manual practico observadores electorales...política. En este sentido, la observación electoral...

2008

MINISTERIODE ASUNTOS EXTERIORESY DE COOPERACIÓN

SUBSECRETARÍA

SECRETARÍA GENERALTÉCNICA

MANUAL PRÁCTICO

PARA OBSERVADORES ELECTORALES

DE CORTA DURACIÓN

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manual_practico_observadores_electorales.pmd 28/04/2008, 12:372

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MANUAL PRÁCTICOPARA OBSERVADORES ELECTORALES

DE CORTA DURACIÓN

MADRID 2008


DIRECCIÓN GENERAL DE NACIONESUNIDAS, DERECHOS HUMANOS YORGANISMOS MULTILATERALES

OFICINA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS


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SUBSECRETARÍAEdita: SECRETARÍA GENERAL TÉCNICA

VICESECRETARÍA GENERAL TÉCNICA

Centro de Documentación y PublicacionesIMPRENTA DEL MINISTERIO DE ASUNTOS EXTERIORES Y DE COOPERACIÓN

NIPO: 501-08-046-4Depósito Legal: M. 16.114 - 2008



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Grupo de observadores de NU para las primeras elecciones democráticasde Suráfrica en 1994.


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Justo antes del inicio de una nueva edición del «Curso de capacita-ción para observadores electorales de corta duración», y en el año en queEspaña ejerce la Presidencia de la Organización para la Seguridad y Co-operación en Europa, el Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Coopera-ción publica este breve «Manual práctico para observadores electoralesde corta duración» elaborado por Isabel Menchón López, de la Oficina deDerechos Humanos, cuyo fin es complementar las clases impartidas duran-te el curso y ayudar a los futuros observadores electorales de corta dura-ción a desempeñar mejor su cometido.

Tanto este manual como los cursos de capacitación para observadoresde corta duración, organizados conjuntamente por la Oficina de DerechosHumanos y la Escuela Diplomática, ponen de manifiesto el compromiso deEspaña con el apoyo a la construcción democrática y promoción de losderechos humanos y valores democráticos en todo el mundo que se traduceen una contribución generosa al esfuerzo promovido por OrganizacionesInternacionales como la OSCE, la Unión Europea o la Organización deEstados Americanos, así como diversas Organizaciones No Gubernamenta-les. No puede haber mejor contribución que garantizar e incrementar lapresencia de observadores especialmente cualificados en misiones de ob-servación electoral internacional.

La ola democratizadora que recorrió numerosos países desde mediadosde los años 80, puso de manifiesto el profundo anhelo de todas las socie-dades de conquistar y ejercer su derecho a la participación política a tra-vés de elecciones auténticas, vistas como verdadero instrumento de trans-formación democrática.

Apoyar la celebración de elecciones libres y competitivas constituye unaprioridad política y un imperativo moral, no sólo porque la celebración deelecciones auténticas contribuye a la construcción y consolidación de lademocracia, sino también porque son un mecanismo eficaz para la recons-trucción de sociedades fracturadas y un elemento fundamental en todo pro-ceso de la hoy llamada justicia transicional. Lejos de constituir un arro-


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gante ejercicio de injerencia, la observación electoral se ha convertido enun instrumento de apoyo para la consolidación democrática y la preven-ción y resolución de conflictos.

Con este manual, la Oficina de Derechos Humanos del Ministerio deAsuntos Exteriores y Cooperación pretende realizar una pequeña contri-bución a la consolidación democrática y promoción de los derechos hu-manos, proporcionando un instrumento que sirva para mejorar la capaci-tación de aquellas personas que al realizar labores de observaciónelectoral expresan su compromiso con los valores que sustentan la demo-cracia y su solidaridad con las sociedades que anhelan su emancipaciónpolítica.

Fernando Fernández-Arias,Director de la Oficina de Derechos Humanos.


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ÍNDICEPÁGINAS

A ¿Para qué este Manual?........................................................................B ¿Por qué se estructura en ocho capítulos?......................................

I Introducción........................................................................................

II Preguntas claves respecto a la observación electoral....................1.—¿Qué es una misión de observación electoral?.......................2.—¿Cuáles son los objetivos de una misión de observación

electoral?..........................................................................................3.—¿Cuáles son los estándares internacionales mínimos que ri-

gen las elecciones democráticas?..............................................4.—¿Cómo pueden definirse unas elecciones auténticas?...........5.—¿Qué tipo de metodología se aplica en las misiones de ob-

servación electoral?.................................................................6.—¿Cuál es el proceso de toma de decisión para decidir enviar

una misión de observación electoral?......................................6.1.—Ámbito OSCE........................................................................6.2.—Ámbito UE.............................................................................

7.—¿Para qué una misión exploratoria electoral?.............................

III ¿Cómo se estructura una misión?.......................................................a.—«Core Team» o Equipo dirigente................................................b.—Observadores de larga duración................................................c.—Observadores de corta duración..................................................

IV Core Team...............................................................................................1.—¿Qué funciones tiene el Core Team?.........................................

1.1.—Análisis del marco legal......................................................1.2.—Análisis del sistema de quejas y recursos.....................1.3.—Análisis del comportamiento de los medios de comu-

nicación................................................................................

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1.4.—Informes de los observadores de larga duración..........1.5.—Declaración preliminar..........................................................1.6.—Informe final...........................................................................

V Observadores de larga duración........................................................1.—¿Qué funciones tienen los observadores de larga duración?.2.—¿Por cuánto tiempo se despliegan?...........................................3.—¿Cómo se despliegan?...................................................................4.—¿Cómo observan?............................................................................5.—¿Cómo informan?..............................................................................6.—¿Qué aspectos del proceso electoral observan?.........................

6.1.—El contexto y entorno político .........................................6.2.—La Administración Electoral................................................6.3.—El censo electoral.................................................................6.4.—Registro de partidos y candidatos......................................6.5.—Campaña electoral..................................................................6.6.—Campañas de educación al votante.....................................

VI Observadores de Corta Duración.........................................................1.—Salida de los observadores de corta duración y llegada al

país anfitrión...................................................................................2.—¿Qué funciones desarrollan los OCD?.........................................3.—Cuestiones relevantes para la observación de corta duración.

3.1.—Formularios............................................................................3.2.—Metodología del despliegue.................................................3.3.—Capacidad de penetración de la observación de corta

duración...............................................................................4.—Actividades de los OCD a su llegada al terreno......................

4.1.—Sesión informativa por parte de los observadores delarga duración......................................................................

4.2.—Familiarización con el clima político del área de respon-sabilidad..................................................................................

4.3.—Entrevistas con los actores electorales. Visibilidad.......4.4.—Localización y determinación de la zona a observar.....

5.—Premisas para la observación de la votación y el recuento...6.—Apertura de los colegios electorales.........................................7.—Observación múltiple de colegios electorales...........................

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PÁGINAS

7.1.—Metodología...........................................................................7.2.—Entorno....................................................................................7.3.—Observación dentro del colegio electoral.........................7.3.1.— ¿Qué observar?................................................................7.3.2.—¿Cómo valorar el proceso de votación?...........................

8.—Cierre y recuento...............................................................................8.1.—¿Qué hay que observar en el cierre?...............................8.2.—¿Qué hay que observar en el recuento?..........................

9.—Agregación de los resultados.......................................................10.—Transmisión de los resultados de la observación......................11.—Formularios.......................................................................................

VII Proceso de selección de los observadores electorales españoles.1.—Consideraciones Generales...........................................................2.—Proceso de selección de los observadores españoles en el

ámbito de la OSCE.........................................................................3.—Procesos de selección de los observadores españoles en el

ámbito de la UE..............................................................................

VIII Código de conducta............................................................................

ANEXOSAnexo 1: Declaración de Principios para la observación electoral

internacional y código de conducta......................................Anexo 2: Declaración preliminar sobre la segunda vuelta de las elec-

ciones presidenciales de Ucrania de 2004...............................Anexo 3: Declaración preliminar sobre las elecciones generales de

Bosnia Herzegovina de octubre 2006.....................................Anexo 4: Declaración preliminar sobre las elecciones legislativas en

Armenia en mayo 2006................................................................Anexo 5: Declaración preliminar sobre las elecciones presidenciales

de Venezuela de diciembre 2005..................................................Anexo 6: Declaración preliminar sobre las elecciones legislativas de

Gaza y Cisjordania de enero de 2006.........................................Anexo 7: Declaración preliminar sobre las elecciones legislativas, pre-

sidenciales y al Senado de Nigeria de 2007.....................

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¿PARA QUÉ ESTE MANUAL?

Tras el éxito de las cinco ediciones de los cursos de capacitación paraobservadores electorales de corta duración organizados por la Oficina de De-rechos Humanos del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación conla colaboración de la Escuela Diplomática, la Oficina de Derechos Humanosha decidido elaborar un manual práctico que permita proporcionar a los ob-servadores electorales de corta duración los conocimientos básicos sobreobservación electoral internacional y las herramientas necesarias para el des-empeño de sus funciones.

¿POR QUÉ SE ESTRUCTURA EN OCHO CAPÍTULOS?

Para poder desarrollar satisfactoriamente su labor, además de conocer susfunciones, tareas y elementos que debe observar, el observador de cortaduración debe estar familiarizado con los principios y objetivos de la obser-vación electoral, la estructura de una misión de observación, las funcionesdel «Core Team», equipo dirigente, y de los observadores de larga duración,el código de conducta y los procesos de selección de los observadores decorta duración.

Por ello este manual realiza en su primer capítulo una introducción en laque se da cuenta del auge de la observación electoral en estos quince años.En el segundo capítulo aborda las preguntas claves referidas a la observa-ción electoral (¿qué es una misión de observación electoral, cuáles son susobjetivos, cuáles son los estándares internacionales para unas elecciones de-mocráticas, etc.?). El tercer capítulo explica la estructura de una misión deobservación electoral, mientras que el cuarto, quinto y sexto capítulo se de-dican respectivamente al «Core Team», los observadores de larga duración ylos observadores de corta duración con referencia detallada a sus funciones,aspectos observados y metodología utilizada. El séptimo capítulo aborda elcódigo de conducta para observadores electorales y el octavo explica el pro-ceso de selección de los observadores de corta y larga duración.


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I. INTRODUCCIÓN

La expansión de la observación electoral durante estos últimos veinte añosestá directamente vinculada a la tendencia global hacia la democratización.De hecho, al amparo de la ola democratizadora iniciada en los años 80 enIberoamérica y que tras la caída del muro de Berlín recorrió el espacio de laantigua Unión Soviética, parte de África y Asia, numerosos países celebra-ron sus primeras elecciones multipartidistas iniciando de este modo un pro-ceso de transición democrática o como estrategia de salida a una situaciónde conflicto. En este último contexto las elecciones se convertían en un ins-trumento útil de estabilización de sociedades profundamente divididas y con-tribuían a llevar a las partes en conflicto a una dinámica de resolución deconflicto pacífica y democrática.

Las elecciones no son equivalentes a democracia sin embargo sin ellasno puede establecerse un gobierno participativo y representativo. En otras


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palabras, no puede construirse un sistema democrático que se caracteriza,entre otros elementos, por elecciones transparentes y competitivas, respetoa los derechos humanos, división de poderes, imperio de la ley, transparen-cia y responsabilidad de las autoridades elegidas, buen gobierno y una so-ciedad civil fuerte y estructurada.

La celebración de las elecciones puede ser vista como un instrumentoútil para resolver el conflicto societario y canalizar este conflicto hacia la esferapolítica. En este sentido, la observación electoral garantizaría que el conflictopermanezca en la esfera política. Al evaluar y reforzar la transparencia de losprocesos electorales, la observación electoral contribuye a la promoción yprotección de los derechos humanos, la democracia y la paz.

Varias organizaciones internacionales, de carácter universal, como lasNaciones Unidas, y de carácter regional como la Organización de EstadosAmericanos (OEA), la Unión Africana (UA), la Unión Europea (UE), y la Or-ganización para la Seguridad y Cooperación en Europa (OSCE), realizan en laactualidad observación electoral junto con organizaciones internacionales nogubernamentales como el Centro Carter, IFES, etc.

Mientras que la observación electoral ha decaído en el seno de las Na-ciones Unidas, pionera y muy activa tras la segunda guerra mundial coinci-diendo con los procesos de descolonización, la OSCE y la UE han realizadograndes esfuerzos humanos y financieros en materia de observación electo-ral en esta última década. La UE ha desplegado desde el año 2000 hasta agostodel 2007 unas 57 misiones de observación electoral. Por su parte la OSCE haenviado desde el año 1996 hasta agosto del 2007 unas 103 misiones de ob-servación electoral a países con democracias no consolidadas.

Ambas organizaciones comparten una metodología similar que fuesistematizada en 1996 por la OSCE con la publicación de su primer manual deobservación electoral y en 2000 por la UE con la publicación de la importanteComunicación de la Comisión, COM (2000) 191, que representó un punto deinflexión en la política de la UE en materia de observación electoral al darmás consistencia y coherencia a sus misiones de observación.

Existe una división geográfica entre ambas organizaciones en virtud de lacual la UE observa en África, Asia, América Latina y parte de Oriente Medio.En el caso de la OSCE, sus 56 Estados miembros se comprometieron des-de 1990 en el Documento de Copenhague, compromiso reforzado en la Cum-


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bre de Estambul en 1999, a invitar a la Oficina para las Instituciones Demo-cráticas y los Derechos Humanos, ODIHR en sus siglas inglesas y con sedeen Varsovia, a observar los procesos electorales que tuvieran lugar en susterritorios, es decir Europa, espacio de la antigua Unión Soviética, Canadá yEstados Unidos.

Mientras que hasta hace unos años la ODIHR observaba exclusivamenteen las democracias de tipo emergente, ésta empezó hace unos años a enviara democracias consolidadas misiones de observación electoral reducidas com-puestas por una docena de expertos electorales y legales con vistas a reco-ger prácticas electorales positivas de estas democracias y prestar mayor aten-ción a potenciales elementos frágiles de dichos procesos, como el votoelectrónico, el voto por correo con riesgo de comprometer el secreto del voto.Así pues junto a las múltiples observaciones electorales llevadas a cabo porla ODIHR en estos últimos años en democracias emergentes, las eleccioneslegislativas italianas de abril 2006, las elecciones legislativas españolas demarzo 2004, las elecciones presidenciales americanas de noviembre 2004, ylas elecciones legislativas del Reino Unido de mayo del 2005 fueron, entreotras muchas, observadas por la ODIHR. Las evaluaciones están disponi-bles en la página web de la ODIHR: http://osce.org/odihr-elections/14207.html

Se pretendía también con estas observaciones electorales realizadas endemocracias establecidas dar satisfacción a aquellos otros Estados partici-pantes de la OSCE que si bien aceptaban que sus procesos electorales fue-ran observados, reclamaban en virtud del principio de reciprocidad observaren democracias consolidadas.

La observación electoral se ha convertido en un elemento importantede la política exterior de la UE, y de su política de cooperación al desarro-llo, constituyendo una manifestación práctica del firme compromiso dela UE hacia la promoción y protección de los derechos humanos y la demo-cracia. De hecho los resultados de las misiones de observación electoralcondicionan en cierta medida las estrategias de la UE en materia de coope-ración y desarrollo ya que, en conformidad con los Acuerdos de Cotonou(2000), la ayuda al desarrollo está estrechamente vinculada a los progresosrealizados por los países receptores de esa ayuda en sus procesos de de-mocratización. Así pues, en virtud de esa «cláusula democrática», la Comi-sión Europea ha llegado a suspender proyectos de cooperación y desarro-llo destinados a interlocutores gubernamentales, cuando alguna Misión deObservación Electoral de la UE ha dictaminado que las elecciones observa-

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das no cumplían con los estándares mínimos internacionales para las elec-ciones democráticas.

En diciembre del 2006 la UE aprobó el Reglamento (CE) N.º 1889/2006del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo por el que se establecía un instru-mento nuevo financiero para la promoción de la democracia y de los dere-chos humanos a escala mundial para el período 2007-2013. Este nuevo ins-trumento Europeo para la promoción de la democracia y los derechoshumanos tiene, entre otros objetivos estratégicos, la finalidad de «afianzarla confianza en los procesos electorales y aumentar la fiabilidad de los mis-mos, en particular con misiones de observación de las elecciones y apo-yando a las organizaciones de la sociedad civil local que participan en di-chos procesos». (Título 1, Artículo 1, Párrafo 2c del citado Reglamento).


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II. PREGUNTAS CLAVES RESPECTOA LA OBSERVACIÓN ELECTORAL

1.—¿QUÉ ES UNA MISIÓN DE OBSERVACIÓN ELECTORAL?

Una misión de observación electoral realiza a través de una determinadametodología un análisis en profundidad de un proceso electoral y proporcio-na una evaluación independiente, neutral y profesional del mismo.

La misión de observación electoral siempre se despliega a invitación deun país soberano por lo que el mandato del observador consiste en observare informar, de ninguna manera podrá el observador interferir en el procesoelectoral. En este sentido difiere de la figura de la Supervisión en la que laComunidad Internacional asume la dirección del proceso electoral. Éste fueel caso de Bosnia, Kosovo y Timor Este cuyos procesos electorales fueronsupervisados por las Naciones Unidas y la OSCE mientras estaban bajo latutela de la Comunidad Internacional.


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2.—¿CUÁLES SON LOS OBJETIVOS DE UNA MISIÓN DE OBSERVA-CIÓN ELECTORAL?

Una misión de observación electoral pretende contribuir a:

1.—Reforzar la transparencia del proceso electoral y de este modo incre-mentar la confianza del electorado en el mismo.

2.—Reducir las posibilidades de fraude, de prácticas irregulares y de in-timidación. La presencia de una misión de observación electoral creíble yvisible tendrá un efecto disuasorio sobre la posible comisión de fraude.

3.—La prevención y resolución de conflicto al impulsar la aceptación delos resultados por parte de todos los actores electorales, y así desactivar latensión y violencia que pueda surgir durante el periodo postelectoral.

4.—Fortalecer el respeto por los derechos humanos, ya que las eleccio-nes constituyen en sí una celebración de los derechos humanos.

5.—Fortalecer la legitimidad de las autoridades surgidas de un procesoelectoral transparente, elemento esencial en procesos de estabilización y re-construcción tras la finalización de un conflicto.

6.—La construcción y consolidación de la democracia elaborando reco-mendaciones que tienen por objetivo mejorar los procesos electorales poste-riores.

3.—¿CUÁLES SON LOS ESTÁNDARES INTERNACIONALES MÍNIMOSQUE RIGEN LAS ELECCIONES DEMOCRÁTICAS?

Estos estándares se derivan de los principios universales recogidos enlos distintos Tratados Internacionales de Derechos Humanos de NacionesUnidas, de los compromisos contraídos por los Miembros de la OSCE en elDocumento de Copenhague de 1990, y de otros tratados como la Conven-ción Europea para la Protección y los Derechos Humanos y de las LibertadesFundamentales del Consejo de Europa, el Tratado sobre la Unión Europea yla Carta de la Unión Europea de los Derechos Fundamentales.

La Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos de 1948 establece ensu artículo 21 el derecho universal a elecciones auténticas: «todo el mundotiene derecho a participar en el gobierno de su país, directamente o a travésde representantes libremente elegidos… La voluntad del pueblo será la basede la autoridad del gobierno; esta voluntad se expresará mediante elecciones


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periódicas y auténticas que se celebrarán por sufragio universal, igualitario yvoto secreto o por procedimientos equivalentes de votación libre».

El Pacto Internacional sobre Derechos Civiles y Políticos reitera y desa-rrolla los derechos establecidos en la Declaración Universal de Derechos Hu-manos. Su artículo 25 otorga a todo ciudadano sin discriminación alguna elderecho de voto y de presentarse como candidato.

Los estándares internacionales para elecciones democráticas que utilizanlas misiones de observación electoral para evaluar los procesos electoralesson los siguientes:

1.—Sufragio Universal. Este principio hace referencia al derecho de cual-quier ciudadano con derecho a voto a votar. Este derecho debe definirse lomás ampliamente posible. No deben establecerse restricciones por razonesde género, raza, ideología o religión. Las restricciones de derechos civiles ypolíticos de ciudadanos condenados por un delito deberían ser proporciona-les al delito, y el derecho de voto deberá reestablecerse una vez cumplida lasentencia.

Este derecho requiere un proceso de registro censal eficaz, imparcial, nodiscriminatorio y fiable. A través del registro censal (en un contexto de regis-tro activo) pueden excluirse segmentos de la población, como minorías obastiones de la oposición, mediante el marco legal o durante la aplicación dela ley a través de sutiles estrategias de exclusión. Un censo con ciertos nive-les de imperfección desvirtúa los resultados de las elecciones y conculca elderecho al sufragio universal. La elaboración del censo constituye una faseesencial del ciclo electoral, y será objeto de un análisis minucioso por partede la misión de observación.

2.—Derecho a presentarse como candidato. Como el sufragio universal ac-tivo este derecho debe definirse lo más ampliamente posible sin restriccionesrelativas al género, la raza, la ideología, la religión o afiliaciones políticas pasa-das. A través del proceso de registro de candidatos y partidos también se pue-den excluir candidatos y partidos de la carrera electoral mediante sutiles estra-tegias de exclusión como la obligación de depositar grandes cantidades dedinero, de recabar grandes cantidades de firmas de apoyo, de aprobar difícilesexámenes lingüísticos, etc, que pueden discriminar a partidos pequeños conpocos recursos financieros y representantes de minorías.

3.—Sufragio libre. Unas elecciones auténticas requieren que todos losciudadanos disfruten de sus derechos fundamentales de libertad de expre-


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sión, asociación, asamblea y movimiento. El votante debe poder expresar suopción política mediante un voto libre de violencia e intimidación.

4.—Sufragio igualitario. Hace referencia al diseño de las circunscripcio-nes e implica que cada voto debe tener el mismo valor. El número de repre-sentantes en cada circunscripción debería ser proporcional a la poblaciónelectoral bajo un sistema de representación proporcional. En un sistema derepresentación mayoritario la población de las circunscripciones debería seraproximadamente equivalente. Se admite una diferencia de hasta el 10%.

5.—Sufragio informado. Implica el derecho del votante a emitir un votoinformado. Es importante garantizar este derecho a través de campañas efica-ces de educación al votante en contextos de alto nivel de analfabetismo.

6.—Voto secreto. Se debe garantizar al votante la posibilidad de expresarlibremente su elección en la privacidad de una cabina de votación segura. Elprincipio del secreto del voto constituye a menudo la última salvaguardia paraque el votante exprese libremente su voluntad en un entorno intimidatorio. Elvoto familiar puede poner en riesgo el voto de las mujeres.

7.—Igualdad de oportunidades entre partidos y candidatos. Implica ga-rantizar las mismas condiciones para los contendientes en un proceso elec-toral. Implica en concreto un acceso equitativo para todos los partidos ycandidatos a los recursos estatales incluidos los medios de comunicaciónestatales, imparcialidad y neutralidad por parte de la Administración Esta-tal, Local y Electoral. Los candidatos y partidos deben competir sobre labase de un tratamiento igual e imparcial de la ley y de las distintas Autori-dades.

8.—El derecho a un recuento justo. Hace referencia al derecho de losvotantes a que se contabilicen debidamente, sin manipulaciones ni falsifica-ciones, los votos, a que los resultados anunciados reflejen fielmente la vo-luntad popular libremente expresada.

9.—Elecciones periódicas. Deben garantizarse para tomar nota de la vo-luntad cambiante del electorado. Requiere que las elecciones se celebren aintervalos regulares. Se admite como período máximo entre elecciones el desiete años para elecciones presidenciales, y entre cuatro o cinco años paraelecciones legislativas.


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4.—¿CÓMO PUEDEN DEFINIRSE UNAS ELECCIONES AUTÉNTICAS?

Unas elecciones auténticas son unas elecciones libres y competitivas encondiciones iguales para todos los partidos y candidatos en liza, donde to-dos los votantes con derecho a voto han sido censados y pueden ejercerlibremente su derecho a voto y donde los resultados reflejan fielmente lavoluntad informada de los votantes.

5.—¿QUÉ TIPO DE METODOLOGÍA SE APLICA EN LAS MISIONESDE OBSERVACIÓN ELECTORAL?

Una elección es la culminación de un proceso que se desarrolla duranteun determinado periodo de tiempo, por ello tanto la UE como la OSCE al igualque otras Organizaciones Internacionales han desarrollado una metodologíaexhaustiva que cubre todas las fases del ciclo electoral, fase preelectoral,votación, recuento y fase inmediatamente post electoral con el seguimientode los contenciosos electorales.

6.—¿CUÁL ES EL PROCESO DE TOMA DE DECISIÓN PARA DECI-DIR ENVIAR UNA MISIÓN DE OBSERVACIÓN ELECTORAL?

6.1.—Ámbito OSCE

Dentro del ámbito de la OSCE sus 56 Estados Participantes se comprome-tieron a partir de 1990 a invitar a la ODIHR a observar las elecciones quetuvieran lugar en sus territorios.

6.2.—Ámbito Unión Europea

La decisión de enviar una misión de observación electoral constituye ensí misma una manifestación política de la UE de contribuir al esfuerzo de de-mocratización de un país determinado.

La Comisión establece una lista de prioridades que es discutida en losdistintos grupos de trabajo intergubernamentales. Esa lista de prioridades seestablece de acuerdo con cuatro criterios:

a Una evaluación previa realizada por el Consejo sobre la situación po-lítica del país en cuestión.

b El efecto potencial de una observación electoral de la UE sobre el pro-ceso de democratización del país.


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PÁGINASc La implicación de la UE en proyectos de cooperación y desarrollo enel país.

d Disponibilidad de recursos.

Los recursos financieros son limitados. La UE dedicó en el año 2005, 15millones de euros para financiar las misiones de observación electoral. Estepresupuesto se duplicó en el año 2006. A partir de 2007, las misiones deobservación electorales son financiadas mediante el nuevo Instrumento Fi-nanciero Europeo para la promoción de la democracia y los derechos huma-nos establecido por el Reglamento (CE) N.º 1889/2006 del Parlamento Eu-ropeo y del Consejo de 20 de diciembre de 2006. El presupuesto dedicado amisiones de observación electoral para 2007 es de 30, 1 millones de euros.

La decisión definitiva sobre el despliegue de una misión de observaciónelectoral es tomada por el/la Comisario/a de Relaciones Exteriores de la Comi-sión, y dependerá del diagnóstico de una misión exploratoria electoral.

Una vez decidido el envío de una misión de observación electoral, se fir-mará un Memorando de Entendimiento con las Autoridades del país cuyaselecciones se va a observar.

La Misión de observación electoral de la UE, una vez desplegada, es com-pletamente independiente.

Se ha producido un incremento exponencial en el número de misiones deobservación electoral desplegadas por La UE. Ésta ha ido observando desdeel año 2000 hasta el año 2005 una media de 8 a 10 elecciones anuales. En2006 observó 13 elecciones y en 2007 habrá observado unas 15 elecciones.

7.—¿PARA QUÉ UNA MISIÓN EXPLORATORIA ELECTORAL?

Para evitar que una misión de observación electoral corra el riesgo de le-gitimar un proceso fraudulento, se despliega una Misión Exploratoria antesde adquirir cualquier compromiso de observar unas elecciones. En la OSCEla misión de evaluación de necesidades, «Needs Assessment Mission», res-ponde al mismo objetivo que la Misión Exploratoria de la UE.

La Misión Exploratoria, compuesta por un grupo reducido de expertos elec-torales, legales, de logística y seguridad, desplegada unos cuatro meses an-tes de la celebración de las elecciones, evaluará si la Misión de ObservaciónElectoral es aconsejable, útil y viable.


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Una Misión Exploratoria evaluará por lo tanto:

a el entorno preelectoral;— si se garantiza el respeto a los Derechos Humanos y libertades Fun-

damentales sin los cuales no pueden celebrarse elecciones autén-ticas;

— si se dan las condiciones mínimas para la celebración de eleccio-nes democráticas. Concretamente si el marco legal permite eleccio-nes competitivas. Por lo tanto se analizará, entre otros elementos,la existencia o no de libertad de campaña, si se garantiza el sufra-gio universal y por lo tanto si los niveles de registro de votantesson aceptables. Se analizará si las condiciones para el registro decandidaturas permiten la participación de una pluralidad de parti-dos y candidatos, si se garantiza un acceso razonable de los con-tendientes a los medios de comunicación, y se estudiará la compo-sición y estructura de la Administración Electoral en todos susniveles;

b el valor añadido que, según los interlocutores del proceso electoral,pueda aportar una misión de observación electoral al mismo;

— En concreto si la misión de observación puede contribuir a reforzar latransparencia del proceso electoral y la confianza del electorado enéste;

c si las condiciones de seguridad y logísticas sobre el terreno permitenel despliegue de una misión de observación electoral;

— Debe garantizarse la libertad de movimiento de los observadores, quie-nes deben poder desplazarse libremente por toda la geografía del paísen cuestión y entrevistarse con todos los actores del proceso electoral.

Tras las conclusiones de la Misión Exploratoria o de la «Needs AssessmentMission» se decidirá el envío o no de una misión de observación electoral.


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III. CÓMO SE ESTRUCTURA UNA MISIÓN

La estructura de una misión de observación electoral refleja la necesidadde cubrir todas las fases del proceso electoral.

a «Core Team» o Equipo dirigente

Está encabezado por el Jefe de Misión. En el caso de la UE se trata nor-malmente de un eurodiputado del Parlamento Europeo designado por la Co-misión. Se ha querido asociar el Parlamento Europeo en las misiones de ob-servación electoral de la UE, por ser el órgano por excelencia donde reside lasoberanía popular europea, órgano elegido por sufragio universal, y porquesu representante como jefe de misión se halla en una posición idónea paraimpulsar el seguimiento político de las recomendaciones producidas por laMisión de Observación Electoral. Es totalmente independiente de la Comi-sión Europea, y el responsable último de la Declaración Preliminar.


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Está también compuesta por el Jefe de Misión Adjunto, y los diferentesexpertos: experto electoral, experto político en caso de que el país presenteuna situación política compleja, experto legal, experto en logística, experto enseguridad si la situación lo requiere, experto en medios de comunicación ycoordinador de observador de larga duración.

El equipo central se despliega aproximadamente dos meses y medio an-tes de la celebración de los comicios, y permanece en el país unas dos o tressemanas después de las elecciones para hacer un seguimiento del períodopostelectoral.

b Observadores de larga duración

Se despliegan por un período de aproximadamente dos meses, en gruposde dos por toda la geografía nacional. Analizan el período preelectoral e in-mediatamente posterior a las elecciones.

c Observadores de corta duración

Se despliegan por un período aproximado de diez días, en equipos de dospor todo el territorio. Observan el día de la votación y el recuento.

Misión de Observación Electoralpara las elecciones Presidenciales y Legislativas

del 20 de mayo en Malawi

Jefe de Misión

Jefe adjunto de Misión

Experto legalExperto electoral

Experto en medios decomunicación

Coordinador OLDExperto en Operaciones

53 Observadores de Corta Duración22 Observadores de Larga


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IV. CORE TEAM

1.—¿QUÉ FUNCIONES TIENE EL «CORE TEAM»?

1.1.— Análisis del marco legal

El experto legal analiza el marco legal determinando si cumple los estándaresinternacionales para elecciones democráticas, y con la ayuda de los informesde los observadores de larga duración desplegados sobre el terreno evalúasi se aplica de forma coherente e imparcial. El marco legal debe garantizar eldisfrute de los derechos y libertades fundamentales y, permitir la celebraciónde elecciones libres, abiertas y competitivas.

1.2.—Análisis del sistema de quejas y recursos

El experto legal analiza si la ley electoral proporciona a los contendientesla posibilidad de plantear recursos contra posibles violaciones de la ley elec-toral, si establece de forma clara el sistema de recursos aplicable y prevé unos


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plazos razonables que no priven a los contendientes de sus derechos electo-rales. También evalúa si la ley garantiza la independencia e imparcialidad delos organismos responsables de la resolución de los recursos, es decir laAdministración Electoral y órganos judiciales. Hace un seguimiento de losrecursos presentados durante y después de la campaña y evalúa si se resol-vieron con independencia, imparcialidad y en los plazos previstos.

1.3.—Análisis del comportamiento de los medios de comunicación

Unos medios de comunicación libres e independientes constituyen un ele-mento esencial para la consecución de unas elecciones democráticas. LasAutoridades deben garantizar una libertad de información sin intimidación,obstáculos, ni censura. El experto en medios de comunicación estudiará enprimer lugar si se garantiza la libertad de información, si el escenario mediáticoes plural, y si el electorado recibe una información suficiente y equilibradapara tomar una decisión informada.

En cuanto a los medios de comunicación estatales, dicho experto estudiarási las reglas que rigen el acceso de los contendientes a esos medios son equi-tativas y si se aplican correctamente. Evaluará por lo tanto, si los candidatos ypartidos tienen un acceso equitativo a los medios de comunicación estatales.Hará también un análisis estadístico de la cobertura de la campaña electoralpor parte de esos medios, para evaluar si cumplen con su obligación de pro-porcionar una cobertura neutral e imparcial de la campaña electoral.

Para evaluar si los medios de comunicación estatales escritos, televisivosy radiofónicos proporcionan una información equilibrada y neutral sobre lacampaña y los contendientes, el experto coordinará un equipo de profesio-nales locales que deberán determinar la cantidad de tiempo y espacio dedica-do a cada candidato y partido También evaluará con la ayuda de esosmonitores si la cobertura de las campañas electorales de los candidatos hasido positiva, neutral o negativa. Este análisis cualitativo y cuantitativo sellevará a cabo también para los medios de comunicación privados ya que sepretende también evaluar el impacto de los medios de comunicación priva-dos sobre la campaña electoral.

1.4.—Informes de los observadores de larga duración

El «Core Team» recibe los informes de los observadores de larga dura-ción y extrae las pautas generales para todo el país.


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1.5.—Declaración Preliminar

El Jefe de Misión con la ayuda de su equipo redacta la declaración preli-minar sustentada en las observaciones de los observadores de larga y cortaduración y derivada de sus propios análisis. Ésta se emite a más tardar dosdías después de las elecciones, período de máxima atención mediática. La De-claración Preliminar proporciona una evaluación independiente del procesoelectoral según las variables siguientes:

• Imparcialidad y eficacia de la Administración Electoral.• Libertad de campaña dada a partidos y candidatos.• Uso de los Recursos Estatales.• Acceso de los contendientes a los medios de comunicación.• Carácter universal del sufragio.• Condiciones de registro de partidos y candidatos.• Desarrollo de la votación y recuento.• Cualquier otro asunto relativo al carácter democrático de las elecciones.

1.6.—Informe final

Todos los miembros del «Core Team» contribuyen al informe final. Éstese publica entre uno y tres meses después de la publicación de los resulta-dos definitivos. Es un informe exhaustivo que es presentado en rueda deprensa por el jefe de Misión acompañado por el jefe adjunto de la Misión alas autoridades, partidos políticos y sociedad civil del país anfitrión.

Está redactado con un enfoque constructivo, subrayando los elementospositivos del proceso electoral y mencionando los aspectos negativos ymejorables que serán objeto de atención en el importante capítulo dedicadoa las recomendaciones.

Se presta cada vez mayor atención a las recomendaciones ya que preten-den subsanar las deficiencias identificadas y por lo tanto, mejorar los proce-sos posteriores.

