Over thirty years ago Juan Linz divided the worlds political syste e ten othree categories: totahtarian, authoritanan, and democratic. ( )te lo ri .nomic side, others have categorized economies by the extent ul stalevention in production: command, developmental, and market en )Ite no.

I toe iratefnl to loreest (,olhteen, \ttel kohli, Kathleen IIeehte, Kent \evl,ie,el, \I iiii*hWoo(,i,tnuni4s, end the voleenee teitleots lot IttIftI iii conimeiltS, tied to the Intl! IiIt the Unneisc of None Dante end lee lnstenete for P011ev Rcseate:h ti Nortlecce,, I

ecs,te lot i(seeItIl seepport. tleleer is cited to Ro,4ets BItLheker, Reehinknn (I i cion: Fhc- Soeioloi.pceI \ stoic of Ii im I,otttdittt, ihcoit ((ltd .Sl0N 14, tee, (N ccet)5): o.

1. Jetttl Lit,,, ,,,it ,tttIeoiiteiieii B.eiiuee: Specie, ice Eiik ,llerele eetd \rp t l,ete,,e e 114Cicavurc, !tholons, ((11(1 iac(t .cys(e,nc (1 Ielsietki: \c,edrre,c 1,ookstoee-, I

(li.elneers Johnson, fUll (111(1 (lie Jn/mciecc Mount: Tin (o,w/i, 0/ lcicIt, sips,! / oi!75 (Stenloiti: Stenfded Lniveesjt iress, ieSa). 5cc tn-tI Block, lIee RI i ihSeth- in the Lconoccn, in Neil Smelsee tied Richard Soedhccg, eels., llandb,soi, u/Icc,oolu,y (Princeton: Iein(ete)n Unistisitv leess, Ie)_l), fore tisefolel (listitictiote .ttttcII I -of states, as well es cc cete(fne of the eceIen enehsis of st,ete internention. lit eddie, ce I.three tepee noted Beet, Illeeck inclodes social ti4hIs end iflecroeeonOncIC shehili,,ei iii

The Desarrollista State in Brazil and Mexico

-c I vf)Ologies run along diiiiensions of more oi less central state controllet economy and the political system. As Chalmers Johnson and Linzcc, I ewever, developmental states and authoritarian regimes are not

teti(lpoint.s on continuous scales but rather discrete and distinctive sys-. cc. fable 1 provides some pro1n1nnt examples ol the nine types of pollk flhhoiflieS generate(1 by crossing these two typologies.

flee I In-ce cells along the diagonal from the top left to the bottom rightlen little tilost of the political economies of the twentieth c:erltury. ihese

I elso contain the most stable and presumably compatible combinaet of econormc and political systems. The concrete examples of coun

liii e eeelside these tyj)es (save the authoritarianmarket cases) are short1 111(1 seem to have tendencies that push them toward this diagonal.

ii the diagonal, we still know more about the corner boxes of totalilot cc Hllmaml(l and democraticmarket systems than we do about au

lies etc iandevelopmental states.I evelopmcntal has beeti applied to states such as those in Japan,

kit. t, hiiwan, and titscist Italy, but this 1yp ol stat took a l)trti(ulLretc. what I call the desarroilisia state, in Mexico, Brazil, all(l other (oun

ii n- ccl I ,atin America. The terms developmentalism and develo1nneni.iI -Ide are not new to the social science (lebate omi Latin America. In

el lIce analysis of (levelopmentalism or national developmecitalisniwa-. dense in the iqGos. The concept of the (levelol)nlental state, as

ci lee more generalized Weltanschauung of (levelol)mentalism, lirstteed in the late 1 gbos and early i qos. In the context of Latin Amer

tey knowledge, Fernando I lenrique Cardoso an(l Lmizo Falettoii I e lice first relerence to developmeritalist states. The Spanish vem

eel llmeir 1)00k appeared in iq 1, though dralts of it were (irculating- cc lv is 1q67. Even mor( explicitly, Soares used desenvolvimentjsta to de

U iice teeany l)ostwitr states in Latin America and to distinguish them ana

IdIi el ,,Iete-le ccc less eeneril tee lee :eneksis of cle,elee1eioene eel st,ete eneec,ecceteen in liceiii.. ccci -

In pci, Leinen, end K,eue-;e, see Jcehnseen, lvii!! cotd (Its Jo/rn Uses fume/c Cleeliiieiscc, he elteicel liistitutioics mel 1,ceeiioneic lerfoi-ccttnc-e, in Fieehecic C. l)e-e o, ed,, Jltc

?Wih.ce/ 1, scsssssn, se/ (Ice lien 11000 iisdso(cm/oni (Ithaca: Cornell Uni,e-isit Piess I gS); andF SitS, I:cnheddec/ 11 slkssiuccc,: S/u/it aced ito/n s/csa/ Iraccc/orseealiuee (Pie nteIe ccc: Iei ncetoet

-

c its Ire-sn, t ei): cell Itch, cci A. Jemis Ut-egoi, i/a/cuss laenisect acid Dccslohtceccflal Ditto,,,?, it ineeceelc: ltine ehon Unisirsity Press, u)7g). ,lthteeep,hc ctttnhersoceee, the Sie;enishe

I c eeigtcesc adjectives, decactollisia end dssecevo1icceecs/cs(a, c-tsleechc;el,, Is eeseftel lot chisH, i-l,iic14 I,ettn .fineiicin \,oients leone tethet cases.

c icr cxacee pIe, LeccI;eeeo Meet ins, icsdse,e(ea/ezamao, hit tgcSia (ea(totta/ I (/etflticslVt (lltti /0Is- J.ceeenec: Se4e, t e)()S) , cod foi a full hiisteen, Rie-ecelo lfielse:leceevsk,, lceesatcten/ss

cues cc /s, so chits: () Cu/a sdsologsno (/0 (Ic-SIte vu/icc tttsfl (/s (tie) (Rio e It Jecie ne: II IA, I e5sS ) --b e n,seetlee If, C;tidoset end Knice heleteo, Ds,bcssthnsy (c,s(/ DevsIo/ncsstt/ tee l.a/,es rttscetu a

Ilk 1, Ics: Ccci, tisle, of C;elifociiie Piess, ie7)), plc, 14;48.

CIIA1Ti-1 NINI-.

The Desarrollista State in Brazil and Mexio

Ben Ross Schneider

er the knowle(1t,e ed hiseotic:eI ph eenotnert:e in elicit Concte Iiteess, ehe tnost ,,enetel laws, beeuse they ete the most de:vt del ofcontent are: cisc) the: le:est eluible, The: more cotni ctehensi c liieliditvot scopeoft tetttc, the more it leads its away frotce leetichness of reality since in oider to incltide the conmmoteneents of thi l;etgestpossible: number ofpleenotnen:e, ii micsh ieeeess:erily be es ebstrece es possible- end hence e Ievoiel of conIc, ii.

M1sx Wc:,ei-,ec[

276 277

u.N R )ss S( 11 N111)ER The l)esarrollista Stale in Brazil and Meieo

I( III il S .11111

lnnnin 1 ()ItlIILrIa)1 \tItlIOII1.LI1111 1 )nui,ii

(1 nii nL11l l(,l,LIl(I ( 1?O) t_ lii4(I Si.ii, .iiItitiuli (IIIIII \\ I I

Its I 111(1 II

lytically horn classic miiiirnal and welfare states.tDevelopmentalisiii tless central to arlier debates in Mexico and began to appear mote Iiin the Irndlq7os. DCSJ)ite the long (:urrency in Litiii America ul Iterms development ahsm and (leVelOpmefltal state, analyses iitended to locus on either the intellectual history of theorLes SUppi it(levelopmelltalisln or on the (Ons((lUences of state promotion oF iitry. Largely neglected has been a full reconstruclion oh how (LeVel( 9 ni Ital states evolved historically as well asaluller appreciation of the inlet ition between e(onomic intervention and political exclusion.

In this chapter 1 abstract out of a comparison oh Bratil and Mcs ifrom the igis to tile iqSos four essential cliaractenstics of the stilIt iiiits relations with the economy and the polity: (i) political capiLiliwhere profits and investment de1wnded on decisions made in time slil

.;(2) a (lOlilinailt develoj)mental discourse on the necessity of inchmst iiitiofl afl(l of state intervention to promote it; () political exclusion ni iimajority of the adult population; arni (i.) a fluid, weakly iiistitiitiotiiIi,bureaucracy in which appointments structured power anti represri Il.mtmofl. These components of the model of the desarrollista slate illitmitittit(lie motivation l)elund the actions of state elites (developmentalisimt ) iistructure of power within the state (the appointive bureaucracy); Im n I i Ipidotiiriarit forms of state interaction with the economy (politictItalism) and with political and civil society (political exclusii in). A m ii.tgoal of this chapter is to examine these four characteristics in genem;iI. iieluding an asseSsment of measurable indicators or thresholds, inn I

It. (;Itii(i() ti [)iIIi,it St)iItS () Nnto lstn1o lid \iit(tj(t Lahitid, tutu/at (1i?l/ It ij(jiitliosiitiiiliio I g75) :

7. liii i\iiiiI)I(, v1;iiI.t (ttuIaIuItt ttueilo tIe Silut, Crisis dcl cltsatiulltsittn v 1.111 Iitlt(I(tli ut-I Lpirii(t tscti,i1 Nl(Xi( I), I 7(t I i)7, I,uvista tvhua,,a itt (7u,u,au Is//I,,,,,its/cs 21, tnt. Sa (OctiutniDecttitltti Ig71): I

fla ui IImd Mexico. In this usage, the desarrolhista state is an intensive,It IIimmge conceptualization ihit leaturesacomh)matinn of elements

IN I dial to these political e onomies, though these four characteristicsIt I I isH iii iii l)I()L(ler compiLris(>flS. my formulation of theiii ti it tilista state (listinguishes Latin American and East Asiami versions in

ttis I )I career lttei11s in the executive bureaucracy.ii lIter preuhise ofmy characterization is that the clevelopmnetital state

ma i-i I te defined solely by trails of the state and its relations to society.Ittt spcciuicallv, the desarrollista state is characterized by au eclusioii

I cult ioriship to the polity (or political society, in Alt red Stepanshr itis) amid an interventi( mist strategy oh pu )mnotlng the economy. I-here IthIti with Johnsons formulation, which adds on several nonstate lea

i- including labor relations (though these are, of course, ultimately

tic id by the state) and the si ructure of the private sector (the prontiti of zathatsulike groups and the relative absence (>1 foreign capi

I ( )diei nomistate factors such as geopolitics, culture, class relations,I I In nature of private firms should not enter julIo definitions of (hiler

cut I,iil(Is of states, though they obviously affect their perbrmnance.its chapter has several potential contributions to make to the l)roa(lelill I c on the developmental state. First, it ohfeis a HormA,siaml

III , IVII 1(11 given the exceptional 1)cr1orniLncc of the Asian developmentins timakes Ihem less relevant tom- t lie study oh the Hmaj( rity of ot her

-ii iii develo1)ing countries. Second, in this chapter I alI(miil)l toth- liii i meal criteria for iclenti1ing fratures (ii the (levelol)mncIllal state.

tit us imalvses often (10 not proi1e clear empirical ref erents for theiitt tilt features of a developmental state, as in Johnsons original fir

11111: one historical case is defined as a developmental state, yet, toIhr Ituisl ration of the comparativist, without using indicators thaI travel

I IS lo other regions. Lastly, these fiiur characteristics are usefhl inhi to Iii (ompansnns between Fast Asia and Latin Amnet-ica aIl(l amongI mnu \IIumicLlli anti developing countries genera11, IS I (hiscflss iuithei inilte ii itll ision. Ihe first task, Iliough, is to analyze the four componentsIn itt ,i,ii incl Mexico, begimmning with1)Ohiti(1l (;al)itahisni.

