SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 6403. August 31, 2004]

RUDECON MANAGEMENT CORPORATION and ATTY. RUDEGELIO D. TACORDA, complainants, vs. ATTY. MANUEL N. CAMACHO, respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

On November 23, 2000, Rudecon Management Corporation and Atty. Rudegelio D. Tacorda filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a verified complaint for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law against Atty. Manuel N. Camacho for knowingly committing forum-shopping, in violation of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94 in relation to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 7, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and the Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The factual antecedents leading to the instant complaint are as follows:

On September 3, 1998, Sisenando Singson, represented by herein respondent Atty. Manuel N. Camacho, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a complaint against herein complainant Rudecon Management Corporation for damages and reconveyance, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-98-35444.[1] The case was originally raffled to Branch 79, RTC, Quezon City (Branch 79 for brevity) but was eventually re-raffled to Branch 85 of the same court.

On September 21, 1998, Singson, again represented by Atty. Camacho, filed with Branch 78, RTC, Quezon City (Branch 78 for brevity) a “Motion for Intervention (With Attached Answer in Intervention With Affirmative Defenses and Compulsory Counterclaim)” in Civil Case No. Q-98-35326, entitled, “Rudecon Management Corporation, plaintiff-appellee vs. Ramon M. Veluz, defendant-appellant,” a case for unlawful detainer on appeal before said court.[2]

On October 1, 1998, Rudecon filed a motion before Branch 78 seeking to cite Singson and his counsel, Atty. Camacho, for contempt for having allegedly violated the rule against forum shopping. Rudecon contends that the answer-in-intervention filed before Branch 78 involves the same issues already raised in the complaint filed with Branch 79.

On November 6, 1998, Branch 78, issued an order, with the following dispositive portion:

WHEREFORE, finding appellee’s herein Motion to be well taken, this Court finds would-be-intervenor, Sisenando Singson and his counsel, Atty. Manuel N. Camacho to have violated the rule on forum-shopping and holds them liable for contempt of Court under Circular No. 04-94 and Section 5, Rule 7, Rules of Court in relation to Rule 71 and hereby reprimands both of them

without prejudice to any administrative and appropriate action against would-be-intervenor’s counsel.

SO ORDERED.[3]

Singson and Camacho did not appeal the order.

On the basis of the above-cited order, Rudecon and Tacorda filed the instant complaint for disbarment or suspension against Atty. Camacho. Complainants submit that aside from disregarding the rule against forum shopping, contained in Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94 and Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Court, respondent is also guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1 and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[4]

Respondent filed his Answer to the instant complaint. He denies the allegations of complainant and contends that he is not guilty of forum shopping. He claims that the Answer in Intervention filed with Branch 78 in Civil Case No. Q-98-35326 and the Complaint filed with Branch 79 in Civil Case No. Q-98-35444 do not involve the same issues and reliefs prayed for and that he did not resort to the filing of both actions in order to increase the chances of his client obtaining a favorable decision.[5]

The case was docketed by IBP as CBD Case No. 00-779 and was referred by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP to an Investigating Commissioner for investigation, report and recommendation.

On October 24, 2003, Investigating Commissioner Julio C. Elamparo submitted his report to the IBP Board of Governors with the following findings and recommendation:

. . . . .

Two court cases gave rise to the present complaint. The first is Sisenando Singson vs. Rudecon Management Corp., Civil Case No. Q-98-35444 before Quezon City, RTC Branch 79 and the other case is Rudecon Management Corp. vs. Ramon M. Veluz, Civil Case No. Q-98-35326 before Quezon City, RTC Branch 78.

The respondent does not deny the existence of an Order dated November 6, 1998 issued by RTC Branch 78 of Quezon City in the case entitled Rudecon Management Corp. vs. Ramon M. Veluz, Civil Case No. Q-98-35326. Respondent does not deny also that this Order has become final and executory. What the respondent asserts is that he is not guilty of forum shopping because the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for in Civil Case No. Q-98-35326 are different from the cause of action and reliefs prayed for in Civil Case No. Q-98-35444 are different.

When respondent failed to contest the Order dated November 6, 1998, the same was rendered final and executory. This office is therefore devoid of any jurisdiction to review the factual

finding of the trial court which give rise to said order finding the respondent guilty of forum shopping. This office has no other option but to recognize the validity of said order.

. . . . .

Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that the penalty of warning be meted out against the respondent for violating the prohibition against forum shopping, specifically, Supreme Court Adm. No. 04-94, paragraph 2 and Section 5, Rule 7, paragraph 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[6]

On February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2004-43 adopting and approving the report and recommendation of Investigating Commissioner Elamparo.[7]

We do not entirely agree with the IBP Resolution.

Based on the records, there are two issues to be resolved: (1) whether respondent is guilty of forum shopping; and (2) whether respondent may be held administratively liable for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As to the first issue, we rule in the affirmative. As to the second issue, we rule in the negative.

Anent the first issue.

Respondent maintains that he is not guilty of forum shopping. However, it is not disputed that the RTC found respondent and his client guilty of forum shopping, on the basis of which it held both of them in contempt. This order has become final and executory for failure of respondent to appeal the same. The general rule is that once an issue has been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent court, it can no longer be controverted anew and should be finally laid to rest.[8] When a final judgment becomes executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, directly or indirectly, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by this Court.[9] The only recognized exceptions are the correction of clerical errors or the making of so called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and, of course where the judgment is void.[10] The instant case does not fall under any of these exceptions. Indeed, it has been held that controlling and irresistible reasons of public policy and of sound practice in the courts demand that at the risk of occasional error, judgments of courts determining controversies submitted to them should become final at some definite time fixed by law, or by a rule of practice recognized by law, so as to be thereafter beyond the control even of the court which rendered them for the purpose of correcting error of fact or of law, into which, in the opinion of the court it may have fallen.[11] In the present case, since the order of the trial court dated November 6, 1998 has already attained finality, we are now precluded from seeking otherwise.

Anent the second issue.

After a perusal of the records before us, we agree with respondent that there was no intention on his part to mislead the court by concealing the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-98-35444 in Branch 79 when they filed the Motion for Intervention and Answer in Intervention in Civil Case No. Q-98-35326 in Branch 78. Indeed, the first paragraph of the said Answer in Intervention shows that respondent and his client called the trial court’s attention with respect to the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-98-35444. Herein complainant, which is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-98-35326, does not dispute respondent’s allegation that the latter and his client attached to their Answer in Intervention a copy of their complaint in Civil Case No. Q-98-35444.

Rules 1.01, 1.02, Canon 1 and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide as follows:

CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legal processes.

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02 – A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.

. . . . .

CANON 10 – A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

Rule 10.01 – A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

Complainants seek the disbarment or suspension of respondent from the practice of law for his having allegedly violated the above-quoted provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility in relation to Supreme Court Administrative Circular 04-94 and Section 5, Rule 7[12] of the 1997 Rules of Court.

In administrative cases for disbarment or suspension against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is clearly preponderant evidence and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant.[13] Moreover, an administrative case against a lawyer must show the dubious character of the act done as well as of the motivation thereof.[14] In the present case, complainant failed to present clear and preponderant evidence to show that respondent willfully and deliberately resorted to falsehood and unlawful and dishonest conduct in violation of the standards of honesty as provided for by the Code of Professional Responsibility which would have warranted the imposition of administrative sanction against him.

WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVI-2004-43 dated February 27, 2004 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is SET ASIDE and the instant administrative case filed against Atty. Manuel N. Camacho is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

[12] Section 5. Certification against forum shopping. – The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.

A.C. No. 6273 March 15, 2010

ATTY. ILUMINADA M. VAFLOR-FABROA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. OSCAR PAGUINTO, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

An Information for Estafa1 was filed on June 21, 2001 against Atty. Iluminada M. Vaflor-Fabroa (complainant) along with others based on a joint affidavit-complaint which Atty. Oscar Paguinto (respondent) prepared and notarized. As the joint affidavit-complaint did not indicate the involvement of complainant, complainant filed a Motion to Quash the Information which the trial court granted.2 Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration of the quashal of the Information was denied3

Respondent also filed six other criminal complaints against complainant for violation of Article 31 of Republic Act No. 6938 (Cooperative Code of the Philippines) before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, but he eventually filed a Motion to Withdraw them.4

On October 10, 2001, complainant, who was Chairperson of the General Mariano Alvarez Service Cooperative, Inc. (GEMASCO), received a Notice of Special General Assembly of GEMASCO on October 14, 2001 to consider the removal of four members of the Board of Directors (the Board), including her and the General Manager.5 The notice was signed by respondent.

At the October 14, 2001 Special General Assembly presided by respondent and PNP Sr. Supt. Angelito L. Gerangco (Gerangco), who were not members of the then current Board,6 Gerango, complainant’s predecessor, as Chair of the GEMASCO board, declared himself Chair, appointed others to replace the removed directors, and appointed respondent as Board Secretary.

On October 15, 2001, respondent and his group took over the GEMASCO office and its premises, the pumphouses, water facilities, and operations. On even date, respondent sent letter-notices to complainant and the four removed directors informing them of their removal from the Board and as members of GEMASCO, and advising them to cease and desist from further discharging the duties of their positions.7

Complainant thus filed on October 16, 2001 with the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA)-Calamba a complaint for annulment of the proceedings taken during the October 14, 2001 Special General Assembly.

The CDA Acting Regional Director (RD), by Resolution of February 21, 2002, declared the questioned general assembly null and void for having been conducted in violation of GEMASCO’s By-Laws and the Cooperative Code of the Philippines.8 The RD’s Resolution of February 21, 2002 was later vacated for lack of jurisdiction9 of CDA.

In her present complainant10 against respondent for disbarment, complainant alleged that respondent:

X X X PROMOTED OR SUED A GROUNDLESS, FALSE OR UNLAWFUL SUIT, AND GAVE AID AND CONSENT TO THE SAME11

X X X DISOBEYED LAWS OF THE LAND, PROMOTE[D] DISRESPECT FOR LAW AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION12

X X X DID NOT CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND CANDOR TOWARD HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUE AND ENGAGED IN HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL13

X X X VIOLATED CANON 19 – A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW14

X X X RUINED AND DAMAGED NOT ONLY THE GEN. MARIANO ALVAREZ SERVICES COOPERATIVE, INC. (GEMASCO, INC.) BUT THE ENTIRE WATER-CONSUMING COMMUNITY AS WELL15

Despite the Court’s grant,16 on respondent’s motion,17 of extension of time to file Comment, respondent never filed any comment. The Court thus required him to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with,18 but just the same he failed to comply.19

The Court thus referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.20

It appears that during the mandatory conference before the IBP, complainant proposed the following issues:

1. Whether or not the acts of respondent constitute violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly the following:

1.1 Canon 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal [processes].

1.2 Canon 8 – A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.

1.3 Canon 10 – A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

1.4 Canon 19 – A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law.

1.5 Rule 12.03 – A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.

2. Whether or not the above acts of respondent constitute violations of his lawyer’s oath, particularly the following:

2.1 support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein

2.2 will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court

2.3 will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same

2.4 will delay no man for money or malice

3. Whether or not the above acts of [respondent] complained of are grounds for disbarment or suspension of attorneys by the Supreme Court as provided for in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.21

Respondent’s counsel who represented him during the conference proposed the issue of whether, on the basis of the allegations of the complaint, misconduct was committed by respondent.22

After the conclusion of the conference, both parties were ordered to submit position papers.23 Complainant filed hers,24 but respondent, despite grant, on his motion, of extension of time, did not file any position paper.

In her Report and Recommendation,25 Investigating Commissioner Lolita A. Quisumbing found respondent guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath as well as Canons 1, 8, 10, and Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Noting that respondent had already been previously suspended for six months, the Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended for two years.

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) Board of Governors opted for the dismissal of the complaint, however, for lack of merit.261avvphi1

On Motion for Reconsideration,27 the IBP-CBD Board of Governors recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six months.

The Court finds that by conniving with Gerangco in taking over the Board of Directors and the GEMASCO facilities, respondent violated the provisions of the Cooperative Code of the Philippines and the GEMASCO By-Laws. He also violated the Lawyer’s Oath, which provides that a lawyer shall support the Constitution and obey the laws.

When respondent caused the filing of baseless criminal complaints against complainant, he violated the Lawyer’s Oath that a lawyer shall "not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid or consent to the same."

When, after obtaining an extension of time to file comment on the complaint, respondent failed to file any and ignored this Court’s subsequent show cause order, he violated Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that "A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so." Sebastian v. Bajar28 teaches:

x x x Respondent’s cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondent’s conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. A Court’s Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively". Respondent’s obstinate refusal to comply with the Court’s orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in her character; it also underscores her disrespect of the Court’s lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof.

Lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and processes and respondent’s deference is underscored by the fact that willful disregard thereof will subject the lawyer not only to punishment for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. In fact, graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect to their processes.29 (Citations omitted).

The Court notes that respondent had previously been suspended from the practice of law for six months for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility,30 he having been found to have received an acceptance fee and misled the client into believing that he had filed a case for her when he had not.31 It appears, however, that respondent has not reformed his ways. A more severe penalty this time is thus called for.

WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Oscar P. Paguinto, is SUSPENDED for two years from the practice of law for violation of Canons 1, 8, 10, and Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer’s Oath, effective immediately.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent’s personal record as an attorney; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 7084 February 27, 2009

CONRADO G. FERNANDEZ, Complainant, vs. ATTY. MARIA ANGELICA P. DE RAMOS-VILLALON, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

BRION, J.:

For our resolution is this administrative case filed by complainant Conrado G. Fernandez (Fernandez) against Atty. Maria Angelica P. De Ramos-Villalon (Atty. Villalon). The complainant was the respondent in Civil Case No. 05-1017, in which Carlos O. Palacios (Palacios) sought to nullify a Deed of Donation he purportedly executed in favor of Fernandez.1 The respondent in

this administrative action, Atty. Villalon, was Palacios’ counsel in the early part of the case; she withdrew from the case after her appointment as prosecutor of Quezon City.2

A brief summary of Civil Case No. 05-1017 is in order to put this administrative complaint in proper context.

Palacios, in his Complaint in Civil Case No. 05-1017, alleged that he was the owner of a lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 178587 located in Barangay San Lorenzo, Makati City.3 He allegedly inherited the lot from his mother. Sometime in June 2004, he became aware that his lot was being eyed by a land-grabbing syndicate. The syndicate attempted to obtain a copy of TCT No. 178587 by pretending to be Carlos Palacios, Jr., and by filing a Petition for Judicial Reconstitution of Lost Owner’s Duplicate Original Copy of TCT No. 178587. The petition was docketed as LRC Case No. M-4524.4

Palacios received information that Fernandez could help him oppose the syndicate’s petition. Thus, Palacios approached Fernandez, and they eventually succeeded in causing the withdrawal of LRC Case No. M-4524, with the assistance of a certain Atty. Augusto P. Jimenez, Jr.. Palacios allegedly agreed to pay Fernandez P2,000,000.00 for the services he rendered in LRC Case No. M-4524.

On September 27, 2005, when Palacios visited the Village Administrator of the San Lorenzo Village Association, he bumped into Mrs. Jocelyn Lirio who expressed her interest in Palacios’ San Lazaro property. She had heard it was being sold by Fernandez. Palacios was surprised by Mrs. Lirio’s story, as he had no intention of selling the property. Upon investigation, he discovered that Fernandez had falsified a Deed of Donation that he (Palacios) purportedly executed in Fernandez’ favor. This Deed was duly registered, and on the strength of the purported donation, TCT No. 178587 in Palacios’ name was cancelled, and a new TCT (TCT No. 220869) was issued in Fernandez’ name.

Palacios then employed the services of respondent Atty. Villalon to file a Complaint for the declaration of nullity of the Deed of Donation that became the basis for the issuance of a title in Fernandez’ name.5 This complaint was subsequently amended to implead Romeo Castro, Atty. Augusto P. Jimenez, Jr., Levy R. De Dios, and Rosario T. Abobo.6

In his Answer, Fernandez claimed that the transfer of title in his name was proper on account of an existing Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 12, 2005 between him and Palacios. He also alleged that it was Palacios who falsified a Deed of Donation by forging their signatures and having it notarized;7 Palacios did this in order to cheat the government by paying only the donor’s tax, which was lower than the capital gains tax he would have paid had the transaction been represented as a sale. He additionally alleged that Palacios intended to falsify the Deed of Donation in order to have a ground for the annulment of the new TCT issued in favor of Fernandez and, ultimately, to recover the property.

On March 2, 2006, Fernandez filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Villalon for violation of Rule 1.01,8 Rule 7.03,9 Rule 10.01,10 Rule 10.02,11 and Rule 10.0312 of the Canons of Professional Responsibility.13 Fernandez alleged that Atty. Villalon, acting as Palacios’ counsel, deceitfully:

1. suppressed and excluded in the Original and Amended Complaint her knowledge about the existence of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 12, 2005;

2. used the fake and spurious Deed of Donation to deceive the court into trying Civil Case No. 05-1071, the action for the annulment of TCT No. 220869, despite her knowledge of the existence of the Deed of Absolute Sale;

3. committed misrepresentations as follows: to verify whether the attached Deed of Absolute Sale was properly notarized, the respondent Villalon personally inquired before the notarial section of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City thru a letter-request, whether a record of the deed existed in the said office; in the letter-request, the respondent misrepresented that there was already a pending case in the RTC of Makati before November 9, 2005;

4. refused to receive the complainant’s Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim so that she could file on behalf of her client an Amended Complaint without leave of court and without presenting the Deed of Absolute Sale;

5. induced her witness Agnes Heredia (Heredia) to sign a false Affidavit by telling her that it would only be for purposes of compelling Fernandez to pay additional sums to her client; however, Atty. Villalon used it as evidence to frame the complainant Fernandez for her own personal gain;

6. only submitted the Deed of Donation for signature examination and certification by the NBI and intentionally failed to submit the Deed of Absolute Sale.14

The Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation. On January 30, 2008, Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa (Commissioner Funa) issued a Report and Recommendation to dismiss the case, which in part reads:

There is no sufficient basis to hold respondent accountable for failure to mention in the Complaint and Amended Complaint the existence of the January 12 Deed of Absolute Sale. No such duty is imposed upon the legal counsel under any law or the Rules of Court. This Commissioner agrees with respondent’s argument that only the client’s operative facts and not the other evidentiary facts need to be included in the Complaint. It is correct for the respondent to argue that pointing out the existence of the January 12 Deed of Absolute Sale was a matter of defense which the defendant in said civil case can freely point out to the trial judge through his own pleadings.