Tanto las declaraciones preliminares como los informes finales de las mi-siones de observación electoral de la OSCE y UE, pueden consultarse en lassiguientes páginas de internet de la OSCE y de la UE respectivamente:

http://osce.org/odihr-elections/14207.htmlhttp://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/human_rights/eu_election_ass_observ/index.htm


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V. OBSERVADORES DE LARGA DURACIÓN

1.— ¿QUÉ FUNCIONES TIENEN LOS OBSERVADORES DE LARGADURACIÓN (OLD)?

Los observadores de larga duración son los «ojos y los oídos de la Mi-sión» y por lo tanto, pieza fundamental de la misión de observación. Su prin-cipal función es la de observar, recogiendo información, e informar al «coreteam» sobre las conclusiones de sus observaciones. Son también responsa-bles del despliegue de los observadores de corta duración (OCD), de pro-porcionarles información a través de un «briefing» sobre el desarrollo delproceso electoral en su región y comunicar al «core team», los resultados delas observaciones de los OCD sobre la votación y el recuento el día de laselecciones. Deben por lo tanto tener una gran capacidad analítica, ciertas ha-bilidades logísticas, y habilidades sociales para entrevistarse con los actoresdel proceso electoral

3


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2.—¿POR CUÁNTO TIEMPO SE DESPLIEGAN?

Se despliegan por un período que oscila entre un mes y medio a dos me-ses. Observan el proceso preelectoral, la campaña, la votación, el recuento, laagregación de resultados y el período postelectoral con el anuncio de los re-sultados, y el seguimiento de los recursos electorales y su resolución.

Durante los tres primeros días de su estancia en la capital, los miembrosdel «Core team» les proporcionarán información valiosa sobre:

— El marco legal que regula las elecciones, el sistema electoral, la estruc-tura y composición de la Administración Electoral, el proceso de re-gistro, el sistema de votación.

— La situación política del país.— Elementos claves del proceso electoral a los que los OLD deberán

prestar atención por suscitar la preocupación de los interlocutores elec-torales y del Core team.

— Cuestiones pertinentes relativas a la seguridad.— Cuestiones logísticas, financieras.— Cuestiones relativas al envío de los Informes, sistema de envío utili-

zado y periodicidad de los mismos.

3.—¿CÓMO SE DESPLIEGAN?

Se despliegan en su área de responsablilidad en equipos de dos perso-nas por cuestiones de seguridad, pero también por conveniencia metodológicaya que «4 ojos» ven más que «dos ojos».

Las conclusiones de la observación del equipo son el resultado de lainteracción de los análisis de dos personas, y el contraste de sus perspecti-vas que pueden complementarse o diferir. Ello aporta lógicamente una mayorriqueza a la información transmitida al Core Team.

Se busca un despliegue que cubra la mayor parte de la geografía nacio-nal, o por lo menos las zonas más representativas a nivel político y demo-gráfico.

El despliegue de los OLD debe asegurar un alcance lo más extenso posi-ble, siempre teniendo en cuenta la existencia de zonas prioritarias por su pesopolítico o demográfico.


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4.—¿CÓMO OBSERVAN?

1.—Mantienen entrevistas con los partidos, candidatos, la Administra-ción Electoral, las Autoridades Locales, organizaciones de la Sociedad Civil(organizaciones de observadores locales, de derechos humanos, etc.), votan-tes y cualquier otra organización u organismo que tengan alguna implicacióno impacto en el proceso electoral.

2.—Asisten a los mítines de campaña de los partidos y candidatos.3.—Asisten a las reuniones que mantiene la Administración Electoral con

los actores electorales y políticos, en caso de existir, y cuando las sesionesson públicas.

4.—Asisten a los seminarios de formación de los miembros de los cole-gios electorales.

5.—¿CÓMO INFORMAN?

Los observadores deberán realizar un informe semanal que enviarán alCoordinador de los OLD para el «Core team» en el que proporcionarán infor-mación lo más precisa y exhaustiva posible sobre los aspectos del procesoelectoral a observar, y sobre cualquier asunto de especial interés para el «coreteam». Aparte de esos informes semanales, podrán si se producen hechosgraves o incidentes reseñables, (graves violaciones de los derechos y liber-tades fundamentales de los candidatos o votantes, graves episodios de vio-lencia, etc.), mandar informes diarios, llamados «flash report» o «incidentreport».

Los observadores deberán asegurarse de que sus observaciones son pre-cisas y exhaustivas, y sus conclusiones deben basarse sobre un análisis im-parcial y objetivo de sus observaciones y sobre hechos comprobados. De-berán en todo momento, distinguir claramente entre hechos observadosdirectamente, y afirmaciones o denuncias realizadas por los interlocutores elec-torales a los que se pedirá que las fundamenten en la medida de lo posible.

Aunque no constituyan hechos directamente observados por los OLD,las alegaciones no contrastadas (por ejemplo un partido de la oposición ale-ga que el partido gobernante está comprando votos mediante la entrega desacos de arroz o dinero a votantes, o que se está practicando actos de vio-lencia contra partidarios y candidatos de la oposición) pueden figurar en losinformes de los OLD como tales ya que constituyen elementos útiles para elanálisis del proceso electoral. De hecho contribuyen a reflejar el clima políti-


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co predominante y constituyen, por otra parte, acusaciones susceptibles deser comprobadas.

6.—¿QUÉ ASPECTOS DEL PROCESO ELECTORAL OBSERVAN?

6.1.—El contexto y entorno político.

El observador de larga duración analizará el contexto político de su áreade responsabilidad, y evaluará si el entorno político permite una competiciónelectoral abierta y plural y una votación libre. Con este fin analizará si serespetan los derechos políticos y civiles de votantes y candidatos.

Evaluará si el clima político es pacífico, o por lo contrario se caracterizapor la violencia e intimidación dirigidas a los actores del proceso electoral, ypor profundas fracturas políticas y honda desconfianza entre los actorespolíticos y con respecto al proceso electoral. En este último caso podrá an-ticipar la existencia de problemas a la hora de aceptar los resultados por par-te de algunos actores políticos.

Estudiará los principales rasgos del sistema de partidos predominante enla región (si se trata de partidos de base ideológica, fuertemente estructuradosy disciplinados o partidos débiles con lealtades que fluctuan entorno a per-sonalidades, y de corte clientelar etc.). También analizará las principales cues-tiones planteadas en los programas de cada partido de su región.

6.2—La Administración Electoral.

El observador de larga duración evaluará la actuación de la Administra-ción Electoral en términos de su independencia, imparcialidad, transparenciay eficacia. La administración electoral es el órgano encargado de administrar,gestionar y llevar a cabo las elecciones. Es por lo tanto, un órgano clave delproceso electoral.

a Independencia de la Administración Electoral

La administración electoral puede estructurarse como un órgano compues-to por:

a miembros profesionales e independientes procedentes de la judicatu-ra, otros organismos y la sociedad civil, o

b una representación equilibrada de partidos políticos.


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En ambos casos, la administración electoral deberá aplicar correctamentela legislación electoral y los reglamentos, y llevar a cabo sus funciones sininterferencia del gobierno, ni de cualquier actor electoral.

La independencia de la Administración Electoral se ve reforzada por unaparte, con el establecimiento de un órgano permanente, o en su defecto lacreación de un comité ejecutivo permanente. En ausencia de los dos supues-tos anteriores se deberá al menos garantizar un mandato fijo a sus miembros.Por otra parte, dotar a la administración electoral de su propio presupuesto lepermitirá ser más impermeable a las posibles interferencias por parte del go-bierno y partidos políticos.

El observador de larga duración deberá evaluar si la administración elec-toral es independiente en su actuación.

b Imparcialidad de la Administración Electoral

La Administración Electoral debe actuar de forma imparcial sin favorecera ningún partido ni candidato.

c Transparencia de la Administración Electoral

La Administración Electoral debe actuar de forma transparente.

Sus reuniones deberán ser abiertas, y si así no fuera el caso, deberá almenos dar publicidad a sus decisiones en el menor tiempo posible.

Deberá también proporcionar a todos los actores electorales informaciónvital relativa al proceso electoral con gran impacto sobre la transparencia delmismo, como el censo, número de papeletas y tarjetas de votación emitidas ydistribuidas, sistema de reclutamiento de los miembros de las mesas electora-les, etc.

d Eficacia de la Administración Electoral

Como órgano responsable de la gestión y conducción de las elecciones,la Administración Electoral deberá cumplir con eficacia sus funciones. El ob-servador evaluará la viabilidad de los planes de la Administración Electoralrelativos al número previsto de colegios electorales, de miembros de las me-sas electorales, de urnas y cabinas de votación, etc. La Administración Elec-toral deberá también planificar con eficacia la distribución del material electo-


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ral, y la formación de los miembros de las mesas electorales. El observadordeberá en la medida de lo posible asistir a algunas de estas sesiones de for-mación.

6.3.—El Censo Electoral.

El proceso de registro constituye una fase esencial del proceso electoral,ya que un censo defectuoso puede desvirtuar los resultados electorales. Porel contrario, un censo fiable y lo más inclusivo posible constituye un ele-mento importante para reforzar la confianza del electorado en el proceso elec-toral. Por ello será objeto de una especial atención por parte de la Misión deObservación Electoral.

El observador deberá evaluar el grado de fiabilidad (niveles de incorrec-ción), transparencia y el carácter inclusivo del censo electoral. Éste debepermitir el cumplimiento del principio relativo al carácter universal del sufra-gio, por lo tanto debe ser lo más inclusivo posible.

El proceso de registro no es observado directamente por el observador,ya que en caso de registro de tipo activo en el que el elector acude a loscentros de registro a registrarse, éste se produce 4 ó 5 meses antes de laselecciones. Sin embargo, el observador podrá evaluar el nivel de fiabilidad, elcarácter inclusivo del censo y el grado de confianza que genera, a través delas entrevistas mantenidas con todos los actores del proceso electoral, par-tidos políticos, ciudadanos, electores, organizaciones de derechos humanos,de observación local y la Administración Electoral y local.

El observador deberá estar atento a las múltiples formas de exclusión delvoto mediante el proceso censal. En efecto, mediante el proceso de registrose puede excluir deliberadamente del censo, y por lo tanto del proceso elec-toral, a importantes segmentos incómodos de la población, como minorías obastiones de la oposición. Hay muchas formas de privar de su derecho alvoto a estos segmentos de la población:

1. En primer lugar, a través de la elaboración de un marco legal restricti-vo en el que se establecen restricciones injustificadas para el ejerciciodel derecho al voto, como las restricciones por razón de raza, género,religión, origen étnico, ideología, dominio de una lengua, nivel de al-fabetización, o capacidad económica. El observador prestará especialatención a las condiciones establecidas por la ley para la adquisición


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de la ciudadanía. Éstas en algunos casos se establecen para excluirdel derecho al voto a determinados segmentos de la población.

2. Existencia de altos niveles de errores en el censo.3. Inexistencia o ineficacia de métodos habilitados para corregir los erro-

res en el censo.

Por vías más sutiles:

• Por ejemplo, a través de una distribución mal intencionada de los cen-tros de registro que dificulta o simplemente imposibilita, el acceso dedeterminados segmentos de la población a éstos. En contextos africa-nos caracterizados por medios de comunicación y de transporte muyprecarios, ubicar los centros de registro a grandes distancias de de-terminados núcleos poblacionales, constituye un método eficaz deexcluir minorías o población opositora geográficamente concentrada.

• A través de una insuficiente dotación de material esencial de los cen-tros de registros, que imposibilita el registro de la población que acu-de a ser registrada.

• A través de una falta deliberada de información respecto al procesode registro.

6.4.—Registro de partidos y candidatos

El principio de universalidad que sustenta el derecho de voto se aplicatambién al derecho a ser candidato, por lo tanto el observador deberá:

1. Evaluar si los requisitos exigidos para el registro de partidos y candi-datos son injustificadamente restrictivos y destinados a eliminar de lacompetición electoral a determinados partidos y candidatos. Apartede las restricciones discriminatorias relativas a raza, género, ideolo-gía, afiliaciones políticas pasadas, religión u origen étnico, los requi-sitos siguientes son igualmente discriminatorios:

—Exigencia de depositar cantidades excesivamente elevadas de dinero afondo perdido, o sólo parcialmente reembolsable para poder concurrira las elecciones. Este requisito discrimina a los candidatos indepen-dientes, y a los partidos pequeños con pocos recursos económicos.

—Exigencia de contar con oficinas de representación en todas las re-giones del país. Este requisito impide la presencia en las eleccionesde partidos de base regional o étnico, y partidos representantes deminorías.


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—Exigencia de presentar un número excesivamente alto de firmas de apo-yo para presentarse como partido o candidato en las elecciones. Esterequisito reduce las posibilidades de concurrir a las elecciones a parti-dos pequeños o de reciente creación, y a candidatos independientes.La exigencia de presentar un elevado número de firmas repartidas porigual por todo el territorio nacional es aún más restrictiva.

—Exigencia de superar un examen lingüístico sobre el idioma nacional ex-cesivamente difícil. Este requisito puede discriminar a los partidos ycandidatos representantes de minorías.

2. Evaluar si los requisitos establecidos por la ley se aplican de formaimparcial y no discriminatoria.

6.5.—Campaña Electoral

A.—Los observadores deberán evaluar si los partidos y candidatos pue-den hacer campaña libremente sin obstáculos de ninguna clase. Para ello de-berán:

1. Analizar si el marco legal garantiza el disfrute de los derechos y liber-tades fundamentales como, libertad de expresión, asociación y movi-miento. Cualquier restricción de estas libertades afecta directamentela libertad de campaña.

2. Evaluar si el entorno permite a los partidos y candidatos llevar a cabosu campaña libre de violencia, intimidación y hostigamiento.

B.—Los observadores deberán también evaluar si se garantiza una cam-paña electoral equitativa, en la que ningún partido o candidato se vea favo-recido por el mal uso de los recursos estatales o locales, y en la que no seproduzcan interferencias indebidas de las autoridades locales, regionales oestatales, en beneficio de determinados candidatos. Para ello deberán:

1. Analizar si el marco legal garantiza una campaña equitativa para to-dos los partidos y candidatos, y prohíbe eficazmente las interferenciasindebidas de las autoridades locales, estatales o regionales.

2. Evaluar, en caso de que efectivamente se den dichas garantías lega-les, si se cumple correctamente la legislación, de forma imparcial, y nodiscriminatoria.

El observador deberá prestar atención entre otros elementos al uso inde-bido de vehículos estatales, u otros recursos materiales y humanos a favor


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de los candidatos gubernamentales, a la denegación injustificada por partede las autoridades locales o Administración Electoral del uso de espaciospúblicos para la celebración de mítines de los candidatos y partidos de laoposición. Si se autoriza el uso de espacios públicos, deberán estar disponi-bles para todos los partidos y candidatos sobre la misma base.

La ley deberá establecer claras disposiciones acerca de si los funciona-rios y empleados públicos pueden implicarse en la campaña electoral. En casode que lo permitiese, éstos no deberán participar en la campaña electoral os-tentando su función pública ya que tiene un efecto perverso sobre el proce-so electoral, especialmente en sistemas clientelares.

La legislación sobre financiación de campaña deberá ser clara y aplicarsepor igual a todos los partidos y candidatos.

6.6.—Campañas de educación al votante

Los observadores deberán evaluar la dimensión y eficacia de las campa-ñas de educación al votante, así como las campañas de educación cívica,esenciales en contextos de elevado analfabetismo.

Las campañas de educación al votante están destinadas a informar al vo-tante sobre los requisitos y procedimientos para ser registrado como votante(cómo, dónde registrarse para votar y plazos de verificación). También infor-marán sobre cómo y dónde votar el día de las elecciones.

La Administración Estatal es la principal responsable de garantizar que elvotante reciba a tiempo una información imparcial y objetiva.


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VI. OBSERVADORES DE CORTA DURACIÓN

1.—SALIDA DE LOS OBSERVADORES DE CORTA DURACIÓN Y LLE-GADA AL PAÍS ANFITRIÓN

Una vez que los OCDs hayan sido seleccionados por el organismo com-petente, la Oficina de Derechos Humanos del Ministerio de Asuntos Exterio-res y de Cooperación convocará una reunión en la cual el representante de laDirección Política correspondiente del Ministerio, y el responsable de obser-vación electoral de la Oficina, proporcionarán a los observadores informa-ción sobre el país de carácter general, política y electoral.

A su llegada a la capital del país, en el que se celebran las elecciones, y don-de permanecerán unos dos días, asistirán a varias sesiones informativas orga-nizadas por los distintos expertos del «Core Team». Esto les permitirá familiarizar-se con la situación política, el marco legal, el sistema electoral, los procedimientosseguidos en la votación y recuento, y los problemas que puedan aquejar al pro-


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ceso electoral como; censo defectuoso, violencia latente, una AdministraciónElectoral que goza de poca credibilidad y confianza, un ineficaz sistema de re-cursos, una insuficiente preparación de los miembros de la mesa, etc.

Se les comunicará el plan de despliegue: regiones a la que se les envía ynombre del compañero con el que harán equipo.

Se les presentará, asimismo, al conductor y al intérprete que acompañaraal equipo durante su período de trabajo.

2.—¿QUÉ FUNCIONES DESARROLLAN LOS OCD?

Su principal cometido es el de observar el día de la votación, recuento yel proceso de agregación. Transmitirán el resultado de sus observaciones me-diante varios formularios.

3.—CUESTIONES RELEVANTES PARA LA OBSERVACIÓN ELECTO-RAL DE CORTA DURACIÓN

3.1.—Formularios

Los formularios recogen los elementos a observar en base a las peculiarida-des del proceso electoral y problemas detectados por el «Core Team», y losobservadores de larga duración del proceso electoral. Por lo tanto variarán demisión en misión. Constituyen la base sobre la que la misión hará el análisis cuan-titativo del desarrollo de la votación, el recuento y la agregación de los resulta-dos. Servirán también para la valoración posterior que se hará del proceso elec-toral en su conjunto.

Los observadores cumplimentarán cuatro formularios durante la jornadaelectoral, un formulario de apertura, de votación, de cierre y recuento y deagregación.

3.2.—Metodología del despliegue

Se despliegan por un periodo de aproximadamente diez días en equiposde dos por todo el territorio nacional, llegando a su área de responsabilidadunos tres días antes de las elecciones.

Su despliegue por toda la geografía nacional permitirá al «Core Team»disponer de una fotografía casi instantánea del desarrollo de la votación,recuento y agregación de los resultados.


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Por otra parte, la presencia masiva de observadores distribuidos por todoel territorio permitirá reforzar la transparencia del proceso electoral, y por endela confianza del electorado en el mismo, lo cual contribuirá a aumentar laparticipación en las urnas.

El factor visibilidad constituye un aspecto importante de la metodologíade la observación electoral, ya que tiene obvios efectos disuasorios sobreprácticas irregulares, y constituye a la vez una clara señal de apoyo a la so-ciedad en su esfuerzo por conquistar su derecho a la participación política.

3.3.—Capacidad de penetración de la observación de corta duración

La eficacia o capacidad de penetración de la observación electoral de cortaduración dependerá de la capacidad de los observadores de entender la rea-lidad, y contexto socio-político en el que se desarrolla el proceso electoral yque lo condiciona.

Deberán por lo tanto, captar la importancia de fenómenos que tienen in-cidencia directa sobre la integridad del proceso. Deberán, por ejemplo, en-tender que la presencia sistemática de autoridades locales, o personas iden-tificadas con el poder dominante a las puertas de los colegios tiene un efectoclaramente intimidatorio en un contexto cultural donde sigue viva la memoriahistórica de un sistema totalitario y de control social rígido. Si no se percibeel impacto de este entorno intimidatorio, su observación de los aspectosmeramente técnicos puede llevarles a conclusiones erróneas.

La observación de corta duración no se reduce a una fría y automáticarecogida de datos técnicos, de ahí su complejidad.

4.—ACTIVIDADES DE LOS OCD A SU LLEGADA AL TERRENO.

4.1.—Sesión informativa por parte de los observadores de larga duración

A su llegada al terreno los observadores de larga duración les informaránsobre la realidad socio-política, y sobre el desarrollo del proceso electoral enla región.

Se les informará sobre la existencia, en su caso, de problemas relativos alproceso como: compra de votos, falta de independencia e imparcialidad de laAdministración Electoral, mesas electorales sólo aparentemente pluripar-tidistas, prácticas intimidatorios contra votantes y candidatos, registro devotantes defectuoso, voto múltiple, votación de menores, etc.


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Esta información les será muy útil para centrar su atención en aquellosaspectos susceptibles de comprometer la integridad de la votación y el re-cuento.

4.2.—Familiarización con el clima político del área de responsabilidad.

Los observadores de corta duración llegan a su área de responsabilidadunos tres días antes de la elección. Durante estos tres días, realizarán unaserie de actividades que les permitirá familiarizarse con el clima político, yproblemas propios de su área de responsabilidad.

Si así lo estiman oportuno los OLD les pedirán que asistan al cierre decampaña de los distintos partidos en liza, ya que constituye un buen mediopara valorar si existe un clima abierto y de libre discusión entre el electorado,o si por el contrario prevalece un clima de miedo y de reserva. A este fin,podrán preguntar a los electores asistentes si han tenido dificultades decualquier tipo para acudir al cierre de campaña, observarán el comportamien-to de las fuerzas de seguridad ya que una excesiva presencia puede ser indi-cativa de una voluntad y estrategia intimidatorias. Estarán atentos a los co-mentarios que los asistentes hagan durante el acto.

El recorrido por su área de responsabilidad les permitirá también familia-rizarse con el paisaje electoral, y valorar el clima político imperante en la zona.

Estarán atentos a todo tipo de signos externos, como la cantidad y el signopolítico de las pancartas de campaña visibles en espacios públicos o priva-dos como portales de casa, elementos útiles para valorar el clima político. Porejemplo, la existencia de pancartas y posters de partidos de la oposicióncolgados ante portales de casas privadas constituye una clara manifestacióndel libre ejercicio a la disensión política.

4.3.—Entrevistas con los actores electorales. Visibilidad

En un contexto de fragilidad institucional donde la Misión ha detectadoimportantes problemas que afectan al proceso electoral, deberán realizar unavisita a las autoridades locales, a la Administración Electoral correspondien-te y a los partidos políticos, no sólo por cortesía, sino para dar mayor visibi-lidad posible a la Misión, ya que, esta visibilidad tiene un efecto disuasoriosobre posibles comportamientos y prácticas irregulares.

Estas visitas también servirán para obtener información significativa so-bre el desarrollo del proceso electoral, posibles problemas el día de la vota-


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ción, (intimidación, violencia, problemas con el censo, votación de menores,fraudulenta distribución de tarjetas de votación, centro electoral problemáti-co), nivel de preparativos de las elecciones y grado de confianza en el proce-so electoral por parte de los actores políticos.

4.4.—Localización y determinación de la zona a observar.

El día anterior a las elecciones, los observadores electorales de corta du-ración, desplegados en equipo de dos, identificarán los colegios electoralesque visitarán el día de las elecciones estableciendo una ruta. Para esto con-tarán con el mapa y las direcciones que les hayan proporcionado el equipode OLD. Éstos les darán indicaciones generales de la zona a cubrir, o podránseñalarles colegios, o áreas concretas donde sospechen que puedan produ-cirse problemas.

Se trata de obtener una muestra representativa, y por ello, se procurarámantener un equilibrio entre zonas urbanas y zonas rurales. Es importante nodescuidar las zonas rurales ya que, aunque acogen una menor concentraciónde población, es allí donde se suelen producir las irregularidades más gravepor constituir un entorno más vulnerable a la presión e intimidación de loslíderes tradicionales y locales, y por ser, así pues, más propenso a un votocontrolado, y de más difícil acceso a la observación electoral.

Deberán seleccionar el colegio electoral de apertura y de cierre. Si se hadetectado la presencia sobre el terreno de otras organizaciones de observa-ción creíbles, se intentará coordinar con ellas la apertura y el cierre para evi-tar duplicidades.

Este mismo día suele producirse la distribución y recepción del materialelectoral en los colegios electorales, lo que les permitirá entrevistarse conmiembros de la mesa encargados de la recepción, y conocer el desarrollo delos preparativos y posibles problemas como la falta de material.

5.—PREMISAS PARA LA OBSERVACIÓN DE LA VOTACIÓN Y EL RE-CUENTO

5.1.—Deberán hacer uso del sentido común y de las informaciones pre-viamente recibidas sobre los condicionamientos socio-políticos-culturales, yel desarrollo del proceso electoral para discernir entre simples deficienciastécnicas, debidas esencialmente a la falta de experiencia de miembros de lamesa y votantes, sin impacto significativo sobre los resultados, y las irregu-


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laridades graves que desvirtúan los resultados y comprometen la integridaddel proceso electoral; como por ejemplo, dejar votar a personas sin derechoa voto, no dejar votar electores inscritos en el censo, permitir la votaciónmúltiple, no garantizar el secreto del voto en un entorno marcadamenteintimidatorio.

5.2.—Nunca deberán hablar con la prensa para valorar el proceso, ya quesólo disponen de una visión parcial del mismo, y prejuzgan de este modo dela valoración final del «Core Team», ver Código de Conducta.

5.3.—En contextos de fragilidad democrática, marco habitual de la obser-vación electoral, el proceso de apertura, votación, recuento y agregación delos resultados se halla protegido por toda una serie de salvaguardias quepretenden garantizar la limpieza del proceso electoral.

El observador deberá estar por lo tanto muy atento a estas salvaguardias:

— sellado de la urna,— contabilización de las papeletas recibidas,— autentificación de las papeletas con un sello o firma de un miembro de

la mesa antes de entregarla al votante,— firma del censo por el votante,— uso obligatorio de la cabina de votación,— uso de la tinta indeleble.

Éstas son salvaguardias que pretenden evitar graves irregularidades comorelleno de urnas, voto múltiple, manipulación de los resultados y violacióndel secreto del voto en contextos marcadamente intimidatorios.

6.—APERTURA DE LOS COLEGIOS

Los observadores llegarán al primer colegio una hora antes de la apertu-ra, para observar los preparativos para la apertura de la votación, y constitu-ción de la mesa. Tendrán que cumplimentar un formulario de apertura.

a En primer lugar, deberán observar si la mesa se ha constituido de acuerdocon los procedimientos previstos por la ley, relativos a la acreditación de losmiembros de la mesa y al quórum necesario para la constitución de la misma.

b En esta fase, los miembros de la mesa debidamente acreditados deberáncontar el número de papeletas, y anotarlas en el acta de apertura, operación ne-cesaria para la posterior conciliación entre votos emitidos y papeletas recibidas.


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c El observador deberá anotar el número de papeletas recibidas para queasí la misión pueda rastrear cualquier discrepancia entre el número de pape-letas recibidas, y el número de votos emitidos.

d Las papeletas recibidas deben superar sólo ligeramente el númerode votantes inscritos para evitar cualquier riesgo de relleno de urnas, «Ballotstuffing». Una discrepancia considerable entre el número de votantes ins-critos y las papeletas recibidas, puede ser indicativa de una estrategia frau-dulenta.

e El sellado de la urna constituye un momento importante de los prepa-rativos para la apertura. El observador deberá estar atento a que el Presiden-te de la mesa enseñe la urna a todos los presentes antes de sellarla.

Se sella la urna con uno o varios sellos de plásticos, cuyo número deserie es anotado por observadores y representantes de partidos. Esto lespermitirá comprobar al cierre que no ha habido manipulación de la urna. Espor lo tanto importante observar si se cumplen estos procedimientos, y nose obstaculiza por parte de los miembros de la mesa la anotación del númerode sello.

f La presencia de observadores domésticos y representantes, constitu-ye una garantía de la transparencia del proceso, por lo tanto constituye unelemento esencial a observar.

g La falta de material sensible, urna, papeletas, censo y tinta indeleble,puede privar del derecho al voto a numerosos votantes, o comprometer latransparencia del proceso, por lo que deberá ser anotado por los OCD. Pue-de responder a una deficiencia técnica, o a una estrategia deliberada.

h Los observadores deberán anotar la hora de apertura. Si por ejemplo,los colegios electorales abren con dos o tres horas de retraso con respectoa la hora prevista, sin que por ello se aplace la hora de cierre en la mismaproporción. De esta forma numerosos electores pueden verse privados de suderecho a votar.

7.—OBSERVACIÓN MÚLTIPLE DE COLEGIOS ELECTORALES.

Los Observadores de corta duración visitarán tras la apertura, un prome-dio de entre 10 y 15 colegios electorales. Permanecerán un promedio de 30minutos o más si lo estiman necesario, en el caso de que se estén producien-do problemas.

4


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7.1.—Metodología

• Se presentarán a los miembros de la mesa.• Sin obstaculizar el desarrollo de la votación, solicitarán al presidente

de la mesa algunos datos como numero de votantes registrados, vo-tos emitidos, número de votantes no encontrados en el censo, núme-ro de papeleteas, etc.

• Anotarán cualquier irregularidad o deficiencia, y con una actitud cons-tructiva podrán llamar la atención de los miembros de la mesa sobreesta irregularidad o deficiencia, de forma educada, sin imposiciones ysin obstaculizar el proceso de votación.

• Se acercarán a los representantes de los partidos y observadores lo-cales, para obtener su impresión sobre el desarrollo de la votación encolegio electoral.

• Anotarán cualquier reclamación o denuncia sobre irregularidades quele presenten los observadores locales, representantes de partidos olos votantes. Si pueden, intentarán contrastarla. Por ejemplo, si algúnrepresentante les informa que en un determinado colegio se estáintimidando, o menores están votando, procurarán acudir al colegioelectoral en cuestión para contrastar la información pero también paraproducir un efecto disuasorio, siempre y cuando las consideracionessobre la seguridad lo permitan.

• Podrán hablar con los votantes para evaluar su confianza en el proce-so electoral, preguntarles si creen que su voto fue secreto cuando nose dieron las condiciones para asegurar un voto secreto

• Podrán valorar la eficacia de las campañas de educación al votante,preguntándoles si estaban familiarizados con los procedimientos de lavotación, y si recibieron suficiente información para decidir su opción.

Los formularios variarán de misión en misión. Si el proceso de registro delos votantes ha sido cuestionado por los interlocutores, su grado de inclu-sión será objeto de especial atención el día de la votación. El día de las elec-ciones se pone a prueba la calidad del censo.

7.2.—Entorno

El primer elemento que deben observar los observadores de corta dura-ción es el entorno en el que se produce la votación. Deberán detectar cual-quier actividad intimidatoria dirigida hacia los votantes en las inmediacionesde los recintos electorales.


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No es fácil ya que muchas veces la intimidación se ejerce de forma indi-recta, y es difícilmente perceptible por el observador.

— La presencia de autoridades locales, o líderes tradicionales en el recintoelectoral, puede constituir una forma de intimidación en un entorno rural,donde esas autoridades ejercen una importante influencia.

— Los OCD deberán prestar especial atención a la presencia y comporta-miento de las fuerzas de seguridad. Una presencia excesiva de fuerzasde seguridad también puede producir un efecto intimidatorio, sobreto-do si se da en un contexto de post conflicto en zonas de ex rebeldes.

— Los observadores prestarán atención a la presencia o ausencia de ma-terial de campaña, o si se está desarrollando alguna actividad de cam-paña en violación de la normativa electoral.

7.3.—Observación dentro del colegio electoral

7.3.1.—¿Qué observar?

Los observadores deberán evaluar si se respetan los procedimientos elec-torales.

Los aspectos importantes que deben ser observados son los siguientes:

• Si se detecta la presencia de personas no autorizadas dentro del re-cinto electoral, autoridades locales, líderes tradicionales, etc. Éstastienen capacidad de ejercer cierta intimidación sobre los votantes, so-bretodo en sociedades de tipo comunitario o con un pasado de con-trol social y político rígido.

• Si se identifica correctamente a los votantes con la documentaciónadecuada, DNI o tarjeta de votación, o cualquier otro documento pre-visto por la ley.

• Si se verifica que el dedo no tiene tinta antes de dejarle votar.• Si se deja votar sólo a los que figuran en el censo.• Si se detecta si muchas personas no han podido votar por no estar en

el censo. Si no se observa directamente, se preguntará al presidentede la mesa sobre el número de personas que no pudieron votar porno encontrarse en el censo. Este elemento se incluye en el cuestiona-rio para evaluar la dimensión de las posibles deficiencias del registro,y su impacto en el proceso electoral. Se puede comprometer la integri-dad del proceso, excluyendo del censo segmentos de la población.

• Si se observa casos de suplantación, es decir si personas registradasno han podido votar porque ya otros habían votado en su lugar.


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• Si se produce un uso fraudulento de tarjetas de votación.• Si existen indicios de voto múltiple. La posibilidad de registrarse en

una lista adicional el día de la votación junto al no uso de la tinteindeleble puede facilitar el voto múltiple.

• Si se garantiza y respeta el secreto del voto mediante la correcta colo-cación, y uso de las cabinas de votación. En un contexto intimidatorio,o en un contexto de gran pobreza en el que la práctica de la compradel voto está muy extendida, garantizar el secreto del voto constituyeuna salvaguardia importante.

• Si los miembros de la mesa actúan de forma imparcial, neutral y profe-sional sin influir en el votante.

• Si la composición multipartidista de las mesas electorales es real o falaz.• Si se asiste correctamente a las personas que necesitan asistencia, anal-

fabetos, personas con discapacidad, etc.• Si se observa voto familiar. El derecho al sufragio prescribe un voto

en secreto y en persona. Este tipo de voto suele comprometer el de-recho al voto de las mujeres.

• Si las papeletas son firmadas o selladas antes de entregarlas. Se debecumplir con ese procedimiento para evitar el uso fraudulento de pape-letas para rellenar urnas.

• Si los votantes firman el registro tras votar. Este procedimiento cons-tituye una salvaguardia contra el voto múltiple.

• Si se aplica la tinta indeleble, garantía contra el voto múltiple.• Si observadores locales y representantes de partido están presentes

en los colegios electorales. Su presencia constituye una garantía parala transparencia del proceso. La posible presencia de observadoreselectorales locales y representantes falsos de partidos políticos, res-ponde a la voluntad de mantener ante los votantes y la ComunidadInternacional la falacia de un control plural del proceso electoral.

• Si se producen actos intimidatorios o de violencia, contra los votan-tes o personal electoral, tanto en las inmediaciones de los centros elec-torales como dentro de los colegios electorales.

• Si existen «colegios electorales fantasmas». Son Colegios electoralesregistrados oficialmente como tales, en los que ninguna votación tie-ne lugar, pero para los cuales se publican resultados.

• Se deberá evaluar el nivel de entendimiento de los procedimientos,por parte de los votantes en contextos de alta tasa de analfabetismo,al igual que la preparación de los miembros de la mesa para acometersus funciones.


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• En caso de que la ley electoral contemple la constitución de «closedpolling stations», los observadores deberán visitar estos colegios elec-torales especiales. Son universidades, prisiones, hospitales o cuartelesconvertidos en lugar de votación, exclusivamente para los trabajadoresde estas instituciones. Estos colegios especiales constituyen un entor-no propicio a la intimidación, por la dependencia orgánica y económicade sus trabajadores/votantes, lo que compromete la libertad de voto.

7.3.2.—¿Cómo valorar el proceso de votación?

La observación de corta duración no debe reducirse a una simple y fríarecogida de datos técnico. El observador debe tener en cuenta la realidad delpaís, condiciones materiales y factores culturales, para evaluar en su conjun-to el proceso de votación y recuento. Las votaciones tienen lugar algunasveces en condiciones materiales muy precarias. Si las deficiencias observa-das no comprometen el principio de votación libre, la valoración general podráser relativamente positiva.

