Labor 2nd Cases

7/27/2019 Labor 2nd Cases

1/35

1

[G.R. No. 98107. August 18, 1997]

BENJAMIN C. JUCO, petit ioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONSCOMMISSION and NATIONAL HOUSING CORPORATION, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

This is a petition forcertiorarito set aside the Decision of the National LaborRelations Commission (NLRC) dated March 14, 1991, which reversed the Decisiondated May 21, 1990 of Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday, on the ground of lack ofjurisdiction.

Petitioner Benjamin C. Juco was hired as a project engineer of respondentNational Housing Corporation (NHC) from November 16, 1970 to May 14, 1975. OnMay 14, 1975, he was separated from the service for having been implicated in acrime of theft and/or malversation of public funds.

On March 25, 1977, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against theNHC with the Department of Labor.

On September 17, 1977, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision dismissing thecomplaint on the ground that the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the case.

[1]

Petitioner then elevated the case to the NLRC which rendered a decision onDecember 28, 1982, reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter.[2]

Dissatisfied with the decision of the NLRC, respondent NHC appealed before

this Court and on January 17, 1985, we rendered a decision, the dispositive portionthereof reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision of the respondent

National Labor Relations Commission is SET ASIDE. The decision of the Labor Arbiterdismissing the case before it for lack of jurisdiction is REINSTATED.[3]

On January 6, 1989, petitioner filed with the Civil Service Commission acomplaint for illegal dismissal, with preliminary mandatory injunction.[4]

On February 6, 1989, respondent NHC moved for the dismissal of the complainton the ground that the Civil Service Commission has no jurisdiction over the case.[5]

On April 11, 1989, the Civil Service Commission issued an order dismissing thecomplaint for lack of jurisdiction. It ratiocinated that:

The Board finds the comment and/or motion to dismiss meritorious. It was not disputed thatNHC is a government corporation without an original charter but organized/created under theCorporate Code.

Article IX, Section 2 (1) of the 1987 Constitution provides:

The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of thegovernment, including government owned and controlled corporations with original charters.(underscoring supplied)

From the aforequoted constitutional provision, it is clear that respondent NHC is not within thescope of the civil service and is therefore beyond the jurisdiction of this board. Moreover, it is

pertinent to state that the 1987 Constitution was ratified and became effective on February 2,1987.

WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction, the instant complaint is hereby dismissed.[6]

On April 28, 1989, petitioner filed with respondent NLRC a complaint for illegaldismissal with preliminary mandatory injunction against respondent NHC.

[7]

On May 21, 1990, respondent NLRC thru Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday ruledthat petitioner was illegally dismissed from his employment by respondent as therewas evidence in the record that the criminal case against him was purely fabricated,prompting the trial court to dismiss the charges against him. Hence, he concludedthat the dismissal was illegal as it was devoid of basis, legal or factual.

He further ruled that the complaint is not barred by prescription considering thatthe period from which to reckon the reglementary period of four years should be fromthe date of the receipt of the decision of the Civil Service Commission promulgated onApril 11, 1989. He also ratiocinated that:

It appears x x x complainant filed the complaint for illegal dismissal with the Civil Service

Commission on January 6, 1989 and the same was dismissed on April 11, 1989 after which onApril 28, 1989, this case was filed by the complainant. Prior to that, this case was ruled upon

by the Supreme Court on January 17, 1985 which enjoined the complainant to go to the CivilService Commission which in fact, complainant did. Under the circumstances, there is meriton the contention that the running of the reglementary period of four (4) years was suspendedwith the filing of the complaint with the said Commission. Verily, it was not the fault of therespondent for failing to file the complaint as alleged by the respondent but due to, in thewords of the complainant, a legal knot that has to be untangled.[8]

Thereafter, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision, the dispositive portion ofwhich reads:

"Premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the dismissal of the complainant

as illegal and ordering the respondent to immediately reinstate him to his former position
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn1


2/35

2

without loss of seniority rights with full back wages inclusive of allowance and to his otherbenefits or equivalent computed from the time it is withheld from him when he was dismissedon March 27, 1977, until actually reinstated.[9]

On June 1, 1990, respondent NHC filed its appeal before the NLRC and onMarch 14, 1991, the NLRC promulgated a decision which reversed the decision ofLabor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

[10]

The primordial issue that confronts us is whether or not public respondentcommitted grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner is not governed by theLabor Code.

Under the laws then in force, employees of government-owned and /or controlledcorporations were governed by the Civil Service Law and not by the Labor Code.Hence,

Article 277 of the Labor Code (PD 442) then provided:

"The terms and conditions of employment of all government employees, including employeesof government-owned and controlled corporations shall be governed by the Civil Service Law,rules and regulations x x x.

The 1973 Constitution, Article II-B, Section 1(1), on the other hand provided:

The Civil Service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision and instrumentality of thegovernment, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

Although we had earlier ruled in National Housing Corporation v. Juco,[11]that

employees of government-owned and/or controlled corporations, whether created byspecial law or formed as subsidiaries under the general Corporation Law, aregoverned by the Civil Service Law and not by the Labor Code, this ruling has beensupplanted by the 1987 Constitution. Thus, the said Constitution now provides:

The civil service embraces all branches, subdivision, inst rumentalities, and agencies of theGovernment, including government owned or controlled corporations with original charter.(Article IX-B, Section 2[1])

In National Service Corporation (NASECO) v. National Labor RelationsCommission,

[12]we had the occasion to apply the present Constitution in deciding

whether or not the employees of NASECO are covered by the Civil Service Law or theLabor Code notwithstanding that the case arose at the time when the 1973Constitution was still in effect. We ruled that the NLRC has jurisdiction over theemployees of NASECO on the ground that it is the 1987 Constitution that governsbecause it is the Constitution in place at the time of the decision. Furthermore, weruled that the new phrase with original charter means that government-owned andcontrolled corporations refer to corporations chartered by special law as distinguishedfrom corporations organized under the Corporation Code. Thus, NASECO which had

been organized under the general incorporation stature and a subsidiary of theNational Investment Development Corporation, which in turn was a subsidiary of thePhilippine National Bank, is excluded from the purview of the Civil ServiceCommission.

We see no cogent reason to depart from the ruling in the aforesaid case.

In the case at bench, the National Housing Corporation is a government ownedcorporation organized in 1959 in accordance with Executive Order No. 399, otherwiseknown as the Uniform Charter of Government Corporation, dated January 1, 1959. Itsshares of stock are and have been one hundred percent (100%) owned by theGovernment from its incorporation under Act 1459, the former corporation law. Thegovernment entities that own its shares of stock are the Government ServiceInsurance System, the Social Security System, the Development Bank of thePhilippines, the National Investment and Development Corporation and the PeoplesHomesite and Housing Corporation.

[13]Considering the fact that the NHA had been

incorporated under act 1459, the former corporation law, it is but correct to say that itis a government-owned or controlled corporation whose employees are subject to theprovisions of the Labor Code. This observation is reiterated in recent case of TradeUnion of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) v. National HousingCorporation,[14]where we held that the NHA is now within the jurisdiction of the

Department of Labor and Employment, it being a government-owned and/or controlledcorporation without an original charter. Furthermore, we also held that the workers oremployees of the NHC (now NHA) undoubtedly have the right to form unions oremployees organization and that there is no impediment to the holding of acertification election among them as they are covered by the Labor Code.

Thus, the NLRC erred in dismissing petitioners complaint for lack of jurisdictionbecause the rule now is that the Civil Service now covers only government-owned orcontrolled corporations with original charters.

[15]Having been incorporated under the

Corporation Law, its relations with its personnel are governed by the Labor Code andcome under the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission.

One final point. Petitioners have been tossed from one forum to another for asimple illegal dismissal case. It is but apt that we put an end to his dilemma in the

interest of justice.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the NLRC in NLRC NCR-04-02036089 datedMarch 14, 1991 is hereby REVERSED and the Decision of the Labor Arbiter datedMay 21, 1990 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 100947 May 31, 1993

PNOC ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and MARCELINOTONGCO, petitioners,vs.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and MANUEL S.PINEDA, respondents.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/98107.htm#_edn9


3/35

3

Alikpala, Gomez & Associates Law Office for petitioners.

Filomeno A. Zieta for private respondent.

