Programa Interamericano para la Promoción y Protección de los Derechos Humanos de...

Sesión Anual, 2009

Programa Interamericano

para la Promoción y Protección de los

Derechos Humanos de los Migrantes,

incluyendo a los Trabajadores Migratorios

y sus Familias

Programa de Migración y Desarrollo Secretaría Ejecutiva para el Desarrollo Integral

Comisión de Asuntos Jurídicos y Políticos

AGRADECIMIENTOS

El Programa de Migración y Desarrollo (MiDE) de la Secretaria Ejecutiva para el Desarrollo Integral (SEDI), ejecutado para los estados Miembros de la Organización de los Estados Americanos (OEA), ha sido posible gracias al financiamiento de la Agencia Canadiense para el Desarrollo Internacional (CIDA). Como parte del MiDE, se llevo a cabo la sesión anual 2009 del Programa Interamericano para la Promoción y Protección de los Derechos Humanos de los Migrantes incluyendo a los Trabajadores Migratorios y sus Familias, que contó con la valiosa participación de expertos y profesionales procedentes de diversos sectores, incluyendo universidades, centros de investigación, gobiernos, sociedad civil, procesos regionales de consulta y otros organismos internacionales, cuyas contribuciones se presentan en esta publicación. A todos ellos nuestro agradecimiento por su importante contribución al análisis y discusión de las posibles consecuencias e impacto de la crisis financiera mundial en los flujos y tendencias migratorias en los mercados laborales y en las comunidades de origen y destino.

INDICE

I. Presentación . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 II. Introducción . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

III. Antecedentes del Programa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

IV. Palabras de Apertura de la Embajadora del Luján Flores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

V. Primera Sesión: Futuros Cambios en las Tendencias Migratorias

frente a la Desaceleración de las Economías Mundiales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

a. B. Lindsay Lowell, Instituto de Estudios de Migración Internacional, Georgetown University . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

b. Armand Pereira, Organización Internacional del Trabajo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

c. Anna Greene, Oficina del Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Refugiados (ACNUR). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

VI. Segunda Sesión: La Crisis Financiera Mundial y

su Impacto en los Países de Origen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

a. G. Papademetrios and Aaron Terrazas, Migration Policy Institute . . . . . . . 41

b. Robert Wilke Meins, Fondo Multilateral de Inversiones, Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

c. Ponente: Miguel Ángel Fernández Pastor, Centro Interamericano de Estudios de la Seguridad Social (CIESS) . . . . . . . 83

VII. Tercera Sesión: La Importancia de los Sistemas de Información

Migratoria en la Formulación de Políticas Públicas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

a. Jeffrey Passel, Pew Hispanic Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

b. Richard E. Scott, Organización Internacional para las Migraciones (OIM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

c. Jorge Peraza‐Breedy, Conferencia Regional sobre Migración (CRM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

VIII. Conclusiones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

Programa Interamericano para la Promoción y Protección de los Derechos Humanos de los Migrantes incluyendo a los Trabajadores Migratorios y sus Familias

1

PRESENTACION DE LA MEMORIA La presente publicación es el resultado del diálogo que se llevó a cabo en el marco de la Sesión Anual del Programa Interamericano para la Promoción y Protección de los Derechos Humanos de los Migrantes, incluidos los Trabajadores Migratorios y sus Familias, como parte de los trabajos de la Comisión de Asuntos Jurídicos y Políticos (CAJP) del Consejo Permanente de la Organización de los Estados Americanos (OEA). La sesión tuvo por objetivo presentar a la CAJP el reporte de las actividades efectuadas en cumplimiento del programa para que los Estados Miembros evalúen estas actividades y propongan acciones para su mejoramiento. Así mismo, la sesión sirvió de marco para el análisis y reflexión del posible impacto de la crisis financiera mundial en los flujos y tendencias migratorias, y en las comunidades de origen y de destino de los migrantes. El evento contó con la participación de las entidades de la OEA, sus Estados Miembros, otras organizaciones internacionales, destacados académicos y especialistas en el tema, y miembros de la sociedad civil. La sesión se organizó en tres páneles, en los que se abordaron los siguientes temas: Futuros cambios en las tendencias migratorias frente a la desaceleración de las economías mundiales; la crisis financiera mundial y su impacto en los países de origen; y la importancia de los sistemas de información migratoria en la formulación de políticas públicas y marcos regulatorios en tiempos de crisis. Esta publicación es una compilación de los documentos presentados por los panelistas, las recomendaciones hechas por los Estados Miembros y las conclusiones derivadas del diálogo. Esperamos que contribuya al intercambio de ideas y de mejores prácticas en el tema migratorio y proporcione a los gobiernos información valiosa para hacer frente a los desafíos y oportunidades que esta crisis financiera presenta desde la perspectiva de los derechos humanos de los migrantes y sus familias.


2


3

INTRODUCCION La migración no es un fenómeno reciente, sino que ha sido una constante en la historia de los pueblos desde siempre. El flujo continuo de personas ha sido el factor determinante en el intercambio de ideas, tradiciones y costumbres, avances tecnológicos y expresiones artísticas. Sin embargo, el rasgo distintivo de la migración actual es, además de la magnitud, la complejidad de las relaciones que se generan alrededor de la migración. Hasta la década de 1960 el continente americano continuaba siendo un espacio de recepción de inmigrantes extracontinentales, fundamentalmente europeos. Simultáneamente, la región se caracterizaba por fronteras porosas donde los movimientos de migración internacional eran casi exclusivamente regionales y en gran medida fronterizos. A partir de los años 70 y más claramente hacia los 80, las tendencias migratorias en el continente cambiaron drásticamente, y América Latina y el Caribe se convirtieron en países expulsores de migrantes. Los efectos de la crisis económica se extendieron por todo el subcontinente y el periodo se caracterizó por un gran crecimiento de las corrientes emigratorias hacia el norte, particularmente a Estados Unidos, mientras que generó una suerte de efecto paralizante sobre la migración intrarregional. Los datos de los censos de Estados Unidos muestran con claridad la aceleración de este fenómeno en las ultimas décadas; las cifras de personas nacidas en países latinoamericanos y del Caribe pasaron de 1 millón en el censo de 1960, a más de 14.5 millones en el año 2000 y a 19,3 millones para el año 2005. En 2008, la Organización Internacional para las Migraciones (OIM) estimó que existen más de 200 millones de migrantes en el mundo, lo que equivale al 3% de la población mundial. Más de 30 millones de ciudadanos de países de América Latina y el Caribe residían, en ese mismo año, en un país distinto a su país de origen, lo que significa que uno de cada ocho migrantes en el mundo proviene de la región. En términos de los principales flujos migratorios del hemisferio, dos países constituyen el eje del fenómeno: por un lado, Estados Unidos es el mayor receptor de inmigrantes de América Latina y el Caribe (y también a nivel mundial), y por otro, México es el mayor emisor. Mientras Estados Unidos recibe aproximadamente el 75% del flujo del continente, los mexicanos representan 35% del total de este flujo. Aunque la gran mayoría de los migrantes aun se encuentran en Estados Unidos, los lugares de destino de la migración latinoamericana y del Caribe se han diversificado de manera progresiva. Las causas de la migración mundial son múltiples, heterogéneas y complejas. Sin embargo, en el caso de América Latina y el Caribe, podemos afirmar que los factores económicos son el rasgo distintivo de los movimientos migratorios. Las brechas de


4

desarrollo relativas entre países de origen y destino, la desigualdad en el interior de los países y el desempleo constituyen fuertes incentivos para emigrar. Durante los últimos años, prácticamente todos los países de la región se han transformado en países de origen, tránsito y destino de migrantes. Como resultado de ello, la migración, y en especial los derechos humanos de los migrantes y sus familias, se han transformado en temas prioritarios de la agenda política y diplomática de numerosos países, de sus Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno y, por supuesto de la Organización de los Estados Americanos.


5

ANTECEDENTES DEL PROGRAMA La Asamblea General, en su trigésimo quinto período ordinario de sesiones, celebrado en Fort Lauderdale, Florida, adoptó el Programa Interamericano para la Promoción y la Protección de los Derechos Humanos de los Migrantes, incluyendo los Trabajadores Migratorios y sus Familias, por medio de su resolución AG/RES. 2141 (XXXV‐O/05) el día 7 de junio de 2005. En esta misma resolución, la Asamblea General también puso en marcha la implementación del Programa y convocó la primera sesión anual de la CAJP para recibir los informes respectivos sobre las actividades llevadas a cabo en apoyo al Programa, para compartir y diseñar mejores prácticas en materia de migración, y para elaborar nuevas propuestas que habrían de incorporarse a su texto. Asimismo, solicitó a los órganos, organismos y entidades pertinentes de la Organización que incluyeran en sus informes anuales a la Asamblea General sus acciones dirigidas a la implementación de las actividades enunciadas en el Programa. III. Objetivos y estructura del Programa A. Objetivos del Programa El objetivo principal del Programa es la protección de los derechos humanos de los migrantes, a través de la promoción de políticas públicas, legislación, intercambio de mejores prácticas y cooperación entre países de origen, tránsito y destino. El Programa también establece una serie de objetivos específicos que abarcan la gestión eficaz y ordenada de los flujos migratorios, la promoción de un intercambio más efectivo de información sobre legislación y políticas migratorias, la atención a las necesidades especiales de grupos vulnerables de migrantes —tales como niños, niñas, mujeres e indígenas— y la inclusión de los derechos humanos de los migrantes como un eje transversal en todas las actividades pertinentes que lleva a cabo la OEA. B. Estructura del Programa El Programa encomienda treinta y tres actividades específicas a las diferentes áreas de la Secretaría General. Estas actividades, que tienen por objeto promover políticas públicas y prácticas para la protección de los migrantes, tienen un alcance amplio que abarca desde la difusión de información sobre la legislación existente, hasta acciones concretas de promoción de los derechos humanos de este grupo de personas. Así mismo, el Programa encomienda más de cien actividades opcionales a tres grupos adicionales de actores: los Estados Miembros de la OEA, las organizaciones multilaterales y regionales y a las organizaciones de la sociedad civil.


6

El Programa contempla una Sesión Especial Anual que actúa como mecanismo para el seguimiento de su implementación, requiriendo que las diferentes áreas de la Secretaría General y los Estados Miembros presenten un informe ante la CAJP sobre las acciones del Programa que se han cumplido en el transcurso de cada año e informen sobre las actividades planeadas para el siguiente año, así como para intercambiar mejores prácticas, información y nuevas propuestas que puedan incorporarse al mismo. En adición a las Sesiones Especiales Anuales, cada dos años la CAJP convocará Reuniones de Expertos para elevar recomendaciones sobre el tema de migrantes a las Cumbres de las Américas. En sus labores, estas Reuniones de Expertos tendrán en cuenta las contribuciones que sean presentadas por los órganos, organismos y entidades de la OEA y por los Estados Miembros, así como las conclusiones a que se lleguen en las Sesiones Especiales convocadas anualmente por la CAJP. Tomando en consideración lo anterior, hemos creado, dentro de la Secretaria Ejecutiva de Desarrollo Integral de la OEA, el “Programa de Migración y Desarrollo”. Por intermedio de este Programa intentaremos contribuir a la formulación de políticas públicas que promuevan procesos migratorios justos, seguros y ordenados, a través del fortalecimiento de las capacidades institucionales, las acciones de cooperación, el intercambio de mejores prácticas y la implementación de sistemas de información que armonicen la información de distintas fuentes y permitan conocer de manera ágil, oportuna, estandarizada y continua la magnitud y características de los movimientos migratorios en los países miembros de la OEA.


7

PALABRAS DE APERTURA DE LA EMBAJADORA MARIA DEL LUJAN FLORES

Intervención de la presidenta de la Comisión de Asuntos Jurídicos y Políticos (CAJP), Embajadora María Del Luján Flores, representante permanente de Uruguay ante la OEA, en la apertura de la sesión especial sobre el Programa Interamericano para la Promoción y Protección de los Derechos Humanos de los Migrantes, incluidos los Trabajadores Migratorios y sus Familias. Sesión Anual, 2009 [AG/RES. 2289 (XXXVII‐O/07)]

En mi calidad de Presidenta de la Comisión de Asuntos Jurídicos y Políticos, es un honor inaugurar esta sesión especial que ha sido convocada para responder al mandato de la Asamblea General de la Organización de los Estados Americanos en su resolución 2289 (XXXVII‐O/07)]. Es esta una señal inequívoca de la seriedad y la convicción con las cuales los Estados Miembros de la OEA incorporamos al más alto nivel político la consideración de materias vinculadas a los trabajadores migrantes y sus familias. Lejos de tratarse de una actividad aislada, es parte de una política integral de compromiso permanente con la defensa de los derechos humanos.

El tema migratorio constituye un punto de relevancia en la agenda interamericana, debido al impacto que ocasiona el movimiento poblacional de ciudadanos en las estructuras económicas, sociales, laborales y culturales de nuestros países. A la trascendencia que por sus causas y consecuencias tiene de por sí el fenómeno migratorio, se suma el impacto que sobre él tiene la actual crisis económica mundial. Según estudios de la Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), la frecuencia de los ciclos macroeconómicos y financieros, en la forma de crisis, booms de crecimiento y crisis financieras, son un factor determinante de las migraciones internacionales. Adicionalmente, experiencias anteriores han demostrado que para aquellos migrantes que arriban durante períodos de recesión, es más difícil integrarse y están más expuestos a sufrir pérdidas a largo plazo. En consecuencia, los mercados laborales y las políticas sociales deben poner aun más atención a estos grupos. Las consecuencias de la crisis actual dependerán en gran medida de su duración y de cuan profunda ella sea. De cualquier manera, si el desempleo continúa aumentando como hasta ahora, los factores que atraen a los migrantes pueden reducirse en los países de destino; pero ello puede también ser compensado por los factores de empuje en los países de origen, donde el impacto que generan las causas de la crisis puede ser significativo. Sin embargo, es claro que las poblaciones de menos recursos son quienes sufrirán en forma más severa las consecuencias de esta coyuntura, produciéndose un aumento de las desigualdades, la exclusión social y el desempleo. Por otra parte, si a raíz de la crisis se adoptan políticas más restrictivas hacia la migración laboral, y el discurso


8

público sobre la migración irregular y la necesidad de controlarla se torna más estricto, es posible también que la migración irregular se reduzca. En cuanto al impacto en la reducción de las remesas, este es difícil de predecir. Una crisis económica global probablemente afectará la capacidad de los migrantes de enviar remesas a sus países de origen. Adicionalmente, es argumentable que la crisis en el sector financiero podría acarrear consecuencias negativas en la intención de los migrantes de transferir fondos a través de canales formales, cabe aquí mencionar que el programa interamericano hace un llamado a los Estados para tomar acciones concretas que promuevan el establecimiento, lo antes posible, de las condiciones necesarias con miras a alcanzar la meta de una reducción de por lo menos la mitad del costo promedio regional de esas transferencias, de ser posible, a más tardar en el 2008. Asimismo, según sea necesario y apropiado, a que busquen adoptar medidas tales como la promoción de la competencia entre los prestadores de estos servicios, la eliminación de obstáculos normativos y otras medidas restrictivas que afectan el costo de estas transferencias, así como el uso de nuevas tecnologías, manteniendo normas de supervisión financiera efectivas. Los distintos aspectos de las dimensiones económicas, sociales, políticas y culturales asociadas a los flujos migratorios ponen de relieve la multiplicidad de significados de este fenómeno así como la alta complejidad de estos procesos, tanto en virtud de la multiplicidad de actores involucrados (estados, organismos internacionales, organizaciones de la sociedad civil, familias, individuos) como de la diversidad de espacios y tiempos que se intersectan entre los países de procedencia, tránsito y de llegada. Por ende, su tratamiento impone enormes desafíos. Es por ello, que tareas como la que abordamos el día de hoy adquieren una especial relevancia. Con esta reunión nos proponemos entonces reflexionar de cómo nuestra organización puede contribuir a enfrentar los desafíos y oportunidades que este proceso social supone para el desarrollo.

Enfatizaremos la necesidad de promover y fortalecer la cooperación como una forma legítima de lograr que la migración internacional contribuya al desarrollo de nuestros países. Creemos que, como un aspecto positivo, la crisis también puede coadyuvar a una mayor cooperación global sobre la migración e incrementar el compromiso de los Estados con esta materia.

Destacaremos aspectos del Programa Interamericano para la Promoción y Protección de los Derechos Humanos de los Migrantes, incluyendo los trabajadores migratorios y sus familias, que lo convierten en un instrumento útil en la estrategia por impedir que los efectos de la crisis mundial conviertan a los migrantes en grupos poblacionales aún más vulnerables.

Iniciativas como la del Sistema Continuo de Reportes de Migración Laboral de las Américas (SICREMI) están siendo diseñadas como resultado y en cumplimiento de este


9

programa, y serán una herramienta importante para llenar el vacío que genera la ausencia de información sistematizada, confiable y actualizada sobre el tema. Es innegable que la calidad de las políticas y del discurso público depende en cierta medida de la calidad de la información existente.

Adicionalmente, el programa interamericano incluye una serie de mecanismos y medidas útiles para enfrentar los efectos negativos de la crisis y proteger a los migrantes en todos los niveles de la migración, desde la etapa que se inicia antes de su partida del sitio de origen, hasta la migración de vuelta y la reintegración. Para mencionar sólo algunas de ellos:

El programa exhorta a los Estados Miembros a que consideren la firma, ratificación o adhesión a todos los instrumentos universales e interamericanos de derechos humanos, y tomen medidas concretas a nivel nacional para promover y fortalecer el respeto de los derechos humanos y las libertades fundamentales de todas las personas, incluyendo, entre otros, aquellos que corresponden a las mujeres, niños, ancianos, pueblos indígenas, migrantes y sus familias, repatriados, discapacitados y los que pertenecen a otros grupos vulnerables.

Asimismo, señala la importancia de que tanto en el plano internacional como en el orden nacional se considere la generación de consensos que puedan dar base a nuevas leyes y tratados para reconocer los derechos de los migrantes.

La protección del derecho internacional en general, incluyendo el derecho internacional de los derechos humanos, el derecho internacional humanitario y el derecho internacional de los refugiados, es aplicable a todas las personas y por ende también a los migrantes. Los Estados deben ratificar que sus obligaciones internacionales bajo los sistemas de protección de los derechos humanos, derecho internacional humanitario y derecho internacional de los refugiados ‐incluidas las obligaciones que emanan de los principios de no discriminación arbitraria, debido proceso, no devolución‐ tienen plena vigencia respecto de los migrantes.

No obstante lo señalado, las normas específicas a nivel internacional sobre migrantes son escasas. El principal instrumento de carácter vinculante, la convención internacional sobre los derechos de todos los trabajadores migratorios y sus familias, cuenta con un escaso número de ratificaciones. Y a nivel interamericano no contamos con ningún instrumento convencional que aborde el tema en forma integral. De allí la conveniencia de elaborarlo teniendo presente, entre otros elementos, los desarrollos jurisprudenciales de la corte interamericana de derechos humanos como ya lo expresaremos en anteriores oportunidades.


10

En este mismo sentido, la CEPAL ha señalado que las normas relativas a la movilidad de las personas deben tratarse mediante acuerdos globales, como parte de una agenda internacional contemporánea. Reconociendo que se trata un campo controvertido, se señala que tales acuerdos tienen que adoptarse con sujeción a las especificidades regionales y tomando en cuenta la dinámica de los mercados laborales y la protección de los derechos humanos de las personas.

Con respecto a la gobernabilidad migratoria, es necesario propender a la formulación de políticas de migración que contemplen el fenómeno de manera integral, comprendiendo sus determinantes y vínculos con el desarrollo.

El programa reconoce que los planes de integración deben ir acompañados de un proceso de educación y comunicación orientado a generar una conciencia ciudadana favorable a la efectiva inserción social de los inmigrantes y a prevenir actitudes xenofóbicas y racistas, y prácticas discriminatorias.

Asimismo tiene en cuenta que la integración de los inmigrantes es una posibilidad de enriquecer la sociedad de acogida con un conjunto de rasgos culturales propios de la sociedad de origen, lo que contribuye al fortalecimiento de la tolerancia y al respeto de las diferencias individuales en un medio democrático.

En el campo laboral aboga por la promoción de la utilización de diversas formas de migración laboral temporal y documentada en el marco de proyectos concretos que coadyuven a elevar las potencialidades de los trabajadores nacionales para contribuir al desarrollo de sus países de origen. Reconociendo la necesidad de que toda agenda sobre migración recoja la especificidad de los temas de género, el programa promueve el desarrollo de políticas y programas dirigidos a proteger a las mujeres migrantes y sus familias, en particular a las mujeres cabeza de familia, y dirigidos a combatir la violencia contra la mujer. Las mujeres migrantes son más de la mitad de los migrantes, son actores con voz propia, su influencia en todos los aspectos de la migración es muy amplia, y su condición ofrece potencialidades y también les presenta grandes riesgos.

El programa se refiere también a aspectos como el de la trata de personas y el tráfico de migrantes, grave y creciente problema mundial. En este ámbito existe falta de tipificación a escala nacional; insuficiente capacitación específica de los funcionarios encargados de hacer cumplir la ley (policías, funcionarios judiciales, oficiales migratorios, etc.); escasa asistencia y protección a las víctimas, y falta de prevención. Además, es frecuente que las autoridades nacionales otorguen la categoría de "migrante irregular" a quienes son víctimas de estos ilícitos, lo que conlleva a una re victimización.


11

En este sentido aboga por la capacitación a los funcionarios públicos que desempeñan funciones relacionadas con la migración sobre el marco jurídico migratorio, la protección de los derechos humanos de los migrantes y sus familias, las condiciones de vulnerabilidad de los migrantes y sus familias, la identificación y protección de refugiados y potenciales solicitantes de asilo, la forma en que operan las redes de tráfico ilícito de migrantes y de trata de personas, y la identificación y asistencia a las víctimas.

Contempla asimismo mecanismos de prevención y cooperación técnica en el combate a la trata de personas; de investigación, acción penal en contra de las personas responsables de este delito, y de protección y asistencia a las víctimas de trata. Por último, impulsa mecanismos para el retorno seguro y la reintegración de las víctimas de la trata y de procedimientos especiales para la protección de menores víctimas de ese delito.

Son estos, pues, apenas algunos de los muchos ejemplos con que podemos ilustrar la viabilidad del programa en el marco de la actual coyuntura mundial.

Espero sinceramente que después de esta sesión especial profundicemos el espíritu de cooperación que nos anima en la búsqueda de soluciones coordinadas a nuestros problemas comunes y se continúen dando respuestas acordes a las necesidades de los migrantes. Agradezco a los aquí presentes y les expreso nuestra satisfacción de compartir con ustedes esta sesión de la Comisión de Asuntos Jurídicos y Políticos. Saludo muy especialmente a los distinguidos panelistas que nos acompañan en esta oportunidad. Sean todos ustedes muy bienvenidos.


12

PRIMERA SESION Futuros Cambios en las Tendencias Migratorias frente a la Desaceleración de las Economías Mundiales

Futuros Cambios en las Tendencias Migratorias frente a la Desaceleración de las Economías Mundiales

15

Slowing Economic Growth and Future Impacts on Migration and Migrants* Susan Martin and B. Lindsay Lowell Instituto de Estudios de Migracion Internacional, Universidad Georgetown

No one knows how deep and long the current economic crisis will be, but we know that it is already causing sharp increases in unemployment and, in some countries, an impact on migration trends. The Organization for Economic and Cooperative Development (OECD) reports that unemployment rate in OECD countries hit 6.5 percent last November 2008, almost a point higher than the previous year. It forecasts that unemployment will hit a peak of 7.3 percent half way through 2010. The International Labor Organization estimates that global unemployed will increase from 190 million in 2007 to 210 million in 2009. International mobility is already showing the results of the economic fallout. Mobility can change in many ways, either in terms of a slowing of in migration or, assuming a constant flow of at least some migratory streams, the primary response may be return migration. Migrants typically move to better opportunities, but in recession unemployment and hardship may accompany either the decision to move or not to move. Thus far, the most noticed migratory phenomenon have been the return of hundreds of thousands of Poles and workers from the new EU accession countries. For many observers in the United Kingdom and Ireland, where most of these workers had found employment in the foregoing two years, this return is a welcome relief. The return of these migrants reduces labor supply at a time when labor demand is declining and that alleviates economic pressures. Interestingly, there appears to be some evidence that jobs are relocating to Poland, along with the return migrants. For example, Dell Computers recently announced it would shift its European operations from Ireland to Poland. Migrants may be returning because of the pull of the Polish economy, rather than the push of a downturn in Ireland. In contrast, job losses in Spain reached one million in 2008, but migrant workers there are showing little tendency to return home, despite financial inducements offered by the Spanish government. Trends in migration are notably hard to project, not just because the course of the recession is uncertain, but because facts on the ground differ. In the united the United States there is good evidence that growth in the stock of migrants started to slow by at least 2007, for the most part due to a slowing of newly arriving unauthorized migrants. On the other hand, some observers believe that the slowing growth of the migrant population is due to the return migration of unauthorized migrants displaced by the economic slowdown, first and foremost from the construction industry. Other observers credit enforcement measures for discouraging unauthorized migrants and polls indicate that many Hispanics perceive a chill in the social climate. Yet other observers believe that there is a growing return of legal, highly skilled migrants,

* Prepared for the Inter‐American Program for the Promotion and Protection of the Human Rights of Migrants, Including Migrant Workers And Their Families, 2009 Annual Meeting.


