Facultar a las autoridades nacionales de competencia para...

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Case Id: d2414d2b-1362-4885-adda-d249f6c0ff9bDate: 27/01/2016 19:24:27

Facultar a las autoridadesnacionales de competencia para quesean más eficaces a la hora degarantizar el cumplimiento de lanormativa

Los campos marcados con * son obligatorios.

GUÍA PRÁCTICA

Responder a las preguntas

En las preguntas con botones de selección solo se puede elegir una opción.En las preguntas con casillas de verificación se pueden elegir varias respuestas.Las preguntas con un recuadro vacío son de texto libre.En función de la respuesta que se dé a una determinada pregunta, pueden parecerautomáticamente otras preguntas adicionales pidiendo más información (eso ocurre, porejemplo, cuando se elige la respuesta "Otros").Utilice exclusivamente los botones "Anterior" y "Siguiente" para desplazarse por el cuestionario(no use los botones de avance y retroceso del navegador).

Guardar un borrador de las respuestas

El cuestionario está dividido en varias secciones.

Al final de cada sección, puede elegir entre seguir contestando a las restantes secciones delcuestionario (pulsando "Siguiente") o guardar un borrador de las respuestas que ya ha formulado(pulsando "Guardar como borrador"). NOTA: las dos primeras secciones ("Guía práctica" e

."Introducción") no contienen preguntas

Si elige "Guardar como borrador", el sistema:

- le confirmará que se ha guardado el borrador de su respuesta - le facilitará el enlace que tendrá que utilizar para seguir respondiendo al cuestionario en otromomento - le ofrecerá la posibilidad de recibir el enlace por correo electrónico (recomendamos queutilice esta opción).

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Después, puede cerrar la aplicación y hacer uso del enlace en otro momento para seguirrespondiendo al cuestionario.

Enviar las respuestas definitivas

El envío de las respuestas definitivas debe hacerse pulsando el botón " " que aparece enEnviarel apartado final de la encuesta (" ").Conclusión y envío

Cuando envíe la respuesta, el sistema le mostrará un mensaje con el número de identificacióncorrespondiente (" "). Consérvelo, ya que podría necesitarlo para modificar su respuestaCase Iden una fase posterior.El sistema también le permitirá imprimir o descargar sus respuestas para que puedaconservarlas.

INTRODUCCIÓN

Observación preliminar: los servicios de la Dirección General de Competencia han elaboradoeste cuestionario con el fin de recabar opiniones sobre la aplicación de la normativa de la UEpor parte de las autoridades nacionales de competencia. El cuestionario no refleja el punto devista de la Comisión Europea ni prejuzga sus posibles decisiones futuras sobre ulterioresmedidas a este respecto.

A: Objeto de la consultaLa presente consulta tiene por objeto recabar información sobre la mejor manera de servir a losciudadanos de la Unión Europea mediante la aplicación del marco normativo sobre competencia. Laconsulta invita a los ciudadanos y a las demás partes interesadas a comunicar su experiencia yconocimientos en relación con los problemas a los que se enfrentan las autoridades nacionales decompetencia para hacer cumplir de forma efectiva la normativa de la UE y las posibles medidas quese deberían adoptar a este respecto.

La Comisión analizará detenidamente el resultado de la consulta antes de tomar una decisión sobrela necesidad de adoptar medidas y el alcance de estas. Las aportaciones de las partes interesadaspodrán utilizarse para una evaluación de impacto que determine las medidas que cabe tomar, en sucaso, para garantizar que las autoridades nacionales de competencia sean más eficaces a la hora degarantizar el cumplimiento de la normativa.

B. AntecedentesLa política europea de competencia es una parte esencial del . Las normas demercado interiorcompetencia de la UE tienen como meta poner a disposición de todos los europeos bienes yservicios innovadores, de mejor calidad y a menor precio. La política de competencia tiene porobjetivo garantizar que las empresas compitan entre sí de forma equitativa. Ello fomenta la actividadempresarial y la eficiencia, amplía la oferta para los consumidores y contribuye a bajar los precios ymejorar la calidad. Estas son las razones por las que las autoridades luchan contra los

.comportamientos anticompetitivos

Junto con la Comisión Europea, las autoridades nacionales de competencia son actoresfundamentales a la hora de hacer cumplir la normativa de la UE en este campo. Desde 2004, elReglamento (CE) nº 1/2003 otorga a las autoridades nacionales de competencia la facultad deaplicar las normas de competencia de la UE. Las autoridades nacionales y la Comisión Europeacooperan estrechamente a través de la Red Europea de Competencia para garantizar que lanormativa de la UE se aplique de forma coherente.[1]

http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/internal-market/index_en.htm

http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/overview_en.html

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La aplicación de las normas de competencia de la UE por parte de la Comisión Europea y lasautoridades nacionales es un elemento fundamental para la creación de un mercado único abierto,competitivo e innovador y resulta crucial para generar crecimiento y empleo en todos los sectores dela economía. Por lo tanto, las autoridades nacionales de competencia desempeñan una función clavea la hora de garantizar el funcionamiento correcto y equitativo del mercado único, en beneficio de lasempresas y los consumidores.