NARVASA, C.J.:

The applicability to private respondent Manuel S. Pineda of Section 66 of the ElectionCode is what is chiefly involved in the case at bar. Said section reads as follows:

Sec. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. Anyperson holding a public appointive office or position, including activemembers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers andemployees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shallbe considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing ofhis certificate of candidacy.

Manuel S. Pineda was employed with the Philippine National Oil Co.-EnergyDevelopment Corp. (PNOC-EDC), as subsidiary of the Philippine National Oil Co.,from September 17, 1981, when he was hired as clerk, to January 26, 1989, when hisemployment was terminated. The events leading to his dismissal from his job are notdisputed.

In November, 1987, while holding the position of Geothermal Construction Secretary,Engineering and Construction Department, at Tongonan Geothermal Project, OrmocCity, Pineda decided to run for councilor of the Municipality of Kananga, Leyte, in thelocal elections scheduled in January, 1988, and filed the corresponding certificate ofcandidacy for the position. Objection to Pineda's being a candidate while retaining hisjob in the PNOC-EDC was shortly thereafter registered by Mayor Arturo Cornejos ofKananga, Leyte. The mayor communicated with the PNOC-EDC thru Engr. Ernesto

Patanao, Resident Manager, Tongonan Geothermal Project to express the viewthat Pineda could not actively participate in politics unless he officially resigned fromPNOC-EDC. 1 Nothing seems to have resulted from this protest.

The local elections in Leyte, scheduled for January, 1988, were reset to and held onFebruary 1, 1988. Pineda was among the official candidates voted for, and eventuallyproclaimed elected to, the office of councilor. Some vacillation appears to have beenevinced by Pineda at about this time. On February 8, 1988, he wrote to the COMELECChairman, expressing his desire to withdraw from the political contest on account ofwhat he considered to be election irregularities; 2 and on March 19, 1988, he wrote tothe Secretary of Justice seeking legal opinion on the question, among others, ofwhether or not he was "considered automatically resigned upon . . . filing of . . . (his)certificate of candidacy," and whether or not, in case he was elected, he could "remain

appointed to any corporate offspring of a government-owned or controlledcorporation." 3 Nevertheless, Pineda took his oath of office in June, 1988 as councilor-

elect of the Municipality of Kananga, Leyte. 4 And despite so qualifying as councilor,and assuming his duties as such, he continued working for PNOC-EDC as the latter'sGeothermal Construction Secretary, Engineering and Construction Department, atTongonan Geothermal Project, Ormoc City.

On June 7, 1988, Marcelino M. Tongco, Department Manager of the Engineering andConstruction Department, PNOC-EDC, addressed an inquiry to the latter's LegalDepartment regarding the status of Manuel S. Pineda as employee in view of hiscandidacy for the office of municipal councilor. 5 In response, the Legal Departmentrendered an opinion to the effect that Manuel S. Pineda should be considered ipsofacto resigned upon the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy in November, 1987, inaccordance with Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code. 6

Pineda appealed the PNOC-EDC Legal Department's ruling to N.C. Vasquez, theVice-President of PNOC-EDC, on July 14, 1988. In his letter of appeal, 7 he invoked a"court ruling in the case of Caagusan and Donato vs. PNOC-Exploration Corp. . . . (tothe effect that) while the government-owned or controlled corporations are covered bythe Civil Service Law (as is taken to mean in Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election Code of1985) (sic), the subsidiaries or corporate offsprings are not." In the same letter hedeclared his wish to continue resign from his position as councilor/member of theSangguniang Bayan.

He also wrote a letter dated October 1, 1988 to the Department of Local Governmentinquiring about the status of his employment with PNOC-EDC in relation to his electionas member of the Sangguniang Bayan. He was advised by DLG UndersecretaryJacinto T. Rubillo, Jr., by letter dated March 31, 1989, that there was no legalimpediment to his continuing in his employment with PNOC-EDC while holding at thesame time the elective position of municipal councilor. Cited as basis byUndersecretary Rubillo was Section 2(1) Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution and thisCourt's ruling in NASECO vs. NLRC, 168 SCRA 122. Undersecretary Rubillo went onto say that Pineda could receive his per diems as municipal councilor as well as thecorresponding representation and transportation allowance [RATA] "provided thePNOC-EDC charter does not provide otherwise and public shall not be prejudiced." 8

The PNOC-EDC did not, however, share the Undersecretary's views. On January 26,1989, the PNOC-EDC, through Marcelino Tongco (Manager, Engineering andConstruction Department), notified Manuel S. Pineda in writing (1) that after havinggiven him "ample time" to make some major adjustments before . . . separation fromthe company," his employment was being terminated pursuant to Section 66 of theOmnibus Election Code, effective upon receipt of notice, and (2) that he was entitledto "proper compensation" for the services rendered by him from the time he filed hiscertificate of candidacy until his actual separation from the service. 9

On October 16, 1989, Pineda lodged a complaint for illegal dismissal in the RegionalArbitration Branch No. VIII, NLRC, Tacloban City. Impleaded as respondents were the

PNOC-EDC and the Manager of its Engineering and Construction Department,Marcelino M. Tongco. 10


4/35

4

After due proceedings, Labor Arbiter Araceli H. Maraya, to whom the case wasassigned, rendered a decision on December 28, 1990, 11 declaring Manuel S. Pineda'sdismissal from the service illegal, and ordering his reinstatement to his former positionwithout loss of seniority rights and payment of full back wages corresponding to theperiod from his illegal dismissal up to the time of actual reinstatement. The Arbiterpointed out that the ruling relied upon by PNOC-EDC to justify Pineda's dismissal fromthe service, i.e., NHA v. Juco,

12 had already been abandoned; and that "as early as

November 29, 1988," the governing principle laid down by case law in light ofSection 2 (1), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution 13 has been that government-owned or controlled corporations incorporated under the Corporation Code, thegeneral law as distinguished from those created by special charter are notdeemed to be within the coverage of the Civil Service Law, and consequently theiremployees, like those of the PNOC-EDC, are subject to the provisions of the LaborCode rather than the Civil Service Law. 14

The PNOC-EDC filed an appeal with the National Labor Relations Commission. Thelatter dismissed the appeal for lack of merit in a decision dated April 24,1991. 15PNOC-EDC sought reconsideration; 16 its motion was denied by theCommission in a Resolution dated June 21, 1991. 17

It is this decision of April 24, 1991 and the Resolution of June 21, 1991 that thePNOC-EDC seeks to be annulled and set aside in the special civil actionforcertiorariat bar. It contends that the respondent Commission gravely abused itsdiscretion:

1) when it ruled that Manuel S. Pineda was not covered by the CivilService Rules when he filed his candidacy for the 1988 localgovernment elections in November 1987;

2) when it ruled that Pineda was not covered by the OmnibusElection Code at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy for the1988 local elections;

3) when it ruled that Pineda was illegally dismissed despite the factthat he was considered automatically resigned pursuant to Section66 of the Omnibus Election Code; and

4) when it ruled that Pineda could occupy a local governmentposition and be simultaneously employed in a government-owned orcontrolled corporation, a situation patently violative of theconstitutional prohibition on additional compensation.

Acting on the petition, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining therespondent NLRC from implementing or enforcing its decision and resolution datedApril 24, 1991 and June 21, 1991, respectively.

In the comment required of him by the Court, the Solicitor General expressedagreement with the respondent Commission's holding that Manuel Pineda had indeedbeen illegally separated from his employment in the PNOC-EDC; in other words, thathis running for public office and his election thereto had no effect on his employmentwith the PNOC-EDC, a corporation not embraced within the Civil Service.

Petitioner PNOC-EDC argues that at the time that Pineda filed his certificate ofcandidacy for municipal councilor in November, 1987, the case law "applicable as faras coverage of government-owned or controlled corporations are concerned . . . ( wasto the following effect): 18

As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the issue ofjurisdiction had been resolved in a string of cases starting withthe National Housing Authority vs. Juco (134 SCRA 172) followedbyMetropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage Systemvs. Hernandez(143 SCRA 602) and the comparatively recent caseofQuimpo vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 72553, Dec. 2, 1986) inwhich this Court squarely ruled that PNOC subsidiaries, whether ornot originally created as government-owned or controlledcorporations are governed by the Civil Service Law.