16

many of whom are caught in visa processing backlogs that keep them in undetermined “temporary” status pending an uncertain adjustment to legal permanent status. The debate over the causes of these trends has different constituents and they emphasize, unsurprisingly, different reasons and favor slowing in‐migration or increasing return migration. Indeed, the trends just mentioned in the European setting, other than the shared economic shock, seem to be almost unrelated to what is happening in the United States. In the short‐term, return migration may be a first response and it is likely that new migration will slow because that has historically been the case, but how much it slows will depend on the length of the crisis and the nature of the migration. The Asian economic crisis of 1997 raised fears of a regional and even global economic decline of a severe nature. Migration outflows from the most impacted nations were, indeed, strongly affected and there were short term declines. Migration into the United States slowed, from business and tourism travel, to foreign students coming to the Americas. But business related travel from the region was less strongly impacted. In the final analysis, the economic crises was both shorter lived and not as deep as many had feared. Highly skilled, business‐related migration appears to have played some role in leading the rebound. However, the “clandestine” workers in these economies appeared not to leave during the crisis, despite perceptions that these were “temporary workers” who would leave in a downturn. Only Malaysia appears to have been somewhat successful in voluntary repatriations during a period when amnesty was being offered.1 Arguably, migration quickly rebounded and the basic structure of migration changed little over the longer run. At the other extreme, the great depression of the 1930s put “a stop” to international migration globally for at least a decade.2 In 1933, at the height of the depression, only 23,000 immigrants were admitted to the United States, with emigration exceeding immigration. The extreme nature of that economic calamity suggests possibilities for future trends if the current crises deepens and holds for longer than optimistic observers would hope. Economic downturns lower demand for labor and the income that workers can command. That impacts both host and source countries. On the one hand, that lessens the attractive power of nations to which migrants are currently going. On the other hand, it lowers the ability of workers in today’s source nations to afford to be able to migrate—it also lowers the attraction for migrants to return home. In the case of the United States, for example, new migration slowed and there was increased return migration of some groups and, thus, net emigration overall. However; the recession also saw the United States, with the cooperation of Mexico, undertake

1 Chris Manning, 2001. “The East Asian Economic Crisis and Labour Migration: A Set‐Back for International Economic Integration?” http://rspas.anu.edu.au/economics/publish/papers/wp2001/Manning%202001_03.pdf 2 Adam McKeown, 2004. “Global Migration,1846‐1940,” Journal of World History 15, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_world_history/v015/15.2mckeown.html


17

deportations of Mexican migrant workers who otherwise showed little inclination to return. What is unknown is where the current crises will lead between these two extremes, crises that scare everyone but are, relatively speaking, short lived with little impact on migrants; and a crisis that hits the depths of a “depression” that slows migration to a trickle. If short lived, then many of the concerns that arise now as we look forward will, with luck, rapidly dissipate and lend themselves to forward looking but intermediate policy responses that are likely good things under any circumstance. If the downturn is deep and long, many of the strong policy measures that some will call for to reduce immigration will be unnecessary because the volume of migration will “naturally” reduces economic and social pressures. At the same time, a deep recession holds the serious possibility of adverse impacts on workers, both native and foreign, and social backlash that exceeds whatever impacts migrants might have in reality. The goal of good policies should be anticipate the worse outcomes, but in a measured way that do not create problems that do not yet exist, while being prepared to alleviate the realization of the worse case scenarios. Good policies will seek to moderate but not curtail mobility in the face of economic uncertainty, while the rights of migrants should be respected. Some will call for business as usual, in particular that nations should facilitate migration during the economic crisis and even court higher numbers of migrants. While it isalways a good idea to facilitate movement, it is likely that the best course of action is not to seek to increase the number of migrants but rather to encourage the volume to seek its own (declining) level. It is also likely that it is a good idea to facilitate return migration, but not to engage in sweeps and deportations that victimize migrants and affirm natives’ worst fears. As far as economic impacts go, there are a couple of reasons to be concerned that outcomes will not be good for migrants, even barring reasonable speculation about predatory employers and clandestine labor markets going ever deeper underground. The available research is somewhat conflicting and it safest to observe that it typically finds little impact of migration on native workers, either positive or negative. What is not known from that research is whether or not the impact of migrants increases and becomes negative during an economic downturn. It is reasonable to surmise such a possibility as migrants may accept lower wages and working conditions, but we simply do not know. What we do know from the available research, nevertheless, is that migrants have a substantial and adverse impact on other, already resident migrant workers. So it is likely that increased or even steady volumes of migration will adversely impact many migrants during a recession, even if most natives escape job losses—and this would especially be the case for low‐skilled migrants and, quite possibly, unauthorized workers and their families. Research also finds that migrants who arrive and begin work in their new host country during a recession experience lower earnings throughout their working life compared with migrants who arrive in a growing


18

economy.3 Precisely why that occurs is open to some speculation, but the empirics support the logic that migrant workers’ earnings trajectory, and future economic health, is impeded by migration during periods of economic recession. Recession impacts are greatest on youth and recent migrants, but also migrant workers in construction and other industries which have been slammed by the recession.

Even while migrants stand to loose more than natives during a down turn, the perception of natives is often quite the reverse. The come to fear competition from migrants. Research supports the commonplace observation that economic recessions harden natives’ opinions toward immigrants and their support of restrictive and harsh policies. Yet, the change in opinions is not, roughly consistent with the research on the small wage impacts of immigrants on natives, as much rooted in personal economic conditions as it is in perceptions of the national economy. Attitudes toward migrant groups may be particularly hardened by perceptions of declining national economic fortunes.4 At present, concerns over immigration are taking a back seat during the first and most immediate phases of the current economic crisis. In the United States, 42 percent of polled individuals say the economy is “the biggest issue on their minds,” which is twice as many as felt that way a year ago when the war in Iraq was the greatest concern. Today, 21 percent rank Iraq as the second most important issue on their minds, 18 percent rank health care, 10 percent rank terrorism, and only 7 percent rank immigration a distant fifth ranked concern. But concerns over immigration can easily increase as the recession lengthens and the possibility of a strong backlash is of concern in the medium term, while longer range impacts on migrants and future mobility policies are possible. Several groups in the United States assert that hate crimes against immigrants have been increasing in the last couple of years, in no small part because of the debate over “comprehensive” immigration reform that would grant legal status to up to 12 million unauthorized residents. The fear is that such attacks against immigrants will increase as the economy worsens and unemployment increases.5 Somewhat surprising, given the economic crisis, Congress recently passed legislation guaranteeing the eligibility of legal immigrant children to the State’s Children Health Insurance Program. Reversing policies adopted in 1996 that restricted the access of legal immigrants to federally funded services for their first five years in the country, Congress indicated a willingness to protect immigrant children along with natives—as long as they are legally in the country. This certainly seems a good practice; likely to help today’s hard working households and safeguard future workers.

3 B. Lindsay Lowell, 2004. “Immigrant Labor Market Assimilation in the United States: Critique of Census Data and Longitudinal Outcomes,” in Integrating Immigrants into the Workforce: North American and European Experiences, Joint US‐EU Seminar Papers, the U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, D.C.. 4 Jack Critin, et. al, 1997. “Public Opinion Toward Immigration Reform: The Role of Economic Motivations,” The Journal of Politics. 5 See the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC).


19

While reiterating that much is still unknown about the impacts of the economic crisis on migration flows, we agree that prudence calls for measures designed to protect migrants from becoming scapegoats for economic ills. Xenophobia has too often been a response to uncertainty in the past, with immigrants blamed for a host of problems that have little to do with immigration. This is an area in which political leadership is critical and governments need to be particularly vigilant to guard against using protectionist rhetoric that could inflame sentiments against immigrants as they struggle themselves to find real solutions to the economic problems ahead.


21

Efectos de la Crisis sobre los Trabajadores Migrantes y Respuestas de Política Pública1 Armand Pereira Oficina Internacional del Trabajo2 Este documento discute las tendencias de las migraciones laborales recientes y como estas podrán ser impactadas por los efectos de la crisis financiera y económica y por las respuestas de políticas nacionales e internacionales. Dos documentos suplementares están disponibles en el website de esta Sesión sobre las actividades de la OIT referentes a esos puntos en las Américas y prácticas óptimas bajo el Marco Multilateral de la OIT para las Migraciones Laborales.3 La crisis financiera y económica levanta tres cuestiones centrales para la OIT: • ¿Cuáles serán sus efectos laborales generales y, entre ellos, para los migrantes y sus

familias? • ¿Qué medidas adoptar para evitar una recesión en algunos avances importantes en

años recientes en materia del cuadro normativo internacional, de legislación y de buenas prácticas nacionales, y de cooperación?

• ¿Cómo aprovechar en la crisis nuevas oportunidades de cooperación en materia de armonización de políticas y de medidas especiales de apoyo a los migrantes por la parte de los gobiernos, de la sociedad civil y de donantes?

Esas preguntas hacen necesario empezar por una muy breve reflexión sobre la situación pre‐crisis antes de focalizar en los efectos de la crisis y las respuestas de política pública y cooperación internacional.

1 Documento presentado por Armand F. Pereira, Director de la Oficina de la OIT en Washington, preparado en colaboración con el Programa de Migraciones Internacionales de la OIT (Ibrahim Awad, Gloria Moreno Fontes, Patrick Karan and Piyasiri Wickramasekara). 2 La Oficina Internacional del Trabajo es el Secretariado de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo. Las posiciones expresadas en este documento son para discusión técnica en la Sesión Especial de la OEA y no necesariamente reflejan una visión consolidada de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo. 3 OIT: Contribución de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo a la Sesión Especial sobre el "Programa Interamericano para la Promoción y Protección de los Derechos Humanos de los Migrantes incluyendo a los Trabajadores Migrantes y sus Familias” (Ginebra, OIT/MIGRANT) enero 2009; OIT: Prácticas óptimas - Marco multilateral de la OIT para las migraciones laborales. Vease también ILO: Migrant Workers: Elements for a policy agenda and related recommendations, paper prepared for the OAS session of 17 April 2008, Washington, DC. (revised 30 April 2008); OIT: La OIT y su trabajo en las Américas 2001-2008 (Ginebra, OIT/MIGRANT), 2008. Este último, incluye detalles del Plan de Acción de la OIT para los Trabajadores Migrantes y su Marco Multilateral, agenda de trabajo en la región, referencias de estudios de la OIT y recomendaciones.


22

1. Migraciones laborales: Tendencias antes de la crisis En los últimos años hubo un aumento significativo de migraciones por razones de desequilibrios demográficos y de oferta/demanda laboral, y disparidades de ingresos y de regimenes de derechos y protección social. Las crisis sociales y políticas en algunos países de origen han tenido algún impacto. Sobre todo, la desregulación de mercados laborales junto con políticas de migración laxas han tenido un papel bastante importante en muchos países. Esas dos tendencias han particularmente incrementado las migraciones laborales irregulares en el total de flujos migratorios. A su vez, las mismas han contribuido para la informalidad de los mercados laborales que incluye, en parte, relaciones de empleo ilegales en muchos casos. Esta cadena de procesos ha, al mismo tiempo, afectado y a menudo contribuido a debilitar el papel de las principales instituciones laborales tales como servicios de estadísticas y de administración e inspección laboral, organizaciones sindicales y patronales, etc. Por otro lado el aumento de migraciones laborales, tanto regulares cuanto irregulares ha creado una conciencia mayor sobre las dificultades enfrentadas por los migrantes y sus familias, aun cuando el respaldo de ello sea aun limitado en términos de políticas y programas concretos hacía la integración social de los migrantes y sus familias. De los 200 millones de migrantes internacionales, el 50 por ciento son mujeres y hombres trabajadores, que han dejado sus hogares y comunidades en busca de trabajo y de mejores oportunidades en otras partes del mundo. Las migraciones laborales aportan beneficios y costos para los migrantes y las economías de origen y de destino. Sin embargo, a menudo no se les da el reconocimiento que merecen, en términos de lo que contribuyen al crecimiento y desarrollo tanto de sus países de acogida como de sus comunidades de origen. Por su dimensión y repercusiones, el papel de las remesas ha sido ya bastante enfatizado en los últimos años. En 2007, el flujo de remesas global llegó a cerca de USD 340 billones, incluyendo más de USD 250 billones a los países en desarrollo. Las remesas constituyen más del 10 por ciento del PIB en más de 20 países. Otras dimensiones económicas y sociales han sido insuficientemente tratadas y merecen mayor estudio de carácter inter‐disciplinario. Esto es no solo necesario desde el punto de vista ético y político, sino instrumental para un diálogo social sano, para formular políticas laborales y de migración adecuadas y asegurar justicia y estabilidad social al largo plazo. En los últimos años hubo un reconocimiento creciente de jure de derechos de no‐discriminación y protección de trabajadores migrantes y sus familias, para garantizar la cohesión y justicia social y el desarrollo. Hubo también reconocimiento de una brecha


23

de aplicación de facto de esos derechos de protección. Sin embargo, es alentador que un número importante y creciente de países ha reconocido la necesidad de una agenda de política de migración laboral que incluye una pauta de elementos esenciales, entre ellos: 1) Legislación mínima basada en tres tratados internacionales (dos de la OIT y uno de la ONU): El Convenio sobre los trabajadores migrantes (revisado), 1949 (núm. 97), el Convenio sobre los trabajadores migrantes (disposiciones complementarias), 1975 (núm. 143), así como el Convenio internacional sobre la protección de los derechos de todos los trabajadores migratorios y sus familias (1990).4 2) Una política y una administración de migración laboral informada y transparente. 3) Mecanismos institucionales para el diálogo, la consulta y la cooperación. 4) Cumplimiento mínimo de las normas nacionales de empleo en todos los sectores de actividad. 5) Medidas de migración laboral sensibles a cuestiones de género. 6) Un plan de acción contra la discriminación y la xenofobia. 7) Vínculo entre la migración y el desarrollo en las políticas y prácticas. 8) Consultas y cooperación regional, tal como ha sido facilitado por la OEA, la OIT y otros organismos. Los tres convenios que forman la Carta Internacional de la Migración (Internacional Charter on Migration) proporcionan el marco normativo y el modelo específico de 4 El contenido de las convenios varía considerablemente, aunque todos ellos hacen hincapié en la obligación de cada Estado miembro para asegurar el tratamiento "no menos favorable que el que se aplique a sus propios nacionales". Los dos convenios de la OIT de garantía de los derechos de los trabajadores migrantes legalmente empleados y sus familias en un amplio número de cuestiones, incluida la igualdad de acceso a toda la gama de mecanismos de protección social. El Convenio 143 reconoce la diferencia entre tipos de asistencia contributiva y no contributiva (incluidos los programas que se basan en las contribuciones implícitas en el pago de los impuestos sobre sueldos al largo del tiempo) y permite a los Estados miembros la flexibilidad necesaria para establecer, dentro de un rango de tiempo inicial de los umbrales de los inmigrantes elegibles para convertirse en determinados beneficios. El Convenio de las Naciones Unidas tiene un importante objetivo de garantizar normas mínimas de tratamiento y ampliar el respeto de los derechos humanos fundamentales a todos los migrantes - independientemente de su situación jurídica, incluida la igualdad de acceso a la seguridad social y asistencia sanitaria, siempre y cuando las condiciones de admisibilidad para los demás trabajadores se cumplan. Otros dos instrumentos abordan específicamente la cuestión del acceso de extranjeros a la protección social. El Convenio 118 de la OIT, ratificado por 37 países, establece normas sobre la igualdad de acceso a la protección social (jubilación, invalidez, desempleo, servicios médicos) de los ciudadanos de cualquiera de los Estados ratificadores con arreglo a un principio de reciprocidad de trato. El Convenio 157 de la OIT garantiza el derecho de los trabajadores a seguir contribuyendo a los regímenes de seguridad social en curso de adquisición de un derecho (como la jubilación) en cualquier país signatario, y para permitir la totalización de períodos de cotización. El Convenio también exige a los Estados miembros para organizar la portabilidad de las prestaciones a través de los Estados ratificadores, proporcionando así un marco innovador para la armonización de diversos acuerdos bilaterales.


24

lenguaje legislativa necesario para establecer una base para la política nacional. Hasta mayo de 2008, 78 Estados habían ratificado una o más de esas tres normas complementares, incluso 23 en la región de ALC. Hoy son 80.5 Los elementos esenciales de una agenda de política se reflejan en el Marco Multilateral de la OIT para las Migraciones Laborales, que establece las directrices comunes para las políticas basadas en los derechos sobre la migración internacional en una serie de temas, incluido el empleo, la protección social y el diálogo social. Es un marco de carácter no obligatorio y no vinculante (non‐binding), pero influyente, que fue adoptado por consenso por la 92 ª sesión de la Conferencia Internacional del Trabajo (2004)6 a través de una resolución que hace un llamado a "un trato justo para los trabajadores migrantes en la economía mundial". 2. Efectos generales de la crisis sobre el desempleo y trabajadores pobres La crisis financiera y económica global puede causar un incremento entre 18 y 50 millones de personas en situación de desempleo abierto en 2009, llegando a un total de 190 a 230 millones en el mundo, de acuerdo con tres escenarios estimados por la OIT en su reciente informe Tendencias del Empleo Global 2009. Las proyecciones en el informe de la OIT para las tasas de desempleo abierto, trabajadores pobres y trabajadores vulnerables comportan tres escenarios. El primero – con un aumento de 18 millones de desempleados que es hoy ya demasiado “optimista”‐ se basa principalmente en la relación a largo plazo entre el crecimiento del PIB y el crecimiento del empleo a nivel de cada país con base a la proyección del FMI (en nov. 2008) de crecimiento económico de 2.2% en 2009. Sin embargo la previsión revisada del FMI en enero 2009 de una reducción del PIB global de 0.5% llevaría a un incremento de 25‐27 millones de desempleados en 2009. El segundo escenario de 30 millones adicionales se basa en la relación histórica entre el crecimiento económico y el empleo sobre la base del peor año de "crisis" en cada país desde 1991. El tercero – el peor escenario, estimando hasta 50 millones ‐ se construye sobre la base del mayor porcentaje de incremento de la tasa de desempleo observada en cada país en un año cualquiera y aplicándose esa relación para proyectar el desempleo en 2009.

5 Hasta mayo de 2008, el Convenio N º 97 de 1949 fue ratificado por 47 países, el Convenio N º 143 de 1975 ratificado por 23 países, y la Convenio Internacional de 1990 sobre la Protección de los Derechos de Todos los Trabajadores Migratorios y de sus familiares, ratificado por 37 países y firmado por otros 14. Un número de Estados han ratificado los dos convenios de la OIT, varios han ratificado uno o los dos convenios de la OIT y la Convenio Internacional de 1990. Sin embargo, algunos países que no los han aun ratificado por una u otra razón, han adoptado algunas medidas legislativas coherentes con estos convenios. 6 La Conferencia Internacional del Trabajo es el órgano tripartite de la OIT que convoca a todos los gobiernos de los Estados miembros y las organizaciones de empleadores y de trabajadores.


25

En ALC, después de caídas continuas en el desempleo urbano hasta 2008, la última previsión del Panorama Laboral de la OIT es de un aumento de desempleados entre 1,5 y 2,5 millones en 2009. Trabajadores en situación de desempleo abierto 2009 6.1 % = +18m = total 198m 6.5 % = +30m = total 210m 7.1 % = +50m = total 230m Al mismo tiempo podrá haber una reversión de la mejora observada en las estimativas de “trabajadores pobres” y “trabajadores vulnerables” en el período de de 1997 a 2007 y que, en el caso de ALC, se dio principalmente en 2004‐2007. Trabajadores pobres ‐ <$1.25 al día (20.6% en 2007 ‐12% desde 1997) 2009 Esc. 1 ‐ 18.8% ‐ continuidad histórica de los últimos 12 anos. Esc. 2 ‐ 23.2% ‐ 10% por encima de la línea de la pobreza vuelven por debajo de ella Esc. 3 ‐ 26.8% ‐ 20% por encima de la línea de la pobreza vuelven por debajo de ella Trabajadores pobres ‐ <$2 al dia (46.6% en 2007); 2009 Esc. 1 ‐ 38.5% ‐ continuidad histórica de los últimos 12 anos. Esc. 2 ‐ 42.1% ‐ 10% por encima de la línea vuelven por debajo Esc. 3 ‐ 45.4% ‐ (1.4 bill.) 20% por encima de la línea vuelven por debajo Trabajadores vulnerables ‐ (50% en 2007) 2009 Esc. 1 ‐ 48.9% Esc. 2 ‐ 50.0% Esc. 3 ‐ 52.9% 3. Repercusiones sucesivas para los migrantes y la migración laboral Las repercusiones de la crisis financiera y económica global ocurren de forma espiral. La crisis afecta los trabajadores migrantes en todo el mundo, sucesivamente en términos de: aumento de desempleo y subempleo, baja de ingresos, alta de vulnerabilidad, baja en los flujos de remesas y de migración. No es posible estimar con la mínima precisión la proporción de trabajadores migrantes en los escenarios citados a niveles nacionales y mucho menos a nivel global. Sin embargo, la experiencia del pasado nos hace tomar plena conciencia de que los trabajadores migrantes se ven entre los más afectados y los más vulnerables durante las situaciones de crisis. Los migrantes en situación irregular son los más afectados tanto


26

por el crecimiento del desempleo cuanto por el insuficiente acceso a las redes de seguridad. Si bien todavía no se ha hecho sentir el pleno impacto de la crisis sobre los trabajadores migrantes, se constata lo siguiente:

- aumento proporcional mayor de despidos directos (comparado con el de nacionales),

- número mayor de migrantes, con y sin documentos, buscando asistencia de búsqueda de empleo y de asistencia social por la parte de organizaciones comunitarias,

- empeoramiento de las condiciones de trabajo, incluso con recortes salariales, - reubicación geográfica en búsqueda de empleo a menudo con separación

temporal de las familias. - discriminación y xenofobia, - aumento del número de migrantes que regresan a su lugar de origen, - reducción del flujo de inmigrantes admitidos.