It cannot be argued that there was suppression of evidence on the part of the respondent as she is not the only person who had access or possession of the said Deed of Absolute Sale. It was a document readily available to the general public through the Notarial Office. Moreover, it was a document which was fully known to herein complainant as he was supposed to be a party to the said Deed of Absolute Sale. In other words, a person cannot possibly suppress the existence of a document which everyone else, especially the opposing party-litigant, knows about.

Furthermore, it is noted that while the letter to the Notarial Office was dated November 9, it was actually received by said office only on November 14, 2005. The civil Complaint was filed on November 15, or on the next day. We take note that there is no indication when the Notarial Office formally replied to the respondent’s letter inquiry. Therefore, it cannot be said with certainty that respondent acquired knowledge about the Deed of Absolute Sale on November 14 or November 15.

We also take note that assuming the respondent had knowledge about (sic) the existence of the Deed of Absolute Sale before the civil complaint was filed, her role as the legal counsel is limited by the client’s choice of cause of action. Moreover, its mere existence as a document is not an affirmation of its validity or due execution. In other words, the client, possibly believing in the invalidity of the Deed of Absolute Sale, may have chosen to refute the validity of the document at a later time when and if its existence is raised. This is a choice within the discretion of the party-litigant. The opposing party cannot impose it as a duty upon the other party or his legal counsel. There is, therefore, no sufficient factual basis to hold respondent accountable in this charge. As it turns out, respondent’s client claims no consideration was ever given for the Deed of Absolute Sale and is consequently arguing that said Deed is void.

As for the accusation that respondent committed misrepresentation in her November 9 letter by stating that a case had already been filed when in truth no such case is yet pending, we take note that assuming a misrepresentation was committed, such act does not attain a degree of materiality or gravity so as to attribute evil malice on the part of respondent. The intent on the part of respondent remains the same, that is, to obtain relevant information. We cannot attribute any evil deception in the said letter considering the surrounding facts especially since a civil complaint was in fact filed the very next day the letter was sent.

As for the accusation that respondent refused or failed to receive registered mail matters, such has not been factually substantiated. The same goes with the accusation that respondents failed to furnish herein complainant’s lawyer with a copy of the Amended Complaint.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is submitted that respondent did not commit any act for which she should be disciplined or administratively sanctioned.

It is therefore recommended that this CASE BE DISMISSED for lack of merit.15

Before this Court, Fernandez filed a Petition for Review raising the following issues:

1. whether Commissioner Funa committed grave abuse of discretion in recommending the dismissal of the disbarment case against the Respondent;

2. whether Commissioner Funa committed grave abuse of discretion in failing to resolve the matter regarding the affidavit of Heredia, in which she retracted her affidavit in Civil Case No. 05-1017 and further said that the respondent induced her to issue a false affidavit by telling her that the said affidavit would only be used to compel Fernandez to pay additional sums to Palacios.

THE COURT’S RULING

We agree with the recommendation of IBP Commissioner Funa. The charges against the respondent do not constitute sufficient grounds for disbarment.

A lawyer, as an officer of the court, has a duty to be truthful in all his dealings.16 However, this duty does not require that the lawyer advance matters of defense on behalf of his or her client’s opponent. A lawyer is his or her client’s advocate; while duty-bound to utter no falsehood, an advocate is not obliged to build the case for his or her client’s opponent.

The respondent’s former client, Palacios, approached her to file a complaint for the annulment of the Deed of Donation. This was the cause of action chosen by her client. Assuming arguendo that the respondent knew of the presence of the Deed of Absolute Sale, its existence, is, indeed, a matter of defense for Fernandez. We cannot fault the respondent for choosing not to pursue the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale. The respondent alleged that her former client, Palacios, informed her that the Deed of Absolute Sale was void for lack of consideration. Furthermore, unlike the Deed of Donation, the Deed of Absolute Sale was not registered in the Registry of Deeds and was not the basis for the transfer of title of Palacios’ property to Fernandez. Under the circumstances, it was not unreasonable for a lawyer to conclude, whether correctly or incorrectly, that the Deed of Absolute Sale was immaterial in achieving the ultimate goal – the recovery of Palacios’ property.

On the second issue, the petitioner complains that Commissioner Funa failed to consider Heredia’s affidavit of retraction.17 As a rule, we view retractions with caution; they can be bought and obtained through threats, intimidation, or monetary consideration.18 The better rule is to examine them closely by considering the original, the new statements and the surrounding circumstances, based on the rules of evidence.19

The petitioner raised the retraction for the first time in his Supplemental to (sic) Reply to Comment filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant on November 10, 2006.20 The petitioner attached Heredia’s affidavit of December 11, 2005 and her affidavit of retraction.

In her affidavit of December 11, 2005, Heredia attested that: 1) Palacios sought her help when a syndicate attempted to grab his land; 2) she referred Palacios to the group of Castro, Fernandez, and Jimenez who were then helping her with her own legal problems; 3) she

regretted having referred Palacios to this group as she herself was later "victimized by the group; 4) they made her sign blank papers after gaining her trust and confidence, which signed blanks the group later filled up to make it appear that they bought and paid for her real property; 5) she terminated the services of this group sometime in April 2005; 6) she only recently came to know of this group’s modus operandi; and 7) Palacios eventually became one of the group’s victims.

In her affidavit of retraction, Heredia basically averred that the statements in the affidavit of December 11, 2005 were prepared by Villalon who asked her, in the presence of Palacios, to sign the affidavit; that the affidavit contained lies which she rejected outright, but Palacios and the respondent convinced her that they would only use the affidavit to convince Fernandez to give additional sums of money for Palacios’ property; that Palacios admitted getting a motorcyle from Fernandez; that Palacios had been paid not less than P6,000,000.00 for his property; that the respondent and Palacios used her affidavit in the cases they filed against Fernandez; that this violated their agreement that the affidavit would only be used in their negotiations to get more money for the property; that Palacios admitted to her that he executed a Deed of Absolute Sale with Fernandez; that the execution of the Deed of Donation was his idea; that Palacios had Fernandez’ signature in the Deed of Donation forged and was regretting having done so because Fernandez filed various charges, including perjury, against him; that she executed the affidavit of retraction in the interest of justice, to tell the truth about the circumstances surrounding the affidavit of December 11, 2005, to clear her name, to show that she is not part of the lies concocted by Atty. Villalon and Palacios, and to correct the wrong that was done by the affidavit of December 11, 2005 to the persons of Conrado Fernandez, Romeo Castro, and Atty. Augusto Jimenez, Jr.

In the Mandatory Conference and Hearing held on July 4, 2007, Commissioner Funa asked the respondent, through counsel, whether she wanted to cross-examine Heredia regarding her affidavit of retraction.21 The respondent passed up the chance for a direct confrontation and opted to adopt her comment as her position paper. In the position paper she submitted on January 14, 2008, she attacked the credibility of Heredia’s affidavit of retraction. She posited that Heredia contradicted herself when she said that she rejected the pre-prepared contents of the first affidavit outright but still signed it; that Heredia’s claim that she had been hoodwinked into signing the first affidavit because she was assured that it was a mere scrap of paper, was unbelievable; and that Heredia failed to rebut her earlier statement that she regretted having referred Fernandez’ group to Palacios because she herself fell victim to the group.

In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests on the complainant.22 Considering the gravity of the penalty of disbarment or suspension as a member of the Bar, a lawyer may only be disbarred or suspended if there is clear, convincing, and satisfactory proof that he or she committed transgressions defined by the rules as grounds to strip him or her of his professional license.23

In this case, we find no clear evidence we can satisfactorily accept showing that the respondent improperly induced Heredia to sign the affidavit of December 11, 2005, as alleged in Heredia’s affidavit of retraction.

First, the original affidavit and the retraction stand uncorroborated by any other evidence and, in our view, stand on the same footing. Neither affidavit provides clear, convincing and satisfactory proof of what they allege. They cannot therefore stand as meritorious basis for an accusation against the respondent.

Second, the allegations in both sworn statements are so contradictory that we can only conclude that Heredia had grossly lied in either or even in both instruments. We find it incredible that Heredia, as stated in her affidavit of retraction, vehemently rejected the statements in the first affidavit, but nevertheless agreed to sign it because it would only be used to aid Palacios in his negotiations with Fernandez. Effectively, she admitted in her retraction that she had lied under oath and entered into a conspiracy to extract additional funds from Fernandez who would not have accepted the demand if they were falsely made. Why she did what she said she did is not at all clear from her retraction, which itself was not convincingly clear on why she was retracting. For this Court to accept a retraction that raises more questions than answers, made by a witness of doubtful credibility allegedly for the sake of truth, is beyond the limits of what this Court can accept.

In these lights, the retraction has no particular relevance so that the Commissioner’s failure to consider it would matter.

WHEREFORE, the complaint for Disbarment is hereby ordered DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

* Designated additional member of the Second Division per Special Order No. 571 dated February 12, 2009.

8 Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

9 Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

10 Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

11 Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or mispresent the contents of a paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved.

12 Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.

Adm. Case No. 7252 November 22, 2006 [CBD 05-1434]

JOHNNY NG, Complainant, vs. ATTY. BENJAMIN C. ALAR, Respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is Resolution No. XVII-2006-223 dated April 27, 2006 of the IBP Board of Governors, to wit:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent’s propensity to resort to undeserved language and disrespectful stance, Atty. Benjamin C. Alar is hereby REPRIMANDED with a stern Warning that severe penalties will be imposed in case similar misconduct is again committed. Likewise, the counter complaint against Atty. Jose Raulito E. Paras and Atty. Elvin Michael Cruz is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

A verified complaint1 dated February 15, 2005 was filed by Johnny Ng (complainant) against Atty. Benjamin C. Alar (respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), for Disbarment.

Complainant alleges that he is one of the respondents in a labor case with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) docketed as NLRC NCR CA No. 040273-04, while respondent is the counsel for complainants. The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the NLRC rendered a Decision2 affirming the decision of the LA. Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Inhibit (MRMI),3 pertinent portions of which read:

x x x We cannot help suspecting that the decision under consideration was merely copied from the pleadings of respondents-appellees with very slight modifications. But we cannot

accept the suggestion, made by some knowledgeable individuals, that the actual writer of the said decision is not at all connected with the NLRC First Division.

x x x Why did the NLRC, First Division, uphold the Labor Arbiter in maintaining that the separation pay should be only one half month per year of service? Is jurisprudence on this not clear enough, or is there another reason known only to them?

x x x If this is not grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC, First Division, it is ignominious ignorance of the law on the part of the commissioners concerned.

The NLRC wants proof from the complainants that the fire actually resulted in prosperity and not losses. xxx Respondents failed to prove their claim of losses. And the Honorable Commissioners of the First Division lost their ability to see these glaring facts.

x x x How much is the separation pay they should pay? One month per year of service – and all of it to the affected workers – not to some people in the NLRC in part.

x x x They should have taken judicial notice of this prevalent practices of employers xxx. If the Honorable Commissioners, of the First Division do not know this, they are indeed irrelevant to real life.

x x x we invite the Honorable Commissioners of the First Division to see for themselves the evidence before them and not merely rely on their reviewers and on the word of their ponente. If they do this honestly they cannot help seeing the truth. Yes, honesty on the part of the Commissioners concerned is what is lacking, not the evidence. Unfair labor practice stares them in the face.

If labor arbiter Santos was cross-eyed in his findings of fact, the Honorable Commissioners of the First Division are doubly so – and with malice thrown in. If the workers indeed committed an illegal strike, how come their only "penalty" is removing their tent? It is obvious that the Labor Arbiter and the Honorable Commissioners know deep in their small hearts that there was no strike. This is the only reason for the finding of "illegal strike". Without this finding, they have no basis to remove the tent; they have to invent that basis.

x x x The union in its "Union Reply To The Position Paper Of Management" and its Annexes has shown very clearly that the so called strike is a myth. But Commissioner Dinopol opted to believe the myth instead of the facts. He fixed his sights on the tent in front of the wall and closed his eyes to the open wide passage way and gate beside it. His eyes, not the ingress and egress of the premises, are blocked by something so thick he cannot see through it. His impaired vision cannot be trusted, no doubt about it.

Commissioner Dinopol has enshrined a novel rule on money claims. Whereas, before, the established rule was, in cases of money claims the employer had the burden of proof of payment. Now it is the other way around. x x x For lack of a better name we should call this

new rule the "Special Dinopol Rule". But only retirable commissioners are authorized to apply this rule and only when the money claims involved are substantial. When they are meager the ordinary rules apply.

x x x how Commissioner Dinopol is able to say that the pay slips proved that the sixteen (16) claimants were already paid their service incentive leave pay. This finding is copied verbatim from the cross-eyed decision of Labor Arbiter Santos x x x .

The evidence already on record proving that the alleged blocking of the ingress and egress is a myth seem invisible to the impaired sight of Commissioner Dinopol. He needs more of it. x x x

Commissioner Dinopol by his decision under consideration (as ponente [of] the decision that he signed and caused his co-commissioners in the First Division to sign) has shown great and irreparable impartiality, grave abuse of discretion and ignorance of the law. He is a shame to the NLRC and should not be allowed to have anything to do with the instant case any more. Commissioner Go and Chairman Señeres, by negligence, are just as guilty as Dinopol but, since the NLRC rules prohibit the inhibition of the entire division, Chairman Señeres should remain in the instant case and appoint two (2) other commissioners from another division to sit with him and pass final judgment in the instant case.4 (Emphasis supplied)

In his Answer with Counter-Complaint dated April 6, 2005, respondent Alar contends that the instant complaint only intends to harass him and to influence the result of the cases between complainant and the workers in the different fora where they are pending; that the Rules of Court/Code of Professional Responsibility applies only suppletorily at the NLRC when the NLRC Rules of Procedure has no provision on disciplinary matters for litigants and lawyers appearing before it; that Rule X of the NLRC Rules of Procedure provides for adequate sanctions against misbehaving lawyers and litigants appearing in cases before it; that the Rules of Court/Code of Professional Responsibility does not apply to lawyers practicing at the NLRC, the latter not being a court; that LAs and NLRC Commissioners are not judges nor justices and the Code of Judicial Conduct similarly do not apply to them, not being part of the judiciary; and that the labor lawyers who are honestly and conscientiously practicing before the NLRC and get paid on a contingent basis are entitled to some latitude of righteous anger when they get cheated in their cases by reason of corruption and collusion by the cheats from the other sectors who make their lives and the lives of their constituents miserable, with impunity, unlike lawyers for the employers who get paid, win or lose, and therefore have no reason to feel aggrieved.5

Attached to the Counter-Complaint is the affidavit of union president Marilyn Batan wherein it is alleged that Attys. Paras and Cruz violated the Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers in several instances, such that while the labor case is pending before the NLRC, respondents Paras and Cruz filed a new case against the laborers in the Office of the City Engineer of Quezon City (QC) to demolish the tent of the workers, thus splitting the jurisdiction between the NLRC and the City Engineer's Office (CEO) of QC which violates Canon 12, Rules 12.02 and 13.03; that although Ng signed the disbarment complaint against Alar, respondents Paras’s and Cruz’s office instigated the said complaint which violates Canon 8; that Ng's company did not pay

income tax for the year 2000 allegedly for non-operation due to fire and respondents consented to this act of the employer which violates Canon 19, Rule 19.02; and that when the case started, there were more or less 100 complainants, but due to the acts of the employer and the respondents, the number of complainants were reduced to almost half which violates Canon 19, Rule 19-01, 19-02 and 19-03.6

In Answer to the Counter-Complaint dated April 14, 2005,7 respondents Paras and Cruz alleged: At no time did they file multiple actions arising from the same cause of action or brook interference in the normal course of judicial proceedings; the reliefs sought before the CEO has nothing to do with the case pending before the NLRC; the demolition of the nuisance and illegal structures is a cause of action completely irrelevant and unrelated to the labor cases of complainant; the CEO was requested to investigate certain nuisance structures located outside the employer's property, which consist of shanties, tents, banners and other paraphernalia which hampered the free ingress to and egress out of the employer's property and present clear and present hazards; the Office of the City Engineer found the structures violative of pertinent DPWH and MMDA ordinances; the pendency of a labor case with the NLRC is completely irrelevant since the holding of a strike, legal or not, did not validate or justify the construction of illegal nuisance structures; the CEO proceeded to abate the nuisance structures pursuant to its power to protect life, property and legal order; it was not their idea to file the disbarment complaint against respondent Alar; they merely instructed their client on how to go about filing the case, after having been served a copy of the derogatory MRMI; Canon 8 should not be perceived as an excuse for lawyers to turn their backs on malicious acts done by their brother lawyers; the complaint failed to mention that the only reason the number of complainants were reduced is because of the amicable settlement they were able to reach with most of them; their engagement for legal services is only for labor and litigation cases; at no time were they consulted regarding the tax concerns of their client and therefore were never privy to the financial records of the latter; at no time did they give advice regarding their client's tax concerns; respondent Alar's attempt at a disbarment case against them is unwarranted, unjustified and obviously a mere retaliatory action on his part.

The case, docketed as CBD Case No. 05-1434, was assigned by the IBP to Commissioner Patrick M. Velez for investigation, report and recommendation. In his Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of using improper and abusive language and recommended that respondent be suspended for a period of not less than three months with a stern warning that more severe penalty will be imposed in case similar misconduct is again committed.

On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner did not find any actionable misconduct against Attys. Paras and Cruz and therefore recommended that the Counter-Complaint against them be dismissed for lack of merit.

Acting on the Report and Recommendation, the IBP Board of Governors issued the Resolution hereinbefore quoted. While the Court agrees with the findings of the IBP, it does not agree that respondent Alar deserves only a reprimand.

The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:

CANON 8 – A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.

Rule 8.01 — A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

CANON 11 – A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

Rule 11.03 – A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.

Rule 11.04 – A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no materiality to the case.

The MRMI contains insults and diatribes against the NLRC, attacking both its moral and intellectual integrity, replete with implied accusations of partiality, impropriety and lack of diligence. Respondent used improper and offensive language in his pleadings that does not admit any justification.

In Lacurom v. Jacoba,8 the Court ratiocinated as follows:

Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. However, even the most hardened judge would be scarred by the scurrilous attack made by the 30 July 2001 motion on Judge Lacurom's Resolution. On its face, the Resolution presented the facts correctly and decided the case according to supporting law and jurisprudence. Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of unnecessary language is proscribed if we are to promote high esteem in the courts and trust in judicial administration.

In Uy v. Depasucat,9 the Court held that a lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.