This doctrine, petitioner further argues, was not "automatically reversed" by the 1987Constitution because not "amended or repealed by the Supreme Court or theCongress;" 19 and this Court's decision in November, 1988, in National ServiceCorporation vs. NLRC, supra

20 abandoning the Juco ruling "cannot be givenretroactive effect . . . (in view of ) the time-honored principle . . . that laws (judicialdecisions included) shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided(Articles 4 and 8 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines)."

Section 2 (1), Article IX of the 1987 Constitution provides as follows:

The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,

instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, includinggovernment-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.

Implicit in the provision is that government-owned or controlled corporations withoutoriginal charters i.e., organized under the general law, the Corporation Code arenot comprehended within the Civil Service Law. So has this Court construed theprovision. 21

In National Service Corporation (NASECO), et al. v. NLRC, et al., etc.,22 decided on

November 29, 1988, it was ruled that the 1987 Constitution "starkly varies" from the1973 charter upon which the Juco doctrine rested in that unlike the latter, thepresent constitution qualifies the term, "government-owned or controlled corporations,"by the phrase, "with original charter;" hence, the clear implication is that the Civil

Service no longer includes government-owned or controlled corporations without


5/35

5

original charters, i.e., those organized under the general corporation law. 23 NASECOfurther ruled that the Juco ruling should not apply retroactively, considering that priorto its promulgation on January 17, 1985, this Court had expressly recognized theapplicability of the Labor Code to government-owned or controlled corporations. 24

Lumanta, et al. v. NLRC, et al.,25 decided on February 8, 1989, made the same

pronouncement: that Juco had been superseded by the 1987 Constitution for implicitin the language of Section 2 (1), Article IX thereof, is the proposition that government-owned or controlled corporations without original charterdo not fall under the CivilService Law but under the Labor Code.

And in PNOC-EDC v. Leogardo, etc., et al., 26 promulgated on July 5, 1989, this Courtruled that conformably with the apparent intendment of the NASECO case, supra,since the PNOC-EDC, a government-owned or controlled company had beenincorporated under the general Corporation Law, its employees are subject to theprovisions of the Labor Code.

It is thus clear that the Juco doctrine prevailing at the time of the effectivity of thefundamental charter in 1987 i.e., that government-owned or controlled corporations

were part of the Civil Service and its employees subject to Civil Service laws andregulations, 27 regardless of the manner of the mode of their organization orincorporation is no longer good law, being at "stark variance," toparaphrase NASECO, with the 1987 Constitution. In other words, and contrary to thepetitioner's view, as of the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, government-owned orcontrolled corporations without original charters, or, as Mr. Justice Cruz insists in hisconcurring opinion inNASECO v. NLRC,

28 a legislative charter (i.e., those organizedunder the Corporation Code), ceased to pertain to the Civil Service and its employeescould no longer be considered as subject to Civil Service Laws, rules or regulations.

The basic question is whether an employee in a government-owned or controlledcorporations without an original charter (and therefore not covered by Civil ServiceLaw) nevertheless falls within the scope of Section 66 of the Omnibus Election

Code, viz.:

Sec. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. Anyperson holding a public appointive office or position, including activemembers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers andemployees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shallbe considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing ofhis certificate of candidacy.

When the Congress of the Philippines reviewed the Omnibus Election Code of 1985,in connection with its deliberations on and subsequent enactment of related andrepealing legislation i.e., Republic Acts Numbered 7166: "An Act Providing forSynchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing

Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes" (effective November 26, 1991),6646: "An Act Introducing Additional Reforms in the Electoral System and for Other

Purposes" (effective January 5, 1988) and 6636: "An Act Resetting the LocalElections, etc., (effective November 6, 1987), it was no doubt aware that in light ofSection 2 (1), Article IX of the 1987 Constitution: (a) government-owned or controlledcorporations were of two (2) categories those with original charters, and thoseorganized under the general law and (b) employees of these corporations were oftwo (2) kinds those covered by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulationsbecause employed in corporations having original charters, and those not subject to

Civil Service Law but to the Labor Code because employed in said corporationsorganized under the general law, or the Corporation Code. Yet Congress made noeffort to distinguish between these two classes of government-owned or controlledcorporations or their employees in the Omnibus Election Code or subsequent relatedstatutes, particularly as regards the rule that any employee " in government-owned orcontrolled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office uponthe filing of his certificate of candidacy." 29

Be this as it may, i t seems obvious to the Court that a government-owned or controlledcorporation does not lose its character as such because not possessed of an originalcharter but organized under the general law. If a corporation's capital stock is ownedby the Government, or it is operated and managed by officers charged with themission of fulfilling the public objectives for which it has been organized, it is a

government-owned or controlled corporation even if organized under the CorporationCode and not under a special statute; and employees thereof, even if not covered bythe Civil Service but by the Labor Code, are nonetheless " employees in government-owned or controlled corporations," and come within the letter of Section 66 of theOmnibus Election Code, declaring them "ipso facto resigned from . . . office upon thefiling of . . . (their) certificate of candidacy."

What all this imports is that Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code applies toofficers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, even thoseorganized under the general laws on incorporation and therefore not having an originalor legislative charter, and even if they do not fall under the Civil Service Law but underthe Labor Code. In other words, Section 66 constitutes just cause for termination ofemployment in addition to those set forth in the Labor Code, as amended.

The conclusions here reached make unnecessary discussion and resolution of theother issues raised in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the decision of public respondent NationalLabor Relations Commission dated April 24, 1991 and its Resolution dated June 21,1991 are NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE; and the complaint of Manuel S. Pineda isDISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.


6/35

6

G.R. No. 87676 December 20, 1989

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the NATIONAL PARKSDEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE,petitioner,vs.THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE NATIONAL PARKS DEVELOPMENTSUPERVISORY ASSOCIATION & THEIR MEMBERS, respondents.

Bienvenido D. Comia for respondents.

GRIO-AQUINO, J. :

The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch III, dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, thepetitioner's complaint in Civil Case No. 88- 44048 praying for a declaration of illegalityof the strike of the private respondents and to restrain the same. The Court of Appealsdenied the petitioner's petition for certiorari, hence, this petition for review.

The key issue in this case is whether the petitioner, National Parks DevelopmentCommittee (NPDC), is a government agency, or a private corporation, for on this issuedepends the right of its employees to strike.

This issue came about because although the NPDC was originally created in 1963under Executive Order No. 30, as the Executive Committee for the development of theQuezon Memorial, Luneta and other national parks, and later renamed as the NationalParks Development Committee under Executive Order No. 68, on September 21,1967, it was registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as a non-stock and non-profit corporation, known as "The National Parks DevelopmentCommittee, Inc."

However, in August, 1987, the NPDC was ordered by the SEC to show cause why itsCertificate of Registration should not be suspended for: (a) failure to submit theGeneral Information Sheet from 1981 to 1987; (b) failure to submit its FinancialStatements from 1981 to 1986; (c) failure to register its Corporate Books; and (d)failure to operate for a continuous period of at least five (5) years since September 27,1967.

On August 18, 1987, the NPDC Chairman, Amado Lansang, Jr., informed SEC thathis Office had no objection to the suspension, cancellation, or revocation of theCertificate of Registration of NPDC.

By virtue of Executive Order No. 120 dated January 30, 1989, the NPDC was attachedto the Ministry (later Department) of Tourism and provided with a separate budget

subject to audit by the Commission on Audit.

On September 10, 1987, the Civil Service Commission notified NPDC that pursuant toExecutive Order No. 120, all appointments and other personnel actions shall besubmitted through the Commission.

Meanwhile, the Rizal Park Supervisory Employees Association, consisting ofemployees holding supervisory positions in the different areas of the parks, wasorganized and it affiliated with the Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services(TUPAS) under Certificate No. 1206.

On June 15, 1987, two collective bargaining agreements were entered into betweenNPDC and NPDCEA (TUPAS local Chapter No. 967) and NPDC and NPDCSA(TUPAS Chapter No. 1206), for a period of two years or until June 30, 1989.

On March 20, 1988, these unions staged a stake at the Rizal Park, Fort Santiago,Paco Park, and Pook ni Mariang Makiling at Los Banos, Laguna, alleging unfair laborpractices by NPDC.