Con todo, las autoridades nacionales de competencia podrían hacer mucho más. No basta conotorgarles la facultad de aplicar las normas de defensa de la competencia de la UE: además, hayque poner a su disposición los medios e instrumentos que necesitan para hacerlo de manera eficaz.

El 9 de julio de 2014, la Comisión adoptó la Comunicación «Diez años de aplicación de la normativaantimonopolio del Reglamento 1/2003: logros y perspectivas futuras»[2], en la que se señalabandiversos ámbitos de actuación para facultar a las autoridades nacionales de competencia a aplicar lanormativa de manera más eficaz y :garantizar, en concreto, que dichas autoridades

1. cuenten con las herramientas de aplicación adecuadas

2. puedan imponer sanciones eficaces

3. apliquen programas de clemencia eficaces para animar a las empresas a facilitar informaciónsobre los carteles

4. dispongan de recursos adecuados y gocen de suficiente independencia.

A modo de seguimiento de la Comunicación, la Comisión ha emprendido trabajos de recopilaciónpormenorizada de datos en colaboración con las autoridades nacionales de competencia. Lapresente consulta pública pretende recabar el punto de vista de las partes interesadas, los expertos yel público en general.

C. Observaciones generales en relación con la consultaSe invita a participar en la consulta tanto a los ciudadanos como a las organizaciones interesadas y,en particular, a las partes afectadas por temas de competencia (como las empresas y sus asesoresjurídicos y económicos), a las asociaciones de consumidores y empresas y a los integrantes de lacomunidad académica. Las respuestas pueden enviarse en cualquiera de las lenguas oficiales.

También se agradecerá todo tipo de observaciones y datos (documentos, informes, estudios, etc.)que puedan ser pertinentes.

El cuestionario consta de tres partes:

A. Perfil del participante B: Preguntas generales C. Preguntas detalladas para las partes interesadas en el ámbito de la competencia

Las preguntas detalladas se subdividen en cuatro secciones :opcionales

C.1. Recursos e independencia de las autoridades nacionales de competencia C.2. Herramientas de aplicación con que cuentan las autoridades nacionales de competencia C.3. Capacidad de las autoridades nacionales de competencia para imponer sanciones a lasempresas C.4. Programas de clemencia

Pedimos a .todos los participantes que respondan a las preguntas generales

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Además, animamos a las partes interesadas en el ámbito de la competencia a que respondanDichas secciones son opcionales, por también a las preguntas detalladas (secciones C.1 a C.4).

lo que pueden seleccionar aquellas sobre las que posean experiencia o conocimientos.

Los participantes que solo vayan a responder a las preguntas generales también hallarán deprovecho la lectura de los preámbulos de las secciones C.1 a C.4, ya que en ellos se proporcionamás información sobre el objeto del cuestionario.

El plazo para enviar las respuestas finaliza el . 12 de febrero de 2016

Si tiene que considere pertinente al objeto de facultar a lasalguna pregunta u observaciónautoridades nacionales de competencia para que sean más eficaces a la hora de garantizar elcumplimiento de la normativa, puede enviarla a la siguiente dirección:

[email protected]

[1] Más información sobre la Red Europea de Competencia (REC) en: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/index_en.html

[2] COM(2014) 453 final de 9.7.2014.

A. PERFIL DEL PARTICIPANTE

*1. Responde en calidad de:

particularorganización o empresaadministración pública u organismo internacional

Facilite su información de contacto:

*Nombre y apellidos

MARIA ARANZAZU DEL VALLE SCHAAN

*Organización a la que representa

UNESPA, ASOCIACION ESPAÑOLA DE ASEGURADORES

*Ubicación (país)

ESPAÑA

*Dirección de correo electrónico

[email protected]

*

*

*

*

*

http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/index_en.html

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1.1. Indique el tipo de organización o empresa:

Institución académica Organización de consumidoresOrganización no gubernamental Administración públicaEmpresa / pyme / microempresa / sociedad unipersonal Asociación sectorialLaboratorio de ideas (think tank) Consultoría / bufete de abogadosMedios de comunicación Sindicato

3. ¿Dónde está radicado?

