La seguridad nuclear tras Fukushima y su impacto en el ... · A lasting tribute to NEA’s 50 years...

La seguridad nuclear tras La seguridad nuclear tras ggFukushima y su impacto en el Fukushima y su impacto en el futuro de la energía nuclearfuturo de la energía nuclear

Javier ReigJavier ReigDirector Director SeguridadSeguridad NuclearNuclear

OECD Nuclear Energy AgencyOECD Nuclear Energy Agencygy g ygy g y

Curso de Verano UPMCurso de Verano UPMJulio 2011

OECD/NEA MembershipOECD/NEA Membership

• Australia• Austria

• Iceland• Ireland•• IsraelIsrael• Austria

• Belgium• Canada

ChilChil

•• IsraelIsrael• Italy• Japan

K•• SloveniaSlovenia

Spain•• ChileChile• Czech Republic• Denmark

• Korea• Luxembourg• Mexico

• Spain• Sweden• Switzerland

•• EstoniaEstonia• Finland• France

• Netherlands•• New ZealandNew Zealand• Norway

• Turkey • United Kingdom

U it d St tFrance• Germany• Greece

H

Norway• Poland• Portugal

Sl k

• United States

Not member of NEANot member of NEA

2

• Hungary • Slovak Republic

75 1

80

Nuclear Power Share of Total Electricity Production in OECD Countries (2009)%

75,1

60

70

44,9

51,754,4

50

29,2

33,134,7 35,8

37,4 38,2 39,2

,

30

40

14,817,5 17,9

20,222,8

29,2

21,818,6

24,7 25,3

10

20

3,2 4,40

10

3

NEA StrengthsNEA Strengths

♦ Small size and budget(80 staff members; budget of 14 million euros + voluntary(80 staff members; budget of 14 million euros, + voluntary contributions and projects)

♦ Large representation (85% of the world’s nuclear power♦ Large representation (85% of the world s nuclear power capacity)

♦ Non-political forum; climate of mutual trust♦ Non-political forum; climate of mutual trust

♦ Tries to pool world’s best nuclear expertise among developed countriesdeveloped countries

♦ Narrow focus: in-depth scientific, technical, legal work

4

N lN lNuclearNuclearE E Energy Energy O tl kO tl kOutlookOutlook

5

A lasting tribute to NEA’A lasting tribute to NEA’ssA lasting tribute to NEAA lasting tribute to NEA ss50 years50 years50 years50 years

•• First ever NEA outlookFirst ever NEA outlook•• Responding to renewed Responding to renewed

i t t i l i t t i l interest in nuclear energyinterest in nuclear energy•• Intention to inform the debateIntention to inform the debate•• Intention to inform the debateIntention to inform the debate

6OECD NEA: Nuclear Energy Outlook '08

WWhyhy the renewed interest in the renewed interest in yynuclear energy?nuclear energy?

F il f l F il f l G th i G th i Fossil fuel Fossil fuel pricesprices

Growth in energy Growth in energy demanddemand

Security of Security of l l

COCO22 emissions + emissions + li t hli t h energy supplyenergy supplyclimate changeclimate change


WWhh th d i t t i th d i t t i WWhyhy the renewed interest in the renewed interest in nuclear energy?nuclear energy?nuclear energy?nuclear energy?


WWhyhy the renewed interest in the renewed interest in WWhyhy the renewed interest in the renewed interest in nuclear energy?nuclear energy?

C bC b di id i i fdi id i i f f ilf il fi d fi d CarbonCarbon--dioxide emissions fromdioxide emissions from fossilfossil--fired fired power plants by far the biggest and power plants by far the biggest and

fastestfastest--growing sources of COgrowing sources of CO22


Business as usualBusiness as usual to 2050to 2050PopulationPopulation upup byby 50%...50%...


Business as usualBusiness as usual to 2050to 2050EnergyEnergy demanddemand upup byby 100%100%EnergyEnergy demanddemand upup byby 100%...100%...


Business as usualBusiness as usual to 2050to 2050ElectricityElectricity demanddemand upup byby 150%150%ElectricityElectricity demanddemand upup byby 150%...150%...


Business as usualBusiness as usual 20502050PopulationPopulation upup byby 50%...50%...

EnergyEnergy demanddemand upup byby 100%100%EnergyEnergy demanddemand upup byby 100%...100%...ElectricityElectricity demanddemand upup byby 150%...150%...