It must be remembered that the language vehicle does not run short of expressions which are emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.10 A lawyer's language should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but respectful as befitting an advocate and in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession.11 Submitting pleadings containing countless insults and diatribes against the NLRC and attacking both its moral and intellectual integrity, hardly measures to the sobriety of speech demanded of a lawyer.

Respondent's assertion that the NLRC not being a court, its commissioners, not being judges or justices and therefore not part of the judiciary; and that consequently, the Code of Judicial Conduct does not apply to them, is unavailing. In Lubiano v. Gordolla,12 the Court held that respondent became unmindful of the fact that in addressing the NLRC, he nonetheless remained a member of the Bar, an oath-bound servant of the law, whose first duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice and whose conduct ought to be and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics.13

Respondent’s argument that labor practitioners are entitled to some latitude of righteous anger is unavailing. It does not deter the Court from exercising its supervisory authority over lawyers who misbehave or fail to live up to that standard expected of them as members of the Bar.14

The Court held in Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer,15 thus:

2. What we have before us is not without precedent. Time and again, this Court has admonished and punished, in varying degrees, members of the Bar for statements, disrespectful or irreverent, acrimonious or defamatory, of this Court or the lower courts. Resort by an attorney – in a motion for reconsideration – to words which may drag this Court down into disrepute, is frowned upon as "neither justified nor in the least necessary, because in order to call the attention of the court in a special way to the essential points relied upon in his argument and to emphasize the force thereof, the many reasons stated in the motion" are "sufficient," and such words "superfluous." It is in this context that we must say that just because Atty. Armonio "thought best to focus the attention" of this Court "to the issue in the case" does not give him unbridled license in language. To be sure, lawyers may come up with various methods, perhaps much more effective, in calling the Court’s attention to the issues involved. The language vehicle does not run short of expressions, emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.

To be proscribed then is the use of unnecessary language which jeopardizes high esteem in courts, creates or promotes distrust in judicial administration, or which could have the effect of "harboring and encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the source of disorder, thus undermining the foundation upon which rests that bulwark called judicial power to which those who are aggrieved turn for protection and relief." Stability of judicial institutions suggests that the Bar stand firm on this precept.

The language here in question, respondents aver, "was the result of overenthusiasm." It is but to repeat an old idea when we say that enthusiasm, or even excess of it, is not really bad. In fact, the one or the other is no less a virtue, if channeled in the right direction. However, it must be circumscribed within the bounds of propriety and with due regard for the proper place of courts in our system of government.16

Respondent has clearly violated Canons 8 and 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. His actions erode the public’s perception of the legal profession.

However, the penalty of reprimand with stern warning imposed by the IBP Board of Governors is not proportionate to respondent’s violation of the Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, he deserves a stiffer penalty of fine in the amount of P5,000.00.

Anent the Counter-Complaint filed against Attys. Paras and Cruz, the Court finds no reason to disturb the following findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, as approved by the IBP Board of Governors, to wit:

The Counter-complainant Batan failed to submit any position paper to substantiate its claims despite sufficient opportunity to do so.1âwphi1

At any rate, it must be noted that the alleged case with the Office of the City Engineer really partakes of a different cause of action, which has nothing to do with the NLRC case. The decision was made by the city engineer. Respondent’s remedy should be to question that decision, not bring it to this Commission which has no jurisdiction over it. We can not substitute our judgment for the proper courts who should determine the propriety or sagacity of the city engineer’s action.

Furthermore, parties are not prohibited from availing themselves of remedies available in law provided; these acts do not exceed the bounds of decency. In supporting the action against respondent’s conduct, no such abuse may be gleaned. Indeed, it is the attorney’s duty as an officer of the court to defend a judge from unfounded criticism or groundless personal attack. This requires of him not only to refrain from subjecting the judge to wild and groundless accusation but also to discourage other people from so doing and to come to his defense when he is so subjected. By the very nature of his position a judge lacks the power, outside of his court, to defend himself against unfounded criticism and clamor and it is the attorney, and no other, who can better or more appropriately support the judiciary and the incumbents of the judicial positions. (Agpalo, p. 143 citing People v. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572 (1946); Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, 31 SCRA 1 (1970); see Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil. 152 (1957) Whether the disbarment complaint was filed by Ng or by his lawyers is therefore not of great import, what is more apropos would be the contents of the complaint and whether the same is sufficient to consider disciplinary sanctions.

Likewise, the tax case is a different matter altogether. Since the respondent lawyers have already stated that they were not engaged as counsels to take care of their client’s tax problems, then they cannot be held accountable for the same. If any wrongdoing has been committed by complainant Ng, he should answer for that and those lawyers who were responsible for such acts be held liable jointly. There is no showing [that] attorneys Paras and Cruz were responsible for that tax fiasco.1âwphi1

Finally, while it may be true that Batan’s group has been greatly diminished from about 100 claimants to less than half the number is not by itself an actionable misconduct. Lawyers are duty bound to foster amicable settlement of cases; litigation and adversarial proceedings while a necessary part of the practice is not encouraged, because it will save expenses and help

unclogged [sic] the dockets. If the compromise is fair then there is no reason to prevent the same. There is nothing in the counter-complaint which shows that the compromise agreement and waivers executed appear to be unfair, hence no reason to hold lawyers liable for the same. Besides, a "compromise is as often the better part of justice as prudence the part of valor and a lawyer who encourages compromise is no less the client’s champion in settlement out of court than he is the client’s champion in the battle in court." (Curtis, The Advocate: Voices in Court, 5 (1958); cited in Agpalo’s Legal Ethics, p. 86, 1980 ed.) What is therefore respondent Alar[‘]s beef with the execution of these waivers if these were executed freely by his clients?

All told, we do not find anything actionable misconduct against Attorneys Paras and Cruz; hence the dismissal of the counter-complaint against them is proper for absolute lack of merit.17

ACCORDINGLY, we find respondent Atty. Benjamin C. Alar GUILTY of violation of Canons 8 and 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is imposed a fine of P5,000.00 with STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.

The Counter-Complaint against Atty. Jose Raulito E. Paras and Atty. Elvin Michael Cruz is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

CARMELITA FUDOT, G.R. No. 171008

Petitioner,

Present:

QUISUMBING, J.,

- versus - Chairperson,

CARPIO,

CARPIO MORALES,

TINGA, and

CATTLEYA LAND, INC., VELASCO, JR., JJ.

Respondent.

Promulgated:

September 13, 2007

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N

TINGA, J.:

For resolution is a petition that seeks to nullify the Decision1[1] and Resolution2[2] of

the Court of Appeals dated 28 April 2005 and 11 January 2006, respectively, in C.A.–G.R. CV No.

73025 which declared respondent as having a better right over a parcel of land located in Doljo,

Panglao, Bohol.

1[1]Rollo, pp. 22-32. Penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon, with Associate

Justices Arsenio J. Magpale and Enrico A. Lanzanas, concurring.

2[2]Id. at 35.

The facts, as culled from the records, follow.

Sometime in July 1992, Cattleya Land, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as respondent) asked

someone to check, on its behalf, the titles of nine (9) lots, the subject land included, which it

intended to buy from the spouses Troadio and Asuncion Tecson. Finding no defect on the titles,

respondent purchased the nine lots through a Deed of Conditional Sale on 6 November 1992.

Subsequently, on 30 August 1993, respondent and the Tecsons executed a Deed of Absolute

Sale over the same properties. The Deed of Conditional Sale and the Deed of Absolute Sale

were registered with the Register of Deeds on 06 November 1992 and 04 October 1993,

respectively.3[3] The Register of Deeds, Atty. Narciso dela Serna, refused to actually annotate

the deed of sale on the titles because of the existing notice of attachment in connection with

Civil Case No. 3399 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.4[4] The attachment was

eventually cancelled by virtue of a compromise agreement between the Tecsons and their

attaching creditor which was brokered by respondent. Titles to six (6) of the nine (9) lots were

issued, but the Register of Deeds refused to issue titles to the remaining three (3) lots , because

the titles covering the same were still unaccounted for.

On 23 January 1995, petitioner presented for registration before the Register of Deeds

the owner’s copy of the title of the subject property, together with the deed of sale purportedly

executed by the Tecsons in favor of petitioner on 19 December 1986. On the following day,

3[3]Id. at 48-49. Vide Entry No. 83422 and Entry No. 87549, respectively of the

Register of Deeds of Bohol.

4[4]Tantrade Corporation v. Troadio Tecson, et al.

respondent sent a letter of protest/opposition to petitioner’s application. Much to its surprise,

respondent learned that the Register of Deeds had already registered the deed of sale in favor

of petitioner and issued a new title in her name.5[5]

On 5 May 1995, respondent filed its Complaint6[6] for Quieting Of Title &/Or Recovery

Of Ownership, Cancellation Of Title With Damages before the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran

City.7[7] On 26 June 1995, Asuncion filed a complaint-in-intervention, claiming that she never

signed any deed of sale covering any part of their conjugal property in favor of petitioner. She

averred that her signature in petitioner’s deed of sale was forged thus, said deed should be

declared null and void.8[8] She also claimed that she has discovered only recently that there

was an amorous relationship between her husband and petitioner.9[9]

5[5]Rollo, pp. 51-52.

6[6]Id. at 47-55.

7[7]Docketed as Civil Case No. 5781, Cattleya Land, Inc. v. Carmelita Fudot and Atty.

Narciso dela Serna. The case was eventually raffled to Branch 4, 7th

Judicial Region, Tagbilaran

City.

8[8]Rollo, pp. 60-61. Asuncion Tecson’s testimony was made through oral deposition;

records, pp. 497-510.

9[9]Records, Vol. 1, pp. 66-68; Complaint-in-Intervention; id. at 66.

Petitioner, for her part, alleged in her answer10[10] that the spouses Tecson had sold

to her the subject property for P20,000.00 and delivered to her the owner’s copy of the title on

26 December 1986. She claims that she subsequently presented the said title to the Register of

Deeds but the latter refused to register the same because the property was still under

attachment.

On 31 October 2001, the trial court rendered its decision:11[11] (i) quieting the title or

ownership of the subject land in favor of respondent; (ii) declaring the deed of sale between

petitioner and spouses Tecson invalid; (iii) ordering the registration of the subject land in favor

of respondent; (iv) dismissing respondent’s claim for damages against the Register of Deeds for

insufficiency of evidence; (v) dismissing Asuncion’s claim for damages against petitioner for lack

of factual basis; and (vi) dismissing petitioner’s counterclaim for lack of the required

preponderance of evidence.12[12]

According to the trial court, respondent had recorded in good faith the deed of sale in

its favor ahead of petitioner. Moreover, based on Asuncion’s convincing and unrebutted

10[10]Volume 1, pp. 35-41; Answer with Counter Claim and Motion to Dismiss,

Records.

11[11]Rollo, pp. 57-64.

12[12]Id. at 64.

testimony, the trial court concluded that the purported signature of Asuncion in the deed of

sale in favor of petitioner was forged, thereby rendering the sale void.13[13]

Petitioner sought recourse to the Court of Appeals, arguing in the main that the rule on

double sale was applicable to the case. The appellate court, however, dismissed her appeal,

holding that there was no double sale because the alleged sale to petitioner was null and void

in view of the forgery of Asuncion’s purported signature in the deed. The appellate court noted

that petitioner failed to rebut Asuncion’s testimony despite opportunities to do so.14[14]

Moreover, even if there was double sale, according to the appellate court, respondent’s claim

would still prevail since it was able to register the second sale in its favor in good faith, had

made inquiries before it purchased the lots, and was informed that the titles were free from

encumbrance except the attachment on the property due to Civil Case No. 3399.15[15]

Petitioner sought reconsideration of the decision but the Court of Appeals denied her

motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.16[16]

13[13]Id. at 62-63.

14[14]Id. at 22-32, 28-29; CA Decision dated 28 April 2005.

15[15]Rollo, p. 30.

16[16]Supra note 2; Resolution dated 11 January 2006.

Petitioner thus presents before this Court the following issues for resolution:

I. BETWEEN 2 BUYERS OF REGISTERED LAND, WHO HAS THE BETTER RIGHT-IS IT THE FIRST BUYER WHO WAS GIVEN THE OWNER’S DUPLICATE TCT TOGETHER WITH A DEED OF SALE IN 1986, OR THE SECOND BUYER IN 1992 WITH ONLY A DEED OF SALE.

II. IS A BUYER OF REGISTERED LAND WHO DID NOT DEMAND OR REQUIRE THE DELIVERY OF THE OWNER’S DUPLICATE TCT A BUYER IN GOOD FAITH.

III.

II. IN SUBSEQUENT REGISTRATION OF REGISTERED LANDS, AS BY SALE, WHICH LAW SHALL GOVERN, ARTICLE 1455 OF CIVIL CODE OR P.D. 1529 OR TORRENS SYSTEM.17[17]

Petitioner avers that she was the first buyer in good faith and even had in her

possession the owner’s copy of the title so much so that she was able to register the deed of

sale in her favor and caused the issuance of a new title in her name. She argues that the

presentation and surrender of the deed of sale and the owner’s copy carried with it the

“conclusive authority of Asuncion Tecson” which cannot be overturned by the latter’s oral

deposition.18[18]

17[17]Rollo, p. 12.

18[18]Id. at 14.

Petitioner claims that respondent did not demand nor require delivery of the owner’s

duplicate title from the spouses Tecson, neither did it investigate the circumstances

surrounding the absence of the title. These indicate respondent’s knowledge of a defect in the

title of the spouses and, thus, petitioner concludes that respondent was not a buyer in good

faith.19[19]

Finally, petitioner insists that the applicable law in this case is P.D. No. 1529, a special

law dealing precisely with the registration of registered lands or any subsequent sale thereof,

and not Article 1544 of the Civil Code which deals with immovable property not covered by the

Torrens System.20[20]

Respondent points out, on one hand, that petitioner’s first two issues which present an

inquiry on who has a better right or which one is a buyer in good faith, are questions of fact not

proper in a petition for review. The third issue, on the other hand, is ostensibly a question of

law which had been unsuccessfully raised below.21[21]

19[19]Id. at 15-16.

20[20]Id. at 12-17.

21[21]Id. at 67.

Respondent maintains that there is no room to speak of petitioner as a buyer in good

faith since she was never a buyer in the first place, as her claim is based on a null and void deed

of sale, so the court a quo found. Respondent also asserts that its status as a buyer in good

faith was established and confirmed in the proceedings before the two courts below.22[22]

Lastly, respondent argues that P.D. No. 1529 finds no application in the instant case.

The “production of the owner’s duplicate certificate x x x being conclusive authority from the

registered owner” is only true as between the registration applicant and the register of deeds

concerned, but never to third parties. Such conclusive authority, respondent adds, is “only for

the Register of Deeds to enter a new certificate or to make a memorandum of registration in

accordance with such instrument.” It cannot cure the fatal defect that the instrument from

which such registration was effected is null and void ab initio, respondent concludes.23[23]

The petition is bereft of merit.

Petitioner’s arguments, which rest on the assumption that there was a double sale,

must fail.

22[22]Id. at 70-71.

23[23]Id. at 72-73.

In the first place, there is no double sale to speak of. Art. 1544 of the Civil Code,24[24]

which provides the rule on double sale, applies only to a situation where the same property is

validly sold to different vendees. In this case, there is only one sale to advert to, that between

the spouses Tecson and respondent.

In Remalante v. Tibe,25[25] this Court ruled that the Civil Law provision on double sale is

not applicable where there is only one valid sale, the previous sale having been found to be

fraudulent. Likewise, in Espiritu and Apostol v. Valerio,26[26] where the same parcel of land

was purportedly sold to two different parties, the Court held that despite the fact that one

deed of sale was registered ahead of the other, Art. 1544 of the Civil Code will not apply where

said deed is found to be a forgery, the result of this being that the right of the other vendee

should prevail.

24[24]CIVIL CODE, Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different

vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession

thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.

Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it

who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.

Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith

was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof to the person who presents the oldest title,

provided there is good faith.

25[25]No. L-59514, 25 February 1988, 158 SCRA 138.

26[26]119 Phil. 69 (1963).

The trial court declared that the sale between the spouses Tecson and petitioner is

invalid, as it bears the forged signature of Asuncion. Said finding is based on the unrebutted

testimony of Asuncion and the trial court’s visual analysis and comparison of the signatures in

her Complaint-in-Intervention and the purported deed of sale. This finding was upheld by the

Court of Appeals, as it ruled that the purported sale in petitioner’s favor is null and void, taking

into account Asuncion’s unrefuted deposition. In particular, the Court of Appeals noted

petitioner’s failure to attend the taking of the oral deposition and to give written

interrogatories. In short, she did not take the necessary steps to rebut Asuncion’s definitive

assertion.

The congruence of the wills of the spouses is essential for the valid disposition of

conjugal property.27[27] Thus, under Article 166 of the Civil Code28[28] which was still in

effect on 19 December 1986 when the deed of sale was purportedly executed, the husband

cannot generally alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without

the wife’s consent.

27[27]Abalos v. Macatangay, G.R. No. 155043, 30 September 2004, 439 SCRA 649,

661.

28[28]Article 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under

civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the

conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent. If she refuses unreasonably to give her consent, the court may

compel her to grant the same.

This article shall not apply to property acquired by the conjugal partnership before the effective date of

this Code.

In this case, following Article 17329[29] of the Civil Code, on 26 June 1995, or eight and

a half years (8 ½) after the purported sale to petitioner, Asuncion filed her Complaint-in-

Intervention seeking the nullification thereof, and while her marriage with Troadio was still

subsisting. Both the Court of Appeals and the trial court found Asuncion’s signature in the deed

of sale to have been forged, and consequently, the deed of sale void for lack of marital consent.

We find no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. Findings

of fact of lower courts are deemed conclusive and binding upon the Supreme Court subject to

certain exceptions,30[30] none of which are present in this case. Besides, it has long been

recognized in our jurisprudence that a forged deed is a nullity and conveys no title.31[31]

29[29]Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage and within ten years from the

transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered

into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband

which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the

wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand

the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband.

30[30]The exceptions are: when the findings are grounded on speculation, surmises or

conjectures; when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; when there

is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; when the factual findings of the trial and

appellate courts are conflicting; when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, has gone

beyond the issues of the case and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant

and appellee; when the judgment of the appellate court is premised on a misapprehension of facts

or when it has failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a

different conclusion; when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific

evidence upon which they are based; and when findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are

premised on the absence of evidence but are contradicted by the evidence on record. Solid

Homes, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 341 Phil. 261, 275 (1997).