I lit , )ttc(I)t is tititltllt i:toi,c i Iii stsi that ii is in ititia;tti;l ,ttltut:tnsoii tinoti_4piIaitIu littnttgtiuttits ettt,Itxis. St-i- (hto:ttiitt S,titt,, Cttiici1tt Nlislti, tti;ititai in Coii,

to I,,Iiiits, tan, its,i Is/i/nat .S,,tnre Iton,z, (1 it. (1)ietniltii It)7o): 1t Itii S,,rttiis I:nhler l iIstI,titi(ttli_tlt)I)til, ittitltlli i,iiti_t, ,iuI Iotu ItselIits nlsun

i, I Iiii,itauioiis, (iIol,,cI ilitoiit, (XItItti ,l itt tlttois it H,:tits ucllilirtts; tii,tklltltuI,I Ilti((pls iIItiittiittte nictic nhtuoiIiis ii, Ittvtt ccclintil(s,

I Iis Ilitijntnal listintiitsis thus nit Stelctiis tluiteuuo tlisiiiit Intl ,,Iitcnii, tltt stilt,Iitti t\t(tlint, lti,:tI, ,ittcl cotci\t Intiu:ttti ntcs); ailli il socteis (It:iiitu-s, thtioi,ul .sss

1.1,1 c,I I,iisIaint,): intl civil sot it-is (oig,,niittI /ioliI)s)_ Si-c ,lIiitI SIc1t:iii, fle//iiiil:nig 11,/il,I,h, t /i,n:/l aunt I/i, Stat//u,,,, (s,,e (Iiitn c-toil: Iiiin Iout Litlstis,It Itiss, iSSt,

I It ,ts,ti I, loIiw cl Iissitttti tcctis ,,utd leoiioiii,c Ic-tInt itc:citc i,

I/tb/u 1, Ittliin cl tlitl (COtl(titil( tj)ttl(ti,tItS

lit-c tIol ut ci

So ic-I l,_t.utccn ,i,til()t[i(i ((tilitlittt listssklii5

Its, 151 It, tlsq,,i ( .i into is

(ltiit,t? (1 )Sl)s)

II,atiltltxjt oIc it-,i

II nt-I 1-15)(lIttle (I

I-IS Laliti,tlintit:t

Spain ( 1hl;S75)

I- t,,ttt-t

Itititi ( I lc I

OI-l( IL) tutu it its

I278 279

BF,N Ross S( 1 [NI IDER The Desarrollista .Slatr en Brazil acid MixuoPoLurlcAc CrITALIsI

Pervasive, (liscr(tionarv control by the state over resource allo(it IC IIIpoliticizes capitalisni. In political capitalism, accumulation (public iiil)ritt() depends more on politics than markets. Political capitalisiti iWeIxrs term for wartime or booty capitalism, l)ut it can he broa(leinwithout being stretched, to include iiormnal peacetime conditions. Sci Iworldwide Set rules for capitalist economies; in political CIl)italiSIIl, CIcials make rulings. Policvmakers in political capitalism have a grelI lt.i Iof (liscret ion: ihe avar(l ifl(iiVidU1l contracts, make loans, gralit spe ii Itax exefliptions, approve import licenses, negotiate with multinatiicorj)orations (MNCs) , and J)ermit price increases on individual [tel isCreative officials can extend their discretion over (Veil nominal elititicmnent1)rogr;mls by reinterpreting the impleinentttion or manipulal II(lisl)ursenlents.

For Brazil aml Mexico there is relative consensus that capitalism wiquite politicized or state controlled from the 1(405 (or much eaiIici Iuntil the 1 ggos. 12 Raymond Vernon claimed that there were two disifive fratures of the Mexican economy: first, the relative pervasiveluand vigor of the governments regulatory measures; second, the cxl II(linac) (legree of particularit, and discrimination in the applicatiul I cclthose regulatory powers. A decade liter Susan Purcell concludedMexico had a form of state capitalism. Jose Luis hon argues that ticstate in Brazil promoted politi ized accumulation: politicized bcc;iiit responds to the delenninations ola state much more than to rules cclthe market. Michael Barzclay coined the term1)ohlicizedl muarket dc ciiomy for his analysis of Brazil in the 1 70S and 1 gS()s. Despite the ap 1,11emit (Onsensus, 11w analyses provided criteria for distinguishing .11I roin noim1colitical forms of c11)italiSIiI.1

Assessing the (legrdl of political iapitalism n(quir(s a qualitatni aiiilof resource flows through the narrows of the economy. In est [[HIll(r(clit and foreign exchange constitute crucial narrows in [host (LeVelO1HI I

I I. H. II. (Il-h 11(1 c. \ihIiI vliIl, its., 1mm tlux tIe/cc,: I.O(fll in Smm/ccc (Ncic ccci()xhcid tiiic\cisii lrcss, cl_Ill), pp. lc(c(c7.

12. N1,ililisccii ci It. olici ilic hcst sci(cicc(I iccc1i1cciimcii ccl 1l(\cIcc)cillliil ii, Iii;i,iI ccclNlcxicc. \iiiii N1nIitisoii Cl ii,, Iic(ci/ ((11(1 .ti,i, (Niii cicik: ()xIccI1t tiiisccsci Icc,I ()()2 )

[tic iilccIl(I \ icicci, I/Ic fl,) c,,,,, o/ ti,,,,, I)cc/n/cmc,/ ) aicclni,lc: I IiiI\Hi(I tIIl,c IsliS I,,ss. I :)

. I 2 ) Si,siic I,ci,l,cc:,cc Iiii,,It I/cc 1,:vnnci (cn/,l.SIui,,ccr I),c,cin,,: 1,,/cli, c in(IH Iii1/inijiaitiici (lci kIIcc: I I1ii(lsilc ccl L;cI,Icciiic;c Iccm. IC)7c) c JOSI cc

Scclcc .1 ,ii,c ito I:si;,cicc lcicsclciicc. flci,,lu dc 1:,nnnc,iu, In/dnn I. icc. :; (luh\_Scicl11,hci I hc1) I or,; cci,t NIi,Iiac I Ii,cFtci1i, I he /n/,/icrjd hoc/ni l,,cc,,ccm: Ihoho/icc 1/ia:i/c Ii,.SIca/ci (licckclci tIIIS(cs,i\ cci ( cliicciiliO Iicss cS(ci

ci Ic ciiiies. Particular economnics sufier as well from their own peculiar

ccc

liis. For example, in Mexico amid other arid regions, water flows,- Ic ic ii1y and economically, through a narrows. Where governments have

I, ill 1 )[I over the distribution of water, hydraulic politics an intense andp -iii iiably salient in private decisions on agricultural investtnent. Be4 1151 time overall extent and mix of discretion over scarce resource flows

cu-S Iiomn country to country, no simple threshold can be applied, and itci ccl i;ihly best to think of capitalism as mnorc or less politicized.liiis politicize capitalism through direct investment in infrastructure

II cii state entcrpnses that ultimately trickles into the private sector asI 1111 .nts for goods and services. In Brazil and Mexico the state ac

iii iii directly for arouml 40 l of total investment fl)r much ofIII cstwar period. Many businesses depended on the political dcci

cs iii how to spend this money. In her introduction, Meredith Woocccli i igs highlights the pivotal role of credit allocation by developmental

I lics, iii the Brazilian and Mexican desarrollista states, through their deIc

cpiiieimt banks, controlled most longtermmm credit to in(lustry. Until theHI I i c1os public bank resources in Mexico were greater than those in

Ic, Cl ivate sector. The national dlevi.lopmnent batik in Mexico, Nafinsa,ilc ilcounted for 20 perctlit of total Iliitn(1iig l1I(l 30) l)erctmil of all iiC ill In industry. From 1 C).f() to i go only 10 percent or less 0)1 :reditccii nivate commercial bank.s went for nie(liUman(l longterni fimiatmc

I? cli neover, as private hank.s grew, they lent proportionately less to inI c ii v1 Further subsidy and regulation influenced the allocation ofccc, ii ui the remaining, nominally private resources. Urmtil the 1 gcSos, a

Iii ccl lie major fiwms of indirect state control in both countries inclwledcli hId nontariff barriers to imports, tax incentives, controls on interest

I I icc bus ccllcis u lcccidcI list of IiIi2s1i1i5 in ,:tuip liii Icl:ct,cc Illipoli:cuicl- of IiI.ickci411,1 lcIIc-,ccc nile lolloc-oc Is ccli 1111 rpllsc t)ch.cVIOI Inc:tiIctio ) I) ihc priciceiIci stc:crc ofI cc -icc cicc(lil( ticcic: (n) [in deipcc III dcci:cicccii (ci Ilcciiilstcu peecs licii IlitIIil:ciccco;cl

I ice (ic-i_tIle ccl Sc(Icci,cl Iooclictl,cmicco; ([i wileihcc iOiIIest I.itcs dcvi;cil luccniII Ic I ills: mci (c) ti-ic Ills cci input ,nvciiiocI(s to inSIniccclls cci 111:11 lc1ct1c1 is, SetI Iuu Icc Limcs, I-(olcc,IIu( Scsu.ems RlIccii,i in DccliopIi1i (ccIiIilrits, 10 Pcikiiis onci%III I, cc I licccccic,, ccis Iie/ccrccuilg l:cnccoiccu SW/cc,,, iii I)cnchc/nci_t (ccic,I/iics ((:;cniliruclgc: IdIll I inc ciSliy iicss, I i)c I )

,

p I

I c- 1ii NiciI(0, SIC I)nic- Sicc, 1cidccc/c, II,, c/ale, (111(1 1I0/1/1, lSiin ici Mc vim (usd0: UI,)lIsIIl cci lions 111(55, i8li). p. (mIS. (JO 1101/il. sc:t lIcnri Rcichstmci 111(1 L,ic:i:incc (:cciciiultccc,Ii-. iliccciiicc msi:ci.ii, I (7dI lm (c(io c cmisc, iii t,oiz Uc,nAu_t:c Pntluicc cod RlIl:ui,

I lic c, cils., l)cccccvcthi,,,cc ct/c, (V/n/a/Ic/a ,ia lice, s,/ (S:ici l;cotcc: itu,ISI1Iiis(, I (3) , 11.15ill Fl .111k ih:cnchnicoie_t, I/ic ,hIa/,,,c o/ Modccni ,b-i,xuo (En_tlcccoccd Chlis, NI: Piccciic

cc/c i15, is .1 bi:cxlicI

BEN Ross S( 1 lxii Tin Desarroflisia Stale in Brazil and Mexica

lates, eX1)Oit SU1)Si(lies, agricultural price supports, restrictions oiand wage and price controls. In Mexico. 11w pul)hc sector I was insition to make or break any private firm.

The Mexican an(l Brazilian ecOnomies were nonetheless stilt I . IIIPropert wealth, and profit were mostly private, arni tlwrefi)re 1)11.11set the overall parameters for the slate afl(l its policymnakers. VI i I Istate provi(le(L mitch of total investment, the private sector often i .11the harvest For instance, rates of return on state investment vii I I-I I IIlower than on private investment, often because state enterplis(s

customers low prices.1States may account fur a large 1NI ip Illof total investment but not enough to sustain rapid growth iili )l II. IIthey (lepen(l on private investment to keep growth at a politiciIlv ial)le rate. Political capitalism thus involves heavy Fec ipr( )cal (011S1 II,,State clii es have enorm( ms discretion and power over particular t onthey are structurally coflstraifle(l to )mTIs1e J)ohcies conducive to . .1profit geiwrally in order to increase total investment, especially as (.11 iibecame more mobile over the 1 g705 and i q8os.