COCO22 emissions per unit of energy consumption emissions per unit of energy consumption COCO22 emissions per unit of energy consumption emissions per unit of energy consumption must must be be reducereducedd by a factor of 4by a factor of 4

Nuclear could Nuclear could make a significant contributionmake a significant contribution


Nuclear could Nuclear could make a significant contributionmake a significant contribution

…1400 reactors …1400 reactors in 2050in 2050

439 reactors439 reactors600 to…600 to…

439 reactors 439 reactors In June 2008In June 2008

Nuclear could expand by a factor of Nuclear could expand by a factor of 3314

Nuclear could expand by a factor of Nuclear could expand by a factor of 33OECD NEA: Nuclear Energy Outlook '08

Potential benefits of Potential benefits of nuclear nuclear powerpower

Virtually COVirtually CO freefreeVirtually COVirtually CO22--freefree


DiverseDiverse, , politicallypolitically stablestablesourcessources of of plentifulplentiful uraniumuraniumsourcessources of of plentifulplentiful uraniumuranium


CostCost competitivecompetitive and and veryveryinsensitiveinsensitive toto priceprice of of uraniumuraniuminsensitiveinsensitive toto priceprice of of uraniumuranium


Managing current and future Managing current and future Managing current and future Managing current and future challengeschallengeschallengeschallenges

UnUnsafe? safe? Actually, safer than Actually, safer than

base load base load alternativesalternativesalternativesalternatives


Radwaste? Radwaste? Actually most disposActually most disposableable by 2050by 2050


Actually, most disposActually, most disposableable by 2050by 2050

Managing current and future Managing current and future Managing current and future Managing current and future challengeschallengeschallengeschallenges

Proliferation? Proliferation? NPT largely successful, improved NPT largely successful, improved

regime under discussionregime under discussionregime under discussionregime under discussion


1400 reactors in 2050?1400 reactors in 2050?Today’s reactors are fit for purpose and could

provide for a significant expansion to 2050p g p

SignificantSignificant COCO22 alleviationalleviation nownow

Tomorrow’s fast reactors can expand the energy

SignificantSignificant COCO22 alleviationalleviation nownow

p gyavailable from uranium by up to 60 times

Vast resourcesVast resources of virtually of virtually COCO free energyfree energy


COCO22--free energyfree energy

1400 t i 2050?1400 t i 2050?1400 reactors in 2050?1400 reactors in 2050?

Vast resourcesVast resources of of virtuallyvirtually COCO22--free free energyenergy


Vast resourcesVast resources of of virtuallyvirtually COCO22 free free energyenergy

But!…But!…

Safety is a mustSafety is a mustGovernments have clear responsibilities:Governments have clear responsibilities:

–– mmaintain continued effective safety regulationaintain continued effective safety regulationy gy g–– foster pfoster progress facilities for waste disposalrogress facilities for waste disposal

mmaintain and reinforce international nonaintain and reinforce international non–– mmaintain and reinforce international nonaintain and reinforce international non--proliferation arrangementsproliferation arrangements

id th t bilit ( li l t fi l) id th t bilit ( li l t fi l) –– provide the stability (policy, regulatory, fiscal) provide the stability (policy, regulatory, fiscal) investors requireinvestors require


F k hi D i i hi N l P Pl tFukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant

Unit 6

Unit 1

Unit 5

Unit 2Unit 2

Unit 3Unit 4

Source: http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/news/gallery/nuclear-e.html Information updated on 24 March 2011

Damages at Fukushima Dai-ichi (March 2011)

• Normal sea water surface: O.P. 0m (O.P. : Onahama Point.)

• If tsunami comes, it runs up the land to a higher elevation.

• Design basis tsunami taking account of reflection was initially

( )

Design basis tsunami, taking account of reflection, was initially O.P. 3.1m and then changed into O.P. 5.7m at Fukushima-Daiichi.

• The tsunami was perhaps higher than O.P. 10m at the seashore p p gbank. It ran up to O.P. 14~15m in the site, while the site elevation

is 10~13m.