Petitioner argues she has a better right over the property in question, as the holder of

and the first one to present, the owner’s copy of the title for the issuance of a new TCT. The

Court is not persuaded.

The act of registration does not validate petitioner’s otherwise void contract.

Registration is a mere ministerial act by which a deed, contract, or instrument is sought to be

inscribed in the records of the Office of the Register of Deeds and annotated at the back of the

certificate of title covering the land subject of the deed, contract, or instrument. While it

operates as a notice of the deed, contract, or instrument to others, it does not add to its validity

nor converts an invalid instrument into a valid one as between the parties,32[32] nor amounts

to a declaration by the state that the instrument is a valid and subsisting interest in the

land.33[33] The registration of petitioner’s void deed is not an impediment to a declaration by

the courts of its invalidity.

Even assuming that there was double sale in this case, petitioner would still not prevail.

The pertinent portion of Art. 1544 provides:

31[31]Salomon v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 70263, 14 May 1990, 185

SCRA 352.

32[32]Pascua v. Court of Appeals, 401 Phil. 350, 367 (2000).

33[33]Agricultural Credit Cooperative Assn. of Hinigaran v. Yusay, et al., 107 Phil 791

(1960).

Art. 1544. x x x.

Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.

x x x x.

In interpreting this provision, the Court declared that the governing principle is primus

tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in right). Knowledge gained by the first buyer of the

second sale cannot defeat the first buyer’s rights, except where the second buyer registers in

good faith the second sale ahead of the first as provided by the aforequoted provision of the

Civil Code. Such knowledge of the first buyer does not bar him from availing of his rights under

the law, among them to register first his purchase as against the second buyer. However,

knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if he is first to

register the second sale, since such knowledge taints his prior registration with bad faith.34[34]

It is thus essential, to merit the protection of Art. 1544, second paragraph, that the second

realty buyer must act in good faith in registering his deed of sale.35[35]

34[34]Ulep v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125254, 11 October 2005, 472 SCRA 241,

253 citing Uraca v. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 702 (1997).

35[35]Coronel, et al. v. Court of Appeals, 331 Phil. 294, 321-322 (1996) citing VITUG, COMPENDIUM OF

CIVIL LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, 1993 Ed., p. 604.

We agree with the trial court and the Court of Appeals that respondent was a buyer in

good faith, having purchased the nine (9) lots, including the subject lot, without any notice of a

previous sale, but only a notice of attachment relative to a pending civil case. In fact, in its

desire to finally have the title to the properties transferred in its name, it persuaded the parties

in the said case to settle the same so that the notice of attachment could be cancelled.

Relevant to the discussion are the following provisions of P.D. No. 1529:

Sec. 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner.— An owner of registered land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge or otherwise deal with the same in accordance with existing laws. He may use such forms of deeds, mortgages, lease or other voluntary instruments as are sufficient in law. But no deed, mortgage, lease or other voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make Registration.

The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the registration shall be made in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies. (Emphasis supplied) Sec. 52. Constructive notice upon registration.—Every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land shall, if registered, filed or entered in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land to which it relates lies, be constructive notice to all persons from the time of such registering, filing or entering.

It has been held that between two transactions concerning the same parcel of land, the

registered transaction prevails over the earlier unregistered right. The act of registration

operates to convey and affect the registered land so that a bona fide purchaser of such land

acquires good title as against a prior transferee, if such prior transfer was unrecorded.36[36]

As found by the courts a quo, respondent was able to register its purchase ahead of petitioner.

It will be recalled that respondent was able to register its Deed of Conditional Sale with the

Register of Deeds as early as 6 November 1992, and its Deed of Absolute Sale on 14 October

1993. On the other hand, petitioner was able to present for registration her deed of sale and

owner’s copy of the title only on 23 January 1995, or almost nine years after the purported sale.

Why it took petitioner nine (9) years to present the deed and the owner’s copy, she had no

credible explanation; but it is clear that when she finally did, she already had constructive

notice of the deed of sale in respondent’s favor. Without a doubt, respondent had acquired a

better title to the property.

Finally, anent petitioner’s claim that P.D. No. 1529 applies to registered lands or any

subsequent sale thereof, while Art. 1544 of the Civil Code applies only to immovable property

not covered by the Torrens System, suffice it to say that this quandary has already been

answered by an eminent former member of this Court, Justice Jose Vitug, who explained that

the registration contemplated under Art. 1544 has been held to refer to registration under P.D.

No. 1529, thus:

The registration contemplated under Art. 1544 has been held to refer to

registration under Act 496 Land Registration Act (now PD 1529) which considers

36[36]Macadangdang v. Martinez, G.R. No. 158682, 31 January 2005, 450 SCRA 363,

368.

the act of registration as the operative act that binds the land (see Mediante v. Rosabal, 1 O.G. [12] 900, Garcia v. Rosabal, 73 Phil 694). On lands covered by the Torrens System, the purchaser acquires such rights and interest as they appear in the certificate of title, unaffected by any prior lien or encumbrance not noted therein. The purchaser is not required to explore farther than what the Torrens title, upon its face, indicates. The only exception is where the purchaser has actual knowledge of a flaw or defect in the title of the seller or of such liens or encumbrances which, as to him, is equivalent to registration (see Sec. 39, Act 496; Bernales v. IAC, G.R. 75336, 18 October 1988; Hernandez vs. Sales, 69 Phil 744; Tajonera s. Court of Appeals, L-26677, 27 March 1981) (Emphasis supplied)37[37]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court

of Appeals are affirmed. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. RTJ-90-483 September 25, 1998

ATTY. ANTONIO T. GUERRERO, complainant, vs. HON. ADRIANO VILLAMOR, respondent.

A.M. No. RTJ-90-617 September 25, 1998

GEORGE CARLOS, complainant, vs. HON. ADRIANO VILLAMOR, respondent.

QUISUMBING, J.:

In a sworn letter-complaint 1 addressed to this Court through the Court Administrator, dated March 8, 1990, Atty. Antonio Guerrero charges Judge Adriano Villamor of the Regional Trial

Court at Naval, Sub-Province of Biliran, Leyte, Branch 16, with serious misconduct, ignorance of the law, knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, misfeasance, malfeasance and neglect of duty for issuing an Order 2 dated December 11, 1987 declaring the complainant and one George Carlos guilty of direct contempt.

In a separate verified complaint, involving exactly the same incident, George Carlos also charges Judge Adriano Villamor with substantially the same offenses. 3

By resolution dated February 5, 1991, this Court referred to Associate Justice Cancio C. Garcia of the Court of Appeals the complaint of Atty. Guerrero, docketed as Administrative Matter (A.M.) RTJ 90-483, for investigation, report and recommendation. This was followed by another resolution, 4 pursuant to which the records of the case relating to Carlos' complaint, docketed, as A.M. RTJ-90-617, were forwarded to said investigator for consolidation with A.M. RTJ 90-483.

The said administrative matters have now to be resolved in view of respondent's pending claims, for gratuity granted by this Court per its Resolution dated April 12, 1994, which reads as follows:

A.M. No. RTJ-90-474 (Clemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr. vs. Judge Adriano Villamor, Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Naval, Leyte) and A.M. No. RTJ-90-606 (Clemencio C. Sabitsana, JR. vs. Judge Adriano Villamor, Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Naval, Leyte). — Acting on the plea for mercy and compassion, dated February 2, 1994, filed by counsel for respondent judge, and it appearing that the Court in its per curiam resolution, dated February 7, 1992, amended the dispositive portion of its decision, dated October 4, 1991, by allowing Judge Villamor to enjoy all vacation and sick leave benefits that he has earned during the period of his government service and in the resolution of May 11, 1993, denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the respondent for having been filed late, and although the Court will not condone the wrongdoings of any member of the bench, neither will it negate any move to recognize and remunerate their lengthy Service in the government, more so, if this will greatly benefit the last days of their remaining life, the Court Resolved to GRANT former Judge Adriano Villamor a gratuity equivalent to 25% of his retirement benefits. The payment of this benefit, however, shall be subject to the availability of funds and the usual clearance requirements. This ruling is pro hac vice and is not a precedent for other cases.

As gleamed from the report by the Investigating Justice, the antecedent facts of the present consolidated cases are as follows:

Sometime in November 1968, one Gloria Pascubillo filed a complaint against George Carlos for quieting of title. Docketed as Civil Case No. B-0168 in the Regional Trial Court at Naval, Leyte, the case ended in a compromise agreement approved by the court whereby Carlos agreed to deliver possession of the property in question to Pascubillo who, in turn, undertook to pay the

former the sum of P5,000.00 as purchase price. For some reason or another, the judgment by compromise remained dormant for five (5) years.

On November 23, 1977, Gloria Naval, nee Pascubillo, filed before the Regional Trial Court at Naval, Leyte, Civil Case No. B-0398 against Carlos for revival and enforcement of the judgment in Civil Case No. B-0168. In turn, Carlos filed Criminal Cases Nos. N-989, N-990, N-991, N-992 and N-993 for qualified theft against Naval and her helpers. These criminal cases, like Civil Case No. B-0398, were raffled to the sala of Judge Villamor.

Due to the pendency of Civil Case No. B-0398, Judge Villamor had the criminal cases archived, noting in his Orders 5 of January 4, 1984 that both sets of cases have for their subject the same parcel of land.

Eventually, Judge Villamor rendered judgment in Civil Case No. B-0398, declaring Naval to be the lawful owner/possessor of the land being disputed, and ordering Carlos to vacate the same.

Forthwith, Carlos moved to reactivate the archived aforecited criminal cases. Acting on the motion of the accused, Judge Villamor dismissed the cases. As he observed in his dismissal order dated December 5, 1986, Naval and her helpers cannot be held liable for qualified theft for gathering coconuts on a piece of land of which Naval is the owner. 6

Meanwhile, Carlos appealed the decision in Civil Case No. B-0398. During the pendency of the appeal, Judge Villamor issued an order granting execution which Carlos, in due time, challenged through a petition for certiorari before this Court. The case was certified to the Court of Appeals and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 12011. In its Decision dated October 7, 1987, amending its earlier decision of July 24, 1987, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the order of immediate execution issued by Judge Villamor. Later, this Court, in G.R. No. 81826, resolved to deny the petition for review filed by Carlos for failure to show that the Appellate Court committed reversible error in sustaining the trial court's order granting execution pending appeal. 7

On July 28, 1987, Carlos filed with this Court an administrative case against Judge Villamor, docketed as A.M. RTJ 87-105 charging the latter with having issued an illegal order and unjust decision principally in the aforementioned criminal cases and in Civil Case No. B-0398. In its En Banc Resolution dated November 21, 1988, as reiterated in another resolution of January 26, 1989, this Court dismissed the said administrative case for being premature but "without prejudice to refiling should the Supreme Court decision later in G.R. 81826 warrants its refiling."

8

Dissatisfied with the outcome of his administrative case, Carlos, through Atty. Antonio Guerrero, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu a civil action for damages against Judge Villamor. In his complaint, docketed as CEB-6478, and raffled to Branch 21 presided by then Judge Juanito Bernad, Carlos alleged that Judge Villamor knowingly rendered an unjust judgment when he dismissed the five criminal cases against Naval and her co-accused.

The summons in Civil Case No. CEB-6478 was served on Judge Villamor on December 10, 1987. The following day, instead of answering the complaint, Judge Villamor issued in Criminal Cases Nos. N-0989 to 0993 an order declaring Carlos and his lawyer, Antonio Guerrero guilty of direct contempt for "degrading the respect and dignity of the court through the use of derogatory and contemptuous language before the court," 9 In full, the contempt order reads:

ORDER OF CONTEMPT OF COURT

It is indeed unfortunate and regrettable that George Carlos and his counsel, Atty. Antonio T. Guerrero have brushed aside the warning of this Court not to mistake its maximum tolerance as weakness. Once again, they have defiled this Court with abusive, offensive and disrespectful language in their complaint for Damages, Civil Case CEB 6478, RTC, 7th Judicial Region, Cebu City against the herein presiding judge for dismissing the aforementioned cases on December 5, 1986.

Neither George Carlos, the private prosecutor or public prosecutor questioned the said dismissal in the proper forum. It was only on December 3, 1987 that George Carlos and his counsel Atty. Antonio T. Guerrero when they filed civil case CEB 6478 peremptorily labelled the dismissal as "unjust decision."

And in their complaint they alleged:

Par. 12. That the dismissal of criminal cases Nos. 0989, 0990, 0991, 0992 and 0993 for qualified theft was arrived at certainly without circumspection — without any moral or legal basis — a case of knowingly rendering unjust judgment since the dismissal was tantamount to acquittal of the accused Gloria P. Naval who is now beyond the reach of criminal and civil liability — all because the defendant Hon. Adriano R. Villamor was bent backwards with his eyes and mind wilfully closed under these circumstances which demanded the scrutiny of the judicial mind and discretion from bias, . . .

Par. 14. By the standard of a public official and a private person the conduct of defendant Honorable Judge — not only shocking, but appalling — in giving the plaintiff before his court the run-around is at the very least distasteful, distressing and mortifying and moral damages therefor would warrant on this kind of reprehensible behavior . . . .

Par. 15. That the aforecited manifestly malicious actuations, defendant judge should also visit upon him . . . for reducing plaintiff his agonizing victim of his disdain and contempt for the

former who not only torn asunder and spurned but also humiliated and spitefully scorned.

The foregoing specially chosen language by George Carlos and Atty. Guerrero is what Dean Pound aptly termed as "Epithetical Jurisprudence". And to paraphrase then Chief Justice Bengzon in Lagumbay v. Comelec (16 SCRA 175) the employment of intemperate language serves no purpose but to detract the force of the argument. That is to put as its mildest a well-deserved reproach to such propensity. A member of the bar who has given vent to such expressions of ill will, not to say malevolence, betrays gross disrespect not only to the adverse party, but also to this Tribunal (Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, 31 SCRA 1).

These epithets undermines (sic) the dignity of the court. It (sic) affronts its majesty and puts (sic) it in disrepute and disrespect. Not only are they unfounded and unsubstantiated. They constitute direct contempt or contempt in facie curiae summarily punishable without hearing.

The Court finds George Carlos and Atty. Antonio T. Guerrero GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Direct Contempt of Court and sentences both to an imprisonment of five (5) days and to pay a fine of Five Hundred (P500.00) Pesos.

xxx xxx xxx

Carlos and Atty. Guerrero afterwards went to this Court on a petition for certiorari with a prayer for preliminary injunction against Judge Villamor. On November 13, 1989, this Court, in G.R. No. 82238-42, promulgated a decision annulling the contempt order 10.

On March 8, 1990, Atty. Guerrero filed this instant case. Eight months later, Carlos followed with his complaint.

Complainant Atty. Guerrero, joined for the most part by complainant Carlos, alleged that the respondent judge issued the contempt order (a) as an incident of Criminal Case Nos. N-989 to N-993 which have long been terminated, (b) without informing them of the charge, (c) without a hearing, or at least a show cause order to determine whether their alleged contemptuous utterances constitute direct or indirect contempt, and (d) without following the prescription of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court on contempt. Complainant Atty. Guerrero adds that the supporting cases cited by the respondent in his order — referring to Lagumbay vs. COMELEC 11 and Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel 12 are contextually not at all in point. Thus, it is contended that respondent is ignorant of the law and/or has knowingly rendered an unjust judgment. It is also contended that respondent stands liable for serious misconduct for adjudging complainants guilty of direct contempt despite their non-presence in court. 13

In his comment, respondent submits that the various reverses encountered by the complainants before his court and the appellate courts impelled them to institute their complaint as a measure of harassment. 14 He, however, anchors his defense on the following terse line: What happened was an error in judgment. 15 In connection with this main posture, respondent submitted a Manifestation of Supervening Supreme Court Decision 16, attaching therewith a copy of the decision promulgated on November 13, 1991 by this Court in the consolidated cases of Hon. Judge Adriano Villamor vs. Hon. Judge Bernardo LI. Salas & George Carlos and Hon. Judge Adriano Villamor vs. Antonio Guerrero & Hon. Peary G. Aleonar 17. In the decision, this Court said:

Nowhere in this Court's decision annulling Judge Villamor's order of direct contempt (G.R. Nos. 82238-42, November 13, 1989) can there be found a declaration that the erroneous order was rendered maliciously or with conscious and deliberate intent to commit an injustice. In fact, a previous order of direct contempt issued by Judge Villamor against Carlos' former counsel was sustained by this Court (Jaynes C. Abbarientos, et al. vs. Judge Villamor, G.R. No. 82237, June 1, 1988).

At most, the order of direct contempt which we nullified may only be considered an error of judgment for which Judge Villamor may not be held criminally or civilly liable to the respondents.

A judge is not liable for an erroneous decision in the absence of malice or wrongful conduct in rendering it (Barroso vs. Arche, 67 SCRA 161).

Investigating Justice Garcia recommends the dismissal of the complaints against respondent judge. This Court agrees with this recommendation.

With regard to the charge of malfeasance, misfeasance, neglect of duty, or misconduct, complainants have not established a prima-facie case against respondent judge. After a careful examination of the records of this case, the Court concurs with the findings of the investigating Justice that the acts or omission allegedly constituting any of these offenses have either not been spelled out with definite specificity, or the causal connection between the given act/omission and the resulting offense/s not logically demonstrated.

The other charges, namely ignorance of the law and issuing an unjust judgment, deserve consideration, since the direct contempt order of the respondent judge, under the attending circumstances it was issued, appears to be clearly erroneous. The supposedly contemptuous language used in a pleading was not submitted to respondent, but filed in another court presided by another judge stationed in Cebu literally miles away from where respondent holds court in Leyte. As this Court ruled in Ang vs. Castro: 18

Use of disrespectful or contemptuous language against a particular judge in pleadings presented in another court or proceeding is indirect, not direct,

contempt as it is not tantamount to a misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice.

However, administrative liability for ignorance of the law and/or knowingly rendering an unjust judgment does not immediately arise from the bare fact of a judge issuing a decision/resolution/order later adjudged to be erroneous. 19 Otherwise, perhaps no judge, however competent, honest or dedicated he may be, can ever hope to retire from the judiciary with an unblemished record. 20

For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation of the judge in the performance of official duties must not only be found erroneous but, most importantly, it must also be established that he was moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred, or some other like motive. 21 Similarly, a judge will be held administratively liable for rendering an unjust judgment — one which is contrary to law or jurisprudence or is not supported by evidence — when he acts in bad faith, malice, revenge or some other similar motive. In fine, bad faith is the ground for liability in either or both offenses. 22

Conversely, a charge for either ignorance of the law or rendering an unjust judgment will not prosper against a judge acting in good faith. Absent the element of bad faith, an erroneous judgment cannot be the basis of a charge for any said offenses, mere error of judgment not being a ground for disciplinary proceedings.