Sin embargo, hay gran variación entre los sectores de actividad. Los más afectados son especialmente los de la construcción, de los servicios, de la manufactura y del turismo. Las mujeres son a menudo relativamente más afectadas no solo por su mayor vulnerabilidad sino también por su concentración en los servicios domésticos y de hotelería, y los hombres más afectados especialmente en la construcción y manufactura. En algunos países, los extranjeros han sido objeto de despidos y sometidos a la discriminación y la xenofobia como chivos expiatorios de la crisis. Hay algunas evidencias de que los migrantes recientemente desempleados por el efecto de la crisis actual están mostrando resistencia a regresar a sus países donde el desempleo puede ser peor. Eso los hace más susceptibles a aceptar peores condiciones de trabajo, incluso recortes salariales. Esos efectos sobre los migrantes, en lo sucesivo, afectan las economías de muchos países de origen, especialmente los más pequeños y de bajo ingresos. Este efecto ocurre por un lado por la disminución en las remesas y el alivio de la pobreza a nivel local y, por otro, por el regreso de los trabajadores que aumentan aun más el desempleo nacional y presionan los retos de generación de empleo y de asistencia social. Algunos países de América Latina y Caribe (p.e. El Salvador, Ecuador, Bolivia, etc.) están ahora más expuestos a la crisis actual por el hecho que sus economías son altamente dependientes de remesas procedentes del extranjero. En Nepal, por ejemplo, la


27

disminución de remesas hará más difícil el servicio de la deuda exterior y podrá provocar un aumento de la tensión social.7 4. Respuestas a la crisis La naturaleza y dimensiones de la crisis financiera y económica global requieren medidas urgentes globales y coordinadas entre los gobiernos, los organismos internacionales, y los donantes. De su parte, la OIT ha movilizado un esfuerzo de estudio y de consultas que llevaron a identificar diez medidas de políticas a corto y mediano plazo para atenuar las repercusiones de la crisis financiera y económica mundial:

1.‐ Evaluar la situación y el impacto probable sobre el empleo y afinar la política macroeconómica para aumentar la creación de puestos de trabajo y la protección social. 2.‐ Aplicar políticas del mercado de trabajo activas y pasivas incluidas la extensión de la cobertura de seguro de desempleo, asegurar indemnizaciones adecuadas por despido, así como medidas diseñadas para ayudar a los trabajadores desplazados. Como enfatizó recientemente el Director General de la OIT, Juan Somavía: “Las políticas del mercado de trabajo no solamente contribuyen a mitigar los efectos sociales de la crisis sino que además impulsan la demanda y reactivan la economía en general funcionando como medida anticíclica”.8 3.‐ Brindar apoyo a las empresas, incluidas las pequeñas y medianas, en forma de concesiones de nuevos créditos, bonificaciones fiscales, readiestramiento y subvenciones para el empleo, inversiones públicas en infraestructura y créditos iniciales a desempleados y desplazados. 4.‐ Introducir programas específicos en apoyo de grupos vulnerables, tales como los trabajadores del sector informal y rural, las mujeres, los jóvenes y las personas de edad. 5.‐ Promover el reconocimiento efectivo del derecho de negociación colectiva, ya que ésta puede fomentar soluciones basadas en la colaboración entre los trabajadores y los empleadores para hacer frente a las consecuencias de la crisis.

7 Ver documento de la 303.ª sesión ‘(nov. 2008) del Consejo de Administración de la OIT, in http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_100485.pdf 8 Facing the jobs crisis, an interview with the ILO Director-General, in: http://www.ilo.org/global/About_the_ILO/Media_and_public_information/Broadcast_materials/Videointerviews/lang--en/docName--WCMS_101490/index.htm


28

6.‐ Prevenir el trabajo infantil como estrategia de las familias vulnerables, ya que ante una disminución de los ingresos son más proclives a retirar a los niños de la escuela y enviarlos a trabajar. 7.‐ Formar a los interlocutores sociales a fin de aumentar su capacidad para utilizar el diálogo social con objeto de abordar las cuestiones derivadas de la crisis, en particular la reestructuración de empresas, la productividad, flexibilidad de los contratos, horas de trabajo y los despidos colectivos. 8.‐ Fortalecer el diálogo social sectorial en los planos nacional, regional y mundial a fin de determinar las políticas necesarias para abordar las repercusiones sociales de la crisis en los diferentes sectores económicos. 9.‐ Abordar la financiación de los fondos de seguridad social y poner en práctica regímenes de seguridad social basados en la solidaridad. 10.‐ Proteger a los trabajadores migrantes y promover el diálogo entre los países de origen y destino.

5. Medidas especiales de protección de migrantes La mayoría de las medidas arriba señaladas ‐ que son estrictamente asociadas al ámbito de relaciones de trabajo de jure o de facto‐ deberían aplicarse a trabajadores sin discriminación de origen o de estatus. Sin embargo, la situación real de los mercados laborales en que se insieren muchos trabajadores migrantes requiere un desdoblamiento del último punto arriba citado, en términos de medidas más específicas, entre ellas:

a. Refuerzo de la inspección del trabajo y la aplicación de las normas de trabajo para reducir el abuso y la explotación de los trabajadores migrantes.

b. Movilizaciones de los sindicatos, la sociedad civil, las organizaciones de

empleadores y los gobiernos para prevenir la discriminación y desalentar la idea de tener los migrantes como chivos expiatorios.

c. Evitar la política de empleo discriminatoria y medidas de expulsión de los

trabajadores migrantes formulando políticas en materia de admisión de los trabajadores migrantes a la luz de los mercados de trabajo global, sectorial y de las ocupaciones y las necesidades, a fin de satisfacer la demanda de mano de obra y, por tanto, anticiparse a la migración irregular.

d. Medidas para reducir los costos de las transferencias de remesas.


29

e. Mantener fondos de asistencia oficial al desarrollo con foco en la creación de trabajo decente en los países de origen.

Sobre este último punto, es aun importante enfatizar la necesidad de mayor coherencia de políticas de las agencias donantes internacionales y de los bancos de desarrollo regional en el sentido de apoyar esfuerzos de combate a la pobreza a través del Agenda de Trabajo Decente en el marco de las Metas del Milenio.9 La disponibilidad de mayores oportunidades de trabajo decente en los países de origen permitiría allanar el camino para una migración que respondiera más a una elección personal. 6. Observaciones finales Las sucesivas repercusiones de la crisis tendrán un impacto mayor sobre los migrantes que los trabajadores nacionales. En algunos países estos efectos podrán ser brutales para sus familias pero también para comunidades y economías de origen. Hay necesidades urgentes de aliviar esos efectos directos e indirectos. Pero es igualmente necesario evitar repercusiones intolerables en términos de discriminación, xenofobia y distorsiones sobre el papel y la importancia económica y social de los trabajadores migrantes. Un reconocimiento mayor y mejor de los beneficios y costos netos de la migración es instrumental para un diálogo social más objetivo y más fértil para la elaboración de las políticas de migración en los países de origen y de acogida, y sobretodo para buscar medidas urgentes que permitan aliviar los efectos negativos sobre los migrantes. Es igualmente esencial promover medidas para evitar una recesión en avances importantes aunque limitados en materia del cuadro normativo internacional, de legislación, y de cooperación observada en años recientes. Además, la crisis genera nuevas oportunidades de cooperación en materia de armonización de políticas y de medidas especiales de apoyo a los migrantes por parte de los gobiernos, de la sociedad civil y de donantes. La estrategia integrada para el trabajo decente plasmada en la Declaración de la OIT sobre la Justicia Social para una Globalización Equitativa ‐ aprobada por los constituyentes de la OIT en junio de 2008, y aprobada por unanimidad por la Asamblea

9 Ver UN Economic and Social Council: Resolution 2008/18 Promoting full employment and decent work for all (New York, ECOSOC), 2008, in http://www.un.org/ecosoc/docs/2008/Resolution%202008-18.pdf and S. R. Osmani: The Role of Employment in Promoting the Millennium Development Goals, Paper prepared under the Joint ILO-UNDP Programme on Promoting Employment for Poverty Reduction (New York, UNDP), 2005.


30

General de las Naciones Unidas en diciembre de 2008 10 representa una base sólida para hacer frente a la crisis actual. La creciente movilización mundial en que participan, entre otras, las federaciones sindicales mundiales y regionales, las organizaciones de empleadores y las asociaciones nacionales será también fundamental para la promoción de los intereses de los trabajadores migrantes.

10 La resolución de la Asamblea General titulada "Declaración de la OIT sobre la justicia social para una globalización justa" pide la aplicación de la Declaración y requiere al sistema de las Naciones Unidas, incluidas las instituciones financieras internacionales, de incorporar el objetivo del trabajo decente en sus políticas, programas y actividades a través de la promoción de un enfoque integrado.


31

Trends and Challenges in the Protection of Refugees and Asylum Seekers within Mixed Migratory Flows Anna Greene Oficina del Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Refugiados (ACNUR) At the invitation of the Commission of Juridical and Political Affairs of the Organization of American States, and as follow up of the General Assembly resolution 2289 (AG/XXXVVII‐0/07), UNHCR is grateful to have been invited today to participate in this important event. We would like to share with you UNHCR’s observations on the emerging trends related to the movement of asylum seekers, refugees and other persons in need of international protection in the Americas region. We will also take the opportunity to mention some of the activities undertaken by UNHCR in 2008, to highlight some good practices by states which are relevant to the implementation of the Inter‐American Programme for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights of Migrants, and to bring attention to important gaps in the international protection regime in the hemisphere. I. REGIONAL TRENDS Over the last year, UNHCR’s offices throughout the Americas region have witnessed an increasing number of asylum seekers and refugees traveling within broader migratory movements and seeking entry to potential asylum countries without proper documentation. In 2008, the population of asylum seekers and refugees moving within migration flows within the region included individuals from Latin American and Caribbean countries, but also included an ever‐increasing number of extra‐regional asylum seekers, mainly from the African continent. In 2008 alone, UNHCR assisted asylum seekers and refugees from countries as diverse as Sierra Leone, Liberia, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Ivory Coast, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, Iran, Sri Lanka and Myanmar, just to name a few of the most common countries of origin. Many of these cases arrived to the hemisphere after having fled their country, while others arrived to the Americas in a more indirect manner after having spent years in refugee camps without any durable solutions in sight. In many cases, asylum seekers and refugees were forced to resort to networks of migrant smugglers to obtain access to territories where they might seek safety. Ironically, in their attempt to seek safety, many asylum seekers and refugees traveled dangerous migratory routes, exposing themselves to violence as well as other risks. To cite one example, since January 2008 alone, over 125 migrants of various nationalities drowned at sea in the northern Caribbean region while making the perilous journey towards the north. It is not known how many of these individuals were fleeing from


32

poverty or the effects of natural disaster versus how many were seeking refuge from conflict or persecution. Systematic interception, detention and/or return policies continued to be widely implemented throughout in the region, indiscriminately affecting asylum seekers and refugees due to lack of appropriate asylum safeguards. Of particular concern was the fact that undocumented migrants, including asylum seekers, remained in detention for prolonged and indefinite periods of time. The increase in arrivals of undocumented migrants, which will undoubtedly continue within the context of the global economic crisis, continues to put to a test the capacity of States to implement effective migration management procedures which are at the same time compatible with their international human rights obligations. II. UNHCR ACTIVITIES DURING 2008 As part of its mandate to provide protection to refugees and seek durable solutions for their plight, and taking into account the existing differences between migrants and refugees and their distinct legal regimes for their treatment and protection, in 2008 UNHCR continued to support States in the following fields related to the implementation of the Inter‐American Programme for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights of Migrants: 1) Technical advice for the adoption or revision of legal frameworks on migration and refugees;

2) Training to migration and border officials on practical ways to identify persons in need of international protection;

3) Active participation in regional migration fora; and

4) Evaluation of the international protection needs of victims of trafficking and separated and/or unaccompanied children. Some of the most important activities undertaken by UNHCR in this regard were as follows: In January 2008, at the invitation of the OAS Committee on Juridical and Political Affairs, and with the support of the Department of International Law, UNHCR organized a special session on the contemporary challenges of international protection of refugees in the region. During the year, UNHCR provided technical advice to the governments of Panama and Venezuela for the revision of their migration legislation, recommending the establishment of effective safeguards for the identification and protection of asylum seekers and refugees. The Office also supported the legislative process for the adoption


33

of an amendment to the new Migration Law of Costa Rica, which includes a chapter on refugee protection. Throughout 2008, UNHCR’s country offices continued to advocate for the non application of indiscriminate migratory control measures and the adoption of specific safeguards for the identification and treatment of those in need of international protection. UNHCR offices trained migration and border officials in many countries in the hemisphere on the dynamics of mixed migratory flows, to raise awareness on the need for specific protection safeguards and to better ensure that migratory systems are sensitive to individuals with international protection needs. As regards to separated and/or unaccompanied children, in September 2008 UNHCR published the findings of a study undertaken along the southern border of Mexico which highlights the vulnerability of separated and unaccompanied children within south‐to‐north migration movements, and the growing presence of this population within regional migratory flows1. UNHCR also participated actively in a US Government‐sponsored Conference on Protection of Unaccompanied and Separated Children held in October 2008. Recognizing the need to raise more awareness about the existing relationship between migration and refugee protection, UNHCR actively participated in various regional fora on migration:

1) Regional Conference on Migration (Puebla Process). During 2008, UNHCR supported the revision of the Plan of Action of the Regional Conference on Migration, mainly the human rights chapter, which includes a section on refugee protection. Furthermore, within the framework of this migration forum, along with the governments of Canada and Costa Rica, UNHCR participated in the implementation of a seminar on mixed migration movements and international protection of refugees. It is expected that this initiative could be replicated in 2009 within the framework of the South American Conference on Migration (Lima Process). UNHCR also provided technical inputs for the revision of draft regional guidelines for the return of unaccompanied children, preserving the right to seek asylum for those children who are at risk of harm or who express fear to return to their countries of origin. The Office also participated in the workshops organized within the framework of the Puebla Process to highlight the existing nexus between trafficking in persons and international protection of refugees.

2) South American Conference on Migration (Lima Process). 1 UNHCR, The international protection of unaccompanied or separated Children in the southern border of Mexico (2006-2008), http://www.acnur.org/biblioteca/pdf/6734.pdf


34

As part of the deliberations during the VIII South American Conference on Migration the Member States reiterated their commitment with the international protection of refugees. In this forum, UNHCR shared with the participants its position paper regarding its concern on the implication of the new directive on return adopted by the European Union2.

3) Specialized Forum on Migration of MERCOSUR. With the support of the governments of Argentina and Brazil, as Presidencies pro‐tempore of MERCOSUR during the year 2008, the international protection of refugees was addressed in two specific seminars. The first one, held in Buenos Aires in March 2008, focusing on “Asylum Policies: Refugees, Human Rights and Security”, sensitized officials to the compatibility between refugee protection and nationality security and how the international refugee instruments safeguard the legitimate security interests of States. The second workshop, which took place in Porto Alegre in November 2008, was dedicated to refugee protection and mixed migration, analyzing the implications for migrants and refugees of the new directive on return adopted by the European Union3. At the suggestion of the governments of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, the topic of regional policies on refugee protection will continue to be part of the agenda of the Specialized Forum on Migration of MERCOSUR.

4) Regional Caribbean seminars. Building on five years of cooperation with International Organization for Migration (IOM) in the implementation of a Caribbean seminar series on mixed migration, UNHCR participated in an IOM‐sponsored Caribbean regional seminar held in Saint Lucia in December 2008 where diverse migration issues were addressed, including the issues of trafficking in persons and protection of child migrants. At this event, UNHCR provided specific support on the issue of the protection of unaccompanied and separated child migrants and refugees, introducing UNHCR’s Guidelines on Determining the Best Interests of the Child. UNHCR hopes that states throughout the region will use the new guidelines on Best Interests of the Child, and stands ready to provide training and technical support to states in their implementation. III. BEST PRACTICES BY STATES IN THE REGION In complement to UNHCR’s activities, there were several important advances made by states in 2008 which strengthened the regional legal framework for refugee protection in the hemisphere during the year. These included:

2 UNHCR, Position on the proposal for a directive on common standards and procedures in Member States for Returning Illegally Staying Third-Country Nationals, http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/485632a32.pdf 3 See, supra footnote 3.


35

• the adoption of a refugee law in Nicaragua which, among other positive features, contains language recognizing the links between gender and persecution4;

• the discussion of draft refugee bills in Colombia, Chile and México, which are expected to be approved in the near future;

• the constitutional regulation of the right to asylum in the new Political Constitutions of Bolivia and Ecuador;

• the adoption of an innovative national policy on refugee protection by the Ecuadorian government, which will facilitate the recognition of some 58,000 refugees living in the northern border, through a programme called “enhanced registration” applying the expanded refugee definition contained in the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees of 1984;

• the increasing recognition among states in the region of the nexus between trafficking and asylum, and the granting of refugee recognition for some victims of trafficking in countries such as Brazil, Costa Rica and Panama; and

• an innovative initiative implemented by the Mexican government to appoint Child Protection Officers within the National Migration Institute (INM).

UNHCR hopes that efforts like the ones mentioned above will be emulated by other countries in the Americas, particularly those who have not yet ratified international refugee instruments, have not passed implementing legislation, or have not created functioning asylum procedures. This is of particular importance in the Caribbean region, where there is a generalized need to pass refugee legislation and/or to formally establish well‐functioning national asylum procedures. Establishing functioning procedures would help the Caribbean states better manage the highly complex influx of undocumented persons to their territories, distinguishing between individuals who are in need of international protection and those who are not. IV. OUTSTANDING CONCERNS As indicated above, there have been important and concrete measures of progress in the strengthening of the international protection regime in the hemisphere in the last year. Nonetheless, serious challenges remain. UNHCR would like to take this opportunity to highlight two challenges in particular, the first related to the continued and widespread detention of asylum seekers and refugees traveling in mixed migratory movements, and the second related to the need to enhance and ensure the protection of victims of trafficking and unaccompanied or separated child migrants. In relation to the detention, first it must be said that UNHCR fully supports the efforts undertaken by States to combat irregular migration, and in particular the transnational criminal activities of organized networks which benefit from the illicit smuggling of migrants. In spite of this, the Office is also concerned about the use in many countries of

4 In this sense, please also see the domestic refugee legislation of Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Canada, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, United States of America, and Uruguay.


36

prolonged detention of migrants and asylum seekers and refugees, especially extra‐regional nationals, because of their fraudulent documentation and illegal entry. In the case of refugees, the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees establishes an exception to migratory legislation by contemplating the non penalization for illegal entry5. UNHCR understands the concern of States to ensure that procedures for refugee status determination will not be used in a fraudulent or abusive manner, however, at the same time it is necessary that those procedures satisfy minimum guarantees for the prompt identification of those in need of international protection. These guarantees are important, even in countries experiencing migratory arrivals of mainly economic migrants with relatively few asylum seekers among them. As a result, the administrative detention of asylum seekers and refugees should not be linked to the form of entry, the documentation used or the cooperation for the identification and punishment of members of transnational organized crime networks6. In relation to the detention of migrants, UNHCR, through its detention center monitoring activities and its work with asylum seekers, has seen a troublesome increase in the prolonged and indefinite detention of undocumented migrants. Long periods of detention often result from the lack of capacity to implement swift deportation, and in some cases is also the result of criminal penalties for undocumented entry. In the latter regard, UNHCR wishes to recall article 5 of the Palermo Protocol against the smuggling of migrants by land, sea and air, concerning the criminal liability of migrants: “Migrants shall not become liable to criminal prosecution under this Protocol for the fact of having been the object of conduct set forth in article 6 of this Protocol.” (emphasis added). In relation to the second area of concern, UNHCR has been very pleased to see an increasing awareness of the plight of victims of trafficking and separated or unaccompanied children, which in many cases has translated into the strengthening of national legal and institutional frameworks for their treatment and protection. In spite of the progress made, UNHCR reiterates that the return of these vulnerable populations must be voluntary, and that voluntary return constitutes one of the possible solutions and not the only one to be considered, and should only be considered on the basis of a full and proper assessment of protection needs7. In the case of victims of trafficking, UNHCR is concerned about the hesitation of some States to analyze the relationship between trafficking and international protection of refugees (the trafficking‐asylum nexus)8. UNHCR is concerned about the lack of will in

5 As established in article 31 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. 6 UNHCR: Guidelines on applicable criteria and standards relating to the detention of asylum seekers, http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3bd036a74.pdf 7 UNHCHR, Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights and Human Trafficking, http://www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/4986fd6b2.pdf 8 UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection No. 7: The Application of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees to Victims of Trafficking and Persons at Risk of Being Trafficked, http://www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/443b626b2.pdf


37

some states to grant refugee status to some victims of trafficking who genuinely comply with the criteria set forth in the refugee definition, in particular alleging the setting of precedents and/or the construction of broad social groups. In this vein, UNHCR reiterates the technical and principled nature of the criteria of the refugee definition, as well as that the refugee definition is not contingent on the number or the size of the group, but whether the person has a well‐founded fear of persecution for one of the grounds set forth in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and/or its 1967 Protocol. In the case of unaccompanied and separated children, UNHCR would urge states throughout the hemisphere to give a higher priority to assessing protection needs of this population, through the application of the principle of best interest of the child. UNHCR stands willing to provide technical assistance in this area, including through the dissemination of and training on the new UNHCR Guidelines on Determining the Best Interests of the Child. UNHCR urges the Inter‐American Programme for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights of Migrants to include in its priority areas for action the promotion of the protection needs of victims of trafficking and separated or unaccompanied child migrants, regardless of whether or not they are in need of international refugee protection. V. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS Today’s migratory environment has generated new challenges for the protection of refugees. Whereas in decades past, refugees were easily identifiable due to their mass movements across borders and/or their presence in refugee camps, today an increasing number of asylum seekers and refugees are being displaced farther distances in a more dispersed fashion. The presence of asylum seekers and refugees within mixed migratory flows is a phenomenon throughout the hemisphere, and is a challenge which states in the region must face together, with the strong support of the international community. UNHCR is convinced that the Inter‐American Programme for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights of Migrants provides critical opportunities for addressing some of these key challenges. UNHCR reiterates to the OAS and its member States our commitment to support them in the adoption and implementation of migratory mechanisms for the identification of those who are in need of international protection.

SEGUNDA SESION La Crisis Financiera Mundial y su Impacto en los Países de Origen: El Retorno de los Migrantes, su Inserción en los Mercados Laborales Locales y las Posibles Variaciones en el Envío de Remesas.

La Crisis Financiera Mundial y su Impacto en los Países de Origen: El Retorno de los Migrantes, su Inserción en los Mercados Laborales Locales y las Posibles Variaciones en el Envío de Remesas.

41

Immigrants and the Current Economic Crisis: Research Evidence, Policy Challenges and Implications Demetrios G. Papademetrious and Aaron Terrazas Instituto de Politica Migratoria Executive Summary The United States is in an economic crisis that may already be the worst since the Great Depression and some fear that the country may be in a downward spiral. For immigration analysts and policymakers alike, the crisis raises fundamental questions about how current and prospective immigrants will fare, and how they will respond to the already severe downturn. A widening circle of government officials, business and community leaders, advocates, and researchers in the United States and other major immigrant‐receiving countries, as well as major sending ones, are trying to think through the implications of these events — for the economy and society, for public policy, and for the individuals and families themselves. At the heart of this issue are complex, and often politically charged, questions of whether immigrants — both legal and unauthorized — are leaving the United States in large numbers as certain job sectors contract. And are would‐be immigrants deciding not to come at all? Though anecdotes abound, reliable answers to these questions are not easy to come by, primarily because there has been no analog to the current situation during the professional lives of those who study migration or make immigration policy. The picture is further complicated by the fluidity of the global economic climate and evolving immigration enforcement policies. Nonetheless, one can look at what is known and use experience and insight to speculate about how this crisis might play itself out. Careful analysis of historical evidence and the most recent data, a nuanced understanding of the motivations and likely behavior of immigrants, and a degree of educated speculation together can provide a useful guide to the implications of the crisis. This paper examines the current economic crisis, its impact on immigrants, and its likely effect on immigration flows to and from the United States. The paper’s major findings include the following:

A growing body of evidence suggests that growth in the US foreign‐born population has slowed since the recession began in late 2007; much of the slowdown can be attributed to the fact that there has been no significant growth in the unauthorized population since 2006.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that return migration to some countries, including Mexico, appears to have increased in the last two years; however, data do not yet substantiate these reports. As a result, there is no definitive trend so far that


42

can be tied in a significant way to US economic conditions. Some observers’ attempts to tie immigrants’ returns (other than removals) to the substantial increases in interior immigration enforcement appear to be premature.

Generally speaking, return migration flows appear to correlate more closely with economic, social, and political developments in countries of origin, and with the ease of circulation, than with economic conditions in receiving countries such as the United States. For instance, sustained economic improvements in Eastern Europe — along with the guarantee of continued labor market access — are widely thought to have facilitated the large‐scale return migration of Poles and certain other Eastern Europeans since the British and Irish economies began to slow down in 2007.

Nevertheless, several factors taken together, such as the growing anti‐immigrant animus of the past few years; increasingly strict federal, state, and local immigration enforcement policies; a much more robust border enforcement effort; improving economic and political conditions in some migrant‐sending countries; and the worsening US economic climate have contributed to a measurable slowdown in the historic growth in overall immigration.

Legal immigration appears least tied to US economic conditions because most legal immigrants arrive on family‐based visas that, in many cases, took years to secure. Employment‐based immigration accounts for a relatively small share of overall legal immigration and the pent‐up demand that exists for employer‐sponsored visas should continue to drive employment‐based immigration, at least for the near term. Generally, all social and humanitarian legal flows (family unification, refugee, and asylum flows) can be expected to behave without regard to the economic cycle for the foreseeable future.