España

4. Representa intereses o ejerce actividades en el ámbito:

Nacional (solo en su país)A escala de la UEA nivel internacionalOtros

Por motivos de transparencia, en las consultas públicas la Comisión pide a las organizaciones quedeseen enviar comentarios que informen a la Comisión y al público en general de las personas,entidades e intereses que representan inscribiéndose en el y suscribiendoRegistro de Transparenciael correspondiente . Si una organización no facilita esta información, la políticaCódigo de conductade la Comisión es encuadrar su contribución entre las individuales. [Normas de consulta, verCOM(2002) 704 final; directrices para la mejora de la legislación, ver SWD(2015) 111 final yComunicación «Seguimiento del Libro Verde "Iniciativa europea en favor de la transparencia"»,COM(2007) 127 final].

Si su organización ya está inscrita, indique el número de identificación en el Registro deTransparencia al responder al cuestionario. De ese modo se considerará que su contribuciónrepresenta el punto de vista de su organización.

Si su organización no está inscrita, puede . Después, puede volver a esta páginaregistrarla ahorapara seguir contestando al cuestionario y enviar sus respuestas como organización inscrita.

Si desea saber cómo se tratarán sus datos personales y sus respuestas, le recomendamos que leala declaración específica de confidencialidad que acompaña al anuncio de consulta.

5. Organizaciones inscritas en el Registro de Transparencia: indicar el aquí el número deidentificación

814721210555-72

*6. Uso de su contribución (elija una de las opciones)

Mi/nuestra contribución:

Puede publicarse directamente junto con la información sobre mi persona u

organización (doy mi consentimiento a que se publique total o parcialmente toda la

*

http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/homePage.do

http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/staticPage/displayStaticPage.do?locale=en&reference=CODE_OF_CONDUCT

https://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/ri/registering.do?locale=en

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organización (doy mi consentimiento a que se publique total o parcialmente toda lainformación que figura en mi contribución, incluidos mi nombre y apellidos o el nombrede mi organización, y declaro que nada de lo que contiene es de carácter ilegítimo,vulnera derechos de terceros ni impide su publicación).Puede publicarse directamente a condición de que se mantenga mi anonimato o el de mi

organización (doy mi consentimiento a que se publique total o parcialmente cualquierinformación que figure en mi contribución, incluyendo citas u opiniones mías, siempreque se haga de forma anónima. Declaro que nada de lo que contiene es de carácterilegítimo, vulnera derechos de terceros ni impide su publicación).No puede publicarse directamente pero puede tenerse en cuenta en los datos

estadísticos (entiendo que mi contribución no se publicará directamente pero que misrespuestas anónimas pueden incluirse en los datos estadísticos publicados, por ejemplopara presentar las tendencias generales de las respuestas a la consulta). Nota: susrespuestas podrán ser objeto de una solicitud de acceso del público a los documentosen virtud del Reglamento (CE) nº 1049/2001.

7. En caso necesario, ¿los servicios de la Comisión pueden ponerse en contacto con ustedpara que les amplíe la información enviada?

Sí No

B. PREGUNTAS GENERALES PARA TODOS LOS PARTICIPANTESEN LA CONSULTA

Las normas de competencia de la UE tienen como meta poner a disposición de todos los europeosbienes y servicios innovadores, de mejor calidad y a menor precio.

Junto con la Comisión Europea, las autoridades nacionales de competencia son las responsables deaplicar las normas de la UE contrarias a los comportamientos anticompetitivos, al objeto degarantizar que las empresas compitan entre sí de forma equitativa.

Ello fomenta la actividad empresarial, la innovación y la productividad, amplía la oferta para losconsumidores y contribuye a bajar los precios y mejorar la calidad.

1. ¿Cree usted que las autoridades nacionales de competencia son eficaces a la hora de?garantizar el cumplimiento de las normas de competencia de la UE

Totalmente en desacuerdoEn desacuerdoDe acuerdoTotalmente de acuerdoOpinión neutraNo sé / no procede

Indique a qué seEstado(s) miembro(s)refiere su respuesta:

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España

Si tiene opiniones diversas sobre la situación en varios países, expóngalas acontinuación.

2. ¿Cree que las autoridades nacionales de competencia podrían hacer para garantizar el cumplimiento de las normas de competencia de lamás

UE?Totalmente en desacuerdoEn desacuerdoDe acuerdoTotalmente de acuerdoOpinión neutraNo sé / no procede

Indique a qué seEstado(s) miembro(s)refiere su respuesta:

España

Si tiene opiniones diversas sobre la situación en varios países, expóngalas acontinuación.