From the record before us we agree with the finding of the investigating Justice that respondent, in issuing his erroneous contempt order, was not moved by ill-will or by an impulse to do an injustice. To be sure, complainants have not presented evidence or offered logical arguments tending to show that bad faith accompanied the issuance of the contempt order. It ought to be remembered that bad faith is not presumed and he who alleges the same has the onus of proving it. In this regard, complainants have not discharged that burden of proof sufficiently.

Should a circumstance tend to becloud the bona fides of respondent's actuation, it could only refer to the strained relationship existing between him and complainants brought about by the cumulative effect of the reverses Carlos encountered in respondent's sala, on one hand, and the filing by complainant Carlos, through Atty. Guerrero, of the damage suit against respondent, on the other. 23 The text of the contempt order, however, yields no indication that respondent, in mistakenly citing complainants for direct contempt, was prevailed upon by personal animosity or by a desire to exact revenge. On the contrary, respondent stressed in his order that he observed "maximum tolerance" in dealing with complainants, previous legal skirmishes notwithstanding.

The fact that respondent did not accord complainants a hearing nor informed them beforehand of the charges relative to the contempt incident cannot, without more, be indicative of bad faith or malice. For, respondent labored under the impression, mistaken as it turned out to be,

that complainants committed an act constituting direct contempt summarily punishable. 24 Assuming, as respondent did assume, that complainants did indeed commit an act punishable by direct contempt, then a formal hearing would hardly be necessary.

Needless to underscore, the utilization by respondent of the long-terminated criminal cases as the vehicle for his contempt order formed a part of his error. Bad faith, however, cannot be inferred from this particular error, per se.

Incidentally, the invocation in the contempt order of the cases Lagumbay and Cloribel is not at all misplaced as complainants now urge. To be sure, respondent cited these cases not so much to support the propriety of the contempt order as to accentuate the pernicious effect of the use of intemperate language in pleadings on the orderly administration of justice.

In all, the assailed act of the respondent judge appears to be a case of error of judgment not subject to disciplinary action. The decision of this Court in the consolidated cases of Hon. Judge Adriano Villamor vs. Hon. Judge Bernardo Ll. Salas & George Carlos and Hon. Judge Adriano Villamor vs. Antonio Guerrero & Hon. Peary G. Aleonar 25 concedes as much. In the decision, this Court held:

At most, the order of direct contempt which we nullified may only be considered as error of judgment for, which Judge Villamor may not be held criminally or civilly liable to the respondents [herein complainants].

While the quoted portion of the foregoing ruling speaks only of exemption from criminal or civil liability, there is no reason not to include from its reach administrative liability as well. After all, this Court had occasion to rule that:

[A] judge may not be administratively charged for mere errors of judgment in the absence of showing of any bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose. 26

Moreover, it is settled that judges cannot be held to account criminally, civilly, or administratively for an erroneous decision rendered by them in good faith. 27

In sum, there is no legal basis nor convincing evidence, to support the proposition that the respondent judge, in issuing his controversial contempt order, acted in bad faith or with ill-will or malice as to justify holding him liable for an error in judgment.

WHEREFORE, herein administrative complaints against Judge Adriano Villamor are hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-33037-42 August 17, 1983

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant vs. DEMETRIO JARDIN, accused-appellee.

The Solicitor-General for plaintiff-appellant.

Marcos C. Lucero, Jr. for accused-appellee.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Two constitutional rights—speedy trial and freedom from double jeopardy—are interposed as defenses by the accused in this petition for review on certiorari.

The petitioner asks us to review and annul the orders of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch V, which dismissed the criminal cases against accuse Demetrio Jardin because his constitutional right to speedy trial was allegedly violated.

The criminal prosecutions originated from a letter complaint of the Provincial Auditor of Quezon requesting the Provincial Fiscal to file the necessary criminal action under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code against Demetrio Jardin for malversation of public funds thru falsification of public documents on six counts.

The cases were assigned to Assistant Fiscal Meliton V. Angeles who set them for preliminary investigation.The accused moved to postpone the investigation twice. On the third time that the investigation was re-set, the accused and his counsel failed to appear.

On the fourth resetting, the accused and his counsel again failed to appear. Inspire of their absence, the preliminary investigation was conducted and shortly afterwards, six informations were filed against the accused before the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch II, docketed as Cases Nos. 16052 (0043-M), 16053 (0044-M), 16054 (0045-ML 16055 (0046-M), 16056 (0047-M), and 16057 (0048-M). The arraignment was set for May 9, 1967.

The records show that from May 9, 1967, the arraignment was re-set for June 6; then re-set for June 26; then from August 16, the same was re-set for September 5, all because of the motions for postponement filed at the instance of the accused. (Original records [0043-M] pp. 54, 61, 66 and 69).

When the arraignment of the accused was called on September 5, 1967, counsel for the accused verbally moved for reinvestigation on the ground that the accused was not given the opportunity to present his defense during the preliminary investigation. This was granted by the court and the first reinvestigation was set on November 24, 1967. On this date, however,

the Investigating Fiscal motu proprio postponed said reinvestigation due to the non-appearance of accused and his counsel and re-set the date for December 21, 1967.

A series of postponements was again filed by the accused causing further. delays of the reinvestigation. On June 27, 1968, accused and his counsel appeared together but requested for a period of fifteen (15) days within which to file a memorandum.

In view of the expiration of the 15-day period, the Investigating Fiscal filed a manifestation before the court that the records of these cases be returned and the trial on the merits of the same be set.

The court without acting on said manifestation, issued an order transferring the six (6) cases to the new branch (Branch V) of the Court of First Instance at Mauban, Quezon. Upon receipt by the latter of the records of these cases, the arraignment and trial were set for December 3, 1968.

On the latter date, the counsel for the accused sought again the postponement of the arraignment and this was followed by more postponements, all at the instance of the accused. (Original records, [0043-M] pp. 90,93,120 and 125).

On March 31, 1969, counsel for the accused moved for the postponement of the arraignment and requested the court that the records be returned again to the Office of the Fiscal for further reinvestigation. This was granted and the reinvestigation was again set for May 5, 1969. The accused and his counsel, however, failed to appear and thus, the said reinvestigation was re-set for June 2, 1969. On this date, counsel for accused requested that he be given five (5) days within which to file a written sworn statement of the accused which would constitute the defense of the latter, subject to the cross-examination of the Investigating Fiscal.

Considering the fact that the period to file such sworn statement had already expired without anything being filed, the records of the cases were returned to the court which set said cases for arraignment and trial on September 2, 1970. On this date, the accused again moved for postponement.

When these cases were called for arraignment on September 8, 1970, Demetrio Jardin, pleaded not guilty to the crime as charged, after which he requested that the trial be postponed and re-set for September 29, 1970.

On September 29, 1970, the trial scheduled on that day was postponed again on motion of counsel for the accused. The trial was re-set for October 12, 1970, with notice to both parties.

On October 12, 1970, when the said criminal cases were called for hearing, no one appeared for the prosecution, except a state witness, Mr. Cesar Alcala of the Provincial Auditor's office who remained silent during the proceedings.

Invoking his client's constitutional right to speedy trial and seizing the opportunity to take advantage of the prosecution's failure to appear on that day, the defense counsel moved for the dismissal of the cases. The respondent court granted the oral motion for dismissal "for reasons of constitutional rights of the accused Demetrio Jardin. "

Two questions are now raised by the People in this appeal:

I. Considering the factual setting in the criminal cases at bar, was the respondent Court correct in dismissing the cases and in predicating the dismissal on the right of the defendant to a speedy trial?

II. Does the present appeal place the respondent accuse in double jeopardy?

The respondent court committed a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the cases and in basing the dismissal on the constitutional right of the accused to speedy trial. The right to a speedy trial means that the accused is free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, its salutary objective being to assure that an innocent person may be free from anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatever legitimate defense he may interpose. (See Andres v. Cacdac, 113 SCRA 216)

[From a perusal of the facts, it is readily seen that all the delays in the prosecution of the cases were caused by the accused himself.] All the postponements of proceedings were made at his instance and for his behalf. Hence, the constitutional right to a speedy trial afforded to an accused by our Constitution cannot be invoked. From the start of the preliminary investigation of the cases up to the trial on the merits, the accused always managed to delay the proceedings through postponements and requests for reinvestigation. [It would, therefore, be a mockery of the criminal justice system if the accused would be allowed to benefit from his own wrongdoings or tactical maneuvers intended to frustrate the administration of justice. By his own deliberate acts, he is deemed to have waived or abandoned his right to a speedy trial. In the case of Andres v. Cacdac, 113 SCRA 216, we ruled:]

In this case, however, there was a waiver or abandonment of the right to a speedy trial in the first case when the herein petitioners sought and obtained several postponements of the trial: first, when they asked for the deferment of the arraignment because the accused Ladislao Tacipit was not present; second, when they asked for the postponement of the trial for March 5, 1968 upon the ground that they have requested the Provincial Fiscal of Cagayan for a reinvestigation of the case; and finally, when they agreed, with the prosecution, to postpone the hearing set for November 28, 1968 to January 4, 1969..

The dismissal of the criminal cases against the accused by the respondent court on the ground that his right to speedy trial had beer violated was devoid of factual and legal basis. The order

denying the motion for reconsideration is similarly infirm. There being no basis for the questioned orders, they are consequently null and void.

Would a reinstatement of the dismissed cases place the accused in double jeopardy?

In order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure to the benefit of an accused, the following requisites must be present in the first prosecution: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a competent court; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. (Rule 117, Section 9, Rules of Court; People v. Ledesma, 73 SCRA 77). The last requisite assumes a valid acquittal and a valid acquittal presupposes a valid judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction. Since in the instant cases, the dismissal was void for having been issued without legal basis, it follows that the acquittal brought about by the dismissal is also void. Hence, no jeopardy can attach from such acquittal. The act of respondent judge in discussing the cases amounted to lack of jurisdiction which would prevent double jeopardy from attaching. In the case of People v. Court of appeals (10 1 SCRA 450) we ruled:

Private respondents further argue that a judgment of acquittal ends the case which cannot be appealed nor reopened, otherwise, they would be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense. That is the general rule and presupposes a valid judgment. As earlier pointed out, however, respondent Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. (Comia v. Nicolas, 29 SCRA 492 [1969]) By it no rights are divested Through it, no rights can be attains & Being worthless, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void. (Gomez v. Concepcion, 47 Phil. 717, 722.[1925]; Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663, 685 [1968]; Parades v. Moya, 61 SCRA 526, [1974]). ...

We also note that the dismissall of the criminal cases was upon motion and with the wxpress consent of respondent Demetrio Jardin. For double jeopardy to attach, the general rule is that the dismissal of the case must be without the express consent of the accused. (People v. Salico, 84 Phil. 722; People v. Obsania, 23 SCRA 1249; People v. Pilpa, 79 SCRA 81; and People v. Cuevo, 104 SCRA 312).

If the accused had been denied his right to speedy trial or if some other basic right had been impaired, the doctrine of waiver of the right to invoke double jeopardy would not apply even if the accused had expressly moved for the termination of proceedings. In the instant case, however, the defendant had deliberately used all the available dilatory tactics he could utilize and abused the principle that the accused must be given every opportunity to disprove the criminal charge. The doctrine of double jeopardy was never intended for this purpose.

Even as we rule that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion, we also rebuke the attorneys for both the defense and the prosecution and to a certain extent, the court itself because of the breach of duties to the courts and to the administration of justice apparent in this case.

The duties of an attorney found in Rule 138, Section 20 include: -

xxx xxx xxx

(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means only as are consistent with truth and honor,...

xxx xxx xxx

(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or proceeding, or delay any man's cause, from any corrupt motive or interest.

xxx xxx xxx

The dilatory tactics of the defense counsel and the failure of both the judge and the fiscal to take effective counter measures to obviate the delaying acts constitute obstruction of justice.

As aptly stared:

12.09 Obstructing the administration of justice

An attorney as an officer of the court is called upon to assist in the due administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is an instrument to advance its cause. (Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel, G.R. No. 11071, Jan. 9, 1972, 31 SCRA 1; In re Climaco, G.R. Adm. Case No. 134-J, Jan. 21, 1974, 55 SCRA 107) For this reason, any act on the part of a lawyer that obstructs, perverts or impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct and justifies disciplinary action against him. (Cantorne vs. Ducasin 57 Phil, 23 [1932]; De los Santos vs. Sagalongos 69 Phil. 406 [1940]).

Acts which amount to obstruction in the administration of justice may take many forms. They include such acts as instructing a complaining witness in a criminal action not to appear at the scheduled hearing so that the case against the client, the accused, would be dismissed. (Cantorne vs. Ducasin supra) asking a client to plead guilty to a crime which the lawyer knows his client did not commit, (Nueno v. Santos, 58 Phil. 557 [1933]) advising a client who is detained for a crime to escape from prison, (Cf. Medina v. Yan, G.R. No. 30978, Sept. 30, 1974) employing dilatory tactics to frustrate satisfaction of clearly valid claims, Pajares vs. Abad Santos, G.R. No. 29543, Nov. 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 748) prosecuting clearly

frivolous cases or appeals to drain the resources of the other party and compel him to submit out of exhaustion (Samar Mining Co. vs. Arnado, G.R. No. 22304. July 30, 1968) and filing multiple petitions or complaints for a cause that has been previously rejected in the false expectation of getting favorable action. (Gabriel vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 43757, July 30, 1976, 72 SCRA 173; Ramos vs. Potenciano, G.R. No. 27104, Dec. 20, 1976, 74 SCRA 345; Macias v. Uy Kim, G.R. No. 31174, May 30, 1972, 45 SCRA 251) Acts of this or similar nature are grounds for disciplinary action." Agpalo Legal Ethics, U.P. Law Center, 1980 Edition, pp. 405-406)

The invocation of constitutional rights by the private respondent is without merit.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned orders of the respondent court are hereby SET ASIDE. Criminal Cases Nos. 0043-M, 0044-M, 0045-M, 0046M, 0047-M, and 0048-M are reinstated and the proper regional trial court is ordered to proceed with all deliberate speed in these cases.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 3923. March 30, 1993.

CONCORDIA B. GARCIA, complainant, vs. ATTY. CRISANTO L. FRANCISCO, respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL ETHICS; MISCONDUCT OF COUNSEL; VIOLATION OF OATH NOT DELAY ANY MAN OR MONEY OR MALICE; SUSPENSION FOR ONE YEAR FROM PRACTICE OF LAW FOR GROSS ABUSE OF RIGHT OF RECOURSE TO THE COURTS BY ARGUING A CAUSE THAT IS OBVIOUSLY WITHOUT MERIT. — The cause of the respondent's client is obviously without merit. The respondent was aware of this fact when he wilfully resorted to the gambits summarized above, continuously seeking relief that was consistently denied, as he should have expected . . . By grossly abusing his right of recourse to the courts for the purpose of arguing a cause that had been repeatedly rebuffed, he was disdaining the obligation of the lawyer to maintain only such actions or proceedings as appear to him to be just and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law. By violating his oath not to delay any man for money or malice, he has besmirched the name of an honorable profession and has proved himself unworthy of the trust reposed in him by law as an officer of the Court . . . For this serious transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he deserves to be sanctioned, not only as a punishment for his misconduct but also as a warning to other lawyers who may be influenced by his example. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED for ONE YEAR from the practice of law and from the enjoyment of all the rights and privileges appurtenant to membership of the Philippine bar.

R E S O L U T I O N

PER CURIAM, p:

In a sworn complaint filed with the Court on October 6, 1992, Concordia B. Garcia seeks the disbarment of Atty. Crisanto L. Francisco.

On March 9, 1964, Concordia B. Garcia and her husband Godofredo, the Dionisio spouses, and Felisa and Magdalena Baetiong leashed a parcel of land to Sotero Baluyot Lee for a period of 25 years beginning May 1, 1964. Despite repeated verbal and written demands, Lee refused to vacate after the expiration of the lease. Lee claimed that he had an option to extend the lease for another 5 years and the right of pre-emption over the property.

In this disbarment case, the complainant claims that Lee's counsel, respondent Francisco, commenced various suits before different courts to thwart Garcia's right to regain her property and that all these proceedings were decided against Lee. The proceedings stemmed from the said lease contract and involved the same issues and parties, thus violating the proscription against forum-shopping.

Respondent, in his comment, says that he inserted in defense of his client's right only such remedies as were authorized by law.

The tangle of recourses employed by Francisco is narrated as follows:

1. On March 29, 1989, Lee, through Francisco, filed a complaint against Garcia and the other lessors for specific performance and reconveyance with damages in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. This was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-2118. On June 9, 1989, Garcia filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of failure to state a cause of action, laches and prescription. The case was dismissed by Judge Felimon Mendoza on August 10, 1989.

2. On May 29, 1989, Garcia and the other lessors filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Lee in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 1455. Through Francisco, Lee filed an answer alleging as special and affirmative defense the pendency of Civil Case no. Q-89-2118 in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On September 5, 1989, Judge Marcelino Bautista issued a resolution rejecting this allegation on the ground that the issues before the two courts were separate and different.

3. On October 24, 1989, Lee, through Francisco, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction against Judge Bautista, Garcia and the other lessors. This was docketed as civil Case No. Q-89-3833. In filing this petition, Francisco knew or should have known that it violated the Rule on Summary Procedure prohibiting the filing of petitions for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the court.

Francisco claims that what he appealed to the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. Q-89-3833 was the denial of his prayer for dismissal of Civil Case No. 1455. This is not true. Civil Case Q-89-3833 was clearly a special civil action and not an appeal.

On November 13, 1989, Judge Abraham Vera issued an order enjoining Judge Bautista from proceeding with the trial of the unlawful detainer case. Upon motion of the complainant, however, the injunction was set aside and Civil Case No. Q-89-3833 was dismissed on January 9, 1990. Lee did not appeal.

4. On April 6, 1990, Lee through Francisco, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals against Judge Vera, Judge Singzon, Garcia and the other lessors. Docketed as CA G.R. Sp No. 20476, the petition assailed the January 9, 1990 order of Judge Vera dismissing Civil Case No. Q-89-3833. On May 31, 1989, the petition was denied.