Multinational corl)orations hirther constrain the slate. Their acc, iii niltion strategies are global, and they may not therefhre invest in the doieconomy despite generous sul)sidies. They lle also more likely to ni (il Iinvestment elsewhere ill response to perceived political uncertainty. Iii Inprotected economies such as those of Brazil ami Mexico, liowevei iiii Ii iiitional firms caine to resemble domestic firms in that l)ro(Lu(tioli was Iii, I lielocal market, managers were often nationals, and, espe(:ially, most invesl iiicaine from local profitsH For example, over the decade of the 1 g IS. n iivested profits accounted for ( percent of the 1-ecorde(L value of U.S. in %Iinent in Latin America.-1 The far greater presence of MNCs distiiigiil aLitin Amenca from Northeast Asia. But MNCs do not change the essel (Ipolitical capilahsm, which was similar across the two regions, though In, Iappear to aflect greatly the effectiveness of elevelopuietital states.1

I i. \-iiinn, Dilemma o/ il,xnos Ihvela/nnn/. p.10. Sir I r Or F ins, I) /,en thai Develo/anen?: i/n it llia no of tin/li ,,alu,nal, Slate, a,,? / ,,e,,I

(;a/nial Li lilaal (trinii-lnii: tIIIW(lI)fl tjiiiiisiti Ii,ss, Ig7), ti). 22225, ;nnl I iiIrl-lidI, InI)tiC FIiIrrplis( ii Ill-a/il nut Nlrxicii, in Ihotii;ts C. Itrnne:ni ,ii,l Iliilil:mchr,, i-its., iInl/iotharmn (:a/ill alisin (Itnuhtrr, Coin.: \V,sl, eW, i

Ii. Si-I (,.n-y (1-irlIi 111(1 P11,1 11. ta,tns, Io,nsn,non:il (o1]nli.uioIis, t)(j)(ii(IrIii IotinilnI, till! Slat, Inti, in ill, Scn,i1arij,hc-rv: t (omp;irison of lti;,tit and Nlixi,, / iiiinn,uan il,c,a,cl, l?eviea, i (, no. , (i i) ,

22. SrIi_I0 Ititai, Ci)I1)0i.,IiOIl(S nai1sI1,lIinflIlrS V 1:,s nlIi,,I% iil;icioiws (IC \iiI Ii .11.,,tin:t ((Ill t_stt,t,,s I_Jiil(lnS, lco,,,in,a Ie it ,, ,ua l.a/ma I I (I )i /: 1)1)i 2!, Is (it,,! ii, I 1,i.,islo X\IIII. lii, Oiiisiion (it I,i,,i,n Iii,,sln,,ni ,ti,I 1,, F,oi,oiiiit (lilsis iii

iii Richard F. FiinIai,.t miii! Ricarlo Il,,nrhL)a, is. ,,k,. l)(ielii/Ofl(iil ,,i,/ iii,in la/i, .tn,,,,,a (\oII( DITTo: t,ii,iilm of iiic t)amc Pi,ss, l). p. i(i.1.

Sii Iiiir F,:,i,s, CI: O, SIIk. mit Ih1ih-iii ,- in l-,,si \,a: L,ssons or latinc.lIiIsIs. in t)ivo. Cd., lSil,li,al lom,,a,,,t of lb, .Veii itcia,, f,,d,,,?,,a/a,,,

oil ical capitalism has a prolomuieL illipact on tIme1)olitiCtI strategies ofin nimic and state elites. Economic elites (lepeild heavily on the state

I I ave good reasons to lobby officials and to (1(1 so individually ratheriii coilectively. Moreovem-, state intervention increases political uncer

lilt V (or investors at the same time it, reduces imiarkel uncertainty. For

d 0 elites, political capitalism provides a powerful array of sticks and car- Is 1(1 influence the political as well as the economic behavior of ceoiii ii elites. Unfortunately, most studies of the developimienlal state

1 iS on their econemlic coiiseeiuences to the iieglee:t of their usually last

V

ilitical legacies.

Iii Vi-1.opMENrAL DlscouRsi-:

\Vnlespread state intervention in the economy politieized capitalism;In lominant. (levelo)melltal (hiscourse gave that ulterventiomi direction,ii,l legitimacy. Developmentalismmi is an ideology or world view that ac

i i,iils industrialization a higher priority than other societal goals andmi-s lime state the leading role ill promoting it. Ihe criteiioii for evaluat

ii iiicy is e1ftctiveness, miot efiie:iency.1 Pohi(vmnIkers rely omi straighta iv,iid qitatit itative measul-es such as increases ill cultiflit or export.s to

- militate progress. In an exemplary display of developnientalisni, officialsiii K iiea, infused with the c:olnpetitive spirit of the Olympic games in.

constructed an electronic scorel)e)ard in a central subway stationlisted the partici)ioting countries, their capitals, flags, and incomes

i head. In contrast, olfie:ials iii liberal, socialist, or (orl)oratist states- militate polie:v in terms of overarching ideologies fdr which political lead- ne often willing to suffer losses in proehiction or e:ompetitive.miess.1

Iii Brazil and Mexico after the depression of the 1 qOs, the prevai1iii-

lt.iiiosis of the barriers to industrialization argued that the domestic:liii igeoisie was incapable of generating self sustailling industrialization.

I hi- state should lead and tIie bourgeoisie ihIlow. This diagnosis spilledit into political (liscourse, and reduced the legitimnac:y (If sector

- I it at irIs and by extension active political participation by the hourml iisie. For example, at his inaugural address in iq34, the new Mexican

-siolent, LIzaro Cirdenas, stated: The state alone embodies the gell- t ii ii lerest, 1n(l for this reason only the state Imas ii vision (II the whole.Iii, slate must e:onlinually broaden, ine:rease and deepen its interven

I 11(11 Ross S, hn,-i,!i,, Oit.t.,n,itil Ilnsiiuss tnI,iim in I)i-ini,mi,,iii Hiazil, Jn,onal,,oneneai, S/,,,la:m amid tImid .1//ala I. 10, 4 (\Vnoi-i I i7S) : i) I 27.Iolnnim. till! and /1,, /a/ia,i, n- ,Ii,,,,,i,: pp. t

051, Rail Dal,riinl,irf, Ntuk,i miii! Itan: Imm,i lmpt-s iml R.,ij,ni:mIjI\, in I-mat, in /1gmll,,,,,t mm/.Smmmn/ (St,miil,,l,I: Stanlni,! L nImlsiti Ii(,,s. I()(iS).

282 283

B1N Ross S(:l INI11)l R The Des.Lrrolli.sIa Stale in Brazil and Mexico

tion. Public defrnse of the states tUi(llng role was constant. Nearly pyears later, Luis Echeverria stated that it was the states res1)onsibilitvset the (lirection and rhythm of development and to particij)ate diie I Is1)0th in the J)roduction and distribution of iflCO1T1e. These argunlellit preexisting,(1UasiRousseaUim discourses that accorde(l the staterole of Seeing it) the national interest while other societal actors pulsilil Itheir partu ulari.stic interests. The dominant discourses in Latin Amelhad generall accorded the state pnmacy over soc;ial afl(L economic ii liiiests, though belore i go liberalism mounted a strong (ainpaign ((I (I ilodge this (loinmailt discourse.2nMoreover, the state had been active,J)eclally in Braiil, iii l)1omOtiI4 growth.

Postig.o developrneiitalism mvshe(l with some preexisting tliscotii siml practices, l)ut it arose in the specific crises in international trade (LIIIitig World Wars I and II and the Great Depression, gaining theoretic a)rogritTmitic body in the aiiaiyses of Radl Prebisch and the United Nitions Econontit Commission lbr Latin America (ECLA). [he growilconsensus among elites was that Latin Amenca could ho longer rely iiindustrial countries to provide manufiictured goods, nor could I al IiAmerica ever catch up to the rich countries without industrializing.

The military in some countries added national se univ (oncelil.though these were not as strong and immediate as the were later in IraAsia. Meredith WooCumings has argued that national security conc(i ii.decisively in! lueiiced the course of economic policy in l)Ostwitr Korea. .111

27. Lizaio Cdnkn:ts, iiicct in Nor:s tI:tmilion. Lije limits a! Slate tulonos,: Poslls,,,/,/ioIsahi svlpxsca (iiIn(sIsin: iiiiiciton Lnjpiisit II(ss, Il)ia), p. i ig; Lois E( hs

BIN Russ Sc; INEII)rR The Dcsarrollista State in Brazil and Mexico

Branclenburg claims that it was not until the post Would War II years I.,,ifl(lUstry rnanage(l to acquire a l)reierential role in economic (level;ment.x Time two governments after 194() made industrialization tin iiitral policy objective: In i q46 Miguel Alemin took industrialization in;the campaign trail as one of his three Sl( gaTIs and the only one ielat i;economies. In his review of the literature, Edwar(l Williams conul in I;that the ideology of industrialization

... began to take root duriig ti;Cirdenas regime and later became full fledged revolutionary (I; i,i iiwith tIme I(CeSSl()I1 to povoi of Miguel Aleiniii in 1q46. Brande;also notes tile primacy of the stato in economic liii but argues that I inis a centuriesold tradition. The host comprehensive study of Mcxi; iiibusiiiess (o ;iuludes that most lcading entrepreneurs accept the [act t liiiMexico has a mixed economic system....Even in the 1 q)s, most imim;iessnieim still favor a substantial government role.

Another way to assess the dominance of (lcelopmentalisni is from Iil)ersPtive of the eclipse of competing discourses, especially oiiln ni ieconomics and liberalism, which had ardent albeit isolated backeis ii;both countries. Iii Brazil one of the strong but ultimnateh unsuccessi iicandidates for the liresiclenhial elections of 1945 campaigned against iiivelopmentalisin and the olesarrollista state Vmrgos had been (OflS(rtmot iIiand in favor of relying primarily on export agriculture. In Brazilgenio Owlin and Octavio Bulhoes were the leading liberal economilisiThey were 1)0th ministers in postwar governments but could do Iii iimore thaim stall developnmenialism md increasing state intervention. IMexico time cleavage betwecii monetarists and stmucturalists doimimmaic iistruggles over discourse and policy. Howevem time ascendant Inonctal siin the period of stabilizing developmeiit, including Antonio OrtIz Mii,;a major figure among mnoimietarists and finance mirlister Ironi 19551970, were still moderate (levelopmentalists.

silivey of elite opinion ill authoritarian Brazil (197273) revealedsupport for econonnc over social or l)olitieal developmnent. In

its nf longterm priorities all groups (save e;liurch leaders and leaders1 iii; oppositio n pithy) Iavo>reol econo irnc olevclo)pment, including

Ai ii.; l)nuitieiims (46 percent, N = , labor leaders (.[g percent, N =I, civil servants ((io l)erce11t, N .fo)) , business executives (66 per

= 84), ami(i mnaiiagers of public cumnpamimes (So percent, N= in).hi; ;acler survey in tile I qbos in twelve Latin American countries in

Iii ig Brazil and Mexico, most hlmanagers (N= 2.1) favored state interill;;;; to p1oile infrastructure, technical assistance ;uid research,

Ii tariff protection, tax exemnptiomIs, and overall plamming. They wereit itmibivalent about state enterprises and thought theni appropriate

h when they elid not compete with private finns. They also) criticiZe(l inII;; icy anol Polities ill governmemit but generally opposed inept interiii; ii rather than intcrventiofl per Se. As late as 1982, a survey after

iii; i i;;ision by the Mexican goverrmnlent to) natiomialize l)riiLte banks reliii widespread support for the (heiSioul aiming all social groups: 72

lit of all respondents favored the nationalization, as IRL imearly twoiii; Is oil business leaders and industrialists. s

tantitative indicator of tile dommane:e oti developii;entalisni ;nioL

ihr .i inenty of political leaders who efl(lo)rSe it is the division of goverlltHrill spemldihig between economic pro111otin and other eX})ehl(lilures.t,bi I; i I he economic buolget exceeds the military, social, amiol administra11%. iii; lget.s (singly, not iii total), it is one strong indicator that the state

leveiopniemital orientation (see Table 2 below). In contrast, aeimmiiiiliv; and military expenses are greatest in the classic state, while tileii hi nlget is highest in the wellimue state. Consistently high econonue;

in lii ig, over time, and across various gomvernments and regimes, is aiii indicator of how enduring and widely shareel (levelopmentahSmn is.

14 0 iiiIiII itative thnsholds require qualitative cenifirmation because Strongliii otmiental motivations can underlie apparently noneconomic spend

%.ii \iilii-in I;n.,n;,. ;,p((l;iIl was 11(1 11)1; to; tin- ii;; ;iit;rpris;- tin-san- lint tlnIII iii,ilil ii; pinji; I tI;;i si(;s n;ttin;;;IIo 1.51 ;,nnn;;;tiscii;tis;. tii I,11,,il. liii S(nt)i)ilii1I....; a;iI;iii ii;; ;;IIn ii ((111)5 Svi-lii ;i;itt;st it; ;n(tnrsln1i till tilt p;aI..:i14;- itt inlil var at;

liii lii ; iii.; an mills. tt;;I i-si-il shill; il iii;-,; j)lnnnn;ni ta-nun-is sari; is t.ii;;stnI,, . I in, ;;;-il aiim I;) In sLiiiSis n ct-S i-; \II,id Stmp.iit. 1?,, lu//mis /// Pa//f/i-.: (/ia;w

,n 15U7// (tiimt;;-inn: tr,ni;-inn ti;isi-tsiis Pins. n7, I Pt-,

I n-i \tnt)i ni;niih, ISii,i (nil! I//(Vh/75 i/i IJ,azi/ Piiiloii) it: rn;; ci;;;; t ttis c-is/is P;;ss,I), iii.