On average, most immigrants share the demographic characteristics of the workers who are most vulnerable during recessions, including relative youth, lower levels of education, and recent entry into the labor force. Immigrants are also highly overrepresented in many of the most vulnerable industries — including construction, many sectors in low value‐added manufacturing, leisure and hospitality, and support and personal services — and in many of the most vulnerable jobs within those industries. Immigrants from Mexico and Central America are even more concentrated in many of these industries, and as a result, bear a disproportionate share of the downturn’s consequences.

At the same time, immigrants (and especially recent immigrants) may be able to

adjust more quickly than native‐born workers to changing labor market conditions because they are more amenable to changing jobs and their place of residence for work‐related reasons.


43

Public policies — such as the lack of access to the social safety net for unauthorized immigrants and many recently arrived legal immigrants — may increase immigrants’ vulnerability to abject poverty if they become long‐term unemployed. Consequently, there is an increasing probability that some immigrants may eventually choose to return to their countries of origin.

Deeply felt family obligations (including the need to continue to send

remittances to relatives in the country of origin) and lack of access to the federal social safety net often force immigrant workers to go to extraordinary lengths to remain employed or find new employment quickly. While such flexibility and determination are commendable, they may have less laudable consequences, such as pushing immigrant workers into dangerous working conditions or informal work.

I. Introduction On December 1, 2008 the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) officially declared the United States in recession, and estimated that it began in December 2007.1 This makes the current US recession already longer than all but two since World War II. And an avalanche of increasingly dismal economic assessments from most parts of the world points to a severe and deepening global economic crisis. It is still unclear how deep, wide, and long this recession will be. But one thing seems clear: the recent period of unparalleled economic growth and prosperity has come to an abrupt end, both in the United States and in most of the world, a fact that massive governmental interventions might mitigate but are not likely to reverse — at least not in the next year. Before 2007, the US economy had grown in 23 of the past 25 years. During this period of sustained economic growth the United States attracted record numbers of new immigrants.2 The US foreign‐born population had quadrupled from 9.6 million in 1970 to about 38.1 million in 2007. For much of the past decade, more than one million immigrants have entered the United States legally each year, and about another half a million have settled illegally. Although immigrants have come from all over the globe over the course of the last three decades, Mexico’s share of the total foreign‐born population in the United States has increased by a factor of four (from 8 to 31 percent). And immigrants from Latin America (including Mexico) and the Caribbean now account for over half (54 percent) of all immigrants (compared to 18 percent in 1970). Asians, who have also experienced significant, if less dramatic, growth account for another 27 percent (compared to 9 percent in 1970) while the combined share from Europe and Canada has plummeted to 15 percent — less than a quarter of its share 40 years ago (68 percent).


44

For policymakers and analysts, the current economic crisis raises fundamental questions about how immigrants who are already here and those slated to enter in the coming years will fare and how they might respond to the economic downturn. These questions appear particularly daunting because there has been no comparable crisis in recent memory. Both analysts and policymakers face many unknowns. Now, more than ever, expert judgment and insight must provide guidance. This report combines careful analysis of the most recent data, a nuanced understanding of America’s immigration history and the motivations and likely behavior of immigrants, and a degree of educated speculation to examine the potential impact of the economic crisis on immigration flows to and from the United States. In doing so, it relies on evidence about prior recessions and their effects on immigration trends. The paper poses and partially addresses the following policy questions:

How has the number of immigrants in the United States changed since the recession began?

How might the flows of immigrants by entry category change? Beyond the economy, what other factors might explain changes in immigration

flows observed since the current economic crisis began? How do immigrants fare in the US labor market during recessions?

The analysis cannot answer the full range of questions that arise from the complex relationship between immigration flows and business‐cycle fluctuations. Nor does it attempt to project the future trajectory of immigration flows to the United States or the performance of the US economy. Rather, it reviews the limited available literature and data on the impacts of economic crises on immigration flows and immigrants in the labor market, and it uses the available evidence to frame several important issues that, to the degree possible, policymakers will need to address. II. How has the number of immigrants in the United States changed since the current economic crisis began? Given the current economic climate, many wonder how the stock of immigrants in the United States might change and how immigrants have already and will likely continue to respond to the recession. Available data suggest both slower growth in the stock of the foreign born in the United States and slightly slowing inflows of immigrants — especially from Mexico. The growth of the stock of immigrants in the United States has slowed recently. Data from official population surveys suggest that the historic growth in the stock of immigrants in the United States is slowing. The first slowdown appeared in the US Census Bureau American Community Survey (ACS) data for 2007. The ACS registered a net increase of just over 500,000 immigrants between 2006 and 2007 (from 37.5 million to 38.1 million).3 In contrast, between 2000 and 2006, the ACS, Current Population Survey (CPS), and other data sources suggest the net annual increase in the foreign‐born population was higher — approaching one million.


45

More recent monthly data from the CPS, a monthly survey conducted by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Census Bureau, show a leveling‐off of the immigrant population since mid‐2007, although the data also reflect seasonal trends (Figure 1).4 Figure 1. Monthly Estimate of the US Foreign‐Born Population, January 2000 through November 2008

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

36

37

38

Jan 0

0M

ar 00

May

00

Jul 0

0S

ep 0

0N

ov

00

Jan 0

1M

ar 01

May

01

Jul 0

1S

ep 0

1N

ov

01

Jan 0

2M

ar 02

May

02

Jul 0

2S

ep 0

2N

ov

02

Jan 0

3M

ar 03

May

03

Jul 0

3S

ep 0

3N

ov

03

Jan 0

4M

ar 04

May

04

Jul 0

4S

ep 0

4N

ov

04

Jan 0

5M

ar 05

May

05

Jul 0

5S

ep 0

5N

ov

05

Jan 0

6M

ar 06

May

06

Jul 0

6S

ep 0

6N

ov

06

Jan 0

7M

ar 07

May

07

Jul 0

7S

ep 0

7N

ov

07

Jan 0

8M

ar 08

May

08

Jul 0

8S

ep 0

8N

ov

08

Recessions (monthly)

Estimated foreign-born population (millions)

Note: Estimates are based on a three‐month moving average. Source: Migration Policy Institute analysis of US Census Bureau, Basic Current Population Survey, January 2000 to November 2008. In November 2008, the latest month for which data are currently available, the CPS counted about 37.7 million immigrants in the United States, slightly up from 37.4 million in January 2008 and the 37.6 million immigrants counted in November 2007.5 However, the increases observed between November 2007 and January and November 2008 are not statistically significant — they could be due to statistical variation in population sampling in the CPS — so it is not clear whether the observed changes in the long‐term trend amount to an actual decline. An increasing reluctance on the part of illegally resident immigrants to continue to respond to government surveys in an environment of strongly increasing enforcement, and greater proportions of more mobile, even itinerant, legal and unauthorized immigrants in search of jobs could also have a small influence on trends observed in the CPS. Data and statistical and respondent


46

idiosyncrasies aside, however, it seems clear that the growth of the foreign‐born population has slowed. CPS data also show that similar to the recent past, the number of Mexican and Central American immigrants in the United States fluctuates seasonally — although the overall direction continues to be generally upward (see Figure 2).6 The number of immigrants from regions of the world other than Mexico and Central America also displays some seasonal trends but the general trend has been flat for about a year. Figure 2. Monthly Estimate of the US Foreign‐Born Population by Region of Origin, January 2000 to November 2008

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

Jan 0

0M

ar 00

May

00

Jul 0

0S

ep 0

0N

ov

00

Jan 0

1M

ar 01

May

01

Jul 0

1S

ep 0

1N

ov

01

Jan 0

2M

ar 02

May

02

Jul 0

2S

ep 0

2N

ov

02

Jan 0

3M

ar 03

May

03

Jul 0

3S

ep 0

3N

ov

03

Jan 0

4M

ar 04

May

04

Jul 0

4S

ep 0

4N

ov

04

Jan 0

5M

ar 05

May

05

Jul 0

5S

ep 0

5N

ov

05

Jan 0

6M

ar 06

May

06

Jul 0

6S

ep 0

6N

ov

06

Jan 0

7M

ar 07

May

07

Jul 0

7S

ep 0

7N

ov

07

Jan 0

8M

ar 08

May

08

Jul 0

8S

ep 0

8N

ov

08

Recessions (monthly)

Estimated foreign-born population from Mexico and Central America (millions)

Estimated foreign-born population from other regions of the world (millions)

Note: Estimates are based on a three‐month moving average. The Mexico/Central America category includes foreign born from Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Panama. Source: Migration Policy Institute analysis of US Census Bureau, Basic Current Population Survey, January 2000 to November 2008.


47

Official flow data are not recent enough to identify trends during the current recession, but unofficial estimates suggest a slowdown of an uncertain size. Flow data on the entry of new legal immigrants to the United States are reported each fiscal year by the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS).7 The most recently reported data for fiscal year 2007 — which ended in September 2007 — are not recent enough to make any judgments about the flow since the recession started. However, estimates of flows can be derived from some sample surveys including the CPS. Unofficial estimates of immigration flows based on the CPS suggest a slowdown in total immigration of an uncertain size. Pew Hispanic Center Demographer Jeffrey Passel estimates that immigration from Mexico has slowed and that flows from Central America show signs of a decrease as well, although the magnitude of these changes is not clear.8 Immigration from South America has slowed, but the slowdown is in line with longer‐term trends since about 2000 and reflects in large part tighter visa‐issuing policies by the US State Department (intended to reduce visa overstaying from certain countries in the region) and closer cooperation from Mexico in reducing the entry into Mexico of the third‐country nationals most likely to subsequently seek to enter the United States illegally. Immigration flows from Europe and Canada also appear to be slowing. By contrast, immigration from Asia appears to be increasing; and flows from the Middle East are also increasing but are very small overall. Other data sources confirm the slowdown in immigration from Mexico. According to the National Survey of Occupations and Employment (ENOE) — a labor force survey of 120,000 Mexican households conducted four times each year by Mexico’s official statistical agency, the National Institute of Statistics, Geography, and Information Technology (INEGI) — the rate of outmigration from Mexico in the spring (February to May)9 has slowed over the past two years from 14.6 per 1,000 residents in 2006 to 10.8 per 1,000 in 2007 and 8.4 per 1,000 in 2008.10 III. How might the flow of immigrants by entry category change? The number of immigrants in the United States fluctuated very little from its long‐term upward trend during the most recent recession — which officially lasted from March to November 2001 — as Figure 1 (above) shows. Although the number of immigrants declined initially, it began increasing again midway through the recession in September 2001. The current recession is already longer and deeper than the 2001 recession. While all recessions are unique, historical evidence, knowledge of the complexities of the US immigration system, and a solid understanding of immigrants’ motivations can provide insight into how the flow of immigrants entering through different legal channels might behave during the current recession. Migration to the United States is composed of several major categories or types of flows: Lawful permanent residents (LPRs), humanitarian migrants (including refugees


48

and asylum seekers), unauthorized migrants, and temporary workers and students. Each of these flows is likely to respond differently to changing labor market conditions. LPRs, the largest group, are admitted to the United States primarily because of family ties and, only secondarily, directly for employment. They undergo a lengthy official immigration application process and most have to endure long waiting periods. Refugees are resettled in an orderly manner from large pools of eligible applicants, and asylum seekers apply for refugee status after arriving at a port of entry or from inside the United States following a change of circumstances in their home country.11 Unauthorized immigrants are those who either entered the country illegally — typically by crossing the border with Mexico — or overstay or otherwise violate the terms of a valid visa. Temporary workers are admitted on work visas issued after a successful petition by their prospective employer. Students enter the United States on visas whose duration corresponds to the term of their studies. Foreign students can work in the United States in addition to studying. In addition, some students are granted the right to work for a period of up to 18 months after completing their studies under the Optional Practical Training (OPT) regulation.12 On balance, historical evidence does not point to a direct, long‐term relationship between business‐cycle fluctuations and legal immigration flows. Each period of US history is unique so historical comparisons must be taken with caution; however, available historical evidence does not suggest a direct, long‐term relationship between legal immigration flows and the ups and downs of the US economy. Changes in the volume of immigration flows following recent recessions appear to be mostly the result of policy changes and administrative delays although some variation — especially in much earlier times — is likely due to economic conditions as well. Research conducted by the Mexican Migration Project at Princeton University and the University of Guadalajara in Mexico found that during the Great Depression the annual flow of legal immigrants from Mexico declined dramatically from around 46,000 per year during the 1920s to less than 2,700 per year during the 1930s, when the US government conducted systematic roundup and removal operations directed at Mexican workers.13 More recent Migration Policy Institute (MPI) analysis of DHS data on legal permanent immigrant admissions and NBER historical data on US recessions show that the decline in legal immigration observed during the Great Depression (the recession that officially lasted from August 1929 to March 1933) actually began in 1928 — before the stock market crash of 1929 (see Figure 3). This timing suggests that the decline in legal immigration observed during the Great Depression may be also explained by the Immigration Act of 1924, which imposed severe quotas limiting the annual inflow of new immigrants from most countries and which took effect in 1928.


49

Political and legal factors also clearly influence immigration trends observed for the past three decades. Following the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 — that legalized nearly 3 million unauthorized immigrants, reformed the seasonal agricultural worker program, and institutionalized penalties for employers who hire unauthorized workers — immigration trends became strongly influenced by policy changes and operational and administrative priorities and failures. The dramatic decline in admissions following the July 1990 to March 1991 recession is largely the result of the end of the wave of IRCA legalizations. Similarly, the decline following the 2001 recession is strongly related to the heightened security climate following September 11, 2001. After the attacks, both the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the State Department made extensive changes to their procedures in order to strengthen security screening and diverted adjudications personnel and resources to security operations. The changes required more rigorous reviews of all petitioners for immigration benefits by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). These adjustments slowed the processing of applications dramatically in 2002 and 2003. Visa processing slowed for all applicants but the process ground to a virtual halt — sometimes for years — for a subset of applicants about whom the FBI had questions. Lawful permanent immigration flows are least responsive to the US economy. As a general rule, lawful permanent resident (LPR) immigration flows are less responsive to the US economic cycle than those for unauthorized immigrants and temporary workers. 1. The majority of LPRs in recent years have been status adjusters who already reside in the United States and tend to have strong ties to the labor market. The total yearly inflow of permanent immigrants is composed of status adjusters and new arrivals to the United States. Status adjusters are individuals who enter the United States in one legal status (such as that of a student or a temporary worker admitted under one of the few temporary work visa categories that allow the holder to change status) and then apply for permanent residency while still in the country. About 58 percent of LPRs admitted between 1998 and 2007 were status adjusters. Status adjusters appear to have higher labor market attachment than new arrivals and tend to be more embedded in the US economy and society than newly arriving immigrants. Over the period 1998 to 2007, status adjusters were about three times more likely to be sponsored by an employer than newly arriving LPRs (21 percent of status adjusters compared to 7 percent of new arrivals). Accordingly, the number of new status adjusters is less likely to immediately respond to changes in the labor market since so many are already employed and do not need to find new jobs. Together, the large share of status adjusters among total LPRs, and their high labor market attachment, reinforces the relative rigidity of the total LPR flow.


50

2. Pent‐up demand for employment‐sponsored visas means that actual lower admissions in these categories are not anticipated in the immediate future. Although they are designed to respond to labor needs, employment‐based admissions do not appear to respond to business‐cycle fluctuations. DHS admissions from the two most recent recessions are clear on this point. This trend is the result of pent‐up demand for employment‐sponsored visas and the relatively short duration of these recessions. Whenever there are more applicants for a visa category than there are available visas, the category becomes “oversubscribed” and immigrant visas are issued in the chronological order in which the petitions were filed until the annual numerical limit for the category is reached. Each month the State Department publishes the filing dates of petitions currently being processed. As of December 8, 2008, the State Department was processing visas for skilled employment‐based visas (second and third preference) filed between October 15, 2001 and May 1, 2005 depending upon the nationality of the applicant.14 Even if new demand for employer‐sponsored visas falls, pent‐up demand will likely continue to drive employment‐based immigration in the short term. 3. The relatively small share of employment‐based immigrants means that even if demand for such visas slackens in 2009, the effect on overall permanent admissions will be small. LPRs arrive in the United States through several immigration categories: family reunification, employer sponsorship, humanitarian cases (refugee and asylum adjustments), the diversity visa program, and a variety of other smaller, targeted categories.15 Only employment sponsorship — which accounts for about 15 percent of all LPR inflows — is explicitly linked to labor market needs.16 By contrast, family reunification accounts for about two‐thirds of lawful permanent immigration. (Most LPRs work once they reach the United States — regardless of whether they entered through family reunification.)

La Crisis Financiera M

undial y su Im

pacto en

los Países de Origen: El R

etorno

de los Migrantes, su Inserción en

los Mercado

s Labo

rales Locales y las Po

sibles Variacion

es en el Envío de

Remesas.

51

Figure 3. P

ersons Obtaining

Law

ful Perman

ent R

esiden

t Status in th

e United States (a

nnua

l, in m

illions), the Bu

sine

ss Cycle

(peak to trou

gh, q

uarterly), an

d Ke

y Im

migration

Legislation

, Fiscal Years 1882 to 2007

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4

1.6

1.8

2.0

1882

1887

1892

1897

1902

1907

1912

1917

1922

1927

1932

1937

1942

1947

1952

1957

1962

1967

1972

1977

1982

1987

1992

1997

2002

2007

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4

1.6

1.8

2.0

Rec

essi

ons

(qua

rter

ly)

Per

sons

obt

aini

ng la

wfu

l per

man

ent

resi

dent

sta

tus

(ann

ual)

Gre

at D

epre

ssio

n

IRC

A

Sept

. 11,

20

01

Wor

ld W

ar I

Wor

ld W

ar II

Imm

igra

tion

and

Nat

ural

izat

ion

Act

,

Imm

igra

tion

and

Nat

iona

lity

Act

, 196

5

Chi

nese

Exc

lusi

on

Act

, 188

2

Imm

igra

tion

and

Nat

ural

izat

ion

Act

, 195

2Im

mig

ratio

n A

ct, 1

891


undial y su Im

pacto en

los Países de Origen: El Retorno


los Mercado

s Labo


sibles Variacion

es en el Envío de

Remesas.

52

Note: The

se data represen

t persons adm

itted

for lawful permanen

t residen

ce during the 12

‐mon

th fiscal year en

ding

in

Octob

er of the

year de

signated

. The

total for 197

6 includ

es both the fiscal year and transitio

nal quarter data. Recession

s are

based on

quarterly data from

peak to trou

gh of the

business cycle. The

National Bureau of Econo

mic Research de

fines a

recession as “a significant decline in econo

mic activity

spread across th

e econ

omy, lasting more than

a fe

w m

onths, normally

visible in real G

DP, real incom

e, employmen

t, indu

strial produ

ction, and

who

lesale retail sales.” The

first b

road

mod

ern

assertion of th

e fede

ral regulatory po

wer in

the im

migratio

n area

is gen

erally con

side

red the Ch

inese Exclusion Act of 1

882.

Source: M

igratio

n Po

licy Institu

te analysis of Table 1 in

US Dep

artm

ent o

f Hom

eland Security, O

ffice of Im

migratio

n Statistics,

Yearbo

ok of Immigratio

n Statistics 2007. A

vailable at

http://w

ww.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbo

ok/200

7/table01.xls. Data on

recession

s from

National Bureau of

Econ

omic Research, US Bu

siness Cycle Expan

sion

s an

d Co

ntractions. A

vailable at

http://w

ww.nbe

r.org/cycles.htm

l#anno

uncemen

ts. Legislatio

n from

, Michael Fix and

Jeffrey S. Passel, Im

migratio

n an

d Im

migrants: Settin

g the Re

cord Straigh

t (Washington, DC: The

Urban

Institu

te, M

ay 1994).


53

Humanitarian immigration flows are largely independent of the US economic climate. Refugees and asylees represent a small share (about 7 percent) of the US immigrant population.17 Because refugees and asylees are fleeing persecution, their flows are typically unrelated to economic conditions. While budget allocations for the refugee resettlement program can be susceptible to budget cuts that often occur during economic downturns, overall one should expect foreign wars, other international political upheavals, and changes in US policy priorities (such as increased admissions of Iraqi refugees) to be much more important than US economic conditions in determining refugee flows. As a result, if the economic crisis leads to humanitarian emergencies — such as armed conflicts or famines — new pressures on humanitarian flows are expected to emerge and the US government is likely to respond in ways that may also include some new admissions. Refugee admissions are set yearly by the administration and must be approved by Congress. Many temporary worker flows gradually adjust to labor market conditions, but not all do so. Temporary worker programs are intended to fill seasonal and other labor market gaps. While many temporary worker programs should respond to labor market changes, not all do so. There is a wide range in the duration and conditions of admission for temporary workers whose visas can be valid for as long as six years and, in some cases (such as with the O and TN visas) indefinitely.18 In many cases there are limits on the number of temporary workers allowed into the country each year — either through annual quotas (for example H‐1B visas) or by requiring employers to prove that US workers are unavailable for a particular job (for example H‐1B and H‐2A visas).19 Where labor market tests are required to ensure that employers have made an effort to recruit local workers, temporary worker programs might be expected to respond relatively quickly to the business cycle. Rising unemployment during recessions will presumably steer workers already in the country toward sectors where jobs are available. These trends might lead to fewer labor shortages and lower demand for temporary workers. However, this adjustment does not occur automatically.20 Worker shortages may continue due to geographic mismatches and in occupations that are particularly unappealing and physically demanding (such as agriculture), require specialized knowledge or training (such as health care, information technology, or advanced sciences), or are expected to continue growing robustly (such as elder care). Some unemployed workers already in the country — including both natives and immigrants — may be unwilling to move to regions of the country where jobs are available due to family ties or other personal constraints, or they may be unwilling to take jobs that they find financially or socially unattractive. Others may prefer to drop out of the labor force entirely, deciding to rely on their savings, the income (and the hospitality) of family


54

members, or the social safety net. Some workers who are able to do so, such as those without family obligations or with significant savings, may choose to continue their education rather than move or remain unemployed. The degree to which unemployed workers already in the country are willing and able to adjust to a changing labor market will strongly influence the demand for temporary workers during a recession. Illegal immigration should be more responsive to economic changes than legal immigration. Still, large‐scale return migration of the unauthorized is unlikely absent protracted and severe economic conditions in the United States. The number of legal immigrant visas is set by legislation independent of economic conditions. However, demand for visas from both US employers and foreign workers exceeds the supply. These rigidities in the US legal immigration system force many economic migrants into illegal channels.21 Accordingly, illegal immigration flows should be more responsive to economic changes than legal immigration flows. The evidence overall, discussed below, confirms this viewpoint and suggests that illegal immigration flows tend to be highly responsive to the US economy. While unauthorized migrants are motivated, in large part, by employment prospects in the United States, their migration decisions are influenced by other factors as well. As a result, large‐scale return migration of the unauthorized is unlikely absent protracted and severe economic conditions in the United States. Indeed, several characteristics of the unauthorized immigrant population as well as recent trends along the Southwest border and in Mexico and Central America, suggest that large returns of unauthorized migrants may be unlikely. These include:

unauthorized immigrants’ high degree of attachment to the labor force,22 unauthorized workers’ greater intersectoral mobility and high geographic

mobility within the United States, the rising cost of illegal entry to the United States23, which has contributed to

reducing circular migration dramatically over the past two decades24, and the unstable security climate fueled largely by rising narco‐violence in Mexico

and the Central American countries that together are the source of most unauthorized immigrants in the United States.