On March 21, 1988, NPDC filed in the Regional Trial Court in Manila, Branch III, acomplaint against the union to declare the strike illegal and to restrain it on the ground

that the strikers, being government employees, have no right to strike although theymay form a union.

On March 24, 1988, the lower court dismissed the complaint and lifted the restrainingorder for lack of jurisdiction. It held that the case "properly falls under the jurisdiction ofthe Department of Labor," because "there exists an employer-employee relationship"between NPDC and the strikers, and "that the acts complained of in the complaint,and which plaintiff seeks to enjoin in this action, fall under paragraph 5 of Article 217of the Labor Code, ..., in relation to Art. 265 of the same Code, hence, jurisdiction oversaid acts does not belong to this Court but to the Labor Arbiters of the Department ofLabor." (p. 142, Rollo.).

Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 14204). OnMarch 31, 1989, the Court of appeals affirmed the order of the trial court, hence, thispetition for review. The petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred:

1) in not holding that the NPDC employees are covered by the CivilService Law; and

2) in ruling that petitioner's labor dispute with its employees iscognizable by the Department of Labor.

We have considered the petition filed by the Solicitor General on behalf of NPDC andthe comments thereto and are persuaded that it is meritorious.


7/35

7

In Jesus P. Perlas, Jr. vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 84637-39, August 2,1989, we ruled that the NPDC is an agency of the government, not a government-owned or controlled corporation, hence, the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over itsacting director who committed estafa. We held thus:

The National Parks Development Committee was created originallyas an Executive Committee on January 14,1963, for thedevelopment of the Quezon Memorial, Luneta and other nationalparks (Executive Order No. 30). It was later designated as theNational Parks Development Committee (NPDC) on February 7,1974 (E.O. No. 69). On January 9, 1966, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcosand Teodoro F. Valencia were designated Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively (E.O. No. 3). Despite an attempt to transfer itto the Bureau of Forest Development, Department of NaturalResources, on December 1, 1975 (Letter of Implementation No. 39,issued pursuant to PD No. 830, dated November 27, 1975), theNPDC has remained under the Office of the President (E.O. No.709, dated July 27, 1981).

Since 1977 to 1981, the annual appropriations decrees listed NPDCas a regular government agency under the Office of the Presidentand allotments for its maintenance and operating expenses wereissued direct to NPDC (Exh. 10-A Perlas, Item No. 2, 3). (Italicsours.)

Since NPDC is a government agency, its employees are covered by civil service rulesand regulations (Sec. 2, Article IX, 1987 Constitution). Its employees are civil serviceemployees (Sec. 14, Executive Order No. 180).

While NPDC employees are allowed under the 1987 Constitution to organize and joinunions of their choice, there is as yet no law permitting them to strike. In case of alabor dispute between the employees and the government, Section 15 of Executive

Order No. 180 dated June 1, 1987 provides that the Public Sector Labor-Management Council, not the Department of Labor and Employment, shall hear thedispute. Clearly, the Court of Appeals and the lower court erred in holding that thelabor dispute between the NPDC and the members of the NPDSA is cognizable by theDepartment of Labor and Employment.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision of the Court of Appealsin CA-G.R. SP No. 14204 is hereby set aside. The private respondents' complaintshould be filed in the Public Sector Labor-Management Council as provided in Section15 of Executive Order No. 180. Costs against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 109095-109107 February 23, 1995

ELDEPIO LASCO, RODOLFO ELISAN, URBANO BERADOR, FLORENTINOESTOBIO, MARCELINO MATURAN, FRAEN BALIBAG, CARMELITO GAJOL,DEMOSTHENES MANTO, SATURNINO BACOL, SATURNINO LASCO, RAMONLOYOLA, JOSENIANO B. ESPINA, all represented by MARIANO R.ESPINA, petitioner,vs.UNITED NATIONS REVOLVING FUND FOR NATURAL RESOURCES

EXPLORATION (UNRFNRE) represented by its operations manager, DR.KYRIACOS LOUCA, OSCAR N. ABELLA, LEON G. GONZAGA, JR., MUSIB M.BUAT, Commissioners of National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), FifthDivision, Cagayan de Oro City and IRVING PETILLA, Labor Arbiter of ButuanCity, respondents.

QUIASON, J. :

This is a petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set asidethe Resolution dated January 25, 1993 of the National Labor Relations Commission

(NLRC), Fifth Division, Cagayan de Oro City.

We dismiss the petition.

I

Petitioners were dismissed from their employment with private respondent, the UnitedNations Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration (UNRFNRE), which is aspecial fund and subsidiary organ of the United Nations. The UNRFNRE is involved ina joint project of the Philippine Government and the United Nations for explorationwork in Dinagat Island.

Petitioners are the complainants in NLRC Cases Nos. SRAB 10-03-00067-91 to 10-03-00078-91 and SRAB 10-07-00159-91 for illegal dismissal and damages.

In its Motion to Dismiss, private respondent alleged that respondent Labor Arbiter hadno jurisdiction over its personality since it enjoyed diplomatic immunity pursuant to the1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. In supportthereof, private respondent attached a letter from the Department of Foreign Affairsdated August 26, 1991, which acknowledged its immunity from suit. The letterconfirmed that private respondent, being a special fund administered by the UnitedNations, was covered by the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of theUnited Nations of which the Philippine Government was an original signatory (Rollo, p.21).


8/35

8

On November 25, 1991, respondent Labor Arbiter issued an order dismissing thecomplaints on the ground that private respondent was protected by diplomaticimmunity. The dismissal was based on the letter of the Foreign Office datedSeptember 10, 1991.

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied. Thus, an appeal was filed with theNLRC, which affirmed the dismissal of the complaints in its Resolution dated January25, 1993.

Petitioners filed the instant petition forcertiorariwithout first seeking a reconsiderationof the NLRC resolution.

II

Article 223 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, provides that decisionsof the NLRC are final and executory. Thus, they may only be questionedthrough certiorarias a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Ordinarily, certiorarias a special civil action will not lie unless a motion forreconsideration is first filed before the respondent tribunal, to allow it an opportunity tocorrect its assigned errors (Liberty Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 222SCRA 37 [1993]).

In the case at bench, petitioners' failure to file a motion for reconsideration is fatal tothe instant petition. Moreover, the petition lacks any explanation for such omission,which may merit its being considered as falling under the recognized exceptions to thenecessity of filing such motion.

Notwithstanding, we deem it wise to give due course to the petition because of theimplications of the issue in our international relations.

Petitioners argued that the acts of mining exploration and exploitation are outside theofficial functions of an international agency protected by diplomatic immunity. Evenassuming that private respondent was entitled to diplomatic immunity, petitionersinsisted that private respondent waived it when it engaged in exploration work andentered into a contract of employment with petitioners.

Petitioners, likewise, invoked the constitutional mandate that the State shall afford fullprotection to labor and promote full employment and equality of employmentopportunities for all (1987 Constitution, Art. XIII, Sec. 3).

The Office of the Solicitor General is of the view that private respondent is covered bythe mantle of diplomatic immunity. Private respondent is a specialized agency of theUnited Nations. Under Article 105 of the Charter of the United Nations:

1. The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of its Members suchprivileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of itspurposes.

2. Representatives of the Members of the United Nations andofficials of the Organization shall similarly enjoy such privileges andimmunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of theirfunctions in connection with the organization.

Corollary to the cited article is the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of theSpecialized Agencies of the United Nations, to which the Philippines was a signatory(Vol. 1, Philippine Treaty Series, p. 621). We quote Sections 4 and 5 of Article IIIthereof:

Sec. 4. The specialized agencies, their property and assets,wherever located and by whomsoever held shall enjoy immunityfrom every form of legal process except insofar as in any particularcase they have expressly waived their immunity. It is, however,understood that no waiver of immunity shall extend to any measure

of execution (Emphasis supplied).

Sec. 5. The premises of the specialized agencies shall beinviolable. The property and assets of the specialized agencies,wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall be immune fromsearch, requisition, confiscation, expropriation and any other form ofinterference, whether by executive, administrative, judicial orlegislative action (Emphasis supplied).