17 \IIn-rt t.;;lic-riuni), (.nsc-rnnn-tli aid fl;-sc-lnju;n-i;;: Nt_ui_up-i;.ii n,iiiii;s In Lit;;;IllIi .1 /iiii/m/ a/ life; -t,neruan Sf u/n; 7, in. (init I g(;):

N \lcin-l tiasati;-, nut Rn(i;-;i( 5. (.niip. La twa anal;i: ;;inn ii;- I.; I;,;m.i Ia npinalnp*tIh; ti-it \t sirn, I-i,ii lnf,n,au,anal;iS (O;nct);-rDoi-cmh;-i I p54): inS.

p Snails, -o Nnvn Fsi:idn ui Smniic:; L:itn;a, p. (.i.

4t

a

s- l; .in;t;-iil;;crii, 5Ia/:,ni 0/ lbn/;i,, lhs,, P 2Mc ;sk, ln;Iintisa/ ItnioIiit,in( ii; ilrwao, pp. 5;

p) Si-;- .;tsn \;innii. 1);/in;tna o/ .tle.snn.; l)nr1a/;u,en/. I-i L;Iwn;tj. \\itti;ciw. Ntn;.;iinit in tin- Mnxinan i-ia-/nt;Ltinl;, .Sl:COLt.S rinnn/s (Mt; I.

tg7i): :5 IPa)titcI/i)Iit4,.i!a/,/;,L o/ ilodern iIesua, p 2;;: Rn liii; Si (mij;, En/u-/mn. i-.an,-/ lS/;fn;in las-n/u-1/l-(rn/ur) h am (\;-s; \i;ik: Oxtiioii t:nisi-rsii- ii-;-ss I ;) P- I

[2 Si-;- Ji;tn; I-ri-itch, i/u lirwa/,a,; limo/u-ri .-tflC: C/nt.; (lam//lit nn/ .-illiaa mu in that,-,,, SPan/n (Cttajn-t I tilt: t_niv;-tuas ni N;;rih (,irntitta P1(ss, l;)i)2), pp 14ti;.

Bi;-t;;s; lciuvskt, Ieu;ann-umu ,rnnn;nlen /nnul,-,,n.Ntaxli;t;t, (li/ti/ni.

.,.

Vi;in; tJiqui;ti, ini;-;sl;-w liv initini, Nni-;i;In-;- (i, n)i. 11w sot;-;-iia- titit

flIN Ross S(.i INLII)1R The Desarrollista Stat, in Brazil ((lid Mhx,co

ing on education (such as funding foreign graduate study in eiigiio Iing) or military training aIi(l nsearch an(1 (levelol)IneHt in high ted iiogy that has commercial applications. In Brazil, fur example, the nogovernment created social programs SUCh as ummployment instil iiin the fonTi of funds on which beneliciaries could draw. In prtct1c. t Igoerflrnent agencies Use(I Unclaime(1, aCCUIiiUlate(I lufl(IS to fmn;nn IV(h)pIfl(flt projects. Moreover, (1eelOpin(fltIli5tS may prefer to i(I iiifl(IireCt h)IfliS of intervention, such as trade protection or cie(ln 1.1tioning, which (10 tiot show up as large items iii the government bimd1t

In the twentieth century most states were eXpecte(1 to facilitate gi I IV, I Iari(I improve social well are. The developmental state is peculiar iii .15tate aIi(l other elites eXl)ect (conOmiC policies to transform thc CC( II )I IIIfrom a less to a more in(Lustrialize(1 stage and tolerate enormous state Iicretion over resource allocation. Regulatory states may promote 111(105111ahzation as a byproduct, but it is not the primary goal, nor is it legiiimii.iifur ollicials to use state intervention to achieve it. We1fire states nmv Isquite interventionist in [lie distribution, rather than production, of gII IS.(lomflestiC product (CDI), and much if not most of the (1)P maythrough the government. Moreover, officials lack discretion (11(1 meast iisuccess with melicators of social welfare rather than CDP l)(T (i1l)itil.

PoLrTIcu. EXCLUSION

Political exciusiomi (or limited pluralism) exists when the majolilv Iadults are denied the right to free ami meaningful choices in regititielectionsmeaningful in that op1)e)sition candidates have a chamice iicoming to power, free in the limited sense of absence of direct COei(il IINeither of these conditions exists in authoritarian regim(s, which in mncases hold no elections. When they do, as in Brazil wider the mnilitaiv, Iiopposition still has no chance of winning. Politu:iil ex(;Iusion is riot Iiiiiite(l to authoritarian regimes, however; many democracies inhibit, Imally or informally, the participation of the majority of adults. Propei Il

,0. NiallS hiiii;tt (tlI1II)(IL(ils 0 [11111 \I111II(iI il 1111/S (I(tIIlIIillIl (It (lIltIfllIl(I II,rIgillics S SIlIIIS with liIIliI((t, (101 I1SI)(II1SII)t(, )0tIII1I p)1II1IisI11; SSItInlIII tIIIHIl IIIII (Ii(lilIi.4 I(ho]oi_tv (htit ((1111 (1IStlI1(tiV( III(l1II(IIli(S) ssiilii>tii lIltIlISIW 1101 (xt(IIlIj)OIili((t I(lflIIjIi/(IIOI( (IxcIjo 501111 1)011115 Ill 111(11 (11\(I0((I11(IIIC iii,t lit ((111(11.11(111(1 s(((((S0)i11IIS 1 SIllilil iI0tlj)) X1l(IS(S )0SS(I \VilIliII 101(151115 lll(llhIt((t Iiniits htit swill11111(1 )(l(ti(l(t)tI ((Ills. SlI tjtt,. \I( \(IllI((IillII((i RlLIII1(, ). Oiti,i wII,ois oh(Illilil )l(tIIi(iIt S\Stlll0i III 1:11111 \ttl((( III IS lX(tlISi( l(i_,lI(It(SS Ill IlJ,II11l t rn 11(11Ilolisoll, v1tn (ISIS to oiIll cxultisiosl. Switcs, mid (.spl(I;lII\ Rciiini,i: Sc, (0IIln Its I((Oil. Itt, Incit ot 1; III \III,vsln 1)111101 51(5, \171 l_i/I fl(iliil I I I I J;IIII(;lrs \1i0)71)): 71101): 5(1,015, 0 Now [slOb ILL \ItoiIc,l L,I(IIl1I. p i: 1(1(1 kI1ltt t.. t{lIolIl,

nv, gender, palty, or registration ree1uirements cati deny the fran4 III II) the majority. Like (leveloprnemitahisrn in ecofloiiiic policy, exclu

ii I ImientS and mnotivates political activity on the part of state and politi1 lijt(s. Political exclusion was often more a question of practice and(((liv contradicted lip service to democracy. The generals in Brazil, for

tltille, always claimed that they were in power temporarily in order tosite Brazil fur democracv,m Political haders, after first paving

h .tn.oge to classic democratic J)rCepts, often went on to quaIi1 the typeoh lii ii tcracy appropriate fur the times or the country. EcheverrIa, fur cx

III, claimed that politics could not be left to the free play offorces.lit ioai exclusion in the desarrollista state was enduring. The majority

1 i hilts in both Brazil and Mexico had either no real choice or no voteIll lie end of the twentieth century. In Brazil, literacy requirements

4 I 1)10 heel a majority of adults during the (lemocratic period 1 945b4.Ill eligible electorate grew from 13 percent of the total (notjust adult)i Illiation in 1Qr to to percent in igGo, levels that were low coInill with other Latin American countries at similar levels of developni In Mexico, formal restrictions on voting were fewer, but political

rh s iiiaintained exclusion by denying opposition canelulates any realdi (Ill e of victory. Such other countries as Chile and Argentina alterii 1 hetwemi exclusive authoritarian regimes amid inclusive demnocra4 I4. I lowever, exclusionary periods were pr(sume(l to l)e temporary ali(L

(I .0 lmolinary,law /inlftioa is an apt term to describe the exclusie political elite in

I loll and Brazil. Politicians in Brazil referred to themselves as memI of such a class with unique rights and privileges. The press helpedlit om(t this class. For instance, the Mexican daily La Jornada devotedII lit page section titleI Cl;ose Poiltica to political intrigue and elite

I , Ii i (1:115 1)11111)1 IllS S/Iulii n (0u1/ianhins Iflhi(i)flhlO(I(I/ I)ii s/i/ni(iil i( I, 11(1. (\\ itlillSh): I5 tiI(rl)flIII 1115(1 (OllSi(tItS 11(11S (i(IIIO(ll(Ci(S ill 1.111(11 \Ii(IlidI lX(tIlsin;Inii. (Oh till/Il \tl\I(,0, 111(1 (osi:i Pill) as Ill ((Ills ((lllStltlltlOIIiIt (XClilSi,ISi

II s Ill 1g75 (t 1)5, 1.11(11 ). RIlIlilIll (ISIS I):ItIls (11511111 11011 tOt(SllIt ClllttIS(dlrnIl1141 0 (I(ibI;IIholl ill liIIlllIII4lllIlt0dII(( tO (111111 1 lWlI(tIlIllflSl(lIl,lt lt,lS.ill( :110(11 ((I Ii tIll

IlIbII(Iitali.lll 5(lS(lS (llllIUdl,ItII, (11(1 LIII ttISlllIl:iI 5015(15 l\dhllSIoIl:IlS till kI\ (:111IIIS 11(1 till (1051111 (tIS((lSSiOIl is IX(IIISHIII,(tS (bOtIlIICItl 5, SVtti(tI Iitdt(hlt(d till/It

hip I , II. 1(11 lgSII R(lIInIlI (t:lsShIiIS lilil/it 111(1 NtIXl((( IS Ix(II(slolEIIS ;HIIIIOIti:IItllIlWi III II(Sl(IIIaIS aIIItill(nI:lIl:Ill, IlspIcliSltS (p. s)

50 HI (II ittltlptt( 111(15 515 ((I the ll(tlIlO( 1:110 lhII(li_ilt (II 1111 (tIlt(t:1l5 IlL)IlII(, 511I Ill. t ill/Si (/1)5 /1(0(1(0) (((Il ltI(lII0l:Ic, 501 lSjI. till :.t71()

(11(11 ill ,\nillt:i, IllS 4IIlpflS ItltptlS;Ill.Il(s 11)011 it t.Sl;IlllL 1.lIlitil(l(l C. Sl:hIllIIIlI, Iiit,rl (Sui/lui and Paiflual (/ian in ibm;,! (SIlIlloIst: Slatth,td

I SIlL Poss, o)7p1, II. ;5I. SlI ,ttso 0110(1 titilSit ItS [.011:1 JI., [III toi.,t PlIlUl1IlilIIOl III(i, (75): tIll tsi.)lSt.IltOIl, 1111 I:iitv 5551111w, 11111 ttIIlOl,lt ttllIlooIs. 1.l(1ll1i(fl,.1I

N l 01111 :111, (III, I (SstllIIIIlI igS;): 7;.

&

288 2

BI.N Ross S(I1NI1I1)1J{ The Desarro1liste Stale in Brazil and Mexico

inachinations, Tlie (liSe l)OlItica WdS successful iii controlling its ii iiibership iLII(l blunting nonelite challenges. Beyond crude devices sin Iilimiting the electorate in Brazil or electord fraud in Mexico, pout ii iii111 1)0th countries (levised more sophisticatmi techiiiques of rnimil)i IL Ielections. Basing electoral coiflpetitiohI OIl clieiitelisin and pil(I( )iI,ishores UI) elite positions, l)e((USe it favors those Wit Ii access to reS( ii I Iand (lelijes oIeis accountability, Polili(al lea(leiS cuopted iitl)ei I ii Irepresented. Iii 1)0th Brazil and Mexico, election was usually by iIpI itoulent, which allowed elites to screen entr into the clase pu1itict iin I I(001)1 challengers. In Mexico iioinmation by the IflStjtUlioliLliZe(l Rnlutiunary Party (PRI) guaranteed electoral victory. Elections in hi ui1were inoi.e open, but the many politiciaiis who launclied their dccli liiicareers from executive l)oSitiOlIs testify to the electoral value of app iiuluimient, The alHl)itious were more likely to enter [lie appointie l)LIIe,l Ii(racy thaii try to build griissroots support br a program.