Some analysts have studied the relationship between illegal immigration and business‐cycle fluctuations by relying on data from large official sample surveys and border apprehensions.25 Although both sources are flawed, they provide the most complete portrait currently possible. These studies show that illegal migration to the United States is driven by both the prospect of employment in the destination country and the economic climate in source countries. Family reunification is another important factor driving illegal immigration.26 Estimates of the unauthorized population over time based on the CPS show a strong correlation with recessionary periods in recent years. According to Pew Hispanic Center


55

estimates, the growth of the unauthorized immigrant population in the United States has slowed recently although it is not yet clear if the slowdown represents a decline in the stock of unauthorized immigrants in the United States.27 From 2000 to 2008, the unauthorized population increased by more than 40 percent — from an estimated 8.4 million to 11.9 million.28 There were estimated increases in the unauthorized population in each of these years, except for 2001‐02 and 2007‐08.29 Thus, the most recent recession and the current recession are the only two time periods when the estimated unauthorized population observed in these data did not increase. Border apprehensions data add support to the conclusion that illegal immigration is correlated with the business cycle. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Senior Economist Pia Orrenius observes that, when a six‐month lead is accounted for, fluctuations in migrant apprehensions along the Southwest border closely track changes in US labor demand since about the 2001 recession (see Figure 4).30 Using survey data from interviews with immigrants in the Mexican state of Oaxaca and in San Diego County, California, Cornelius et al. reach a similar conclusion finding that “undocumented migration responds to changing US economic conditions, with steep increases in the flow toward the end of expansion phases of the business cycle and significant decreases during economic downturns.”31 Figure 4. Border Apprehensions as a Function of US Labor Demand, 1991 to 2008

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

1991

1992

199

3

1994

1995

1996

199

7

1998

1999

200

0

2001

2002

2003

200

4

2005

2006

2007

200

8

App

rehe

nsio

ns

(tho

usa

nds)

-1,500

-1,000

-500

0

500

1,000

1,500

To

tal e

mpl

oym

ent

gro

wth

(th

ous

and

s)

Apprehensions Employment

Note: De‐trended employment shifted six months. Apprehensions data correspond to the month indicated; employment data correspond to six months after the month indicated.


56

Source: Courtesy of Pia Orrenius, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. Data from: US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; US Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics. IV. Beyond the economy, what factors might explain changes in immigration flows observed since the current economic crisis began? On balance, the evidence suggests that inflows of new immigrants to the United States have slowed substantially since the economic crisis began. Still, the precise relationship between immigration flows and business cycles is difficult to pin down. Migrants decide to move for various reasons and political and social factors often influence their decisions as much as economic ones.32 As a result, both businesses and individuals are unlikely to make long‐term decisions regarding employment and residence based on what are often perceived (at least initially) as short‐term fluctuations in the business cycle — particularly given the lag between the onset of a recession and adjustments on the part of both employers and workers. Yet when a recession is deep and prolonged — as the current crisis appears to be — there are more opportunities for employers and workers to adjust their expectations and behaviors. These adjustments become further complicated when economic crises are international — as is the current one. In addition to changing demand for workers in the US labor market, several other variables are contributing to the changes in immigration observed since the economic crisis began. They include:

Changing US federal immigration enforcement policies and strategies and the proliferation of state laws targeting unauthorized immigrants and their employers;

Sustained high levels of deportations; The depth and speed with which the economies of migrant‐sending economies

(especially Mexico and Central America) have been affected by the US downturn; The intensity of anti‐immigrant animus in many parts of the country; and The growing effectiveness of the border enforcement effort.

Federal, state, and local immigration enforcement policies and other factors are likely initially to divert unauthorized immigrants to other destinations rather than induce return migration. Some observers have argued that increasingly strict enforcement of immigration laws by federal, state, and local authorities is deterring illegal immigration and convincing some unauthorized migrants to return to their home countries. A recent study suggested that a significant drop in the number of less‐educated Hispanic immigrants in the monthly CPS data, from summer 2007 to spring 2008, could be attributed in part to the economy and in part to enforcement.33 DHS formally deported 319,382 immigrants in fiscal 2007 — a record number and a 14 percent increase from 2006.34 That figure grew to about 361,000 in fiscal 2008 according to preliminary DHS reports.35 In addition, DHS has been conducting a steady stream of high‐profile worksite raids, often arresting significant


57

numbers of unauthorized workers for removal. Teams of immigration enforcement agents, in an initiative called the National Fugitive Operations Program (NFOP), have been locating growing numbers of noncitizens with outstanding orders of removal because of non‐immigration crimes, as well as unauthorized immigrants who happen to be in the same household or nearby.36 At the same time, several states — most notably Arizona, Colorado, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and South Carolina — have enacted legislation designed to curb illegal immigration through mandatory verification of employment eligibility; criminalization of harboring and transporting unauthorized immigrants; restrictions on eligibility for public services; and similar provisions.37 Data are not yet available to show definitive trends, but anecdotal evidence suggests that some immigrants (both legal and unauthorized) are leaving states that have imposed strict immigration regulations.38 It is not possible to identify the destinations of those who have left these states, and it is difficult to disentangle the effects of the economic crisis from those of much more stringent enforcement regimes and the unwelcoming environment that enforcement creates. However, unless implementation of enforcement regimes — both on the federal and state levels — is nationwide, state laws and selective enforcement strategies will probably first divert unauthorized immigrants to other destinations within the United States rather than induce return migration. They may also force unauthorized immigrants into increasingly informal and precarious employment situations and further isolate them from US society. In the context of a slowing economy, state laws and selective enforcement could also erode a state’s business competitiveness and encourage businesses to relocate to neighboring states, further destabilizing local labor market and broader economic conditions. The depth and speed with which the economies of migrant‐sending economies are affected by the US downturn will strongly influence immigration trends. Migration is driven by both the economic climate in source countries and the prospect of employment in the destination country. It is the perception of a large “opportunity differential” between countries that leads many to migrate. As a result, how sending and receiving countries fare during business‐cycle fluctuations matters a lot in trying to anticipate how immigrants and prospective immigrants might behave during a severe downturn. Traditionally, recessions spread quickly from the developed to the developing world. However, the degree to which some emerging economies may have partially “decoupled” from business cycles in developing countries could dramatically alter the recession’s impact on immigration flows. A robust debate continues over whether some emerging economies will be able to sustain growth despite the global slowdown.39 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank project that some emerging economies — notably China, India, and Brazil — will grow through 2009 although at slower rates than in the recent past.40


58

Similar to trends observed over the past decade, the employment prospects for some highly skilled migrants returning to these economies appear strong. However, more recent indicators — including slack energy demand (in Brazil), falling industrial output (in India), and the approval of an economic stimulus plan by the Chinese government reportedly to boost domestic demand — suggest that the global slowdown is spreading quickly to these emerging economies. Given the pace at which the global economic outlook is deteriorating, a healthy degree of skepticism is useful when considering projections that suggest that emerging economies will be immune to the developed world’s woes. For Mexico, the forecast is less optimistic. The IMF expects that the Mexican economy will continue to be closely tied to the US economy and predicts that economic growth will slow from 4.9 percent in 2006 to 1.8 percent in 2009; the World Bank expects that economic growth in Mexico will slow to 1.1 percent. In particular, the collapse of the US automobile industry could have dire implications for employment prospects in Mexico, which has become increasingly dependent on automobile and automobile parts exports to the United States. Historically, economic crises in Mexico have resulted in higher levels of migration to the United States. In a study correlating apprehensions along the Southwest border with relative wages in the United States and Mexico, economists Gordon Hanson and Antonio Spilimbergo conclude that when wages in Mexico change relative to wages in the United States, apprehensions respond within the current month.41 More precisely, they estimate that a 10 percent decrease in the Mexican real wage relative to the United States gives rise to at least a 6.4 to 8.7 percent increase in attempted illegal immigration. Currency fluctuations are wild cards in peoples’ decisions whether to emigrate, stay abroad, or return to their countries of origin. Currency fluctuations in response to the business cycle may encourage some migrants to remain abroad rather than return to their countries of origin. A strengthening US dollar increases the real value of remittances (relative to country of origin currency) by making migrants’ income even more valuable for family members remaining in the country of origin. For instance, the recent rapid depreciation of the Mexican peso, the Brazilian real, and the Indian rupee has suddenly increased the real value (in pesos, reais, and rupees) of remittances to these countries. Over the past year (from December 1, 2007 and December 1, 2008), the Mexican peso depreciated 22 percent, the Brazilian real dropped 33 percent, and the Indian rupee fell 25 percent against the US dollar.42 (By contrast, the Chinese yuan has appreciated by about 7 percent over the same period.) These changes make dollar‐denominated income increasingly valuable for the families of migrants in the United States. This, in turn, may encourage new immigration flows or, at least, fewer outflows as migrants who were contemplating return decide to remain in the United States.


59

Return migration flows generally correspond more with developments in the country of origin, and with the ease of circulation, than with economic conditions in immigrant‐receiving countries. The size of the foreign‐born population in the United States is dynamic and characterized by regular population churn: New immigrants constantly arrive while some existing immigrants constantly depart. Generally, arrivals outpace departures by large margins, but that could change during economic crises. Accordingly, the observed slowdown in the growth of the foreign‐born population could be the result of slowing inflows, greater outflows, or both. Estimating foreign‐born emigration from the United States is notoriously difficult. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) tracked departing foreign‐born immigrants between 1908 and 1957, but abandoned this practice due to concerns about the quality of the data.43 While those concerns are valid, it is widely accepted that the emigration rate of the foreign born did increase significantly during the Great Depression.44 Between 1928 and 1937, over half a million immigrants left the United States, although it is not clear if they returned to their home countries or settled elsewhere.45 While about one immigrant departed for every three admitted between 1908 and 1957, the ratio rose to one departure for every two entries during the Great Depression. On balance, historical examples — such as Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain — suggest that return migration correlates more to economic, social, and political developments in the country of origin than to the job market in destination countries.46 In these countries, return migration became the dominant flow (relative to out‐migration) only as the countries made the transition from developing to developed economies. Where the development gap between countries remains large — such as between the United States and China (until very recently), India, and Mexico — return migration is typically seasonal, for investment or entrepreneurial activities, or for retirement.47 Currency fluctuations, enforcement regimes, and changing economic conditions in receiving countries may temporarily influence these trends, but such changes will likely prove to be short‐lived absent broader changes — either in destination‐country immigration policies or in economic conditions in origin countries. The ease of circulation and the strength of attachments that migrants maintain with their countries of origin are also important variables that influence return migration. Recent evidence from migration flows between the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Poland suggest that when job opportunities disappear in the country of destination, having the guaranteed right to return encourages circular movements especially when the job market in the country of origin is strong.48 Hence, policies encouraging circular migration can introduce flexibility into the labor market — during both economic booms and busts.


60

V. How do immigrants fare in the US labor market during recessions? Recessions affect all workers, but some workers suffer more than others. Immigrants — especially those from Mexico, Central America, and many from the Caribbean and the rest of Latin America — are more vulnerable than other workers during recessions both because of their human capital characteristics (including language, education, and work experience prior to immigration to the United States) and because the sectors in which they are employed tend to suffer early and heavy job losses during economic downturns. Many immigrants share the demographic and socioeconomic profiles of the most vulnerable workers and, as a result, suffer disproportionately during economic downturns. Research consistently shows that less‐skilled workers, nonwhites, younger workers, and recent labor market entrants are most vulnerable to fluctuations in the business cycle and experience much higher job losses during recessions.49 Workers without a high school diploma had job loss rates about twice the rate of workers with a college degree or more in all years between 1981 and 1995 and job losses for workers with less than a high school degree peaked during the 1981 and 1990 recessions.50 Employers are simply more willing to shed employees with low marginal productivity or with relatively little specialized training. In addition, higher‐skilled workers may move down the skill chain (preferring skill underutilization or underemployment to unemployment), displacing lower‐skilled workers. Immigrants share many of the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of these particularly vulnerable workers during recessions. Immigrants are on average younger, have less formal education, tend to have less US‐specific work experience, and tend to be more concentrated than natives in several low‐skilled sectors that are particularly vulnerable to fluctuations of the business cycle (see Table A and Figure 5). These factors put immigrants at greater relative risk of job loss during recessions. On average, immigrants from Mexico and Central America are younger and less educated than the overall foreign‐born population and are therefore even more vulnerable. In the US labor market, immigrants from some Latin American countries tend to have relatively low educational attainment — nearly half (49.4 percent) of immigrants from Mexico and Central America51 have less than a high school education — and are disproportionately employed in the low‐value added jobs that are most vulnerable during recessions.52 Evidence from recent recessions confirms that Hispanic immigrants are especially vulnerable to labor market conditions during recessions. Studies show that Hispanic workers suffered more job losses than non‐Hispanic workers during the 1991 recession,53 and, during the 2001 recession, the likelihood of a new Hispanic immigrant finding work was lower than the likelihood of that immigrant remaining unemployed.54


61

Table A. Demographic and Labor Force Characteristics of Native‐ and Foreign‐born Workers in the Civilian Labor Force, 2008

Native born Foreign born

Foreign born from Mexico and Central America

Male Female Male Female Male FemaleAge* 66,422,669 60,687,321 13,961,919 9,536,052 6,405,800 2,916,901 18 to 24 13.1% 13.4% 9.6% 8.2% 13.9% 10.9% 25 to 34 21.2% 21.1% 28.1% 23.4% 33.1% 26.5% 35 to 44 22.5% 22.1% 27.9% 28.6% 28.4% 32.4% 45 to 54 23.9% 24.2% 21.0% 23.8% 17.1% 20.7% 55 to 64 14.9% 15.0% 10.2% 12.8% 6.0% 7.5% 65 and older 4.4% 4.1% 3.1% 3.0% 1.6% 2.1%

Education** 57,726,447 52,582,943 12,615,446 8,749,635 5,516,539 2,600,319 Less than high school

6.7% 4.6% 30.8% 20.7% 58.7% 49.4%

High school diploma or GED

31.4% 27.8% 24.8% 25.3% 26.7% 27.6%

Some college or Associate's degree

28.1% 32.0% 14.0% 19.3% 8.8% 14.2%

Bachelor's degree

22.2% 23.2% 16.9% 22.7% 3.9% 6.6%

Professional degree

11.6% 12.4% 13.5% 12.0% 1.9% 2.2%

Industry* 66,286,816 60,536,442 13,928,844 9,478,325 6,388,077 2,884,609 Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting

2.0% 0.7% 3.0% 1.0% 6.0% 2.7%

Mining 0.9% 0.1% 0.3% 0.1% 0.5% 0.1% Construction 12.2% 1.7% 20.1% 1.2% 32.3% 1.1% Manufacturing 14.7% 6.5% 13.9% 11.3% 13.4% 15.6% Wholesale and retail trade

15.1% 13.6% 12.0% 12.4% 9.9% 12.0%

Transportation and utilities

8.0% 3.0% 6.5% 2.5% 4.8% 2.1%

Information 2.7% 2.3% 2.0% 1.6% 0.6% 0.8% Financial activities

6.3% 8.3% 4.4% 6.5% 2.0% 3.9%

Professional and business services

11.5% 10.2% 12.3% 11.5% 11.3% 11.2%


62

Educational and health services

10.2% 35.3% 8.3% 29.2% 2.5% 20.1%

Leisure and hospitality

7.0% 8.9% 10.9% 11.4% 11.7% 18.3%

Other services 4.3% 4.6% 4.5% 8.7% 4.4% 10.5% Public administration

5.2% 4.9% 1.8% 2.5% 0.5% 1.6%

Year of immigration*

‐ ‐ 13,961,919 9,536,052 6,344,432 2,893,603

Before 1970 ‐ ‐ 6.0% 7.1% 3.1% 4.6% 1970 to 1979 ‐ ‐ 10.8% 12.5% 9.7% 12.4% 1980 to 1989 ‐ ‐ 22.9% 25.0% 23.2% 27.0% 1990 to 1999 ‐ ‐ 31.4% 32.1% 32.3% 34.7% Since 2000 ‐ ‐ 28.9% 23.3% 31.7% 21.3%

Notes: Includes workers in the civilian labor force. * Workers age 18 and older. ** Workers age 25 and older. “Mexico and Central America” includes Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Panama. Source: Migration Policy Institute analysis of US Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, Socioeconomic Supplement, March 2008.


undial y su Im

pacto en

los Países de Origen: El R

etorno


los Mercado

s Labo


sibles Variacion

es en el Envío de

Remesas.

63

Figure 5. D

emograph

ic and

Lab

or Force Cha

racteristics of N

ative‐ and

Foreign

‐born Workers in

the Civilian Labo

r Force, 2008

Immigrant workers are on averag

e youn

ger tha

n na

tives…

0.0

%

0.5

%

1.0

%

1.5

%

2.0

%

2.5

%

3.0

%

3.5

%

15

19

23

27

31

35

39

43

47

51

55

59

63

67

71

75

79

Age

Percent of civilian labor force

Nativ

e b

orn

Fore

ign b

orn

Fore

ign b

orn

fro

m M

exi

coand C

ent

ral A

merica

They are also more likely to be less edu

cated…

**

6%

30%

30%

35%

27%

25%

16%

32%

56%

27%

11%

7%

Less

than

hig

hsc

hool

Hig

h sc

hool

gra

duate

or

GE

DS

ome

colle

ge o

rA

ssoc

iate

's d

egre

eB

achelo

r's d

egre

eor

hig

her

Nat

ive b

orn

Fore

ign b

orn

Fore

ign b

orn

fro

m M

exi

co a

nd C

entr

al A

meric

a


undial y su Im

pacto en



los Mercado

s Labo


sibles Variacion

es en el Envío de

Remesas.

64

And

tend

to work in different sectors th

an natives…*

(Distribution of native‐ and

foreign‐bo

rn in lead

ing indu

strie

s.)

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

Construction

Educationaland healthservices

Wholesaleand retail

trade

Manufacturing

Professionaland business

services

Leisure andhospitality

Financialactivities

Nativ

e b

orn

Fore

ign b

orn

Fore

ign b

orn f

rom

Mexi

co a

nd C

entr

al A

meric

a

A large share of im

migrants are recent entrants to th

e US labo

r market.*

(Year o

f immigratio

n of th

e foreign bo

rn.)

Foreign bo

rn

1980

-89

, 24%

1990

-99

, 31%

Bef

ore

1970

, 7%

1970

-79

, 12%

Sinc

e 20

00,

26%

Foreign bo

rn from

Mexico an

d Ce

ntral A

merica

1980

-89

, 24%

1990

-99

, 33%

Bef

ore

1970

, 4%

1970

-79

, 10%

Sinc

e 20

00,

29%

Includ

es workers in

the civilian labo

r force. * W

orkers age 18 and olde

r. ** Workers age 25 and olde

r. “Mexico and Ce

ntral A

merica”

includ

es Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvado

r, Guatemala, Hon

duras, M

exico, Nicaragua, and

Panam

a.

Source: M

igratio

n Po

licy Institu

te analysis of US Ce

nsus Bureau, Current Pop

ulation Survey, Socio‐econo

mic Sup

plem

ent, M

arch 2008.


65

The unemployment rate among Hispanic immigrants also increased dramatically during 2008. Between the third quarter of 2007 and the third quarter of 2008, the unemployment rate for foreign‐born Hispanics increased from 4.5 to 6.4 percent (compared with an increase from 7.1 to 9.6 percent among native‐born Hispanics and an increase from 4.8 to 5.3 percent among all workers).55 The unemployment rate for Mexican immigrants rose from 4.3 to 6.3 percent over the same period, and that for Central American immigrants from 4.5 to 7.0 percent. For recent Hispanic immigrants (those arriving since 2000), the unemployment rate rose from 5.5 to 7.2 percent.56 Because, recent Hispanic immigrants are a large share of the total Hispanic population (about one‐quarter of foreign‐born Hispanics in the labor force in 2008 were recent immigrants) they are more vulnerable to losing their jobs. The Pew Hispanic Center also found that year‐to‐year median real income of all noncitizen households fell between 2001 and 2003, and then fell again in 2007. Specifically, in 2007, households headed by noncitizens from Latin America, recent immigrants, adults with less than a high school education, single‐parent households, and adults who worked in production occupations experienced the largest declines in median real income.57 Immigrants are more concentrated than natives in the sectors that have suffered the most job losses over the past year. A recent report by the Federal Reserve Board suggests that the slowdown nationally is being felt most strongly in the finance, non‐financial services, construction, real estate, manufacturing, and tourism industries, but less strongly in agriculture and extractive industries such as oil and gas.58 However, slackening energy demand (particularly for oil) and the consequent collapse in oil prices may dampen the employment outlook for the oil and gas industry. Not all sectors (and occupations) suffer uniformly during recessions, but immigrants disproportionately work in many of the sectors that have been most affected by the current recession. Nationally, immigrants — and particularly immigrants from Mexico and Central America — are disproportionately employed in many of the industries such as construction, manufacturing, and hospitality services that have suffered the heaviest job losses during this recession. The 15 industries that shed the most jobs between November 2007 and November 2008 employed about 21 percent of native‐born workers in 2007.59 However, these same 15 industries employed about 30 percent of foreign‐born workers, and 43 percent of workers from Mexico and Central America. While the foreign born are about 16 percent of the total non‐farm labor force, they represent a higher share of workers in several industries that experienced the largest job losses between November 2007 and November 2008. Most notably, the foreign born are over a quarter of all “accommodation” workers — the majority of whom are hotel workers. The foreign born are also nearly one‐quarter of construction and


66

administrative and support workers, and just over one‐fifth of furniture and related product manufacturing workers (see Figure 6). The impact on immigrants of the slowdown in the construction industry, which started in 2007, has been well documented. Rakesh Kochhar of the Pew Hispanic Center estimates that nearly 250,000 Hispanics lost jobs in the construction sector during 2007 and that most of these job losses were among Mexican immigrants.60 Kochhar attributes much of the recent rise in Hispanic immigrant unemployment to declines in construction industry employment.


undial y su Im

pacto en



los Mercado

s Labo


sibles Variacion

es en el Envío de

Remesas.

67

Figure 6. N

ative an

d Foreign Bo

rn Employmen

t in Indu

stries with the Largest N

et Jo

b Losses, 2007 to 200

8

Chan

ge in

em

ploymen

t,

2007

to 200

8

Total N

ative bo

rn

employmen

t in

indu

stry, 200

7

Total Foreign

bo

rn

employmen

t in

indu

stry, 200

7

Foreign bo

rn

from

Mexico an

d Ce

ntral A

merica

employ

ed in

indu

stry, 200

7

Indu

stry

Num

ber

('000)

Percen

tNum

ber ('0

00)

Percen

t of

Num

ber ('0

00)

Percen

t of to

tal

Num

ber ('0

00)

Percen

t of to

tal

Total non

farm

‐1,870

‐1.4%

127,75

0 84.3%

23,765

15.7%

9,484

6.3%

Constructio

n ‐568

‐7.6%

9,292

77.2%

2,746

22.8%

1,945

16.2%

Adm

inistrative and supp

ort

services

‐532

‐6.6%

4,550

76.6%

1,392

23.4%

872

14.7%

Transportatio

n eq

uipm

ent

‐153

‐9.1%

2,115

88.0%

287

12.0%

109

4.5%

Motor veh

icle and

parts dealers

‐126

‐6.6%

1,811

88.9%

226

11.1%

99

4.9%

Accom

mod

ation

‐109

‐5.8%

1,184

70.4%

497

29.6%

215

12.8%

Durable goo

ds

‐108

‐3.4%

2,068

86.8%

315

13.2%

107

4.5%

Cred

it interm

ediatio

n and

related activities

‐79

‐2.8%

1,298

87.7%

181

12.3%

35

2.4%

Fabricated

metal produ

cts

‐70

‐4.5%

1,222

85.3%

210

14.7%

108

7.5%

Clothing

and

clothing accessories

stores

‐65

‐4.2%

1,189

83.3%

238

16.7%

62

4.3%

Woo

d prod

ucts

‐63

‐12.4%

494

85.4%

84

14.6%

64

11.0%

Furnitu

re and

related

produ

cts

‐62

‐11.7%

487

78.1%

137

21.9%

90

14.5%

Truck transportatio

n ‐59

‐4.2%

1,701

86.8%

259

13.2%

127

6.5%

Bu

ilding material and

garde

n supp

ly stores

‐55

‐4.3%

1,412

92.3%

118

7.7%

51

3.3%

Gen

eral m

erchandise stores

‐53

‐1.8%

2,628

88.7%

333

11.3%

107

3.6%

Plastics and rubb

er produ

cts

‐43

‐5.8%

614

84.3%

114

15.7%

58

8.0%

Notes: Employmen

t is season

ally adjusted (excluding

con

struction). Ind

ustries are at th

e NAICS three‐digit level (e

xcluding


undial y su Im

pacto en



los Mercado

s Labo


sibles Variacion

es en el Envío de

Remesas.

68

constructio

n). “Mexico and Ce

ntral A

merica” includ

es Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvado

r, Guatemala, Hon

duras, M

exico,

Nicaragua, and

Panam

a.