As a matter of state policy as expressed in the Constitution, the PhilippineGovernment adopts the generally accepted principles of international law (1987Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 2). Being a member of the United Nations and a party to theConvention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the

United Nations, the Philippine Government adheres to the doctrine of immunitygranted to the United Nations and its specialized agencies. Both treaties have theforce and effect of law.

In World Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242, (1972), we had occasion torule that:

It is a recognized principle of international law and under our systemof separation of powers thatdiplomatic immunity is essentially apolitical question and courts should refuse to look beyond adetermination by the executive branch of the government, andwhere the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed bythe executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is

then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon


9/35

9

appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of thegovernment, the Solicitor General or other officer acting under hisdirection. Hence, in adherence to the settled principle that courtsmay not so exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and detention ofproperty, as to embarrass the executive arm of the government inconducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that " in suchcases the judicial department of (this) government follows the action

of the political branch and will not embarrass the latter by assumingan antagonistic jurisdiction (Emphasis supplied).

We recognize the growth of international organizations dedicated to specific universalendeavors, such as health, agriculture, science and technology and environment. It isnot surprising that their existence has evolved into the concept of internationalimmunities. The reason behind the grant of privileges and immunities to internationalorganizations, its officials and functionaries is to secure them legal and practicalindependence in fulfilling their duties (Jenks, International Immunities 17 [1961]).

Immunity is necessary to assure unimpeded performance of their functions. Thepurpose is "to shield the affairs of international organizations, in accordance withinternational practice, from political pressure or control by the host country to theprejudice of member States of the organization, and to ensure the unhamperedperformance of their functions" (International Catholic Migration Commission v.Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 [1990]).

In the International Catholic Migration Commissioncase, we held that there is noconflict between the constitutional duty of the State to protect the rights of workers andto promote their welfare, and the grant of immunity to international organizations.Clauses on jurisdictional immunity are now standard in the charters of the internationalorganizations to guarantee the smooth discharge of their functions.

The diplomatic immunity of private respondent was sufficiently established by theletter of the Department of Foreign Affairs, recognizing and confirming the immunity of

UNRFNRE in accordance with the 1946 Convention on Privileges and Immunities ofthe United Nations where the Philippine Government was a party. The issue whetheran international organization is entitled to diplomatic immunity is a "political question"and such determination by the executive branch is conclusive on the courts and quasi -judicial agencies (The Holy See v. Hon. Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr., G.R. No. 101949,Dec. 1, 1994; International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, supra).

Our courts can only assume jurisdiction over private respondent if it expressly waivedits immunity, which is not so in the case at bench (Convention on the Privileges andImmunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, Art. III, Sec. 4).

Private respondent is not engaged in a commercial venture in the Philippines. Itspresence here is by virtue of a joint project entered into by the Philippine Government

and the United Nations for mineral exploration in Dinagat Island. Its mission is not to

exploit our natural resources and gain pecuniarily thereby but to help improve thequality of life of the people, including that of petitioners.

This is not to say that petitioner have no recourse. Section 31 of the Convention onthe Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations statesthat "each specialized agency shall make a provision for appropriate modes ofsettlement of: (a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of privatecharacter to which the specialized agency is a party."

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-9245. October 11, 1956.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. DOMINADOR PANIS, Defendant,

ALLIANCE INSURANCE & SURETY CO., INC., Petitioner-Appellant.

D E C I S I O N

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Dominador Panis was accused of illegal possession of firearm in the Municipal Court of the

City of Legaspi. He was given provisional liberty on a bond filed by the Visayan Surety and

Insurance Corporation. Because of his failure to appear when required by the court, an order

was issued for the confiscation of his bond. Subsequently, another bail bond was filed by the

World Wide Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. also for his provisional release. On September 17,

1952 the Municipal Court forwarded the case to the Court of First Instance of Albay for trial

on the merits, it appearing that this case had been pending trial since July 17, 1950, and

every time that this case was set for hearing for 8 times now, the trial had been postponed all

at the request of the accused.

On September 19, 1952, the city attorney filed an information against the accused for same

offense, and, thereafter, upon petition of the city attorney, the court ordered on September

3, 1953, the confiscation of the bonds filed for the accused on account of his failure to appear

on the date of the hearing, giving the bondsmen 30 days within which to produce their

principal and to show the cause why judgment should not be rendered against them for the

amount of their bonds. On December 23, 1953, the Visayan Surety & Insurance Corporation

and the World Wide Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., filed motions (1) to surrender the accused,

(2) to lift the order of confiscation, and, (3) to have their bonds cancelled. On the same date,

the accused filed a motion to file a new bond promising that he will always appear in the

future hearing to be scheduled by this Honorable Court and will never jump up his bail. This

motion having been favorably acted upon, the herein, Appellant, Alliance Insurance & Surety

Co., Inc., filed a bond in the amount of P2,000 for the provisional release of the accused.


10/35

10

On January 29, 1954, Appellantwas duly notified that the case would be heard on February

10, 1954. On account of the failure of the accused to appear on said date, the court ordered

the confiscation of the bond and gave Appellant30 days within which to produce the person

of the accused and to explain its reasons if any, why judgment should not be rendered against

it for the amount of the bond. Copy of this order was received by Appellanton February 16,

1954. On February 23, 1954, the city attorney filed a motion to dismiss the case alleging that,

upon reinvestigation, it was belatedly shown that on July 13, 1950, the date when the accuse

was found in possession of a firearm, the Philippine Constabulary had issued in his favor a

temporary permit to possess a firearm for a period of 30 days from June 30, 1950.

Upon petition of the provincial fiscal filed on July 6, 1954, the court issued an order of

execution of the order of forfeiture entered on February 10, 1954 not only of the bonds filed

by the original bondsmen, but also of the bond of P2,000 filed by Appellantand, on July 29,

1954, acting upon the motion to dismiss filed by the government the court dismissed the case

against the accused. On September 24, 1954, Appellant filed a motion to set aside the order

of execution in so far as its bond is concerned, praying at the same time that the same be

cancelled, which motion was denied for lack of merit on September 25, 1954. Its motion for

reconsideration having been denied, Appellant interposed the present appeal.

It appears that Appellant, Alliance Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., is the third bonding company

that was secured by the accused when he was surrendered to the court by his previousbondsmen because of his several failures to appear when his presence was required by the

court, andAppellantonly came in on December 22, 1953. It also appears that on January 29,

1954, the accused was notified that the case would be heard on February 10, 1954, and when

he again failed to appear, the court ordered the confiscation of the bond and

gaveAppellant30 days within which to produce the person of the accused and to explain its

reasons, if any, why judgment should not be rendered against it for the amount of the bond.

Copy of the order was received by the Appellanton February 16, 1954. On February 23, 1954,

the government filed a motion to dismiss because it was found that the accused had a

temporary permit to possess the firearm involved, but before acting on said motion to

dismiss, the court, on petition of the provincial fiscal, issued on July 7, 1954, an order of

execution of the order of forfeiture of the bonds entered on February 10, 1954. It was only on

July 29, 1954 that the court dismissed the case against the accused.

It therefore, appears that the motion to dismiss the case was filed by the city attorney only 13

days after the order of confiscation of the bond and within the period of 30 days given

toAppellantwithin which to show cause why judgment should not be rendered against it for

the amount of the bond. But the court instead of acting on the motion to dismiss

immediately, it first ordered the execution of the order of confiscation even if the same was

done upon the petition of the city attorney. Considering that the motion to dismiss the case

was filed before the expiration of the 30-day period granted to Appellantto explain its

reasons why judgment should not be rendered against it for the amount of the bond, we are

of the opinion that the court has acted somewhat harshly against Appellanteven if the

explanation of the latter for its failure to produce the accused came months after. Said

motion to dismiss having been filed before the expiration of the 30 day period, Appellanthad

reason to expect that the same would be acted upon before considering the motion for

execution, which circumstance has apparently induced it to believe that the production of the

accused was unnecessary. And when the order of execution came, Appellant lost no time in

filing a motion for reconsideration wherein it explained the steps it had taken leading to the

arrest of the accused. Thus, in the affidavit submitted by the arresting officer employed

byAppellantto produce the accused, the officer stated that the reason why he was not able

to arrest and bring the accused before the court was that the accused told him that he could

only be brought a dead body, and when confronted with this attitude, he sought the

assistance of the local police force of Guimba, Nueva Ecija, but the assistance was denied him

unless he could present a warrant of arrest issued by the court. Pertinent portions of the

affidavit are quoted hereunder:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

5. Upon my arrival at Guimba, Nueva Ecija, I informed the accused of my mission to arrest

him because of his failure to appear at the trial of his case in court and because of the order

of confiscation issued by this Honorable Court.

