

n

Jamaica:

The

myths

f

development

nd

the

anti-White

bias.

Canadian

Review

of Sociology

nd Anthro-

pology

4:368-80.

[CSH]

HOMANS, . C. 1958. Social behavior s

exchange.American

ournal

ofSociology 2:597-606.

HUNTER, J.

1823. Memoirs

f

a

captivitymong

he ndians

of

North

America.London:

Longmans.

ISHWARAN,

K.

1966.

Tradition

nd

economy

n

village ndia.

London:

Routledge

nd

Kegan

Paul.

KAMMA, . C. 1970. 'A

spontaneous

capitalist'

revolution

n

the

Western

Vogelkop

area of West

Irian,"

in

Anniversaryontribu-

tions

o

anthropology,p.

132-42.

Leiden.

[JL]

KNOX,

ROBERT. 1911. An haistorical

elation f

Ceylon. Edited by

J.

Ryan. Glasgow: MacLehose.

KRADER,

LAWRENCE. 976.

Dialectic f civil society. ssen:

Van

Gorcum. [LK]

-

. 1979. Treatise

f

ocial labor.

Assen:

Van

Gorcum.

[LK]

KURTZ,

DONALD

V.

1978. "The

legitimation

f

the

Aztec state,"

in

The early tate.Edited

by H. J. M. Claessen and

P. Skalnik,

pp.

169-90.The

Hague: Mouton.

[DVKI

-.

n.d.

"The

legitimation

f

early

nchoate

tates,"

n The

study

of the state.Edited

by

H.

J.

M.

Claessen

and

P. Skalnfk.The

Hague:

Mouton.

n

press. [DVK]

LEACH, . R.

1954. Political ystemsf

highland urma.

Cambridge:

Harvard

University ress.

LEVI-STRAUSS, . 1961. Tristes

ropiques.ranslatedby

J.Russel.

New York:

Atheneum.

. 1969.

The

elementary

tructuires

f

kinshlip.

ranslated

by

J. H. Bell,

J.

R. von

Sturmer,nd R.

Needham.Boston: Beacon

Press.

LEWIs, 0.

Editor. 1958. Village

life in northern

ndia. Urbana:

University

f

llinois

Press.

LEwis, O., and V. BARNOUW.958."Caste and the ajmani systemin a North Indian village," in Village

life in northern

ndia.

Edited by 0. Lewis.

Urbana: University f

llinoisPress.

LIENHARDT,G. 1957. Anuak

village

headman. 1. Headman and

villageculture.Africa

17:341-55.

.

1958.

Anuak village headmen.

2. Village

structure nd

rebellion.

Africa

18:25-35.

MAGUBANE. . 1969. Pluralism

and

conflictituations

n Africa:

A

new look.African

ocial Research

:529-54. [CSH]

MAINE, SIR HENRY

SUMNER. 875. Lectures

n theearly history

f

institutions.

ondon:

John

Murray.

.

1876

(1871).

Village communitiesn the

East and West.

London:

John

Murray.

-

.

1883.

Dissertations n

early

aw

and

custom.

ondon:

John

Murray.

. 1954

(1861). Ancient

aw.

London:

OxfordUniversity ress.

MAIR, L. P.

1964. Primitive overnment.

armondsworth:

enguin

Books.

MALINOWSKI,. 1922. Argonauts f theWestern acific. London:

Routledge

and

Kegan

Paul.

MANDELBAUM,. G.

1940. ThePlains Cree.

AmericanMuseum of

Natural

HistoryAnthropological

ublications 7(2).

1970.

Society n India.

Berkeley nd Los

Angeles:University

of

California

ress.

MANNHEIM, . 1936.

Ideology nd utopia.

Translated by L. Wirth

and

E.

Shils.

New

York: Harcourt,Brace.

MAQUET,

J. J.1961.

Thepremisef nequalityn

Ruanda. London:

Oxford

University ress.

MARX,

KARL.

1884

(1844).

Critique fHegel's

philosophy fright.

Translatedby A.

Jolin and J. O'Malley.

Cambridge:

Cambridge

University

ress.

MARX,K., and F.

ENGELS.1964.

On religion.ew York:

Schocken.

(Reprinted

from

the 1957

edition,

Moscow: Foreign

Languages

PublishingHouse.)

MATTINGIY,

. 1957.Roman

mperialivilization.

Jondon:

rnold.

MAUSS,M.

1954(1925).The ift.ranslatedby I.

Cunnison.

London:

Cohen and West.