8—CIERRE Y RECUENTO

8.1.—¿Qué hay que observar en el cierre?

Los observadores deben valorar:

• si el cierre se realiza de acuerdo con los procedimientos establecidosen la ley.

• Si se deja votar a los votantes que están en la cola a la hora del cierrede la votación.

• Si se procede a contar el número de papeletas entregadas, dañadas yno usadas, y se refleja correctamente en las actas estas operaciones,imprescindibles para las posteriores operaciones de conciliación queavalan la integridad del proceso.

• Si se conservan las papeletas no usadas y dañadas en sobres previs-tos a tal efecto, para evitar un uso fraudulento de estas papeletas.

8.2.—¿Qué hay que observar en el recuento?

En situaciones de fragilidad institucional, puede producirse todo tipo demanipulaciones y falsificaciones en esta fase. Los observadores evaluarán latransparencia del recuento y el cumplimiento de los procedimientos. En con-creto observarán:


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• Si el sello de la urna es el mismo que fue anotado por la mañana porobservadores y representantes de los partidos, lo que certifica que laurna no ha sido manipulada.

• Si se permite la presencia de observadores electorales y representan-tes de los partidos y candidatos independientes.

• Si se les permite colocarse a una distancia adecuada para presenciar,sin dificultades, el proceso de recuento en su integridad. Si se mues-tra de forma visible a todos los presentes las papeletas.

• Si se invalida de forma arbitraria, afectando sistemáticamente algúnpartido en concreto. El abanico de votos inválidos considerado nor-mal se sitúa entre un 1% y 5%, incluso en contextos de elevado anal-fabetismo.

• Si se guardan los votos inválidos para una posible revisión posterior.• Si no hubo discrepancias significativas en las operaciones de conci-

liación; número de votos emitidos, número de papeletas recibidas ynúmero de votantes registrados.

• Si se entrega una copia del acta de los resultados a representantes departidos y observadores, como medida de garantía contra la posteriormanipulación de resultados.

• Si se expone el acta de los resultados a la puerta del colegio electoral.Esta medida constituye una importante salvaguardia que garantiza latransparencia del proceso de recuento, al proporcionar información vitala partidos y votantes para verificar los resultados, y por lo tanto per-mitir la detección de posteriores manipulaciones y documentar loscontenciosos electorales.

Algunas veces se decide no realizar el recuento en el colegio sino a unnivel superior, en el que se mezclan las papeletas de varios colegios electo-rales, para dar garantía al electorado de comunidades pequeñas de que suvoto no podrá ser rastreado, y de que por lo tanto no podrán ser objeto deningún tipo de represalias. En sociedades con una memoria viva de un re-ciente pasado totalitario, esta medida infunde confianza en el electorado.

9.—AGREGACIÓN DE LOS RESULTADOS.

Tras el recuento, los observadores deberán acompañar al presidente dela mesa del colegio electoral con las urnas, hasta las instituciones encarga-das de la recogida y agregación de los resultados a nivel regional. Debenobservar el proceso de agregación en su integridad, y evaluar su transparen-


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cia, y si se desarrolla conforme a la normativa electoral. Deberán estar prepa-rados para trabajar hasta altas horas de la madrugada.

Existe en esta fase un alto riesgo de manipulación y falsificación de losresultados. Pueden detectarse a este nivel importantes discrepancias entrelos resultados publicados a nivel de los colegios electorales, y los resulta-dos anunciados en la fase de agregación para estos mismos colegios elec-torales.

10.—TRANSMISIÓN DE LOS RESULTADOS DE LA OBSERVACIÓN

Los observadores de corta duración deberán durante el día de la vota-ción transmitir los resultados de sus observaciones, recogidos en los distin-tos formularios, a sus observadores de larga duración quienes a su vez lostransmitirán al «Core Team». Deberán asimismo respetar el esquema de trans-misión preestablecido por el equipo de observadores de larga duración. Porlo general la transmisión se hará por vía telefónica (móvil o satélite en casode falta de cobertura). Se transmitirán los datos relativos a la apertura entrelas 9 y las 10 horas de la mañana. Los datos relativos a la observación de lavotación en los distintos colegios electorales, se transmitirán justo despuésde la finalización de la jornada electoral. Tras finalizar el recuento, los obser-vadores de corta duración transmitirán los datos relativos al cierre y recuen-to. En caso de que deban observar el proceso de agregación, transmitirán lainformación requerida al finalizar dicho proceso.

11.—FORMULARIOS


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VII. PROCESO DE SELECCIÓNDE LOS OBSERVADORES ELECTORALES ESPAÑOLES

1.—CONSIDERACIONES GENERALES

La Oficina de Derechos Humanos del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores yde Cooperación es la unidad encargada de seleccionar a los observadoreselectorales españoles de corta y larga duración, tanto en el ámbito de la OSCEcomo el de la UE.

En ambos casos, utiliza los criterios siguientes para la selección de losobservadores:

• deben tener experiencia previa en observación electoral internacional, o,• deben haber participado en uno de los cursos de capacitación para

observadores de corta duración, que la Oficina de Derechos Huma-nos realiza dos veces al año en la Escuela Diplomática, o en otroscentros de la geografía nacional.


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Para poder optar a ser observador de larga duración, se exige experiencia previaen observación electoral de larga duración, o haber acumulado varias experien-cias en observación de corta duración. Para ser observador de corta duración serequiere experiencia previa, o haber participado en los cursos mencionados.

Teléfono y dirección de contacto de la Oficina de Derechos Humanos conrespecto a la observación electoral: 913798572, [email protected]

2.—PROCESO DE SELECCIÓN DE LOS OBSERVADORES ESPAÑOLESEN EL ÁMBITO DE LA OSCE

En primer lugar la Oficina de Derechos Humanos recibe una Nota, de laOficina para las Instituciones Democráticas y los Derechos Humanos (ODIHRen sus siglas inglesas, OIDDH en sus siglas españolas), en la que informa alos Estados Miembros del despliegue de una misión de observación electoralpara unas elecciones determinadas, y el número total de observadores reque-ridos. En esta misma Nota la OIDDH solicita a los Estados Miembros que apor-ten un número indeterminado de observadores de larga y corta duración.

Tras la recepción de esta Nota, la Oficina de Derechos Humanos en coor-dinación con la Dirección Política correspondiente, decidirá la oportunidadpolítica de mandar observadores electorales españoles, y el número de ob-servadores a desplegar.

En caso afirmativo, enviará por correo electrónico a los observadores queestán incluidos en una base de datos, una convocatoria en la que solicita alas personas interesadas que manden su CV, y procederá a la selección delos observadores de larga y corta duración. Una vez la selección finalizada,remitirá los nombres de los observadores seleccionados a la OIDDH.

La Secretaría de Estado de Asuntos Exteriores del Ministerio de AsuntosExteriores y de Cooperación sufraga la totalidad de los gastos derivados dela participación de los observadores españoles en las misiones de observa-ción electoral de la OSCE.

3.—PROCESOS DE SELECCIÓN DE LOS OBSERVADORES ESPAÑO-LES EN EL ÁMBITO DE LA UE

Aparte de cumplir con uno de los dos criterios mencionados al principiode este capítulo, los observadores españoles que quieran participar en lasmisiones de observación de la UE, deberán previamente incluir su CV en el


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Roster de observadores que la UE tiene habilitado a este fin y cuya direcciónes la siguiente: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/europeaid/observer/index_en.htm

Como primer paso, la Comisión envía a la Oficina de Derechos Humanosuna Nota, en la que informa del despliegue de una misión de observaciónelectoral a unas elecciones determinadas, y en la que solicita a cada EstadoMiembro que le remita una preselección de un número determinado de ob-servadores de larga y corta duración.

Tras la recepción de esta Nota, la Oficina envía por correo electrónico alos observadores que tiene incluidos en una base de datos, una convocato-ria en la que solicita a las personas interesadas que envíen su CV. Posterior-mente, procederá a la selección de las candidaturas que presentará a la Comi-sión. Ésta hará una selección final sobre las candidaturas presentadas.

La UE sufraga la totalidad de los gastos derivada de la participación delos observadores en sus misiones de observación electoral.

Las personas incluidas en la base de datos de la Oficina de derechos Hu-manos, son los observadores que cuentan con experiencia previa, y los par-ticipantes a los cursos de capacitación sobre observación electoral de cortaduración organizados por la Oficina de Derechos Humanos en colaboracióncon la Escuela Diplomática u otros organismos.


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VIII. CÓDIGO DE CONDUCTA

Todas las organizaciones intergubernamentales, y organizaciones inter-nacionales no gubernamentales de observación electoral, han ido adoptandosus propios códigos de conducta, vinculantes para los miembros de las mi-siones de observación electoral internacional. No obstante, estos distintoscódigos de conducta se estructuran alrededor de los siguientes principiosbásicos comunes: respeto a la soberanía del país anfitrión, respeto a las le-yes del país anfitrión, imparcialidad de los observadores, no interferencia enel proceso electoral, transparencia y profesionalismo en la ejecución de susfunciones, contacto reglado con los medios de comunicación, derechos y obli-gaciones de los observadores ante la misión de observación electoral.

En un esfuerzo de homogeneizar los distintos códigos de conductaoperativos en las diferentes organizaciones de observación electoral interna-cional, se adoptó en octubre del 2005 bajo los auspicios de Naciones Unidasun Código de Conducta para los Observadores Electorales Internacionales,


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junto con una Declaración de Principios para la Observación Electoral Inter-nacional. Ambos documentos fueron suscritos por 21 organizaciones inter-nacionales de observación electoral, entre las que destacan, la ComisiónEuropea, la OSCE, Naciones Unidas, la Organización de Estados Americanos,la Unión Africana, el Consejo de Europa, la Unión Interparlamentaria, el Se-cretariado de la Commonwealth, el Centro Carter, IFES, Asian Network for FreeElections y otras diez más.

Se reproduce a continuación el citado Código de Conducta para Obser-vadores Electorales Internacionales.

La observación electoral internacional está ampliamente aceptada en todoel mundo. Se realiza por organizaciones intergubernamentales, y organizacio-nes y asociaciones internacionales no gubernamentales, con el fin de propor-cionar una evaluación imparcial y precisa de la naturaleza del proceso electo-ral, para beneficio, de la población del país en el que se celebra la elección, yde la Comunidad Internacional. Por lo tanto, el éxito de la misma depende de lacapacidad de garantizar la integridad de la observación electoral internacional,y de todos aquellos que forman parte de esa misión de observación electoralinternacional, incluyendo los observadores de corta y larga duración, los miem-bros de las delegaciones de evaluación, los expertos y los jefes de misión, loscuales deben suscribir y respetar este Código de Conducta.

Respetar la soberanía y los Derechos Humanos Internacionales

Las elecciones constituyen una expresión de la soberanía que perteneceal pueblo de un país, cuya libre expresión de la voluntad proporciona la basede la autoridad y legitimidad del gobierno. El derecho de los ciudadanos avotar, y ser elegidos, en elecciones periódicas y auténticas, constituyen de-rechos humanos internacionalmente reconocidos, y requieren el ejercicio deun número de derechos y libertades fundamentales. Los observadores elec-torales deben respetar la soberanía del país anfitrión, así como los derechosy libertades de su pueblo.

Respetar las Leyes del País y de la Autoridadde los Organismos Electorales

Los observadores deben respetar les leyes del país anfitrión, y la auto-ridad de los organismos encargados de administrar el proceso electoral. Losobservadores deben respetar cualquier instrucción legal procedente de las


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autoridades gubernamentales, electorales y de las fuerzas de seguridad delpaís. Los observadores deben también mantener una actitud respetuosahacia los funcionarios de la administración electoral, y otras autoridadesnacionales. Los observadores deben tomar nota de si las leyes, regulacio-nes o las acciones de los funcionarios electorales y/o estatales restringeny obstaculizan indebidamente el ejercicio de los derechos electorales ga-rantizados por la ley, la constitución, o por instrumentos internacionalesaplicables.

Respetar la integridad de la Misiónde Observación Electoral Internacional

Los observadores deben respetar y proteger la integridad de la misión deobservación electoral internacional. Ello implica, respetar este Código de Con-ducta, cualquier instrucción escrita (como los términos de referencia, directri-ces, y reglas), y cualquier instrucción verbal procedente del equipo dirigentede la misión de observación. Los Observadores deben: asistir a todos los«briefings», sesiones de formación, y «debriefings» exigidos por la misiónde observación; familiarizarse con la ley electoral, regulaciones y otras leyespertinentes indicadas por la misión de observación; y observar cuidadosa-mente las metodologías empleadas por la misión de observación. Los obser-vadores deben también informar al equipo dirigente de la misión de observa-ción, acerca de cualquier conflicto de intereses que puedan tener y sobrecualquier comportamiento impropio de otros observadores que forman partede la misión.

Mantener en todo momento una estricta imparcialidad política

Los observadores deben mantener en todo momento, una estricta impar-cialidad política, incluso en su tiempo de ocio en el país anfitrión. No debenexpresar ni mostrar ningún sesgo, o preferencia, con respecto a las autorida-des nacionales, partidos políticos, candidatos, cuestiones sometidas a refe-réndum, o en relación a cualquier tema polémico del proceso electoral. Losobservadores tampoco deben llevar a cabo, ninguna actividad que pudierarazonablemente percibirse como una actividad que favorece, o proporcionaun beneficio partidista, a cualquier contendiente político en el país anfitrión,tales como llevar o exhibir símbolos partidista, colores, banderolas o aceptarcualquier objeto de valor de los contendientes políticos.


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No obstaculizar los Procesos Electorales

Los observadores no deben obstaculizar ningún aspecto del proceso elec-toral, incluyendo procesos preelectorales, la votación, el recuento y la agre-gación de los resultados y los procesos surgidos en el periodo postelectoral.Los observadores pueden en el mismo momento llamar la atención del perso-nal electoral sobre irregularidades, fraude o problemas significativos obser-vados, y deben hacerlo sin obstaculizar el proceso. Los observadores pue-den plantear preguntas al personal electoral, a los representantes de lospartidos y otros observadores dentro de los colegios electorales, y puedencontestar a las preguntas sobre su propia actividad, siempre y cuando, losobservadores no obstaculicen el proceso electoral. Al contestar a las pre-guntas, los observadores no deberían intentar dirigir el proceso electoral. Losobservadores pueden preguntar a los votantes y contestar preguntas de losvotantes, pero no pueden pedirles que desvelen por quién o qué partido, opor que opción del referéndum votaron.

Proporcionar una identificación adecuada

Los observadores deben mostrar la identificación proporcionada por lamisión de observación electoral, así como la identificación exigida por las au-toridades nacionales, y deben presentarla al personal electoral y otras auto-ridades nacionales a requerimiento suyo.

Mantener la precisión de las observacionesy el profesionalismo al extraer conclusiones

Los observadores deben asegurarse de que todas sus observacionesson precisas. Las observaciones deben ser exhaustivas, señalando tantolos factores positivos como los negativos, distinguiendo entre los factoressignificativos e insignificantes, e identificando pautas que podrían tener unimpacto importante sobre la integridad del proceso electoral. Los juicios delos observadores deben basarse sobre el más alto nivel de precisión en lainformación, y de imparcialidad en el análisis, distinguiendo entre los fac-tores subjetivos y la evidencia objetiva. Los observadores deben basar susconclusiones sobre hechos comprobados, y no deben sacar conclusionesde forma prematura. Los observadores deben también mantener un registrobien documentado, de dónde observaron, de las observaciones realizadas


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y cualquier otra información pertinente requerida por la misión de observa-ción, y deben devolver esta documentación a la misión.

Abstenerse de hacer comentarios al públicoo los Medios de Comunicación antes de que la Misión se pronuncie

Los observadores deben abstenerse de hacer cualquier comentario sobresus observaciones o conclusiones a los medios de comunicación, o los miem-bros del público, antes de que la misión de observación realice una declara-ción, a menos que específicamente se le instruya lo contrario, por parte delequipo dirigente de la misión de observación. Los observadores pueden ex-plicar la naturaleza de la misión de observación, de sus actividades y otrosasuntos que la misión de observación estime adecuados, y deberían remitir alos medios de comunicación u otras personas interesadas, a las personasdesignadas por la misión de observación electoral.

Cooperar con otros Observadores Electorales

Los observadores deben ser conscientes de la presencia de otras misio-nes de observación electoral, tanto internacionales como locales, y cooperarcon ellos siguiendo las instrucciones del equipo dirigente de la misión deobservación electoral.

Mantener un comportamiento personal adecuado

Los observadores deben mantener un comportamiento personal adecua-do y respetar otros comportamientos, mostrar sensibilidad por las culturas ycostumbres del país anfitrión, ejercer el sentido común en las relacionesinterpersonales, y observar en todo momento el nivel más alto de conductaprofesional, inclusive en el tiempo libre.

Violaciones de este Código de Conducta

En caso de sospecha sobre la violación de este Código de Conducta, lamisión de observación electoral llevará a cabo una investigación al respecto.Si se comprueba que se ha producido una violación grave, se podrá retirar laacreditación al observador implicado o despedirle de la misión de observa-ción. Tales decisiones son de la exclusiva competencia del equipo dirigentede la misión de observación electoral.


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Compromiso de observancia de este Código de Conducta

Cada persona que participa en una misión de observación electoral debeleer y entender este Código de Conducta, y debe firmar una declaración com-prometiéndose a observarlo.


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A N E X O S


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DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLESFOR INTERNATIONAL

ELECTION OBSERVATION

and

CODE OF CONDUCTFOR INTERNATIONAL

ELECTION OBSERVERS

Anexo 1

6


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Commemorated October 27, 2005, at the United Nations, New York

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES FOR INTERNATIONAL ELECTIONOBSERVATION

and

CODE OF CONDUCT FOR INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVERS

Commemorated October 27, 2005, at the United Nations, New York

Endorsing Organizations as of October 24, 2005:

African UnionAsian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL)The Carter CenterCenter for Electoral Promotion and Assistance (CAPEL)Commonwealth SecretariatCouncil of Europe European Commission for Democracy

through Law (Venice Commission)Council of Europe - Parliamentary AssemblyElectoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA)European CommissionEuropean Network of Election Monitoring Organizations

(ENEMO)Electoral Reform International Services (ERIS)IFESInternational IDEAInter-Parliamentary UnionInternational Republican Institute (IRI)National Democratic Institute (NDI)Organization of American States (OAS)Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe,

Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights


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(OSCE/ODIHR)Pacific Islands, Australia & New ZealandElectoral Administrators' Association (PIANZEA)

Pacific Island ForumUnited Nations

This Declaration and the accompanying Code of Conduct for InternationalElection Observers remain open for endorsement by other intergovernmentaland international nongovernmental organizations. Endorsements should berecorded with the United Nations Electoral Assistance Division.

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES FOR INTERNATIONAL ELECTIONOBSERVATION

October 27, 2005

Genuine democratic elections are an expression of sovereignty, whichbelongs to the people of a country, the free expression of whose willprovides the basis for the authority and legitimacy of government. Therights of citizens to vote and to be elected at periodic, genuinedemocratic elections are internationally recognized human rights.Genuine democratic elections serve to resolve peacefully thecompetition for political power within a country and thus are centralto the maintenance of peace and stability. Where governments arelegitimized through genuine democratic elections, the scope for non-democratic challenges to power is reduced.Genuine democratic elections are a requisite condition for democraticgovernance, because they are the vehicle through which the peopleof a country freely express their will, on a basis established by law, asto who shall have the legitimacy to govern in their name and in theirinterests. Achieving genuine democratic elections is a part ofestablishing broader processes and institutions of democraticgovernance. Therefore, while all election processes should reflect uni-versal principles for genuine democratic elections, no election can beseparated from the political, cultural and historical context in which ittakes place.Genuine democratic elections cannot be achieved unless a wide rangeof other human rights and fundamental freedoms can be exercised on


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an ongoing basis without discrimination based on race, colour, sex,language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,property, birth or other status, including among others disabilities, andwithout arbitrary and unreasonable restrictions. They, like other humanrights and democracy more broadly, cannot be achieved without theprotections of the rule of law. These precepts are recognized by humanrights and other international instruments and by the documents ofnumerous intergovernmental organizations. Achieving genuinedemocratic elections therefore has become a matter of concern forinternational organizations, just as it is the concern of nationalinstitutions, political competitors, citizens and their civic organizations.International election observation expresses the interest of theinternational community in the achievement of democratic elections,as part of democratic development, including respect for human rightsand the rule of law. International election observation, which focuseson civil and political rights, is part of international human rightsmonitoring and must be conducted on the basis of the higheststandards for impartiality concerning national political competitors andmust be free from any bilateral or multilateral considerations that couldconflict with impartiality. It assesses election processes in accordancewith international principles for genuine democratic elections anddomestic law, while recognizing that it is the people of a country whoultimately determine credibility and legitimacy of an election process.

International election observation has the potential to enhance theintegrity of election processes, by deterring and exposing irregularities andfraud and by providing recommendations for improving electoral processes.It can promote public confidence, as warranted, promote electoral participationand mitigate the potential for election-related conflict. It also serves to enhanceinternational understanding through the sharing of experiences andinformation about democratic development.

International election observation has become widely accepted aroundthe world and plays an important role in providing accurate and impartialassessments about the nature of electoral processes. Accurate and impartialinternational election observation requires credible methodologies andcooperation with national authorities, the national political competitors(political parties, candidates and supporters of positions on referenda),domestic election monitoring organizations and other credible internationalelection observer organizations, among others.


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The intergovernmental and international nongovernmental organizationsendorsing this Declaration and the accompanying Code of Conduct forInternational Election Observers therefore have joined to declare:

1 Genuine democratic elections are an expression of sovereignty, whichbelongs to the people ofa country, the free expression of whose will provides the basis for theauthority and legitimacyof government. The rights of citizens to vote and to be elected atperiodic, genuine democraticelections are internationally recognized human rights. Genuinedemocratic elections are centralfor maintaining peace and stability, and they provide the mandate fordemocratic governance.

2 In accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, theInternational Covenant forCivil and Political Rights and other international instruments, everyonehas the right and mustbe provided with the opportunity to participate in the government andpublic affairs of his orher country, without any discrimination prohibited by internationalhuman rights principles andwithout any unreasonable restrictions. This right can be exerciseddirectly, by participating inreferenda, standing for elected office and by other means, or can beexercised through freelychosen representatives.

3 The will of the people of a country is the basis for the authority ofgovernment, and thatwill must be determined through genuine periodic elections, whichguarantee the right andopportunity to vote freely and to be elected fairly through universaland equal suffrage bysecret balloting or equivalent free voting procedures, the results ofwhich are accuratelycounted, announced and respected. A significant number of rights andfreedoms, processes,


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laws and institutions are therefore involved in achieving genuinedemocratic elections.

4 International election observation is: the systematic, comprehensiveand accurate gathering ofinformation concerning the laws, processes and institutions relatedto the conduct of electionsand other factors concerning the overall electoral environment; theimpartial and professionalanalysis of such information; and the drawing of conclusions aboutthe character of electoralprocesses based on the highest standards for accuracy of informationand impartiality ofanalysis. International election observation should, when possible,offer recommendationsfor improving the integrity and effectiveness of electoral and relatedprocesses, while notinterfering in and thus hindering such processes. International electionobservation missionsare: organized efforts of intergovernmental and internationalnongovernmental organizationsand associations to conduct international election observation.

5 International election observation evaluates pre-election, election-dayand post-election periods through comprehensive, long-termobservation, employing a variety of techniques. As part of these efforts,specialized observation missions may examine limited pre-election orpost-election issues and specific processes (such as, delimitation ofelection districts, voter registration, use of electronic technologies andfunctioning of electoral complaint mechanisms). Stand-alone,specialized observation missions may also be employed, as long assuch missions make clear public statements that their activities andconclusions are limited in scope and that they draw no conclusionsabout the overall election process based on such limited activities.All observer missions must make concerted efforts to place the electionday into its context and not to over-emphasize the importance ofelection day observations. International election observation exami-nes conditions relating to the right to vote and to be elected, including,among other things, discrimination or other obstacles that hinder


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participation in electoral processes based on political or other opinion,gender, race, colour, ethnicity, language, religion, national or socialorigin, property, birth or other status, such as physical disabilities. Thefindings of international election observation missions provide a fac-tual common point of reference for all persons interested in theelections, including the political competitors. This can be particularlyvaluable in the context of disputed elections, where impartial andaccurate findings can help to mitigate the potential for conflicts.

6 International election observation is conducted for the benefit of thepeople of the country holding the elections and for the benefit of theinternational community. It is process oriented, not concerned with anyparticular electoral result, and is concerned with results only to the degreethat they are reported honestly and accurately in a transparent andtimely manner. No one should be allowed to be a member of aninternational election observer mission unless that person is free fromany political, economic or other conflicts of interest that would interferewith conducting observations accurately and impartially and/or drawingconclusions about the character of the election process accurately andimpartially. These criteria must be met effectively over extended periodsby long-term observers, as well as during the more limited periods ofelection day observation, each of which periods present specificchallenges for independent and impartial analysis. International electionobservation missions should not accept funding or infrastructuralsupport from the government whose elections are being observed, as itmay raise a significant conflict of interest and undermine confidence inthe integrity of the mission's findings. International election observationdelegations should be prepared to disclose the sources of their fundingupon appropriate and reasonable requests.

7 International election observation missions are expected to issuetimely, accurate and impartial statements to the public (includingproviding copies to electoral authorities and other appropriate nationalentities), presenting their findings, conclusions and any appropriaterecommendations they determine could help improve election relatedprocesses. Missions should announce publicly their presence in acountry, including the mission's mandate, composition and duration,make periodic reports as warranted and issue a preliminary postelectionstatement of findings and a final report upon the conclusion of the


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election process. International election observation missions may alsoconduct private meetings with those concerned with organizinggenuine democratic elections in a country to discuss the mission'sfindings, conclusions and recommendations. International electionobservation missions may also report to their respectiveintergovernmental or international nongovernmental organizations.

8 The organizations that endorse this Declaration and the accompanyingCode of Conduct for International Election Observers pledge tocooperate with each other in conducting international electionobservation missions. International election observation can beconducted, for example, by: individual international election observermissions; ad hoc joint international election observation missions; orcoordinated international election observation missions. In allcircumstances, the endorsing organizations pledge to work togetherto maximize the contribution of their international election observationmissions.

9 International election observation must be conducted with respect forthe sovereignty of the country holding elections and with respect forthe human rights of the people of the country. International electionobservation missions must respect the laws of the host country, aswell as national authorities, including electoral bodies, and act in amanner that is consistent with respecting and promoting human rightsand fundamental freedoms.

10 International election observation missions must actively seekcooperation with host country electoral authorities and must notobstruct the election process.

11 decision by any organization to organize an international electionobservation mission or to explore the possibility of organizing anobservation mission does not imply that the organization necessarilydeems the election process in the country holding the elections to becredible. An organization should not send an international electionobservation mission to a country under conditions that make it likelythat its presence will be interpreted as giving legitimacy to a clearlyundemocratic electoral process, and international election observationmissions in any such circumstance should make public statements toensure that their presence does not imply such legitimacy.


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12 In order for an international election observation mission to effectivelyand credibly conduct its work basic conditions must be met. Aninternational election observation mission therefore should not beorganized unless the country holding the election takes the followingactions:

a Issues an invitation or otherwise indicates its willingness to acceptinternational election observation missions in accordance with eachorganization's requirements sufficiently in advance of elections to allowanalysis of all of the processes that are important to organizing genuinedemocratic elections;

b Guarantees unimpeded access of the international election observermission to all stages of the election process and all electiontechnologies, including electronic technologies and the certificationprocesses for electronic voting and other technologies, withoutrequiring election observation missions to enter into confidentialityor other nondisclosure agreements concerning technologies or electionprocesses, and recognizes that international election observationmissions may not certify technologies as acceptable;

c Guarantees unimpeded access to all persons concerned with electionprocesses, including:

i electoral officials at all levels, upon reasonable requests,ii members of legislative bodies and government and security officials

whose functions are relevant to organizing genuine democraticelections,

iii all of the political parties, organizations and persons that havesought to compete in As a prerequisite to organizing aninternational election observation mission, intergovernmental andinternational nongovernmental organizations may require that suchguarantees are set forth in a memorandum of understanding orsimilar document agreed upon by governmental and/or electoralauthorities. Election observation is a civilian activity, and its utilityis questionable in circumstances that present severe security risks,limit safe deployments of observers or otherwise would negateemploying credible election observation methodologies.

the elections (including those that qualified, those that were disqualifiedand those that withdrew from participating) and those that abstained fromparticipating,


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iv news media personnel, and all organizations and persons that areinterested in achieving genuine

v democratic elections in the country;

d Guarantees freedom of movement around the country for all membersof the international election observer mission;

e Guarantees the international election observer mission's freedom toissue without interference public statements and reports concerningits findings and recommendations about election related processes anddevelopments;

f Guarantees that no governmental, security or electoral authority willinterfere in the selection of individual observers or other members ofthe international election observation mission or attempt to limit itsnumbers;

g Guarantees full, country-wide accreditation (that is, the issuing of anyidentification or document required to conduct election observation)for all persons selected to be observers or other participants by theinternational election observation mission as long as the missioncomplies with clearly defined, reasonable and non-discriminatoryrequirements for accreditation;

h Guarantees that no governmental, security or electoral authority willinterfere in the activities of the international election observationmission; and

i Guarantees that no governmental authority will pressure, threatenaction against or take any reprisal against any national or foreigncitizen who works for, assists or provides information to theinternational election observation mission in accordance withinternational principles for election observation.

13 International election observation missions should seek and mayrequire acceptance of their presence by all major political competitors.

14 Political contestants (parties, candidates and supporters of positionson referenda) have vested interests in the electoral process throughtheir rights to be elected and to participate directly in government.They therefore should be allowed to monitor all processes related toelections and observe procedures, including among other things thefunctioning of electronic and other electoral technologies inside pollingstations, counting centers and other electoral facilities, as well as thetransport of ballots and other sensitive materials.


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15 International election observation missions should:

a establish communications with all political competitors in theelection process, including representatives of political parties andcandidates who may have information concerning the integrity ofthe election process;

b welcome information provided by them concerning the nature ofthe process;

c independently and impartially evaluate such information; andd should evaluate as an important aspect of international election

observation whether the political contestants are, on anondiscriminatory basis, afforded access to verify the integrity ofall elements and stages of the election process. Internationalelection observation missions should in their recommendations,which may be issued in writing or otherwise be presented atvarious stages of the election process, advocate for removing anyundue restrictions or interference against activities by the politicalcompetitors to safeguard the integrity of electoral processes.

16 Citizens have an internationally recognized right to associate and a rightto participate in governmental and public affairs in their country. Theserights may be exercised through nongovernmental organizationsmonitoring all processes related to elections and observing procedures,including among other things the functioning of electronic and otherelectoral technologies inside polling stations, counting centers and otherelectoral facilities, as well as the transport of ballots and other sensitivematerials. International election observation missions should evaluateand report on whether domestic nonpartisan election monitoring andobservation organizations are able, on a nondiscriminatory basis, toconduct their activities without undue restrictions or interference.International election observation missions should advocate for the rightof citizens to conduct domestic nonpartisan election observation withoutany undue restrictions or interference and should in their recommen-dations address removing any such undue restrictions or interference.

17 International election observation missions should identify, establishregular communications with and cooperate as appropriate withcredible domestic nonpartisan election monitoring organizations.International election observation missions should welcome infor-mation provided by such organizations concerning the nature of the


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election process. Upon indepen-dent evaluation of informationprovided by such organizations, their findings can provide an importantcomplement to the findings of international election observationmissions, although international election observation missions mustremain independent. International election observation missionstherefore should make every reasonable effort to consult with suchorganizations before issuing any statements.

18 The intergovernmental and international nongovernmentalorganizations endorsing this Declaration recognize that substantialprogress has been made in establishing standards, principles andcommitments concerning genuine democratic elections and committhemselves to use a statement of such principles in makingobservations, judgments and conclusions about the character ofelection processes and pledge to be transparent about the principlesand observation methodologies they employ.

19 The intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations endorsingthis Declaration recognize that there are a variety of crediblemethodologies for observing election processes and commit to sharingapproaches and harmonizing methodologies as appropriate. They alsorecognize that international election observation missions must be ofsufficient size to determine independently and impartially the characterof election processes in a country and must be of sufficient durationto determine the character of all of the critical elements of the electionprocess in the pre-election, election-day and post-election periods -unless an observation activity is focused on and therefore onlycomments on one or a limited number of elements of the electionprocess. They further recognize that it is necessary not to isolate orover-emphasize election day observations, and that such observationsmust be placed into the context of the overall electoral process.

20 The intergovernmental and international nongovernmental organi-zations endorsing this Declaration recognize that international electionobservation missions should include persons of sufficiently diversepolitical and professional skills, standing and proven integrity to ob-serve and judge processes in light of: expertise in electoral processesand established electoral principles; international human rights;comparative election law and administration practices (including useof computer and other election technology); comparative political


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processes and country specific considerations. The endorsingorganizations also recognize the importance of balanced genderdiversity in the composition of participants and leadership ofinternational election observation missions, as well as diversity ofcitizenship in such missions.

21 The intergovernmental and international nongovernmental organiza-tions endorsing this Declaration commit to:

a familiarize all participants in their international election observationmissions concerning the principles of accuracy of information andpolitical impartiality in making judgments and conclusions;

b provide a terms of reference or similar document, explaining thepurposes of the mission;

c provide information concerning relevant national laws and regula-tions, the general political environment and other matters, includingthose that relate to the security and well being of observers;

d instruct all participants in the election observation missionconcerning the methodologies to be employed; and

e require all participants in the election observation mission to readand pledge to abide by the Code of Conduct for InternationalElection Observers, which accompanies this Declaration and whichmay be modified without changing its substance slightly to fitrequirements of the organization, or pledge to abide by a pre-existing code of conduct of the organization that is substantiallythe same as the accompanying Code of Conduct.

22 The intergovernmental and international nongovernmental organiza-tions endorsing this Declaration commit to use every effort to complywith the terms of the Declaration and the accompanying Code ofConduct for International Election Observers. Any time that anendorsing organization deems it necessary to depart from any of termsof the Declaration or the Accompanying Code of Conduct in order toconduct election observation in keeping with the spirit of theDeclaration, the organization will explain in its public statements andwill be prepared to answer appropriate questions from other endorsingorganizations concerning why it was necessary to do so.

23 The endorsing organizations recognize that governments sendobserver delegations to elections in other countries and that others


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also observe elections. The endorsing organizations welcome any suchobservers agreeing on an ad hoc basis to this declaration and abidingby the accompanying Code of Conduct for International ElectionObservers.

24 This Declaration and the accompanying Code of Conduct forInternational Election Observers are intended to be technical docu-ments that do not require action by the political bodies of endorsingorganizations (such as assemblies, councils or boards of directors),though such actions are welcome. This Declaration and theaccompanying Code of Conduct for International Election Observersremain open for endorsement by other intergovernmental andinternational nongovernmental organizations. Endorsements should berecorded with the United Nations Electoral Assistance Division.

CODE OF CONDUCT FOR INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVERS

International election observation is widely accepted around the world. Itis conducted by intergovernmental and international nongovernmentalorganizations and associations in order to provide an impartial and accurateassessment of the nature of election processes for the benefit of the populationof the country where the election is held and for the benefit of the internationalcommunity. Much therefore depends on ensuring the integrity of internationalelection observation, and all who are part of this international electionobservation mission, including long-term and short-term observers, membersof assessment delegations, specialized observation teams and leaders of themission, must subscribe to and follow this Code of Conduct.

