Post on 27-Jun-2020
Agosto 2009
P E R S P E C T I V A S E C O N Ó M I C A S I N T E R N A C I O N A L E S : I M P U L S O S C Í C L I C O S V S . C A R G A S E S T R U C T U R A L E S
Vladimir WerningDirector Ejecutivo212-834-4144vladimir.werning@jpmorgan.com
IX Seminario de Proyecciones Económicas 2009 – Amcham Chile / El Mercurio
ST
RIC
TL
YP
RIV
AT
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ND
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V L A D I M I R W E R N I N G 2 1 2 8 3 4 4 1 4 4
Agenda
• El proceso de normalización: “plata dulce” y “dulces sueños”
• Tomando el pulso a la recuperación: “La codicia” con fundamento- Proyección: Crecimiento por encima del consenso (2H y 2010)- Luz verde: Pedidos de seguro de desempleo- Contornos: ciclo de inventarios, motores auxiliares y produccion vs. consumo- Perspectiva: variables, demanda final y crecimiento potencial, desbalances
• Riesgos estructurales de recaída: “Los miedos” con atenuantes- Continuo desapalancamiento (mercado inmobiliario)- Proliferación de bancos “muertos vivos” (limitaciones crediticias)- Sobre-ajuste de ahorro (mercado laboral deprimido)- Insolvencia fiscal y monetizacion (riesgo soberano y crowding out)
• Riesgos ciclicos de recaída: los “miedos” de mercado- Alza del precio del petróleo- Alza de tasas largas de interés
• Riesgos inflacionarios- Brechas de capacidad dominan preocupcaciones sobre monetizacion- Deflacion de bienes pero no de materias primas- Debate sobre estrategia de salida de QE- Proyección: tasas de politica monetaria
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V L A D I M I R W E R N I N G 2 1 2 8 3 4 4 1 4 4
Proceso de normalización financiera: “plata dulce”
Ben Bernanke
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0
350
700
1050
1400
1750
2100
2450
Jul 07 Dec 07 Jun 08 Dec 08 Jun 09
$mil millonesBalance de la Fed por tipo de activos
Programas de liquidez
Activos totales
Títulos
V L A D I M I R W E R N I N G 2 1 2 8 3 4 4 1 4 4
Proceso de normalización económica: “dulces sueños”
Larry Summers
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Tomando el pulso a la recuperación: proyecciones de crecimiento
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Real GDP Real GDP% over a year ago % over previous period, saar
2008 2009 2010 4Q08 1Q09 2Q09 3Q09 4Q09 1Q10 2Q10The AmericasUnited States 0.4 -2.6 3.0 -5.4 -6.4 -1.0 3.0 2.5 3.0 4.0Latin America 3.8 -3.1 4.2 -8.9 -10.1 -0.3 8.2 3.5 4.3 4.4
Argentina 6.8 -3.0 2.0 -2.0 0.2 -6.0 0.0 -4.0 6.0 6.0Brazil 5.1 -0.4 4.5 -13.8 -3.3 7.0 5.5 4.0 4.0 5.0Chile 3.2 -1.5 4.3 -7.9 -2.5 -2.5 7.0 6.0 4.0 3.5Colombia 2.5 -0.5 3.0 -5.9 0.9 0.0 0.8 2.1 3.5 4.3Ecuador 6.5 -2.0 0.5 -1.0 -6.3 -4.0 -4.0 0.0 1.5 2.5Mexico 1.3 -6.5 5.0 -9.8 -21.5 -4.0 15.5 5.0 5.0 4.0Peru 9.8 1.7 5.4 -1.2 -6.2 -0.5 13.0 9.0 3.0 4.1Venezuela 4.8 -2.5 1.5 1.4 -9.3 -4.0 -2.0 0.0 2.0 3.5
Asia/PacificJapan -0.7 -5.4 2.5 -13.5 -14.2 4.5 3.5 3.5 3.0 -0.5Asia ex. Japan 5.8 3.9 6.8 -5.2 2.7 11.3 7.5 6.6 6.4 6.9
China 9.0 8.4 9.0 1.9 8.3 14.9 9.5 9.0 8.7 8.7Hong Kong 2.4 -2.6 5.3 -7.4 -16.1 13.9 9.0 5.0 4.2 4.0India 6.1 6.2 7.2 2.3 6.4 3.9 6.5 7.5 8.0 9.4Indonesia 6.1 3.5 4.5 1.5 5.4 3.8 3.0 2.0 5.0 6.0Korea 2.2 -1.1 3.9 -18.8 0.5 9.7 4.0 3.5 3.5 3.5Malaysia 4.6 -3.0 4.4 -10.1 -15.1 10.0 6.1 4.5 1.6 4.9Philippines 3.8 1.3 5.0 1.1 -8.9 8.0 6.0 6.0 5.0 4.0Singapore 1.1 -2.8 4.9 -16.4 -14.6 20.4 7.8 2.0 0.4 4.1Taiwan 0.1 -3.8 5.0 -23.8 -3.4 12.8 8.0 5.0 4.3 3.5