Design Basis Tsunami HeightTsunami Height

O P 0mRun-upHeight

O.P. 0m

Explanation about the “Height” related to Tsunami

El ti f f t l t d d iElevation of safety-related devices at Unit 1 of Fukushima-Daiichi

Accident progressions at Unit 1 to 3 reactors(Almost common to 3 units)(Almost common to 3 units)

• Total loss of off-site power due to EQ motionp• Total loss of EDGs due to tsunami→Prolonged station blackout

• Total loss of sea water pumps due to tsunami →Prolonged loss of ultimate heat sinkT t l ti l l f DC d t t i• Total or partial loss of DC power due to tsunami→Loss of plant parameter indications→Loss of plant control→Loss of plant control(Operators connected temporary batteries to I&C.)

• Occurrence of uncontrollable severe accident• Hydrogen explosions in reactor buildings • Release of radioactive materials to the environment • Sheltering and evacuation of general public

Issues with Design Impacts

1. Clarify the design basis requirements for earthquakes and tsunamis (and other external q (hazards)

• Plurally linked seismic centers• Damage to offsite infrastructure (electrical grid)• Tsunami flooding and associated damage to plant equipment• Earthquake generated tsunamisq g

2. Onsite and Offsite Power Supplies• Common cause failures of onsite and offsite electrical power suppliesCommon cause failures of onsite and offsite electrical power supplies

due to external events• Battery life considering extended station blackout• Capability to connect alternate power supplies to the onsite electrical• Capability to connect alternate power supplies to the onsite electrical

distribution system• Alternative cooling methods for emergency power supply equipment

Issues with Design Impacts3. Ultimate Heat Sink Alternatives• Transfer decay heat from core to environment without electrical power• Alternative sources of cooling water or air cooling capability• Alternative sources of cooling water or air cooling capability• Alternative pumping arrangements• Capability to connect alternative cooling water sources to the primary

t t l thsystem to cool the core• Consideration of the amount of contaminated water generated in alternative

cooling methods

4. Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Protecting Spent Fuel from Damageg

• Capability to connect alternative sources of spent fuel pool makeup and cooling

• Protection of fuel in the spent fuel pool from missile hazards• Protection of fuel in the spent fuel pool from missile hazards

5. Multi-unit Site ConsiderationsImpact of shared facilities in responding to accidents at multiple units• Impact of shared facilities in responding to accidents at multiple units

• Proximity of units on site (physical separation of units)


6. Arrangement of Nuclear Power Station on the Site• Configuration and location of spent fuel pools within reactor building

I t ti b t t b ildi d t bi b ildi ith• Interconnections between reactor building and turbine building with regard to containing the spread of radioactive liquids

• Placement of structures on the site to minimize the impact of external l i d i i ibili f ll i jevents on plant equipment and to maximize accessibility following major

external events

7 Flooding Protection of Essential Equipment and7. Flooding Protection of Essential Equipment and Facilities

• Provide water tight facilities for equipment essential to prevent or mitigateProvide water tight facilities for equipment essential to prevent or mitigate accidents that could challenge the barriers to the release of radioactive material

8. Enhancement to Prevent Hydrogen Explosions• Develop strategies for preventing or mitigating the buildup of explosive

levels of hydrogen in essential facilities (reactor building)levels of hydrogen in essential facilities (reactor building)


9. Enhancing Containment Venting Capabilities• Independence of containment ventilation systems on multi-unit sites• Robustness of ventilation systems to withstand external hazards• Alternative methods for operation of the ventilation systems with the lossAlternative methods for operation of the ventilation systems with the loss

of power and compressed gas systems• Capability of the ventilation system to minimize the spread of radioactive

materialmaterial

10.Access to Essential Structures and EquipmentProtection of the main control room from high levels of radiation• Protection of the main control room from high levels of radiation

• Protection of onsite emergency equipment and buildings from high levels of radiation

• Communication capabilities within the site• Ventilation and lighting without AC power


11. Instrumentation for Monitoring Reactor and Primary Containment Conditions

• Capability to connect alternate power supplies to individual instruments• Alternate instrumentation for monitoring essential parameters of the reactor and

primary containment• Ability to monitor releases of radioactive material without AC power

12. Independence and Diversity of Safety Systemsp y y y• Expanded consideration of independence and diversity in considering the effect

of events that have a wide spread impact on site structures, systems, and componentscomponents

• Implementing independence and diversity to avoid common cause failures at multi-unit sites

13. Use of Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) in Risk Management

• Develop insights from PSA for design enhancements for accident management in response to severe external events

Concluding Remarks• The accident continues to be a global• The accident continues to be a global

challenge to regulators and the industry• Impact on new projects not yet clear• Impact on cost to be assessedImpact on cost to be assessed • New entrants would be delayed

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