Civil society posed little threat to this political elite, Local associul iiisuch as squatter settlements, religious groups, professional organizimlit iiiand labor Unions had little independent powel-. Depen(ling on the itministration in power, the political elite attempkd to coopt their leIilti.ship, ITlaflipulate their finances, or intmudate ami repress 1)0th lenheitfl(l members, In Brazil, government officials successftmlly nmanipmiliui Icorporatist finmanciel controls and legal restrictions on labor unions. liiMeXic() PRI control of the Conficler;icin dc Trabajadores de Mcxii(Cl\I) is less tornial and legal hut more eliective,

Iii sum. I)olitical competition in the developinemital state was restrich Ito a small group. Of course, these polities were not hernietie and still iiseveral elefects kept them iii constant agitation (if not evolution), Tlniexclusive politics lacked solid legitimacy, institutional mechmnisms hr iisolving interelite conflict, and assurance of the continued acquiescel ii

, .

Fi (.i,ni,iln,, \llxl(ns 11,10 )))llIII.l intiit null nI lii Ri nIuiu1iiii.ii l,miiI. huip.iliiiiinuiialiii cuuuitiil of ilic silk, intl In ilti i i1Xn incluilitI nun Iiiani I,nlilins: nitli iilullS, luIulI;tlI( Iii, intl (icllIIn(iuli i Sin Jiinw (niizali, (,nil, [i lisi, itt Ii ti.,

j))IIi(i(I, \).VO) I (i ( \jnil I55. l(iiijil(t)) II. (iitIiin. () ))lO(l)f( /(II)i)(() I)I(l)I11li(, (S.tii uiiIii I)iftis,tii liiil)I)Ii.I IL

Iiiii, I )7), p. , iuuul Siiiiuii Si lisiit,iii,iii. ti 11(10) (10 (Ill/O)I/u)nu)l() lflfl.)i/)1)() (RI IJuiiIiil): Idjiiu,i ( :,nni,, i5k, Sni Scluiiiidii, 15,1,/u. wi/Iuiii the S/al,, iii.7. Stt Snsni Fcksiini, Ih, ISnerii a! Itevulniull: Ih, 5/0/) 0)1(1 (h) 1 (1)01) IStor ii 1 IC) ft

(Ii iliciinn: lrinc 11011 tlitiiisiit Ins,, IS. Sit kuuuitli I I:I,lksnn, hi, 1?iaz,l,an (:a,/knale S/a/C and tlfti1,i1L (Jan IS/il,,

(Iiiikilt: t iuiii:uis nI (:alilni,ui,i Pits,, nyj7). 111(1 ioiis.sI ( nlit,i, 1/i, .lIan/ulaim n/(at,,,!: II,, S/al, (1,1(1 Ilnu/:Hlz(Jas (5,)l)r,,uuui,l)s 1)1 IJ)(1// (lIilSl)ulidIi tniti:ns (ItIiwili Pits,, I

g Sic Rout kin,, ( ulluni, IL, (5ui/radu/ar t/liann S/a/elabn 1,5/a//an and li(.hauu, 1,, ,\l,,,,t, (lkikcliv: luiltiit,,i,i,i,;il unit Sit,) Siti(tIis, tlnisci,ii nI (,ililnritt,u, ill)

iiehites, flie elase pohtica usually iilarlage(l to stop threatening opii ion but spent enormous energies recreating internal accomimlo(la

iii while constantly cheeking over its shoulder.

till :\mlOINTIVE BUR)AUCRA(\

htv I he 1 gSos the Brazilian and Mexican bureaueracies comprisedIi lisinds of agencies and employed millions of people. In iqSS publiciul)ll yment iii Mexico totaled million (including 2.7 million in the

II iii government, 6oo,ooo in state and local governmellt, tfleI I milIi Iii iii public enterprises) and accounted for onefilth ol total emnploy

Ii, In Brazil ui 1q73, 9 percent of the ecOIlOflU(all) active populaill. iii 4 milliomi people, worked in the public sector, though

I Iiirds of them worked in state and loe:al governrnent (1,1 millionii Lil in 1)li1)hic firms uid other autonomous agencies at all levels ei1

) iiiiinent) Municipal, state, and le(lcral emnploynment grew to 41ni by l , and the largest slate enlerprises employed o\er 1 niil

III topl in addition)lii these mammoth bureaucracies, formal organizatiolls are fluid afl(l

I II lId, stve for such wellknown eX(eptiOris as the Baneo de Mexico an(lIi hiazihiati National Bank for Le:onomiean(l Social Developmncimt

I I )lS) , which prove the rule. Moreover, these bureaucracies simileredIi, i (lebilnating malige of conventional pathologies: overcentrahization,

ii iniitatioil, low professional ethics, high turnover, eotTuptioll, low

( ii tiles, amL poor training. It is hardly surprising that hureaue:racy enad so little public esteerfl in either country.I)1)ointments gave this unwieldy mass dynamism and structure, hi the

1. ii iohhjsta state positions of power in the bureaucracy were distributed

4 11% i hi ed personal, political appoititflleflt. One thousand appointments toml I p three to jour levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy is a roughIii sliold to elefnie an appoifltive bureaucracy. Brazil, Mexico, most of

I ii iii:5.Ilieriea and other oleveloping countries, the Uniteel States and alliiiiiimiiiSt systems thus have Lppoimmtive bureaucracies. About 50,00() p0

ii us ime tilled by political appoifltuient iii Brazil and Mexico, The iiiIi ii ig Collor administration estimateel the number of political, conli

tn Niliutsa (NlI init,tl tiuuauitti.,), La eenn(,,,ua mexualla ti) (7/Ia (Mlxi) 11 (Sn Notins,i,

Iii lii n,titttn I{titiuiti ,iitit ll;ivin P. (Stsinlii lSi.ln ti, () tflIp liLi1 pululitit tlOilll lIlsiltiII,, Ii lIltIlIlli (t(lill)Iflhi(l, iii Rtiindn ct ut ,, ,ts/a/iu do /aeIutJmno (It) (OV))l)ll 110 10)1)-kill I,untiit: IPt 5, i7Ii). lip

\ul,i,uililln Nl,liiIill lie,isan. ()pii.l( It) (t(STIIIII1(t, (alga iiititti.tiia c as lsl.ui.lis,1. inuuim I)l(/)((l(l() 51) (St1iinbii i jSS):

I290 291

B1:N Ross SCI-INI11)ER

r(1(Iice positions at An estimate for Mexico from time i (iwhen the bureaucracy was smaller, l)tt the number at 25,000 (ii 1(11S,ooo in the PRI bureaucracy) Later observers put the total (14 )(I i50,000. ThOtLSalI(lS of th(Se itpl)OilltmentS may be pure patlI1;1i44oils with little impact on policy, but all positions with any real ( )WI iiopen to iippoifltiiieflt ati(l subject to inimnediate (liStfliSSLl. Even (1w Ikucle Mexico which by tradition has a meritocratic, career hureaucim v, ulegally unprotected from the appointive powers of the president . IIextremely high number of appointments distinguishes Brazil and M\from most (leVelOpe(l and many developing countries.

Appoimitmnents structure power and incentives inside and 011151(14 Ibureaucracy. Subordinates caii rise only through appointment, vlhelps b)cuS their attention on those above them. The poer to ;ii ii I Ian(l dismiss reinforces the topdown How of power and gives superi( 41 . I.more potential control over subordinates than they would have iiireaucracy where promotion (lepends on inipersonal criteria. Given iii(lominmce of the bureaucracy in the polity, appointment then henthe primary means for gaining representation. Factions in the pnhlIic .11elite maneuver to get their representatives designated, while anlI)it i usbureaucrats seek outside support. The process often takes on the iiiii .4an electoral campaign: the candidates for various positions (or any p ition) seek visibility, make speeches, and give interviews. Newspapers IIImagazines endorse or reject candidates, propose names, and circul1lt Isumes. When the president has selected his subordinates (and they iiturn theirs) the basic lines of representation and access are set until Illnext ministerial shakeup or presidential succession. In a famous (JIll 44the politician Hltimo de Carvalho distilled the essence of power in IiBrazilian political system into four verbs: appoint, dismiss, imprison. .n IIreleilse.

The key variable in (histinguishing among bureaucracies is tenure.reaucrats in appointive bureaucracies have no job security amid are iiconstantly looking toward their nextjobs and their next boss. In comil ioa key element of what Peter Evans calls Weberian bureaucracy is precis(l(jol) security.5 Meritocratic recruitment and promotion are 1)O5Sibl( iiiboth Weberian and appointive bureaucracies, but depoliticized adnn Ill

6;. /ai-nal do Thacil, March_,

I l)gII, p.KiiiiitiiiIiuii. I\iahiIIU (1/ l10deIll IIIVICO, p. 157.

(is. (ahinI Zai(t, iiit(isl(w h atittilli, NI(XIcII (ts, jiih i lI).66. ImpIoOI III (III IlilflcO (Ii Mexico, IiiI(ili(lV 1)1 iIitIi(ii, Noveintwr i, iIp.67. Ste ScIiiidei, 1101601 W1//IllI tile S(at(, Chap. 4, 111(1 M(iilei Sci rut Urinetli, 1tl1,,U

(ISIS, Jo/fliua,o, (illS! Iea,anI in Mex/in: A (Ass .SIudl III Iubln Poin 1 (Berkeley: Unis ci sill(AIiIoini:i 1i(Ss, 1)77), for till (liS(tiSSiOiiS Of IppOiiitiii(l11 i(IaiiOflS.

68. 14 iiis, 1,IflbIddl(l II/5l(0I115.

111111 is possible only in the former. The distinction between WeberianI iii i.iiicracies in Asia versus politicized, ;tp}nHlitive bureaucracies inI 11111 America is the crucial fcctor that differentiates developmental from

.1 ollisti states. I return to these and other comparisons alter exarnini I lie consohi(latiOn of desarroihista states in Brazil and Mexico and as

ii ig ftirther the interaction alm(l synergy among the four cOlflJR)neflts.

I i50IIDATmON

iveial contributors to this olume have noted that elevelopmneciihiv when some components eIu(h j)recise quantitative,isIIIement. The political comp(ments preel:mt the full developmen

1 sI:Ite by decades if not c:enturies. The ee:nhioinic elements are harder

I l.ite. At the turn of the century the Brazilian 1In(1 Mexican governlislits intervened in their economies but generally limited ifltervefltioflin .iceordance with the dominant econonhic liberalism. lroni iSq to1ii) government revenues range(l from 6 to 12 l1 of GDP in Brazil

liii from 5 to 5 percent in Mexico.7 The midi qbos however iiiark a11111 ig point in the goals and mtlmods of stale intervfllifln. On the one

Ii lilt, liberals could no longer 1101(1 out hope that the 01(1 internationalII hug sstem would soon return. 0cm the other hand, Presichflts Getihio

h VII 1)S and L;i:cro C:irdenas were moving increasingly, sometimes a(hnithr lv only in response to shortterm crises, toward muon systematic: statelii vention. This was a period throughout the world of political and ecoIlilic iedelinition. Wat gradually emerge:el from it in Brazil and Mexico

I, 11 particular form of (levelopmental state.