6. I was informed by him that he is duly authorized to possess the firearm, by virtue of a

permit issued by the Executive Officer, Capt. Fermin Peralta, of the Philippine Constabulary,

Firearm and Explosive Section. He also intimated to me that if inspite of the fact that he has

supporting documents showing that he is legally authorized to handle firearms, and should I

insist he will have no alternative but to resist, and can only bring him to court a dead body.

(Annex B pp. 1 & 2, paragraphs 5 and 6; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryEmphasis supplied.)

While it has been held that That fact that a criminal prosecution is finally dismissed on the

motion of the fiscal does not relieve the bondsmen of the accused from the effects of a

previous forfeiture of the bond consequent upon non-appearance of the accused at the time

originally set for hearing (People vs. Uy Eng Hui, 49 Phil., 954), however, it has also been held

that the question whether a bondsman may be relieved of the effects of an order of

confiscation and of his liability under the bond is a matter that is addressed to the sound

discretion of the court and it may be given favorable consideration if there are good reasons

that justify it. (People vs. Alamada, 89 Phil., 1; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryPeople vs. Calabon,

53 Phil., 945.) The explanation given by Appellantof the efforts it has made in securing the

arrest of the accused, plus the fact that a motion to dismiss was filed within the period of 30

days granted said Appellantto give such explanation, constitute in our opinion sufficient

justification for the relief of saidAppellant.

Wherefore, the order appealed from dated July 27, 1954 ordering the execution of the order

of confiscation of the bond ofAppellant is hereby set aside as regards Appellant, wi

G.R. No. 113547 February 9, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.ANITA BAUTISTA y LATOJA, accused-appellant.


11/35

11

PUNO, J. :

Four (4) separate Informations 1were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila(Branch XLI) against accused ANITA BAUTISTA y LATOJA, charging her with thecrimes ofIllegal Recruitment In Large Scale2and Estafa. 3

Upon arraignment on January 29, 1992, accused pleaded NOT GUILTY.

4

The four (4)cases were tried jointly.

After trial, the court a quo found accused guilty as charged. 5In the illegal recruitmentcase, she was meted the penalty of life imprisonment and ordered to pay P100,000.00 as fine. In the estafa cases, she was sentenced from two (2) years, eight(8) months and twenty one (21) days ofprision correccionalas minimum, to six (6)years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days ofprision mayoras maximum for eachcount of estafa, and pay each complainant the amount of P40,000.00 as civilindemnity.

Accused, thru counsel, filed her Notice of Appeal, dated March 6, 1992, indicating herdesire to elevate her case to this Court. 6The records of the case were, however,

transmitted by the trial court to the Court of Appeals. In its Decision7

dated November26, 1993, the appellate court affirmed appellant's conviction. However, it modified thepenalty for the three (3) estafa cases. The dispositive portion of the decision of theappellate court states:

WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 92-102377, the Court findsaccused Anita Bautista GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLEDOUBTof the crime of illegal recruitment, described and penalizedunder Article 13 (b), Article 38 (a) and (b) and Article 39 (a) of theLabor Code, and imposes upon her the penalty of life imprisonmentand fine of P100,000.00. . . .

Insofar as Criminal Case No. 92-102378, Criminal Case No. 92-

102379 and Criminal Case No. 92-102380, the Court rendersjudgment, finding accused Anita Bautista GUILTY BEYONDREASONABLE DOUBTof the crime of estafa, described andpenalized under Article 315 par. 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code,and sentencing her in each criminal case to the indeterminatepenalty of (sic) from FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS ofprision correccional, as minimum, to NINE (9) YEARS ofprisionmayor, as maximum, and to pay each complainants Remigio Fortes,Anastacio Amor and Dominador Costales, the amount ofP40,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,with costs. Accordingly, the penalty imposed upon accused by thelower court isMODIFIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Pursuant to Section 13 of Rule 124, the appellate court elevated to us the records ofthe case for review. Notice was given to appellant for her to file additional Brief if sheso desires. None was filed in her behalf.

The facts are as found by the appellate court:

Sometime in August 1991, accused Anita Bautista approachedRomeo Paguio at the latter's restaurant at 565 Padre Faura St.,Manila, and offered job openings abroad. At that time, Paguio hadrelatives who were interested to work abroad. Accused, who alsooperated a restaurant nearby at Padre Faura, informed Paguio thatshe knew somebody who could facilitate immediate employment inTaiwan for Paguio's relatives. Accused Anita Bautista introducedRosa Abrero to Paguio. Abrero informed him that the applicantscould leave for Taiwan within a period of one-month from thepayment of placement fees. They informed Paguio that theplacement fee was P40,000.00 for each person. Paguio contactedhis relatives, complainants Remigio Fortes and Dominador Costaleswho were his brothers-in-law, and Anastacio Amor, a cousin, wholost no time raising the needed money and gave the same to

Paguio. The three were to work as factory workers and were to bepaid $850.00 monthly salary each. Paguio gave Rosa AbreroP20,000.00, which would be used in following up the papers of thecomplainants; later he gave accused P40,000.00 and P60,000.00 inseparate amounts, totalling P100,000.00, as the remaining balance.Abrero and accused Bautista promised Paguio and complainantsthat the latter could leave for Taiwan before September 25, 1991.As September 25, 1991 approached, accused Bautista informedPaguio and complainants that there was a delay in the latter'sdeparture because their tickets and visas had not yet beenreleased. Accused re-scheduled the complainants' departure toOctober 10, 1991. Came October 10, 1991, and complainants werestill not able to leave. Paguio then required accused Bautista to sign

the "Acknowledgment Receipt," dated October 11, 1991, in whichaccused admitted having received the sum of P100,000.00 fromPaguio, representing payment of plane tickets, visas and othertravel documents (Exhibit A). Paguio asked accused to returncomplainants' money; accused, however, promised thatcomplainants could leave for Taiwan before Christmas. FromPOEA, Paguio secured a certification, dated January 9, 1992attesting that Annie Bautista and Rosa Abrero are not licensed orauthorized to recruit workers for overseas employment (Exhibit B).Complainants Fortes, Amor and Costales, as well as Paguio, gavetheir written statements at the Office of the Assistant ChiefDirectorial Staff for Intelligence of the WPDC, complaining abouttheir being victims of illegal recruitment by Rosa Abrero and AnnieBautista (Exhibits C, D, E and F).


12/35

12

The issue boils down to whether or not reasonable doubt exists to warrant theacquittal of appellant Anita Bautista.

We find none.

The Labor Code defines recruitment and placementas referring to "any act of

canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers,and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment,locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Providedthat any person or entity which, inany manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall bedeemed engaged in recruitment and placement." 8

It is settled that the essential elements of the crime of illegal recruitment in largescale are: (1) the accused engages in the recruitment and placement of workers, asdefined under Article 13 (b) or in any prohibited activities under Article 34 of the LaborCode; (2) accused has not complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary ofLabor and Employment, particularly with respect to the securing of a license or anauthority to recruit and deploy workers, either locally or overseas; and (3) accusedcommits the same against three (3) or more persons, individually or a group. 9

For her exculpation, appellant denied she recruited complainants for employmentabroad. She claimed Romeo Paguio was the one who approached her and asked forsomeone who could help his relatives work abroad. She thus introduced Rosa Abrero,a regular customer at her restaurant, to Paguio. In turn, Paguio introduced Abrero tocomplainants in their subsequent meeting. Further, appellant testified she was presentduring the recruitment of complainants since their meeting with Abrero was held at herrestaurant. Appellant likewise stressed she did not receive the amount ofP100,000.00, as stated in the Acknowledgment Receipt, dated October 11, 1991, butmerely acknowledged that said sum was received by Rosa Abrero from RomeoPaguio.

Appellant's defense does not persuade us.