MEGGITT,M. J.1965. The lineage

ystem f theMae Enga of

Newu

Guinea. ondon:Oliver and

Boyd.

MERTON, R. S. 1949. Social theory nd social

structure.

lencoe:

Free Press.

MURDOCK, G. P. 1949. Social structure.

ew York: Macmillan.

NORBECK, E. 1963. African rituals

of

conflict.

AmericanAnthro-

pologist 5:1254-79.

OLIVER, DOUGLAS.

1955. A Solomon Island society. Cambridge:

Harvard University ress.

ORANS, MARTIN. 1965. The Santal: A

tribe n search f a great radi-

tion. Detroit: Wayne University ress.

ORENSTEIN, H. 1962a.

Exploitation r function n the nterpretation

of

ajmani. Southwestern

ournal fAnthropology8:302-16.

. 1962b.

Review of: A comparativenalysis of the

ajmani

system, y

T.

Beidelman

(Association

for

Asian Studies

Mono-

graph 8). AmericanAnthropologist4:633-35.

. 1965. Gaon:

Conflict nd cohesion n an Indian

village.

Princeton: rincetonUniversity ress.

-

.

1968.

The

ethnological heories

f Henry SumnerMaine.

American

Anthiropologist

0:264-67.

-

. 1971.

Accumulation

nd

disjunction

n ethnographic ethod.

Human Organization

0:267-76.

-

.

1979.

Whosoever

f

you

will be the chiefest,musthe be the

servant

of

all?: On the dearth of

Third World democracies.MS.

PARKES, HENRY B. 1970. The divineorder:Western ulture n the

Middle Ages and

theRenaissance. ondon:VictorGollancz.

PARSONS,

T. 1937.

The tructuref ocialaction.New York:

McGraw-

Hill.

POSPISIL, L. 1958a. Kapauku Paputans nd their aw. New

Haven:

Yale Universityress.

. 1958b. Social change

and

primitive

aw: Consequences

of a

Papuan

legalcase. AmericanAnthropologist

0: 832-37.

.

1963a.

Kapauku Papuan

economics.New Haven:

Yale

University ress.

-. 1963b. The

Kapauku Papuans of West

New Guinea.

New

York: Holt,Rinehart nd Winston.

[JL]

REAY, MARIE. 1959. The Kuma. Melbourne:

Melbourne University

Press,

RICHARDS, AUDREY

I.

1939. Land,

laboutr,nd diet n northernho-

desia.

London:

OxfordUniversity

ress.

RODRIGUEZ, MAXIMA. 1919 (1774).

"

Daily narrative kept by the

interpreterMaxima Rodriguez at the

island of Amat,otherwise

Otahiti,

n

the

year

1774,"

in

The quest nd occupation f

Tahiti

by

emissaries

f

Spain . . , 1772-1776,vol. 3. Edited

by B. G.

Corney.

London:

Hakluyt Society.

ROSMAN, ABRAHAM,

nd

PAULA RUBEL. 1970. Potlatch

and

sagali:

The

structureof exchange in Haida

and Trobriand societies.

Transactions f theNew York A cademy

f Sciences, Series2,

32:

732-42. [EC]

-

. 1971. Feasting

with

mine enemy. New

York: Columbia

University ress. [EC]

ROSTOVTZEFF,

M.

1960. Rome.

Translated by J.

D. Duff.

London:

Oxford

University

ress.

RUBIN,

VERA. 1960. Discussion

of M.

G. Smith's

social

and cultural

pluralism." Annals of theNew York

Academy f Sciences83:780-

85.

[CSH]

RYAN, BRYCE. 1953.Caste n modern eylon.

ew Brunswick: Rutgers

University ress.

SAHLINS, M. 1962. Moala: Cultutrend

natutren a Fijian

Island.

Ann

Arbor:University

fMichiganPress.

.

1963. Poor

man,

rich

man, big-man,

hief:Political

types

n

Melanesia and Polynesia. Comparative tuidies

n

Society

and

History

: 285-303.

.

1965.

"On the sociology

of

primitive xchange,"

in

The

relevance fmodels or social anthropology.

dited by M.

Banton.

London: Tavistock.

SALISBURY, RICHARD F. 1962. Fromstone

o

steel.

Melbourne:

Mel-

bourne

University

ress.

.

1964. Despotismand Australian dministrationn theNew

Guinea

highlands.

AmericanAnthropologist

6:225-39.

. 1970. Vienamami:Economictransformation

n

a traditional

society.

erkeley

nd Los

Angeles:

University

f California

ress.

SCHUMPETER,

J.