Sources: M

igratio

n Po

licy Institu

te analysis of Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Employmen

t Statistics, Novem

ber 2

007 to

Novem

ber 2

008 (change in to

tal employmen

t) and

US Ce

nsus Bureau, American

Com

mun

ity Survey, 2007 (foreign

born

employmen

t). A

merican

Com

mun

ity Survey: Steven Ru

ggles, M

atthew

Sob

ek, Trent Alexand

er, Cathe

rine

A. Fitch, Ron

ald

Goe

ken, Patricia Ke

lly Hall, Miriam King, and

Chad Ro

nnande

r, Integrated

Pub

lic Use M

icrodata Series: Version

4.0

[Machine

‐readable database], Minne

apolis, M

N: M

inne

sota Pop

ulation Ce

nter [p

rodu

cer a

nd distributor], 20

08.


69

Nevertheless, and as noted, job losses during recessions are not uniform across the economy. Over the past year, a number of sectors reported large job gains — mainly health care, education, social services, agriculture, and extractive industries. Agriculture has long been a mainstay for immigrants — especially the unauthorized — and nearly one‐quarter (22.5 percent) of workers in agriculture, forestry, and fishing and hunting are foreign born.61 Health care has also historically attracted large numbers of more highly skilled immigrants. Given the uneven nature of the economic slowdown thus far, one outcome could be a shift of immigrant employment from construction, manufacturing, hospitality and other low‐wage, low‐value added personal service sectors back into agriculture — the reverse of the pattern observed during recent decades.62 Returning to agricultural jobs would typically result in a decline in wages and working conditions for immigrant workers. At present, such a shift is anecdotal and has yet to appear in official statistics. Public policies may increase immigrants’ hardship during economic downturns. Beyond demographic and labor force characteristics, public policies may also make immigrants more likely to feel the effects of downturns much more deeply than other populations. Since the implementation of the 1996 welfare law, known as the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWORA), many legal immigrants who are not citizens and have been in the United States for less than five years are excluded from access to major federal public benefit programs, such as cash welfare and food stamps, which are important sources of support during periods of job loss, underemployment, or other economic hardship.63 Some states, including California, New York, Texas, Florida, Illinois, and New Jersey have restored state‐based coverage to these recent legal immigrants64 although collapsing tax revenues have spread the economic pain throughout the country and state governments are scrambling to cover ever‐widening deficits. This new fiscal reality in most states makes immigrants who lose their jobs particularly vulnerable regardless of whether a state has formally restored benefits to them or not. Except for a specified group of emergency services, unauthorized immigrants are generally ineligible for federal benefits and services. For instance, unauthorized immigrants are ineligible for unemployment insurance, the Earned Income Tax Credit, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, food stamps, and Medicaid. Overall, public benefits permit many low‐wage natives and naturalized citizens to survive periodic economic downturns by providing a stable source of emergency income.65 For low‐skilled noncitizens without access to these public benefits, periodic or even just short‐term unemployment can lead to greater economic hardship.


70

Many immigrants appear to adjust more quickly to labor market upheavals by changing their place of residence for work‐related reasons or by changing jobs. Evidence from the last 50 years suggests that most labor market adjustments to employment shocks are the result of labor mobility rather than business location decisions, and the foreign born appear to adjust more quickly to these shocks than natives.66 Immigrants (especially the unauthorized) are more mobile geographically within the United States and, to a lesser degree, between industries and occupations than natives. While 20 percent of noncitizens reported having changed residence over the previous year, only 13 percent of natives and 8 percent of naturalized citizens have done so; among movers, 28 percent of noncitizens report changing residence for job‐related reasons compared to 19 percent of natives and 20 percent of naturalized citizens.67 Thus, while immigrants may face higher job losses during recessions, they may also adjust more quickly to labor market upheavals. Like all recessions, the current recession has had uneven impacts on different regions of the country. Some of the highest unemployment rates as of November 2008 were in states with large and/or recently arrived immigrant populations, including California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Nevada, North Carolina, and South Carolina.68 Moreover, between November 2007 and November 2008, the unemployment rate grew most rapidly in many recent immigrant destinations including, Georgia (+3.0 percent), Nevada (+2.9 percent), and North Carolina (+3.2 percent). By contrast, the unemployment rate has remained relatively stable (less than 1 percent change between November 2007 and November 2008) in agricultural states or states with large oil and gas industries in the interior of the country, including Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, New Hampshire, South Dakota, Utah, and Wisconsin. However, the jobless rates may be rising due to the recent collapse of food and energy prices and the increasing difficulty in obtaining the financing needed for energy extraction and further exploration. All of these states have relatively small foreign‐born populations — the number of foreign born does not exceed 8 percent of the total state population in any of them, compared to 13 percent nationwide. If current economic trends persist, one might expect that to change, with increased immigration into these states. VI. Policy Challenges and Implications Although some studies have examined how immigrants fare in the US labor market during economic downturns, surprisingly little research has focused on the relationship between economic downturns and immigration flows. This may be the result of the relatively short duration of the last two recessions and the unprecedented period of strong economic growth over the past quarter century.


71

Overall, immigration flows — both legal and illegal — respond to varying degrees to the conditions of the labor market. However, the relationship is complex. Nor do job losses and unemployment rates alone tell the full story of what happens to immigrants and how immigrants adapt to bad economic times. In general, legal immigration flows are slow to respond to economic reversals because of: (a) the different responses to labor market conditions by status adjusters versus newly arriving immigrants; (b) pent‐up demand for employer‐sponsored visas; and (c) the relatively small share of legal immigrants admitted directly for employment. By contrast, illegal immigration flows appear to be much more responsive to labor market fluctuations, in part because many unauthorized immigrants tend to fill the demand for work not met by the legal immigration system and other US workers. As the US labor market tightens and competition for jobs increases, the demand for new workers will decline. Historically, unauthorized immigrants have introduced flexibility into the US labor market by providing a ready pool of highly mobile workers during expansions who often returned to their countries of origin (most often in Mexico and Central America) when the US labor market tightened. However, this may not longer be the case. Much tighter border enforcement (which has made back‐and‐forth movement increasingly difficult, dangerous, and costly), high labor‐force attachment among unauthorized immigrants, and immigrants’ relatively high occupational and geographic mobility within the United States suggest that above‐normal return migration is unlikely unless the US economic downturn turns out to be particularly prolonged or severe, economic conditions show consistent improvement in origin countries (which appears unrealistic in the near term), and potential leavers are guaranteed that they would be allowed to return to the United States when economic conditions change. The latter two conditions are thought to have been instrumental in the large‐scale return migration of Poles and certain other Eastern Europeans when the British and Irish economies slowed dramatically beginning in late 2007. The absence of these two conditions is thought to be at the heart of Spain’s inability to persuade its hundreds of thousands of unemployed immigrants to return to their countries of origin despite financial incentives to do so. Typically, low‐skilled workers, young workers, and recent labor market entrants are more vulnerable to unemployment during recessions than better educated, established older workers. Immigrants from Mexico and Central America (and especially unauthorized immigrants from these countries) share these characteristics to a greater extent than other immigrants or native‐born workers. As a result, one would expect more mobility — and responsiveness to labor market upheavals — among these groups. Since not all sectors or all regions of the country suffer uniformly during recessions, immigrants are typically able (or compelled by circumstances) to move in search of better opportunities.


72

Unlike native‐born workers and naturalized citizens, recently arrived legal immigrants and unauthorized immigrants are generally ineligible for public support limiting their ability to pursue non‐labor force activities during recessions, such as continuing their education. Family obligations (such as the need to continue to send remittances to relatives in the country of origin) and a lack of access to the federal social safety net often force immigrant workers to go to extraordinary lengths to remain employed or find new employment quickly — even if it implies relocating, taking jobs that do not fully utilize their skills, or accepting substandard wages and working conditions. While such flexibility and determination may be commendable, they may have troubling consequences —including putting downward pressure on the wages and working conditions of others who work side‐by‐side with them (or even across firms) and contributing to the growth in the underground economy. This analysis leaves many unanswered questions, in large part because there is relatively little systematic empirical work about how immigrants respond to business‐cycle fluctuations, and because the United States faces a recession whose likely depth we have not experienced since the Great Depression. In many ways it is inappropriate to compare the current crisis with the Great Depression. The United States and other advanced economies have a panoply of public‐ and private‐sector tools and the financial wherewithal that were not available in the late 1930s. Nonetheless, the most vulnerable may experience economic pain quite similarly. Given this reality, the questions that we need to continue to seek answers to include the following:

How will immigrants of different status adjust to the labor market shocks? Are better educated and skilled immigrants (and natives) more likely to take jobs

that underutilize and otherwise discount their skills during a recession? And if they do, will they crowd the less prepared out of the labor force and with what human implications?

How will low‐skilled native‐born workers (including African Americans) fare in an extended and deep recession relative to low‐skilled immigrant workers?

If the economic crisis spreads and is felt with similar intensity across societies with well‐established and complex migration relationships, such as between the United States and Mexico and much of Central America, how will migration flows respond? Will fewer immigrants come due to diminished job prospects in the United States? Will many immigrants return out of desperation? Or, will more people decide to migrate as economic conditions at home continue to deteriorate?

Will the United States continue, or even intensify, its interior enforcement operations against illegal immigration if the recession cuts deeper and lasts longer than many expect? What will be the political pressures and counter‐pressures on the Obama administration on this issue and how will it react?

Will legal immigrants who arrive and enter the labor market during the recession suffer from a long‐term penalty, for example, lower wages for a sustained period of time in the future?


73

Nor are these the only set of questions we will need answers to. An additional set of questions must focus on whether the recession (and how key actors respond to it) will provide impetus to and inform a badly needed conversation about an immigration system that serves Americans’ and America’s interests best. Among the questions that should be considered are the following:

Should there be a formula for reducing certain kinds of immigration during times of economic contraction? How would such a policy work given the administrative delays inherent in the immigration process and the unpredictability of the economic cycle?

Are labor market tests effective mechanisms for adjusting worker inflows to changing levels of demand — a question that a prolonged recession will certainly put to the test — and are the tests that have been on the books since the 1950s up to the task?

Will changing the skill mix of legal admissions — for instance, by giving greater preference to immigrants with more formal education or specialized skills in growing economic sectors and areas— serve US interests better overall, including during economic downturns?

What type of workforce development (i.e., education, training, and job linkage) policies might best help ameliorate the impact of economic downturns on the most vulnerable workers regardless of their birthplace?

Finally, what types of enforcement strategies (e.g., border, worksite, other interior) are most sensible during periods of economic decline? And what economic consequences do different enforcement strategies have — for example, on people and their families, and on a state or locality’s competitiveness?

The rapidly changing character and magnitude of the economic crisis, its unanticipated contagion around the globe, and the unique nature of all recessions make any program of specific policy recommendations premature. However, the current economic crisis brings into stark relief the relative inflexibility of the US immigration system in comparison to the highly dynamic and constantly evolving global economy. Now, more than ever, the United States needs an immigration system that better serves US economic and social interests regardless of economic fluctuations. An essential first step toward developing practical, policy‐oriented responses to the questions raised in this paper would be to establish a Standing Commission on Immigration and Labor Markets — as proposed by the Migration Policy Institute’s Independent Task Force on Immigration and America’s Future.69 The standing commission would make regular recommendations to Congress and to the administration for adjusting admissions levels based on labor markets needs, employment and unemployment patterns, and changing economic and demographic trends. While a severe economic downturn may not immediately appear to be the most opportune moment to address the chronic disconnect between the US immigration system and its labor market, farsighted


74

policymakers will recognize that the crisis may provide impetus toward creating a more nimble and thoughtful immigration system — one that is both more consistent with our values as a nation and serves better and more consistently US economic interests.


75

1 The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) is the official body responsible for deciding when the US economy has entered a recession. NBER defines a recession as a “significant decline in economic activity spread across the economy, lasting more than a few months, normally visible in real gross domestic product (GDP), real income, employment, industrial production, and wholesale‐retail sales.” 2 Throughout this paper we use the terms “immigrant” and “foreign born” interchangeably. 3 The American Community Survey (ACS) is administered monthly, and data are released annually. The 2006 and 2007 figures cited here represent averages across all 12 months in each year. Demographers estimate that the ACS and other official surveys may undercount the unauthorized immigrant population by as much as 10 percent, and so these figures may be slight underestimates (see also footnotes 19 and 23 below). 4 Like the ACS, the Current Population Survey (CPS) is administered monthly, but the data are released for each individual month. The CPS sample size is much smaller than the ACS. As a result, in addition to potential undercounts, there is also a wider margin of error on the CPS monthly estimates of the foreign‐born. Thus it is difficult to tell at this point whether the monthly figures for 2008 represent just a slowdown in the growth of the foreign‐born population or an actual decline (see also footnotes 19 and 23 below). 5 Estimates are based on a three‐month moving average (the estimate for the current month, the previous month, and the subsequent month). The November 2008 estimate is based only on the average of the October and November 2008 estimates. Similarly, the January 2000 estimate averages only January and February 2000 estimates since person weights calibrated to the 2000 Census are not available for years prior to 2000. 6 Includes foreign born from Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Panama. 7 Flow data are derived from administrative records collected by the US Department of Homeland Security (and its predecessor agencies) and correspond to fiscal years rather than calendar years. They include only immigrants arriving through legal channels. Since 1976, US government fiscal years have run from October 1 of the year prior to the listed year to September 30 of the listed year. Prior to 1976, the US government’s fiscal year ran from July 1 of the year prior to the year listed to June 30 of the year listed. 8 Estimates are based on a three‐month moving average of the foreign‐born population entering the United States since 1990 for each regional‐origin group. Jeffrey S. Passel, “Recent Trends in Undocumented Migration,” (presentation at the Migration Policy Institute, Washington, DC, November 24, 2008). (See also footnote 5 above.) 9 Migration trends from and to Mexico display seasonal fluctuations with outflows peaking in the spring and inflows peaking in the fall of each year. 10 Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática, “Ejercicio estadístico del INEGI confirma el descenso en la salida de Mexicanos al Extranjero,” (Comunicado Núm. 240/08, Aguascalientes, Mexico, November 20, 2008). 11 The lawful permanent resident (LPR) category includes refugees and successful asylum seekers who have been in the United States for more than a year and have completed their permanent residency applications. 12 “Extending Period of Optional Practical Training by 17 Months for F‐1 Nonimmigrant Students With STEM Degrees and Expanding Cap‐Gap Relief for All F‐1 Students with Pending H‐1B Petitions,” 73 Federal Register 68 (April 8, 2008), pp. 18944‐18956.


76

13 Douglas S. Massey, Jorge Durand, and Nolan J. Malone, Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an Era of Economic Integration (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002): 34. 14 Other categories of employment‐sponsored visas were current, including visas for priority workers (mostly workers with extraordinary abilities, outstanding professors or researchers, or multinational executives or managers and their families), other special immigrants (such as religious workers, employees of the US government born abroad and employees of international organizations, and their families), and investors and their families. US Department of State, Visa Bulletin IX, no. 4 (January 2009). Available at http://travel.state.gov/visa/frvi/bulletin/bulletin_4406.html. 15 Smaller, targeted categories include parolees, children born abroad to alien residents, individuals who have had a removal notice canceled, Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act entrants, and Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act entrants. 16 Annual average employment‐sponsored legal permanent immigration for 1998 to 2007. Based on Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 2007 (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, 2008). 17 Jeffrey S. Passel, The Size and Characteristics of the Unauthorized Migrant Population in the US (Washington, DC: Pew Hispanic Center, March 7, 2006). 18 O visas are granted to persons who have extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, business, or athletics, or extraordinary achievements in the motion picture and television field, and to their supporting personnel. TN visas are granted to professional workers from North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) countries (Canada and Mexico). Deborah Waller Meyers, “Temporary Worker Programs: A Patchwork Policy Response,” (Independent Task Force on Immigration and America’s Future Insight No. 12, Migration Policy Institute, Washington DC, January 2006). Available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/ITFIAF/TFI_12_Meyers.pdf. 19 There are two types of labor market tests: labor certification and labor attestation. Labor certification, which is required for H‐2A and H‐2B workers, requires that employers conduct an affirmative search for available US workers and can demonstrate to the US Department of Labor that admitting the foreign worker will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of similarly employed US workers. Labor attestation, which is required for H‐1 and certain other workers, requires that employers attest in an application to the US Department of Labor that the employer will pay the foreign worker the greater of the actual wages paid other workers in the same job or the prevailing wages for that occupation. In addition, the employer must provide working conditions for the foreign worker that do not cause other workers’ working conditions to be adversely affected and the employer must attest that there is no strike or lockout whose outcome might be affected by the employment of the foreign workers. Finally, the firm must provide a copy of the application to representatives of the bargaining unit or — if there is no bargaining representative — must post the application in a conspicuous location at the worksite. Labor attestation is typically less onerous for employers than labor certification. 20 Analysts have long questioned the effectiveness of the labor certification process. See for example Demetrios G. Papademetriou and Stephen Yale‐Loehr, Balancing Interests: Rethinking the US Selection of Skilled Immigrants (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996); and Martin Ruhs, “The Potential of Temporary Migration Programmes in Future International Migration Policy,” International Labour Review 145, no. 1‐2 (2006): 7‐36. 21 See for example Gordon Hanson, “The Economic Logic of Illegal Immigration,” (Council on Foreign Relations, Council Special Report No. 26, April 2007). Economist George Borjas makes this argument with respect to newly arrived immigrants who disproportionately tend to be


77

unauthorized. See George J. Borjas, Does Immigration Grease the Wheels of the Labor Market (Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, No. 1, March 2001). 22 Randy Capps, Karina Fortuny, and Michael E. Fix, Trends in the Low‐Wage Immigrant Labor Force, 2000‐2005 (Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, 2007). 23 Wayne Cornelius, “Controlling ‘Unwanted’ Immigration: Lessons from the United States, 1993‐2004” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 31, no. 4 (July 2005): 775‐794. 24 Jorge Durand, Nolan J. Malone, and Douglas S. Massey, Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an Era of Economic Integration (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2003); Demetrios Papademetriou, “The Shifting Expectations of Free Trade and Migration,” NAFTA’s Promise and Reality: Lessons from Mexico for the Hemisphere (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004); Elena Zúñiga Herrera, Paula Leite Neves, and Luis Acevedo Prieto, Mexico‐United States Migration: Regional and State Overview (Mexico, DF: Consejo Nacional de Población, 2006). 25 Large official surveys such as the CPS have substantial sampling errors and may undercount unauthorized immigrants; moreover, analysts must make assumptions in assigning legal status to noncitizens, which may further bias the end result. Smaller‐scale surveys may be influenced by trends at the microeconomic level and are not necessarily reflective of the overall US economy or population. On the other hand, data on border apprehensions, which are often used as a proxy measure for trends in illegal immigration, fail to capture fully the extent of such immigration since individuals are counted as many times as they are caught and do not include unauthorized migrants who succeed at entering the United States without getting caught. Other factors also influence how apprehensions data are interpreted in two important ways: (1) highly publicized enforcement efforts may deter potential unauthorized migrants from attempting to cross the border, thus skewing any observed relationship between illegal crossings and the US economy, and (2) apprehension data may better reflect Border Patrol resources dedicated to preventing entry rather than attempted crossings. 26 Randy Capps and Karina Fortuny, “Immigration and Child and Family Policy,” (paper prepared for the Urban Institute and Child Trends Roundtable on Children in Low‐Income Families, January 12, 2006). 27 Jeffrey S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn, Trends in Unauthorized Immigration: Undocumented Inflow Now Trails Legal Inflow (Washington, DC: Pew Hispanic Center, October 2, 2008). 28 Ibid. 29 There are significant margins of error around the estimates in the US Current Population Survey data employed by the Pew Hispanic Center in Passel and Cohn (2008). These are due to potential undercounts of the unauthorized population, limited sample sizes, adjustments of the weighting scheme in some years, and the imprecision of assigning legal status to noncitizens in the data. Thus the decline shown in the report for 2007‐08 may in fact reflect more of a slowdown in the rate of growth. 30 Unpublished data courtesy of Pia Orrenius, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. 31 Wayne A. Cornelius et al., “Controlling Unauthorized Immigration from Mexico: The Failure of ‘Prevention through Deterrence’ and the Need for Comprehensive Reform,” (Washington, DC: Immigration Policy Center Briefing paper, June 2008). 32 Theories explaining why people migrate include neoclassical economic theory, which posits that international migration stems from geographic differences in the supply and demand for labor, and the new economics of labor migration, which assumes that migration decisions are not made by individuals but by larger units of interrelated people such as households or families that work together to collectively overcome failures in capital, credit, and social insurance


78

markets. In reality, migrants’ decisions combine these motivations in varying configurations. See generally, Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller, The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 33 Steven A. Camarota and Karen Jensenius, Homeward Bound: Recent Immigration Enforcement and the Decline in the Illegal Alien Population (Washington, DC: Center for Immigration Studies, July 2008). 34 Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 2007 (Washington, DC: Author, 2008). 35 Unpublished data courtesy of the US Department of Homeland Security. 36 Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “ICE Fugitive Operations Program,” (Fact Sheet, August 2007); Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “Frequently Asked Questions About Worksite Enforcement,” (Fact Sheet, August 2008). 37 See generally, Cristina Rodriguez, Muzaffar Chishti, and Kimberly Nortman, Testing the Limits: Assessing the Legality of State and Local Immigration Measures (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2007). Available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/NCIIP_Assessing%20the%20Legality%20of%20State%20and%20Local%20Immigration%20Measures121307.pdf. For access to specific laws, see the Migration Policy Institute’s, “State Responses to Immigration: A Database of All State Legislation.” Available at http://www.migrationinformation.org/datahub/statelaws_home.cfm. 38 Arizona: Daniel Gonzalez, “New Hiring Law Nears, Migrants Flee,” The Arizona Republic, August 27, 2007; South Carolina: Daniel Brownstein, “Are Hispanics Leaving Because of the Crackdown?” The Island Packet, September 2, 2008; Arizona, Colorado, and Oklahoma: Emily Bazar, “Illegal Immigrants Moving Out,” USA Today, September 26, 2007. 39 For a discussion, see M. Ayhan Kose, Christopher Otrok, and Eswar Prasad, “Global Business Cycles: Convergence or Decoupling” (Institute for the Study of Labor Discussion Paper No. 3442, April 2008). 40 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook October 2008: Financial Stress, Downturns, and Recoveries (Washington, DC: Author, October 2008); The World Bank, Global Economic Prospects 2009: Commodities at the Crossroads (Washington, DC: Author, December 2008). 41 Gordon H. Hanson and Antonio Spilimbergo, “Illegal Immigration, Border Enforcement, and Relative Wages: Evidence from Apprehensions at the US‐Mexico Border,” American Economic Review 89, no. 5 (December 1999): 1337‐1357. 42 Daily averages using interbank rates. 43 Jennifer Van Hook, Weiwei Zhang, Frank D. Bean, and Jeffrey S. Passel, “Foreign‐born Emigration: A New Approach and Estimates Based on Matched CPS Files,” Demography 43, no. 2 (May 2006): 361‐382. 44 Robert Warren and Jennifer Marks Peck, “Foreign‐Born Emigration from the United States: 1960 to 1970,” Demography 17, no. 1 (February 1980): 71. 45 US Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1960). 46 Jean‐Christophe Dumont and Gilles Spielvogel, “Return Migration: A New Perspective,” in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), International Migration Outlook, Annual Report 2008 (Paris, OECD, 2008). 47 China: Yaohui Zhao, “Causes and Consequences of Return Migration: Recent Evidence from China,” Journal of Comparative Economics 30, no. 2 (June 2002): 376‐394; India: AnnaLee Saxenian, The New Argonauts: Regional Advantage in the Global Economy (Cambridge,


79

Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2006); Mexico: Belinda Reyes, Dynamics of Immigration: Return Migration to Western Mexico (San Francisco, California: Public Policy Institute of California, 1997). 48 Naomi Pollard, Maria Latorre, and Dhananjaya Sriskandarajah, Floodgates or Turnstiles? Post‐EU Enlargement Migration Flows to (and from) the UK (London: Institute for Public Policy Research, April 2008). 49 Steve Davis, John Haltiwanger, and Scott Schuh, Job Creation and Destruction (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996); Demetra Smith Nightingale and Michael Fix, “Economic and Labor Market Trends,” The Future of Children 14, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 49‐59; Demetra Smith Nightingale, et al., The Employment Safety Net for Families in a Declining Economy: Policy Issues and Options (Washington, DC: Urban Institute, March 2001); Hilary Hoynes, “The Employment, Earnings, and Income of Less‐Skilled Workers over the Business Cycle,” (Institute for Research on Poverty Discussion Paper no. 1199‐99, University of California, Berkeley, October 1999). 50 Henry S. Farber, “The Changing Face of Job Loss in the United States, 1981‐1995” (working paper #382, Princeton University Industrial Relations Section, June 1997). 51 Includes foreign born individuals (from Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Panama) age 25 and older in the civilian labor force. Migration Policy Institute analysis of US Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, Socioeconomic Supplement, March 2008. 52 Randy Capps, Karina Fortuny, and Michael E. Fix, Trends in the Low‐Wage Immigrant Labor Force, 2000‐2005 (Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, 2007). 53 Johanne Boisjoly and Greg J. Duncan, “Job Losses among Hispanics in the Recent Recession,” Monthly Labor Review 117, no. 16 (June 1994): 16‐23. 54 Rakesh Kochhar, Jobs Lost, Jobs Gained: The Latino Experience in the Recession and Recovery (Washington, DC: Pew Hispanic Center, October 2003). 55 Rakesh Kochhar, Latino Workers in the Ongoing Recession: 2007 to 2008 (Washington, DC: Pew Hispanic Center, December 15, 2008). 56 Ibid. 57 Rakesh Kochhar, Sharp Decline in Income for Non‐Citizen Immigrant Households, 2006‐2007 (Washington, DC: Pew Hispanic Center, October 2, 2008). 58 Federal Reserve Board, Summary of Commentary on Current Economic Conditions by Federal Reserve District, Washington DC, December 2008. 59 With the exception of construction, industries are included at the North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) three‐digit level. Includes only non‐farm employment 60 Rakesh Kochhar, Latino Labor Report, 2008: Construction Reverses Job Growth for Latinos (Washington, DC: Pew Hispanic Center, June 2008). 61 Includes workers in the civilian labor force. US Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, Socioeconomic Supplement, March 2008. 62 David Card and Ethan G. Lewis, “The Diffusion of Mexican Immigrants During the 1990s: Explanations and Impacts,” (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. W11552, August 2005). 63 See generally, Michael Fix, ed., A Decade Later: Welfare Reform and Immigrant Children and Families (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, forthcoming 2009). 64 Michael Fix and Jeffrey Passel, “The Scope and Impact of Welfare Reform’s Immigrant Provisions,” (Assessing the New Federalism Discussion Paper 02‐03, The Urban Institute, January 2002).