Appellant's active participation in the recruitment process of complainants belies herclaim of innocence. Complainants' recruitment was initiated by appellant during herinitial meeting with Romeo Paguio. She gave the impression to Romeo Paguio and thecomplainants that her cohort, Rosa Abrero, could send workers for employmentabroad. She introduced Rosa Abrero to Romeo Paguio. Both women assured thedeparture of complainants to Taiwan within one month from payment of the placementfee of P40,000.00 per person. They even claimed that complainants would work asfactory workers for a monthly salary of $850.00 per person. Moreover, it was appellantwho informed Romeo Paguio that complainants' scheduled trip to Taiwan would be onOctober 10, 1991, instead of the original departure date of September 25, 1991, dueto some problems on their visas and travel documents.

Her close association with Rosa Abrero is further strengthened by theAcknowledgment Receipt, dated October 11, 1991, which was prepared by RomeoPaguio for the protection of complainants. The receipt reads:

ACKNOWLEDGMENT RECEIPT

P100,000.00 October 11, 1991

RECEIVED FROM: ROMEO PAGUIO, the amount of ONEHUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS, PhilippineCurrency, representing the payment (of) plane ticket, visa and othertravel documents.

CONFORME:

By:

(Sgd.) ROMEO PAGUIO (Sgd.) MRS. ANNIE BAUTISTA

c/o Rosa Abrero

SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:

(Sgd.) Anastacio Amor Remigio Fortes

Dominador Costales

Said receipt shows that appellant collected the P100,000.00 for and in behalf of RosaAbrero, and bolsters Romeo Paguio's allegation that he gave P20,000.00 to RosaAbrero, while the rest was received by appellant. Notably, in its Decision, dated

February 14, 1992, the trial court observed:

The denial(s) made by the accused of any participation in therecruitment of the complainants do not persuade. The evidence athand shows that she acknowledged in writing the receipt ofP100,000.00 from witness Romeo Paguio who was all alongrepresenting the complainants in securing employment for them inTaiwan. Her denial of having actually received the money in the sumof P100,000.00, the receipt of which she voluntarily signed is notconvincing. By her own admission, she is a restaurant operator. Inother words, she is a business woman. As such, she ought to knowthe consequences in signing any receipt. That she signed Exh. "A"only goes to show that fact, as claimed by Romeo Paguio, that she

actually received the same.


13/35

13

It is uncontroverted that appellant and Rosa Abrero are notauthorized or licensed toengage in recruitment activities. 10 Despite the absence of such license or authority,appellant participated in the recruitment of complainants. Since there are at least three(3) victims in this case, appellant is correctly held criminally liable for illegalrecruitment in large scale. 11

We shall now discuss appellant's culpability under the Revised Penal Code,specifically Article 315 thereof, inasmuch as her conviction for offenses under theLabor Code does not avert punishment for offenses punishable by other laws. 12

The elements ofestafa are as follows: (1) that the accused defrauded another (a) byabuse of confidence, or (b) by means of deceit; and (2) that damage or prejudicecapable of pecuniary estimation is caused by the offended party or third party.

In the case at bench, it is crystal clear that complainants were deceived by appellantand Rosa Abrero into believing that there were, indeed, jobs waiting for them inTaiwan. The assurances given by these two (2) women made complainants part withwhatever resources they have, in exchange for what they thought was a promising jobabroad. Thus, they sold their carabaos, mortgaged or sold their parcels of land and

even contracted loans to raise the much needed money, the P40,000.00 placementfee, required of them by accused and Rosa Abrero.

The penalty forestafa depends on the amount defrauded. Article 315 of the RevisedPenal Code provides: "the penalty ofprision correccionalin its maximum periodto prision mayorin its minimum period (or imprisonment ranging from 4 years, 2months and 1 day to 8 years), if the amount of the fraud is over P12,000.00 but doesnotexceedP22,000.00 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penaltyprovided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period(6 years, 8 monthsand 21 days to 8 years), adding one year for each additional P10,000.00 pesos; butthe total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such case,and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for thepurpose of other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prisionmayororreclusion temporal, as the case may be.

The amount defrauded in such estafa case (Criminal Case Nos. 92-102378, 92-102379, 92-102380) is P 40,000.00. As prescribed in Article 315, supra, the penaltyshould be imposed in the maximum period(6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8years) plus one (1) year, there being only one (1) P10,000.00 in excess ofP22,000.00. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty shouldbe taken from the aforesaid period, while the minimum term of the indeterminatepenalty shall be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, that is prisioncorreccionalin its minimum and medium periods which has a duration of 6 months, 1day to 4 year and 2 months.

Considering the foregoing, the appellant court correctly imposed the indeterminate

penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months ofprision correccional, as minimum, tonine (9) years ofprision mayor, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals, findingappellant ANITA BAUTISTA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of IllegalRecruitment in Large Scale (Criminal Case Nos. 92-102377) and Estafa (CriminalCase Nos. 92-102378, 92-102379, 92-102380) is AFFIRMED. No Costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 133563. March 4, 1999]

BRIDGET BONENG Y BAGAWILI, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PURISIMA, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the RevisedRules of Court, seeking to set aside the Decision[1]of the Court of Appeals[2]dated March 31,1998 in CA G.R. CR No. 17133, affirming in its entirety the judgment of conviction handeddown by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Baguio City, finding the petitioner herein guilty

beyond reasonable ofIllegal Recruitmentand sentencing her to a prison term of four (4) years,as minimum, to eight (8) years, as maximum, and to pay the costs.

Petitioner Bridget Boneng y Bagawili was indicated for a violation of Article 38 (a), inrelation to Articles 13 (b), 16, 34 and 39 (b) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended by

Presidential Decree No. 1920, in Criminal Case No. 12104 before the Regional Trial Court,Branch 6, Baguio City, under an Information, alleging:

That on or about the 24th day of September 1993, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and

within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then private

person, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously engage in the following illegal

recruitment activities to wit: by promising, for profit to complainant MA. TERESA GARCIA

employment abroad under false pretenses and fraudulent acts, without any license or authority

from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, Department of Labor andEmployment, Manila, in violation of the aforecited provision of law.

On December 9, 1993, with the assistance of counsel, she was arraigned thereunder andpleaded NOT GUILTY to the crime charged. Trial ensued, and after presenting the
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/mar99/133563.htm#_edn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/mar99/133563.htm#_edn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/mar99/133563.htm#_edn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/mar99/133563.htm#_edn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/mar99/133563.htm#_edn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/mar99/133563.htm#_edn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/mar99/133563.htm#_edn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/mar99/133563.htm#_edn1


14/35

14

witnesses, SPO3 Jesus Nevado, SPO3 Romeo Dulay and Maria Teresa Garcia, anddocumentary evidence consisting of Exhibits A to G, the prosecution made a formal offer

of evidence and rested its case.

On April 7, 1994, after the prosecution had rested, the accused (now petitioner) presenteda demurrer to evidence and manifested that she was waiving the right to adduce evidence forthe defense, and was submitting the case for decision on the basis of the evidence on record.

On May 5, 1994, the trial court came out with its Decision, finding petitioner guilty ofthe offense charged and sentencing her thus:

Wherefore, the Court Finds (sic), accused Bridget Boneng guilty beyond reasonable doubt for

the offense of Violation of Article 38(a) in relation to Article 13(b), 16, 34 and 39(c) of PD 442

as amended by PD 1920 (Illegal Recruitment) and sentences her, applying the indeterminatesentence law, to an imprisonment ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS as Minimum to EIGHT (8)

YEARS as Maximum and to pay the costs.

Not satisfied with the verdict below, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals,contending that the testimony of the complainant, Ma. Teresa Garcia, is perjured, hearsay,uncorroborated and tainted with material inconsistencies and she (petitioner) should have been

acquitted because the documentary evidence taken from her office was seized in violation ofher constitutional right against illegal search and seizure.

On March 31, 1998, the Court of Appeals decided as follows:

In sum appellant was correctly found to be l iable for violation of Art. 38(a) in relation to

Articles 13(b), 16, 34 and 39 (c) of P.D. 442, as amended.

WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of appellant in conformity with the law and evidence, the

same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Without resorting first to a motion for reconsideration, the petitioner came to this Courtvia the present petition, placing reliance practically on the same grounds she invoked and reliedupon before the Court of Appeals.

Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the judgment convicting petitioner for illegalrecruitment? This is the crucial issue at bar.