A. 1951.

mperialism

nd socialclasses.

Translated

by

H.

Norden. Oxford:Blackwell.

SEIGNOBOS,

CHARLES.

1912.

The

feudalregime.

ranslated

by

E. W.

Daw.

New

York: HenryHolt.

SHARP,

L.

1952.

"Steel

axes for

Stone

Age Australians,"

n

human

problems n

technologicalhange.

Edited

by

E.

H.

Spicer.

New

York:

Russell Sage.

SHERIF,

M.

1952.

"Group

influence

n

the

formation

f

norms

nd

attitudes,"

in

Readings

in

social psychology.

dited

by

G.

E.

Swanson,

T.

M.

Newcomb,

and

E. L.

Hartley,

t

al.

New

York:

Henrv

Holt.

SHILS,

E.

1965. Charisma, order,

nd status.

American

ociological

Review 0: 199-213.

SIMMEL, GEORG.

1950 (1908). The sociology

f Georg immel.Trans-

lated by K. Wolff.Glencoe: Free Press.

SMITH,

M. G. 1965.

Thle

plural society n the British West ndies.

Berkeley:University f California ress.

[CSH]

90

CURRENT

ANTHROPOLOGY

This content downloaded from 186.9.135.139 on Sun, 1 Sep 2013 10:52:54 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

7/23/2019 Asimetrica Reciprocidad.

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/asimetrica-reciprocidad 24/24

Orenstein:

SYMMETRICAL

RECIPROCITY

RINIVAS, M. N. 1955. "The social system

f a Mysore village,"

in

VillageIndia.

Edited

by

M. Marriott. Chicago: University

f

ChicagoPress.

-.

1959.

The

dominant aste in Rampura. AmericanAnthro-

pologist

1:1-16.

.

1966. Social change

n modern ndia. Berkeleyand

Los

Angeles:University

f California ress.

STEPHENSON, CARL.

1942. Medieval eudalism. thaca: Cornell

Uni-

versity

ress.

STRAYER, JOSEPH

R. 1970. On themedieval rigins f hemodern

tate.

Princeton:

rincetonUniversity

ress.

STRAYER, JOSEPH,

and D.

C.

NUNRO.

1959. The MiddleAges:

359-

1500. New

York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.

TAYLOR, HENRY

0.

1914. The medievalmind:A historyf he evelop-

ment

f

hought

nd emotionn theMiddleAges.London: Macmillan.

THOMAS,

ELIZABETH MARSHALL. 1958. The harmless eople.

New

York:

Vintage.

THURNWALD, RICHARD. 1932. Economics

n primitive ommunities.

London:

OxfordUniversity

ress.

TITIEV, M.

1971. Some aspects

of

lowning

mong heHopi Indians,"

in

Themes

n culture. dited by

M.

Zamora,

M. Mahar, and H.

Orenstein.

Manila:

University

f

Philippines

ress.

T6NNIES, F. 1940. Fundamentaloncepts

f sociology. ranslated

by

C. P.

Loomis. New York:

AmericanBook

Co.

TRAINOR, JOHN. 1972. Scordatura: ts origin

nd

development.

he

Strad

83(985):25-33.

WARNER,

W.

L., and

P. S. LUNT.

1941. The

social

lifeof

a

modern

community.

Yankee

City Series

1.) New

Haven: Yale

University

Press.

WEBER, MAX.

1947a

(1922). The

theory

f

ocial

and

economic

rgani-

zation.

Translated

by A. Henderson

nd

T.

Parsons.

New

York:

Oxford

University

ress.

--. 1947b

(1906-24).

From Max

Weber:

Essays in

sociology.

Translated

by

H.

Gerth and

C.

Mills.

London:

Kegan

Paul,

Trench,

Trubner.

--. 1954

(1922).

Max

Weber

on law in

economy

nd

society.

Translated by E. Shils; edited by M. Rheinstein.Cambridge:HarvardUniversityress.

---

.1968

(1922).

Economy

nd

society.

vols.Edited

by

Guenther

Roth and

Claus

Wittich.

otowa,

N.J.:

Bedminster

ress.

[DHW]

WESTERMARCK, EDWARD.

1908. The

origin nd

development

f moral

ideas.

London:

Macmillan.

WEYER,

E.

M. 1967.

The

structuref

ocial

organization

mong he

Eskimo," in

Comparative

olitical

ystems.

dited

by

R.

Cohen

and

J.

Middleton.

Garden

City:

Natural

HistoryPress.

WRONG,

DENNIS

H.

1970.