80

65 David M. Smith and Stephen A. Woodbury, The Low‐Wage Labor Market: Challenges and Opportunities for Economic Self‐Sufficiency (Report to the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, US Department of Health and Human Services, prepared by the Urban Institute, Washington DC, December 1999). 66 Olivier Jean Blanchard and Lawrence F. Katz, “Regional Evolutions,” (Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1: 1992). 67 US Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, Social and Economic Supplement, March 2008. Job‐related reasons include a new job or job transfer, to look for work for due to a lost job, or other job‐related reasons. 68 US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Regional and State Employment and Unemployment: November 2008,” (USDL 08‐1830, December 19, 2008). Available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/laus.pdf. 69 See Doris Meissner, Deborah W. Meyers, Demetrios G. Papademetriou, and Michael Fix, Immigration and America’s Future: A New Chapter (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2006).


81

Remesas en Tiempo de Inestabilidad Financiera Robert Wilke Meins Fondo Multilateral de Inversiones del Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo The current economic climate has brought the importance of remittance flows to Latin America and the Caribbean into renewed focus. After years of double digit growth, remittances remained essentially flat in 2008 as the slowing US economy combined, a negative immigration climate, the slowly depreciating dollar and rising food and fuel costs had a negative effect on the impact of remittances in Latin America and the Caribbean. With seven of the region's nations receiving 12% or more of the GDP from their compatriots living abroad, developments in remittances are of great consequence not only to the families receiving them, but to their communities and national economies as well. The onset of the financial crisis has fundamentally redefined the factors influencing remittance flows. With remittances from the United States, Europe and further afield affected in different ways the Multilateral Investment Fund of the Inter‐American Development Bank is currently finishing a more in‐depth analysis of the specific challenges to Latin American and Caribbean remittances in the year ahead, (currently scheduled for release in mid March). Fundamentally, remittances are seen as a family obligation and thus do not respond to 'normal' market dynamics. Generally seen as 'countercyclical', in that they rise in times of greater need, remittances are more robust during times of crisis that other capital flows or export and tourism revenues. For this reason, remittances are likely to be of even greater importance to the region's balance of payments in the year ahead.


82


83

Migración Laboral desde la Perspectiva de la Seguridad Social: Análisis de la Crisis Financiera Global y su Efecto sobre los Migrantes Miguel Ángel Fernández Pastor Centro Interamericano de Estudios de Seguridad Social (CIESS) El análisis que se presenta enseguida se va centrar en los distintos tipos de migrantes que existen, desde la perspectiva del migrante, y no del país receptor o del país emisor. Los migrantes se pueden dividir en Migrantes discriminados ‐ Los migrantes ilegales, aquellos que en busca de un futuro mejor asumen los riesgos de cruzar una frontera pero siempre en busca de una esperanza y después, en función de sus distintas realidades, quedan a veces marginados en la sociedad receptora. ‐ Aquellos que son productos de grandes crisis o situaciones dramáticas que los obligan a cruzar las fronteras y normalmente tienen diferencias raciales o religiosas que los hacen víctimas de reacciones xenofóbicas brutales que hemos conocido a través del tiempo muy claramente. ‐ Aquellos que son producto de la miseria, pobreza, desesperación y cruzan la frontera en busca de alimentos, o en búsqueda de refugio. Migrantes no discriminados ‐ Los que migran de países centrales; en todos nuestros países de América Latina existe gran cantidad de inmigrantes de Estados Unidos, de Canadá, y de países europeos que normalmente ocupan niveles preponderantes en estas sociedades (directores de empresa, gente muy bien considerada). ‐ Los trabajadores “calificados” que impactan las economías de los países de los que emigran. Nuestros países se dedican a construir sabiduría, a construir profesiones, desarrollar gente con altas capacidades que, la mayoría de las veces, es absorbida por las economías centrales y se llevan esas capacidades importantes que podrían producir una gran economía y sin embargo emigran porque les ofrecen mejores oportunidades en otros países, ocupan lugares preponderantes en empresas, universidades, organismos, centros de investigación. ‐ Aquellos que forman parte de las Migraciones Programadas: cuando dos países se ponen de acuerdo en la transferencia de trabajadores para que temporalmente (i.e. México‐Canadá o Ecuador‐España) hagan el trabajo que la mano de obra local no lo hace y luego retornan a sus países sin problemas y normalmente tienen distintos tipos de cobertura en materia de seguridad social o de respeto a las normas del trabajo.


84

Los dos tipos de trabajadores migrantes tienen importancia económica. Casi siempre al referirse a la migración, hablan sobre el migrante pobre, criminalizado, discriminado que se encuentra con serios problemas en el país receptor. Pero está también el otro migrante que muchas veces deja un vacío muy grande en su país de origen, que agudiza las crisis. Hay algunos países que reciben migrantes no calificados y envían migrantes calificados a otras regiones. Por lo tanto, ese proceso retroalimenta la situación de pobreza y no contribuye el desarrollo económico. Las soluciones al problema de los migrantes (visto desde la óptica de la seguridad social) debe involucrar a los dos tipos de trabajadores, no se debe centrar solamente en el trabajador marginal, o aquel que trabaja de forma ilegal. Sobre el tema de reforzar, jerarquizar y valorizar el trabajo decente, este debe ser universal. No hay duda que los países centrales y Estados Unidos tienen los mejores índices de trabajo decente. Pero para quienes? Esa sería la pregunta más importante. El Social Security de Estados Unidos establece que, para ser contratado, se debe tener un número de seguridad social. Los trabajadores ilegales falsean este número para ser contratados, aunque de esta manera, igual aportan al Social Security Administration pero nunca reciben un beneficio a cambio. Ese dinero va a las cuentas innominadas del sistema de seguridad social de los Estados Unidos. La cantidad de dinero acumulado en estas cuentas innominadas es igual o superior a las reservas de la seguridad social para los norteamericanos, quiere decir que la seguridad social de los norteamericanos la financian los trabajadores ilegales. Por lo tanto, hay que tener trabajo decente para todos. Entre las normas que se necesitan para mejorar la crisis está la jerarquía de la solidaridad en materia de seguridad social. Solidaridad con quienes? En la Unión Europea (UE) hay un régimen de solidaridad entre todos los países, pero solo para aquellos que son legalmente comunitarios. Los que son ilegales o que no son comunitarios, pero trabajan en la UE, no tienen solidaridad en materia de seguridad social. Por lo tanto, cuando hablamos de trabajo decente y de solidaridad debemos agregar como condimento central la solidaridad y el trabajo decente entre el conjunto de los habitantes de un territorio. Para este fin, se han desarrollado, en materia de seguridad social, dos formas de darles cobertura a los distintos trabajadores que recorren las diferentes fronteras. Como herramientas posibles se desarrollaron: ‐ Convenios bilaterales: los migrantes trabajan cruzando las fronteras, por lo tanto involucra a solo dos países. ‐ Convenios multilaterales de seguridad social: cada día van adquiriendo mayor importancia y mayor preponderancia.


85

¿Cuál es el impacto de los convenios multilaterales de seguridad social en el futuro cercano? Para que surja un convenio multilateral normalmente lo primero que aparece es un mercado común. Es decir, primero se acuerdan los movimientos de las mercaderías y las economías y después se incorpora lo que se llama la pata social, la transformación social de ese mercado común en un pequeño o incipiente proceso de integración. Entonces, si ese proceso se profundiza, si la seguridad social avanza, se pasa a la integración profunda donde todos los países se ponen de acuerdo tanto en términos de transferencia de mercaderías como en términos de transferencia de personas. Así, el trabajador vale solamente por el hecho de ser trabajador. Por último, se entra en el proceso de formación de una comunidad de naciones, cuando la integración profunda se sociabiliza y toda la comunidad lo adopta. Para un acercamiento a la realidad de América Latina en la materia, se han tomado algunos países de referencia para conocer su visión sobre su acercamiento con otros países.

- En Argentina se tiene convenios con casi todos los países limítrofes, y un convenio parcial con México, que es en realidad un convenio de pago en materia de seguridad social. Brasil también tiene características similares.

- México tiene solo un convenio de seguridad social bilateral con España, sin embargo no tiene uno con Estados Unidos que es el país al que más migrantes envía. Tampoco tiene convenios de seguridad social con los países de Sudamérica.

- Estados Unidos no tiene convenios en materia de seguridad social con ningún país de América Latina.

América Latina y el Caribe han intentado buscar estos puntos de acuerdo, empezando incipientemente con un proceso de integración. Por ejemplo, el CARICOM involucra a todos sus países miembros más algunos países observadores que intentan encontrar normas comunes que puedan permitir que los trabajadores se muevan con mayor prolijidad, comodidad, con mayor control y mayores facilidades. También existe el Convenio de la Comunidad Andina, que es muy precario, no ha logrado unificar sus distintas normas todavía. El Consejo de Instituciones de Seguridad Social de Centro América y República Dominicana (CISSCAD) involucra a países de esa región, y el Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR) es el que está hoy más desarrollado, tiene su propio Convenio Multilateral de Seguridad Social. Por último en materia multilateral, está el Convenio Multilateral Iberoamericano de Seguridad Social, iniciativa de la Organización Iberoamericana de Seguridad Social, que ya tiene la firma de Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil. Costa Rica, Chile, El Salvador, España,


86

Paraguay, Perú, Portugal, Uruguay y Venezuela, y el consentimiento del resto de los países. Es decir, hay en principio una posición de acuerdo para suscribir y ser parte de este convenio. Lo que es importante de este fenómeno, es la voluntad expresada por los países (a veces incoherentemente o a veces sin la fuerza necesaria) de empezar un proceso de integración y en ese proceso es donde la seguridad social tiene una importancia clave para organizar, estructurar y avanzar en dicho proceso de integración.

Respondiendo a la manifestación que hizo Rodríguez Zapatero referente a la migración y el trabajo en la UE, en la que afirma: “o exportamos progreso o importamos precariedades” efectivamente es cierto para los países centrales. Pero también se hace un gran esfuerzo en materia de integración, un gran esfuerzo en hacer valer las normas de seguridad social entre el conjunto de los países, entre el conjunto de los distintos sectores, si se toma el compromiso de estructurar una seguridad social para todos, no solo para los nacionales, y si se avanza en este proceso de integración, seguramente la integración será la globalización con solidaridad.

Si se tiene la capacidad de integrarse entre iguales para trabajar todos juntos en búsqueda de un beneficio común, la integración será el antídoto ideal contra la discriminación, contra la xenofobia, contra la marginalidad, contra las asimetrías sociales y contra las asimetrías económicas.

Es muy importante que se discutan temas de migración en foros como los que organizó la Comisión de Asuntos Jurídicos y Políticos de la Organización de Estados Americanos (OEA) el 12 de febrero en Washington D.C. Tenemos la obligación de llamar la atención en todos nuestros países sobre la necesidad de trabajar en estos procesos de integración, sin olvidarnos que en el mundo de la globalización, las mercaderías traspasan las fronteras sin ningún tipo de problemas, y las personas todavía no han logrado traspasar con amabilidad las fronteras de entre países. Instémonos a trabajar por mejorar esta circunstancia, por mejorar esta integración, y por darle al futuro un mundo mejor.

TERCERA SESION La Importancia de los Sistemas de Información Migratoria en la Formulación de Políticas Públicas y Marcos Regulatorios

La Importancia de los Sistemas de Información Migratoria en la Formulación de Políticas Públicas y Marcos Regulatorios

89

Issues of Quantity and Quality of Data on Immigration and its Role in the Public Arena Jeffrey Passel Pew Hispanic Center This presentation focuses on the USA. Immigration is the distinctive demographic feature of the United States; It affects population growth composition in virtually every area of public policy including but not limited to employment and labor relations, internal and border security, social and welfare education and public finance. In spite of remarkable advances over the last decade and a half in the amount and range of data available on immigration and immigrants, as well as a greatly improved data quality, the data collected and generated by our Department of Homeland Security, the Census Bureau and other government agencies still fail to meet the needs of a variety of users: the country’s security forces, policy analysts, policy makers and even demographers.

Good data on immigration involves knowing who is in the country, who has left the country, how many foreigners are in the country, their current legal status and where they are living. Because immigrants, refugees, asylees, asylum seekers, temporary entrance or legal non immigrants can change statuses knowing how many people shift between legal categories is essential for understanding how the US immigration system works and how it affects the country. A full assessment of US immigration policies together with related security aspects and social impacts also requires that we understand the economic and social characteristics of the immigrant population relative to natives and how they change over time.

During the 1990s the Census Bureau estimated the level of immigration into the country as part of its estimate population program using data from the US Immigration and Naturalization Service and other official sources. When the results of the 2000 Census came in, there were 5 to 7 million more people counted than what they had expected. When we researched why, it appeared that at least half of the difference, perhaps 3 to 4 million of the higher unexpected count, could be attributed to the fact that they had underestimated the level of immigration to the country, the level of unauthorized migration. With better data and better analytic capacity they would have avoided some of these problems.

In this decade we have much more data on immigration flows. However, it is still not easy to measure the inflows. Last year the Census Bureau revised its measure of the net total immigration to the US since 2000 and revised down by more than a million using one question from the American Community Survey. My own analysis of this data and other measures from the same and similar sources implies strongly that they should be revising the measure upward a bit and not downward. So I think there are at least a million, maybe a million and a half too low on the level of immigration this decade as we still have no definitive measures on the overall flow of immigrants into and out of the US.


90

What we would like to know? At a very basic level, to monitor immigration levels and asses overall immigration policy, the country needs some fundamental numbers on immigrants stocks and flows.

‐ How many foreign born are in the country at a given time, where are they, what legal statuses do they have ? Is the flow into and out of the country, and what is the flow into and out of the legal status categories?

‐ In addition to simple counts, we would also like to know some simple demographic factors such as country of birth, age and sex. But beyond these, a lot of the policy questions and analytic questions have other data needs. How do people move between categories, how long are waiting lists for varying and switching categories, who is on them? Do the immigrants come in as individuals or with families? What are the impacts in US society in terms of fiscal, social, economic, demographic impact? How do the immigrants match up in terms of socio economic characteristics with the people already here or with the natives, how do they change over time? Do the immigrants assimilate into American society, and if so, how fast, how long, what are the dimensions?

Currently we are moving in the direction of being able to answer questions like these, but there are still a lot of gaps in the data. We have two principal sources of data that help address these questions. Since the mid 1990’s our current population survey, our monthly Labor Force Survey has provided national level information on the number of immigrants living in the country. It is a large survey, about 50.000 households per month, and about 80.000 for the March sample, but there are significant gaps. We have only approximate measures of survey undercount. What percent of immigrants show up in the survey? So, our estimates of the size of the foreign born population and sub groups are not very exact. More importantly, the survey does not provide direct data on legal statuses, yet we know it includes legal permanent residence, legal temporary immigrants, refugees, asylums, asylum applicants, and very large numbers of unauthorized migrants. This survey, in my own work, is the basis for what is now the widely accepted estimate of about 12 million unauthorized migrants living in the US. Yet we cannot say with any confidence whether this population is growing right now. My own research suggests that it is stabilized, and has stopped growing for the last 2 years. We do not have very good data on how many unauthorized immigrants are coming into the country each year, and we have almost nothing at all on how many are leaving the country. Also, the sample size limits the ability to measure the population for sub national areas, such as states, metropolitan areas and other jurisdictions. In 2005 a new survey began. It is called the American Community Survey, and it has a sample of over 2 million households annually. It has permitted us to improve some of


91

these measures from the other survey in terms of the amount of geographic and socio economic detail. A major flaw with both of these, is that there is no direct information on legal statuses and the assessments of survey coverage for the total foreign born population or for immigrants with different legal statuses is missing. Without such data, it is difficult to address issues surrounding our immigration system. For example, if you try to use the survey data without paying attention to legal statuses when the survey includes broad ranges of category of immigrants, the results can get misleading answers to the effectiveness of our missions and policies that affect the selection of immigrants who would become successful members of society. For example, legally admitted immigrants need social services that impact our welfare and education systems, whereas temporary admissions might impact differently. Because we can’t tell who is who in the data system, it might be possible to collect some information directly from correspondence with the government agencies. The Census Bureau and Homeland Security could probably take advantage of different data systems and actually do some matching if they were so implant. A key set of data systems for assessing immigration additionally are the immigration databases maintained at the Department of Homeland Security. These have greatly improved over the 5 or 6 years but there is still much to be done. The system provides counts of admissions but they could be improved to provide more detailed information on the characteristics of the immigrants, the time of admission and better linkages of data to other data sets such as the surveys that I just noted. Combining survey technology with current registration systems could yield a great deal of policy related data and more surveys taken by Homeland Security. So if they encounter every one of the immigrants as part of their processing, they could take advantage of that encounter to draw a sample and interview the people, we would know a lot more. The data systems on temporary admissions have been improved but they are still inaccurate to determine how many people are here in various statuses, because they do not keep good track of conversions of temporary to permanent statuses or departures from the US. So if they could improve both of them, it would be a good deal. Another side of data is enforcement actions. It is collected by a number of agencies within Homeland Security. Apprehensions at the Southern border are routinely by committed by the Border Patrol and as indication of their success in various enforcement activities; If the apprehensions have going up they argue that they need more resources. However they do not have good information on the number of overall attempts that are being made, so they do not have a good assessment of the success rate. They do not know how many times they catch the same person more than once or how many people leave the US voluntarily. So, as such the pattern we get is only a rough


92

indicator of effectiveness. They began to process this data in ways that might be more useful but it is still very early. There are some other specific improvements that will help a lot; we have no measures of the number of people coming into the US through the ports of entry. The authorities at the border actually encounter and talk to everybody, but they have not bothered to count, which I think would help a lot. Combining the admissions process with survey collection methods could provide more information and is relatively low cost. Some of the overall approaches that I think we need to take, relate to system design issues. There has been a lot of progress made in 6 or 7 years, but if the systems were designed with greater attention to the analytic functions needed, I think we could get a lot better data and fill some of the information gaps that we have. The analytic capacity at the Department of Homeland Security is not very great; they have an office of Immigration Statistics, it has been expanded, but given their mission to develop portraits of the immigrant populations in the United States, they could use an expansion of that capacity. They also need to become a statistical agency. The Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics have statistical standards and employ statisticians to set standards for analyses and for data systems. There is no such capacity right now within the Office of Immigration Statistics, and it is sorely needed. Finally, there are a number of impediments within this big great burocracy of Homeland Security. Each of the agencies treats its own data systems as its property, and is often unwilling to share it for analytical purposes. Yet there is a lot of data in different parts of the Department on apprehensions and we sorely need these combined to get a better hand on the impact of the success of enforcement activities as well as the impact on the overall population.


93

The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Migration Richard E. Scott Organizacion Internacional para las Migraciones (OIM)

Summary

The current global financial crisis is expected to lead to a downturn in the global economy (and perhaps a deeper recession). The depth and extent of the crisis is difficult to predict and the impact of the crisis is likely to vary according to country, geographic region and employment sector.

During economic downturns. However, migrant workers are often the first to lose their jobs and while some may well choose to return. Policies aimed at sending migrant workers home are not the solution and could have potentially disastrous consequences for development, given the scale of remittances expected to reach TJSD 283 billion to developing countries in 2008 and the already high levels of unemployment in developing countries.

Calls to reduce migration in destination countries tend to be based on the false perception that "migrants take jobs" or "compete for welfare benefits", when in fact the majority of migrants create economic activity and jobs. Human mobility, as underscored in 2008 World Migration Report, makes economies more dynamic and more efficient.

Migration may also be a positive force in alleviating various aspects of the financial crisis and potentially make an important contribution towards overcoming the economic downturn. Trying to combat the financial crisis by simply cutting immigration may make the situation worse.

Nevertheless, countries of origin are likely to experience some influxes of returning migrants, which may result in economic and social instability in poorer countries. Reduced labour migration flows and increases in irregular migration and trafficking in human beings are also possible outcomes.

Therefore, flexible, coherent and comprehensive migration management policies are needed to maximize the benefits of migration, protect migrants and take their needs into account in measures addressing the crisis.

Likely impact of the financial crisis on migration

There is no concrete evidence available vet on the impact of the global financial crisis on migration, but the following largely negative effects have already been observed or are likely to occur:


94

Job losses, especially in construction, manufacturing, finance, services, retail and tourism, thus affecting migrants in these sectors.

Possible reductions in wages and poorer conditions in the workplace as companies and employers seek to make savings, as well as cuts in social services provision, impacting on migrants' quality of life and health.

The risk of discrimination and xenophobia as migrants are mistakenly perceived as taking the jobs of local workers particularly in low‐skilled sectors of the labour market.

The return of unemployed migrants to countries of origin (or regions of origin in the case of internal migration) where they are also likely to face inferior economic conditions (e.g. high unemployment and poverty) and could become an element of economic and social instability. Such returns, however, are less likely to occur from those countries (e.g. European countries) where migrants (and their families) enjoy secure residence and the safety net of a strong social welfare system.

A decline in remittance flows to developing countries as migrants lose their jobs, thus increasing poverty and exacerbating development gaps. However, the World Bank has observed that remittances are expected to remain resilient relative to many other categories of resource flows (e.g. trade, foreign direct investment FDI) to developing countries and in 2009 are expected to fall by 0.9 per cent and, at worst, by no more than six per cent. Migrants may also be more reluctant to send money through formal channels due to a lack of confidence in the stability of banking systems.

Adoption of more restrictive immigration policies to protect the local labour market and in response to a demand for fewer foreign workers. For example, a reduction in the number of migrants to be admitted for employment has already been announced in some countries (Italy, U.K.) or is under discussion in others (e.g. Australia). In Spain, the Government has introduced financial incentives to encourage unemployed migrants to return home.

A reduction in labour migration flows as potential migrants choose to stay home and see out the crisis there.

An increase in irregular migration and the strengthening of the informal labour market as unemployed migrants in destination countries seek to work without authorization and as opportunities for regular labour migration decrease resulting in the emigration of more persons from countries of origin more seriously affected by the crisis. An increase in trafficking in human beings is also a possibility.

Crisis is expected to impact differently on male and female migrant workers especially in affected sectors of the economy dominated by one gender (e.g. construction in which male migrant workers predominate).


95

Conversely, the following less negative effects have also been identified:

Demand for migrant workers in destination countries may remain stable in certain employment sectors, particularly where there exists a structural demand of immigrants, such as healthcare and domestic work (and agriculture in some countries).