Respect Sovereignty and International Human Rights

Elections are an expression of sovereignty, which belongs to the peopleof a country, the free expression of whose will provides the basis for theauthority and legitimacy of government. The rights of citizens to vote and tobe elected at periodic, genuine elections are internationally recognized humanrights, and they require the exercise of a number of fundamental rights andfreedoms. Election observers must respect the sovereignty of the host country,as well as the human rights and fundamental freedoms of its people.


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Respect the Laws of the Country and the Authority of Electoral Bodies

Observers must respect the laws of the host country and the authority ofthe bodies charged with administering the electoral process. Observers mustfollow any lawful instruction from the country's governmental, security andelectoral authorities. Observers also must maintain a respectful attitude towardelectoral officials and other national authorities. Observers must note if laws,regulations or the actions of state and/or electoral officials unduly burden orobstruct the exercise of electionrelated rights guaranteed by law, constitutionor applicable international instruments.

Respect the Integrity of the International Election Observation Mission

Observers must respect and protect the integrity of the internationalelection observation mission. This includes following this Code of Conduct,any written instructions (such as a terms of reference, directives andguidelines) and any verbal instructions from the observation mission'sleadership. Observers must: attend all of the observation mission's requiredbriefings, trainings and debriefings; become familiar with the election law,regulations and other relevant laws as directed by the observation mission;and carefully adhere to the methodologies employed by the observationmission. Observers also must report to the leadership of the observationmission any conflicts of interest they may have and any improper behaviorthey see conducted by other observers that are part of the mission.

Maintain Strict Political Impartiality at All Times

Observers must maintain strict political impartiality at all times, includingleisure time in the host country. They must not express or exhibit any bias orpreference in relation to national authorities, political parties, candidates,referenda issues or in relation to any contentious issues in the election process.Observers also must not conduct any activity that could be reasonablyperceived as favoring or providing partisan gain for any political competitor inthe host country, such as wearing or displaying any partisan symbols, colors,banners or accepting anything of value from political competitors.

Do Not Obstruct Election Processes

Observers must not obstruct any element of the election process, includingpre-election processes, voting, counting and tabulation of results andprocesses transpiring after election day. Observers may bring irregularities,


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fraud or significant problems to the attention of election officials on the spot,unless this is prohibited by law, and must do so in a non-obstructive manner.Observers may ask questions of election officials, political party represen-tatives and other observers inside polling stations and may answer questionsabout their own activities, as long as observers do not obstruct the electionprocess. In answering questions observers should not seek to direct theelection process. Observers may ask and answer questions of voters but maynot ask them to tell for whom or what party or referendum position they voted.

Provide Appropriate Identification

Observers must display identification provided by the election observationmission, as well as identification required by national authorities, and mustpresent it to electoral officials and other interested national authorities whenrequested.

Maintain Accuracy of Observations and Professionalismin Drawing Conclusions

Observers must ensure that all of their observations are accurate.Observations must be comprehensive, noting positive as well as negativefactors, distinguishing between significant and insignificant factors andidentifying patterns that could have an important impact on the integrity ofthe election process. Observers' judgments must be based on the higheststandards for accuracy of information and impartiality of analysis,distinguishing subjective factors from objective evidence. Observers mustbase all conclusions on factual and verifiable evidence and not drawconclusions prematurely. Observers also must keep a well documented re-cord of where they observed, the observations made and other relevantinformation as required by the election observation mission and must turn insuch documentation to the mission.

Refrain from Making Comments to the Public or the Media before theMission Speaks

Observers must refrain from making any personal comments about theirobservations or conclusions to the news media or members of the publicbefore the election observation mission makes a statement, unless specificallyinstructed otherwise by the observation mission's leadership. Observers mayexplain the nature of the observation mission, its activities and other mattersdeemed appropriate by the observation mission and should refer the media

7


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or other interested persons to the those individuals designated by theobservation mission.

Cooperate with Other Election Observers

Observers must be aware of other election observation missions, bothinternational and domestic, and cooperate with them as instructed by theleadership of the election observation mission.

Maintain Proper Personal Behavior

Observers must maintain proper personal behavior and respect others,including exhibiting sensitivity for host-country cultures and customs,exercise sound judgment in personal interactions and observe the highestlevel of professional conduct at all times, including leisure time.

Violations of This Code of Conduct

In a case of concern about the violation of this Code of Conduct, theelection observation mission shall conduct an inquiry into the matter. If aserious violation is found to have occurred, the observer concerned may havetheir observer accreditation withdrawn or be dismissed from the electionobservation mission. The authority for such determinations rests solely withthe leadership of the election observation mission.

Pledge to Follow This Code of Conduct

Every person who participates in this election observation mission mustread and understand this Code of Conduct and must sign a pledge to follow it.

PLEDGE TO ACCOMPANY THE CODE OF CONDUCTFOR INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVER

I have read and understand the Code of Conduct for InternationalElection Observers that was

provided to me by the international election observation mission. I herebypledge that I will follow the Code of Conduct and that all of my activities as anelection observer will be conducted completely in accordance with it. I have


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no conflicts of interest, political, economic nor other, that will interfere with myability to be an impartial election observer and to follow the Code of Conduct.

I will maintain strict political impartiality at all times. I will make myjudgments based on the

highest standards for accuracy of information and impartiality of analysis,distinguishing subjective factors from objective evidence, and I will base allof my conclusions on factual and verifiable evidence.

I will not obstruct the election process. I will respect national lawsand the authority of election

officials and will maintain a respectful attitude toward electoral and othernational authorities. I will respect and promote the human rights and funda-mental freedoms of the people of the country. I will maintain proper personalbehavior and respect others, including exhibiting sensitivity for host-countrycultures and customs, exercise sound judgment in personal interactions andobserve the highest level of professional conduct at all times, including leisuretime.

I will protect the integrity of the international election observationmission and will follow the

instructions of the observation mission. I will attend all briefings, trainingsand debriefings required by the election observation mission and willcooperate in the production of its statements and reports as requested. I willrefrain from making personal comments, observations or conclusions to thenews media or the public before the election observation mission makes astatement, unless specifically instructed otherwise by the observation mission'sleadership.

Signed ________________________________Print Name _____________________________Date __________________________________


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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation andthe Code of Conduct for International Election Observers were developedthrough a multi-year process involving more than 20 intergovernmental andinternational nongovernmental organizations concerned with electionobservation around the world.

The process began informally in 200_ at the initiative of the NationalDemocratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) and the United NationsElectoral Assistance Division (UNEAD) and included an initial meeting atthe UN in New York and a meeting in Washington co-hosted by the OASand NDI.

Building on that foundation, the UNEAD, The Carter Center, and NDIformed a joint secretariat and launched the formal phase of the process inOctober 2003 at a meeting held at The Carter Center in Atlanta. This wasfollowed by a September 2004 meeting in Brussels, which was hosted by theEuropean Commission. An ongoing consultative process transpired amongthe participating organizations, which resulted in a consensus document thatwas offered for organizational endorsements beginning in July 2005.

The secretariat was comprised of Carina Perelli and Sean Dunne forUNEAD, David Carroll, David Pottie and Avery Davis-Roberts for The CarterCenter, and Patrick Merloe and Linda Patterson for NDI. The secretariatmembers prepared the documents, with Mr. Merloe serving as the lead drafter,drawing on a substantial body of existing documentation from organizationsinvolved in election observation. During the process, the secretariat receivedcritical input and comments from many of the participating organizations.

The process was supported by financial assistance from the UnitedNations, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID),the European Commission, the Republic of Germany and the Starr Foundation,as well as a number of individual contributors.


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Anexo 2

INTERNATIONAL ELECTIONOBSERVATION MISSION

Presidential Election (Second Round), Ukraine - 21 November 2004

STATEMENT OF PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Kyiv, 22 November 2004 - The International Election Observation Mission(IEOM) for the second round of the Ukrainian presidential election is a jointundertaking of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights(OSCE/ODIHR), the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA), theParliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), the EuropeanParliament (EP) and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

This statement should be considered in conjunction with the IEOM'sstatement released on 1 November 2004, after the first round of voting. It isissued prior to a full and final analysis of observers' findings of the secondround election day.

Preliminary Conclusions

As for the first round, the second round of the Ukrainian presidentialelection did not meet a considerable number of OSCE commitments andCouncil of Europe and other European standards for democratic elections.Despite a number of serious shortcomings being identified by the IEOM inits statement of 1 November, the authorities failed to take remedial actionbetween the two rounds of voting to redress biased coverage on State me-dia, misuse of State resources, and pressure on certain categories of votersto support the candidacy of Mr. Yanukovych. Overall, State executiveauthorities and the Central Election Commission (CEC) displayed a lack ofwill to conduct a genuine democratic election process.


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On election day, although voting was conducted in a generally calmmanner, overall, observers' assessed election day less favourably, particularlyin the central and eastern regions, than 31 October. Observers noted a higherincidence of serious violations, including some isolated incidents of violence,and a pattern of intimidation, including directed towards observers, pollingcommission members and individual voters. Observers reported that in asignificant number of polling stations commissions (PSC) members had beendismissed or ejected. Police were present in a majority of polling stationsvisited. In some instances, unauthorized persons were interfering in ordirecting the process, or otherwise attempting to influence voters.

Despite the suspiciously high turnout in some regions (for example 96.31%in Donetsk and 88.41% in Lugansk, according to the preliminary CEC turnoutfigures), overcrowding was reported by IEOM observers as less of a problemin eastern regions than elsewhere. While far fewer voters were turned awayfrom polling stations due to inaccuracies in the voter list during the secondround than in the first, once again there was a regional variation, with fewervoters being turned away in the east.

A high number of voters - approximately 5 per cent - were added to voterlists on election day. Almost all of the added voters used absentee certificates.This is of concern in view of the abuse of these documents noted by long-term observers prior to the election, and of the high number of voters usingabsentee voting certificates on election day, some being transported by busin a number of regions. A regional variation also exists for this phenomenon,with most absentee certificates used in southern regions and fewest in westernregions.

The observers' assessment of the ballot counting process was worse than31 October, including poorer overall organisation, and more questions raisedabout the accuracy of results reported. Problems included lack of sufficientattention to ballot security and counting procedures. In almost half of pollingstations unauthorized persons were present including police and localgovernment officials. In 10% of polling stations, some PSC members did notreceive a copy of the protocol and in 18% of polling stations the PSC did notpost the protocol publicly as required by law.

Despite serious shortcomings in the process, the second round of theelection offered voters a choice between the two candidates and their res-pective political programmes, despite unequal campaign conditions. However,


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in Donetsk Oblast, preliminary turnout figures announced by the CEC are soimprobable as to cast doubt on whether that choice was always safeguarded.Once again, a vibrant civil society demonstrated a high level of interest andengagement on the part of the citizens of Ukraine and their commitment to ademocratic process.

The period between the election rounds was marred by the continuedfailure of some State structures to respect citizens' rights to make their elec-toral choices freely and to comply with their legal obligation to maintainpolitical neutrality. After the announcement of official first round electionresults, observers reported cases of public sector employees and studentsbeing pressured to support Mr Yanukovych, and a number of instances inwhich Mr Yushchenko's campaign activists were harassed by law enforcementbodies.

The second round of voting was compromised by significantshortcomings:

• The abuse of State resources in favour of the Prime Ministerdemonstrated a widespread disregard for the fundamental distinctionbetween the State and partisan political interests;

• Some citizens, whose livelihood depends directly or indirectly uponthe State, were placed under duress to acquire and hand over to theirsuperiors an «absentee voting certificate». Observers reported thatthese documents were collected in the workplace on an organisedbasis. Hence these citizens were prevented from exercising theirsuffrage rights, as the acquisition of a certificate automaticallyexcludes the voter from voting in the polling station where originallyregistered;

• In other regions, the failure to account properly for the number of«absentee voting certificates» issued and used could have facilitatedmultiple voting, thereby having a potential impact on the integrity ofthe results. Concern for this issue was underscored by observationsof a high numbers of voters using absentee voting certificates, somebeing transported by bus in a number of regions;

• A lack of transparency in the tabulation of the first round preliminaryelection results, and delay in the announcement of final first roundelection results by the CEC, shortened the period available for theresumption of campaign activity and thus impacted negatively on analready tense political environment;


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• The CEC failed to provide information on all first round results atpolling station level, thereby undermining confidence in the process.Despite repeated requests by the OSCE/ODIHR EOM prior to bothrounds, it failed to provide information on the number of ballot papersissued to each TEC, as well as to polling stations outside Ukraine.Prior to the second round, it failed to provide the OSCE/ODIHR EOMor publicly announcethe number of absentee voting certificates delivered and issued ineach territorial election district, as well as the number of voters addedto the voter lists in each territorial election district between bothrounds. This demonstrated a lack of regard for transparency andaccountability;

• The reluctance of the CEC to grant relief on complaints, thus impedinglegal redress where electoral violations occurred;

• The inability of the local State executive to produce accurate voter lists,for whatever reason, and an evident lack of uniformity in the methodsused by Territorial Election Commissions (TECs) and Polling StationCommissions (PSCs) to correct the lists between the election rounds;

• A large number of TECs were unwilling or unable to provide observerswith data on the number of voters registered before 21 Novemberelection day;

• The last minute dismissals by TECs of hundreds of PSC membersappointed by the opposition in Kirovohrad, a key marginal region,and others in Donetsk, Zakarpattiya, Zaporizhia, Kyiv, Khmelnitsky,Odesa, and Volyn, lessened transparency;

• The absence of legal provision recognising the right of non-partisandomestic observers to observe the poll in contradiction with OSCEcommitments;

• There was a continuation of inflammatory campaign languageexchanged between the two rounds, the large majority of which wastargeted towards Mr Yushchenko;

• Overt bias in the State-funded media, which continued to favour thePrime Minister in news presentation and coverage of the campaign,thereby obstructing the opposition candidate's opportunity to conveyhis campaign message to the electorate on an equal basis; and,

• An overall constraint of the public's free access to balanced informa-tion resulting from the issuance, allegedly by the State administration,of so-called temnyky (guidelines on the content and presentation ofnews items).


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Some notable encouraging aspects of the electoral process include:

• Citizens in many regions seemed more confident in exercising theirbasic right of free expression, including by displaying campaign ma-terial and symbols;

• The overwhelming imbalance of media coverage in favour of the Pri-me Minister was redressed to a partial and limited degree through widercoverage of opposition viewpoints, albeit for a short period, in someprivately owned media;

• More than 300 journalists openly protested against effectivecensorship and constraints on freedom of expression represented bythe temnyky guidelines;

• The first televised debate between the two main presidentialcandidates for a decade took place on State-owned UT1 TV. However,the airing of a biased round table discussion immediately after thedebate was an abuse of publicly owned resources;

• After the first round of voting, the proceedings of the Supreme Courtcontinued to be open and transparent, and the Court granted relief inmany cases that were incorrectly decided by lower courts and the CEC;

• The airing of public information slots produced by the Committee ofVoters of Ukraine increased voters' awareness of the electoralprovisions;

• Co-operation extended to election observers by national-level andmost local-level government structures, including the Ministry ofForeign Affairs and the Inter-Departmental Working Group.

The transparency of the tabulation and announcement of official electionresults and the effective and impartial resolution of any election day andsubsequent complaints and appeals will be of crucial importance in forminga final assessment of the 2004 presidential election.

The IEOM calls upon the CEC to act as a politically neutral administrativebody, and re-iterates its appeal to the CEC to post on its website all PSCresults for both election rounds. The first round PSC-level results should beposted without delay. The second round preliminary PSClevel results shouldbe posted as soon as they are received by the CEC. All PSC-level resultsshould be posted no later than the announcement of final election results bythe CEC. This action would enhance the transparency of the electoral processat its most critical phase and might serve to reassure voters and candidatesof the accuracy of the election results.


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OSCE/ODIHR observers will remain in Ukraine to assess the tabulationof results at TECs and the CEC as well as the post-election complaints andappeals processes, and the OSCE/ODIHR may issue additional publiccommentary on the process as necessary. The OSCE/ODIHR will issue acomprehensive Final Report approximately six weeks after completion of theprocess.

The IEOM wishes to thank the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and theInterdepartmental Working Group of the Cabinet of ministers and othernational and local authorities for their assistance and cooperation during thecourse of the observation. In particular, the IEOM wishes to acknowledgethe efforts of those all those election officials throughout Ukraine whoattempted to implement the election in accordance with the law andregulations.

Preliminary Findings

Background

The first round of the 2004 Presidential election took place on 31 October2004. On 10 November, the CEC announced official election results thatrevealed that none of the 24 candidates had secured a qualified majority ofvotes cast, and therefore, in accordance with the election law, the CECscheduled a second round election for 21 November 2004. In this context,the law determines that the winning candidate is only required to receive morevotes than his opponent to be elected. The successful candidate is scheduledto take office no later than 8 January 2005.

Tabulation and Announcement of First Round Results

The Election Law grants the CEC 10 days to determine the official electionresults after the first round (i.e. until 10 November). However, the ElectionLaw does not establish a deadline for TECs and PSCs to complete and submittheir results protocols to the CEC. This constitutes a shortcoming in the le-gal framework.

The speed at which TECs finalised their election results (protocols)appeared to vary between regions. In some central regions, where preliminaryresults indicated relatively narrow margins between the two leadingcandidates, a significant number of complaints on the voting and counting


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process were filed. The tabulation process encountered serious difficultiesin at least 15 TECs across the country and delays in finalising their resultswere noted. Observers are aware of 10 TECs in which at least one PSC resultwas invalidated. The law fails to specifically provide for repeat voting inpolling stations where results are invalidated.

Observers have documentary evidence that the results from four PSCs inone TEC (in Sumy region) were incorrectly entered in the TEC protocol ofresults, with hundreds of votes being shifted from Mr Yushchenko to MrYanukovych. Other similar cases were noted in Khmelnytskyi region.

Senior members of the Yanukovych campaign informed the OSCE/ODIHREOM that electoral fraud had occurred in western Ukraine. Specifically, it wasalleged that between 1.25 and 2 million illegal votes had been cast on behalfof voters resident abroad. In addition, it was claimed that 1.1 million votesfor Yanukovych had been set aside by pro-Yushchenko PSCs. Upon furtherenquiry into both of these serious allegations, the OSCE/ODIHR EOM foundno evidence to support them.

At CEC level, problems with the computerised tabulation of preliminaryresults became evident. On 2 November, the system stopped tabulatingadditional PSC results, with 97.6% of the results processed. At that time, MrYanukovych held a lead over Mr Yushchenko, although his margin was clearlynarrowing. According to the CEC, the stoppage was caused by a technicalmalfunction. The opposition claimed that the failure to provide completeinformation on the election results was a ploy to deny Mr Yushchenko theleading position.

On 10 November, the CEC announced the results of the 31 Octoberelection. In contrast to unofficial preliminary results, the official resultsindicated that Mr Yushchenko was the leading candidate with 39.87% of thevote compared to Mr Yanukovych's 39.32%. The only other candidates whoscored over 1% were: Mr Moroz (5.81%), Mr Symonenko (4.97%) and MsVitrenko (1.53%). According to the final election results, the sum of votescast for the 16 least scoring candidates was less than 500,000; whereas thesecandidates claimed to have provided the CEC with a combined total of over10,000,000 signatures supporting their registration as candidates.

On 9 November, the CEC dismissed all members of TEC 100 (in KirovohradRegion), on the basis that they had not fulfilled their legally prescribed duties.On 10 November, the CEC decided not to consider as valid the results from


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this district, arguing that the TEC protocol was «not produced in accordancewith law». Results from TEC 100 were excluded from the official national-levelresults. The Supreme Court's ruling, which overturned the CEC's decision toinvalidate the results of TEC100, requires the CEC to tabulate the PSC protocolsin this district and to amend the official results. To date the CEC has notacted on this issue, which slightly increases the margin between the twoleading candidates.

After the first round, results data from all TECs was made public by theCEC some 10 days after the election, but the absence of publicly availabledata below TEC level prevents an adequate insight into the accuracy oftabulating the election results. The CEC did not comply with its often-statedintention to publish all PSC-level results, significantly lessening thetransparency of the results tabulation process at the CEC, and furtherpreventing an examination of the accuracy of the calculation of the resultsby candidates and civil society.

Election Administration

Despite two written requests prior to the first round, the CEC did notprovide the OSCE/ODIHR EOM with information, including on the numberof ballots printed and distributed to TECs and outside the borders of Ukraine.During the process of tabulating the first round results, the CEC modified itsrecords on the number of ballots issued to TECs to coincide with the numberof ballots reported as having been received by TECs in their protocols. Thisraised serious concern for the CEC's ability to regulate ballot production anddistribution securely and accurately.

The opposition alleged that legal provisions enabling «absentee voting»were abused during the first round and that, as a result, large-scale multiplevoting occurred. The CEC responded by changing the paper on which theabsentee certificates were printed, but did not take any steps to improve theaccounting of these sensitive documents, for example, by keeping records ofthe number of absentee certificates distributed, issued and used. If misused,these documents could have the potential to impact upon the integrity of theelection.

On 15 November, the OSCE/ODIHR EOM wrote to the CEC requestinginformation on the number of ballots and the number of absentee certificatesprinted and delivered to each TEC. The CEC did not publicly announce, or


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inform the OSCE/ODIHR EOM, of the number of ballots printed and deliveredto each TEC. However, on 17 November, the CEC did announce thatapproximately 1.5 million absentee certificates were printed for the secondround. On 17 November, the OSCE/ODIHR EOM wrote to the CEC requestingdata on the number of absentee certificates issued to voters in each TEC. On20 November, the Observation Mission requested information from the CECon the number of additional voters registered in each TEC after the first round.The failure to provide all the information requested lessened the overall levelof transparency at the highest level of the election administration and impededthe OSCE/ODIHR's observation efforts.

On 10 November the CEC adopted a document addressing some problemsencountered during the first round of voting. For example, it clarified thatPSCs could correct minor errors on voter lists, such as the clear mispelling ofnames, thereby enabling these citizens to exercise their rights without theneed for a TEC or Court decision. Additionally, it clarified the circumstancesin which PSC members can be relieved of their duties due to their non-attendance at PSC sessions. Previously, this provision had been seriouslyabused by some TECs on the eve of the first round election. Indeed, prior tothe CEC's Clarification, 27 PSC Chairs were dismissed in Poltava onquestionable grounds. However, the document failed to remind the PSCs toensure that ballot papers should be validated by placing the mark of the PSCstamp and a signature of a PSC member prior to handing the ballot paper toa voter. A few observers reported this as a problem on 31 October.

In general, the composition of the lower level election commissionsremained stable between the election rounds. Members of TECs and PSCsappointed by all first round candidates retain the right to remain on thesebodies for the second round. However, once again, legal provisions weremisused to dismiss members from a number of PSCs, for example in Kirovohradregion, where a large number of opposition members were excluded from theelection process. This also occurred in Donetsk, Zakarpattiya, Zaporizhia,Kyiv, Khmelnitsky, Odesa, and Volyn oblasts.

Voter Lists

The law requires local State executive authorities to prepare voter listsbased on data available to them from a variety of sources: passport offices,housing committees, tax offices, local branches of the Ministry of Interior,etc. Local authorities were required to prepare the updated Voter Lists by 1


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July 2004. Ultimately, the local Government executive is responsible for theproduction of voter lists. Prior to first round the lists were delivered to PSCsthrough TECs.

In addition, the law requires that PSCs make the voters list «available forgeneral familiarisation». However, most PSCs did not interpret this as a dutyto display voter lists at polling stations, although usually they were availableupon request to voters. This factor may have hidden the full scale ofinaccuracies in the voter lists from public notice.

On the 31 October election day, IEOM observers noted a large number oferrors and/or omissions in the voter lists that challenged the principle ofuniversality of the vote. Almost all TECs visited since the first election dayinformed observers that inaccurate voter lists constituted the main technicalshortcoming.

In accordance with the law, TECs must prepare new voter lists for thesecond round by 11 November. However, the TECs should only begin thiswork after the announcement of the second round by the CEC. These twodeadlines coincided. Hence, TECs had no time to comply with theirobligations. Nevertheless, in a few election districts TECs, PSCs and localgovernment bodies started to update the lists on their own initiative prior tothe announcement of the second round (TECs in Kharkiv, Zaporizhia, Poltava,Donetsk, Ivano-Frankivsk and Uzhgorod).

The new lists should have included the names and data of those personswho were added to the voters lists during the first round, according to thedecision of the respective election commissions and courts, as well as voterswho came of age. The new lists were to be distributed to the PSCs by 13November. PSCs were to make these available for public inspection and makechanges to correct voters' entries including changes of residence. However,it is evident that the law envisages only making minimal changes to the voterlists during this period. Wide-ranging revision of the list is not foreseen.

On 3 November, the Prime Minister issued an instruction to governmentauthorities to ensure that correct information concerning the places of citizens'residence be supplied to election commissions during the process ofcorrecting the voter list. However, the OSCE/ODIHR EOM assessed that lo-cal State administrative bodies were primarily responsible for inaccuracies inthe original draft voter lists. Observers noted that many TECs and PSCsworked hard to correct the voter lists, but the time available before the second


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round was limited, and some PSCs, in 18% of all territorial election districts,lacked adequate resources. Some regional variation was apparent however,and observers in Odessa and Zaporizhia questioned the commitment of thelocal election administration to produce accurate voter lists.

In Donetsk, observers visited one PSC, where persons were working onwhat appeared to be a typed voter list. When asked if they were members ofthe PSC, they replied that they were Yanukovych campaign workers and thatthe PSC would begin its work the next day.

While the CEC had issued Resolutions #155 and #1177 dealing with theupdating of voter lists, observers reported an evident lack of uniformity in themanner in which TECs, PSCs and the local government executive addressedthe problems of inaccurate voter lists after the first round. In general, thereexisted confusion and uncertainty in the intermediate and lower level electionadministration on procedures to correct the lists. In addition, in many instancesobservers noticed that a variety of «working lists» were being usedsimultaneously within the same electoral unit. In general, observers reportedthat citizens were not very active in visiting PSCs to check their voter list entriesor adding their names to the voter lists, despite a number of public informationprogrammes conducted at local level by TECs. However, in the majority of te-rritorial election districts, PSCs went door-to door to check the lists.

As previously mentioned, the CEC issued a document clarifying a varietyof issues that had proved problematic on 31 October, including the role ofTECs and PSCs in remedying mistakes on the voter list. The CEC gave PSCsthe authority to change entries in the voter list without having to take a for-mal decision on the case. This CEC decision may have introduced thepossibility of manipulation of the voter lists at PSC level.

Resolution of Election Disputes after the First Round

After the first round of voting, the majority of election complaints werefiled with the CEC. Continuing a pattern noted before the first round, the CECwas passive in addressing alleged violations of the law and rejected mostcomplaints on procedural grounds without considering their merits. A largenumber of complaints concerned the accuracy of TEC results protocols. ManyTEC protocols recorded a number of votes cast that exceeded the number ofballots issued to the TEC. Nevertheless, in all of these cases, the majority ofthe CEC members voted to «leave without consideration» these complaints,


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arguing that TEC protocols are not «decisions» or «acts» of an electioncommission, but simply «mathematical calculations».

In general, the Supreme Court was more active and effective in addressinglegal violations and overturned several CEC decisions. The proceedings ofthe Supreme Court observed by the OSCE/ODIHR EOM have been open andtransparent, and all parties have had the opportunity to present evidence andlegal arguments in support of their claims. The Court's decisions on casesheard between the first and second rounds of voting appear to be consistentwith applicable legal provisions.

Notably, the Supreme Court issued an important decision protectingsuffrage rights, when it reversed the CEC's invalidation of the first roundvoting results in TEC 100. In this case, the CEC annulled the entire electiondistrict results. The Supreme Court noted that the CEC had violated the rightof universal suffrage of voters in 128 polling stations, and that the CEC hadan obligation to tabulate the PSC protocols itself in order for the will of thepeople to be expressed. The Court also noted that invalidation of electionresults could only occur at the level of the PSC, and only in cases where thelimited grounds stated in the Presidential Election Law were established.

The various courts of appeal and local courts were also active in addressinglegal violations. Although there was inconsistency in some decisions by lowercourts and courts of appeal, overall, the court system was more responsive inaddressing violations of the law than election commissions. On another positivenote, the Supreme Court granted relief in some cases that were incorrectlydecided by courts of first instance. The majority of complaints, in electioncommissions and courts, were filed by the Yushchenko campaign.

The Campaign

The law provides that the campaign period for the second round beginsone day after the CEC formally calls for a second round to be held. As theCEC decided to use the full time given to it by law to announce the finalelection results and the second round, the successful candidates had onlynine days to campaign. Only a very few high profile campaign events tookplace before 10 November, notably a large rally in Kyiv on 6 November infavour of Mr Yushchenko. The Yanukovych campaign filed a complaint withthe CEC as this rally was held before the announcement of the second round.After the Supreme Court reversed the CEC's refusal to hear the complaint,


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the CEC found that the Yushchenko campaign had violated the law. Observersnoted pro-Yanukovych campaign events in Crimea on 8 November.

Oleksandr Moroz, the Socialist Party leader, signed an agreement backingMr Yushchenko in exchange for Mr Yushchenko's support for constitutionalreform, to be enacted before 1 January 2005, and to take effect in 2006. Otherfirst round candidates supporting Mr Yushchenko in the second round includedformer Prime Minister Anatoliy Kinakh, and Leonid Chernovetskyi. While theMayor of Kyiv, Oleksandr Omelchenko, publicly supported Mr Yushchenko,the consent of his party (Unity) to this endorsement was less apparent.

President Kuchma and Nataliya Vitrenko, presidential candidate for theProgressive Socialist Party in the first round, endorsed Viktor Yanukovych.Petro Symonenko, leader of the Communist party, urged his voters to voteagainst both candidates in the second round. Metropolitan Vladimir of theUkrainian Orthodox Church's Moscow Patriarchate endorsed Mr Yanukovych.Anti-Yushchenko campaign material which asserted that he was «an enemyof Orthodoxy» was distributed in a number of churches.

In addition, both candidates received messages of support from abroad,arousing mutual consternation from the respective opponents. On 12November, Russian President Vladimir Putin joined President Kuchma and Mr.Yanukovych in an event highly covered by the media, the reopening of aferry link between the Crimea and Russia. In the coverage, President Putinwished Yanukovych success in his candidacy. Although it was a lower profileendorsement, Viktor Yushchenko received the backing of the EuropeanPeople's Party, the centre-right group in the European Parliament.

After the announcement of the second round, there was a relatively high,although imbalanced, visibility of the two campaigns in the mass media. Therewas a wide display and distribution of campaign material, and campaign eventswere held by both candidates. Yushchenko campaign material focussed onsmall posters and stickers, and his supporters frequently wore or tied orangeribbons to their cars, clothes, statues and public places, though this was farless visible in the east of the country. Billboards in favour of Mr Yanukovychwere in evidence throughout Ukraine.

The Yanukovych campaign devoted most of its campaign effort towardsraising the turnout in the eastern and some southern regions, where MrYanukovych polled well in the first round. Indeed, Mr Yanukovych personallyurged miners and residents of Luhansk region to vote, stating it was necessary

8


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to boost turnout by 20% in the region. Observers noted that his campaign oftenemployed door-to-door canvassing, and reportedly, this was intrusive at times.

Overall, the tone of the campaign between the two rounds remained heatedand personal. Inflammatory campaign material was once again distributed. TheTV debate between the two candidates featured frequent personalaccusations over policies and alleged corrupt practices. The candidatesblamed each other for the polarization of politics during the election campaign.On 17 November, Mr Yanukovych's campaign manager implied at a pressconference that he would call 30-40,000 miners from eastern Ukraine to defendthe CEC from supporters of Mr Yushchenko. On 19 November MrYanukovych stated that he was against this suggestion. Also on 19 November,Mr Yushchenko urged his supporters to congregate in Kyiv's IndependenceSquare after the close of the polls to defend their vote.

Challenges to Civil and Political Rights

Following the announcement of official results on 10 November, themajority of observers recorded numerous instances whereby public employeesand students were pressured to support the Prime Minister. Such pressurewas frequently directed by State officials or work supervisors against theirsubordinates. Observers also reported some cases where the opposition'scampaign activities were impeded.

The IEOM is seriously concerned by reports from its observers thatfiremen, policemen, tax officials, customs officials, teachers, health workersand some private sector factory workers, in Volyn, Lutsk and Lviv, were askedby their superiors at work to apply to PSCs for «absentee certificates» anddemanded that these should be handed over to them. The retention of thesecertificates could prevent these persons from voting, thereby compromisingcitizens' suffrage rights. Furthermore, this apparently concerted activityappears to constitute an attempt to manipulate the election result. However,it is not clear who issued the instructions to their superiors.

Other specific examples of concern include:

• Arrest and imprisonment of voters attempting to verify the protocolsposted at a polling station in Sumy region;

• Disruption of pro-Yushchenko campaign activities in Kirovohrad andharassment of the pro-Yushchenko campaign activists in Luhansk bythe police;


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• Inmates at one prison were told that they had to deliver a 90% votefor Yanukovych to retain the possibility of early release, family visits,and privileges;

• In Mykolaiv region, the detention and rough treatment of pro-Yuschenko campaigners and an opposition MP for «littering» whilehanding out orange ribbons.

Role of State Structures during the Campaign

There remained a lack of clear distinction between State and party resourcesin the second round. State officials continued to campaign on behalf of MrYanukovych. A number of local government officials and State employees,such as University Rectors and managers of public utilities, instructed theirsubordinates to vote for Mr Yanukovych. In Zaporizhia, observers reportedthat persons were checking voter registration records and asking voters forwhom they would vote. On one occasion an observer noted that this taskwas performed by uniformed police.

In some instances, observers reported that law enforcement and justiceorgans were employed to pressure or harass electoral commission membersafter the first round and that local officials interfered in the work of someTECs. These actions raise serious questions about the political neutrality ofsome State institutions, their respect for citizens' rights and the independenceof election commissions. For example in Ivano-Frankivsk, Chernivtsi,Khmelnytskyi and Ternopil regions, where Mr. Yuschenko gained acommanding majority in the official results, local prosecutors opened crimi-nal cases against TEC officials on inexplicable or questionable grounds.

After the announcement of results, President Kuchma dismissed 15 seniorlocal administration officials, in all cases in areas where Mr Yushchenko hadwon the first round of elections or performed well. In addition, observersreceived reports of local officials having signed undated letters of resignationor facing recrimination due to Mr Yanukovych's perceived poor showing insome areas, for example in Poltava region.

In nine regions, observers noticed campaign material displayed on publicbuildings. In eight cases this was in favour of Mr Yanukovych. In at leastten regions, Mr Yanukovych had a campaign office in a public building. Onlyone such example for Mr Yushchenko was recorded. In 15 regions, observersreported that the equality of campaign conditions was poor or very bad.


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The Media

On 2 November, the OSCE/ODIHR EOM recommenced monitoring sixnationwide TV channels, two channels with partial national-level coverage,the main newscasts of several regional TV channels and nine dailynewspapers1. Over a one-week period after the first round of election, themedia actively covered the activities and opinions of the two leading firstround candidates.

While many voters received exposure to a wider range of views than beforethe first round of election, Ukraine lacks a strong and independent media thatcan provide electors with balanced campaign coverage. Between 2 and 20November, there was a divergence between the various media's portrayal ofthe candidates and the election campaign. The main three nationwide TVchannels, UT1 (owned by the State), Inter and, to a lesser extent, 1+1 (bothprivately owned), continued to exhibit bias in favour of Mr Yanukovych andagainst Mr Yushchenko, thus repeating a pattern observed prior to the firstround of election.