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3. En su opinión, ¿ ayudarían a las ANC señaladas a qué medidas ser más eficaces a la hora de?garantizar el cumplimiento de las normas de competencia de la UE

Totalmenteendesacuerdo

Endesacuerdo

Deacuerdo

Totalmentedeacuerdo

Opiniónneutra

Sinopiniónalrespecto

Velar porque lasautoridadesnacionalesdecompetenciatengangarantías deque al aplicarlas normasdecompetenciade la UE lohacen en elinterésgeneral de laUnión y noreciben otrotipo deinstrucciones

Velar porque lasautoridadesnacionalesde

competencia

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competenciatenganrecursossuficientesparadesempeñarsusfunciones

Velar porque lasautoridadesnacionalesdecompetenciatenganinstrumentoseficaces paragarantizar elcumplimientode lanormativa(por ejemplo,para detectare investigarlasinfraccionesde lalegislaciónsobrecompetencia)

Velar porque lasautoridades

nacionales

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nacionalesdecompetenciatenganpoderesefectivospara imponersanciones alas empresasque infringenla normativa

Velar porque lasautoridadesnacionalesdecompetenciaapliquenprogramasde clemenciaeficaces paraanimar a lasempresas afacilitarinformaciónsobre lasinfraccionesde lanormativa

Otros

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Si lo desea, puede aportar más comentarios o explicaciones.

¿ a fin de facultar a las autoridades nacionales de4. Cree que deben tomarse medidascompetencia para que sean más eficaces a la hora de garantizar el cumplimiento de lanormativa de la UE?

Totalmente en desacuerdoEn desacuerdoDe acuerdoTotalmente de acuerdoOpinión neutraNo sé / no procede

5. Si cree que deben tomarse medidas, ¿qui?én habría de adoptarlas

Estados miembrosUECombinación de medidas de la UE y los Estados miembrosNo sé / no procede

6. Si considera que para que las autoridadeslos Estados miembros deben tomar medidasnacionales de competencia sean más eficaces a la hora de garantizar el cumplimiento de lanormativa, ¿ ?qué tipo de actuación sería la más apropiada

Medidas no legislativas (por ejemplo, mejores prácticas)Combinación de medidas legislativas y no legislativasMedidas legislativasNo sé / no procede

Si lo desea, puede aportar más.comentarios o explicaciones

La legislación de la UE debería permitir a las autoridades de competencia

resolver dudas o consultas de las empresas o de las asociaciones empresariales

sobre la aplicación de las normas de competencia. Con ello, se estaría

facilitando la autoevaluación de competencia por parte de empresas y

asociaciones de forma proactiva al conocer la opinión de la autoridad de

competencia. Existe una gran incertidumbre e inseguridad jurídica en las

decisiones y acuerdos ya que las normas de competencia no son una ciencia

exacta y permiten un amplio margen de apreciación por parte de las autoridades

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de competencia. Las Directrices de 2011 sobre acuerdos de cooperación

horizontal no han sido útiles para las empresas y las asociaciones

empresariales y, sin embargo, el instrumento más eficaz para para el

cumplimiento y aplicación de la normativa de competencia son los reglamentos

de exención por categorías. Para el sector asegurador europeo el Reglamento

267/2010 es esencial.

7. Si considera que para que las autoridades nacionales dela UE debe tomar medidascompetencia sean más eficaces a la hora de garantizar el cumplimiento de la normativa, ¿qué

?tipo de actuación sería la más apropiadaMedidas no legislativas (por ejemplo, mejores prácticas)Combinación de medidas legislativas y no legislativasMedidas legislativasNo sé / no procede

Si lo desea, puede aportar más.comentarios o explicaciones

8. ¿Qué efecto tendrían sobre los siguientes aspectos las medidas de la UE que usted?propugna

Muynegativo

Negativo PositivoMuypositivo

NeutroSinopinión alrespecto

Cumplimientoefectivo de lasnormas decompetencia dela UE

Seguridadjurídica de lasempresas

Costes para lasempresas (*)

Cooperación enel marco de laRed Europea deCompetencia

Legitimidad delas decisionesadoptadas por

las autoridades

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las autoridadesnacionales decompetencia

Clima deinversión y elcrecimientoeconómico

(*) Por impacto negativo, se entiende el incremento de los costes. Por impacto positivo, se entiendesu reducción.

Si lo desea, puede aportar , en particularmás comentarios o explicacionessi considera que la opción que usted propugna podría tener otros

(sírvase dar detalles).impactos

9. Si lo desea, puede aportar relacionados con la aplicaciónmás comentarios o explicacionesde las normas de competencia de la UE por parte de las autoridades nacionales decompetencia:

C. DETAILED QUESTIONS FOR STAKEHOLDERS ACTIVE INCOMPETITION MATTERS

C.1. RESOURCES AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE NCAs

The states that: "it is necessary toCommunication on Ten Years of Regulation 1/2003 of 9 July 2014further guarantee the independence of national competition authorities (" ") in the exercise ofNCAstheir tasks and that they have sufficient resources".