EuropeEuro area 0.6 -3.6 2.7 -6.9 -9.7 -0.4 3.0 2.5 3.0 3.0United Kingdom 0.7 -4.4 1.9 -7.0 -9.3 -3.2 1.0 2.5 2.0 2.5Emerging Europe 4.1 -5.2 3.0 -9.0 -18.8 1.3 4.5 4.8 3.1 2.6
Global 1.3 -2.6 3.3 -7.0 -7.5 1.3 3.7 3.2 3.4 3.4Developed markets 0.4 -3.4 2.7 -7.2 -8.5 -0.1 2.8 2.7 2.9 2.8Emerging markets 4.9 0.5 5.4 -6.6 -3.7 6.6 7.1 5.4 5.4 5.6
V L A D I M I R W E R N I N G 2 1 2 8 3 4 4 1 4 4
Tomando el pulso a la recuperación: optimismo justificado
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Tomando el pulso a la recuperación: El impulso del ciclo de inventarios
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90
95
100
105
110
70
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90
100
110
120
130
Indice, Enero 07=100Nivel de inventarios
2007 2008 2009
Corea Taiwan
EEUU Japón
V L A D I M I R W E R N I N G 2 1 2 8 3 4 4 1 4 4
Tomando el pulso a la recuperación: el gran sobre-ajuste de oferta y la fuerte expansión industrial pendiente
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115
Indice, Enero00-Marzo09 promedio=100Producción industrial y proxy de ventas finales globales
00 02 04 06 08
J.P.Morgan proxy de ventas final
Producción industrial
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
-30
-24
-18
-12
-6
0
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12
18
Ratio, saIndice JPM de confianza empresarial global y producción industrial l b l %3m/3m, saar
99 01 03 05 07 09
Producción industrial
globalPMI - órdenes/
inventarios
V L A D I M I R W E R N I N G 2 1 2 8 3 4 4 1 4 4
Tomando el pulso a la recuperación: los motores auxiliares
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Tomando el pulso a la recuperación: aumento del contraste entre el eslabón fuerte y el eslabón debil en 3T
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Tomando el pulso a la recuperación: un eslabon inesperado
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Poniendo el ciclo en perspectiva: No todo lo que brilla es oro
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Sostenibilidad
de los
estimulos
Sinceramiento
de los
ajustes
Magnitud
de los
rebotes
V L A D I M I R W E R N I N G 2 1 2 8 3 4 4 1 4 4
Poniendo el ciclo en perspectiva: la cuerda dura hasta el inicio del 2010
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-50
-40
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-10
0
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%3m, saarVentas globales
2007 20092006 2008
VG = -1.3 + 0.8*vtas minoristas + 0.4*G3 Envios bs de capital
Envíos de bienes de capital G-3
Ventas globales
Ventas minoristas
V L A D I M I R W E R N I N G 2 1 2 8 3 4 4 1 4 4
Poniendo el ciclo en perspectiva: un camino prometedor, un destino algo menos
EEUU: Proyecciones
4q/4q; %ch saar, except where noted1996-2000 2001-2002 2003-2007 2008-2009 2010-2012
Real GDP:
Actual 4.0 1.1 2.9 -0.9 3.5
Potential 3.2 3.6 2.7 2.5 2.1
Unemployment rate (% pa, avg)
Actual 4.6 5.3 5.2 7.4 8.5
NAIRU 5.0 4.8 4.8 5.5 6.0
Core PCE 1.5 1.9 2.1 1.5 0.6
Fed funds rate (%pa, avg) 5.5 2.8 3.1 1.1 0.7
Fiscal budget (% of GDP pa, avg) 0.6 -0.1 -2.6 -10.3 -6.5
Cyclically adjusted deficit -0.3 -0.1 -2.0 -8.7 -5.4
Crecimiento potencial
% point change per year, overall economy1975-1995 1996-2002 2003-2008 2009-2012
Potential growth 3.0 3.3 2.7 2.1
Potential labor productivity
Total economy 1.2 2.2 1.8 1.3
Nonfarm business 1.5 2.7 2.0 1.6
Potential hours worked: 1.7 1.1 0.9 0.8
Memo:
Working age population 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.1
Labor force participation rate 0.4 0.0 -0.1 0.0
Nonresidential capital stock 2.9 3.3 1.8 1.4
Lo bueno…