Mr Yanukovych derived an excess of additional media exposure in hiscapacity as Prime Minister, thereby gaining an advantage prior to 11November, when the official campaign period commenced. A broadinterpretation of the newsworthiness of the coverage allotted to the PrimeMinister, versus his role as a candidate, in State and some private mediaoutlets, blurred the distinction between a State official carrying out officialduties and a candidate engaged in campaigning.

Conversely, other private TV channels, ICTV, STB and Novy Kanal, aireda greater diversity of views. In particular, they provided the opposition withmore airtime, including direct-speech, during which it challenged the politicalopinions of its opponents and presented its electoral platform. However, thesechannels' broadcast range, and consequently their potential audience, is lessthan the three main networks.

The political content of news coverage on the main TV channels continuedto be controlled through «temnyky» (guidelines), which instruct editors tocover only certain points of view on political themes, events and issues whileomitting others, thereby constraining the public's access to balancedinformation. Observers received numerous allegations that these guidelinesare issued by the State administration. While the OSCE/ODIHR EOM was


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not able to verify these allegations, it conducted a detailed analysis of primetime news devoted to domestic news items on UT1, Inter and 1+1. In a simi-lar pattern to that noticed before the first round, almost 44% of these werepresented in a conspicuously similar manner raising questions over the edi-torial freedom of the three channels.

Prior to the first round of the election, a number of journalists from fourTV channels initiated a statement against censorship on the main TV stations.To date, this statement has been signed by more than 330 journalists from avariety of TV channels. On 3 November, a presenter of the main UT1 eveningnews programme refused to read a statement by Mr Yanukovych's campaignheadquarters on the issue of TV debates, saying that if it were aired it wouldalso be necessary to present the opinions of the opposition candidate. On 9November, a senior manager of State television reported that the newspresenter was no longer an employee of UT1. On 15 November,

Television: State-funded UT1, Private Inter, 1+1, ICTV, STB, Novy Kanal,TRK Ukraina and Channel 5. Newspapers: State Uriadovy Kurier, GolosUkrainy, Private Facty I Komentarii, Segodnia, Den, Silski Visty, UkrainaMoloda, Zerkalo Tyzhna and Vechirni Visti.

the news presenter filed a lawsuit against UT1 with a local Kyiv courtrequesting reinstatement and seeking damages.

Another thirteen journalists of the UT1 main news program drafted an«editorial policy agreement» aimed at ensuring full, accurate and balancednews coverage and to limit pressure on journalists or TV companymanagement. However, the management of UT1 refused to sign the document.UT1 complied with a CEC decision to allocate free airtime to candidates, and,in a positive development, for the first time in 10 years, a televised debatebetween the two main presidential candidates took place on UT1. Otherchannels also broadcast the debate. After the debate, UT1 aired a biased«round table» discussion programme in which only the supporters of thePrime Minister participated.

In a positive development, UT1 aired public information advertisements,produced by a wellknown NGO, the Committee of Voters of Ukraine, toincrease voters` awareness of electoral provisions and citizens' participationin the poll, and to encourage the public to check their entries in the voter list.However, in some regions of eastern Ukraine, observers reported that a few


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pro-Yanukovych NGOs placed misleading campaign advertisements that weremisrepresented as public service slots.

The law requires the mass media to cover the election process in anobjective manner and not to favour a particular candidate. UT1, Inter and1+1 apparently violated this provision by broadcasting advertisementsagainst Mr Yushchenko that were not labelled as «paid advertisements» andthus could have been produced at their own initiative. As their content wentbeyond acceptable limits of permissible campaign speech by inciting potentialinterethnic, racial or religious enmity, the airing of these slots was contraryto law and possibly the Constitution.

The OSCE/ODIHR EOM's analysis revealed that in its news and currentaffairs programs, UT1, in the three-weeks preceding the second round,provided Mr Yanukovych with 84% of its political and election prime timenews coverage, of which 99% was considered by the EOM as positive orneutral in tone. In sharp contrast, during the same period, Mr Yushchenkoreceived only 16% of similar airtime, of which 46% had negative connotations.By displaying clear favouritism to the Prime Minister, UT1 comprehensivelyfailed to meet its legal obligation to provide balanced treatment of the twocandidates during the election process. No legal sanctions have been imposedon UT1 in the period prior to the second round of election. The politicalcontent of the channel during a campaign period is one of the clearest casesof the abuse of State resources and the failure to distinguish between theinterests of incumbents and the needs of the public for objective information.

Inter focused its political and election coverage on the activities ofMr Yanukovych, mostly in his capacity as Prime Minister. It devoted 71% ofits political and election prime time news coverage to Mr Yanukovych, ofan overwhelmingly positive tone. Conversely, during the same period,Mr Yushchenko received 29% of similar airtime, which was mostly neutral ornegative in tone. The second of the «big two» private TV channels, 1+1, providedthe opposition with more airtime than noted before the 31 October election,especially prior to the announcement of official election results. However, from11 November, 1+1 adopted a similar editorial line to UT1 and Inter, and displayedclear support for Mr Yanukovych. Other private TV channels, ICTV, STB andNovy Kanal, covered a wider range of political views and opinions.

The two channels with partial national-level coverage monitored by theODIHR EOM had very different political positions. TRK Ukraina demonstrated


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its overt support to the Prime Minister whereas Channel 5 continued to offerfavourable coverage to Mr Yushchenko. Prior to the first round, this channelexperienced and reported various obstructions in reaching its audience. Nosuch problems were reported in the period prior to the second round contest.The print media continued to provide a plurality of views, but showed strongfavouritism for or against one of the candidates. The State-funded newspaperUriadovy Kurier demonstrated its support to the Prime Minister by grantinghim 96% of its political and election reporting which was mostly positive intone. Another State-funded newspaper, Golos Ukrainy, was critical of MrYanukovych in its political and election reporting.

Out of 14 regional television stations monitored by the OSCE/ODIHREOM, 8 gave their support to Mr Yanukovych; For example, in Odessa, theState funded TV allocated 100% of its political and election prime time newscoverage to the Prime Minister, with an exclusively positive or neutral tone.Conversely, the State funded broadcaster in Ivano-Frankivsk, TV Galichina,provided 67% of exclusively positive or neutral coverage to Mr Yushchenko.

Election Day and the Vote Count

At the time of writing, IEOM observers completed and sent reports fromover 2.300 polling stations. Once again, voting was generally calm butobservers noted a higher incidence of unrest at polling stations than the firstround (7% of polling stations visited). Observers reported that in 15% ofpolling stations some PSC members had been dismissed or ejected Overall,observers' assessment of the environment and atmosphere in which the pollwas conducted was less favourable than 31 October, with 8% assessing it aspoor or very bad. Police were present at polling stations in large number (59%)and in 4% of polling stations visited, unauthorized persons were interferingor directing the process, a number similar to 31 October. In 36 polling stationsvisited persons were attempting to influence voters.

Surprisingly, in view of the exceedingly high turnout in some eastern regions(for example 96.31% in Donetsk and 88.41% in Luhansk, according to thepreliminary CEC turnout figures), overcrowding was reported as less of aproblem in eastern regions (4% of polling stations) than in northern regions(12% of polling stations). Other anomalies were also noted in the eastern regions.For example, while most regions averaged 4% of voters casting ballots througha «mobile ballot box» (i.e. outside the polling station), in the east (Donetsk,Luhansk and Kharkiv regions) this figure averaged approximately 8%.


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On 31 October, observers reported errors and omissions in the voter lists.On 21 November, far fewer voters were turned away, and where this wasreported by observers the numbers involved were far fewer than previously.However, once again there was a regional variation, with most voters turnedaway in southern regions and fewest in the east.

Based on the information supplied by PSCs, observers recorded the numberof voters registered at each polling station. On 31 October, the national avera-ge was 1,813 voters per polling station, whereas on 21 November it was 1,838.Nevertheless, despite the inclusion of additional voters on the lists betweenthe election rounds, a high number were added to voter lists on election day(approximately 5% of all voters casting ballots). The vast majority of these addedvoters used absentee certificates. This is of concern in view of the abuse ofthese documents noted by longterm observers prior to the election. A regionalvariation also exists for this phenomenon, with most absentee certificated usedin southern regions and fewest in western regions.

Generally, ballots were issued to voters in accordance with the legalprovisions. However observers noted that the procedures were less scrupu-lously followed than in October (2.3% violation compared to 1% in October).The secrecy of the vote was not assured in over 4% of polling stations visited.Of concern, a much higher number of allegations of serious violations werereceived in the second round (almost 9% of polling stations visited) thanduring the first round (4%). Observers reported a higher number of seriousviolations (101) including 24 cases of voters being transported from pollingstation to polling station to vote 12 cases of series of apparently identicalsignatures on the voter lists (which indicate the receipt of a ballot) and fivecases of ballot stuffing (placing a block of marked ballots in the ballot box).Complaints were filed in 11% of polling stations.

In 7% of reports, observers assessed the conduct of polling as poor orvery bad. There was a regional variation, with polling in western and northernregions being assessed negatively in 4% and 5% respectively. However, incentral and eastern regions this figure was 11% and 9% respectively.

As for voting, observers' assessment of the ballot counting process wasworse than 31 October, with 11% assessing the process negatively. In one insix polling stations visited, the PSC did not pack and seal the voter list beforethe opening of the ballot box as required by law (10% on 31 October). In 17%of polling stations observed the PSC did not announce the number of thenumber of voters that had voted (12% on 31 October). In 8% of polling


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stations observed, PSCs did not determine the validity of ballots in aconsistent manner and in 7% PSC members were unable to scrutinize ballots.In 10% of polling stations, some PSC members did not receive a copy of theprotocol and in 18% of polling stations the PSC did not post the protocolpublicly as required by law. In almost half of polling stations unauthorizedpersons were present including police and local government officials. In 3cases unauthorized persons interfered in the counting process.

The atmosphere during the count was generally more heated with 23% ofobservers reporting disputes between PSC members during the count,although tension was not necessarily reported as a major problem. The PSCsorganization of the counting process was assessed poorly in 15% of pollingstations. In 11% of polling stations observers had a poor or very badassessment of the accuracy of the results as reported (5% on 31 October).

Tabulation and Announcement of Second Round Results

After the first round, the CEC updated the computerised results tabulationsystem, and began to announce preliminary results at approximately 01.00 hrson election night. Based on 76 report forms of observations at TEC level,observers assessed the process as poor or very bad in 9% of visits. Thetransparency of the tabulation was rated poorly in one in five TECs. In one inthree, unauthorised persons, mostly police officers, were present. Tension wasnoted in one in eight TECs. While most observers were able to examine thePSC protocols at the TEC, one in seven was not granted access to do so. Inaddition, in one in four reports, observers had no access to the computerisedtabulation of the results. Twelve hours after the close of polls, 75% of preliminaryresults were accounted for by the CEC. For the second round, the election lawgrants the CEC 15 days to determine the election results.

This statement is also available in Ukrainian.However, the English language version remains

the only official document.

Mission Information & Acknowledgements

Mr. Bruce George, President Emeritus of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly(PA), Special Coordinator appointed by the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, led theOSCE short term observers. Mr Doros Christodoulides, Member of Parliament


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of Cyprus, led the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE)delegation, Mr. Lucio Malan, Member of the Italian Senate, led the delegationof the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA), and Mr Marek Siwiec,Member of the European Parliament led the European Parliament (EP)delegation. Ambassador Geert-Hinrich Ahrens headed the OSCE/ODIHRElection Observation Mission.

The OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission (EOM) opened in Kyivon 31 August with 57 experts and long-term observers deployed in the capi-tal and twenty regional centres. On election day, the IEOM deployed 563short-term observers from 33 OSCE participating States, including 31parliamentarians from the OSCE PA, 21 from the PACE, 8 from the NATO PAand 9 from the European Parliament. 331 observers were accredited as OSCE/ODIHR observers. The IEOM observed the polling and vote count in over2,300 polling stations throughout the country and at over 80 TECs after pollingstations were closed, to observe the tabulation of results.

The OSCE/ODIHR will issue a comprehensive report on these electionsapproximately six weeks after the completion of the process.

The IEOM wishes to thank the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and theInterdepartmental Working Group of the Cabinet of ministers and othernational and local authorities for their assistance and cooperation during thecourse of the observation. In addition the IEOM is grateful to the CentralElection Commission for providing accreditation documents. The IEOM alsowishes to express appreciation to the OSCE Project Coordinator in Ukraineand embassies accredited in Kyiv for their support throughout the durationof the mission.

For further information, please contact:

• Ambassador Geert Hinrich Ahrens, Head of the OSCE/ODIHR EOM,in Kyiv (Tel: + 38-044-537-79-01);

• Urdur Gunnarsdottir, OSCE/ODIHR Spokesperson or Gilles Saphy,OSCE/ODIHR Election Adviser, in Warsaw (Tel: +48-22-520-06-00);

• Mr. Vladimir Dronov, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe,in Strasbourg (Tel: +33-388-41-20-00);

• Mr. Jan Jooren, Press Counsellor of the OSCE PA, in Copenhagen (Tel:+45 4041 1641);

• Mr. Pietro Ducci, European Parliament, in Brussels (Tel: +3222-84-66-56);


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• Mrs Svitlana Svyetova, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, in Brussels(Tel: +32-2-707-41-11).

OSCE/ODIHR Address:

OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Al.Ujazdowskie 19 00-557 WARSAW POLAND Tel: +48-22-520-06-00www.osce.org/odih


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INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSIONBosnia and Herzegovina - General Elections, 1 October 2006


Sarajevo, 2 October 2006 - The International Election Observation Mission(IEOM) for the general election in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is a jointundertaking of the OSCE, comprising the OSCE Office for DemocraticInstitutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) and the OSCE ParliamentaryAssembly (OSCE PA), and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council ofEurope (PACE).

This statement of preliminary findings and conclusions is delivered priorto the completion of the election process, including the tabulation and announ-cement of final results, the expiry of legal deadlines for hearing possiblecomplaints and appeals, and instalment in office of elected officials. Aconclusive assessment of the entire election will depend, in part, on theconduct of these remaining phases of the process.

The IEOM will comment on the cantonal elections in the Federation ofBiH (FBiH) only to the extent that they had an impact on the presidential andparliamentary elections.

PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS

The 1 October general elections in BiH were the first elections since theDayton Agreement to be fully administered by the BiH authorities andrepresented further improvement and progress in the consolidation of democracyand rule of law. The manner in which these elections were conducted wasgenerally in line with international standards for democratic elections.

It is to be regretted that, due to constitutional ethnicity-based limitationsto the right to stand for office, these elections were again in violation ofProtocol no. 12 to the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and ofthe commitments made to the Council of Europe, as well as article 7.3 of theOSCE 1990 Copenhagen Document.

Anexo 3


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In a transparent process, the Central Election Commission (CEC) registeredalmost all candidate lists that had been submitted. In total, 56 political subjectsincluding political parties, coalitions, independent candidates and lists ofindependent candidates, representing a wide political spectrum, competed inthese elections and provided voters with a broad choice.

A wide range of views was available to voters, especially through televiseddebates, the allocation of free airtime, and in the print media. The media mettheir legal obligations with regard to allocation of free airtime to electioncontestants. However, restrictive interpretation of legal provisions on the partof the broadcast media limited, in part, the news coverage of the campaign, asthe broadcast media were reluctant to offer more informative news coverage.

The election campaign was calm, overall, but was marked by sharpnationalist rhetoric and occasional inflammatory statements from key electioncontestants. The last days of the campaign passed in a calm manner, withthe exception of rising tensions among Croat parties in Mostar.

Save for the constitutional limitations mentioned above, the electionlegislation provides a sound basis for the conduct of democratic elections.The transition from an active to a passive system of voter registration wasconducted in a generally smooth manner and appeared to be well accepted.Legal requirements regarding gender balance in candidate lists were met and37 percent of all candidates in the elections observed were women.Nevertheless, the role of women during the campaign was limited. In the CEC,one member out of seven was a woman and 30 percent of MEC chairpersonswere female.

The CEC performed its duties in a transparent and efficient manner.Political subjects expressed general confidence in the professional work ofthe CEC and Municipal Election Commissions (MECs), although someexpressed reservations over the appointment process of Polling StationCommittees (PSCs). These claims have not been substantiated to date.

Some 94 percent of IEOM observation reports assessed the voting as«good» or «very good», with overcrowding in 9 percent of cases, groupvoting in 33 percent, and some cases of procedural irregularities. During thecount, however, 26 percent of observers assessed the process as «bad» or«very bad» and procedural irregularities were frequently noted. Measuresshould be taken to remedy such shortcomings, but there were no significantinfringements of the OSCE 1990 Copenhagen Document.


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The election day process could significantly benefit from more extensivetraining of polling station commissioners. However, the general impressionwas that the elections were held in a positive environment and there weremany examples of polling station commissioners taking considerable troubleto enable voters to exercise their democratic rights.

Preliminary Findings

Background

The Central Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 4 May 2006called general elections for 1 October 2006. This announcement fell within thelegally prescribed six month period, prior to the termination of previous mandates.

These general elections were the first after the 1992-95 war to be fullyadministered by the BiH authorities. The elections took place within a revisedlegislative framework. The latest round of election law amendments wereenacted in April 2006. A total of 7,245 candidates from 36 parties and 8coalitions and 12 independent candidates stood for election at all levels.1

The political landscape in BiH remains largely divided along ethnic lines,with other issues playing a less prominent role. Key contests occurred mainlyamong political parties that competed with one another in their own ethniccommunities. Thus, the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD),the Serb Democratic Party (SDS), the Party of

Democratic Progress (PDP), and other Serb parties competed for the Serbvote, while the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and the Party for BiH (SBiH)competed for Bosniak votes. On the Croat side, a degree of fragmentationresulted recently from the breakaway of the new Croatian Democratic Union1990 (HDZ 1990) from the Croatian Democratic Union of BiH (HDZ BiH). Incontrast, some parties, including the Social Democratic Party (SDP), tried topresent a more multi-ethnic profile.

Election System and Legal Framework

The state of BiH is comprised of two entities: the FBiH and RS. Inaddition, there is one autonomous district (Brcko). Legislative authority, at

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1 All figures given have been provided by the BiH CEC.


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the state level, is vested in a bi-cameral Parliamentary Assembly, composedof a directly elected House of Representatives (BiH HoR) and an indirectlyelected House of Peoples.

All BiH voters were eligible to elect the 42 deputies comprising the BiH HoR.In addition, the same constituency elected a three-member State Presidency. Theinstitution collectively exercises executive power at the state level.2

At the entity level, voters in the FBiH elected 98 deputies to the FBiHHouse of Representatives and the ten cantonal assemblies. In the RS, voterselected 83 deputies to the RS National Assembly as well as the RS Presidentand two Vice-Presidents.3 The IEOM has only commented on the FBiHcantonal elections to the extent that they impacted on the presidential andparliamentary elections.

The electoral framework in BiH remains complex, reflecting the uniqueconstitutional arrangements in the country.4 The 2001 Election Law of BiHforms the basis of the legislative framework and was most recently amendedin April 2006. The amendments introduced substantive changes, including anew passive voter registration system and the abolition of the ElectionComplaints and Appeals Council. The election law is further supplementedby detailed CEC regulations and other pertinent laws. Overall, the electionlegislation provides a sound basis for a democratic election process, savefor the constitutional limitations mentioned above.

As previously noted in OSCE/ODIHR reports5 and in opinions adoptedby the Venice Commission6, the legal framework continues to enshrine anethnicity-based restriction to suffrage and citizens' ability to stand for office.Citizens who do not identify themselves as one of the three «constituent——————————

2 One Serb member was elected in the RS, one Bosniak and one Croat member wereelected in the FBiH.

3 Voters in Brcko could opt to vote as either FBiH or RS voters.4 The BiH Constitution is an annex to the 1995 General Framework Agreement for

Peace (Dayton Agreement). It vests the international community and the HighRepresentative, in particular, with considerable powers. However, the present HighRepresentative has not used his prerogative to impose decisions and remove officials, inaccordance with the Bonn Powers.

5 OSCE/ODIHR EOM Final Report on General Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina,5 October 2002, For example, http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2003/01/1188_en.pdf.

6 See, in particular, the opinion on the constitutional situation in BiH and the powerof the High Representative of 11 March 2005 (CDL-AD(2005)004.


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peoples», Bosniak, Croat and Serb, are effectively barred from standing forthe State and RS presidencies. As well, voters registered in FBiH are limitedin their choice of presidential candidate to either a Bosniak or a Croat, andRS voters can only vote for a Serb presidency member. Such measures arediscriminatory and run counter to the Copenhagen Commitments and toProtocol no. 12 to the ECHR. They are also in violation of commitments madeto the Council of Europe.7


The 1 October general elections were administered by a three-tieredelection administration: the Central Election Commission (CEC), 142 Munici-pal Election Commissions (MECs), and 4,299 Polling Station Committees(PSCs) with more than 15,000 PSC members. The CEC and the MECs areappointed for five-year terms, by the parliament and municipal authorities,respectively. PSCs are appointed for each election by the MECs. The seven-member CEC is ethnically balanced and its chairperson rotates every 15 monthsamongst the members. Until last year, the CEC included three internationalmembers. These posts have now been filled by one additional member fromeach of the 'constituent peoples'. As a result, these elections will be the firstto be exclusively administered by the BiH authorities.

Generally, the CEC functioned efficiently in elaborating various by-lawsnecessary for the uniform implementation of legal provisions in good time.Important decisions were mainly taken by consensus. The CEC also enjoyeda general confidence from political parties.

MECs were well organized, experienced and prepared for the elections.Most MECs thoroughly and responsibly fulfilled their legal obligation to trainthe PSCs in their municipalities. However, neither a manual nor other materialnecessary for ensuring uniform conduct on election day was provided bythe CEC due to insufficient financial resources. This led to an unsystematictraining programme for PSCs. The lack of an officially approved consolidatedtext of the election law was an additional difficulty for the electionadministration.

In line with legal provisions, the CEC elaborated a lottery for theappointment of PSCs, which dispensed with previous multiethnic composition

9

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7 See Accession Opinion 234 (2002) and Resolution 1513 (2006).


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requirements. However, a technical error in the initial lottery led to theoverrepresentation of certain political subjects. A second lottery was orderedby the CEC, and PSCs were subsequently formed within the legal time limits.Some MECs expressed concern over the fact that a substantial number ofPSC members had no previous experience, and this might have influencedtheir performance on election day.

Some smaller parties did not nominate enough members to fill all allocatedPSC posts. This obliged relevant MECs to fill the extra places with votershaving previous election experience and resident in that PSC area. Suchappointments, as with certain chairperson nominations, became the subjectof complaints made to MECs. These were on the whole resolved withoutcontroversy. Many parties expressed concern over this process and someclaimed that other parties were trading PSC places to stack certaincommissions in their favour. Such claims could not be substantiated.

Special categories of voters (absentee, mobile, tendered ballots, out-of-country) required the organization of specialized polling stations and a separatecount at a Main Counting Centre in Sarajevo. While meticulously regulatedby the CEC to ensure transparent and accountable counting procedures, thework of the Main Counting Centre is not yet completed and may last for morethan a week, thus delaying the final results of the election. This may result indifferences between the preliminary and final allocation in seats, with apossible impact on public confidence.

Voters Registration

The transition from an active to a passive system of voter registrationwas conducted in a generally smooth manner and appeared to be wellaccepted. The Central Voters Register (CVR), which provided the data for voterlists, closed on 17 August. As of 15 September, the overall number ofregistered voters increased by more than 400,000 to 2,755,207, while the numberof absentee voters fell almost five-fold.

By official estimates, a small number of voters were not included in theCVR as a result of their non-registration with the CIPS (Citizens IdentificationProtection System) database, upon which the CVR is based. Acting inclusively,the CEC decided to include all voters who had applied to CIPS between 17August and 15 September in supplements to the CVR excerpts, whichrepresent the voter lists. These were provided to PSCs two days beforeelection day. Voters who applied after 15 September were allowed to vote by


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tendered ballot, based on temporary IDs issued by the relevant CIPS offices.Displaced persons (DPs) had to decide before 18 July whether they wouldexercise their legal right to vote in their pre-war (1991) municipality or in theircurrent place of residence. Voters who had lost their DP status between thisday and the closing of the CVR on 17 August were allowed by CEC decisionto retain their special rights for the purpose of this election. Such a decisionwas commendable in that it sought to be inclusive and was reached after ameticulous examination and in accordance with CEC regulations; the decisionaffected some 4,000 voters.

Candidate Registration

The certification process was completed within the legally prescribeddeadlines. Following the complaints and appeals process, a total of 56 politicalsubjects was certified to stand in the elections at all levels. Among them, atotal of 36 parties, 8 coalitions, and 12 independent candidates competed atstate and entity level.8 A total of 7,245 candidates were certified to run in theelections on 773 separate candidate lists for all elections or 527 candidatelists, excluding the cantonal elections. The order on the ballots was determinedby a lottery and no complaints were expressed in this regard.

Campaign Environment

Although campaigning got underway some months before the election, itpicked up steadily after the official start of the campaign on 1 September.The intensity of campaign activities varied across the country. Activitiesincluded rallies, smaller-scale public meetings, door-to-door campaigning,billboard posters and extensive media use. Isolated cases of campaign posterson public buildings were observed.

The inability to pass constitutional changes in April 2006 had an impacton parties' positions during the election and was used by some domesticpolitical forces during the electoral campaign. While certain parties attemptedto raise the profile of issues of the economy, education and social welfare,key questions of the constitutional structure prevailed and much of thecampaign was dominated by nationalist rhetoric. Key Bosniak politiciansadvocated the further integration of BiH as a unitary state without entities.Some Serb politicians repeatedly raised the option of an independencereferendum for RS. A link was sometimes made between the status of the RSand ongoing talks on Kosovo. The High Representative


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These figures were provided by the CEC.

publicly warned Mr. Dodik, head of the SNSD, on 18 September that stepswould be taken against him if such divisive language continued. In addition,some Croat politicians continued to raise the possibility of a third Croat entity.

The SDP's decision to put forward only a Croat candidate in the FBiH forthe state presidency proved controversial. Croat parties objected that, as theSDP's support base had traditionally been mainly among Bosniak voters, theCroat representative might be elected mainly by Bosniaks.

Isolated instances of inflammatory language directed against other ethnicgroups were noted at party rallies of the SDA and SDP in Brcko and of theDemocratic Movement of Srpska in Pale. The campaign atmosphere was alsoinfluenced by ongoing discussions of war crimes from the 1992-1995 conflict.The signing of a special cooperation agreement between the RS and Serbiain Banja Luka five days before the election was considered by many to beempty politicking to attract voters, but invited comment both within andoutside BiH as to its potentially destabilizing effects on BiH and the region.In the week before the election, five candidates for the BiH presidencyannounced their withdrawal from the race. This decision had no legalconsequence and officially they remained candidates.

Political parties expressed few complaints regarding the campaign. They weregenerally able to conduct their campaign activities without hindrance. Numerousinstances of defaced or torn down billboard posters were observed. Someopposition parties made general allegations of abuses of administrative resources.

Political parties expressed concerns about media coverage, although noparties complained of not receiving their legally allocated free airtime. Mostparties expressed a general confidence in the CEC, although several had fearsthat certain PSCs might be biased, especially in remote areas. They alsofrequently expressed confidence that the new passive voter registrationsystem had improved the quality of voter lists.

Participation of Women and National Minorities

While there have been improvements to the legal and institutionalframework with the adoption of the Law on Gender Equality in 2003, womenin BiH remain underrepresented in political and public life and implementationof this law has been limited so far. The Election Law makes no provision forgender representation in the election administration. When the Election Law


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was amended in early 2006, intensive lobbying by the State Gender Agencyfor inclusion of such provisions was not successful. Nevertheless, womenare involved at all levels of the election administration. Of seven CECmembers, one is a woman and 30 percent of MEC chairpersons are female;some 30 MECs were all male while only two were all female.

Legal provisions regarding gender balance in candidate lists wererespected and 37 percent of all candidates for the electoral races observedwere women. The Election Law requires that every candidate list includes atleast one-third of the minority gender, equally spaced on the list. 67 womenand 460 men topped candidate lists. Participation of female candidates in theelection campaign was very limited.

17 national minorities are legally recognised in BiH, but most of these aresmall with Roma being the only numerically significant minority population.In the absence of a new census since 1991 and as a consequence of wartimedisplacements, the size of the Roma minority is unclear. Estimates range from30,000 to 100,000. During the election, no political parties specificallyrepresented national minority interests in the country, although at least oneparty included Roma candidates in their lists.

Media

BiH has a pluralistic media environment that includes both public andprivate broadcasters and a variety of print media. Respect for legal provisionsregarding free airtime on public broadcasters and regular televised debatesallowed candidates to convey their messages to the electorate. In general,voters were exposed to a broad range of views, providing the opportunity tomake informed choices. However, the campaign in the media was dominatedby rhetoric between parties rather than focused on substantive issues.

News coverage of the campaign suffered from a restrictive interpretation oflegal provisions. This may have led to media's confusion regarding thedifferentiation between providing information about candidates and campaig-ningon their behalf; broadcasters apparently maintained that if a candidate was to beinterviewed during the daily news coverage, then all candidates should be givenairtime to fulfil the legal requirement for equal conditions. As a result, broadcastersseemed reluctant to offer lively news coverage of the campaign.

The majority of the media monitored showed limited interest in the elec-toral campaign.9 Instead, they devoted a significant portion of their prime


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time news coverage to the activities of the authorities, outside of the campaigncontext. Media monitoring results showed that in the four weeks precedingthe election, the state-level public broadcaster BHT devoted 25 percent of itspolitical and election prime time news coverage to BiH Council of Ministersactivities, which were reported in an exclusively positive or neutral tone. Theentity-level FBiH and RS governments received the next highest coverage(16 and 21 percent, respectively), which was primarily positive or neutral.Regarding political parties and coalitions, most coverage was devoted to theSNSD at 7 percent and the SDA at 5 percent. While 64 percent of SDA'scoverage was positive and 36 percent was neutral in tone, only 20 percent ofSNSD's coverage was assessed as positive and 37 percent as negative.

There were discernable differences in news coverage between the twopublic entity broadcasters, whose coverage of political subjects appeared tohave been based along ethnic lines. The RS entity public broadcaster, RTRS,favoured incumbent political subjects in the RS and used 62 percent of itspolitical and election prime time news coverage to focus on activities of theRS government (44 percent), the RS president (10 percent), and the SNSD (8percent). This coverage was predominantly positive or neutral in tone. Bycomparison, the FBiH entity public broadcaster, FTV, favoured the SDA,devoting 15 percent of its coverage (mainly neutral and positive) to the party.Its prime time news political and election coverage was primarily focused onactivities of the FBiH government (28 percent), which were reported mainlyin a positive or neutral tone.

Private broadcasters monitored exhibited similar patterns of low interestin the electoral campaign during their news coverage. TV Pink BiH devoted30 percent of its political and election prime time news coverage to the RSgovernment (primarily positive or neutral). The second most-featured politicalsubject was the SNSD (25 percent, mainly positive coverage).

Television: Publicly-funded BHT, FTV and RTRS, Private OBN, Pink TVBiH and Mreza Plus. Newspapers: Dnevni Avaz, Oslobodjenie, NezavisneNovine, Dnevni List and Glas Srpske

By comparison, the Mreza Plus private network allocated the largest portionof its political and election prime time news coverage to the activities of BiHCouncil of Ministers, the entity-level FBiH government and the SDA, whichwas mainly positive and neutral in tone. In contrast, SNSD received primarilynegative or neutral coverage. The third monitored privateowned broadcaster


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OBN gave less coverage to the activities of the authorities and devoted thelargest portion of its election and political news coverage to NSRzB.

The print media provided lively coverage of the election campaign and aplurality of views, but invariably supported specific political parties andcoalitions. As such, voters could form an objective view of the campaign onlyif they read several publications.

The prime time news coverage by regional broadcasters was also shapedalong ethnic lines. In Tuzla, for example, the local broadcaster, TV Tuzla,provided clear support to the SDP by devoting as much as 26 percent ofoverwhelmingly positive or neutral coverage to the party. In comparison, theMostar-based, HTV Mostar, was slightly inclined in favour of HDZ. The thirdmonitored regional broadcaster, ATV (based in Banja Luka), provided mostof its prime time news coverage to the activities of the RS government.

Complaints and Appeals

Prior to the deployment of the EOM and during the certification ofcandidates, the SBiH nominated a Bosniak to stand as a candidate in theRepublika Srpska (RS) for the BiH presidency. This application was rejectedby the CEC on the above mentioned grounds, which restrict candidacy onthe basis of ethnicity. The decision was upheld by the Appellate Division ofthe BiH State Court and has been appealed to the Constitutional Court, asthe final instance. The SBiH has publicly stated its intention to appeal to theECHR on the matter.

During the course of the election process observed, there were few for-mal complaints made to MECs. In most cases, election disputes were settledinformally between political subjects, without lodging of formal complaints.The CEC considered 20 appeals on MEC decisions, mostly concerningformation of PSCs and their appointment and rejected the majority of them.Three complaints filed with the CEC alleged use of inflammatory languageduring the campaign. Although all of them were formally rejected, the CECinitiated a procedure ex officio in one of the cases; it established that a songused during campaigning by the Serb Radical Party, «Dr. Vojislav Šešelj» couldincite violence or hatred through its use of certain nationalist slogans. TheCEC fined the party the maximum amount prescribed.

There was also a complaint to the CEC alleging abuse of public resourcesduring the campaign by an incumbent candidate. It is of concern that this


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complaint was dismissed by a letter signed by the CEC Chairperson, withoutits consideration during a CEC session and without a collegiate decision onthe matter.

Three CEC decisions10 were appealed to and subsequently upheld bythe Appellate Division of the BiH Court. The Court adjudicated the appealswith some delay vis-à-vis the legal requirements, but failed to provide anyjustifiable reasons for these delays.

The Communications Regulatory Agency (CRA), which is tasked to dealwith broadcast media violations during the elections, reported receiving 10complaints regarding the conduct of the media. These complaints mainlyalleged unfair treatment of political subjects. However, the CRA decided todeal with them only after the elections. An early decision by

One appeal challenged the rejection of a request to establish a pollingstation, and two other appeals questioned the rejection of nominees toPSCs on the grounds of missed deadlines.

the CRA may have clarified certain elements of the 'equal treatment'provision, an issue that was cited by broadcasters as a reason not to engagein certain types of election coverage.

There is no codified right under the current legislation to a public hearingon complaints and appeals. Although public hearings may be granted byadjudicating authorities at their discretion, this failed to happen in practice.

Domestic Observers

Domestic observation was fragmented, and the scope and methodologiesof the groups were highly diverse. 29 domestic non-government organizations(NGOs) were accredited to observe the elections, with a total of 4,136 domesticobservers, not nominated by political parties. The NGO network OKOcoordinated activities of seven domestic NGOs in conducting a nationwideelection observation effort. There were also almost 30,000 political partyobservers registered by MECs for election day.

Election Day

On election day, voter turnout was reported by the CEC as 54.48 percent,as officially reported.


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The opening of polling stations was assessed as «good» or «very good»by IEOM observers in 92 percent of cases. All polling stations opened within30 minutes of the legal deadline. However, in 6 percent of cases observed,STOs reported that those present did not have a clear view of the preparationsfor opening, which may have influenced their overall assessment.