The NCAs directly enforce the EU Treaty provisions on competition, namely Articles and 101 102 TFEU, alongside the Commission. EU law leaves Member States a large degree of flexibility for thedesign of the NCAs. The and level of resources degree of independence of the NCAs are

subject to Article 35 of Regulation 1/2003, which requiresessentially determined by national lawMember States to designate NCA(s) in such a way that the provisions of the Regulation areeffectively complied with, and that the EU law principles of effectiveness and equivalence arerespected.

The Commission initial fact-finding in follow-up to the 2014 Communication shows that significant in differences exist among the NCAs in terms of human and financial resources Member

in terms of GDP and that NCAs in small Members States often suffer fromStates of a similar size

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0453&from=EN

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12008E101&from=EN


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in terms of GDP and that NCAs in small Members States often suffer fromStates of a similar sizelimited financial means or very low staff numbers. Moreover, as a result of budgetary and staffingconstraints and cuts, many NCAs have had to stop or refrain from conducting certain

.enforcement activities

Against the backdrop of cuts in the resources of several authorities, an European CompetitionNetwork ("ECN") Resolution of Heads of Authorities was adopted on the continued need for

.[3] The Resolution underlined, inter alia, the need for appropriate infrastructureeffective institutionsand expert resources for all NCAs.

With regard to the functioning of the NCAs, the Commission initial fact-finding shows that while theyhave generally developed in the direction of greater independence, the applicable national rules donot always safeguard them against interference from public and private bodies when carrying

.out their task of enforcing EU competition law

The Commission has also and oftried to address the level of resources degree of independencesome NCAs through the Economic Adjustment Programmes with so-called Programme Countries andthe European Semester where possible, as well as through direct reactions to Member States on abilateral basis.

[3] See the Internet ( ).http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/ncas.pdf

C.1.(a) Your experience/knowledge of resources and independence of NCAs when enforcingEU competition law

1. Do you have experience/knowledge of the enforcement of the EU competition rules by theNCAs?

Yes No Do not know/Not applicable

If yes, in which countries?

Spain

2. In its Communication on Ten Years of Regulation 1/2003 of 9 July 2014, the Commissionconsiders it “necessary to further guarantee the independence of NCAs in the exercise of their

" when enforcing the EU competition rules.tasks and that they have sufficient resourcesDo you agree with this finding with respect to the NCAs with which you have

?experience/knowledge

Strongly disagreeDisagreeAgreeStrongly AgreeNeutralDo not know/Not applicable

http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/ncas.pdf

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You are welcome to add additional:comments/and or explanations

CAs need statutory independence vis-à-vis national governments, as many of

their responsibilities lead to clashes.

3. In your view, which are the main tasks should perform concerning the NCAs enforc

?ement of the EU competition rules

Stronglydisagree

Disagree AgreeStronglyAgree

NeutralNoopinion

Enforcement inindividual cases

Engaging incompetitionadvocacy

Cooperationwithin the ECNfor enforcementof the EUcompetitionrules

Other

You are welcome to add additional:comments/and or explanations

4. Do you have experience/knowledge of instances where a NCA does not have concerning the sufficient human or financial resources to carry out its main tasks enf

(e.g. conduct simultaneous inspections atorcement of the EU competition rulesdifferent locations)?


You are welcome to add , in particular, explainingadditional comments and/or explanationswhich NCA(s) you refer to, and if and why you consider this to be a problem.

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5. Do you have where a experience/knowledge of instances NCA has been influenced by other (e.g. government, other national public bodies, or private entities apart from the partiesbodies

involved in the case) when enforcing theor subject to instructions from outside the authorityEU competition rules in individual cases?


You are welcome to add , inadditional comments and/or explanationsparticular, explaining if and why you consider this to be a problem.

6. Do you have where experience/knowledge of instances members of the NCA’s top due to their management/board or decision-making body have been dismissed enforcement

(including for example the position they took during a collegiate decision makingactivitiesprocess) ? in individual cases


You are welcome to add , inadditional comments and/or explanationsparticular, explaining if and why you consider this to be a problem.

7. Do you have where experience/knowledge of instances members of the NCA’s top or management/board or decision-making body had a conflict of interest immediately after the

end of their contract/mandate with the NCA, have taken up a professionalposition/responsibility with an undertaking which had been subject to an investigation or

during their employment with the NCA?decisionYes No Do not know/Not applicable

You are welcome to add , in particular, explainingadditional comments and/or explanationswhich NCA(s), which activity and if and why you consider this to be a problem.

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C.1.(b) Your views on potential action

8. Which measures are necessary to ensure that NCAs are functionally independent whenenforcing the EU competition rules, i.e. they act in the general interest of the EU and do nottake instructions when carrying out this task?