… lo malo…… y lo feo
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Financiación = Estado mercantilista (soberanía)
Financiación = Estado mercantilista (soberanía)Originación = Estado
sobre-protector (garantías)
Originación = Estado
sobre-protector (garantías)
Distribución = Estado permisivo (desregulación)Distribución = Estado permisivo (desregulación)
WALL ST. Investment BanksMAIN ST.
Commercial Banks
BEIJING Central Bank
WASHINGTON DC
Government Supported Entities
Poniendo el ciclo en perspectiva: persisten los desbalances globales
V L A D I M I R W E R N I N G 2 1 2 8 3 4 4 1 4 4
Riesgo estructural de recaída 1: Espiral vicioso de desapalancamiento e insolvencia y necesidad de recapitalizacion bancaria
Nouriel Rubini
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Riesgo estructural de recaída 1: Espiral vicioso de desapalancamiento e insolvencia
1Q 82 TodayCredit market debt as % of GDP 167.4% 370.4%Equities as % of household net worth 13.5% 23.6%Federal Debt as % of GDP 26.8% 44.8%Federal deficit as % of GDP 4.1% 12.4%Financial sector debt as % of GDP 21.9% 121.2%Household debt as % of GDP 47.5% 97.3%Household debt service ratio 10.7% 13.9%Household liquidity as % of liabilities 112.8% 54.0%Mortgage debt as % disposable income 42.7% 98.1%Mortgage debt as % of GDP 31.6% 73.6%
Personal savings rate 11.6% 4.2%10-year US Treasury 14.3% 3.1%Fed Funds 14.2% 0.2%Annual CPI 7.6% 0.0%
Shiller P/10Yr EPS 7.3x 15.3xSPX Dividend Yield 5.8% 3.1%
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Riesgo estructural de recaída 1: El “efecto dominó” tiene limites
Inventarios estabilizados Ventas estabilizadas
Costo financiero bajo Construcción inferior a demanda inercial
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Riesgo estructural de recaída 2: Los bancos “muertos vivos” y la fata de credito
Wilhem Buiter
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Barney Frank
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Riesgo estructural de recaída 3: Los bancos “muertos vivos” y la fata de credito
Gasto en viviendas nuevas y credito hipotecario
%oya, first year after recessionsRecession Spending Mortgage debt
1969-1970 36.0 8.2
1973-1975 57.0 10.8
1981-1982 39.6 8.3
1990-1991 33.3 7.0
2001 21.3 13.3
Gasto en bienes de consumo durable y credito al consumo
%oya, first year after recessionsRecession Spending Consumer credit
1969-1970 23.6 11.7
1973-1975 24.6 4.6
1981-1982 21.2 12.1
1990-1991 5.2 -1.1
2001 -1.2 5.7
Una recuperación sin credito no sería una novedad
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Riesgo estructural de recaída 4: Las crisis bancarias suelen terminar en un sobre-ajuste de la tasa de ahorro
400
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600
650-3
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%EEUU tasa de ahorro y ratio riqueza a ingreso
%
60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00 05
AhorroRatio
Ken Rogoff
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Riesgo estructural de recaída 4: El sobre-ajuste ya puede haber transcurrido
Medición en tiempo real sufre subestimaciones
Medidas alternativas sugieren que mayor sobre-ajuste ya es realidad
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Riesgo estructural de recaída 4: El sobre-ajuste ya puede haber transcurrido
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Riesgo estructural de recaída 2: insolvencia fiscal
John Taylor
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Riesgo estructural de recaída 2: insolvencia fiscal ?