Voting during election day proceeded smoothly, although overcrowdingand group voting were noted in many places by observers. In 3 percent ofpolling stations, ballot boxes were not properly sealed. Procedural problemswere observed by STOs, especially voters not receiving a proper explanationas to how to fill in ballots, voters not always marking their ballots in secrecy,and signatures not being checked against ID documents.

On a positive note, there were no observations by STOs of multiple votingor carousel voting. However, it was noted that in 55 percent of polling stationsobserved, voters were turned away due to either not being in the voter listswhere they are registered or for being at the wrong polling station. PSCsgenerally acted helpfully, assisting voters in trying to locate their correctpolling stations. STOs overall assessment of the voting process was notedas «good» or «very good» in 94 percent of cases. However, there were someinstances observed of polling station commissioners or party observers tryingto influence voters' choice.

The process deteriorated somewhat during the course of the countingand observers accessed PSCs understanding of procedures as «bad» or «verybad» in 26 percent of cases observed. In 39 percent of cases, PSCs haddifficulty in completing the results protocol and in 22 percent of cases, theresults did not reconcile. In addition, the results poster was not posted in 34percent of polling stations observed and in 44 percent of cases, summaryresults forms were not made available to observers. Unauthorized people eitherdirecting or interfering in the count process were noted in 14 percent of pollingstations observed at closing. PSC members commented that many of theproblems were as a result of poor training prior to the election.

More seriously, two singular cases of deliberate falsification were reportedby STOs. In one case, ballot box stuffing was noted in Livno and in ZvornikSTOs observed one polling station in which ballots were being marked duringthe count by a political party observer.

Based on initial observation, tabulation at MEC level was noted as«good» or «very good» 92 percent of cases. Of note, no MEC was assessed


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as «very bad». MECs generally had a good understanding of tabulationprocedures and the organization was considered good by all STOs observing.Due to the lack of clear instructions from the CEC, a number of MECs decidedto start the tabulation only upon receipt of all materials from PSCs.

The campaign silence period was breached by some parties. Allegationsare being investigated by the CEC.

This statement is also available in the official languages of BiH.However, the English version remains the only official document.

MISSION INFORMATION & ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission opened in Sarajevo on25 August with 14 experts and 17 long-term observers deployed in the ca-pital and eight regional centres. On election day, 364 short-term observerswere deployed in an International Election Observation Mission (IEOM),including 46 parliamentarians from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and19 from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). Intotal, there were observers from 43 OSCE participating States. The IEOMobserved the polling and vote count in over 1,600 polling stationsthroughout the country and in 61 MECs after polling stations closed, toobserve the tabulation of results.

Mr. David Heath, Member of the UK Parliament and of the OSCEParliamentary Assembly was appointed by OSCE Chairman-in-Office asSpecial Coordinator to lead the short term OSCE observation mission. LordRussell-Johnston, former President and current member of the PACE, led theDelegation of the PACE. Ambassador Lubomir Kopaj headed the OSCE/ODIHRElection Observation Mission.

The IEOM wishes to thank the authorities of BiH for the invitation toobserve the elections, the Central Election Commission for providingaccreditation documents, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other state andlocal authorities for their assistance and cooperation. The IEOM also wishesto express appreciation to the OSCE Mission to BiH for their supportthroughout the duration of the mission and the Embassies of OSCE partici-pating States in Sarajevo for their support.


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For further information please contact:

• Ms. Urdur Gunnarsdottir, OSCE/ODIHR Spokesperson (+48-603-683122); or Mr. Vadim Zhdanovich, OSCE/ODIHR Senior Election Adviser,in Warsaw(+48-603-942 914);

• Mr. Bas Klein, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, inStrasbourg(+33-662-265 489).

• Mr. Andreas Baker, OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, in Copenhagen(+45- 601-08030);

• Amb. Lubomir Kopaj, Head of the OSCE/ODIHR EOM, in Sarajevo(+387-33-752 888).

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Anexo 4

INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSIONPARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS, REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA,

12 MAY 2007

STATEMENT OF PRELIMI NARY FIN DINGS AND CONCL USI O N S

Yerevan, 13 May 2007 - The International Election Observation Mission(IEOM) for the 12 May parliamentary elections in Armenia is a joint undertakingof the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA), the ParliamentaryAssembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) and the European Parliament (EP).

This statement of preliminary findings and conclusions is delivered priorto the completion of the election process, including the tabulation andannouncement of final results, the handling of possible post-election daycomplaints or appeals, and the installment into office of the newly electedmembers of the National Assembly.

The election is assessed in line with OSCE and Council of Europecommitments, other international standards for democratic elections andnational legislation. The final assessment of the election will depend, in part,on the conduct of the remaining stages of the election process. The OSCE/ODIHR will issue a comprehensive final report, including recommendationsfor potential improvements, approximately two months after the completionof the election process. The PACE will present its report at its StandingCommittee meeting on 24 May.

The institutions represented in the IEOM stand ready to continue tosupport the authorities and civil society of Armenia in the conduct ofdemocratic elections.


The 12 May 2007 elections for the National Assembly of the Republic ofArmenia demonstrated improvement and were conducted largely inaccordance with OSCE and Council of Europe commitments and other


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international standards for democratic elections. The Armenian authorities andother actors in the electoral process took steps to address previousshortcomings, but were unable to fully deliver a performance consistent withtheir stated intention that the election would meet international standards,and some issues remained unaddressed.

The Election Code was considerably amended and improved since the2003 parliamentary elections, and provides a good basis for the organizationof genuinely democratic elections, although some shortcomings remain. Theamended Election Code clarifies a number of ambiguities in the process aswell as the legal consequences of non-compliance.

The election authorities generally worked efficiently in the pre-electionperiod, and were technically well equipped and prepared for election day.Candidate registration was carried out by the Central Election Commission(CEC) and the Territorial Election Commissions (TECs) in an inclusive manner.Other positive aspects of the pre-election process included:

• The CEC demonstrated ongoing efforts to enhance transparency ofelection procedures, such as a schedule of regular press briefings andthe provision of key information on its website.

• Substantial training of election officials and voter education effortstook place.

• For the first time there was a central and computerized voter register.The police, as the responsible agency, took proactive measures (alongwith the CEC and others) to correct inaccuracies and involve theelectorate in upgrading the voter list through telephone hotlines andadvance publication of the voter list on the CEC website.

• There was visible and dynamic campaigning by many contestants inboth the proportional and majoritarian contests, which took place in apermissive environment.

• There was extensive media coverage of the election, with an apparenteffort to enable most parties and candidates to convey their messages,although largely devoid of critical viewpoints.

• Public media adhered to legal requirements concerning allocation offree airtime during the official campaign period.

• Women's representation in the electoral contest was improved in linewith the amended Election Code providing that women shouldconstitute at least 15 per cent of each proportional contest party/bloclist and be in at least every tenth position on the list.


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However, the following issues raised concerns:

• Gaps remain in the regulatory framework for elections. Existingregulations to address important areas of the electoral process, suchas early campaigning and issues of possible vote buying were notimplemented. The intertwining at all levels of political and businessinterests is of concern, especially in view of relatively weak provisionsand enforcement regarding transparency and disclosure of campaignfinances.

• The mechanisms to regulate the election process and correct irregula-rities were mostly passive. Publicly identified concerns were generallynot acted upon in the absence of formal complaints.

• The complaints and appeals process brought to light inconsistenciesand contradictory elements in the legal framework.

• TEC leadership «troikas» (chairperson, deputy chairperson andsecretary) were dominated by representatives of the Republican Party,Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) Dashnaktsutiun andappointees of the President, which challenges the spirit of balancedcomposition as intended by Election Code provisions.

• The majoritarian contests were characterized by a low number ofcandidates - just under three per constituency on average. Seven outof 41 constituencies had only one candidate.

• The separation of the ruling party and the State appeared to be lessthan distinct in some important elements of the campaign, the mostvisible of which was the convergence of the election campaign of theRepublican Party with a longer-running campaign celebrating thefifteenth anniversary of the Armenian Army, sponsored by the Ministryof Defense.

• Negative newspaper articles relating to private comments by anopposition leader, allegedly recorded surreptitiously, and subsequentpublic remarks by the president referring to those comments as a seriouscriminal act, introduced a negative element to the campaign environment.

Some violent incidents occurred during the campaign period, but they appearnot to have significantly impacted upon the overall electoral environment.

On election day, voting took place in a mostly calm atmosphere. Theconduct of voting was assessed positively in the vast majority of pollingstations observed (94 per cent). Training of PEC members was evident withPECs generally following procedures, including the checking of voter


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identification. Domestic observers were present in 82 per cent of the pollingstations. Some identified problems included: unauthorized persons presentin polling stations (17 per cent), overcrowding (14 per cent) and challengesto secrecy of voting due to the construct of voting booths (17 per cent).

Problems of an apparently more deliberate character emerged in some partsof the country. A few instances of tension due to the conduct of proxies orunauthorized persons were observed. People voting more than once wereobserved in two TECs and potential vote fraud schemes were identified intwo cases.

Counting was mostly conducted according to procedures but in 17 percent of polling stations observed the organizational requirements led todifficulties and consequently to an assessment of the counting as bad orvery bad by IEOM observers. In a number of observations (6 per cent), thevoter's choice on the ballot was either not declared, not shown to thosepresent, or results for contestants not announced. Difficulties compilingprotocols were observed in 20 per cent of PECs, and significant errors in 8per cent. In at least three TECs, PECs completed protocols at the TECpremises, representing a lapse in procedure and the potential for resultsfalsification. Deliberate falsification of results was observed at four pollingstations, and an attempt in two polling stations.

While the IEOM does not have a complete impression of the resultstabulation due to the slow rate of tabulation, although apparently within thelegally prescribed timeframe, IEOM observers recorded procedural andtechnical errors.

Two issues of concern which did not impact on the election process itselfwere also noted by the IEOM:

The Armenian authorities' last-minute denial of visas to OSCE/ODIHRobservers seconded by one OSCE participating State (Turkey) was not inline with the commitment in the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen document to inviteelection observers from any other OSCE participating State.1

Prior to the elections, the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission (EOM)received criticism from State authorities, including in public written statements,that called into question both the veracity of its findings, and its methodology.The IEOM does not agree with such criticism and stands by the findings ofthe OSCE/ODIHR EOM third interim report.


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PRELIMINARY FINDINGS

Background

The 12 May 2007 elections were to elect 131 seats in the NationalAssembly (parliament). Members of the National Assembly are elected forfive-year terms. Ninety seats are elected on the basis of a national proportionalcontest of party/bloc lists, and 41 by majoritarian contest in single-mandateconstituencies. In the proportional contest, to win election a party must passa threshold of 5 per cent of the valid vote, while a bloc must pass 7 per cent.In the majoritarian contests, the candidate polling the highest number of votesis the winner (first past the post).2

Previous elections in the Republic of Armenia in 2003, 1999, 1998, and1996 have been assessed as falling short of OSCE commitments and otherinternational standards for democratic elections.3

1 OSCE Copenhagen Document, 1990, Art. 8: «They will therefore inviteobservers from any other [OSCE] participating State…to observe the courseof their national election proceedings...».

2 In cases where there is only one candidate, he or she must win morethan 50 per cent of the valid vote.

3 For OSCE/ODIHR reports on previous elections in the Republic ofArmenia (1996-2003), see http://www.osce.org/odihr-elections/14350.html

Changes in the political landscape affected the 2007 electoral competition.For this election, the Armenian Republican Party, ARF Dashnaktsutiun andthe United Labour Party did not enter the election as a coalition, althoughthey were partners in government, while the Orinats Yerkir (Law-based State)Party left the government coalition in 2006. New political forces emerged,notably the Prosperous Armenia Party, while others fell into abeyance.

Prime Minister Andranik Margaryan, leader of the Republican Party, diedsuddenly on 25 March. Serge Sargsyan was named on 26 March to take onthe party leadership functions, and on 4 April President Kocharyan appointedhim as prime minister.

Legal Framework

The legislative framework for elections in Armenia consists mainly of theConstitution and the Election Code. The Code has been substantially

10


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amended since the 2003 National Assembly elections, and provides a goodbasis for the conduct of democratic elections. However, gaps remain in theregulatory framework for elections, and there were also failures to implementcertain existing legislative provisions.

The Election Code guarantees State support and cooperation forcampaigning on an equal basis. The formal campaign period begins after theregistration of candidacies. The Code does not address what constitutescampaigning, and whether campaign activities or fundraising by electionparticipants and third parties are permitted prior to the campaign period.

The CEC rejected a complaint against early campaigning brought by anNGO against Orinats Yerkir. The CEC found that the distribution of a leafletconstituted campaigning, but indicated that the absence of a clearprohibition on early campaigning, and constitutional protections for politicalexpression and assembly, prevented it from concluding that there had beena violation.

The Constitution requires openness of political party and campaignfinances, but deficiencies in disclosure, reporting and overall supervision werenoted. The absence of clear prohibitions on early and indirect campaigning,and deficiencies in enforcing party and campaign finance regulations, leavescope for electoral contestants to exceed campaign finance limitations. Thiscould subvert the intent of campaign finance limitations stipulated in theElection Code. The CEC has no competence to investigate whether a party/candidate has failed to disclose relevant financial transactions outside thecampaign fund a contestant must established. Examination of the available2006 financial reports of political parties by the OSCE/ODIHR EOM indicatedthat they lacked detail and could not serve as a sufficient basis for monitoringcampaign finance. It is also questionable whether the reported amounts areaccurate: for example, Prosperous Armenia reported that it had no income,expenditures or property at all in 2006.

The Election Code prohibits parties and candidates, during the officialelection campaign, from giving or promising goods and services to voters -commonly referred to as «vote buying». The statutory provision does notappear to require specific intent to influence a voter to constitute a violation.The OSCE/ODIHR EOM directly observed one episode of provision of goodsby a political party that met the legal definition of prohibited conduct in anelection campaign. Generally, the legal prohibition was not enforced. The


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prosecutor-general informed the OSCE/ODIHR EOM that his office would actonly in cases in which intent to influence voters could be demonstrated.

During the campaign period substantial attention in the media togovernment activities included a prominent focus on Prime Minister Sargsyan.The manner in which his public appearances around the country werepresented by the media, not clearly differentiating between his roles as primeminister and leader of the Republican Party, appeared to confirm the difficultyin applying legal provisions concerning political campaigning by officials.


The election administration comprises the CEC, 41 TECs (correspondingto the 41 majoritarian constituencies), and 1,923 Precinct ElectionCommissions (PECs). The CEC and TECs are permanent bodies, while PECswere formed by 27 April. The amended Election Code provides for a morebalanced composition of election commissions: one member is nominated bythe president, one each by the six parliamentary factions and the «peoples’deputy» group (deputies elected as non-partisan), and one «judicial servant».There is a hierarchy of appointment, each representative on the CECnominating one member to each TEC, who in turn nominated a member toeach of the PECs under that TEC.

During the pre-election period the CEC made notable improvements in itsefficiency and transparency of procedures. All necessary election preparationswere made within the required timeframe. The CEC established a schedule ofregular press briefings, and introduced on its website a chart on complaintsit had considered. In accordance with amendments to the Election Coderequiring publication of election results by precinct, the CEC introduced anetworked computer system linking it to the TECs.

TECs appeared to be well prepared for the elections and generally to beworking in a collegial manner. However, the TEC leadership «troikas»(chairperson, deputy chairperson and secretary), although elected by the TEC,were dominated by the representatives of the Republican Party, ARFDashnaktsutiun and appointees of the President. This challenges the spiritof balanced composition as intended by Election Code provisions. In twoTECs, members acknowledged that the Orinats Yerkir-appointed member hadbeen removed from the TEC troika because that party was now in opposition.Influence of local selfgovernment bodies over the work of TEC 17 (Artashat)


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and TEC 19 (Yeghednadzor) appeared to breach the provisions forindependence stated in the Election Code.

PEC leadership «troikas» had a more diverse composition than TEC«troikas». PECs were extensively trained for election day and provided withmaterials explaining election day procedures in detail. The CEC produced shortTV films explaining election day procedures to voters, which were broadcastthroughout the official campaign period.

Election code amendments enacted in 2005 charged the police withcompiling a centralized and computerized voter register. For these elections,additional efforts were made by the police and CEC as well as by localcommunity leaders, political parties and NGOs to correct inaccuracies (mainlysurplus names and voters registered at incorrect addresses). The police andthe CEC repeatedly called through the media for public cooperation to correctthe voter list, which could be checked on the CEC website or at polling stationpremises, and errors then reported to election authorities or via police hotlines.Candidate registration was inclusive. All twenty-four parties and one bloc thatapplied were registered by the CEC, and no individual candidate from any listwas refused registration. After two parties withdrew their lists, twenty-twoparties and one bloc were on the ballot for the proportional list contest. Of the141 persons who submitted documents for registration as majoritariancandidates, 135 were registered by the TECs. Five withdrew before registration,and there was one refusal due to incomplete documentation. A small number ofwithdrawals after registration (commonly citing negligible prospects of winning),and two de-registrations (see below) resulted in a total of 119 candidates in themajoritarian contest - an average of just under three per constituency.

No party sought to field a candidate in every constituency (only theRepublican Party attempted a countrywide presence). Most parties decidedto concentrate resources instead on the proportional election. There wereseven constituencies with only one candidate, and eleven with only twocandidates. The majoritarian contests reflected local rather than nationwidepolitical dynamics.


The Election Code permits appeals to the courts against actions (or inaction)of election commissions. The CEC and TECs have responsibility under theCode to review actions by subordinate election commissions. There was a


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discernible deficit in this regard due to evident passivity and lack of initiativeby the electoral and other authorities responsible for upholding the regulatoryframework, who stated that they would only take action upon receipt of aformal complaint.

While complaints received by the CEC were handled with overalltransparency, some of its official responses (these were not characterized as«decisions») were not sufficiently reasoned. For example, in response to acomplaint by Orinats Yerkir that a mayor had breached the requirement forprovision of state-owned premises as campaign venues free of charge, theCEC confirmed the definition of state property as central government andnot local self-government property.4 However, this was contrary to practicealready widely in evidence during the campaign.

A small number of complaints were filed with TECs, and none upheld.TEC and court decisions in some instances were arbitrary and inconsistent.A court ordered TEC 19 to deregister two candidates, on the basis of anapplication by a third candidate. However, another court rejected a complaintthat TEC 39 should deregister a candidate (while not disputing the substanceof the complaint) on the grounds that a rival candidate did not havecompetence to apply to court for a candidate's deregistration.

The Election Code and provisions of the Civil Procedure Code on election-related disputes declare election-related first instance court decisions to be finaland not subject to appeal, but in six decisions on complaints rendered on 3 Maythe court of first instance granted the right of appeal, citing different provisionsof the Civil Procedure Code. Additionally, the constitutionality of Civil ProcedureCode provisions has been challenged in the Constitutional Court.

Campaign Environment

In the official campaign period, vigorous campaigning by most parties andmajoritarian candidates was discernible throughout the country. Municipaland community authorities, almost without exception, met their obligationsto designate places for the display of campaign materials. Besides thesedesignated spaces, and advertising on commercially rented installations, apermissive environment prevailed, with posters widely placed on public andprivate buildings and installations.

There was a flexible approach towards the formal procedure whereby, onthe basis of requests received and forwarded by the TECs, municipal and


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community authorities should put venues for campaign meetings at thedisposal of political parties and candidates on the basis of equality and freeof charge. In instances where parties or candidates applied instead directlyto the municipal and community authorities, this was apparently with theapproval of the TECs. Most parties appeared to favour an approach of hol-ding previously unannounced or short-notice rallies, without prohibitive actionfrom the authorities.

Highly visible and prevalent publicity to commemorate the fifteenthanniversary of the Armenian Army, sponsored by the Ministry of Defense,was launched prior to and ran throughout almost the entire campaign period.This was mainly visible in Yerevan, where about half the electorate resides.At a late stage in the campaign, the Republican Party campaign convergedwith the Army's anniversary campaign, with evident crossover of campaignmessages and featured participants. The merging of the image of the party(whose leader was until recently the Minister of Defense) with the symbolsand accomplishments of

Local Government Law, Art. 70.2

the armed forces was evident.5 As a result, the separation between theruling party and the State appeared to be less than distinct.

The Russian-language newspaper Golos Armenii published two editorialsnegatively describing a conversation between an opposition party chair-man and a diplomat, allegedly clandestinely recorded. The editorialscontended that the opposition leader was seeking a negative assessmentof the parliamentary elections by the international community. These eventsand subsequent public remarks by the president referring to the afore-mentioned comments as a serious criminal act, introduced an element ofpressure into the election campaign environment.6 Although the authoritieshave yet to underscore that free expression and secrecy of private commu-———————————

5 This runs contrary to OSCE commitments. See OSCE Copenhagen Document, 1990,Art. 5: «[A]mong those elements of justice which are essential to the full expression ofthe inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all human beings [is]» […Art. 5.4]: «a clear separation between the States and political parties; in particular,political parties will not be merged with the State».6 OSCE Copenhagen Document, 1990, Art. 7.7: «[The participating States will] ensurethat law and public policy work to permit political campaigning to be conducted in a fairand free atmosphere in which neither administrative action, violence nor intimidationbars the parties and the candidates from freely presenting their views…»


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nication are protected by the Armenian Constitution, they have said thatan investigation would be undertaken. Further information on theinvestigation is still pending.

Widely circulating and apparently speculative comments about activitiesin preparation for election fraud could indicate mistrust and cynicism amongthe electorate. A person working for a majoritarian candidate in TEC 25 wasarrested for vote buying on 9 May. The OSCE/ODIHR EOM also heardallegations that some voters were under pressure to vote for certain partiesor candidates, for fear of consequences such as job dismissal. A candidate(and incumbent deputy) from Syunik region confirmed that workers at a largeenterprise he owned were obliged to vote for him, but he characterized thisas consistent with contemporary global corporate management styles.

There were some violent episodes shortly before and during the officialcampaign period, but their connection to the elections, or to election rivalries,was unclear, and they did not appear to impact on the electoral environmentcountrywide.

Media Environment

The Election Code provides for airtime to all candidates based on «equalconditions». Each registered party/bloc in the proportional contest was entitledto a maximum 60 and 120 minutes of free airtime and no more than 120 and 180minutes of paid airtime on public television and radio respectively. The CECallotted the sequence of appearances in free and paid airtime by lottery. Publicmedia adhered to their obligations in a somewhat formalistic manner: public TVH1 decided that all free campaign slots could be broadcast daily as a bloc, inthe time period set by the CEC but outside primetime viewing.

Almost all parties and blocs used their free airtime. On 19 April amajoritarian independent candidate appeared during the free airtime allocatedto a party. Instead of deregistering the party for breaching the Election Codeprohibition on transfer of airtime to another contestant, the CEC issued ageneral warning.

The country's leading private broadcasters offered to air paid politicaladvertisements, while local TV stations limited paid spots mostly tomajoritarian contests, if at all. The national broadcasters' advertising rateswere criticized as prohibitively expensive by a number of contestants, andwere high when compared to regular commercial rates.


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Political and electoral events were extensively reflected in newscasts andcurrent affairs programmes in the broadcast media.7 Many media outlets triedto cover a broad range of political subjects, and thus to comply with legalprovisions requiring equal conditions. Most monitored TV channels, however,devoted the highest portion of political information in newscasts to thegovernment and to the Republican Party, the ARF Dashnaktsutiun andProsperous Armenia.

The two public broadcasters (H1 television and Public Radio) mostlyguaranteed access to the media for contestants. Public Radio offered balancedpolitical coverage (both in time and tone). H1 covered a number of politicalsubjects, with the government accounting for the highest portion (21 per centof predominantly neutral and positive coverage). It was also the onlybroadcaster to pay most attention to the opposition Armenian People's Party(12 per cent). However, coverage of Orinats Yerkir questioned the channel'sobjectivity - H1 was the only television channel to present the first GolosArmenii editorial (see above) verbatim in its main news programme. Later itaired at least twice the president's public remarks referring to the partychairman's private comments. Notwithstanding the editorial freedom to informthe public about these events, H1 did not meet the basic journalistic stan-dard of presenting a response from Orinats Yerkir.

The four nationwide TV channels - H1 and the private channels H2, ArmeniaTV and ALM TV provided extensive coverage of the government (with 26 percent on H2). All monitored private broadcasters dedicated most of their politicalnews to the Republican Party (ALM TV and Armenia TV), Prosperous Armenia(H2, Shant TV and the highest portion in Kentron TV), or ARF Dashnaktsutiun(Yerkir Media). This coverage was positive and devoid of critical comment.

Television coverage of the elections presented overtly positive and neu-tral information, minimizing any critical viewpoints. Only radio stations, mainlyRFE/Radio Liberty, broadcast critical viewpoints voiced by differentcontestants and voters. The print media displayed a diversity of views,including critical views, although no single media source could be relied uponto present balanced coverage.

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7 The OSCE/ODIHR EOM monitored seven television station, two radio stations andfour newspapers, using quantitative and qualitative analysis, from 22 March through 10May: H1 (public-service broadcaster), ALM TV, Armenia TV, H2,


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The media generally respected a silence period that started 24 hours priorto the election day.

Participation of Women

Women are under-represented in political or public life in Armenia. In theoutgoing government, one of sixteen ministers is a woman, and seven of 131deputies in the outgoing parliament are women.

The amended Election Code requires the inclusion of 15 per cent womenfor party/bloc lists in the proportional contest (as compared with 5 per centin 2003), and in at least every tenth position in the lists. However, of the 119candidates contesting the 41 majoritarian seats, only five were women(running in three constituencies). The visibility of female candidates in theelectoral campaign was low.

There are very few women in the election administration: two of nine CECmembers, 15 per cent of TEC members and only three of 41 TEC chairpersonsare women. Eleven TECs are all male. At PEC level, women are betterrepresented: EOM observers reported 38 per cent women as members of PECs,including 23 per cent as chairpersons.

Domestic and International Observers

Fifty-two domestic observation groups observed election day. The CECrefused accreditation to ten NGOs, mainly because they did not meet therequirement that relevant activities were included in their statute, andderegistered one on the grounds that it violated the provision of non-partisanship.8 Domestic observers were present in 82 per cent of pollingstations visited by the IEOM during voting and during 89 per cent of counts.In addition to international organizations represented in the IEOM, the CECaccredited observers from the Executive Committee of the Commonwealth ofIndependent States and its Interparliamentary Assembly.

A recent amendment to the Election Code limits access by internationalorganizations wishing to observe elections in Armenia: the amendment requires——————————

8 Kentron TV, Shant TV, Yerkir Media (TV channels); Public Radio, RFE/Radio Liberty(radio stations); Hayastani

Hanrapetutyun (State-funded), Aravot, AZG, Haykakan Zhamanak (newspapers).Election Code, Art. 29


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that international organizations must be explicitly invited by one of the statebodies (the President, National Assembly, Government and CEC).

Election Day and Vote Count

On election day, voting took place in a mostly calm atmosphere. Theconduct of voting was evaluated as very good or good in 94 per cent of pollingstations. In many cases where it was assessed as problematic this was due toovercrowding (14 per cent) and the maintenance of conditions for secrecy ofvoting with the open-front voting booths (deficiencies in this regard wereobserved in 17 per cent of polling stations). Overcrowding —largely aconsequence of challenging conditions at premises available to serve as pollingstations, and poor weather in some parts of the country meaning that voterswere unwilling to wait outside— caused one PEC in TEC 30 (Vanadzor) to closethe polling station some 30 minutes early, denying the possibility to vote topeople who were waiting. Unauthorized persons were present in 17 per cent ofpolling stations.

Problems of an apparently deliberate character were observed in TECsconcentrated in parts of Aragatsotn, Armavir, Ararat, Gegharkunik, Lori andVayots Dzor regions, leading to a higher prevalence of IEOM observers' negativeassessments. People voting more than once were observed in polling stationsin TECs 23 (Sevan) and 31 (Vanadzor-Alaverdi); an attempt by the PEC to concealthe same activity at a polling station in TEC 39 (Vayots Dzor) was observed.Outside one polling station in TEC 31 IEOM observers saw people having whatappeared to be a false data page (including photograph) inserted into theirpassports, suggesting preparation for voter impersonation fraud. Vote buyingwas observed at another polling station in the same constituency. In a pollingstation in TEC 4 (Arabkir, Yerevan) a voter was observed taking a photographof his marked ballot with his cellphone, an act consistent with a rumoured votefraud scheme. The CEC had previously responded with a decision on 9 Maybanning the use of camera phones in voting booths. Among episodes of tensionconnected to the behaviour of party/candidate proxies or unauthorized persons,there were chaotic scenes at a polling station in TEC 29 when ProsperousArmenia representatives threatened the PEC and stole the ink pad used for thePEC stamp, causing voting to be temporarily suspended.

Counting mostly was conducted procedurally correctly, but in a numberof of polling stations (6 per cent) where the IEOM observed counting thevoters choice on the ballot was either not declared or shown to those present


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by the PEC chairperson, or the number of votes cast for contestants was notannounced aloud. Nearly 20 per cent of PECs were observed to havedifficulties compiling the protocols, and 8 per cent made significant proceduralerrors or omissions. In cases observed at TECs 13 (Erebuni, Yerevan), 19(Vagharshapat), and 24, among others, PECs only completed protocols forthe majoritarian when at the premises of the TEC, which is at best a lapse ofprocedure and at worst a way of facilitating results falsification. Deliberatefalsification of results was directly observed at one polling station in TEC 16(Masis), one in TEC 17 (Artashat) and two in TEC 29 (Spitak), where votescast for smaller parties were redistributed to the piles of six major parties; asimilar falsification was observed being attempted at a polling stations in TEC11 (Shengavit, Yerevan) in the proportional contest and TEC 7 (Malatia-Sebastia, Yerevan), in the majoritarian contest. Security bags with ballotsbrought from one PEC were observed to have been opened when they weredelivered to TEC 13.

While the IEOM does not have a complete impression of the resultstabulation due to the slow rate of tabulation, although apparently within thelegally prescribed timeframe, IEOM observers recorded procedural andtechnical errors. TECs should finish tabulation and reporting of results within18 hours of the end of voting, i.e. by 1400 hours on 13 May, and someinformed IEOM observers that they would not begin tabulation proceduresuntil 0600 hours.

This statement is also available in Armenian.However, the English version remains the only official document.

MISSION INFORMATION & ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The OSCE/ODIHR opened its election observation mission in Yerevanon 21 March 2007 with 15 experts and 29 long-term observers deployed inthe capital and around the country. On election day, 411 short-term observerswere deployed in an International Election Observation Mission (IEOM),including 59 observers from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA),32 from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) and 13from the European Parliament (EP). In total, there were observers from 44 OSCEparticipating States. The IEOM observed the voting in over 1,150 and countingin 110 polling stations throughout the country (out of 1,923 polling stations


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countrywide), the transfer of PEC results to TECs in 40 TECs and thetabulation of results in 30 TECs after polling stations closed.

Ms. Tone Tingsgaard (Sweden), Vice-President of the OSCE ParliamentaryAssembly and Head of the OSCE PA delegation, was appointed as Special Co-ordinator by the OSCE Chairman-in-Office to lead the OSCE short-term observers.Mr. Leo Platvoet (Netherlands) headed the delegation of the ParliamentaryAssembly of the Council of Europe, and Ms. Marie Anne Isler Béguin (France)headed the delegation of the European Parliament. Ambassador Boris Frlec(Slovenia) is Head of the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission.

The IEOM wishes to thank the authorities of the Republic of Armenia forthe invitation to observe the elections, the Central Election Commission forproviding accreditation documents, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs andother state and local authorities for their assistance and cooperation. The IEOMalso wishes to express appreciation to the OSCE Office in Yerevan for theirsupport throughout the mission, and resident embassies of OSCE participatingStates and other international institutions for their cooperation and support.


ƒ Ms. Urdur Gunnarsdottir, OSCE/ODIHR Spokesperson, in Warsaw(+ 48 22 520 0600), or Ms. Nicola Schmidt, Election Adviser, OSCE/ODIHR, in Warsaw (+ 48 22 520 0600); ƒ Mr. Klas Bergman, Directorof Communications, International Secretariat of the OSCE PA, inCopenhagen (+45 60 10 83 80); ƒ Mr. Bas Klein, PACE Secretariat, inStrasbourg (+33 662 2654); ƒ Mr. Pietro Ducci, Election ObservationService, Directorate-General for External Policies, European

Parliament, in Brussels (+32 2 28 46 656).

OSCE/ODIHR EOM Address (until 23 May 2007):17/2, Ervand Kochar Street, Yerevan tel.: +374 (0)10 552399, 552499, 554399fax: +374 (0)10 554299 email: [email protected] OSCE/ODIHR website:www.osce.org/odihr


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Anexo 5

EU ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION TO VENEZUELAPARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 2005

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Caracas, 6 December 2005

Following an invitation of the National Electoral Council (CNE) to obser-ve the Parliamentary Elections (National Assembly, Latin-American Parliamentand Andean Parliament) of 4 December, the European Union ElectionObservation Mission (EU EOM) was deployed in Venezuela on 07 November2005. The Mission is led by Chief Observer Mr. José Albino Silva Peneda,Member of the European Parliament. In total, the EU EOM deployed 160observers in 20 of the 24 states to follow and report on the electoral processin line with established EU methodology and the «Declaration of Principlesfor International Election Observation» adopted under the auspices of theUnited Nations in October 2005. A Delegation of the European Parliament,led by Mr. Arunas Degutis, and including six MEPs, joined in the EU EOMon 1 December. This statement is issued before the process is completed;the EU EOM will remain in country until 21 December to observe the post-election period, including electoral complaints. A Final Report will be issuedin February 2006. The EU EOM wishes to thank the CNE, the Venezuelanauthorities and all the other actors for the excellent cooperation andavailability demonstrated throughout its stay in Venezuela


Wide sectors of the Venezuelan society do not have trust in the electoralprocess and in the independence of the electoral authority.

The legal framework contains several inconsistencies that leave room fordiffering and contradictory interpretations.

The disclosure of a computerized list of citizens indicating their politicalpreference in the signature recollection process for the Presidential Recall


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Referendum (so-called «Maisanta Program») generates fear that the secrecyof the vote could be violated.

The CNE, in a positive attempt to restore confidence in the electoralprocess, took significant steps to open the automated voting system toexternal scrutiny and to modify various aspects that were questioned by theopposition.

The CNE decision to eliminate the fingerprint capturing devices from thevoting process was timely, effective and constructive.

The electoral campaign focused almost exclusively on the issue of distrustin the electoral process and lack of independence of the CNE. The debate onpolitical party platforms was absent.

Both State and private media monitored showed bias towards either ofthe two main political blocks.

The EU EOM took note with surprise of the withdrawal of the majority ofthe opposition parties only four days before the electoral event.

Election Day passed peacefully with a low turnout. While the observersnoted several irregularities in the voting procedures, the manual audit of thevoting receipts revealed a high reliability of the voting machines.

These elections did not contribute to the reduction of the fracture in theVenezuelan society. In this sense, they represented a lost opportunity.


Pre-Election Environment

The EUEOM takes note of the fact that wide sectors of the Venezuelansociety do not have confidence in the electoral process and in the electoraladministration. This standpoint, which has its roots in the high polarizationthat divides the Venezuelan society, became especially apparent during theRecall Referendum in 2004 as well as in the run up to these elections. Thedisclosure of a database containing more than 12 million citizens' personal dataand their political preference (the so called «Maisanta» Program) expressedduring the signature collection for the Recall Referendum generated widespreadfears that this information could be used for intimidation purposes and undueinfluence on voters. This fact played a significant role in favor of the abstention.