Max

Weber.

Englewood

Cliffs:

rentice-

Hall.

[DHW]

-

. 1979.

Power:

ts

forms,

ases, nd uses.New York:

Harper

and

Row.

[DHW]

Institutions

* The

NTERNATIONAL

WORK GROUP

FOR

INDIGENOUS

AFFAIRS

was founded en years

go by

a

groupof anthropologistss a

nonprofit, onpolitical rganization.

ts

objectives

from

he

start were to publicize the

situation

f

oppressed ndigenous

peoples and

to

fosterworldwide

onsciousness

f the

dangers

that threaten

hese

peoples.

Another

bjectivewas

to

help

and

support he ndigenous

eoples'

own

organizations.

To

achieve these

goals,

the

IWGIA has

published,

s

of

December 1978, 36 documents written

by internationally

known

nthropologists,urists, ditors, nd

investigatorsnd

representatives f

indigenous groups-all individuals

who

throughheirworkhavebeen n closecontactwith ndigenous

peoples

nd

are

deeply

oncerned

bout their ituation.

everal

of these

documents

ave

been

the

first o

reveal some of

the

shocking

conditions

prevailing nd have thus contributed

substantially

o

the international ebate

on

measures o

be

taken

n

defence f oppressed

ndigenous roups.

Needless

o

say,

much

more

must

be

done,

s

the

ituation

f

indigenous

eoples

s

everyday moredesperate.

ublic debate

must

be

intensifiedo such an extent s to

put international

politicalpressure n the

governmentsoncerned. or this

to

be

accomplished,

continuous

low of reliable information

must

reach s manypeople as possible.

More

IWGIA subscribers

ot

only would

mean

that

its

documents ouldreach

more

people and that

t

could produce

more fthem, ut also wouldgive t a strong inancial ase for

its

continuing ork

towards nternational ecognition f the

rights

f

the Fourth

World.Subscription ates re U.S. $12 for

individuals, 24

for

nstitutions,nd include

both documents

and

newsletters. heques should

be made payable to IWGIA,

Frederiksholmsanal

4A,

1220

Copenhagen , Denmark.

*

The

Cuzco

CENTER FOR ANDEAN STUDIES

(see CA 20: 80) an-

nounces

n international

ummer chool or 980.The program

is

addressed o scholars

and students nterestedn acquiring

deeper

nsight nto the people of the

Andean region. t offers

tenweeks f classes-June 1 through ugust 5-supportedby

visits o nca and pre-Inca uins, ontemporaryeasantvillages,

and mportant istoricalites n the area and attendance t fes-

tivities nd ceremonials.ome classeswillbe taught n English

while thers, rimarilyoward he end of the program, ill be

taught n Spanish.Attendance t the ntensive panishcourse

offeredhould enable the student o speak basic Spanish by

the end of the firstmonth.The cost of the program s U.S.

$1,800;

this includes

tuition,

ocal

transportation,

nd

food

and lodging uring ours utsideCuzco. Room and board will

cost an additional 1,200. nternational ransportationan be

arranged at lower than normal rates through he Center.

Optional two-week ours, t a cost that will vary

with the

number f students nrolled, re planned for the end of the

summer o the centralAndean highlands, o Lake Titicaca,

and to the headwaters f the Amazon.For furthernformation

and application forms, lease write: International ummer

School 1980, Centro

de

Estudios Andinos, Apartado 582,

Cuzco,

Peru.

*

The

ANTHROPOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES

(UGNAYNANG PANG-AGHAMTAo) has

lined up

a number

of

activities or

1979-80. Preparatory o its third

nnual

confer-

ence,

with he theme The Filipino nd His Changing

nviron-

ment," to be held April 21-27, 1980, at Mindanao State

University,

Marawi

City,

several

study groups

have

been

organized n various regionsof the country. ach group

s

addressing tself o issues of environmentalntegritynd the

quality

f

ife n the Philippines. he results f

these

nvestiga-

tions

will

onstitute he

mainpapers o be presented uring

he

conference. he firstvolume of the Association's ournal,

Aglhamlao,

s now in

press.

A

newsletter, esigned

o

be a

vehicle for

the immediate haring of information

n the

activities

f

anthropologistsnd anthropologicalnstitutions

n

thePhilippines,

s

nowbeing repared. ommunicationsegard-

ing the Associationmay be sent to Ponciano L. Bennagen,

Department

f

Anthropology, niversity f the Philippines,

Diliman,Quezon City,

The

Philippines.

Vol. 21

-

No. 1 * February 980

91