5. On June 14, 1990, Judge Singzon decided Civil Case no. 1455 in favor of complainant Garcia and the other lessors. Lee did not appeal. Instead, on, June 21, 1990, through Francisco again, he filed a petition against Judge Singzon and the other lessors for certiorari and annulment of the decision in Civil Case No. 1455 and damages with prayer for issuance of preliminary injunction. This was docketed as Civil case No. 90-5852 in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 98, presided by Judge Cesar C. Paralejo.

In Francisco's comment before us, he alleges that Civil Case No. Q-90-5852 is an appeal from the unlawful detainer case. Again, he lies. Civil Case No. Q-90-5852 was a specified civil action and not an appeal.

On July 2, 1990, Garcia's group filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 90-5852. On July 13, 1990, Judge Paralejo issued an order enjoining Judge Singzon from enforcing the decision in that case. Garcia attacked this order in a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction docketed as CA Sp. No. 22392. The petition was granted by the Court of Appeals on September 19, 1991, on the ground that the judgment in the unlawful detainer case had come final and executory as June 30, 1990.

6. On September 24, 1991, Garcia filed a motion for execution in the unlawful detainer case. On September 27, 1991, Lee, through Francisco, filed a motion to inhibit Judge Singzon and to defer the hearing of the motion. A writ of execution was nonetheless issued by Judge Singzon on October 8, 1991.

7. Two days later, Lee, through Francisco, filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order against the Court of Appeals, Judge Singzon, Garcia and the other lessors. This Court denied the petition on January 27, 1992, and reconsideration on April 8, 1992.

8. Finally, Lee, still through Francisco, filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction against Judge Singzon, Garcia and the other lessors in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to set aside and declare the writs of execution in Civil Case No. 1455. This was dismissed on August 4, 1992, and Lee, through Francisco, filed a motion for reconsideration. According to Francisco, he was relieved as counsel while this motion was pending.

A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client but not at the expense of truth and the administration of justice.

The cause of the respondent's client in obviously without merit. The respondent was aware of this fact when he wilfully resorted to the gambits summarized above, continuously seeking relief that was consistently denied, as he should have expected. He thereby added to the already clogged dockets of the courts and wasted their valuable time. He also caused much inconvenience and expense to the complainant, who was obliged to defend herself against his every move.

By grossly abusing his right of recourse to the courts for the purpose of arguing a cause that had been repeatedly rebuffed, he was disdaining the obligation of the lawyer to maintain only such actions or proceedings as appear to him to be just and such defense only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law. By violating his oath not to delay any man for money or malice, he has besmirched the name of an honorable profession and has proved himself unworthy of trust reposed in him by law as an officer of the Court.

Atty. Crisanto l. Francisco took his oath as a lawyer on March 2, 1956. Considering his age and experience in the practice of the laws, he should have known better than to trifle with it and to use it as an instrument for harassment of the complainant and the misuse of judicial processes. For this serious transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he deserves to be sanctioned, not only as punishment for his misconduct but also as a warning to other lawyers who may be influenced by his example.

Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED for ONE YEAR from the practice of law and from the enjoyment of all the rights and privileges appurtenant to membership in the Philippine bar.

Let a copy of this Resolution be served immediately on the respondent and circularized to all courts and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-38377 October 15, 1975

CAPT. CONRADO M. CABAGUI, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS THIRD DIVISION, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents, EUGENIO M. MILLADO, respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

TEEHANKEE, J.:

The Court finds respondent, Attorney Eugenio M. Millado, guilty of gross negligence in not having complied with a "show cause" resolution and of abusing the right of recourse to the Court by filing multiple petitions for the same cause in the false expectation of getting favorable action from one division as against the adverse action of the other division. The Court deems his suspension from the practice of law since February, 1975 as sufficient penalty and now lifts his suspension with the warning that the commission in the future by respondent of the same or other infractions shall be dealt with severely.

Under its Resolution of November 20, 1974, the Court, acting on a third petition for review of a Court of Appeals decision affirming petitioner's conviction of the crime of malversation of public funds, as filed on November 13, 1974 by his attorney, Eugenio M. Millado, with address at Koronadal, South Cotabato, ordered that said petition be expunged from the records and required "Atty. Eugenio Millado to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from notice hereof why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for trifling with the Court by filing this third petition despite previous resolutions of this Court." In its previous Resolution of May 8, 1974 referring to the first two petitions filed by respondent Millado on behalf of the same petitioner,

1 the Court had dismissed the second petition (filed on March 18, 1974) by respondent Millado in the guise of a new petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction but which merely raised again the same questions in his first petition (filed on January 9, 1974) seeking to set aside petitioner's conviction for malversation of public funds, by decision of the court of first instance of Misamis Oriental dated June 20, 1963 as affirmed with modification by the Court of Appeals' decision dated June 8, 1973, for alleged lack of jurisdiction and praying for reversal of the conviction or for a reduction of his criminal liability by finding appellant-petitioner guilty of technical malversation only for the amount of P1,161.65. Said first petition had been denied on January 15, 1974 by virtue of the petition having been filed late by 4 months and 25 days beyond the last date for filing which fell due since August 15, 1973. The Court therein reiterated its warning to litigants and counsels against the filing of multiple petitions for the same cause in the false expectation of getting favorable action from one division as against the adverse action of the other division, since "such conduct would tend to trifle with the Court and impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of justice," as follows:

In a similar case (L-37411, Teodoro Fojas vs. CA), the Court per its resolution of March 20, 1974 admonished that "(L)itigants and their counsels are warned under pain of contempt and disciplinary action that a party who has already failed to have a decision of the Court of Appeals set aside through a petition for review by certiorari with the denial of his petition (by the First Division to which such petitions for review are assigned under the Court's standing resolution of November 15, 1973) should not under the guise of a special civil action file a

second petition for the same purpose of setting aside the same Court of Appeals' decision to be acted upon by the Second Division (to which special civil actions are assigned under the Court's resolution of November 15, 1973), and vice-versa, for such conduct would tend to trifle with the Court and impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of justice." 2

For failure on the part of respondent to submit the explanation required under the Court's Resolution of November 20, 1974, notwithstanding the lapse on January 3, 1975 of the period therein given him, the Court per its Resolution of February 7, 1975 resolved to suspend respondent from the practice of law effective immediately and until further action in the premises.

On April 14, 1975, respondent filed his "Petition for Relief from Resolutions and Compliance" pleading inter alia "mistake and/or excusable negligence" for his failure to take note of and attend to the filing of the explanation required in the Court's Resolution of November 20, 1974 and that he was seeking to render "optimum legal service" to petitioner and "to exhaust all remaining legal remedies." He added with reference to the third petition that "if, however, there is any portion thereof that can suggest that its filing trifles with this Honorable Court, he respectfully begs the indulgence and tolerance thereof, and he condescendingly (sic) APOLOGIZES therefor, respectfully assuring that he will be more cautious hereafter." 3

The Court set the petition for relief for hearing on June 2,1975 on which date it heard respondent and further granted him time to submit his memorandum.

In respondent's memorandum filed on June 27, 1975, he again urges that at either of his three petitions be given due course, notwithstanding that he well knows that the Court's Resolutions denying and dismissing the first two petitions have long become final and entries of judgment made since March 12, 1974 and May 13, 1974, respectively, and that his third petition was ordered expunged from the records, i.e. stricken from the records and therefore considered non-existent. Respondent's interjection of the same irrelevant matter here denotes either a stubborn refusal to comprehend or abide by the Court's injunction that he cannot be filing one petition after another for the same cause or worse a deliberate attempt to drag out the case and impede the execution of the judgment of conviction against his client which had become final and executory since August 15, 1973, date of finality of the Court of Appeals' decision of June 8, 1973 affirming the conviction. Such misconduct on the part of a member of the bar cannot be tolerated.

The Court thus finds that respondent was grossly negligent, to say the least, in failing to comply within the required period with the Court's Resolution requiring him to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for filing multiple petitions for the same cause notwithstanding the Court's previous adverse resolutions. His original period to file the required explanation expired on January 3, 1975 and more than a month elapsed thereafter without his having done anything until the Court took note thereof on February 7, 1975 and

ordered his suspension. As already indicated, the Court also finds respondent's explanation for his having filed multiple petitions one after the other to be unsatisfactory and untenable.

Considering, however, that respondent has been under suspension since the Court's Resolution of February 7, 1975, since after respondent filed his belated compliance, the Court as per its Resolution of April 21, 1975 ordered that respondent remain under suspension until it could hear the matter on the merits, the Court is inclined to view with liberality respondent's plea that "he has been sufficiently punished" and that "his suspension ... is substantial enough as to make him improve his professional service to his client and duties to the bench ..." The Court will thus consider the suspension so far served by respondent as sufficient penalty for the serious infractions committed by him..

ACCORDINGLY, respondent's suspension from the practice of law is lifted effective as of the promulgation of this Resolution with the warning that the commission in the future by respondent of the same infractions or other violations of his duties as a lawyer shall be dealt with severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be circularized to all the courts and entered in respondent's personal record.

G.R. No. L-26694 December 18, 1973

NELITA MORENO VDA. DE BACALING, petitioner, vs. HECTOR LAGUNA, HON. VALERION ROVIRA, Judge, Court of First Instance and HON. JUDGE ROSENDO BALTAZAR, Judge, City Court of Iloilo, respondents.

Nicanor D. Sorongon for petitioner.

Apeles L. Padilla for respondents.

ESGUERRA, J.:

I.

Nature of the Case

The petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari with preliminary injunction to annul an Order of Hon. Rosendo Baltazar, as Judge of the City Court of Iloilo, dated June 30, 1966, ordering the demolition of the residential house of petitioner. 1 Assailed likewise is an Order, dated August 25, 1966, of Hon. Valerio V. Rovira, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, stationed at Iloilo City, approving said demolition. 2

II.

Facts of the Case

The record of this case discloses the following facts:

Private respondent Hector Laguda is the registered owner of a residential land known as lot No. 3508 situated at La Paz, Iloilo City 3 many years back, petitioner and her late husband, Dr. Ramon Bacaling, with the acquiescence of private respondent Laguda, constructed a residential house on a portion of said lot fronting Huevana Street, paying a monthly rental of P80.00. 4 Unable to pay the lease rental from July 1959 to September 1961, totalling P2,160.00, an action for ejectment (Civil Case No. 6823) was filed by private respondent Laguda against petitioner in her capacity as judicial administratrix of the estate of her late husband, Dr. Bacaling, in the City Court of Iloilo City. 5 The filing of said case spawned various court suits.

Petitioner on July 23, 1962, filed certiorari proceedings in this Court (G.R. No. L-20061) but was dismissed for lack of merit on August 3, 1962. 6 With this setback, petitioner on November 12, 1962, filed with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction (Civil Case No. 6162) but the same was dismissed on December 1, 1962. 7 Unsuccessful in her motion for reconsideration, petitioner went to the Court of Appeals by way of certiorari (CA-G.R. No. 31882-R) but her petition was dismissed by that Court on March 7, 1967. 8

Suffering from these series of legal reverses, the petitioner entered into a compromise agreement on July 29, 1964, with private respondent Laguda relative to Civil Case No. 6823. 9 Said agreement inter alia, provides as follows:

1. Defendant (petitioner herein) agreed to vacate the premises and remove ... the residential house therefrom ... before December 31, 1966;

2. For the use and occupation ... of the said premises ... from June 1964 to December 31, 1969, the said defendant will pay plaintiff a monthly rent ... of Eighty (P80.00) Pesos per calendar month ...;

3. Upon failure of defendant to comply with any ... provision of the amicable settlement within ... fifty (50) days ... the plaintiff shall be entitled to "immediate execution to restore plaintiff in possession of the premises and to recover all the unpaid monthly rents from June 1, 1964 until said premises are vacated" by defendant;

4. Defendant "waive her right, under Sec. 6, Rule 39, Rules of Court, to bar enforcement of the execution of the judgment in the case at anytime within one year from December 31, 1969".

In a decision dated July 30, 1964, the City Court of Iloilo City approved the amicable settlement and enjoined the parties to comply with its terms. For failure of the petitioner to satisfy the conditions of the settlement within the 50-day period, private respondent Laguda moved for execution which the Court granted on July 7, 1965. 10

On July 14, 1965, petitioner moved for reconsideration to quash the writ of execution, but before the Court could resolve the motion, petitioner on July 19, 1965, served notice of her intention to take the case to the Court of Appeals. 11 Meanwhile on July 23, 1965, respondent Laguda filed an opposition to the petitioner's July 14, 1965, motion, alleging that as judicial administratrix as of July 29, 1964, she was legally authorized to enter into the amicable settlement which was the basis of the decision dated July 30, 1964, of the City Court of Iloilo sought to be executed and, therefore, her act was binding upon the present judicial administrator, Atty. Roberto Dineros, who replaced petitioner upon her discharge as such on November 28, 1964. 12

Denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration and to quash writ of execution on September 30, 1965, the City Court however, held in abeyance the enforcement of the alias writ of execution until the Court of First Instance of Iloilo stamped its imprimatur considering the pendency of Special Proceedings No. 1469 and of the fact that the properties involved therein are in custodia legis. 13 Thereafter, on October 25, 1965, private respondent Laguda moved the Court of First Instance of Iloilo in Special Proceedings No. 1469 for the approval of the City Court's order of execution which was granted despite petitioner's opposition. 14 With the denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration on December 4, 1965, a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction was brought before the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 36939-R) which dismissed the same on January 18, 1966. 15

On April 14, 1966, the respondent City Judge of Iloilo City issued an alias writ of execution upon representations of private respondent Laguda, copies of which were served sheriff upon the petitioner and Atty. Roberto Dineros in his capacity as judicial administrator of the estate of the deceased, Dr. Ramon Bacaling, in Special Proceedings No. 1469. 16

On June 30, 1966, a Special Order of Demolition was issued by the respondent City Judge upon motion of private respondent Laguda and over petitioner's opposition, subject, however, to the approval of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo in Special Proceedings No. 1469. 17 Upon the denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration, respondent Laguda on July 12, 1966, filed a manifestation in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo in Special Proceedings No. 1469, praying for the confirmation of the Order to demolish the house under custodia legis. 18

On August 4, 1966, petitioner interposed an opposition alleging:

1. That she was no longer in control of the estate funds when the stipulated obligations in the amicable settlement became due and payable;

2. That the residential house to be demolished is worth P35,000.00 for which she is entitled to reimbursement as a builder in good faith, in addition to reasonable expenses they may incur in transferring the same to another place; and

3. That the guardian ad litem of the minor children was not notified of the motion for the issuance of an order of demolition; 19

On August 25, 1966, respondent Laguda by way of reply disputed petitioner's claim and supported the legality of the court's ruling. 20 On the same date, the probate court in Special Proceedings No. 1469 approved the order of demolition of the house in controversy. 21 Impugning the said Order as violative of the provisions of Sec. 14, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, and of the constitutional mandate on due process, petitioner moved to reconsider the same but the motion was denied by the Court on September 26, 1966. 22 Frustrated in her effort to set aside the Order of Demolition, petitioner brought this present action of certiorari with preliminary injunction. Upon giving due course to the petition, this Court issued a temporary restraining order on October 21, 1966, to prevent the enforcement of the order of demolition in Special Proceedings No. 1469 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, but when served upon the respondents, the building in question was already partially demolished. 23 Upon petitioner's posting a bond of P1,000.00, this Court on November 10, 1966, issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the herein respondents from proceeding with the order of demolition, until further orders. 24

III.

Issues of the Case

The issues raised in the instant petition boil down to the following:

1. Whether or not the acts of the petitioner as judicial administratrix prior to her discharge or removal are valid and binding upon her successor;

2. Whether or not petitioner is a builder in good faith and, therefore, entitled to reimbursement, and/or reasonable expenses that may be incurred in transferring the house to another place;

3. Whether or not due process was denied to the minor children of deceased Ramon Bacaling, and petitioner in connection with the motion for the issuance of the order of demolition.

IV.

Discussion

Petitioner claims before this Court that since she was no longer the judicial administratrix of the estate of her late husband, Dr. Ramon Bacaling, and was no longer in control of estate funds when the stipulated obligations in the amicable settlement became due and payable, the special order of demolition could not be enforced.

Such a view is not tenable. Under Section 3, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court, petitioner's lawful acts before the revocation of her letters of administration or before her removal shall have the same validity as if there was no such revocation or removal. It is elementary that the effect of revocation of letters testamentary or of administration is to terminate the authority of the executor or administrator, but the acts of the executor or administrator, done in good faith prior to the revocation of the letters, will be protected, and a similar protection will be extended to rights acquired under a previous grant of administration. 25

In connection with the petitioner's contention that she be considered a builder in good faith and, therefore, entitled to reimbursement in addition to reasonable expenses that may be incurred in transferring the house to another place, the same cannot stand legal scrutiny. The rule is well-settled that lessees, like petitioner, are not possessors in good faith, because they knew that their occupancy of the premises continues only during the life of the lease, and they cannot as a matter of right, recover the value of their improvements from the lessor, much less retain the premises until they are reimbursed. Their rights are governed by Article 1678 of the Civil Code which allows reimbursement of lessees up to one-half of the value of their improvements if the lessor so elects. 26

It is next urged by petitioner that there was a denial of process for failure of private respondent to notify the guardian ad litem of the minor children of the deceased Ramon Bacaling, of the motion for execution.

A perusal of the pleadings yields the conclusion that petitioner failed to meet the burden of demonstrating that there was denial of due process. On the contrary, there is evidence to show that Acting Fiscal Alfonso Illemberger guardian ad litem of the minor children of the late Ramon Bacaling, has been duly apprised of the issuance of the assailed special order to demolish, as shown by the certification of the counsel for petitioner at the foot of his opposition dated August 4, 1966, 27 filed with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, and as also shown by the certification of private respondent's counsel at the foot of his opposition dated September 15, 1966, 28 likewise filed with the same Court.

V.

Conclusion

The petitioner is not entitled to the writ of certiorari. In the case at bar, there is absolutely no showing that the respondent courts acted so "arbitrarily", "despotically" or "capriciously" as to amount to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned orders.