.1 denas dramatically increased and medirected government s)efl(liflg( ( e htb1e 2). He nearly doubled the total budget and eXpan(Ied therI Ill dedicated to econ()mic developinent from an average of 25 percent

11(2 f34) to 8 perceIt for his teinh)1 Alter C:mrdcnas, neither ecolilic nor total spendmg frll until the I q8os. The iqS nationalization

.1 i 111 in Mexico marks qualitatively and certainly symbolically, if hot

Ill. llii. I:li6II11 t:eliii4 (II iIs_4irlies Ill eciunitil,itioii iii I(i4lit:iliI.Iil ltiitli\ mu sIu(I:LtII lilieS III iucuiiiut;iiion is itsIl Sill prohleiliLiIc. 5mm D,msid M. 15111,, Lont Wues unul So-

.e.iI

Si liii lilies tui e:Iunmutllion: A Cinique niet tLeniturpretition, Revuw (1/ I1adnwi loCacal1 (lulls II), no f (\\ 111(1 I gS7): nIl. 17:;.[.

topik, lionoiiiic t{ole of he Slate, up. ;g i , iJenies \litkw, Iiie WIlliS I1evoilIIIou(: [14150/ 1 V/hIIdlIIIIi I and ,Swiai (Jians Ill II 11)10

(I, 1,1115: t._nieisn elf Cililonsit Press, i(l7), psi.

The Desarrollista State in Brazil and Mexico

I

4

292 293

BJN Ross S i INI:I1)1:R The Desarrollisia Stale in Brazil and Meico

(:cllcs (1025102i) 2.c 10 1,_______________

li2ili:t 2.c i0 35(1cclccijs ( l03:1o.jo) 33 13 44\vcla (cnu Iicc (t0IJl0-t() I?lcflhc() (t)I7tT2) 2Ruiz (HIccc(s (1:3l3) ct 14 33IA)J)(Z M(I(OS (lOcOlOOl) .0.) 20 III)ic, ()njcj (106Io70) 41 21 3 l,I23iIicwrr1, (I971lo7o) 15 21 tiL ((1 I( ililic c ( I 0.77I 0.32)

quantitatively, a watershed in state interventjon.2It created a Listing(:iItiorI betwee rittio1)ii1isrn iifl(i state intervention. Sonic prote(tive II Iift and tax eXefliptiOfls fi)r ifl(LUStry predate Cirdenas, but tile llurivlegislation creating stateled ifliJ)ortSubstituIing industrialization (lSiiCaIne- niostly in die late i 9305 itfl(l 1

In Brazil, president Getiilio Vargas promoted a qualitative shift igovernment speridrng and intervention, though a recogllizal)ie and (icliberate developmental state emerged only during the Lstado N(i

_) 71 From i 93() I)) igri various Vargas governments with stri ciiimiliIar encouragement stea(IiIy created new ministries (for example,Ministry o Labor, Industry, and Conimerce in i 930), departments, cuiiiicils (such as the National Petroleum Council 111 1935), and state coo I

Sic lS)((I(lI\ fLLIllilkcfl, Ii?flhlc )/S1flict((/cflflflfl PP a 1071)73.Sc c Sior. Iiidus/i Ill, S/ak. and I,ibhc Pa/ic S c S, Ocr a ( liIl)IIIIIO \ I)! III;IjclI Ii

(as.7-I- Skiiliiiiiic- iiiici lIlaC \Il4aS usid ill O(( asian 0) (Icc (sar (0(1(1 Iii ulilciii- iioIiindiistc au allan, 1 .31)11! tcia,nd Wilici) hi hall ucla maiic0. sinci l;7, LItIaRfth as hi,

l.[() lii hid 51(11 1)1)3 c ommillid hi asilf an(illIisocaIh Ia slstimalii itidjistijal dcvcl1nc-nt Sce Skidmaic )ain,r.s 11? I3ra:d, p. Ii Satigan claims dcat hem 11)31) stall mOO((II) h,

InL0.,-2, (avcran(c-nIs1tettchn0. in Iixjici, 0)30toga

[1 allanIli Sal i_il tinatijsi ill IS(pens 010.10) ii lual gdoori(tainI huli3ci)

1 ((pa.1SIcctlIl (13 III11)1)) lIts

0dtu3c; br ilai, sharI insjd,ttc is ill tills period.50001) lga-j-,3, 1V1lii4is bar o;icht mdntiiastiitian lam Jantcs tilkic, 17u liivica I/lIll

lion: I1dcra/ Ex/linr/i/ciccs- and Sara_il Change s/nrc 1gb (ItcrkiIi; Litiicsi oh (alibc mmii,Press, 11)117), p 3a; tg070. lIon) Jatias 0iIka, In revo/iuidn lfl(S/rUl(O (Misic a; FaaiIo I(Siitni.i hl(l1l)lltIC,(, 11)73). is cilid in S;nniicb Si hntldlt. I/n I)c/erii,,n/io,i n//lu lies-ic ii isi/roll (Ilk san: Lllmsirsilv (II \iiian;i Itss, iggi), p. 4a. Icr (:llcild SjiilaiiIlg it igha pcs10111 t),1Ii Star, lndia/y i/ic Sink and 1uh/n 10.11(1 in ktssro (.\ma_ljn; ticiii.ii cib l,-s

S, 11)31)), P I Ilis 111(1:1 iii- Iciilirlc(I II hkc-tcjr intiisals lislec! Iteti 1-, ito Iil(sl 11301,dir iatit mdlilanisi lal 1011.

294 295

BIN Ross ScIINrIlwR

SsTrIc INTFR&CTION

Table provides a summary of the developmental state in Mexicu uiBrazil. Political capitalism and developmentalism affect the en ii ii iiIIwhereas political exclusion and appointments are nmre p0111 ical. Iiterms of (lifierentiating structures and goals, political capitalism iin I iappointment bureaucracies are the structures through which eliws pusued deveh)pment and limited pluralism. Exclusion and developitunilism shaped the Pr irences or ambitions, to borrow Michael Loii;i isterm, especially of state and political elites, whereas the appoint iV( Ireaucracy arid J)olitical capitalism influenced the strategies economil iii Istate elites adopted to further their preferences.

The four components of the desarrollista state aliect and often i ciithree one another; they are parts of a system. In the introduction In Iivolume, WooCumings writes that the developmental state is a short liii iifor the seamless web of political, bureaucratic, and money influcimi cLess a seamless web than a dense set of interrelationships, my concci liiiof the desarrollista state tries to break out the analytically discrete cnniilents better to understand their interaction. This kind of systemic lII.iI\sis is largely absent from research on developmental states in Latin Am iiica, which tends to focus much more on the bases of support and pill 1(111of intervention in the economy.

The interactions iunong the four components are complex and un Iplc. Suflice it here to oiler some examples arnl note that 1101 all the iiactions are equally significant. For instance, the effect of appOint n (i Ion political capitalism is less than vice versa. It is the executives (on Ii 1over resources that moves politics into the bureaucracy, amid the exc(IIl obureaucracy dominates 1)0th politics and economics. The various en I Iof this bureaucracy run state enterprises and banks, lix tarifhs Sul)si( Illcredit, and otherwme budget and plan government intervention jilt)) I iieconomy. The legislature and judiciary are marginal in economican(l this exclusion dilutes their political relevance. The political (11therefore flocks to the executive that then dominates politics mc1 hut liimarginalizes the other branches. Politics becomes an essential p;mi iidoing business. In her study of Mexican industrialists, Flavia Derossieluded that when success and failure depend on political action as iii IIas (>11 productivity, entrepreneurs will remain poweroriented more t liiproductionoriented.

The causal relations also operate in the reverse direction, thougi i Istrongly. The stakes in political capitalism are very high, so capitalists iii i

77, Havia Dciossi, lb ,lItsicnn I.nlojntnenr (Paris: Or.nizition br 1.io omit (fl10011 iiii DisiIopmcnm, 0)71), p. bli; sic also Lanicrb;wh, Gosiinniiii out 1)iuliipiitip. :111:1.

I1(11)1) 3. lb I )isii-iollisti stat

lolitiis I,lOllOIiiIlS

l I(ItIlIllS PP luItl.itIlr,ii loliiiiat (apIt,llIsntlii. i4ii:ih. lolititil iX(IUSII)il Ihcloptittlti.LlIsIit

Ill i(tors walil direct influence in ap1)ointmcnls and through them ( I liii)! over the distribution of state resources. Political capitalism there

i nakes it. ham-der to rethrrn an app( untive bureaucracy. An innocuous11111mg proposal to create a career civil service is in fact a radical rehirni

ii I distribute power.5 These dii hculties and contemiding pressures arepill (;u)t to hear iii mind when analyzing possil)ilities for administrativeliii iii. Most analyses of developmental states in Asia emphasize Weber

lii Ililreaucra(y. By extral)OlatiOfl the recommendation thr Latin AmerIi .i (VI itild be that interventionist states require reforms to make them

iii \\eberiam. Yet, once states mterent extensively in the economy,liv make such administrative reforms more politically costly and less

Dr

II iIV.I iveum that the politicization of capitalisni focuses pnhiti(;al activity oil

(\ecutive bureaucracy, it is themia1)J)oiutfllents that structure access1111 lej)resclitation ibr societal grou)s attemn)tiflg to tleleiitL their inter-

4 also distribute power iii this pohticiznl bureaucracyIII I uesent 1mower holders (the ap1)Ointers) with a sometimes difficultIllilIma: how to balance representation and central control. This nn

II .111(1 effective bureaucratic performances are crucial to elites with dclii ulmental goals. And, it is througha1)poilltlnents that lop (levelol)menli,l communicate iflcefltives to subordinates to make decisions that

I I Rely promote industry.8Lastly, to the extent thatre1)resentalon issit ite only through appointment the appointive bureaucracy impedes

participation, because appointment politics are opaque audi rtto elites. In this sense the appointive bureaucracy ac,ts to exclude

5 \tII:iiii lilt (hiirIIo ,iIttI hi titi lroPos.II Ill ito /,lItillo ,4oVlI miii br adi, Its iIoiil IS (lllIikII ii 1w ItIplinultld I) Itsl Ii would do nSa (Sill ito .ip

.1,1111 Itto;liI(ulU loll llIilIiiiti tIll liasis iii lil.illj/IIt pIOSIr til ilti liSl 101111 SI .11111I iling IRl. 0)1 01)51:, piiliiirialss 11(1 (tpltlliStS iilitii (Still to itS) Sill tlsiiilli IS liii (11t

h oi hits, so thai iicithcrgloop lost illIlUitttl it IIIII4I11 hii iltIISlIil ii a 111111 III tllOVlfllllitIII tillI1i1liiIOhlll(Ilt5 111(1 cIiIioIiIlilii (IISIlIl)iliIlill SIc D;l\lll ,\llIlllti loll Jill) 11th)

Ill I, t llliItI.lI ,til,tltos (11(1 t_lll III lllllltilolts: tIll .tc\lu,llI Sill ttllol 1 .111(1 tIllI,i,llisi SiltIl, p;l}lct liisinild II Ill toolciinii PolItIcal 1,ioltlillt\ ot \iliitiiiis

liii lhIiriti itt I)1SlIo1iiii,4 (loutitlils, No,iltmstiIit tllISllSIt, Nt i)7., i \Ii, 11. \tltsilitt. ,ISIO ,\iv/ (unit: ott/I, 150,10 011(1 1(1,, Iit(/,o/H(tI1UhI5 (Nis Yiii klit I ltiV(tSi P1(55. tiSit) JIlIllisilt, XII1l (lid I/H J(t/)UHISC ll,,n,ln lilt i5ill 1.1115 1s.nis,It? ) t(HiIllllIS

5, tnoolil, Ioli/n s ,,IIni, flit Sin!,, tIttli. 4.

The Desarrollista State in Brazil and Mexico

297296

BI.N Ross S( lIEN El 1)11k

rionelites politically aII(l to inhil)it ill a SifllJ)1( logistic Wily the ex El I siof pluralism.