Please list the 3 most important measures in order of importance (starting with "1" for the mostimportant).

1 2 3

Guarantees ensuring that NCAs are endowed withadequate and stable human and financial resourcesto perform their tasks

Guarantees that NCA's top management/board ordecision-making body are not subject to instructionsfrom any government or other public or private body

Guarantees ensuring that dismissals of members ofthe NCA's top management/board or decision-makingbody can only take place on objective groundsunrelated to its enforcement activities

Rules on conflicts of interest for the NCA's topmanagement/board or decision-making body

Rules on accountability of the NCA (e.g. requiring thatNCAs report annually on their activities)

Other

You are welcome to add additionalcomments and/or explanations.

9. Should ensuring that NCAs have sufficient resources when they enforce the EU competitionrules be addressed by the Member States and/or by EU action?

Member StatesEU actionCombination of EU/Member State actionDo not know/Not applicable


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The coordination between EU and Member State is essential.

10. Should guarantees regarding the independence of the NCAs when enforcing the EUcompetition rules be addressed at Member States and/or EU level?



11. If you consider that there is a case for act, please specifyion by the Member States

what type of action you consider most:appropriate

Non-legislative action (e.g. best practices)Mix of legislative and non-legislative actionLegislative actionDo not know/Not applicable

You are welcome to add additional comments and/or explanations. If your reply is differentfor resources and for independence, please clarify it here.

Legislative regulation ensure more legal certainty but this rules must be

complemented with best practices through co-regulation process with different

economic sectors.

12. If you consider that there is a case for EU action, what type of EU action you consider most appropriate:

Non-legislative action (e.g. best practices)Mix of legislative and non-legislative actionLegislative action

Do not know/Not applicable

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Do not know/Not applicable

You are welcome to add additional comments and/or explanations. If your reply is differentfor resources and for independence, please clarify it here.

13. Please clarify why you consider your preferred type of EU action more appropriate than to ensure the independence of the NCAs in the exercise of their tasks andother types of action

that they have sufficient resources when they enforce the EU competition rules?

14. What would be the impact of your preferred option for EU action:on the following aspects

Verynegative

Negative PositiveVerypositive

NeutralNoopinion

The effectiveenforcement of theEU competitionrules

Legal certainty forbusinesses

Costs forbusinesses (*)

Cooperation withinthe ECN

Legitimacy of NCAdecisions

Investmentclimate/economicgrowth

(*) Negative impact on costs means that costs increase. Positive impact on costs means that costsdecrease.

You are welcome to add ,additional comments and/or explanationsin particular, if you consider that your preferred option would have any other impact.

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15. Please indicate whether you have any, such asother comment or suggestions

examples of good practice etc.

You may also provide additional information which may be relevant for this section (copies ofany documents, reports, studies etc.). Please do it by uploading the relevant information indocuments with a maximum size of 1 MB each using the button below.

Should you prefer to provide documents of more than 1 MB, please send them to the functionalmailbox [email protected] after having submitted your reply to the questionnaireindicating your Case-Id, email and contact details.


C.2. ENFORCEMENT TOOLBOX OF THE NCAs

The provides: “it is necessary of 9 July 2014 Communication on Ten Years of Regulation 1/2003… to ensure that NCAs have a complete set of effective investigative and decision-making powers attheir disposal”.

The are tools NCAs use to apply the EU competition rules essentially governed by national law, subject only to EU general law principles of effectiveness and equivalence.

By way of follow-up to the Communication, the Commission has carried out initial fact-finding whichindicates that the vast majority of NCAs do not have a complete set of investigation and

which are and are .decision-making powers comprehensive in scope effective

Several NCAs do not have the power to fully set their enforcement priorities, e.g. they cannot, and choose which cases to dedicate their scarce resources.reject complaints on priority grounds

While most NCAs broadly have the same basic enforcement tools, some lack fundamental powerssuch as to adopt commitment decisions or to inspect non-business premises.

There are , e.g. while most NCAs have thesignificant differences in the scope of NCAs' powerspower to inspect, some cannot effectively gather digital evidence. Similarly, while all NCAs have thepower to adopt prohibition decisions, some cannot adopt behavioural or structural remedies to restorecompetition on the market.

Some NCAs cannot effectively fine non-compliance with their investigative and


21

Some NCAs cannot effectively fine non-compliance with their investigative and, as either their powers are not backed up by fines, fines are set at a verydecision-making powers

low level or there are no means to compel compliance e.g. through periodic penalty payments.