"Grave abuse of discretion" which is a ground for certiorari means "such capricious and arbitrary exercise of judgment as is equivalent, in the eyes of the law, to lack of jurisdiction." 29 Even mere abuse of discretion is not sufficient by itself to justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari. For that purpose the abuse of discretion must be grave and patent, and it must be shown that it was exercised arbitrarily or despotically, which is not the case made out by the present petition. 30

There is something more to be said about the nature and apparent purpose of this case which has its genesis in the case for illegal detainer (Civil Case No. 6823) brought before the Iloilo City Court. What transpired therein presents a glaring example of a summary proceeding which was deliberately protracted and made to suffer undue delay in its disposal. It was originally filed on September 13, 1960; 31 it reached the appellate courts five (5) times, twice before the Court of Appeals 32, Once before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo 33, and twice before this Court. 34 The present petition smacks of a dilatory tactic and a frivolous attempt resorted to by petitioner to frustrate the prompt termination of the ejectment case and to prolong litigation unnecessarily. Such conduct on the part of petitioner and her counsel deserves the vigorous condemnation of this Court, 35 because it evinces a flagrant misuse of the remedy of certiorari which should only be resorted to in case of lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion by a inferior court. A recourse of this kind unduly taxes the energy and patience of courts and simply wastes the precious time that they could well devote to really meritorious cases.

VI.

Judgment

IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the instant petition should be, as it is hereby, dismissed.

The writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court on November 10, 1966, is immediately set aside. 36

Treble costs against the petitioner for the reasons above set forth. 3

ADM. CASE No. 7006 October 9, 2007

RE : SUSPENSION OF ATTY. ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO, FORMER SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR.

D E C I S I O N

AZCUNA, J.:

This administrative case stemmed from the events of the proceedings in Crim. Case No. 5144, entitled People v. Luis Bucalon Plaza, heard before the sala of Presiding Judge Jose Manuel P. Tan, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City, Branch 29.

Crim. Case No. 5144 was originally raffled to the sala of Judge Floripinas C. Buyser, RTC of Surigao City, Branch 30. In an Order dated March 14, 2002, Judge Buyser denied the Demurrer to the Evidence of the accused, declaring that the evidence thus presented by the prosecution was sufficient to prove the crime of homicide and not the charge of murder. Consequently, the counsel for the defense filed a Motion to Fix the Amount of Bail Bond. Respondent Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo, then Senior State Prosecutor and the deputized prosecutor of the case, objected thereto mainly on the ground that the original charge of murder, punishable with reclusion perpetua, was not subject to bail under Sec. 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.1

In an Order dated August 30, 2002,2 Judge Buyser inhibited himself from further trying the case because of the "harsh insinuation" of Senior Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo that he "lacks the cold neutrality of an impartial magistrate," by allegedly suggesting the filing of the motion to fix the amount of bail bond by counsel for the accused.

The case was transferred to Branch 29 of the RTC of Surigao City, presided by Judge Jose Manuel P. Tan. In an Order dated November 12, 2002, Judge Tan favorably resolved the Motion to Fix the Amount of Bail Bond, and fixed the amount of the bond at P40,000.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated November 12, 2002, which motion was denied for lack of merit in an Order dated February 10, 2003. In October, 2003, respondent appealed from the Orders dated November 12, 2002 and February 10, 2003, to the Court of Appeals (CA).

Instead of availing himself only of judicial remedies, respondent caused the publication of an article regarding the Order granting bail to the accused in the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily. The article, entitled "Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder suspect to bail out," reads:

SENIOR state prosecutor has lashed at a judge in Surigao City for allowing a murder suspect to go out on bail.

Senior state prosecutor Rogelio Bagabuyo lambasted Judge Manuel Tan of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 29 based in Surigao City for ruling on a motion that sought a bailbond for Luis Plaza who stands charged with murdering a policeman . . . .

Plaza reportedly posted a P40-thousand bail bond.

Bagabuyo argued that the crime of murder is a non-bailable offense. But Bagabuyo admitted that a judge could still opt to allow a murder suspect to bail out in cases when the evidence of the prosecution is weak.

But in this murder case, Bagabuyo said the judge who previously handled it, Judge F[lori]pinas B[uy]ser, described the evidence to be strong. B[uy]ser inhibited from the case for an unclear reason.

x x x

Bagabuyo said he would contest Tan's decision before the Court of Appeals and would file criminal and administrative charges of certiorari against the judge.

Bagabuyuo said he was not afraid of being cited in contempt by Judge Tan.

"This is the only way that the public would know that there are judges there who are displaying judicial arrogance." he said.3

In an Order dated August 21, 2003, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, directed respondent and the writer of the article, Mark Francisco of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily, to appear in court on September 20, 2003 to explain why they should not be cited for indirect contempt of court for the publication of the article which degraded the court and its presiding judge with its lies and misrepresentation.

The said Order stated that contrary to the statements in the article, Judge Buyser described the evidence for the prosecution as not strong, but sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused only for homicide. Moreover, it was not true that Judge Buyser inhibited himself from the case for an unclear reason. Judge Buyser, in an Order dated August 30, 2002, declared in open court in the presence of respondent that he was inhibiting himself from the case due to the harsh insinuation of respondent that he lacked the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.

On the scheduled hearing of the contempt charge, Mark Francisco admitted that the Mindanao Gold Star Daily caused the publication of the article. He disclosed that respondent, in a press conference, stated that the crime of murder is non-bailable. When asked by the trial court why he printed such lies, Mr. Francisco answered that his only source was respondent.4 Mr. Francisco clarified that in the statement alleging that Judge Buyser inhibited himself from the case for an unclear reason, the phrase "for an unclear reason," was added by the newspaper's Executive Editor Herby S. Gomez.5

Respondent admitted that he caused the holding of the press conference, but refused to answer whether he made the statements in the article until after he shall have filed a motion to dismiss. For his refusal to answer, the trial court declared him in contempt of court pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.6 The Court's Order dated September 30, 2003 reads:

ORDER

Mr. Mark Francisco for publishing this article which is a lie clothed in half truth to give it a semblance of truth is hereby ordered to pay a fine of P10,000. Prosecutor Bagabuyo, for obstinately refusing to explain why he should not be cited for contempt and admitting that the article published in the Mindanao Gold Star Daily on August 18, 2003 and quoted in the Order of this Court dated August 21, 2003 which is contemptuous was caused by him to be published, is hereby adjudged to have committed indirect

contempt of Court pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court and he is hereby ordered to suffer the penalty of 30 days in jail. The BJMP is hereby ordered to arrest Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo if he does not put up a bond of P100,000.00.

SO ORDERD.7

Respondent posted the required bond and was released from the custody of the law. He appealed the indirect contempt order to the CA.

Despite the citation of indirect contempt, respondent presented himself to the media for interviews in Radio Station DXKS, and again attacked the integrity of Judge Tan and the trial court's disposition in the proceedings of Crim. Case No. 5144.

In an Order dated October 20, 2003, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, required respondent to explain and to show cause within five days from receipt thereof why he should not be held in contempt for his media interviews that degraded the court and the presiding judge, and why he should not be suspended from the practice of law for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 11.05 of Canon 118 and Rule 13.02 of Canon 13.9

In the Order, the trial court stated that respondent was interviewed by Jun Clergio, and that the interview was repeatedly aired on September 30, 2003 and in his news program between 6:00 and 8:00 a.m. on October 1, 2003. He was also interviewed by Tony Consing on October 1 and 2, 2003, between 8:00 and 9:00 a.m. in his radio program. In those radio interviews, respondent allegedly called Judge Tan a judge who does not know the law, a liar, and a dictator who does not accord due process to the people.

The hearing for the second contempt charge was set on December 4, 2003.

On November, 20, 2003, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer to Contempt alleging that he was saddled with work of equal importance and needed ample time to answer the same. He also prayed for a bill of particulars in order to properly prepare for his defense.

In an Order dated November 20, 2003, the trial court denied the motion. It stated that a bill of particulars is not applicable in contempt proceedings, and that respondent's actions and statements are detailed in the Order of October 20, 2003.

On the scheduled hearing of December 4, 2003 respondent neither appeared in court nor informed the court of his absence. The trial court issued an Order dated December 4, 2003 cancelling the hearing "to give Prosecutor Bagabuyo all the chances he asks for," and ordered him to appear on January 12, 2004 to explain in writing or orally why he should not be cited in contempt of court pursuant to the facts stated in the Order dated October 20, 2003. However, respondent did not appear in the scheduled hearing of January 12, 2004.

On January 15, 2004, the trial court received respondent's Answer dated January 8, 2004. Respondent denied the charge that he sought to be interviewed by radio station DXKS. He, however, stated that right after the hearing of September 30, 2003, he was approached by someone who asked him to comment on the Order issued in open court, and that his comment does not fall within the concept of indirect contempt of court. He also admitted that he was interviewed by his friend, Tony Consing, at the latter's instance. He justified his response during the interview as a simple exercise of his constitutional right of freedom of speech and that it was not meant to offend or malign, and was without malice.

On February 8, 2004, the trial court issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding preponderant evidence that Prosecutor Bagabuyo has grossly violated the Canons of the legal profession and [is] guilty of grave professional misconduct, rendering him unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law.

Likewise, he is also found guilty of indirect contempt of court, for which he is hereby ordered to suffer the penalty of IMPRISONMENT for ninety (90) days to be served at the Surigao City Jail and to pay the maximum fine of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00). Future acts of contempt will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of the relevant records be immediately forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review and for further determination of grounds for [the] disbarment of Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo.10

The trial court found respondent's denials to be lame as the tape of his interview on October 2, 2003, duly transcribed, showed disrespect of the court and its officers, thus:

TONY CONSING: Fiscal, nanglabay ang mga oras, nanglabay ang gamay'ng panahon ang samad sa imong kasingkasing nagpabilin pa ba ni. O ingnon nato duna na bay pagbag-o sa imong huna-huna karon?

(Fiscal, after the lapse of time, are you still hurt? Or have you not changed your mind yet?)

BAGABUYO : Ang akong huna-huna kon aduna man ugaling pagbag-o ang pagsiguro, ang mga Huwes nga dili mahibalo sa balaod tangtangon pagka abogado, mao kana.

(If my mind has changed at all, it is that I ensure that all judges who are ignorant of the law should be disbarred. That's it.)

x x x

BAGABUYO : Mao kana ang tinuod, Ton, ug kining akong guibatonan karon nga hunahuna mahitungod nianang mga Huwes nga dili kahibalo sa balaod, magkadugay magkalami. Kada adlao nagatoon ako. Nagabasa ako sa mga bag-ong jurisprudence ug sa atong balaod aron sa pagsiguro gayod nga inigsang-at unya nako sa kaso nga disbarment niining di mahibalo nga Huwes, sigurado gayod ako nga katangtangan siya sa lisensiya . . . . Ang kini nga Huwes nga dili mahibalo sa balaod, pagatangtangon na, dili lamang sa pagka-Huwes kon dili sa pagka-abogado. Tan-awa ra gyod kining iyang gibuhat nga Order, Ton, ang iyang pagkabakakon . . . .

(That's true, Ton, and this conviction I have now about judges who are ignorant of the law is made firmer by time. I study everyday. I read new jurisprudence and the law to insure that when I file the disbarment case against this Judge who does not know his law, I am certain that he loses his license. . . . This judge who is ignorant of the law should not only be removed as a judge but should also be disbarred. Just take a look at his Order, Ton, and see what a liar he is . . . .)

x x x

BAGABUYO : Yes, nag-ingon ang iyang Order. . . . Ngano nga nakaingon ako nga bakakon kini, nag-ingon nga kini konong order given in open court, ang kalooy sa dios, ang iyang order sa Korte wala siya mag-ingon ug kantidad nga P100,000.00 nga bail bond. . . .

(Yes, his Order said that . . . . Why did I say that he is a liar? It states that this Order was "given in open court," and in God's mercy, he did not state the amount of P100,000.00 as bail bond. . . .)

BAGABUYO : Kay dili man lagi mahibalo sa balaod, ako

siyang gui-ingnan, Your Honor, I have the right to appeal. Mibalik dayon, ug miingon siya, BJMP arrest Bagabuyo.

(Because he does not know the law, I said, "Your Honor, I have the right to appeal." Then he came back and said, "BJMP, arrest Bagabuyo.")

x x x

BAGABUYO : . . . P100,000.00 ang iyang guipapiyansa.

Naunsa na? Dinhi makita nimo ang iyang pagka gross ignorance of the law. . . .

(He imposed a bail of P100,000.00. How come? This is where you will see his gross ignorance of the law. . . . )

x x x

TONY CONSING : So karon, unsay plano nimo karon?

(So what is your plan now?)

BAGABUYO : Sumala sa akong gui-ingon moundang lang ako kon matangtang na siya sa pagka abogado. . . .

(As I have said, I will only stop if he is already disbarred. . . .)

x x x

BAGABUYO : Nasuko siya niini kay hambugero kuno, pero angayan niyang hibaw-an nga ang trabajo sa Huwes dili ang pagtan-aw kon ang tawo hambugero . . . . Ug ang akong gisulti mao lamang ang balaod nga siya in fact at that time I said he is not conversant of the law, with regards to the case of murder. . . .

(He got angry because I was allegedly bragging but he should know that it is not for a judge to determine if a person is a braggart. . . .And what I said was based on the law. In fact, at that time, I said he is not conversant of the law, with regards to the case of murder . . . .)

x x x

BAGABUYO : Ah, mi sit down sab ako, contempt ra ba kadto . . . . Mao kana, pero unsa may iyang katuyoan – ang iyang katuyoan nga ipa-adto ako didto kay didto, iya akong pakauwawan kay iya kong sikopon, iya kong ipa-priso, pero kay di man lagi mahibalo sa balaod, ang iyang gui orderan BJMP, intawon por dios por Santo, Mr. Tan, pagbasa intawon ug balaod, naunsa ka ba Mr. Tan? Unsa may imong hunahuna nga kon ikaw Huwes, ikaw na ang diktador, no way, no sir, ours is a democratic country where all and everyone is entitled to due process of law – you did not accord me due process of law . . . .

(I sat down. . . . That's it. But what was his purpose? He made me come in order to humiliate me because he wanted me arrested, he wanted me imprisoned, but because he is ignorant of the law, he ordered the BMJP. For God's sake, Mr. Tan, what's wrong with you, Mr. Tan? Please read the law. What is your thinking? That when you are a judge, you are also a dictator? No way, no sir, ours is a democratic country where all and everyone is entitled to due process of law – you did not accord me due process of law. . . .)

TONY CONSING: So mopasaka kang disbarment, malaumon kita nga maaksiyonan kini, with all this problem sa Korte Suprema.

(So you are filing a disbarment case? We hope that this be given action with all the problems in the Supreme Court.)

BAGABUYO : Dili ako mabalaka niana kay usa ka truck ang akong jurisprudence, nga ang mga Huwes nga di mahibalo sa balaod pagatangtangon gayod sa ilang pagka Huwes. . . . Apan unsa man intawon ang balaod ang iyang gibasa niini nadunggan ko nga kini kuno siya madjongero, mao bitaw na, madjong ang iyang guitunan?

(I am not worried because I have a truckload of jurisprudence that judges who are ignorant of the law must be removed from the Bench. But what law has he been reading? I heard that he is a mahjong aficionado (mahjongero) and that is why he is studying mahjong.11

The trial court concluded that respondent, as a member of the bar and an officer of the court, is duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the court, and should not promote distrust in the administration of justice.

The trial court stated that it is empowered to suspend respondent from the practice of law under Sec. 28, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court12 for any of the causes mentioned in Sec. 2713 of the same Rule. Respondent was given the opportunity to be heard, but he opted to be silent. Thus, it held that the requirement of due process has been duly satisfied.

In accordance with the provisions of Sec. 29,14 Rule 138 and Sec. 9,15 Rule 139 of the Rules of Court, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, transmitted to the Office of the Bar Confidant the Statement of Facts of respondent's suspension from the practice of law, dated July 14, 2005, together with the order of suspension and other relevant documents.

In its Report dated January 4, 2006, the Office of the Bar Confidant found that the article in the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily, which maligned the integrity and independence of the court and its officers, and respondent's criticism of the trial court's Order dated November 12, 2002, which was aired in radio station DXKS, both in connection with Crim. Case No. 5144, constitute grave violation of oath of office by respondent. It stated that the requirement of due process was complied with when respondent was given an opportunity to be heard, but respondent chose to remain silent.

The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended the implementation of the trial court's order of suspension dated February 8, 2004, and that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year, with a stern warning that the repetition of a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

The Court approves the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant. It has been reiterated in Gonzaga v. Villanueva, Jr.16 that:

A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard of his duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming an attorney. Among the grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court are deceit; malpractice; gross misconduct in office; grossly immoral conduct; conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to the practice of law; willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; corrupt or willful appearance as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The grounds are not preclusive in nature even as they are broad enough as to cover practically any kind of impropriety that a lawyer does or commits in his professional career or in his private life. A lawyer must at no time be wanting in probity and moral fiber which are not only conditions precedent to his entrance to the Bar, but are likewise essential demands for his continued membership therein.

Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.17 Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations.18 Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates a lawyer to "observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and [he] should insist on similar conduct by others." Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 states that a lawyer "shall submit grievances against a judge to the proper authorities only."

Respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 when he admittedly caused the holding of a press conference where he made statements against the Order dated November 12, 2002 allowing the accused in Crim. Case No. 5144 to be released on bail.

Respondent also violated Canon 11 when he indirectly stated that Judge Tan was displaying judicial arrogance in the article entitled, Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder suspect to bail out, which appeared in the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily. Respondent's statements in the article, which were made while Crim. Case No. 5144 was still pending in court, also violated Rule 13.02 of Canon 13, which states that "a lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party."

In regard to the radio interview given to Tony Consing, respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for not resorting to the proper authorities only for redress of his grievances against Judge Tan. Respondent also violated Canon 11 for his disrespect of the court and its officer when he stated that Judge Tan was ignorant of the law, that as a mahjong aficionado, he was studying mahjong instead of studying the law, and that he was a liar.

Respondent also violated the Lawyer's Oath, as he has sworn to "conduct [himself] as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients."

As a senior state prosecutor and officer of the court, respondent should have set the example of observing and maintaining the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers. Montecillo v. Gica19 held:

It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude. As an officer of the court, it is his duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court to which he owes fidelity, according to the oath he has taken. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of our democratic institutions which, without such respect, would be resting on a very shaky foundation.

The Court is not against lawyers raising grievances against erring judges but the rules clearly provide for the proper venue and procedure for doing so, precisely because respect for the institution must always be maintained.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo is found guilty of violating Rule 11.05, Canon 11 and Rule 13.02, Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and of violating the Lawyer's Oath, for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year effective upon finality of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that the repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent's personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Chief Justice Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Reyes, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Sec. 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception.-- All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right x x x (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.

2 Rollo, p. 45.

3 Id. at 101.

4 Id. at 115.

5 Id. at 114-115.

6 Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. – After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

x x x

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice.