The association l)elween authoritarianism afl(1 ifl(hlstrializati( iii liilong, HflreSOh((l history in social Science theoi. As suggested in Liithe associatioll betWeen the developmental state and authoritiriiii inseems historically to be a stable, if not necessary, combination. Of (1 iieconomic perftwinance clearly varies in(1e1)elldently of the type i liiical regime.5 Yet there are mutually reinforcing tendencies 1)(tlvcdevelo1rnieiitalism, as ainbitioii not oUtcofll(, lH(l political excliisi iiJohnson thinks so when he characterizes (leiflocratic Japan as a s if I iiiIhoritarian regime. flie developmental state inJa1)aIl apears to wi iil Icause the system is 1101 lulh democratic. The two seem niore closeR iifated aI1(I mutually sul)l)ortlve in (liscourse than they may be in piii IIDevelopmentalists regularly bemoan the messiness anol sluggishness ii(lemocracy. Apologists br dictatorships just as regularly justify autlioiir.iiiall means to promote (IeVeloj)lllerlt. The reinforcing pressures also 1in the opposite direction. Dictators in(:reasingly lost the means to Ieii Imate their rule as the democratizing twentieth century progressed iiiwere naturally drawn to developinentalism.5Maria Covre conducte Iextensive analysis of the discourse of the military rulers in Brazil.5l)egan their rule by saying the were there to restore democracy. After sieral years they could no longer claim to be restonng democracy, iiitheir discourse clearly shifted to extol the virtues of development and iiiadvantages (If inilitar rule to achieve it.

Political capitalism also contributes to, or is ftuictional ft)I politic;iIclusion. Political capitalism was in large part the result of the seclimenIit iiiof myriad shortterm decisions designed to meet particular economic pilerns. The result, a.s politicians are quick to realize, is that the state ends iiiwith (liscretionary control throughout the economy that can easily be iiinil)ulateol to stern Political challenges. For those outside the elite, f)oI ii B iicapitalism also gives state actors resources ft)r strengthening exclusioi iiiclientelisin. These fmids (10 not usually promote real distribution but golocal elites who can effectively silence nonelites in theirareas.

Among business 1)0101)101 or the bourgeoisie, political capitalism can aRblunt democratic impulses. Economic elites realize that they proixil )Ishould not create trouble for a government that is reviewing their aplili

I,.,iiiii I. R(I11IlltI, 1)(IIIU(I,IUV 111(1 l_(OIlOhl!I( (iisii, 11(1,1(1 IoliIns {, In. (iI l 1 111511 1 I11iLil(I. IUII,1,(1l 1 /Hflhi 1/IC Itii/ihiir. Ih, ID/IIlC.S 0/ (,oii//i iii I/i,\lSil) I,I(/,Is11,(t/r.,,iL ( oi,nh,,(l (Itli:ii ii: ( oiii&II tiii 1IsII II 155. I )c)l)) I \1,iiii IiscvniskiI(IILII1(l() I iIlInhli_41, I(1IIti(lII Rl1411111S Hid F(nllnnIic ( ;iUIV1II, /oiiunnl o/ Iaoiioinir Ie, I/IIllSS 7 1(1. (SIIII1III(F I : I(it),

S:iiiuiI I. 1111111 iIItiIIlI. I/Il I/i/Ill 110111, 1)100)1 inIe,alloii 1)1 I/il lUll lainl,eI/i (,),l),,(NHI,Ii:III: tII,s(islt nI ()klalinnia Iiss, iqI ).

81. (InS II, 1/1)1(1 (In) /)Oflhlfl,S, 15I pt), I I 7l2.

The Desarrollista SIaIe in Brazil and Mexico

it 11)115 for subsidies. Political capitalisni disaggregates business elites andill (5 them to work through ad how bureaucratic rings. Ecomoimc

1,115 are thus poorly equipped to) nioulit a collective challenge to authorii in rule. Moreover, political capitalism makes busiiiess especially wor

I ill I 1ll)out the possibility that democracy would allow ailtiI)usiness 1)Olitii.iiis to oversee vast an(l deeply interventionist controls oer the priVate

11111 nny. Big business in Mexico quickly retreated from active oppositionI I lie PRI when the left emerged as the leaoLing alternative to the PRI inIll late iq$os.5 There are limits, though, to the extent political capitaliii shores hf) exclusion. At the limit, if business feels excluded, then ceoinc elites heco)me a l)o(1r1ul force for democracy.5Iliese, then, are some illustrative interactions among the four compo

ii Ills of the (lesarrollista state. ihe analysis 50) far has emnphasize(l similar111)5 between Brazil anol Mexico. In the following section 1 consider sonicI,I nctions between the empirical evolutions of the political economiesI I ti izil all(l Mexico.

Sir l,VlIONS 0)N -im: Ti mi:rvn:

ti izil arid Mexico haol (lesarrollista states for most of the 1)oStV1r 1WIII, but they differed from each otlmeran(l from o)ther developmentalIII ls. The PRI sharply olistingiiishes Mexico Iroumi Brazil. As a niass eleo

II il force, the PRI appears 10) challenge the ideas 0)1 political exclusion11111 lepr(sentatiorl through the bureaucracy. Moreover, by cliamnielmiig

Iii le demands and representation, the PR! ease(1 prtssrIre on appointi ii t.s and shielded appointees lrom populir pressure, enabling them toii v nut unpopular programs, particularly antiinflation policies.5Yet,

II, 5(1> success of the PR! from the igos to the 19805 tenoled to moveS I x in i closet to) the ideal typical desarrollista state. The PRIs quest. for(II If lfete electoral dominance (el carro completo) strippeol elections of

ii .iiiimg anol thereby meduceol the utility (If politicians 1(1 other elites. Iii

.511 0 I,inlnsn, () 11)0(1(10 /X)Ifll(1) blfl,)iI))(lI,)4(, S1( II(Il(IiI 111,11115, NIlXi(aIl II(ISiIl1SS 111(1 1111 81,111: 1l11 P1111111 II l,(nIIOIII( (It .1

SIIIIIIIIII I Il.1IliIi11[1, ill [.111(51 IIIItIll 11111 L,lfttl 1515111, IllS,, 1111,1/IU,)) aod l*,nouvn ill1,11111 l,,,,Il,() (IIi1sI11iIzI1: tilIIS(iSilS (II P111S111111411 lIlSS, 1(1(15),

il 5(1 SI(IlIIdII IIai4,.lId .11)11 RId11It kailfiliSIl, i/n P01)1)1(11 l,ioiiuni n/ l)e,nocraln flancilIOn (liiinninii: P11111 111)11 Ul,iSIISlI) IISSS, 111(15)1 15,11111 R1IllililI, 1)111101 I.lil/,IIII)Il IIII un \IIl1Iica, III P.011(11 815111, 11.1115 8(11011/., 11111 811)111 1)iii,, Ill.,, (,ln/x,l l)(iii)/1)IIIinh/0(i

I fill I/Hill 11(1(1(1 (1111111d1I, (111111,: 1,SflIll RI(IlIIlI, I) 11111 (,;iIlllIiII1 II, (5)II:n,4lI.m, I1CIC fHIH) /)om)na/wfl: lndnq),a/(s/ 0)1(1 //lI .51(11) Ill l,1)l(I(l1lI (IiIlslHlIi.l:: t IIIllISII( ut IIIIS

mu i lW I

5(1 P.11111 IIcIiIl.s (,111111I, POjISIISI 8111(11 111C11111111.IIiOII 11111 InIiiii ii SII}1IIIIIdlSI. 11111 I,VnIIIIillII ill IiIS/il .11111 M1Sil (1, II) 85 IS 01 ,I1I1 I-Ils) III 11111 P.11 1)11(1 S. \\liIllIi,

I , Ilnn.i1 and linden (P11,I,IiIIljlhI:l: InslIlnhl: tIll 1111 Slink 01 I 111111.111 ISslils, )$z).

29S 299

BiN Ross Set INEII)F.R

eliminating elections as a source of uncertainty, politicians (li(l 1t( )i SIC ICCa Commensurate reward for their efforts l)ut committed politiclI 5tH o IIn this sense, PRI dornmance shifted political attention away in III CItiOnS to the bureaucracy. Moreover, in coopting or capturing I pu Liisector organizations, the PRI preerripted nonelite challenges iii( I iforced Ix)litical txclusiori. At the Same time, PRI dominance titti RIthe revolutionary legitimacy of the political elite and encouraged lieni Irely more on nationalism, clientelism, and developmentahsni.

The revolutionary ideology would seem to give Mexican po1itictl h ICers a solid alternative legitimacy nornmlly lacking in the developi 11111 Cstate, but paradoxically, it may have driven them to embrace develo1ml Iitalisni. To the extent that political leaders could not claim that lEtsi ICC CIIdes had advanced the revolutionary promise of social justice, they hiii IC Iit expedient to embrace developmentahsm. From another persplCi IIthe revolutioiiarv ideology embodied in the 117 constitution is eII(( I Cprecisely because it embodies all the major isms of that era and Ciii ICbe invoked in the service of communal, patrimonialist, socialist, and Iii Ceral projects. In any event, the revolutionary ideology (in all its Ii )Ii ii Ifilled Mexican ideological space. It could and (lid accommodate devell 9 Cinentalismn hut never allowed it the dominance achieved in Brazil.

Mexicos porous twothousandmile border with the United States Ci Ihmces the structural power of business and thereby circumscribes sillintervention and makes Mexican capitalism less politictl. The border liii Cits the potential for state control of the economy, especially of the cxiiflon for mobile resources; reduces the range of effrctive interveimi CCI Cand hence predisposes state elites to niore marketoriented policies iisome areas. For example, exchange controls are costly to enforce 11111high inflation is more disruptive because of easier currency convert 1111ity.Su Policymakers had an in(lication of the significance of the 1)1 loll Cfrom the very beginning of the desarrollista state. Between iri 11CC11939 capitalists exported close to a l)illiOn pesos, more than twice I ICCtotal deposits in the banking system.ih In tIme explanation of (lillerelli i. (;CCICICICI. (ICf, tas (11515 (11 III (IICSC l)CCIIIi(C, 1.8. NiCXfC(i(i aIiIl(S hiLt 11CC hlICCICt of uI1i4IIl to liii ([(CHILI iS 11CC CC I( CIII Ill MLXICCC IICCCC CCI

1111111 CI(5CI(ClCiChi. (CCI1111CCCS tICICLIkS to liii IWIC tII(C(ISCIi(t 111111 tJ.S.Nl(Xi( CII I)CCIC1IL . .. I IVICII II

Ii(CiIIt(liS tilt tiil(;Cl CCI (ICICIIICI 11114111 III lIS[)(CLCSC ICC IICifCCOC((I }CCCI1CiCS. SIC (svCIIIinL (:(I/)IfI/i 71. Slit 115CC 901)1(5 (jCdICLIS iiCm(IitiIhi.4 tICICI CXCIiIth)k( C(CL)lIC)IS CCCC OLIlY isoik ILL 1111411(ICS(il)liL)III (CCIC1)ICiIS IVICCIC (11510105 111115 ale i%(H 0Ii4lIIiCt((I 111(1 hoLdIls CIII) ICC ([(C IIi Ii011CIIIt1 IXCl)ICLi14I (CCfltLOI Ii) M(XIUIC 151)0111 StCL(Iy 1)1 (LIl(i(CCi)ii)C(I by the 111111k HIICIkIl I71i). ICC 511101 CIIStICHUCS, hCCOLSC14 till L(Sl)I)I)SC of S11lI( CCIIiCIILIS to (IIIfI(tL[Ii(S (CI 1111)11CC! iCC

1)11)11 lnt(rVCuIionisI lh;Lfl I) 1ILILti, 115 ii the 1)1111k IIICI1CC1)llhZ,CtiOlI f I 91411 CLIII 1111 CCC11cr I)01i1C (Cf M(Xi(ICILIJICtjCCIi of MNCS. SeC GerLIli 111(1 11111115, iICHSIIICI1CCLI,Ci COr[CCILILIICCCC

9CC. JIIICII NI. NI1CItIflIL NOV11, (au/lu to L(fadIiuCCI/CCSOaIW5 (CC loi gVbiCiIIO) (/C (!,thna, III,

Ma/I))/ Ihiirria (N1e1xhCC: N(C(VIC 111)1(14)11, I II ) , p. I CCI.

Tue Des;trrollista State in Brazil and Mexico

II Ills between business ari(l government after 194() in Brazil and Mcxl C C, lIt is border looms large.5I

II he Brazilian military has been a more visible protagonist in the desar11111 slim state than has its counterpalt in Mexico. Brazilian military ofticersIi 51 since the 1920s propagated developmeritalism, restricted political[CIII (ipation even in civilian reginws. and sought and a(hieved represenIII 1)11 througli appointment.z Overall, the military helped make BrazilCIII (levelopmentalism more potent than the Mexican version.