Larry Summers
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Riesgo estructural de recaída 2: insolvencia fiscal ?
China sigue comprando activos de EEUU(pero cambio la composición)… y por ende, USD
Evidente desfasaje de oferta y demanda (pero “crowding out” no impacta en lo
inmediato: inversión privada baja)
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V L A D I M I R W E R N I N G 2 1 2 8 3 4 4 1 4 4
Riesgo cíclico de recaída 1: suba del precio de petroleo
Demanda efectiva
Anticipacion de demanda futura
Shock de oferta
Suba de WTI
Positivo
Riesgo recesivo
Impacto recesivo
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Riesgo cíclico de recaída 2: Suba de tasas
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Ben Bernanke
Diferencial de tasa corporativo EEUU y emisiones de deuda
V L A D I M I R W E R N I N G 2 1 2 8 3 4 4 1 4 4
Debate inflacionario: emisión descontrolada vs. holgura gigantezca en las economías desarrolladas…
Milton Friedman
John Maynard Keynes
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Debate inflacionario: percepcion exagerada de monetizacion del deficit
$ mil millon
Bonos Consumidor Activos
UST Deuda (MBS) (ABS) TALF bancos PPIP
Limite 300 200 1500 1000 1000
Total 212 102 673 17 0
Banco Central 212 102 537
Tesoro 0 0 136 17
Pendiente 88 98 827 983 1000
Emsion neta esp (mayo-dic) 681 200 330 … …
Credito
Bancos de Desarrollo
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Debate inflacionario: riesgo inmediato sigue siendo la deflacion
Paul Krugman
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Debate inflacionario: Evidencia histórica apunta a riesgo deflacionario
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Debate inflacionario: (… y en economias emergentes… precios de materias primas)
Consumer price Phillips curve, developed economies
Regression of %q/q saar headline inflation (t-stats in parentheses)
Constant 0.50 1.00 0.16
(1.31) (2.53) (0.38)
WTI, t 0.06 0.05 0.05
(3.17) (3.22) (3.05)
Agric, t-1 0.02 0.03 0.02
(1.45) (1.63) (1.36)
Agric, t-2 0.03 0.03 0.03
(1.57) (1.74) (1.65)
Res util, t-2 0.39 0.46
(2.06) (2.52)
GDP, t-1 0.05 0.10
(0.71) (1.76)
Core CPI (%oya), t-6 0.63 0.34 0.68
(3.69) (2.49) (3.96)
Adj R-square 0.48 0.46 0.49
Note: 1991-2008 sample period.
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Debate inflacionario: Futura normalización de politica monetaria (gradual vs. mayor simetría con respecto al relajamiento)
Fred Mishkin
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Debate inflacionario: Tasas bajas por un periodo prolongado… con algunas diferenciaciones
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Change from Forecast
Official interest rate Current Aug '07 (bp) Last change Next meeting next change Sep 09 Dec 09 Mar 10 Jun 10 Dec 10
Global GDP-weighted average 1.33 -338 1.31 1.31 1.33 1.36 1.45
excluding US GDP-weighted average 1.90 -253 1.88 1.87 1.90 1.94 2.07
The Americas GDP-weighted average 0.75 -484 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.76 0.77
United States Federal funds rate 0.125 -512.5 16 Dec 08 (-87.5bp) 23 Sep 09 on hold 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125
Canada Overnight funding rate 0.25 -425 21 Apr 09 (-25bp) 10 Sep 09 on hold 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Brazil SELIC overnight rate 8.75 -275 22 Jul 09 (-50bp) 2 Sep 09 on hold 8.75 8.75 8.75 8.75 8.75
Mexico Repo rate 4.50 -275 17 Jul 09 (-25bp) 21 Aug 09 on hold 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50
Chile Discount rate 0.50 -500 9 Jul 09 (-25bp) 10 Sep 09 2Q 10 (+50bp) 0.50 0.50 0.50 1.00 3.50
Colombia Repo rate 4.50 -475 19 Jun 09 (-50bp) 28 Aug 09 on hold 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50
Peru Reference rate 1.25 -350 6 Aug 09 (-75bp) 10 Sep 09 on hold 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25
Europe/Africa GDP-weighted average 1.45 -314 1.40 1.39 1.41 1.46 1.58
Euro area Refi rate 1.00 -300 7 May 09 (-25bp) 3 Sep 09 on hold 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
United Kingdom Repo rate 0.50 -525 5 Mar 09 (-50bp) 10 Sep 09 2Q 10 (+25bp) 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.75 1.25
Asia/Pacific GDP-weighted average 2.05 -150 2.05 2.05 2.09 2.14 2.30
Australia Cash rate 3.00 -350 7 Apr 09 (-25bp) 1 Sep 09 Feb 10 (+25bp) 3.00 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.50
New Zealand Cash rate 2.50 -575 30 Apr 09 (-50bp) 10 Sep 09 8 Jul 10 (+25bp) 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 3.50