Petitioner theorizes that the Court of Appeals erred in not considering the non-existenceand non-admissibility of the documents upon which the trial court based herconviction. According to her, the prosecution should have established that other than Ma.Teresa Garcia, there were other applicants for overseas employment in the office of petitionerwhere she was allegedly conducting her recruitment business and activities. In the absence ofsworn statements from the other applicants, petitioner maintains that the motive of the

prosecution witnesses, whose testimonies she branded as inconsistent with their affidavits, in

carrying out the entrapment, was to fleece money from her.

Petitioner, in effect, is asking this Court to review the factual findings by the trial courtand the Court of Appeals, to examine subject documents, and evaluate and assign the probativevalue of the evidence, the same evidence looked into below, and determine once again thecredibility of the witnesses.

To begin with, this Court is not a trier of facts. It is not its function to examine anddetermine the weight of the evidence supporting the assailed decision. In Philippine Air lines,

I nc. vs. Court of Appeals,

[3]

the Court held that factual findings of the Court of Appeals whichare supported by substantial evidence are binding, final and conclusive upon the Supreme

Court. So also, well-established is the rule that factual findings of the Court of Appeals areconclusive on the parties and carry even more weight when the said court affirms the factualfindings of the trial court.[4]Moreover, well entrenched is the prevailing jurisprudence thatonly errors of law and not of facts are reviewable by this Court in a petition for review

on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, which applies with greater force tothe Petition under consideration because the factual findings by the Court of Appeals are in fullagreement with what the trial court found.

It bears stressing that by opting not to present any controverting evidence during the trial,

petitioner waived her right to come forward with evidence for the defense and foreclosed herright to interpose any objection to the prosecutions evidence upon appeal x x x.[5]

Similarly untenable is petitioners stance that she is not an illegal recruiter, arguing thatthe documents introduced to substantiate her recruitment activities were neither identified normarked by the prosecution.

In People vs. Benemeri to, 264 SCRA 677, 691, the Court enumerated the elements ofillegal recruitment to be as follows:

(1) the person charged with the crime must have undertaken recruitment activities (or any of

the activities enumerated in Article 34 of the Labor Code, as amended); and

(2) the said person does not have a license or authority to do so.

In affirming the findings arrived at by the court a quo, the Court of Appeals ratiocinated:

The prosecutions evidence shows that appellant is a non -licensee or non-holder of authority

as required by law. Proof of this is a certification (Exh. C) dated 18 August 1993 issued bythe POEA-REU, Baguio City, which reads:

CERTIFICATION

Thi s is to certi fy that the name BRIDGETTE BUNEG (sic) per existing and available

records from thi s Offi ce is not licensed nor auth orized to recrui t workers for overseas

employment in the City of Baguio or any part of the region.

When the trial prosecutor was about to present the signatory of the above document, the

defense readily admitted its authenticity (TSN, 03 March 1994, p. 17). Appellant expressly
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/mar99/133563.htm#_edn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/mar99/133563.htm#_edn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/mar99/133563.htm#_edn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/mar99/133563.htm#_edn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/mar99/133563.htm#_edn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/mar99/133563.htm#_edn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/mar99/133563.htm#_edn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/mar99/133563.htm#_edn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/mar99/133563.htm#_edn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/mar99/133563.htm#_edn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/mar99/133563.htm#_edn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/mar99/133563.htm#_edn3


15/35

15

waived her right to rebut this allegation and in effect judicially admitted she was not a licenseeor holder of authority. Consequently, such evidence can be validly taken against her.

In this context, a non-licensee or non-holder of authority has been defined in People vs.

Diaz, (supra)[6]as:

x x x any person, corporation or entity which has not been issued a valid license or authority

to engage in recruitment and placement by the Secretary of Labor or whose license orauthority has been suspended, revoked or cancelled by the POEA or the Secretary x x x .

Anent the second element, Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended, states:

Art. 13 (b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as any act of canvassing,

enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes

referrals, contact services, promising or advertising abroad, whether for profit or not;

provided that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for fee employmentto two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.

The evidence shows that appellant promised Garcia employment abroad for fee. Garcia

testified:Q: After the secretary has introduced Mrs. Boneng to you to be her boss, what did you

do?

A: I asked from Bridget Boneng the rules and what country can I apply, sir.

Q: Did Mrs. Boneng answer you?

A: Yes, sir, she told me in Hongkong.

x x x

Q: ... what things did you talk about with Mrs. Boneng?

A: I asked Mrs. Bridget Boneng how much will I spend in applying for Hongkong and

she told me that it was around P30,000.00 and she told me also to submit my birthcertificate and for the passport, she will (sic) take charge of it but I will (sic) add alittle amount for the processing of my papers.

x x x

Q: What did Mrs. Boneng tell you when you told her that you have (sic) P2,000.00 and ifpossible, she would work first for your passport and your medical examination?

A: Bridget Boneng told me to at least solicit the amount of P10,000.00 as down payment

because there is an on going interview in Manila the following Sunday.

Q: What happen after that?

A: She accepted the amount of P2,000.00 and I told her that I will (sic) add more.

x x x

Q: Was there a receipt given by Bridget Boneng to you when you deliveredthe P2,000.00?

A: He (sic) does not issue a receipt, she told me that.

Q: To whom did you personally deliver the P2,000.00?

A: To Mrs. Boneng

(TSN., 24 February 1994, pp. 18-21).

From the aforecited testimony, it is decisively clear that aside from the promise to deploy

complainant Ma. Teresa Garcia in Hongkong, the petitioner accepted a part of the P30,000.00fee she was collecting for her recruitment work.

Neither do we discern any tenability in petitioners contention that the prosecutionshould have secured sworn statements from the other applicants to prove

her(petitioners) recruitment activities. In People vs. Pabalan, 262 SCRA 574, it wassuccinctly ruled that the testimony of a single prosecution witness, where credible and

positive, is sufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused. There is nolaw which requires that the testimony of a single witness has to be corroborated, except where

expressly mandated in determining the value and credibility of evidence. Witnesses are to beweighed, not numbered. In People vs. Pani s, 142 SCRA 665, the Court also held that any ofthe acts mentioned in the basic rule in Article 13 (b) will constitute recruitment and placementeven if only one prospective worker is involved.[7]

Petitioner complains that the Court of Appeals ignored an avalanche of materialinconsistencies[8]tainting the testimony of complainant Ma. Teresa Garcia. Records disclose,however, that the said court did pass upon such aspect of the case but adjudged the same trivialand minor inconsistencies. Ratiocinated the Court of Appeals:

xxx In this connection appellant has referred to inconsistencies as to the narration of events

that transpired on 24 September 1994. But these are trivial and minor points. In People vs.Trilles, 254 SCRA 633, the Supreme Court held:

Trivial inconsequential inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses do not meritconsideration and cannot destroy the credibility of said witnesses in the face of the positive and

categorical identification of the accused as the perpetrator(s) of the crime."[9]

Petitioner also questions the legality and validity of her arrest sans a warrant. On thisscore, the Court of Appeals erred not in affirming the ruling by the trial court of origin that the

present case falls under Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court, to wit:

Sec. 5 Arrest Without Warrant; when lawful- A peace officer or a private person may,

without a warrant, arrest a person:

x x x
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/mar99/133563.htm#_edn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/mar99/133563.htm#_edn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/mar99/133563.htm#_edn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/mar99/133563.htm#_edn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/mar99/133563.htm#_edn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/mar99/133563.htm#_edn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/mar99/133563.htm#_edn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/mar99/133563.htm#_edn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/mar99/133563.htm#_edn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/mar99/133563.htm#_edn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/mar99/133563.htm#_edn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/mar99/133563.htm#_edn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/mar99/133563.htm#_edn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/mar99/133563.htm#_edn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/mar99/133563.htm#_edn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/mar99/133563.htm#_edn6


16/35

16

(b) when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts

indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;

The Court of Appeals rationalized:

"And in the case at bar, it can be said that when Garcia filled up the application forms for

work aboard and paid P2,000.00 to Boneng as partial payment or advance payment of theplacement fees required and was promised she could work in Hongkong by Boneng, the latter

was actually engaged in il

Labor 2nd Cases

Documents

Transcript of Labor 2nd Cases