Iii the democratic period 191 ,64 Brazil appears to deviate from acase. I)evelopnientalisni and state intervention gained ground, but

III without interruption. In fact, from the viewpoint of ig6, the p\niIllS twenty years seemed to he a merrygoround in economic policy fromii 111111 to (Ievelopmental, to populist, and back. Formal literacy require

Cillills and informal electoral coercion limited participation hut not con, sIlIlion, and the political system and exclusion were unstable. BeforeIC (i1, one can imagine se eral plausible alternative scenarios for Brazil;11111 Quadros not resigned, had Goulart riot poltriil politics, had theiiiIiIiry not intervened. Yet in the period Iromn 1930 to igo as a whole,ICvtlopmentahsm and exclusion were (lomniamit, though there were

CIII CIC detours, fluctuations, and instability than in Mexico.Iii lerms of the appointive bureaucracy, state elites in Mexico maIl

eLtl 10 insulate the bureaucracy more from outside pressures and to inIlli lie more meritocratic promotion criteria, though more l)y custom

111111 law. Lateral entry into high levels of the economic bureaucracy belille rart, and outside economic anti political elites could not pressure

I I;Ive one of their own tppointed to a top bureaucratic position. MeritoCli 1 advancement became the informal norm in public banking and ii

11(111

I )verall, Brazil had a fuller desarrollista state than (lid Mexico. BrazilICC Led a strong party (which could deflect some political attention fromI III I )tireaucracy) , had greater control over its borders, an(l could there

P CII I iianipulate markets more to developmental and political ends. TheI i 1/ilian military invested a lot in discourse an(l helped create aIII iger strain of developnientalism. Lastly, the ilppointive bureaucracy

III Ibazil was more open to outside infiltration amid pressure and ntioreCCCII icized.

III SIc 1111) RCCSS SChnCiIIII, 11i14 litlsifless CLIII the lOliti( S Cli FcoLiICmic RCIOrI1I: (nullI ICC C CCCII (11111 ICrI1CI1CCL) ii 14111101 111(1 NI(XiCIC, in S1uI1L MICXIICIII 111)11 SCI1IICIdCr, ls. I/IC),

11(110/ I/Il S/a/c (Cl I)Cl)ClO/a1114 Coiuiili,1i(ItICIC( a: (aCrillil UI1ISCISItS IICSS, I 997).SIC SIcp;u, Muli/a14 III 1C0/1/)1C, 1111(1 IliIii1II1CIC) (1OIIC[CII5 CICCIlLo, 11111 /1111(0 (/1 I(/III/Idathl

I/ CIII /1(1 CIa )(I(IC(/a(/( /IIasllCCIa (R,o dl I1CIILrCC: lICrIIisc UnCVCrsCt1Cri1C, I 97(1).

300 301

Bix Ross Sm INFI1)1R The Dc,srrroI1ista Slate in Brazil aiid Mexico

Tin: l)I:SARR0JLISTA Srvii: IN (k rpAit,viivi: PERSIEclIVE

The desarrolli.sta state is an intense (1 )n(ept , iii ( i )ViLflfli S;iittellils, (IeSigfled to generate rich, (liffcrentiate(1 theory applicablesmall range of cases. lxclwliiig one of the four cotnl)onents of I hr Isarrolhsta state W(>Ul(1 leave t (0flC(j)t l)iOL(l(r ifl (OV(Tii( l)Ut we;ilcri iiianalyti( leveiage. 1or instance, (lrop)ing the elenieiit of political (iii )iI,IIiSlfl V01Il(1 alIov the ifl(lusiOli of pre(lOnhiflafltlv market (conomi(s si a IiIS sitiall or OlWfl ((0IiOIlli(5 that are constaiitlv subject to interiiit a ii ii Imarket ssures as iii Cm muntries of Central America, ilit Ciribbeati athe (iilr(pOl ((OflOIIil(S mu Asia. But 11w (lOmninailt (Iis(ourse in tincountries is unlikely to lx (lev(lopmemltal, afl(I hence the whole econm a ISi(le of the (ksarrollista Stat( is left out, an(l the general literature oi iith( rilarianisni is adequate to the task of analyzing the many governhlme I IWith appointiVe bureaucracies that limit l)lnlnhlism.

1)ropping the condition of j)olitical exclusion allows the extensioiithe concept to include countries with strong parties and organi/iht 1such as labor unions in a vibrant (lvii society. In Argentina and Chile 1)1fore the military coups of the 1 7OS, appointment relations struct iii eltime bureaucracies, capitalism was largely political, and devel( pmnenthl siefljoye(1 wide though not lmegemomc support. I Strong l)i1rticsunions, however, made elections more important and gave nonelgreater power, in turn encouraging time bourgeoisie to organize in )l iii(hllV.

In these mstances, nonelite power, democracy, arid time elements ol(lesarrollista state created a volatile mix. Political capitalism contril)I i elto polarization because economic elites had rmiore reason to fear a let si(or Peronist) electoral victory in that the (lepenideci so heavily oim iistate. Political (:apitahsm cami also exacerbate polarization by politiciuit lie labor mnovenlent. Because the state is so heavily involved in the em aonivwhich means it also controls such variables as wages immm(l pricesmost affect workersworkers have strong incentives to organize to 1)1sure the state, rather thami employers. Unions target the state, and stiilrbecome political weapons. Omice p larization has taken imohi, (leVel( pnientalism becomes increasingly difficult because one or another flict nilwill oppose almost an industrial policy on the grounds that it Livorsopposition. Polarization also tends to strip the appointment l)ureauclhm

.

SIIInII ( flh1(()i 1i,fflIIil.ltI4)I1 (: iii ;Iiii( POhihi(S S4( .IIS() t(\lII(I(I I((()I4(, (is Sitidims mu Throes 1)mwlopnmrimi: Ila Nhtlioct at Shin mncI jam (Is((I ( mmiii

m,m(is(iii in I.muit (omtiai Iitiiiii, iii, l)i//snmnei (Nmsm\oik: Im tirs, I)7g) (gj. Oil (:tntr,srr ttmmti,mi.i SciItmln4s, C/nms (aim/lid and l(Ofl(ll/i/( l)immi/o/)iiimmm/ in (hi1

(m)5SH)7 (Si.miilimmiI: Sliiitmmid tiiismismt loss, 1)75). (Si \i(iiliiLm. Sri Sikkiimk, l,/,,a(limit lmmslitimliaimm.

1 1 io lleXil)ie advantages it iLls iii less antagonistic eIovirolmnlents. In- milirr voiois, authoritarianisni aiiol the (leSorI0lhmsto state micv hae an

imli affinity because olemo)cra() so upsets the mntemaction amno)ng theI miii (Omfl1)oml(ntS (l(1mJ()cmItj( (onfhct nmakcs develo1uniemitalismu con

lit ions, politicil capitalism exa(erl)ates polarization iii a demnocr;cc, andlit ical (omupetitiomi cripples the ap)oiiitive lmreaucra

I )uvelopmental discourse omi(Ilts the (lesaroollista state. Without it (butmuCh m he other three components) the state would i)e inure parasitic amidmm ill seekitig and less (oimStrailmed b capitalismn. Such p1e(1atoe, kiepto i il a slates have appeared with greater lrequeno in Central America,lii ( ;oribbeami, and Africa than in the larger countries of Latin Anierica.II nurse, the constammt temJ)tatiolI ftr illicit gaul exists for all officials

mm itti (liScretion over direct or indirect resource allocation, lfl(I some ofliiii, succumb. Officials iii successful (levelopmnental states oltemi have

-ii mmiig ethical, ideological (discomirse) , career, or legal groun(ls fur resistmm t lie tehliptatiomi, yet even here corruptiomm has beemi endemic ii not deI militating. Without air alternative discourse, leaders have the limitation ofliii lhlliSm aml(l retention of tuolvm as their only goals, amrd iti such agrarian

(mm ic ties as Zaire, Ghana, I lait i, Paraguay, or prtSutm u linista Nicaragua,ii imV hurid political curpitalisni and h)ureaucratu( aj)1)ouitnlehmts useful iiilose pursuits.

\lmlmough the deelopmneutaIist discourse is, omi the Lice of it, one of theii miii imion leatnires of developmental States ill l)Otil Asia amid latin Aiiiermua,

lii iiatiomiahism underlying the discourse, as emn1)hasiz((l b SnoCumingsiii I lie introduction, (idlers. Iii Asia, miationalismn a)peLrs to) have both

(mi ogu amid deeper root,s as vell as nmore urgemil an(Immine(liote stimnulaurn Fhat is, Asian mocieties, especially Kii amidjapan, are Lii more ho

mm m)4(imeous and have far longer histories as discrete cultural units thaii (1(1mimi oil tIme societies of Latin America. What constitutes the essence of the\ tm\i(ami flatio m has beemi a contested (lelSote for much (If this century,lii ulv l)ucause of the unequal status of indigenous amid mesuzo cultures.

,i,il has 11(1 (omi1paroble indigenous groups but was, (s1)rcially earlier iniii is ientury, a patchwork of immigrant (orflmflummit irs, tire African theIii ist among them. Primary loyalties in both countries, ;os in others iii

il ill America, have often hot iwen to shared vision of the nation.Ill terms of imnicthote stimulus, Japanese colonialism and th cold war

I (VI been Lir nmore dramatic influences iii Asia than Aniericami imperialiii hii(1 ecouloniic dependency in Latin America. Irue, the Utrited States

liii lake half of Mexicos territory iii the nineteenth century and sentiImmmi1 is into Mexico during the Mexicami revolnmtion. Still, this is a Lrr cry

iii nearly half a century (ml hrtmtalJapanese colonial nih of Koiea. Siimri

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302

1:

c- Smu I-i ni. Imnbim/dmm/ - I mio,,,ni.

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TBiN Ross Sci lNi11)ERlarly, the Cuban revolution sent adrenaline through the veins of COl(I WI Iriors and developmentalists in Latin America, hut neither the fear wias enduring nor the threat as close as it was in divided Korea and Iiiwan/China. In sum, despite moments of intense nationalist inobilizati iiin Mexico and Brazilthe nationalization of the oil industries inI os and iqos, respectively, is the best examplenationalism was fl(vi Iconsensual enough amongjic)xI_eltte groups or urgenLenpugh Iin(Itielites toprovith9he same impetus to developrnentalism.

Creiii aWeberian bureaucracy and insulating officials from appi iiimelt politics can give greater imj)etus to developmentalism, as in iliicases of Taiwan and Korea, which otherwise resemble much more tilesarrollista states discussed here. The absence of extensive appointinel Iin these bureaucracies helped create a professional, committed, and usovertly politicized cadre of (levelopmentalist officials (who in addition IIImore attuned to market concerns because of the vulnerability of i iiieconomies to international markets). In his comparative study of Pia,i I.Korea, an(l India, Evans argued that the embedded autonomy of Krean officials accounts for the greater effectiveness of the Korean dcviiopmental state. Officials are embedded when they have enduring lies iidense networks of industrialists; they have autonomy whemi they have \Viherian careers within the bureaucracy. The appointive l)ureaucracy, in IItrast, undermines bureaucratic autonomy and generates high levelscirculation, which preclude embeddedness. Officials in an appointive hireaucracy rarely have the time to develop the longterm relations of iiand reciprocity with business that characterize developmental stales iiAsia because officials move to another job in another area of the stale iiithe private sector whenever ministers or presidents change.

My first goal in this essay was to understand fully afrw causal reiaiii inships within a limited range of variation, rather than generate coluel Iwith broad coverage but, as Weber warned, devoid of content. Nonci liiless, the niodel of the desarrollista state can be useful iii approaelmbroader comparative analysis by generating hypotheses and ident ih Iirinuiiy causal variables. The comparison of East Asia an(l Latin Anni iihas attracted much attention, and explanations lbr their differing cinomic performance range from international factors to authorilari;iiiisniand to culture.7Fred Block has concluded that there is reason to beliiithat most stales aspire to be developmental states; the real issue ale iiiferences in capacities and effectiveness in their policies.5.My appi

gh. 11)1(1.g7. S (it (iilfi ili(t Donihi \tsniili,