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The opposition parties focused their campaign on the perceived lack ofneutrality of the CNE and alleged dangers posed to the secrecy of the voteby an automated voting system which was meant to include the fingerprintcapturing devices. Central electoral campaign themes such as economics andtax policies, the importance of social programs, the role of the private sectorin the economy or environmental policies were missing from the politicalparties' public interventions. The prohibition of state funds for electoralcampaign purposes was often mentioned by parties as a factor, which impededa more public and transparent campaign.

The use of state resources by pro-government parties to mobilizesupporters was observed in Trujillo, Monagas, Anzoátegui, Carabobo andGuarico. Violations of the provision for public officials to take part in thecampaign was observed in nearly all States and committed by almost all mainpolitical parties. The parties included quotes from local officials in theircaptions as well as pictures of officials in their campaign posters including insome cases, of the President. The violations observed in the last phase ofthe campaign were mainly carried out by pro-government parties.

Civil society organizations like Sumateand Ojo Electoral played, in differentways, a very important role in the elections. However, only Ojo Electoralsought and obtained accreditation to observe the elections.

In a context of mistrust and extreme polarization, the EU EOM acknowledgesthe efforts made by the CNE to increase the political parties´ confidence in theprocess. These measures included reviews of various elements of the automatedvoting process such as the software of the electronic voting machines, thefingerprint capturing machines and of the results aggregation system, as wellas the extension of the audit paper trail to encompass the manual recount ofthe voting receipts in 45% of the polling stations.

The discovery of a design flaw in the software of the voting machines,with the consequent remote possibility to violate the secrecy of the vote wasdealt with by the CNE in a timely and adequate manner. The possibility ofendangerment of the secrecy of the vote was evaluated by EU EOM expertsas remote.

The breach of the secrecy of the vote could only be possible if the sequenceof both the identification of the voters and the votes cast was reconstructed.This reconstruction would require access to three different dispersed sourcesof information by a qualified user. These sources are the memory of the voting


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machines, the memory of the fingerprint capturing devices and the entire codeof the encryption key (that was divided among the political parties and theCNE) used in the system to protect the voting data.

The elimination of the fingerprint capturing devices from the votingprocess was a significant move aimed at restoring the confidence of theparties. It was therefore with surprise that the EU EOM took note at this stageof the withdrawal of the main opposition political parties from the electoralcontest without any new additional motivation.

Legal Framework

The legal framework for the elections is composed of the Basic Law ofSuffrage and Political Participation of 1998, the Constitution of 1999, the Elec-toral Statute of Public Power of 2000, the Basic Law of the Electoral Powerof 2002. Due to the National Assembly's inability to find a qualified majorityon the adoption of a new Basic Law, crucial aspects of the electoral processhave not been harmonized with the provisions of the new Constitution 1999.These inconsistencies opened room for differing and contradictory inter-pretations of various aspects of the process (e.g. voter registration, CNEcompetences), and exemplified the already existing divide between opposingsectors of the society.

The current composition of the CNE Steering Board is a contentious issue.Following the inability of the National Assembly to reach the required majorityto elect the CNE Steering Board, the Supreme Court, availing itself of theextraordinary powers granted by the Constitution in case where the NationalAssembly is unable to take a decision, designated the Members of the SteeringBoard before the Recall Referendum. More recently, one of the members ofthe Steering Board was nominated by the Supreme Court under a procedurecontradictory to the one used for the first extraordinary nomination of theSteering Board.

The system of representation in force in Venezuela is described as one of«personalized proportionality» by the Basic Law of Suffrage and PoliticalParticipation of 1998. This ambiguous definition is used to designate a mixedmember proportional system. The use of the electoral technique known asMorochas, which allows the duplication of parties in order to avoid thesubtraction of the seats gained in the plurality-majority list from theproportional list, certainly defies the spirit of the Constitution, but it is


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technically allowed by the mixed system of representation laid out in the BasicLaw of Suffrage and Political Participation.

The principle of the automated voting system is enshrined in Art. 154 ofthe Basic Law of Suffrage and Political Participation 1998 and in Art 33, Item42 of the Basic Law of the Electoral Power of 2002. The current developmentand applications of the automated voting process have however surpassedin various aspects the legal framework.


The National Electoral Council (CNE) is an institution with significanthuman and technical resources. The CNE technically administered the processwell, and its logistical preparations for the electoral event were adequate. Itsperformance was however tainted by the accusations of bias and partisanshipthat have accompanied its work since the past Recall Referendum process.In the election preparations the CNE demonstrated a clear willingness to meetthe demands of the opposition parties to increase confidence on the process.Among the main steps taken to reduce the opposition concerns over theautomated voting process, the CNE increased the number of polling stationsto be audited from an initial 33% to 45% and reduced the use of the electronicvoter lists to 2%. However, this was perceived by the opposition parties asinsufficient.

The security and transparency measures introduced in the automatedvoting process are in line with the most advanced international practice. Thevarious types of system reviews put in place by the CNE represented andimportant opportunity to explain and review various aspects of the automatedvoting system to experts of political parties and observers. Apart from thepaper trail audit on election day, there were four types of reviews that the EUEOM observed including of voting machines software and hardware, resultsaggregation software, voting machines assemblage and production, andelection day simulation. Despite the fact that no proper audit procedures wereagreed in advance, a significant disclosure of information was achieved.However, access to information for party experts could be further improved.The political parties were selective in presenting to the media the activitiesand the findings of the audit sessions.

The voter register (Registro Electoral Permanente, hereinafter REP), hasbeen the source of continuous debate and several allegations of illegitimate

11


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entries. This is not a novelty in the Venezuelan elections; however, the sharpincrease of registered voters before the Presidential Recall Referendum castserious doubts on the composition and entries of the most recent REP. Thesesuspicions were heightened in the pre-electoral period by the refusal of theCNE to make available the address of the voters to political parties due to anunclear constitutional data protection provision. However, political partieswere given sufficient access to the voter register. Structural and long stan-ding problems in the REP are likely to exist, and can only be solved inconjunction with the revision of the Identity Card program which is the basisfor the voter registration system.

Media Coverage

The Venezuelan media display a great diversity of political opinionsHowever, considered individually, the main media outlets only exceptionallyreferred to the various political actors in a manner which could be consideredboth fair and balanced. Most of the private media tended to offer more spaceto the views of the political forces critical of the Government, and whenexpressing their poli-tical preferences, they often disregarded basic jour-nalistic principles.

On the other hand, state-owned media should provide fair recognition tothe views of all Venezuelans and therefore has strong obligations in terms ofobjectivity, fairness and impartiality. However, it did not fulfill theseobligations. The tone of the coverage of opposition parties in the publiclyowned media was significantly more negative than the one reserved to theparties in government. Furthermore, the intense promotion of governmentpolicies on the state media during the campaign worked as an indirect publicityof the parties in power. The excessive resort to cadenas (addresses to thenation simultaneously broadcast through all the nation's electronic media)which proliferated in the days prior to the elections could represent a breachof the campaign silence.

The EU EOM notes that the frequent presence of the President on StateTV and radio is an unusual practice and did not contribute to the improvementof the political climate.

The Mission believes that the excessively inflammatory opinionsencoun-tered in much of the Venezuelan media, especially after thewithdrawal of most of the opposition parties' candidates, did not contributeto an informed and calm political atmosphere, but rather agitated further an


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already tense public opinion which seems to grow increasingly tired andcynical about politics.

The use of images featuring public officials for campaign purposes waswidespread and must be condemned as a generalized, flagrant violation ofCNE regulations on that matter. Furthemore, the excessive focus on partiesand personalities given by the media in its coverage of the campaign hasresulted in a striking scarcity of information about the platforms of thecontesting parties.

Election Day

Polling stations opened on average between 7,00 and 8,00 am. The delayswere mainly due to the late arrival of the staff and a general slowness in theopening procedures. In 70% of the polling stations observed there were missingpolling officials replaced by political party agents, reserves or ordinary voters.

The presence of the armed forces of Plan Repúblicainside the pollingstations was noted in 25% of the polling stations observed. This was contraryto the provision that allowed the security forces to be inside the voting cen-tres but not inside the polling stations.

The political party agents were observed in 70% of the polling stationsvisited. In 68% of these cases there were only agents from pro-governmentparties. Domestic observers were present in 6% of the polling stationsobserved. Their presence was observed in 18% of the polling stations wherethe EU EOM observed the audit of the count.

The majority of the voters in the polling stations observed experiencedproblems with understanding the functioning of the voting machines andrequired assistance. In 41% of the cases observed there were voters unableto complete the process in the prescribed three minutes. This indicates botha lack of adequate voter information and training for election officials on theautomated voting system. The assistance to the voters was often providedby the polling station staff, security forces and the political party agents,raising concerns about the secrecy of the vote.

Campaign activities in favor of pro-Government parties were noted in thevicinity of a large number of the polling stations observed. The type ofcampaign activities observed included food distribution,cars with megaphonesand posters, information stands and provision of transport for voters. Few


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cases of intimidation were observed, with party members asking voters tosign and thumbprint on a piece of paper that they had voted and who theyhad voted for.

The polling hours were extended by the CNE throughout the country. Themotivation for this decision was the delays in the opening and the bad weatherconditions. This led to confusion and allegations of attempts from pro-government parties to boost the turnout.

The paper trail audit (manual recount) of the electronic count was observedin 75 different polling centers. Despite a lenghty implementation of the auditprocedure, the results indicated a clear reliability of the results, with few casesof discrepancy observed between the number of voters marked in the voterregister and those counted by the machine and between the paper receiptsand the votes recorded in the voting machines. The general conclusion of theobservers was that the voting machines seemed very reliable.

The aggregation of results proceeded with high speed. The announcedpreliminary results cover almost 90% of the results. The preliminary turnoutannounced by the CNE is of 25%. However, there is no clarity on the level ofinvalid votes that oscillate between 5 and 10%.

Preliminary Recommendations

The legal framework that governs the electoral process must be harmoni-zed with the constitutional provisions on the elections.

The National Assembly should appoint a CNE Steering Board composedof independent professionals of

various extractions that enjoy the trust of all the sectors of society.The prohibition of public funding to parties for the electoral campaign

should be reconsidered.The electronic voting system should be audited by an independent

institution.

The REP should be audited in conjunction with the ID register by anindependent institution.

The CNE should launch as soon as possible training and civic educationprograms aimed at familiarizing electoral officials and the electorate with theelectronic voting procedures.


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For further information please contact:

Press Officer, Ms. Cathy Giorgetti, Tel. (+58) 0414 6857046 European UnionElection Observation Mission to Venezuela 2005 Eurobuilding, Final CalleLa Guairita, Chuao - Caracas Office Telefhone: 212 993 8222 e-mail:[email protected] website:www.eueomvenezuela.org


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Anexo 6

EUROPEAN UNION

ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION WEST BANK & GAZA 2006

STATEMENT OF PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS AND FINDINGS

Open and well-run parliamentary elections strengthen Palestiniancommitment to democratic institutions

Jerusalem, 26 January 2006

The European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) has beenpresent in the West Bank and Gaza since 13 December 2005 following aninvitation from the Central Election Commission (CEC) of Palestine. TheMission is led by Chief Observer Ms. Véronique De Keyser from Belgium,Member of the European Parliament. In total, the EU EOM deployed over 185observers from 23 EU Member States as well as Norway, Switzerland andRomania. The observers were deployed throughout the West Bank and Gazato assess the whole electoral process in the light of international principlesfor genuine democratic elections. The EU EOM was joined by a 27-memberdelegation from the European Parliament, the largest elected parliamentaryobserver delegation, led by Mr Edward McMillan-Scott MEP of the UnitedKingdom, who endorse this Statement. On election day, the observers visitedover 800 polling stations in 14 of the 16 electoral districts in West Bank andGaza to observe voting and counting. The EU EOM is currently observingthe conclusion of the counting and result tabulation procedures and willremain in country to observe all aspects of the post-election process.


• The 25 January elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC)have so far marked another important milestone in the building ofdemocratic institutions. These elections saw impressive voter partici-


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pation in an open and fairly-contested electoral process that wasefficiently administered by a professional and independent PalestinianCentral Elections Commission (CEC).

• As with the 2005 presidential election, the Palestinian people havedemonstrated an overwhelming commitment to determine their politicalfuture via democratic means, in spite of the uncertain conditions inwhich the elections took place: a background of delay, unacceptablelevels of precampaign violence and an occupation that placed restrictionson the exercise of fundamental freedoms related to elections.

• Voting on 25 January proceeded smoothly and peacefully with animpressive turnout of 77 per cent of the total number of registeredvoters. Procedures were well-followed by CEC polling staff anddomestic observers and candidate representatives were present inalmost all polling stations. The procedures for counting were similarlywell-run. Campaigning was seen to take place both inside and outsideof many polling stations, often vigorously and in contravention of thelaw. There were numerous shortcomings with the voting arrangementsin East Jerusalem.

• The CEC commands a high degree of public confidence. It maintainedintegrity in the face of intimidation, including attacks on its buildingsand threats against staff, that sought to influence the candidateregistration process. These attempts to pressure the election adminis-tration, all of which have gone unpunished, reflect a culture of impunityfor militant groups that the Palestinian leadership must demonstratemore determination to end.

• Candidates from across the whole political spectrum participated inthe elections. The campaign took place in a generally calm and positiveatmosphere, with an absence of provocative rhetoric. However, restric-tions by Israeli forces on the freedom of movement by candidates andvoters reduced the scope for genuinely free elections. Arbitrary restric-tions on campaigning and the freedom of assembly by candidates inEast Jerusalem led to a number of arrests and prevented a propercampaign from taking place in the city.

• The instability and inter-factional violence which at times threatenedto prevent the holding of elections, especially in Gaza, were unaccep-table and have no place in a democratic process. In addition, threatsmade against international observers limited the levels of deploymentthat could be undertaken. However, the security situation improvedduring the two weeks ahead of election day.


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• Despite established precedent and agreement that there is a right to voteby Palestinians resident in East Jerusalem, delays by the Israeli authoritiesin deciding whether voting would be allowed to take place within thecity led to uncertainty which affected the whole election process.Although the decision to allow voting was welcome, it came very lateand - as with earlier elections - electoral arrangements failed to providereasonable, equal or proper conditions for voters from East Jerusalem.

• The provision for early voting by members of the Palestinian securityforces reflected efforts to ensure greater stability on election day.However, repeated attempts by the Ministry of Interior and otherPalestinian Authority (PA) institutions to change these votingarrangements represented an inappropriate level of political interferencein the election administration. The early voting itself generally wentwell but with concerns related to transparency and the high proportionof assisted voting.

• All electoral preparations by the CEC were finalised in good time, withthe exception of delays caused by external factors beyond its controlsuch as the voting arrangements over East Jerusalem. However, thetransparency of the CEC decision-making processes needs to befurther increased.

• Useful steps to improve the reliability of the voter register have beentaken since the 2005 presidential election. The absence of Israelipermission to allow a register of voters in East Jerusalem was a seriousobstacle to the process.

• The legal framework provided an effective basis for the conduct ofdemocratic elections but lacks an appropriate enforcement mechanismand, while an innovative voluntary Code of Conduct for candidatesenjoyed cross-party support, there were limited means to ensure

• Candidates benefited from equal access to free airtime provided bypublic broadcasters in accordance with CEC regulations. In contrast,the news coverage by Palestinian TV was imbalanced in favour ofFatah while some private broadcasters offered unequal fees to

• Civil society organisations played an important role in these elections,especially in relation to election observation, the delivery of votereducation and the development and oversight of the Code of Conductfor campaigning.

• Over 22 per cent of the candidates on national lists were women, apositive reflection of the new legal requirement to include a proportion


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of women candidates; however, only 15 women (3.6 per cent) took partas candidates in the district election, where there was no quota.

• These elections were also held under an occupation that, by its nature,cannot support the sustainable development of a democratic state.However, the Israeli authorities did take measures to facilitate the elec-toral process.

• These elections were notable for the participation of candidates linkedto extremist or radical groups that have advocated violence as a meansto solving the problems in the Middle East. It is hoped that thisparticipation is an indication of the movement of such groups towardsengaging in a truly democratic process, which would be in fundamen-tal contradiction with violent activity.

The final assessment of these elections will depend, in part, on thecompletion of counting and tabulation, the announcement of results by theCEC, and the complaints and appeals process. The EU EOM will remain incountry to observe all aspects of the post-election process and will publisha final report, containing detailed recommendations to improve the electionprocess, within two months of the completion of the entire process.


Background

These second elections for the PLC were widely seen as a crucial steptowards Palestinian institution building foreseen in the Road Map for apermanent solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The elections follow theJanuary 2005 election of the President of the PA and a series of municipalelections that have been held since December 2004. Elections for the PLC,which last took place in January 1996, were initially envisaged to be held in2000, but have been delayed a number of times. The fact that these electionshave taken place is an important milestone in ensuring the new PLC will havegreater credibility and a renewed popular mandate.

During this election process, many political events, some external to theelection process, created uncertainty as to whether or not the election wouldgo ahead. In particular, divisions within the Fatah ruling political party, coupledwith pressures against the CEC and intransigence over the highly significantissue of voting in East Jerusalem created real possibilities that the electionswould again be postponed. Commendably, repeated public commitments from


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key actors, significantly President Abbas, that the elections must be held asscheduled led to negotiated settlement of most problematic issues.

More widely, the general level of instability and inter-factional violence,particularly in Gaza, raised concerns as to whether conditions would permitthe holding of democratic elections. Significantly, steps were taken by anumber of actors, including militia groups, to ensure that the security situationimproved over the campaign period which created a much calmer environmentin the immediate run-up to election day. Threats against internationalobservers, including those from the EU EOM, were made during the campaignperiod. All international observer groups, the CEC and some militia groupsstrongly condemned the threats that, to a degree, restricted the level by whichobservation could take place in certain areas.

Legal Framework

A new election law, adopted in June 2005, provided a basis for the conductof democratic elections. The law introduced a mixed electoral system wherebyan increased number of seats are contested under separate proportional andmajoritarian contests. In a positive development, the law has strengthenedvoter registration procedures, including a prohibition on the use of the civilregister for electoral purposes, and established a requirement for a minimumproportion of women as candidates on national lists. However, the law alsocontains a number of shortcomings that should be addressed ahead of futureelections. Significantly, the CEC lacks any enforcement powers or sanctionswhere the law is violated. In practice, this meant that the CEC used informalchannels to address complaints it received, regardless of the seriousness ofthe allegation. Moreover, there are no effective or transparent procedures forthe handling of complaints and the CEC is under no requirement to publishdetails of the complaints it receives. The legal framework also lacks detailedregulation of campaign financing and criteria for political party registration.There should be a review of whether absentee voting should be allowed forthose unable to vote in their designated polling station on election day.


The CEC and its Secretariat acted in an independent, professional andtechnically proficient manner that ensured all election arrangements withinits control were organised in good time ahead of election day. The CECshowed a strong commitment to running the election to schedule and, in


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particular, achieved notable success in providing training of its 18,700 staff,re-organising its district and polling management structures and in runningan effective and inclusive voter education programme in association with anumber of civil society actors. Moreover, the CEC showed itself to be capableof efficiently implementing arrangements for voting in East Jerusalem and forsecurity forces that were agreed to at late notice.

Public confidence and trust in the independence of the CEC is deservedlyhigh but its integrity and authority were challenged by direct attempts toinfluence its decision-making when its offices in several locations were takenover by armed groups during the candidate registration process and in the earlystages of the campaign. Such acts of violence, intimidation or pressure againstthe CEC and its staff are unacceptable within a democratic election and yet,regrettably, the perpetrators of these acts - many of whom have links to Fatah- have gone unpunished, reflecting a wider culture of impunity amongst membersof militia groups in Palestine in their use of threats and violence.

Separately, unwarranted political interference in the work of the CEC camefrom the Ministry of Interior which sought to change the arrangements forearly voting by over 58,000 security forces so that voting would take placein barracks rather in the locations where they were registered to vote, asaccording to the law. Ensuring opportunities for voting by security forceshad been a problematic issue in previous elections and the solution reached,whereby votes were cast in special polling centres in each district over 21-23January, was an effective arrangement.

There was an open process for the nomination and registration of indivi-dual district candidates and candidates on national lists. A total of 728 candidateswere included in the final lists of candidates and, in contrast to the 1996 PLCelections, provided voters with a real choice from across the Palestinian politi-cal spectrum. In a questionable decision, the Electoral Appeals Court (EAC)overturned a CEC decision and allowed an extension of the candidate registrationperiod which allowed Fatah to merge two separate lists that had been submittedby its members into a single national list.

The EU EOM is aware that a number of complaints have been made tothe CEC during the campaign period. The absence of a formal, transparentmechanism for handling complaints and acting against violations of the lawhas meant that, in most cases, no discernible action has been taken to enforcethe law, although in two relatively minor cases, complaints have been passed


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to the Prosecutor's Office for consideration. The most serious complaintrelated to a letter from the Chief of Civil Police of the West Bank, sent to alldistrict police chiefs, instructed police to vote in favour of the ruling party.This complaint was addressed only through an informal discussion betweenthe CEC and the Office of the PA President.

Voter Registration

A total of 1,332,499 voters were registered for this election, an impressive21 per cent increase on the number of voters registered for the January 2005presidential election that reflected the effective steps taken by the CEC toimprove the accuracy of the voter register. Regrettably, public access to thefinal register of voters was restricted and it was not published by the CEC untilpolling day, although it was made available on request to candidates. It isunfortunate that, for security reasons, the voter register for the security forceswas not made available at any stage thus preventing any independent cross-checking of the persons for double registration. The registration of an estimated123,000 voters in East Jerusalem was not permitted by the Israeli authorities.

Campaign

The campaign period was generally calm and saw a stabilisation in thegeneral security situation that enabled active campaigning to take place.Overall, the campaign was notable for its positive tone and there were noreports of provocative rhetoric or hate speech. In comparison to the 1996and 2005 elections, there was a notable drop in reports of the use of stateresources by candidates in campaign. Despite many large rallies, there wasno major incident related to the campaign, although two activists were killedin events that may have been election-related. There are several complaintsthat campaigning occurred inside mosques. An innovative and useful Codeof Conduct for campaigning was developed by civil society and, althoughvoluntary, was supported by all eleven national lists.

However, the campaign was marked by restrictions on the exercise of fun-damental freedoms that are related to elections caused by the continuedoccupation of Palestinian Territories. In particular, restrictions on the freedomof movement prevented many candidates from being able to undertake anational campaign even when they attempted to seek travel permits. Thefreedoms of assembly and association of Palestinian candidates and activistswere also challenged in East Jerusalem, where arbitrary restrictions on


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campaigning imposed by Israeli authorities led to a number of arrests. Therewere several reports also of arrests of campaign activists by the Israeli DefenceForces in the West Bank. In contrast and despite the levels of instability,there were few reports of similar restrictions or other problems withcampaigning in Gaza except for the difficulties in travel between the WestBank and Gaza.

Media Environment

A broad and flourishing range of media outlets operate in the West Bankand Gaza. Television is the most important source of political information. Inaddition to local stations, the main Pan-Arabic Networks are widely viewed.While the first week of the campaign received relatively limited coverage,reflecting its low-key nature, extensive coverage of the election was providedduring the two weeks prior to election day.

The official electronic media (Palestine TV and Voice of Palestine radio)provided electoral lists and candidates with extensive free airtime in accordancewith the Election Law. Palestine TV, in agreement with the CEC, broadcast anhour-long talk show for each national list, campaign spots for national lists(up to 10 minutes) and district candidates (up to two minutes), plus a finalthree hour debate with representatives of the whole 11 lists. No reports ofcomplaints on the allocation of free airtime were received. All of theseprogrammes provided voters with a genuine opportunity to compare platformsand candidates.

Palestine TV offered only modest election coverage in its news and currentaffair programmes. A bias in favour of the ruling party Fatah (59 per cent of thecoverage) was noted. Voice of Palestine allotted 56 per cent of its news andcurrent affair coverage to Fatah and 31 per cent to Change and Reform.However, the airtime devoted to Change and Reform was often negative in tone.

Many lists and prominent candidates purchased space on private media.Problems with the rates, which were not announced in advance and were notequal for all candidates, undermined the principle of equal treatment for allcontestants. The private TV station Watan TV favoured the IndependentPalestine list, providing it with 60% of its political news and current affaircoverage. The private radio station, Amwaj, devoted most of its coverage toindependent candidates (58 per cent), Fatah (17 per cent) and Alternative (15per cent). On the eve of the elections, the Minister of Interior shut down Al-


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Aqsa TV, a Gaza based private TV station affiliated to Change and Reform,on the basis that it was broadcasting without a license.

The print media offered space to all lists, presenting various articles onpolitical parties and candidates. The state funded newspaper Al-Haya al-Jadeeda favoured the ruling party.


Women made up 47 per cent of registered voters, a slight increase from the2005 presidential election. In a positive development, the election law wasamended to introduce a quota for women on the national party lists. Each listhad to have a woman candidate in positions 3, 7 and 12 on the list (or higher),and then one in every five positions that followed. This resulted in 22 per centof candidates on the national lists being women. However, for the districtelections, where there was no quota, only 15 of the 414 candidates were women.

The CEC produced few civic education materials that specifically targetedwomen. However, a number of NGOs carried out civic and voter educationthat was specifically targeted at women. In Palestinian society, many womenare involved in politics and in political parties. However, not many leadershippositions are held by women. Few of the women district candidates managedto stand as official party candidates, so ran as independents, which is likelyto make it difficult for them to be elected. The media coverage of womencandidates saw a slight under-representation in terms of time. In part thisreflects the parties' decisions on which candidates they put forward to themedia. In the polling stations that were observed, women made up over onethird of polling station staff.

Civil Society

Civil society is vibrant and active, and this was reflected in its participa-tion in election observation. According to the CEC, a total of 254 domesticorganisations were accredited to observe the elections, which in turnaccredited over 17,000 national observers. In addition to election observation,civil society organisations also played a leading role in civic and votereducation, in cooperation with the CEC and media outlets. Specific attentionwas paid to areas where literacy and political awareness was low. Civil societyorganisations also organised candidate training programmes, as well asdeveloping and monitoring a Code of Conduct for the campaign.


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Voting in East Jerusalem

The right to vote by Palestinians resident in East Jerusalem is established bythe 1995 Oslo agreement and the precedents of the 1996 and 2005 elections.Initially, the Israeli authorities refused to allow voting to take place inside EastJerusalem to demonstrate their condemnation of the participation of candidateslinked to extremist groups. As such a policy might otherwise have caused theelections to be postponed, the EU EOM welcomed the 15 January decision ofIsrael to allow for limited voting as a decisive step towards ending the uncertaintyover the election, even though it came at a late stage in the electoral process.

The voting arrangements that were permitted - whereby only around fiveper cent of Palestinians resident in East Jerusalem are able to cast their votesin the city at six specific postal offices while the majority must cross into theWest Bank to vote - fail to provide reasonable, equal or proper conditions. Inparticular, the procedures at the post offices again failed to provide secrecy ofthe ballot, and were administered by Israeli postal workers rather than trainedCEC staff. The inadequacy of the locations also caused long queues and slowvoting procedures that led to a two-hour extension of voting. EU EOM obser-vers rated the voting conditions in all six East Jerusalem post offices as 'bad' or'very bad' and noted that those voters who crossed into the West Bank werehampered by checkpoints and roadblocks even though steps had been takenby the Israeli authorities to provide greater flow of movement.

Polling

The Election Day proceeded smoothly and peacefully, with an impressiveturnout of almost 77 per cent of the total number of registered voters. Therewas an even higher turnout in Gaza of 81 per cent. The vast majority of pollingstations opened on time, all electoral materials having been delivered the dayprior to the elections. EU EOM observers evaluated the voting process as'good' or 'very good' in over 95% of the polling stations they visited and thesecrecy of the vote was respected in almost all polling stations observedexcept in East Jerusalem. Polling staff were well trained and followed theestablished procedures closely. As in 2005, there was a high proportion ofvoters who sought assistance to help them vote. Representatives fromdifferent candidates and lists were present in over 98 per cent of pollingstations observed. Domestic observers were present in over 60 per cent.

Observers reported widespread and vigorous campaigning by candidatesat many polling stations, although it was not reported as being antagonistic


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or intimidating. However, the presence of campaign activists distributingelection materials in and around polling centres was unlawful and steps shouldhave been taken to prevent it from occurring. EU EOM observers did notreport intimidation of electoral staff. Provision of security around pollingcentres by the Palestinian security forces was adequate and unimposing. EUEOM Observers also reported that the close of voting and the counting ofvotes also proceeded well, with 93 per cent of polling stations visited beingrated as 'very good'. However, over 10 per cent of polling stations visited didnot immediately display the election results as required by law.

Early voting by security forces between 21 to 23 January was marked byan extremely high level of turnout of 92 per cent. A surprising number ofsecurity personnel requested assistance to help with their voting on thegrounds of illiteracy or disability, raising concerns of possible undue pressureon the voter and a lack of secrecy of the ballot. This led to the CECtemporarily suspending the right to assisted voting by members of the securityforces to counteract the potential for abuse. Sensitive materials from the earlyvoting were secured satisfactorily.

Remarks by the EU EOM Chief Observer and the Headof the European Parliament Delegation at the press conference

on 26 January 2006:

The Palestinian Legislative Council elections have so far marked anotherimportant milestone in the building of democratic institutions. This is theconclusion of the 185-strong European Union Election Observation Mission(EU EOM) and the 27-strong European Parliament delegation. Yesterday,voters came out in impressive numbers to cast their ballot in a peaceful andenthusiastic manner.

«The Palestinian leadership took the risk of going ahead with theseelections despite widespread opposition in order to give priority to demo-cracy» said Véronique de Keyser MEP, Chief Observer of the EU EOM. Sheadded: «The people of Palestine responded to this opportunity with greatenthusiasm and dignity by coming out in large numbers to cast their ballot ina peaceful manner. I hope that the winners and losers of these elections willaccept the results with the same political maturity that their supporters showedon election day.»

«The conduct of these elections has provided a model for the wider Arabregion and has clearly demonstrated the commitment of the Palestinian people

12


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to democracy,» said Edward McMillan-Scott MEP, Vice-President of theEuropean Parliament and Chairman of the EP delegation, which endorsed thepreliminary findings and conclusions of the EU EOM and will report toParliament in due course. «The parliamentary dimension of the EU'sneighbourhood has thus been further strengthened, which is also importantfor the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly in which members of thePalestinian Legislative Council and the Knesset uniquely participatetogether.»

The EU EOM wishes to express it appreciation to the CEC and otherPalestinian bodies as well as to authorities of the Government of Israel, fortheir cooperation and assistance during the course of the observation. TheEU EOM is also grateful to the European Commission Technical andAssistance Office for West Bank and Gaza and to the InternationalOrganisation for Migration for their operational support throughout.


• Mr. Richard Chambers, EU EOM Deputy Chief ObserverTel: +972 54 698 5327

• Mr. Mathias Eick, EU EOM Spokesperson,Tel: +972 54 697 9287


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Anexo 7


ELECTIONS FAIL TO MEET HOPES AND EXPECTATIONS OF THENIGERIAN PEOPLE AND FALL FAR SHORT OF BASIC

INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS

Abuja, 23 April 2007

The European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) has beenpresent in Nigeria since 14 March 2007, following an invitation from theNigerian authorities. The Mission is led by Chief Observer, Mr. Max van denBerg, Member of the European Parliament. In total, the EU EOM deployedover 150 observers from 21 EU Member States as well as Switzerland andNorway. The observers were deployed to all states and the Federal CapitalTerritory, except Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers states as a result of securityconcerns. The Mission assessed the conduct of the elections in accordancewith international standards for democratic elections, and adhered to the«Declaration of Principles for International Election Observers», commemora-ted at the United Nations in October 2005. Over the election day periods, theEU EOM was joined by a delegation from the European Parliament, led byMr. John Attard-Montalto and Mr. Vittorio Agnoletto, who fully endorse thisstatement. The EU EOM is currently observing the result tabulation process,and will remain in country to observe all aspects of the post-election process.A final report, containing detailed recommendations for the future, will bepublished within two months of the conclusion of the entire election process.The EU EOM is independent in its findings and conclusions from EU MemberStates, the European Parliament and the European Commission.


• The 2007 State and Federal elections have fallen far short of basicinternational and regional standards for democratic elections. They weremarred by poor organisation, lack of essential transparency, widespreadprocedural irregularities, significant evidence of fraud, particularly during the


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result collation process, voter disenfranchisement at different stages of theprocess, lack of equal conditions for contestants and numerous incidents ofviolence. As a result, the elections have not lived up to the hopes andexpectations of the Nigerian people and the process cannot be considered tohave been credible. This is all the more regrettable since they were held in animproved atmosphere in which freedoms of expression and assembly werebroadly respected during campaigning, the judiciary played a generally positiveand independent role and the people showed remarkable commitment todemocracy, eagerly engaging in the electoral process and waiting patientlyto vote in often very difficult circumstances.

• On election day for the State elections, polling started late throughoutthe country due to the late arrival of polling officials and materials and inseveral areas did not take place at all. Polling stations were generally understaffed with officials who were under trained. Procedures were often notfollowed correctly and the secrecy of the ballot was not guaranteed in themajority of polling stations visited by EU observers. However party agentswere seen in almost all polling stations visited with domestic observerspresent in close to half. Incidents of hijacking of ballot boxes were witnessedby EU observers, who reported widespread irregularities and significantevidence of fraud, particularly during the result collation process, whichcompletely lacked transparency due to the fact that polling station resultswere not publicly displayed at any level of the election administrationthroughout the country. Following INEC's decision to order re-runs in twostates and undertake investigations in four other states, serious considerationshould now also be given to initiating investigations in a number of otherstates where serious concerns have been raised by political parties, civilsociety and the media about the conduct of elections.

• On election day for the federal elections, polling material again arrivedlate and incomplete at many polling stations observed, resulting in significantdelays in opening. Several National Assembly elections had to be postponeddue to the incorrect printing of ballot papers, and at times there wereinsufficient numbers of presidential ballot papers. Party agents were againseen in almost all polling stations visited with domestic observers present inclose to half. A heavier security presence helped contribute to a reduction inviolent incidents. Again, polling procedures were often not followed correctlyand the secrecy of the vote was not guaranteed in the majority of pollingstations observed. EU observers witnessed examples of ballot box stuffing,alteration of official result forms, stealing of sensitive polling materials, vote


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buying and under age voting. Despite assurances by INEC, polling stationresult forms were not displayed at polling stations.

• Violence has been a major issue of concern and incidents increasedas the elections drew nearer. Credible reports indicate that at least 200 people,including candidates and police were killed in election related incidents, whichis unacceptable with respect to right to life and the democratic process. Thecontinuing and widespread use of thugs by a number of political partiescreated a significant degree of fear and intimidation. Despite welcomed andrepeated messages from security agencies showing a tolerance zero policytowards political violence, the security agencies, INEC and political partiesdid not appear to take decisive steps to address the situation and holdperpetrators to account.

• Several disputes relating, in particular, to the powers and functions ofINEC and the nomination, substitution and disqualification of candidatesbrought the judiciary into centre stage in the electoral process. In a welcomedevelopment that made a positive contribution to the electoral process, theJudiciary generally acted impartially. However, the lack of adequate proceduresand time limits for initiation and adjudications of complaints and appeals priorto election day resulted in a number of disputes being dealt with by the courtsjust few days before the elections. Some remained pending until after theelection. In a further positive development the Courts of Appeal establishedmechanisms to simplify and ensure timely determination of post-electionpetitions.