7 Rollo, p. 126.

8 CANON 11 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS

x x x

Rule 11.05. – A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper authorities only.

9 CANON 13 – A LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE MERITS OF HIS CAUSE AND REFRAIN FROM ANY IMPROPRIETY WHICH TENDS TO INFLUENCE OR GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF INFLUENCING THE COURT

x x x

Rule 13.02. – A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.

10 Rollo, pp. 153-154.

11 RTC Order, February 8, 2004, Rollo, pp. 144-147. Emphasis supplied.

12 Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court. -- The Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises.

13 Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor.-- A member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the

Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; corrupt or willful appearance as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

14 Sec. 29. Upon suspension by Court of Appeals or Regional Trial Court, further proceedings in Supreme Court. – Upon such suspension, the Court of Appeals or the Regional Trial Court shall forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the order of suspension and a full statement of the facts upon which the same was based. Upon the receipt of such certified copy and statement, the Supreme Court shall make full investigation of the facts involved and make such order revoking or extending the suspension, or removing the attorney from his office as such, as the facts warrant.

15 Sec. 9. Procedure in Court of Appeals or Regional Trial Court.—As far as may be applicable, the procedure above outlined shall likewise govern the filing and investigation of complaints against attorneys in the Court of Appeals or in Regional Trial Court. In case of suspension of the respondent, the judge of [the] Regional Trial Court or Justice of the Court of Appeals shall forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the order of suspension and a full statement of the facts upon which [the] same is based.

A.C. No. 7199 July 22, 2009 [Formerly CBD 04-1386]

FOODSPHERE, INC., Complainant, vs. ATTY. MELANIO L. MAURICIO, JR., Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Foodsphere, Inc. (complainant), a corporation engaged in the business of meat processing and manufacture and distribution of canned goods and grocery products under the brand name "CDO," filed a Verified Complaint1 for disbarment before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Melanio L. Mauricio, Jr., popularly known as "Batas Mauricio" (respondent), a writer/columnist of tabloids including Balitang Patas BATAS, Bagong TIKTIK, TORO and HATAW!, and a host of a television program KAKAMPI MO ANG BATAS telecast over UNTV and of a radio program Double B-BATAS NG BAYAN aired over DZBB, for (1) grossly immoral conduct; (2) violation of lawyer’s oath and (3) disrespect to the courts and to investigating prosecutors.

The facts that spawned the filing of the complaint are as follows:

On June 22, 2004, a certain Alberto Cordero (Cordero) purportedly bought from a grocery in Valenzuela City canned goods including a can of CDO Liver spread. On June 27, 2004, as Cordero and his relatives were eating bread with the CDO Liver spread, they found the spread to be sour and soon discovered a colony of worms inside the can.

Cordero’s wife thus filed a complaint with the Bureau of Food and Drug Administration (BFAD). Laboratory examination confirmed the presence of parasites in the Liver spread.

Pursuant to Joint DTI-DOH-DA Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993, the BFAD conducted a conciliation hearing on July 27, 2004 during which the spouses Cordero demanded P150,000 as damages from complainant. Complainant refused to heed the demand, however, as being in contravention of company policy and, in any event, "outrageous."

Complainant instead offered to return actual medical and incidental expenses incurred by the Corderos as long as they were supported by receipts, but the offer was turned down. And the Corderos threatened to bring the matter to the attention of the media.

Complainant was later required by the BFAD to file its Answer to the complaint. In the meantime or on August 6, 2004, respondent sent complainant via fax a copy of the front page of the would-be August 10-16, 2004 issue of the tabloid Balitang Patas BATAS, Vol. 1, No. 122 which complainant found to contain articles maligning, discrediting and imputing vices and defects to it and its products. Respondent threatened to publish the articles unless complainant gave in to the P150,000 demand of the Corderos. Complainant thereupon reiterated its counter-offer earlier conveyed to the Corderos, but respondent turned it down.

Respondent later proposed to settle the matter for P50,000, P15,000 of which would go to the Corderos and P35,000 to his Batas Foundation. And respondent directed complainant to place paid advertisements in the tabloids and television program.

The Corderos eventually forged a KASUNDUAN3 seeking the withdrawal of their complaint before the BFAD. The BFAD thus dismissed the complaint.4 Respondent, who affixed his signature to the KASUNDUAN as a witness, later wrote in one of his articles/columns in a tabloid that he prepared the document.

On August 11, 2004, respondent sent complainant an Advertising Contract5 asking complainant to advertise in the tabloid Balitang Patas BATAS for its next 24 weekly issues at P15,000 per issue or a total amount of P360,000, and a Program Profile6 of the television program KAKAMPI MO ANG BATAS also asking complainant to place spot advertisements with the following rate cards: (a) spot buy 15-second TVC at P4,000; (b) spot buy 30-second TVC at P7,700; and (c) season buy [13 episodes, 26 spots] of 30-second TVC for P130,000.

As a sign of goodwill, complainant offered to buy three full-page advertisements in the tabloid amounting to P45,000 at P15,000 per advertisement, and three spots of 30-second TVC in the television program at P7,700 each or a total of P23,100. Acting on complainant’s offer, respondent relayed to it that he and his Executive Producer were disappointed with the offer and threatened to proceed with the publication of the articles/columns.7

On August 28, 2004, respondent, in his radio program Double B- Batas ng Bayan at radio station DZBB, announced the holding of a supposed contest sponsored by said program, which announcement was transcribed as follows:

"OK, at meron akong pa-contest, total magpapasko na o ha, meron pa-contest si Batas Mauricio ang Batas ng Bayan. Ito yung ating pa-contest, hulaan ninyo, tatawag kayo sa telepono, 433-7549 at 433-7553. Ang mga premyo babanggitin po natin sa susunod pero ito muna ang contest, o, ‘aling liver spread ang may uod?’ Yan kita ninyo yan, ayan malalaman ninyo yan. Pagka-nahulaan yan ah, at sasagot kayo sa akin, aling liver spread ang may uod at anong companya ang gumagawa nyan? Itawag po ninyo sa 433-7549 st 433-7553. Open po an[g] contest na ito sa lahat ng ating tagapakinig. Pipiliin natin ang mananalo, kung tama ang inyong sagot. Ang tanong, aling liver spread sa Pilipinas an[g] may uod? 8 (Emphasis and italics in the original; underscoring supplied)

And respondent wrote in his columns in the tabloids articles which put complainant in bad light. Thus, in the August 31- September 6, 2004 issue of Balitang Patas BATAS, he wrote an article captioned "KADIRI ANG CDO LIVER SPREAD!" In another article, he wrote "IBA PANG PRODUKTO NG CDO SILIPIN!"9 which appeared in the same publication in its September 7-13, 2004 issue. And still in the same publication, its September 14-20, 2004 issue, he wrote another article entitled "DAPAT BANG PIGILIN ANG CDO."10

Respondent continued his tirade against complainant in his column LAGING HANDA published in another tabloid, BAGONG TIKTIK, with the following articles:11 (a) "Uod sa liver spread," Setyembre 6, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.276);12 (b) "Uod, itinanggi ng CDO," Setyembre 7, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.277);13 (c) "Pagpapatigil sa CDO," Setyembre 8, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.278);14 (d) "Uod sa liver spread kumpirmado," Setyembre 9, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.279);15 (e) "Salaysay ng nakakain ng uod," Setyembre 10, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.280);16 (f) "Kaso VS. CDO itinuloy," Setyembre 11, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.281);17 (g) "Kasong Kidnapping laban sa CDO guards," Setyembre 14, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.284);18 (h) "Brutalidad ng CDO guards," Setyembre 15, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.285);19 (i) "CDO guards pinababanatan sa PNP," Setyembre 17, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.287);20 (j) "May uod na CDO liver spread sa Puregold binili," Setyembre 18, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.288);21 (k) "Desperado na ang CDO," Setyembre 20, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.290);22 (l) "Atty. Rufus Rodriguez pumadrino sa CDO," Setyembre 21, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 291);23 (m) "Kasunduan ng CDO at Pamilya Cordero," Setyembre 22, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 292);24 (n) "Bakit nagbayad ng P50 libo ang CDO," Setyembre 23, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 293).25

In his September 8, 2004 column "Anggulo ng Batas" published in Hataw!, respondent wrote an article "Reaksyon pa sa uod ng CDO Liver Spread."26

And respondent, in several episodes in September 2004 of his television program Kakampi Mo ang Batas aired over UNTV, repeatedly complained of what complainant claimed to be the "same baseless and malicious allegations/issues" against it.27

Complainant thus filed criminal complaints against respondent and several others for Libel and Threatening to Publish Libel under Articles 353 and 356 of the Revised Penal Code before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and Valenzuela City. The complaints were pending at he time of the filing of the present administrative complaint.28

In the criminal complaints pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, docketed as I.S. Nos. V-04-2917-2933, respondent filed his Entry of Appearance with Highly Urgent Motion to Elevate These Cases to the Department of Justice,29 alleging:

x x x x

2.N. The question here is this: What gives, Honorable (???) Prosecutors of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City?

x x x x

2.R. Can an ordinary person like Villarez simply be tossed around, waiting for miracles to happen?

2.S. Why? How much miracle is needed to happen here before this Office would ever act on his complaint?

x x x x

8. With a City Prosecutor acting the way he did in the case filed by Villarez, and with an investigating prosecutor virtually kowtowing to the wishes of his boss, the Chief Prosecutor, can Respondents expect justice to be meted to them?

9. With utmost due respect, Respondents have reason to believe that justice would elude them in this Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, not because of the injustice of their cause, but, more importantly, because of the injustice of the system;

10. Couple all of these with reports that many a government office in Valenzuela City had been the willing recipient of too many generosities in the past of the Complainant, and also with reports that a top official of the City had campaigned for his much coveted position in the past distributing products of the Complainant, what would one expect the Respondents to think?

11. Of course, not to be lost sight of here is the attitude and behavior displayed even by mere staff and underlings of this Office to people who dare complain against the Complainant in their respective turfs. Perhaps, top officials of this Office should investigate and ask their associates

and relatives incognito to file, even if on a pakunwari basis only, complaints against the Complainant, and they would surely be given the same rough and insulting treatment that Respondent Villarez got when he filed his kidnapping charge here;30

And in a Motion to Dismiss [the case] for Lack of Jurisdiction31 which respondent filed, as counsel for his therein co-respondents-staffers of the newspaper Hataw!, before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, respondent alleged:

x x x x

5. If the Complainant or its lawyer merely used even a little of whatever is inside their thick skulls, they would have clearly deduced that this Office has no jurisdiction over this action.32 (Emphasis supplied)

x x x x

Meanwhile, on October 26, 2004, complainant filed a civil case against respondent and several others, docketed as Civil Case No. 249-V-04,33 before the Regional Trial Court, Valenzuela City and raffled to Branch 75 thereof.

The pending cases against him and the issuance of a status quo order notwithstanding, respondent continued to publish articles against complainant34 and to malign complainant through his television shows.

Acting on the present administrative complaint, the Investigating Commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) came up with the following findings in his October 5, 2005 Report and Recommendation:35

I.

x x x x

In Civil Case No. 249-V-04 entitled "Foodsphere, Inc. vs. Atty. [Melanio] Mauricio, et al.", the Order dated 10 December 2004 (Annex O of the Complaint) was issued by Presiding Judge Dionisio C. Sison which in part reads:

"Anent the plaintiff’s prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order included in the instant plaintiff’s motion, this Court, inasmuch as the defendants failed to appear in court or file an opposition thereto, is constrained to GRANT the said plaintiff’s prater, as it is GRANTED, in order to maintain STATUS QUO, and that all the defendants, their agents, representatives or any person acting for and in behalf are hereby restrained/enjoined from further publishing, televising and/or broadcasting any matter subject of the Complaint in the instant case more specifically the imputation of vices and/or defects on plaintiff and its products."

Complainant alleged that the above-quoted Order was served on respondent by the Branch Sheriff on 13 December 2004. Respondent has not denied the issuance of the Order dated 10 December 2004 or his receipt of a copy thereof on 13 December 2004.

Despite his receipt of the Order dated 10 December 2004, and the clear directive therein addressed to him to desists [sic] from "further publishing, televising and/or broadcasting any matter subject of the Complaint in the instant case more specifically the imputation of vices and/or defects on plaintiff and its products", respondent in clear defiance of this Order came out with articles on the prohibited subject matter in his column "Atty. Batas", 2004 in the December 16 and 17, 2004 issues of the tabloid "Balitang Bayan –Toro" (Annexes Q and Q-1 of the Complaint).

The above actuations of respondent are also in violation of Rule 13.03 of the Canon of Professional Responsibility which reads: "A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party."

II.

x x x x

In I.S. No. V.04-2917-2933, then pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, respondent filed his "Entry of Appearance with Highly Urgent Motion to Elevate These Cases To the Department of Justice". In said pleading, respondent made the following statements:

x x x x

The above language employed by respondent undoubtedly casts aspersions on the integrity of the Office of the City Prosecutor and all the Prosecutors connected with said Office. Respondent clearly assailed the impartiality and fairness of the said Office in handling cases filed before it and did not even design to submit any evidence to substantiate said wild allegations. The use by respondent of the above-quoted language in his pleadings is manifestly violative of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: "A lawyer [s]hall [o]bserve and [m]aintain [t]he [re]spect [d]ue [t]o [t]he [c]ourts [a]nd [t]o [j]udicial [o]fficers [a]nd [s]hould [i]nsist [o]n [s]imilar [c]onduct [b]y [o]thers."

III.

The "Kasunduan" entered into by the Spouses Cordero and herein complainant (Annex C of the Complaint) was admittedly prepared, witnessed and signed by herein respondent. …

x x x x

In its Order dated 16 August 2004, the Bureau of Food and Drugs recognized that the said "Kasunduan" was not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and policy, and this accordingly dismissed the complaint filed by the Spouses Cordero against herein complainant.

However, even after the execution of the "Kasunduan" and the consequent dismissal of the complaint of his clients against herein complainant, respondent inexplicably launched a media offensive intended to disparage and put to ridicule herein complainant. On record are the numerous articles of respondent published in 3 tabloids commencing from 31 August to 17 December 2004 (Annexes G to Q-1). As already above-stated, respondent continued to come out with these articles against complainant in his tabloid columns despite a temporary restraining order issued against him expressly prohibiting such actions. Respondent did not deny that he indeed wrote said articles and submitted them for publication in the tabloids.

Respondent claims that he was prompted by his sense of public service, that is, to expose the defects of complainant’s products to the consuming public. Complainant claims that there is a baser motive to the actions of respondent. Complainant avers that respondent retaliated for complainant’s failure to give in to respondent’s "request" that complainant advertise in the tabloids and television programs of respondent. Complainant’s explanation is more credible. Nevertheless, whatever the true motive of respondent for his barrage of articles against complainant does not detract from the fact that respondent consciously violated the spirit behind the "Kasunduan" which he himself prepared and signed and submitted to the BFAD for approval. Respondent was less than forthright when he prepared said "Kasunduan" and then turned around and proceeded to lambaste complainant for what was supposedly already settled in said agreement. Complainant would have been better of with the BFAD case proceeding as it could have defended itself against the charges of the Spouses Cordero. Complainant was helpless against the attacks of respondent, a media personality. The actuations of respondent constituted, to say the least, deceitful conduct contemplated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.36 (Underscoring supplied)

The IBP Board of Governors, by Resolution No. XVIII-2006-114 dated March 20, 2006, adopted the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner to suspend respondent from the practice of law for two years.

The Court finds the findings/evaluation of the IBP well-taken.

The Court, once again, takes this occasion to emphasize the necessity for every lawyer to act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession,37 which confidence may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar.

By the above-recited acts, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates lawyers to refrain from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. For, as the IBP found, he engaged in deceitful conduct by, inter alia, taking advantage of the complaint against CDO to advance his interest – to obtain funds for

his Batas Foundation and seek sponsorships and advertisements for the tabloids and his television program.

He also violated Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates:

A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.

For despite the pendency of the civil case against him and the issuance of a status quo order restraining/enjoining further publishing, televising and broadcasting of any matter relative to the complaint of CDO, respondent continued with his attacks against complainant and its products. At the same time, respondent violated Canon 1 also of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates lawyers to "uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes." For he defied said status quo order, despite his (respondent’s) oath as a member of the legal profession to "obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities."

Further, respondent violated Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandate, viz:

CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.

Rule 8.01 – A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper, by using intemperate language.

Apropos is the following reminder in Saberon v. Larong:38

To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use strong language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients.

However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.1awphi1

On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor and reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer’s language even in his pleadings must be dignified.39 (Underscoring supplied)

By failing to live up to his oath and to comply with the exacting standards of the legal profession, respondent also violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which

directs a lawyer to "at all times uphold the integrity and the dignity of the legal profession."401avvph!1

The power of the media to form or influence public opinion cannot be underestimated. In Dalisay v. Mauricio, Jr.,41 the therein complainant engaged therein-herein respondent’s services as "she was impressed by the pro-poor and pro-justice advocacy of respondent, a media personality,"42 only to later find out that after he demanded and the therein complainant paid an exorbitant fee, no action was taken nor any pleadings prepared by him. Respondent was suspended for six months.

On reading the articles respondent published, not to mention listening to him over the radio and watching him on television, it cannot be gainsaid that the same could, to a certain extent, have affected the sales of complainant.

Back to Dalisay, this Court, in denying therein-herein respondent’s motion for reconsideration, took note of the fact that respondent was motivated by vindictiveness when he filed falsification charges against the therein complainant.43

To the Court, suspension of respondent from the practice of law for three years is, in the premises, sufficient.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Melanio Mauricio is, for violation of the lawyer’s oath and breach of ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility, SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three years effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to his personal record and copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES- SANTIAGO Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice

Footnotes

1 Rollo (Vol. I of the CBD rollo), pp. 1-21.

2 Annex "B" of the complaint, id. at 23.

3 Annexes "C" and "C-1," id. at 24-25.

4 Annex "F," id at 29. The Order reads:

Before us is a "Kasunduan" dated 10 August 2004 duly signed by the parties praying that the above-entitled case be dismissed with prejudice on the ground that they have agreed to settle their differences amicably.

The Joint DTI-DOH-DA Administrative Order No. 1 s. 1993, the "Rules and Regulations Implementing the provisions of Chapter III[,] Title V of RA 7394, otherwise known as the Consumer Act of the Philippines" provides for the encouragement of both parties to settle the case amicably. (Rule III, Section 1, C.1)

The agreement of the parties is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and policy.

PRESCINDING FROM THE FOREGOING, the above-captioned case is hereby DISMISSED.