Japan Overnight call rate 0.10 -40 19 Dec 08 (-20bp) 17 Sep 09 on hold 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Hong Kong Discount window base 0.50 -625 17 Dec 08 (-100bp) 24 Sep 09 on hold 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
China 1-year working capital 5.31 -171 22 Dec 08 (-27bp) 2Q 09 4Q 10 (+27bp) 5.31 5.31 5.31 5.31 5.58
Korea Base rate 2.00 -300 12 Feb 09 (-50bp) 10 Sep 09 1Q 10 (+25bp) 2.00 2.00 2.25 2.50 3.00Bold denotes move since last GDW and forecast changes. Underline denotes policy meeting during upcoming week.
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Disclaimer
Analyst CertificationThe research analyst(s) denoted by an “AC” on the cover of this report certifies (or, where multiple research analysts are primarilyresponsible for this report, the research analyst denoted by an “AC” on the cover or within the document individually certifies, with respectto each security or issuer that the research analyst covers in this research) that: (1) all of the views expressed in this report accurately reflecthis or her personal views about any and all of the subject securities or issuers; and (2) no part of any of the research analyst’s compensationwas, is, or will be directly or indirectly related to the specific recommendations or views expressed by the research analyst(s) in this report.Conflict of InterestThis research contains the views, opinions and recommendations of J.P. Morgan credit research analysts. Research analysts routinely consultwith J.P. Morgan trading desk personnel in formulating views, opinions and recommendations in preparing research. Trading desks may trade,or have traded, as principal on the basis of the research analyst(s) views and report(s). Therefore, this research may not be independent fromthe proprietary interests of J.P. Morgan trading desks which may conflict with your interests. In addition, research analysts receivecompensation based, in part, on the quality and accuracy of their analysis, client feedback, trading desk and firm revenues and competitivefactors. As a general matter, J.P. Morgan and/or its affiliates normally make a market and trade as principal in fixed income securitiesdiscussed in research reports.Important Disclosures* JPMSI or an affiliate has managed or co-managed an offering of securities within the past twelve months.^ A senior employee, executive officer, or director of JPMSI and/or its affiliates is a director of the company.Explanation of Credit Research Ratings:Ratings System: J.P. Morgan uses the following sector/issuer portfolio weightings: Overweight (over the next three months, the recommendedrisk position is expected to outperform the relevant index, sector, or benchmark), Neutral (over the next three months, the recommended riskposition is expected to perform in line with the relevant index, sector, or benchmark), and Underweight (over the next three months, therecommended risk position is expected to underperform the relevant index, sector, or benchmark). ). J.P. Morgan’s Emerging Market researchuses a rating of Marketweight, which is equivalent to a Neutral rating.Valuation & Methodology: In J.P. Morgan’s credit research, we assign a rating to each issuer (Overweight, Underweight or Neutral) based onour credit view of the issuer and the relative value of its securities, taking into account the ratings assigned to the issuer by credit ratingagencies and the market prices for the issuer’s securities. Our credit view of an issuer is based upon our opinion as to whether the issuer willbe able service its debt obligations when they become due and payable. We assess this by analyzing, among other things, the issuer’s creditposition using standard credit ratios such as cash flow to debt and fixed charge coverage (including and excluding capital investment). We alsoanalyze the issuer’s ability to generate cash flow by reviewing standard operational measures for comparable companies in the sector, such asrevenue and earnings growth rates, margins, and the composition of the issuer’s balance sheet relative to the operational leverage in itsbusiness.Other DisclosuresJ.P. Morgan is the global brand name for J.P. Morgan Securities Inc. (JPMSI) and its non-US affiliates worldwide.Options related research: If the information contained herein regards options related research, such information is available only to personswho have received the proper option risk disclosure documents. For a copy of the Option Clearing Corporation’s Characteristics and Risks ofStandardized Options, please contact your J.P. Morgan Representative or visit the OCC’s website athttp://www.optionsclearing.com/publications/risks/riskstoc.pdf.