• The Electoral Act 2006 contains improvements in comparison to theElectoral Act 2002, in particular some measures to strengthen the inde-pendence of INEC. However, full independence of INEC from the executivewas not established due to the fact that Presidential involvement in theappointment of INEC Commissions was retained. Significantly, fundamentaltransparency requirements, in particular for the collation and publication ofresults requiring polling station results to be publicly displayed at all levelsof the counting and collation processes were not included, leaving the elec-toral process wide open to fraud.

• The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), which wasfinancially dependent on the executive, did not prepare well for the elections andexperienced widespread lack of confidence among election stakeholders in relation

*


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to its capacity and impartiality. Deadlines were missed throughout the pre-electionperiod and it lacked transparency in its decisions and conduct. INEC was selectiveand inconsistent in the application and enforcement of electoral legislation.Training of polling staff started late, was of poor quality and in some areas didnot take place at all. Engagement with political parties and civil society was poor.Overall, civic and voter education was very limited and ineffective.

• The voter registration exercise conducted by INEC was marred bydelays due to a lack of available direct data capturing machines, technicalbreak downs and establishment of illegal voter registration centres. Thequality of the final voter register was poor and included under age voters,double entries, missing and blurred pictures of voters. The voter register wasnot displayed at local level as required by the law and was only partly postedprior to election day for orientation purposes only. Permanent voter registrationcards were not issued due to the late publication of the final voter register.

• The pre-election period saw a vigorous campaign throughout thecountry, particularly in states where there was the prospect of a change in power.However, a lack of transparency and accountability in campaign spending,together with a lack of prohibition on use of state resources gave advantageto political parties in power at the state and federal level, meant there was anuneven playing field for candidates and parties. Payment to potential voterswas both witnessed by EU observers and admitted by political parties.

• There is a vibrant and expanding media environment in Nigeria.Presidential contestants and their parties were given equal access todiscussion programmes aired in state as well as private broadcast media,facilitating informed choices of voters. However, there was a failure to adhereto the legal requirements by state owned media which showed bias in favourof the incumbent party, and more generally by broadcast media which focusedon a small number of parties only. Journalists were able to operate in anenvironment of relative freedom, given systematic weakness that characterisethe media sector.

• Civil society organisations mounted a comprehensive observationexercise. INEC unnecessarily delayed the accreditation of international anddomestic election observers which restricted the oversight role they could play.Most domestic observer groups only received accreditation cards on the daybefore the state elections, and then in insufficient numbers. Screening ofdomestic observer organisations was undertaken by the State Security Services.


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• Despite strong commitments from INEC during the pre electoral period,significant efforts by civil society and measures by some political parties towave nomination fees for female candidates, women remain underrepresentedas candidates and within the electoral administration.

• The high levels of poverty, illiteracy and lack of access to basic needs,including education has an impact on the conduct of elections. Reaching theMillennium Development Goals should therefore be a key aspect of theconsolidation of democracy as well as contributing towards improving socialjustice and economic development. In addition, increased internationalsupport should be directed towards good governance and democratisation,particularly through civil society organisations.

• The EU EOM strongly urges all political leaders to demonstrateresponsibility in calling for calm, and for all political contestants to use thecomplaints and appeals mechanisms outlined in the election legislation if theyhave complaints about any aspects of the electoral process. The relevantauthorities should urgently, thoroughly and transparently investigate anyallegations of irregularities that are brought to their attention and takeimmediate action to ensure redress where appropriate.

• In order for the citizens of Nigeria to have trust and confidence in thepolitical and electoral process, urgent remedial action by the relevantauthorities and stakeholders is necessary to restore the conditions for credibleand transparent elections to be held. In particular, concrete steps need to betaken to establish a truly independent and capable election administration,the atmosphere of impunity for electoral violations must cease, executiveimmunity should be removed, and political will must be demonstrated byparties at both federal and state levels to end the practice of hiring thugs toperpetrate electoral violence.


Background

The 2007 general elections are the third such elections to be held sincethe transition from military to civilian rule in 1999 and are widely consideredto be a crucial test of the commitment of the Nigerian authorities tostrengthening democracy. For the first time since independence, the elections


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should see power transferred from one civilian President to another. Theywill also have a significant impact on the potential to find a solution for theserious problems of internal security and national cohesion. Following theproblematic conduct of the 2003 elections, the 2007 elections provided anopportunity to strengthen public confidence in the electoral and widerdemocratic process.

During the 14 April elections, Nigerians voted for 36 State Governors and990 Legislators in the 36 State Houses of Assembly. On 21 April, electionswere held for the President, 109 Members of the Senate and 360 Members ofthe House of Representatives. The elections were conducted using the sim-ple majority system, except for the presidential election, where at least 25 percent in at least two thirds of states had to be achieved, and the gubernatorialelections where at least 25 per cent in at least two thirds of local governmentareas in a state had to be reached.

Nigeria has ratified the most prominent treaties related to human rights,including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, which containstandards relating to the conduct of democratic elections, as well as theConvention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).These international provisions are binding. Nigeria also has additionalcommitments to good governance, human rights and the rule of law underthe framework of the New Partnership for Africa's development (NEPAD) andthe Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance of the EconomicCommunity of West African States (ECOWAS).

Legal framework

These elections are regulated by the 1999 Constitution, and new Electo-ral Act adopted in 2006, as well as regulations and guidelines issued by INEC.The Electoral Act 2006 is an improvement over the Electoral Act 2002 whichregulated the conduct of the 2003 general elections. In particular, it containsmeasures to strengthen the independence of INEC, including appointment ofthe Secretary by INEC and the creation of a fund to provide INEC withfinancial independence. However, this was not established for the 2007elections. The Electoral Act 2006 also clearly outlines the procedures andtimeline of the voter registration exercise and is more inclusive in relation tothe distribution of grants for political parties.


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However, a number of problems were not addressed in the Electoral Act2006, in particular relating to the independence of INEC. The Presidentcontinues to have involvement in the appointment of INEC Commissioners.At the federal level, all Commissioners are still appointed by the President,after consultations with the Council of State and confirmation by the Senate,and at the state level, all 37 Resident Electoral Commissioners (RECs) areappointed directly by the President. Other significant concerns include a lackof requirement for results to be displayed at the polling station level and fora breakdown of polling station results to be displayed at all superior levelsof the election administration, a lack of adequate procedures for the handlingof complaints and appeals before election day, and a lack of time limits forthe publication of results and for the determination of election petitions. TheElectoral Act 2006 is also silent on a number of important issues. Significantly,there is no prohibition on use of state resources during the campaign orprovisions to promote transparency in the appointment of polling station staffor access to INEC decisions. In addition, election petitions can only be filedby candidates and political parties.

An issue of particular concern is the lack of enforcement of the relevantlegal framework by INEC such as the procedures for voter registration,financing of political parties and campaign rules. INEC's selectivity andinconsistency with regard to the application and enforcement of electoral lawsalso appeared in other instances. Following the request for an injunctionrestraining INEC from conducting any election for the office of Governor inAnambra State, the Supreme Court ruled, on 5 April, that it was the statutoryduty of the INEC to conduct elections and to usher in tenure of office. TheConstitution gives the responsibility to INEC to fix the date for a gubernatorialelection1 following the expiration of the term of office of a governor.Therefore, INEC had a clear duty to initiate action to cancel the gubernatorialelection in Anambra State.

Registration of Political Parties and candidates

A record number of 50 political parties were registered by INEC toparticipate in the elections, of which 25 nominated a presidential candidate.Since a Supreme Court ruling in November 2002, INEC had been less stringentin registering political parties. As stated in the Constitution, political partiesneed to reflect the federal character of Nigeria with executive committeemembers from at least two-thirds of the states of the Federation. Thereby


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interest groups such as minorities face constraints in establishing their ownpolitical parties. Further, under the Electoral Act 2006, independent candidatesare not permitted.

1. The Constitution establishes in Section 178 (1) and (2) that the dateof a gubernatorial election shall be established by INEC on a date not earlierthan 60 days and not later than 30 days before the expiration of the term ofoffice of the holder of that office.

2. The Federal High Court Abuja delivered a judgment ordering INEC toinclude the name of Mr. Atiku Abubakar in the list of presidential candidates.The Court based its decision on the nullification of the indictment by theHigh Court in Lagos. Since the indictment was nullified, the grounds fordisqualification lacked merit. This decision was appealed against and waspending at the time of the election.

The nomination of candidates by political parties was often characterisedby a process of selection rather than election. Sometimes party primaries tookplace outside of clear democratic rules. This resulted in a number of courtcases which involved politicians who won their internal party primary butwere not nominated by the political party, or were nominated but subsequentlysubstituted. During the nomination period, INEC disqualified about 100candidates, mainly for non-fulfilment of the age requirements, and in somecases, including that of Vice President Atiku Abubakar, in view of indictmentsby the Administrative Panel of Inquiry. Further, some people who won primarieswere not nominated or were substituted by the political parties. This againresulted in a number of court cases.

The lack of procedures and time limits in the law for handling complaintsrelated to substitution or disqualification of candidates prompted the filingof many cases in the courts just a few days before the elections. Some casesremained pending at the time of the elections. This created uncertainty aboutthe final list of candidates and was not conducive to clear voter choice at theelections. In one such case, a PDP gubernatorial candidate was substitutedby the party leadership challenged his removal. On 4 April the Supreme Courtruled that the candidate was illegally substituted and ordered INEC to includehis name as the gubernatorial candidate for Imo State. However the fact thatthe court decision was delivered so late, prevented the candidate's name fromappearing on the ballot paper and the name of the substituted candidateremained on the ballot paper in some polling stations.


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Despite a Federal High Court Abuja judgment ordering INEC to includeAtiku Abubakar's name on the candidate list, INEC refused to comply untilthe Supreme Court ruled, on 16 April, that INEC was not vested with the powerto disqualify candidates.2 The decision of INEC not to include Mr. Abubakar'sname until the Supreme Court ruling created last minute logistical difficultiesregarding the ballot papers. The Supreme Court ruling also raised questionsas to what would happen to disqualified candidates in the gubernatorial andState Assembly elections.


INEC was provided with a budget of Naira 54.5 billion (€349 million), whichrepresented a sound financial basis. However, although the Electoral Act 2006promulgated financial independence by INEC, the envisaged INEC fund wasnot established and INEC remained dependent on the President's office forapproval of its expenditures as evidenced when some INEC cheques were notcleared in October 2006. By mid December 2006, serious questions were beingraised by some political parties and elements of civil society about INEC'sindependence from the Federal Government, which contributed to underminingpublic confidence in INEC. In the period leading up to the elections, there waslittle engagement of INEC with political parties and civil society.

INEC lacked transparency in its decisions and did not provide importantinformation, including the final number of candidates or the final number ofvoters per constituency. INEC also declined to provide observers with stan-dard information and materials, including access to the voter register, anddid not permit observers to attend INEC meetings with political parties or themedia. Contrary to international best practice INEC made no provision forresults to be posted at polling stations or published at superior levels of theelection administration. After widespread irregularities in the result transferand collation process during the 14 April elections, the INEC Chairmanannounced, on the eve of the 21 April elections, that for the federal electionsresults should be posted at polling stations and collation centres. However,EU observers reported that this was not implemented in the vast majority ofplaces visited. The process of transferring polling station results electronicallylacked clear guidelines and was ill-prepared, resulting in an expensiveinvestment without the expected return.

Preparations by INEC to conduct the elections were delayed throughoutthe process. The delay of two months to complete the voter registration


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exercise affected the production and distribution of permanent voterregistration cards. Voters had to use their temporary voter registration cardswhich were often basic unlaminated print outs. In both elections thedistribution of ballot papers was delayed which had a serious impact on bothpolling days. Although INEC printed correct ballot papers for the 14 Aprilelections a number of elections could not be held on 21 April due to missingcandidate names.

Originally, INEC had planned to print ballot papers which included picturesof candidates for security reasons. However, in the end it only producedpresidential and gubernatorial ballot papers with pictures and the names ofcandidates, at times with spelling mistakes and missing pictures. Followingthe 16 April Supreme Court ruling, INEC reprinted presidential ballot paperswithout the pictures and the names of candidates and, contrary to the law,without serial numbers. Some candidate names were missing from the Senateand House of Representative ballot papers causing a cancellation of elections,for example in the case of a Senatorial race in Lagos State.

INEC had difficulties in recruiting the 500,000 plus ad hoc staff to administerpolling stations, due, at least in part, according to numerous reports receivedby EU observers around the country, to fears of electoral violence andintimidation. Moreover, recruitment of ad hoc staff was conducted in a non-transparent manner and depended on an impartiality check by INEC. The laterecruitment, reportedly for security reasons, delayed the cascade training,which varied in quality.

A limited national voter education media campaign by INEC commencedonly seven days prior to the 14 April election day. In one national TV spotINEC misinformed voters about the secrecy of the vote by broadcasting a mockpolling station without a polling booth. INEC's partners through the Joint DonorBasket Fund implemented voter education programmes, but a broad andeffective and grass-root level civic education programme was lacking.

For security purposes most RECs and Administrative Secretaries werereshuffled to different postings about 10 days before the 14 April elections,reportedly in an attempt to limit fraud and electoral irregularities. At timesvarious INEC state offices were not made aware of INEC HQ regulations, forexample in the case of observer accreditation. In addition, contrary to INECHQ regulations the Kano and Niger State INEC offices informed their Electo-ral Officers that corrections to the voter register could still be undertaken


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during the last few days before the 14 April elections when voter lists wereposted at polling stations for orientation purposes only.

Constituency Delineation and Voter Registration

INEC has the constitutional mandate to delineate constituencies at leastevery 10 years to ensure equal suffrage. The current constituency boundariesdate back to 1996 and are based on the 1991 census, leading to an imbalancedrepresentation of Nigerians in the House of Representatives and the 36 Stateassemblies for the next four years. For example, one Member of the Houseof Representatives in Bayelsa State currently represents 284,000 peoplewhereas one Member in Zamfara State represents 466,000 people. Citizens inthe Federal Capital Territory (FCT), where one Member represents as manyas 703,000 people, are particularly underrepresented. Additionally, theconstitutional requirement of equal suffrage has not been upheld at state level.From the information available, the discrepancies among state assemblyconstituencies are even higher.

The voter registration exercise conducted by INEC was widely reportedto have experienced significant problems. It was initially planned to run from8 October to 14 December 2006 but had to be extended until 2 February dueto the fact that by 10 December only 10 million voters had been registered.NDP filed an action before the Federal High Court on 27 March against INECfor failing to comply with the provisions of the Electoral Act 2006 relating tothe display of the voter registration lists after the cut off date established inthe law. However, on 29 March the President gave his consent to the Electo-ral Acts Amendment Bill 2007, passed by the National Assembly in January2007, which extended the cut off date for registration to 60 days before theelection and the deadline for display of the voter register to 45 days beforethe election. The electronic direct data capturing process used in the exercisewas hampered by a delay in establishing sufficient registration centres in thefield and experienced technical and power supply problems. On 15 February2007, INEC announced that 61 million voters out of the 70 million Nigeriansestimated to be above 18 years of age had been registered. Although INECreported that the voter register was displayed at registration centre and wardlevel from 5 to 10 February 2007, multiple reports received by EU observersaround the country indicated that this legal obligation was not implemented.

The number of registered voters of the total population varies widelybetween the states and ranges from 32 per cent in Ekiti to 60 per cent in Gombe


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State. The voter register at polling stations on 14 April was largely not inalphabetical or numeric order which delayed the voting process. In over 30per cent of polling stations visited, EU observers rated the quality of the voterregister to be poor on the basis of significant numbers of under age voters,double entries, and missing and blurred pictures of voters. The additional orsole use of the manual register at some polling stations was a further indicationof the limitations of the electronic direct data capture exercise.

Campaign

The election campaign took place throughout the country in a lively, ifsometimes quite heated, environment in which freedoms of expression andassembly were broadly respected. Political parties campaigned actively,addressing voters through a wide range of means, including public rallies,vehicle motorcades with loud speakers, gatherings in market places, door todoor visits, billboards and posters, which were visible in abundancethroughout the country. Paid for campaigns by political parties in bothnational and local broadcasters and print media were numerous. In some areasdebates and public forums were organized by journalists, media outlets andcivil society organizations. Traditional and religious leaders were active insome states by arranging public debates or providing various forms ofpeaceful conflict resolution between rival parties.

Only a few of the 50 registered political parties (AC, ANPP, DPP, PPD)conducted extensive nationwide campaigns. However, local activities weresometimes intense, with the primary target for campaign activities being thepresidential and gubernatorial races. General interest in and intensity of, thecampaigns varied greatly, but was reported by EU observers to be higher instates where there was a prospect of a change in power. Although plans toaddress the basic needs of the electorate were sometimes presented, partiesand candidates generally lacked clear political programmes and the main focuswas on personal qualities rather than political ideology. This explained themany high profile defections from one party to another of candidates seekingto affiliate themselves with the strongest backer and best network.

A level playing field did not exist during the campaign, with ruling partiestaking advantage of resources available to them. INEC so far has neglectedits role in providing legal oversight over campaign spending and scrutiny.While the electoral framework includes restrictions on campaign spending toprevent disproportionate expenditure, this was not supervised and enforced


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by INEC. The fact that there was no prohibition on the use of state resourcesin the electoral law contributed to the uneven playing field for politicalcontestants.

While in some states peaceful campaign activities were observed,numerous violent incidents were reported by EU observers and other crediblesources. These often involved destruction of campaign material and partyoffices, harassment, intimidation and violent clashes between party supporters.This was particularly the case in the south-west but other areas such as GombeState were also affected. During this election, political sponsorship, recruitmentand use of thugs, often armed with traditional weapons or fire arms remaineda problem as had been the case in 2003. This activity was reported by mediaand credible organisations in most States and additionally was observed byEU observers in Borno, Abia, Taraba, Gombe, Bauchi, Kaduna, Zamfara, Niger,Oyo, Osun, Kogi and Edo States. At times inflammatory speech or indigenousreferences like «sons of the soil» or «home boys» further aggravated thetense atmosphere. In some areas, such as Assakio in Nassarawa State andWukari, Takum and Jato Aka in the border area between Benue and TarabaStates, violence assumed an ethnic dimension with people belonging tominorities being killed, displaced or rendered homeless because of politicallymotivated clashes. Assaults, assassination of candidates and attempts atassassination of candidates were reported in the pre-election period. Overall,credible reports, including from IDASA and the international and domesticmedia suggest that at least 200 people, including police, have been killed inelection-related violence, which is a higher number than was reported for the2003 elections.

Despite welcomed and repeated messages from security agencies showinga tolerance zero policy towards political violence, the security agencies, INECand political parties did not appear to take decisive steps to address thesituation and hold perpetrators to account.

Media

There is a vibrant and expanding media environment in Nigeria. Radio isthe key media. Freedom of expression is guaranteed by the Constitution.However arbitrary actions by state security agencies curtail it at times. Pressfreedom is further limited by financial instability of the media while low incomeof journalists exposes them to offers of payment in return for favourablereporting. Access of citizens to information through media is limited as a result


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of various factors, including insufficient power supplies, lack of financialmeans to purchase a newspaper and high rate of illiteracy.

National state-owned media NTA (TV) and FRCN (radio), legally obliged togive fair and impartial coverage as they are publicly owned, demonstrated bias infavour of the incumbent party and its presidential candidate in their newsprogrammes. PDP as a political party received a larger amount of news time thanall other political parties together and the PDP presidential candidate received byfar the largest share of time (52 per cent on radio and 30 per cent on TV), dedicatedto presidential candidates in the news programmes of the two nationalbroadcasters. Local state media showed tendency to favour the local ruling party.

Distribution of the time among the candidates and parties in the newsprogrammes of the private broadcast media, monitored by the EOM, was moreequitable in comparison with the state-owned media. However, coverage ofthe broadcast media, both state owned as well as private, was focused ononly a small number of parties, predominantly PDP, ANPP and AC and overall,the broadcast media failed to provide balanced coverage of contestants, asrequired by the legal framework. The campaigns of the 50 registered partiesvaried in intensity, and lack of capacity to sufficiently cover their campaignschallenged the ability of the media to provide balanced coverage of the parties.PDP carried out the most extensive paid for campaign in the media. Visiblecampaigns were also conducted by AC, ANPP, DPA, DPP and PPA.

In a positive development, national state-owned as well as private mediaaired debates and interviews with presidential candidates, and some localmedia organized discussions with gubernatorial candidates, giving them equalaccess and opportunity to present their views and allowing voters access toinformation facilitating an informed choice. Unfortunately some candidatesdid not participate in these efforts, thus reducing the information value ofthese programmes.

Activities of INEC were given wide publicity in the media; in addition,INEC conducted an image-building paid for media campaign of its own.However visible information campaigns educating and informing voters aboutthe process of voting appeared in the national media only in the last weekpreceding the 14 April elections. Get out the vote campaigns, organised bystate institutions as well as by NGOs, were aired in the broadcast media.

Overall picture of the political scene provided by newspapers was morediverse than the one given by broadcast media. However, print media also


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provided the bulk of their coverage to a small number of parties with thehighest ratings in the opinion polls. In contrast with national broadcast me-dia, which gave most of their election coverage to the presidential contest,national newspapers provided much more detailed coverage of gubernatorialcontests and developments in particular states.

Activities of the National Broadcasting Commission (NBC), the regulatorybody for the broadcast media, were rather low-key during the campaign. NBCclaimed to be conducting comprehensive monitoring of the campaign coveragein the broadcast media, however, it did not publicize the results of its mediamonitoring during the campaign. NBC fined 14 broadcast media for campaignblackout violations during the 14 April campaign silence period.

Members of State Security Service suspended broadcasts of Lagos-basedprivate TV Gotell and radio Unity FM on 11 April and sealed the premises ofthe stations. These media did not re-establish their operations during theremainder of the campaign period. The State Security Services also raidedoffices of TV AIT on 17 April, terminating broadcast of a paid program, criticalof the incumbent president. Media regulatory framework was undermined bythese actions of the State Security Services, which bypassed NBC.


Despite a legal framework clearly prohibiting discrimination on thegrounds of sex and strong commitments from Electoral Administration, politicalparties and authorities, women remained under-represented in public life.Many civil society women's organisations throughout the country as well asUNIFEM have struggled successfully to increase general political awarenessin favour of the participation of women and the issue was also debated inthe media during the campaign. However, the highly commercialised natureof politics, the male dominated party apparatus and political violence remainamongst the strongest deterrents. The decision by some political parties towave nomination fees for female candidates has not succeeded in increasingtheir numbers. Some female candidates faced pressure, including violence, towithdraw as candidates or were substituted by male counterparts outside thetimeframe permitted by the Electoral Act 2006. Turnout of women on 21 Aprilappeared to be lower than on 14 April, which could have been due, at leastin part, to violence during the 14 April polls. While INEC agreed to set up agender team, only one of the 12 Commissioners is a woman. At the pollingstation level, a woman was the presiding officer in only 20 per cent of polling


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stations visited on 14 and 21 April. During the election days, only 2 per centof the political party agents in the polling stations visited were women.

Civil society

Nigeria has a strong civil society, which has played a constructive role inthe country's transition towards democracy. Civil society organisations wereparticularly engaged with the constitutional and electoral law amendmentprocess and in the prevention of a third term for the offices of President andGovernors. However, reports vary about civil society organisation involvementin civic and voter education.

The Transition Monitoring Group (TMG) an umbrella of around 250organisations countrywide observed the 1999 and 2003 elections and issuedcritical statements. For the purpose of observing the 2007 elections, eightorganisations (TMG, FOMWAN, LEMT, WEP, MULAC, CDD, CLO, ACENigeria) worked together to issue a common preliminary report. Other observergroups included the Nigerian Bar Association as well as the faith-basedJustice, Development and Peace Coalition, Christian Association of Nigeria,Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs and the Pentecostal Fellowshipof Nigeria.

The fact that INEC did not established objective criteria and a timely processfor observer accreditation encouraged the perception that INEC was notinterested in the involvement of a strong civil society in the oversight of theelections. Screening of domestic observer organisations was undertaken bythe State Security Services. In the end, 53 out of 175 organisations that appliedwere accredited. INEC unnecessarily delayed the observer accredita-tionprocess and most domestic observer organisations received accreditation cardsfor their observers on the eve of the state elections and then in insufficientnumbers. Similarly political parties also faced problems in obtaining sufficientnumbers of accreditation cards in time before the 14 April elections.

Election Day - State Elections

Delays in the opening of polling stations were reported by EU observersthroughout the country. By 9 am only one fifth of polling stations visited byEU observers were open and in only one third were the required three pollingofficials were present. In some polling stations, for example in most of EnuguState, Zamfara State and in the LGA Lafia of Nassarawa State, polling did not


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commence before 15:00. In many polling stations, voting did not take placeat all, for example in eight out of 24 polling stations observed in Gombe Stateand the whole of LGA Ohaozara of Ebonyi State. Essential polling materials,including ballot papers, were missing in almost 40 per cent of polling stationsobserved for the opening. In many states observers reported missing officialresult forms (EC8 series) as in Anambra State where none had been deliveredto the polling stations and LGA collation centres visited

In 45 per cent of polling stations observed, the overall conduct of pollingwas rated as poor. Observers witnessed disorder in 22 per cent of pollingstations visited. In the majority of polling stations observed, breaches of thesecrecy of the vote occurred. In many polling stations observed it was commonpractice to openly vote surrounded by polling agents. In a fifth of pollingstations visited, voters who were clearly under age were witnessed voting,particularly in Bauchi, Kebbi, Sokoto, Yobe, Plateau and Zamfara States.

In almost one fifth of polling stations visited attempts to influence voterswere witnessed and in one fourth of polling stations procedures to checkand apply ink were not adequately followed. Generally in many pollingstations one of the three polling staff was missing and in 40 per cent ofobserved polling stations, polling staff had a poor understanding of pollingprocedures and was widely assisted by polling agents. The Manual for Elec-toral Officials did not appear to be available at most polling stations visited.

Disorder inside polling stations was observed in 15 per cent of pollingstations visited during closing and counting. Although INEC was aware ofthe serious delay in the opening of polling stations, no regulation was issuedto extend official polling hours. In one fourth of polling stations observed,voters who were queuing at 15:00 were not allowed to cast their vote asprescribed by the law. Despite procedural shortcomings observers rated thecounting processes in four fifths of the observed polling stations as good.However in one fifth of counts observed, valid votes were incorrectly rejectedby the presiding officer. In 30 per cent of observed polling stations thereconciliation of used ballot papers did not equal the number of valid, spoiledand rejected ballot papers. In one fourth of polling stations observed not allpolling agents and police received an official result form copy as provided inthe law. The newly introduced electronic result transfer system to INEC HQwas not used at any polling stations visited and used in only 15 per cent ofcollation centres observed.


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Party agents were seen in 96 per cent of polling stations observed and inall collation centres visited. Domestic observers were present in 54 per centduring the opening of polling stations observed and in 40 per cent of collationcentres observed. Police were present in almost all polling stations visited.

The collation process was marred by serious irregularities. In almost 30per cent of collation centres observers had indications or proof that pollingresults were fraudulently changed. Observers rated the collation process atward level and LGA level as poor in 45 per cent and 32 per cent respectively.Results were neither displayed at polling station level, nor publicly displayedbroken down by polling station at collation centres or national level.

EU observers witnessed cases of fraud. For example in Enugu State atward level of the LGA Enugu North observers noted that completely differentresults in favour of the ruling party were recorded on the result forms whencompared with those collected in eight polling stations. Similarly in Abia State,LGA Ohafia an EU observer team was able to detect from official result sheetsof polling stations and ward collation centres that results from polling stationswere falsely recorded. In Zamfara State, no elections took place in five wardsbut fake results were included into the Gubernatorial elections for these wards.In Enugu State, LGA Enugu South collation centre observers witnessed openthumb printing of unused ballot papers in favour of the ruling party. Anidentical case was observed in LGA Ife of Osun State. In LGA Akko of GombeState EU observers witnessed the fraudulent change of election results bythe presiding officer during the transmission of polling station results to thecollation centre. Another indication of irregularities at collation centres wasnoted in Igweorie in Ebonyi State where a polling station with 223 registeredvoters showed a result of 601 votes cast for only one party.

During election day, disruption, sometimes violent, of the polling and thecounting process by groups of thugs has been observed in several states.For example in Anambra State, election material had been hijacked at twopolling stations visited by an observer team. A significant number of ballotpapers for three LGAs (Assakio, Ashinge and Arikya) in Nassarawa Statewere snatched by thugs. However results were delivered including the totalamount of ballot papers for these LGAs. Observers witnessed thugs stealingand destroying official ward collation result forms in front of the INEC officeof the LGA Lafia of Nassarawa State. In Gombe State cases of hijacking anddestruction of ballot boxes and placement of ballot boxes in the private housesof traditional leaders and ruling party members were observed.


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Although for security reasons the EU EOM had no observers deployed inDelta, Bayelsa and Rivers States it received credible and multiple reports frominternational and domestic sources and media reports indicated that the electionsin these states were marred by intimidation, violence and electoral fraud.

Election Day - Federal Elections

Although INEC decided on the eve of the 21 April election to postponethe opening of polling stations from 08.00 to 10.00 and the closing of pollingfrom 15.00 to 17.00 the disorganised delivery of polling materials resulted onceagain in a delayed opening in the majority of states. In a number of statesincluding Abia, Imo, Kaduna and Bauchi polling stations did not open untillate afternoon.

In 78 per cent of polling stations observed during the opening essentialpolling materials were missing, especially polling booths and ballot papers. Anumber of elections could not be held since INEC did not print and providethe correct ballots. The newly printed presidential ballot papers were withoutserial numbers and insufficient quantities were delivered in many parts of thecountry. In eastern Benue State no presidential ballot papers were deliveredand in Ebonyi and Abia States Presiding Officers only received 46 per centof the required number. In Kaduna South in 6 out of 13 wards no electionswere conducted due to the tensions surrounding the delivery of faulty ballotpapers. Similarly in Anambra state in five LGAs no elections took place dueto the delivery of incorrect polling materials. In Enugu State, thugs targetedthe transport of polling materials to polling stations and robbed the sensitivematerials. Once again a shortage of polling staff was reported in 50% ofpolling stations observed and at times a voter register was not used duringthe polling process.

In almost half of polling stations observed the secrecy of the vote wasnot ensured due to a lack of polling booths. In 14 per cent of observed pollingstations attempts were made to influence voters. EU observers witnessedunder age voters in one fifth of observed polling stations particularly inBorno, Yobe, Gombe, Jigawa, Kano, Kebbi and Niger states and in Niger andJigawa States cases of vote buying were observed.

Generally the security situation during polling day was better than on 14April due to a heavier presence of police and the army. According to estimatesby EU observers voter turn out in the North varied between 35 and 55 per


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cent whereas in the South the figures appeared to be lower. In 90 per cent ofpolling stations observed police were present. Party agents and domesticobservers were present in 96 and 43 percent respectively of polling stationsvisited. Observers rated the overall conduct of the polling process as poor in43 per cent of polling stations observed.

Despite the late opening of many polling stations visited, votingprocedures stopped at 5 pm, limiting the polling hours and disenfranchisingpotential voters. Contrary to the provisions in the Electoral Act 2006, in anumber of cases observed, voters waiting in line at 5 pm were not allowed tovote. The closing and counting procedures were generally transparent andno complaints were lodged in polling stations observed.

However disorder was observed in 24 per cent of the result transfer andcollation centre processes observed. Generally the conduct of the collationcentres was slightly better than on 14 April but in a fifth of cases the collationofficers did not collate the results correctly. In one third of observed collationcentres unauthorised staff had been present. In one fifth of ward collationcentres the collation officer was a woman. In 25 per cent of collation centresnot all party agents received an official result form copy and electronic transferof results was rarely seen to be implemented. In 54 per cent of ward collationcentres and 62 per cent of LGA collation centres observers rated the collationprocess as good.

A number of fraudulent practices were observed. In many polling stationsunused ballot papers were marked and stuffed into the ballot box resulting inalmost 100 per cent voter turn out as observed in Kwara, Gombe, Edo andNiger States. Likewise in Akwa Ibom ballot stuffing on a large scale wasobserved with 50 polling station result forms in LGA Ibiono-Ibom producinga 97.9%. Inflation of results on official result forms at any level of the collationprocess was observed, for example at ward level in Cross River State and atLGA level in Ogun and Kwara States. Despite assurances by INEC no publicdisplay of polling station results has been observed.


As no specific procedure is laid down in the law for initiation andadjudication of complaints prior to the elections, considerable confusionsurrounded this aspect of the elections. In practice, complaints were submittedto a variety of institutions including INEC, RECs, the police and the different


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courts at State and Federal level. RECs reported that only a small number ofofficial complaints were lodged with INEC. One reason for the small numberof pre-election complaints might be due to the fact that INEC has advisedpolitical parties and candidates to lodge their petitions after election day. Thishas led to a situation where unlawful acts or omissions that should and needto be addressed before the election have not been dealt with prior to theelection days.

No record of pre-election complaints has been kept and no evidence couldbe found of an official response to complaints. Meetings between INEC andthe political parties have been the forum at which the majority of complaintshave been made. Political parties report that the effective processing of pre-election complaints has depended mainly on the personal skills and degreeof commitment of election officials. Most pre-election complaints related tothe registration of voters and the recruitment of electoral officials.

Some pre-election complaints relating to the nomination and substitutionof candidates by the political parties and disqualification of candidates byINEC have been lodged with the Federal High Court. Most complaintsconcerning campaign violations relate to actions of a criminal nature such asthe defacement of campaign posters, intimidation, violent incidents anddamage to property by opposing political parties. These have been made tothe Commissioners of Police.

After the State elections, some complaints on the conduct of the Stateelections in a number of states, including Ebonyi, Anambra, Benue, CrossRiver, Taraba, Kaduna, Gombe, Kanu, Imo, Jigawa, and Zamfara states werelodged by political parties and individuals with INEC seeking the annulmentof elections in some or all of the Local Government Areas in these states.The main grounds for complaints were violence, rigging and late distributionof materials. More specifically, complaints related to missing voter registers,ballot box stuffing, hijacking of ballot boxes and other sensitive materials,thumb printing of ballot papers, forgery of results, use of violence to forcepeople to voter for a particular political party, intimidation and harassment ofparty agents and voters by thugs, police and the armed forces which, mostcases, resulted in elections not being held in a number of Local Governmentareas in these states.

Based on the reports received, INEC annulled the gubernatorial electionin Imo state but failed to publicly outline the grounds for the annulment of


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the gubernatorial elections and reason why the State House of Assemblyelections were not also annulled. As a result some political parties in Imohave requested INEC to clarify the matter.

The Electoral Act 2006 does not allow voters, observers or other interestedorganisations to file election petitions or to address electoral malpractice inany other way. Election petitions can only be filed by candidates and politicalparties and must be filed within 30 days of the declaration of results. At thetime of this statement, no petitions had been filed before Election Tribunals,however several political parties have stated their intention to do so in areaswhere incidents were reported during the election day. In a positive develop-ment the Courts of Appeal established mechanisms to simplify the procedureand to ensure timely determination of election petition proceedings since thereare no time limits for the determination of petitions included in the law. Thenew strategy focuses on accelerated hearing of petitions before Tribunalsby identifying the issues for determination and narrowing the number ofwitnesses called at the hearing of the petition.


manual practico observadores electorales...política. En este sentido, la observación electoral...

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