If NCAs do not have effective tools, their . It also ability to detect and find infringements suffers: NCAs often ask other NCAs to carry out inspections onimpacts on cooperation within the ECN

their behalf. However, the utility of this tool is diminished if NCAs do not have effective inspectionpowers. for companies operatingDivergences in procedures result in legal costs and uncertaintycross-border, which need to acquaint themselves with different rules.

The on key enforcement tools to foster softECN has developed a set of seven Recommendationsconvergence. Attempts have also been made to improve the enforcement toolbox of NCAsthrough the of Specific Economic Policy Conditionality with the Memoranda of Understanding

and through country specific recommendations in the frameworkso-called "Programme Countries"of the .European Semester

C.2.(a) Your experience/knowledge

1. Do you have use to enforce Articles 101 and 102experience/knowledge of the tools NCAsTFEU, e.g. to carry out inspections, to issue requests for information, to collect digital evidenceand to impose structural or behavioural remedies?


If yes, in which countries:

Spain

2. Do you have experience/ knowledge of instances where NCAs do not have effective to enforce Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, e.g. toinvestigation and decision-making tools

effectively carry out inspections, issue requests for information, adopt commitment decisions,issue interim orders?


Do you consider this to be a problem in terms of:

Stronglydisagree


NeutralNoopinion

The effectiveenforcement of theEU competitionrules e.g. NCAsmay refrain fromtaking action/carryout more limitedaction/take actionwhich does not

http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/documents.html

22

which does notmeet the desiredobjective?

Cooperation withinthe ECN e.g.NCAs may nothave effectivepowers to carryout an inspectionon behalf ofanother ECNmember pursuantto Article 22?

You are welcome to add , e.g. whichadditional comments and/or explanationsMember State(s) you refer to and if you consider that this gives rise to other

.problems

3. Do you have experience/ knowledge of instances where NCAs have divergent investigation to enforce Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, e.g. to gather digital evidence,and decision-making tools

to impose structural or behavioural remedies? Yes No Do not know/Not applicable


Stronglydisagree


NeutralNoopinion

Costs forbusinessesoperatingcross-borderwithin the EU,e.g. costs ofbecomingacquainted withdifferent rules?

Uncertainty forbusinessesoperatingcross-borderwithin the EU,

23

within the EU,e.g. differences interms of whichdata may begathered?

Cooperationwithin the ECNe.g. differences interms of whichevidence can begathered onbehalf of anotherNCA?


.problems

4. Do you have experience/ knowledge of instances where NCAs do not have effective powers:to

with their investigative and decision-making powers, e.g. to4.1. fine non-complianceimpose with inspection powers such as breaching seals orfines for non-compliancefailure to comply with a commitment decision?



Stronglydisagree


NeutralNoopinion

The effectiveenforcement ofArticles 101 and102 TEFU byNCAs, e.g. if

NCAs' inspection

24

NCAs' inspectionand investigationpowers are notbacked up by anypower to imposefines or the finesare set at a verylow levelcompanies may notbe incentivised tocomply?

Costs forbusinessesoperatingcross-border withinthe EU, e.g. costsof becomingacquainted withdifferent rules?

Uncertainty forbusinessesoperatingcross-border withinthe EU?


.problems

4.2. compel compliance with their investigation and decision-making powers,g. to impose to ensure that an undertakingperiodic penalty paymentscomplies with a prohibition decision?



25

Stronglydisagree


NeutralNoopinion

The effectiveenforcement ofArticles 101 and102 TEFU byNCAs, e.g. ifNCAs' inspectionand investigationpowers are notbacked up by anypower to imposefines or the finesare set at a verylow levelcompanies may notbe incentivised tocomply?

Costs forbusinessesoperatingcross-border withinthe EU, e.g. costsof becomingacquainted withdifferent rules?

Uncertainty forbusinessesoperatingcross-border withinthe EU?


.problems

5. Do you have experience/ knowledge of instances where NCAs do not have the power to settheir priorities and to choose which cases to investigate, including the power to reject formal

?complaints on priority groundsYes No Do not know/Not applicable

26



Stronglydisagree


NeutralNoopinion

The effectiveenforcement ofArticles 101 and102 TEFU byNCAs?


Uncertainty forbusinessesoperatingcross-borderwithin the EU?


.problems

6. Do you have of ,experience/ knowledge divergent rules on prescription (limitation) periodse.g. if the possibility for one NCA to take an enforcement decision becomes time barred butanother NCA may still act?


27


.problems


Stronglydisagree


NeutralNoopinion





.problems

7. Do you have experience/ knowledge of instances where one NCA (NCA A) does not have the (e.g. Statements of Objection) power to ask another NCA (NCA B) to notify acts or to enforce

, where it is not possible for NCA A to dofining decisions on its behalf in the territory of NCA B

28

, where it is not possible for NCA A to dofining decisions on its behalf in the territory of NCA Bso in its own jurisdiction, e.g. the company concerned has no legal presence there?