The volume of remittances to countries of origin affected badly by the crisis may actually increase, as well as the level of investment and trade, as migrants and the diaspora seek to reduce the harmful impact of the crisis at home

Elements for policy responses

Previous downturns in the economy at both global and regional levels (e.g. the oil crisis in the early 1970s and the 1998 Asian financial crisis) indicate that migration will continue regardless (and irregular migration may even increase) because of the continuing structural demand for labor in certain sectors of the economy and despite increases in unemployment. Such demand is partly attributable to the fact that local workers remain reluctant to take up certain low or semi‐skilled jobs as well as broader demographic considerations. The Asian financial crisis also demonstrated that keeping markets open is important to stimulating a quicker economic recovery.

Therefore, flexible, coherent and comprehensive policies are needed to ensure that Migrants are effectively protected both in terms of their working and living conditions and in the event of loss of employment through, for example, the retention of regular status in destination countries.

Measures to facilitate remittance flows through lowering transaction costs as well as public and private sector initiatives to encourage the productive use of remittances are promoted in both countries of destination and origin to counter potential declines and also protect the families of migrants.

Migrants are not stigmatized for the job losses that occur and protected from discrimination and xenophobia this also calls for measures to inform the general population and raise awareness in destination countries about the valuable economic and social contributions made by migrants.

Regular labor migration channels remain open with a view to meeting any continuing demand for migrant workers thus helping to prevent irregular migration and trafficking in human beings.

Measures are adopted in countries of origin to assist with the repatriation, reception and reintegration of returning migrants.


96

The consensus achieved between destination and origin countries in recent international Diaspora on migration and development is not weakened as a result of the financial crisis. For example, measures could be taken to increase official development assistance (ODA) or, at the very least, to guard against reductions given that part of ODA contributes to the creation of conditions (e.g. poverty reduction, job creation) that preclude the precipitation of irregular movements and related abuses ‐ the objective is to ensure that migration remains a matter of choice.

Labour mobility and the interests and needs of migrants are hilly factored into any remedial measures (including reforms to the global financial system) proposed to address the crisis. The impact of the financial crisis on migrants is carefully monitored.

IOM's position

IOM considers the following four points to be of particular relevance when responding to requests for police guidance from government policymakers and other stakeholders:

On the basis of past experience with similar crises and the current economic outlook, the financial crisis is likely to have negative effects on both migrants and nationals, although these effects will differ according to country, geographic region as well employment sector. Considerable attention, therefore, needs to be devoted to ensure that migrants, who are particularly prone to stigmatization in such circumstances, are adequately protected from xenophobia and discrimination in the employment and social spheres.

Given that migration, and labour migration in particular, are an integral part of the global economy, flexible, coherent and comprehensive policies are needed to effectively manage migration, and such policies are all the more pertinent in an economic downturn.

A strong degree of solidarity between countries of destination and origin is called for to safeguard and continue to harness the benefits flowing from the migration and development relationship to both sets of countries as well as migrants and their families.

Migration is part of globalization and the global economy. Consequently, this requires that it be factored into policy responses aimed at economic recovery.

In addition, IOM underscores the need to carefully monitor the impact of the financial crisis on migrants as well as countries of origin, transit and destination, and to carryout, collect and disseminate relevant research and data in collaboration with its Member States, international agencies (e.g. those agencies participating in the Global Migration Group) as well as other pertinent stakeholders.


97

Reporte de la Conferencia Regional sobre Migración (CRM) ante la Comisión de Asuntos Jurídicos y Políticos de la Organización de Estados Americanos (OEA) Jorge Peraza‐ Breedy Conferencia Regional sobre Migración Introducción La Conferencia Regional sobre Migración (CRM –o Proceso Puebla) constituye un foro regional multilateral sobre migración internacional en el que participan países que comparten desde distintas perspectivas una problemática común, con base en experiencias que involucran situaciones de origen, tránsito y destino de las migraciones. En la actualidad los países miembros de la CRM son: Belice, Canadá, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Estados Unidos, Guatemala, Honduras, México, Nicaragua, Panamá y República Dominicana.1 Sus objetivos fundamentales incluyen: promover el continuo intercambio de información, experiencias y mejores prácticas; fomentar la cooperación regional en materia migratoria, aunando esfuerzos regionales para proteger los derechos humanos de los migrantes, a través de consultas en general que se realizan; y, fortalecer la integridad de las leyes migratorias, fronteras y seguridad de cada uno de los países miembros. Estructuralmente, la Conferencia se articula del siguiente modo: ♦ La CRM lleva a cabo reuniones anuales a las que asisten los Viceministros de

Relaciones Exteriores y de Gobernación de los países miembros, quienes representan al máximo nivel a los Estados y son quienes toman las decisiones políticas y definen las acciones a seguir.

♦ La Presidencia Pro‐Témpore la ejerce un país por consenso de los países miembros y rota anualmente.

♦ El Grupo Regional de Consulta sobre Migración (GRCM), el cual representa el nivel técnico y operativo de la Conferencia, se constituyó para efecto de instrumentar y dar seguimiento a los acuerdos políticos. Confluyen en la GRCM la Red de Funcionarios para el Combate de Trata de Personas y Tráfico Ilícito de Migrantes y la Red de Funcionarios de Enlace de Protección Consular. Se está constituyendo también un Grupo de Trabajo sobre Migración y Salud.

1 La Conferencia ha otorgado estatus de observadores a otros países que así lo han solicitado, como es el caso de Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Jamaica y Perú. Además, los países miembros han contado con el apoyo sustantivo y ogístico de varias organizaciones regionales e internacionales, que participan también en calidad de observadores: Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Refugiados (ACNUR), Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (CIDH), Fondo de Población de las Naciones Unidas (FNUAP), Organización Internacional para las Migraciones (OIM), Relatoría Especial de las Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos de los Migrantes, Secretaría General del SICA (Sistema de Integración Centroamericana) y la Secretaría Iberoamericana (SEGIB).


98

♦ Se estableció la Secretaría Técnica (ST) con el propósito de brindar asistencia a la Presidencia Pro‐Témpore en cuanto a la organización y seguimiento de las actividades e iniciativas de la CRM. La ST cuenta con la cooperación técnica y el apoyo logístico de la OIM, proviniendo los recursos financieros para su operación de contribuciones directas de los países miembros.

♦ Cuenta con un espacio de diálogo y coordinación con la sociedad civil, que se concreta con la participación de la Red Regional de Organizaciones Civiles (RROCM)2 en puntos específicos de las diferentes reuniones de la CRM.

La Conferencia cuenta con un Plan de Acción el cual se subdivide tres temas, a saber: gestión y políticas migratorias, derechos humanos y vinculación entre migración y desarrollo. En el marco del trabajo realizado en la CRM, se pueden destacar diversos logros y avances en los ámbitos mencionados con anterioridad, mucho de los cuales contribuyen con las actividades previstas en el “Programa Interamericano para la Promoción y Protección de los Derechos Humanos de los Migrantes, incluyendo a los Trabajadores Migratorios y sus Familias” (referido subsecuentemente en este documento como el Programa), vinculadas principalmente al intercambio de mejores prácticas entre los distintos actores del Programa y el establecimiento de acuerdos de cooperación. Contribuciones de la CRM al cumplimiento de los Objetivos del Programa En atención al Plan de Acción de la CRM, se presenta a continuación un breve recuento de las actividades realizadas en el marco de este Foro que, de forma directa e indirecta, contribuyen al cumplimiento de los objetivos del Programa3. Gestión y Políticas Migratorias: • Dentro de los principios básicos de la CRM se encuentra la discusión sobre temas

migratorios regionales con el propósito de mejorar los procesos de coordinación entre los Estados, todo ello a través del intercambio de información sobre gestión, políticas y legislación migratoria –sobre este último tema se realizó un seminario en Guatemala, el 15‐16 de febrero de 20074. En las reuniones regulares y actividades especiales se ha compartido información y mejores prácticas en áreas tales como

2 La Red Regional de Organizaciones Civiles para las Migraciones, conocida por sus siglas RROCM, es una Red de Redes, donde actualmente participan 11 países, los mismos de la CRM, a través de sus espacios de coordinación nacional, instituciones, organizaciones y personas interesadas en el tema. Su origen se encuentra íntimamente relacionado con el proceso mismo de la CRM. Su principal objetivo es constituirse en un espacio de la sociedad civil para el intercambio de información y la construcción colectiva de enfoques y estrategias comunes para el abordaje de la temática migratoria, así como para el seguimiento de los acuerdos generados por los gobiernos integrantes del Proceso Puebla. 3 Se destacan únicamente aquellas que se han realizado a partir de la aprobación del Programa (7 de junio de 2005). 4 La compilación de presentaciones está disponible en el siguiente enlace: http://www.crmsv.org/Eventos/Febrero2007/Presentaciones/Publicacion_Seminario.pdf


99

programas alternativos de gestión migratoria, atención de grupos en situación de alta vulnerabilidad (por ejemplo, víctimas de trata y migrantes menores de edad no acompañados), migración laboral, desarrollo de políticas, entre otros. La CRM también ha desarrollado una matriz comparativa de legislación sobre trata y tráfico de personas, la que constantemente está siendo actualizada, y que permite el establecimiento de políticas armonizadas y acciones tendientes a combatir y erradicar ese crimen.

• En la lucha contra la migración irregular, también se han establecido mecanismos de intercambio de información y capacitación relativos a los documentos migratorios utilizados y aceptados a nivel regional, con énfasis en su expedición, control y seguridad. Periódicamente se realizan talleres de capacitación es estos tópicos para autoridades migratorias, consulares y demás involucradas en la gestión migratoria. Asimismo, a través de la Secretaría Virtual de la CRM (página Web privada), se divulga información sobre documentos fraudulentos.

• Con referencia a la trata de personas y tráfico ilícito de migrantes, se busca fortalecer el combate a estos crímenes, incentivando a los países miembros a estudiar la rigurosidad de la penalización de estos delitos, especialmente cuando afecta a los grupos más vulnerables, entre ellos mujeres, niños, niñas y adolescentes. Dentro de estas actividades, destaca la iniciativa que aprobó los “Lineamientos regionales para la protección especial en casos de repatriación de niños, niñas y adolescentes víctimas de trata”5 elaborados dentro del marco de la CRM como un mecanismo de coordinación efectivo para la atención de este grupo particularmente vulnerable. Con el apoyo de la Organización Internacional para las Migraciones (OIM), en el marco de la CRM se han desarrollado diversas campañas informativas y preventivas en esta materia.

• Se han concretado esfuerzos con el objetivo de mejorar la coordinación y posibilitar la implementación de medidas migratorias que buscan facilitar los procesos de retorno, a fin de que el/la migrante lo realice bajo condiciones dignas, seguras y ordenadas. En este sentido, se ha establecido también un fondo permanente para la atención de migrantes en situación de alta vulnerabilidad y un protocolo para su asistencia, actualmente administrado por la OIM6. Asimismo, se logró en el marco de la CRM la negociación y firma del “Memorándum de entendimiento entre los Gobiernos de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, de la República de El Salvador, de la República de Guatemala, de la República de Honduras y de la República de Nicaragua, para la repatriación digna, ordenada, ágil y segura de nacionales centroamericanos migrantes vía terrestre”, cuya implementación se evalúa regularmente en este mismo Foro.

5 Documento completo disponible en: http://www.crmsv.org/Lineamientos%20Regionales%20‐%20Version%20Final%20Esp.doc 6 Para mayor información, visitar http://oim.or.cr/espanol/procesosregionales/crm/fondos.shtml


100

Derechos Humanos En materia de derechos humanos, se estipula como uno de los principios rectores de la CRM el respeto a los derechos humanos de los migrantes, obviando su condición migratoria como una limitante para el cumplimiento de los mismos. A continuación se reseñan las principales acciones: • Se trabaja en la divulgación de los derechos humanos de los migrantes, incluyendo

los de la población refugiada –con el apoyo del Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Refugiados (ACNUR), a fin de promover una conciencia sobre los aportes que generan y un marco regulatorio adecuado para su trato. Con el apoyo de la Red Regional de Organizaciones Civiles (RROCM), que confluye en algunas de sus actividades con la CRM, y en coordinación con la Red de Funcionarios de Enlace de Protección Consular, se ha destacado la elaboración de los “Lineamientos Regionales para la protección de los derechos humanos de los migrantes en situaciones de verificación de estatus migratorio, detención, deportación y recepción”7. Este instrumento fue elaborado por la RROCM para contribuir a orientar a los gobiernos, particularmente a autoridades consulares, en la atención de la población migrante en situación irregular.

• Se tiene previsto, con el apoyo del Gobierno de Honduras y la OIM, la conducción de un seminario sobre derechos humanos de la población migrante en el I Semestre del 2009.

• También se busca promover la protección internacional del refugiado, fomentando el establecimiento de normas jurídicas en esta materia. Para este fin, el ACNUR acompaña los procesos diálogo entre los gobiernos y diversas capacitaciones sobre gestión migratoria desarrolladas en el marco de la CRM. Como ejemplo concreto de este apoyo, en Nicaragua se aprobó a mediados de 2008 la Ley de Protección a Refugiados. Otro ejemplo reciente es la realización de un Taller sobre Flujos Migratorios Mixtos en San José, Costa Rica, en agosto de ese mismo año, copatrocinado por Canadá.

• En materia de migración y salud, se ha establecido un acuerdo entre la Organización Internacional para las Migraciones (OIM) y el Fondo de Población de las Naciones Unidas (UNFPA) para impulsar un Grupo de Trabajo, cuyo fin es mantener un intercambio continuo de información entre los puntos focales responsables del tema, que permita coordinar mejores prácticas en la protección de la salud de la población migrante.

• En el análisis y establecimiento de iniciativas en materia de derechos humanos, se ha prestado especial atención a aquellos grupos que están en situación de alta vulnerabilidad. Se han realizado diversas actividades para promover una mayor comprensión del impacto de los procesos migratorios en la mujer (por ejemplo, Seminario “Mujer y Migración”, El Salvador, 19‐20 de julio de 20078), a fin de

7 Documento disponible en: http://www.sinfronteras.org.mx/boletines/lineamientos.pdf 8 Documento disponible en: http://www.crmsv.org/Eventos/Julio2007/Finales/SemMujer_Migracion.pdf


101

sensibilizar sobre este tópico y establecer políticas migratorias acordes a las necesidades. Uno de los temas prioritarios en la CRM para los próximos meses está relacionado con la atención de niños, niñas y adolescentes migrantes no acompañados –con la posibilidad de establecer también lineamientos de protección de esta población y coordinación entre las instituciones involucradas de los países miembros.

Migración y Desarrollo La actual Presidencia Pro‐Témpore de la CRM (período 2008‐2009), a cargo del Gobierno de Guatemala, ha establecido como tema angular de su gestión la Migración y Desarrollo. Se destaca, en ese sentido: • Los países miembros de la CRM están promoviendo el abordaje del fenómeno

migratorio a través de un enfoque integral, donde se comparten experiencias sobre migración, respeto de los derechos humanos y desarrollo económico. Se fomenta el diálogo entre los países de origen y destino de la región para el establecimiento de mecanismos que reduzcan los índices de migración irregular, a la vez que se busca mejorar el impacto de los procesos migratorios en las sociedades de los países de origen y destino, y en los/las propios/as migrantes. En ese sentido, por ejemplo, se tiene programado para abril de 2009 un taller sobre trabajadores migratorios temporales, enfocado a compartir mejores prácticas sobre esta temática.

• En línea con lo anterior, se ha organizado un encuentro de Gobiernos con el Sector Privado (Foro‐Taller “Sector Privado y Migración”, 16‐17 de febrero de 2006, auspiciado por los Gobiernos de El Salvador y México) para analizar en mayor detalle políticas y estrategias asociadas a procesos migratorios que puedan impactar positivamente en el desarrollo de los países.

A manera de conclusión, se reconoce en la CRM que el Programa tiene una serie de objetivos, generales y específicos, que coinciden con los propósitos propios del Proceso Puebla –aunque restringido a un espacio geográfico de cobertura menor. Asimismo, muchas de las principales entidades (por ejemplo, organismos multilaterales, migrantes y organizaciones de la sociedad civil) que contribuyen a concretar las actividades fijadas en el Plan de Acción de la CRM, también participan como aliados del Programa. En este sentido, es importante asegurar que no exista duplicidad de esfuerzos y que por el contrario, las diferentes iniciativas contribuyan en su mutuo desarrollo. Es sobre este último punto que se debe hacer un ejercicio importante, a fin de garantizar una adecuada coordinación y apoyo entre los diferentes actores, entre los cuales los procesos regionales de consulta en materia migratoria han ido asumiendo un papel destacado. Por este mismo motivo, la CRM celebra la convocatoria hecha por la Comisión Especial de Asuntos Migratorios de la OEA que busca identificar formas para vincular acciones con la Conferencia Sudamericana sobre Migraciones (CSM) y con la CRM.


103

CONCLUSIONES A continuación presentamos una síntesis de los temas más destacados en las presentaciones de los panelistas en relación al efecto de la crisis global en los flujos migratorios y las remesas, así como los comentarios de los representantes de los Estados Miembros de la OEA en la reunión. En su ponencia “Slowing Economic Growth and Future Impacts on Migration and Migrants” (La desaceleración económica y su futuro impacto sobre la migración y los migrantes), Lindsay Lowell, Director de Estudios Políticos del Instituto para el Estudio de la Migración Internacional de la Universidad de Georgetown, destacó que todavía es muy pronto para conocer los efectos de la crisis sobre las poblaciones migrantes, tanto en términos de flujos de personas y de dinero, como de la vida cotidiana de las comunidades de inmigrantes y las de emigrantes. Aunque algunos indicadores apuntan hacia un impacto negativo mayor sobre los trabajadores inmigrantes que sobre los nacionales, no se cuenta todavía con datos que permitan conocer la magnitud del problema.

Con respecto al flujo de remesas en la región, Robert W. Meins del Fondo Multilateral de Inversiones del Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo expresó en su presentación “Remittances in Times of Financial Instability” (Remesas en tiempos de inestabilidad financiera), que el efecto de la crisis ya se hizo sentir y los números indican que después de años de tasas de crecimiento por encima de los dos dígitos, en 2008 el monto de remesas hacia la región se mantuvo estable. Considerando que para 7 de los países de la región las remesas representan 12% o más de su PIB, es fundamental monitorear de cerca el efecto de la crisis sobre estos montos, dado que impactan no sólo a las familias que reciben envíos, sino también a sus comunidades y a las economías nacionales. Esta información permitirá la toma de medidas de políticas oportunas que amortigüen este impacto en los distintos ámbitos.

Armand Pereira, representante de la OIT en Washington, D.C., apuntó en su ponencia “La crisis financiera global y su impacto sobre las tendencias migratorias” que tanto los países expulsores como receptores deben trabajar conjuntamente en la formulación de políticas para la protección de las poblaciones migrantes, particularmente considerando la vulnerabilidad de estas poblaciones a los efectos de la crisis global. Como parte de la globalización y la economía global, la migración debe ser incluida en la formulación de políticas para la recuperación económica. Al respecto, enfatizó la importancia de la solidaridad entre países de origen y destino, para garantizar los beneficios de los flujos migratorios para ambos grupos de países, así como para los migrantes y sus familias. Históricamente, se ha visto que en periodos de crisis económica, se exacerban las reacciones xenofóbicas, que culpan a los inmigrantes de una serie de problemas que nada tienen que ver con las migraciones. El liderazgo político es crítico para evitar retóricas proteccionistas que exacerban sentimientos anti‐inmigrantes y para promover un discurso incluyente.


104

Richard Scott, representante de la OIM en Washington, D.C., subrayó en su presentación “The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Migration” (El impacto de la crisis global en las migraciones), la necesidad de un monitoreo cuidadoso del impacto de la crisis financiera en los migrantes. En términos de información estadística y de investigación, se requiere dirigir más recursos a las instituciones especializadas, para que se produzca información oportuna y relevante sobre la situación de las comunidades expulsoras y receptoras y sobre los efectos de los cambios en los flujos de migrantes y de dinero en las economías nacionales, y que se disemine oportunamente a las instancias a cargo de las decisiones de política a nivel nacional y regional. En particular, es fundamental dirigir esfuerzos conjuntos para mejorar la colección y procesamiento de datos sobre la migración en el hemisferio americano, que sean constantemente actualizados y comparables, para mejorar la calidad y oportunidad de la investigación sobre el tema. En su presentación “Issues of Quantity and Quality of Data on Immigration and its Role in the Public Arena” (Cuestiones sobre la calidad y la cantidad de información sobre inmigración y su rol en el ámbito público), Jeffrey Passel, demógrafo y especialista en temas de migración del Pew Hispanic Center, concluyó que el análisis de la situación de la información sobre inmigración en Estados Unidos muestra aun importantes deficiencias en el sistema que impiden conocer con precisión las características de movimientos migratorios y de los migrantes en el país. Entre otros obstáculos, Passel destacó que aunque el país tiene instituciones de alto nivel dedicadas a las estadísticas, estas no siempre comparten los mismos estándares técnicos y las políticas internas impiden con frecuencia el acceso a la información que se genera en diferentes agencias del departamento. Por su parte, Demetrio Papademetrious y Aaron Terrazas, presidente y analista político, respectivamente del Migration Policy Institute, señalaron en su presentación “Immigrants and the Current Economic Crisis: Research Evidence, Policy Challenges and Implications” (Los inmigrantes y la crisis económica actual: resultados de la investigación, desafíos políticos e implicaciones), que la crisis económica ha puesto en evidencia la poca flexibilidad del sistema migratorio estadounidense, en comparación con el dinamismo y movimiento constante de la economía global. Estados Unidos necesita un sistema migratorio que sea más adecuado a sus necesidades económicas y sociales, independiente de las fluctuaciones económicas. Mientras que la coyuntura económica actual no parece ser el mejor momento para enfrentar el desconecte entre el sistema migratorio estadounidense y su mercado laboral, se señaló que habría que considerar que esta misma coyuntura puede presentar una oportunidad para promover los cambios necesarios. Por último, Miguel Ángel Pastor, director del Centro Interamericano de Estudios de la Seguridad Social concluyó en su ponencia “Migración laboral desde la perspectiva de la seguridad social” que los países deben hacer un gran esfuerzo en materia de integración, en el que se haga valer las normas de seguridad social entre el conjunto de

Programa Interamericano para la Promoción y Protección de los Derechos Humanos de los Migrantes incluyendo a los Trabajadores Migrantes y sus Familias

105

los países, entre el conjunto de los distintos sectores. Afirmó que si se toma el compromiso de estructurar una seguridad social para todos, seguramente la integración será la globalización con solidaridad. Además, subrayó que la integración será el antídoto ideal contra la discriminación, contra la xenofobia, la marginalidad y las asimetrías sociales y económicas. Durante la sesión de preguntas y comentarios se dieron a conocer los distintos avances en los países miembros de la OEA en el marco de lo encomendado por el Programa Interamericano. Las misiones permanentes de Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Estados Unidos, México y Venezuela reafirmaron su compromiso con el Programa Interamericano y presentaron un breve informe sobre los avances que se han realizado en sus países con respecto al plan de trabajo del Programa Interamericano. En general, se habló del compromiso de continuar impulsando las actividades del Programa, pero también destacan por su relevancia otros temas discutidos por los representantes de las misiones como son: la necesidad de reconocer que los trabajadores migratorios hacen contribuciones positivas en las sociedades de origen y destino; la obligación de los Estados de origen de proveer protección consular en las áreas civil, penal y laboral; la importancia de seguir combatiendo el tráfico de personas; y la urgencia de promover esquemas de cooperación que permitan la movilidad y circularidad de las personas a través de acuerdos de programas de empleo temporal. Adicionalmente, Estados Unidos señaló que promueve la migración humana, segura y legal, desarrollando políticas eficaces de gestión de la migración que incluyen el respeto de los derechos humanos de los migrantes, y ofrecen protección a los refugiados y solicitantes de asilo. Destacó también que para avanzar en la gestión migratoria regional hay que apoyar los diálogos regionales de migración y otros procesos que promuevan el debate abierto y formal y el intercambio de información migratoria. Finalmente, los participantes concluyeron que a través de los foros que organiza la Comisión de Asuntos Jurídicos y Políticos de la OEA, se podrán identificar áreas específicas de cooperación y desarrollar estrategias que conduzcan a migraciones más ordenadas y justas.

Programa Interamericano para la Promoción y Protección de los Derechos Humanos de...

Documents

Transcript of Programa Interamericano para la Promoción y Protección de los Derechos Humanos de...