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Analyst CertificationThe research analyst(s) denoted by an “AC” on the cover of this report certifies (or, where multiple research analysts are primarilyresponsible for this report, the research analyst denoted by an “AC” on the cover or within the document individually certifies, with respectto each security or issuer that the research analyst covers in this research) that: (1) all of the views expressed in this report accurately reflecthis or her personal views about any and all of the subject securities or issuers; and (2) no part of any of the research analyst’s compensationwas, is, or will be directly or indirectly related to the specific recommendations or views expressed by the research analyst(s) in this report.Conflict of InterestThis research contains the views, opinions and recommendations of J.P. Morgan credit research analysts. Research analysts routinely consultwith J.P. Morgan trading desk personnel in formulating views, opinions and recommendations in preparing research. Trading desks may trade,or have traded, as principal on the basis of the research analyst(s) views and report(s). Therefore, this research may not be independent fromthe proprietary interests of J.P. Morgan trading desks which may conflict with your interests. In addition, research analysts receivecompensation based, in part, on the quality and accuracy of their analysis, client feedback, trading desk and firm revenues and competitivefactors. As a general matter, J.P. Morgan and/or its affiliates normally make a market and trade as principal in fixed income securitiesdiscussed in research reports.Important Disclosures* JPMSI or an affiliate has managed or co-managed an offering of securities within the past twelve months.^ A senior employee, executive officer, or director of JPMSI and/or its affiliates is a director of the company.Explanation of Credit Research Ratings:Ratings System: J.P. Morgan uses the following sector/issuer portfolio weightings: Overweight (over the next three months, the recommendedrisk position is expected to outperform the relevant index, sector, or benchmark), Neutral (over the next three months, the recommended riskposition is expected to perform in line with the relevant index, sector, or benchmark), and Underweight (over the next three months, therecommended risk position is expected to underperform the relevant index, sector, or benchmark). ). J.P. Morgan’s Emerging Market researchuses a rating of Marketweight, which is equivalent to a Neutral rating.Valuation & Methodology: In J.P. Morgan’s credit research, we assign a rating to each issuer (Overweight, Underweight or Neutral) based onour credit view of the issuer and the relative value of its securities, taking into account the ratings assigned to the issuer by credit ratingagencies and the market prices for the issuer’s securities. Our credit view of an issuer is based upon our opinion as to whether the issuer willbe able service its debt obligations when they become due and payable. We assess this by analyzing, among other things, the issuer’s creditposition using standard credit ratios such as cash flow to debt and fixed charge coverage (including and excluding capital investment). We alsoanalyze the issuer’s ability to generate cash flow by reviewing standard operational measures for comparable companies in the sector, such asrevenue and earnings growth rates, margins, and the composition of the issuer’s balance sheet relative to the operational leverage in itsbusiness.Other DisclosuresJ.P. Morgan is the global brand name for J.P. Morgan Securities Inc. (JPMSI) and its non-US affiliates worldwide.Options related research: If the information contained herein regards options related research, such information is available only to personswho have received the proper option risk disclosure documents. For a copy of the Option Clearing Corporation’s Characteristics and Risks ofStandardized Options, please contact your J.P. Morgan Representative or visit the OCC’s website athttp://www.optionsclearing.com/publications/risks/riskstoc.pdf.
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