Stronglydisagree


NeutralNoopinion


Costs forbusinessesoperatingcross-borderwithin the EU,e.g. costs ofbecomingacquainted withdifferent rules? (*)




.problems

8. Please specify whether you have encountered any other problem in terms of NCAs not?having sufficient tools to enforce Articles 101 and 102 TFEU


29

Please explain your answer and in particular which Member State(s) you refer to.

C.2.(b) Your views on potential action

in order to have an to enforce9. Which powers do you think NCAs need effective toolboxArticles 101 and 102 TFEU?

9.1. Power to inspect business premises

Stronglydisagree

Disagree AgreeStrongly

agreeNeutral

Noopinion

Which aspects of this tool do you consider to be of importance?

9.2. Power to inspect non-business premises, e.g. homes and means of transport ofdirectors, managers and other members of staff of the company being inspected

Stronglydisagree


agreeNeutral

Noopinion


Only when it allowed by a court order

9.3. Power to issue requests for information

Stronglydisagree


agreeNeutral

Noopinion


30

9.4. Power to effectively gather digital evidence

Stronglydisagree


agreeNeutral

Noopinion


9.5. Power for the officials of one NCA (NCA A), which request another NCA (NCA B) tocarry out an inspection on their behalf or to assist in the inspection carried out by NCA B(e.g. to be present during the inspection, to have investigative powers)

Stronglydisagree


agreeNeutral

Noopinion


9.6. Power to conduct interviews with persons who might have knowledge of the subjectunder investigation

Stronglydisagree


agreeNeutral

Noopinion


This issue could be contrary to the principle of judicial protection

9.7. Power to conduct sector inquiries

Stronglydisagree


agreeNeutral

Noopinion


Investigations should materialize in a few certain facts (press releases,

market research, etc.) but no in general cuestions.

31

9.8. Power to adopt prohibition decisions

Stronglydisagree


agreeNeutral

Noopinion


9.9. Power to adopt formal settlement decisions (formal decision and reduced fine)

Stronglydisagree


agreeNeutral

Noopinion


9.10. Power to adopt commitment decisions

Stronglydisagree


agreeNeutral

Noopinion


9.11. Power to issue interim orders

Stronglydisagree


agreeNeutral

Noopinion


Only when the consumers or the market can be injuried, if the NCA don't take

urgent measures.

32

9.12. Power to impose dissuasive fines for non-compliance with investigative anddecision-making powers

Stronglydisagree


agreeNeutral

Noopinion


9.13. Power to compel compliance with investigative and decision-making powers, e.g.,power to impose effective periodic penalty payments?

Stronglydisagree


agreeNeutral

Noopinion


9.14. Power to fully set enforcement priorities, including the power to reject complaints onpriority grounds?

Stronglydisagree


agreeNeutral

Noopinion


9.15. Power for NCAs to act within a certain time period (prescription periods)

Stronglydisagree


agreeNeutral

Noopinion


33

9.16. Power for one NCA (NCA A) to ask another NCA (NCA B) to notify acts (e.g. aStatements of Objection) on their behalf in the territory of NCA B (e.g. if NCA A cannotnotify acts to a company in its own territory because it does not have a subsidiary or otherlegal representation there)

Stronglydisagree


agreeNeutral

Noopinion


9.17. Power for one NCA (NCA A) to ask another NCA (NCA B) to enforce fining decisionson their behalf in the territory of NCA B (e.g. if NCA A cannot fine a company in its ownterritory because it does not have a subsidiary or other legal representation there).

Stronglydisagree


agreeNeutral

Noopinion


9.18. Other

Stronglydisagree


agreeNeutral

Noopinion

Indicate what this "Other" power would be:


10. Should ensuring that NCAs have an effective competition toolbox?be addressed by the Member States and/or by EU action

Member StatesEU action

Combination of EU/Member State action

34

Combination of EU/Member State actionDo not know/Not applicable

You are welcome to add additional.comments and/or explanations

11. Please clarify why you consider your preferred type of EU action to ensure that NCAsmore appropriate than other types of action

have an effective enforcement toolbox

12. What would be the impact of your preferred option for EU action:on the following aspects

Verynegative


NeutralNoopinion

The effectiveenforcement ofthe EUcompetitionrules?

Legal certaintyfor businesses?

Costs forbusinesses? (*)

Cooperationwithin the ECN?


You are welcome to add , in particular ifadditional comments and/or explanationsyou consider that your preferred option would have any other impact.

35






C.3. POWER OF THE NCAS TO IMPOSE FINES ON UNDERTAKINGS

The provides: "… it is of 9 July 2014 Communication on Ten Years of Regulation 1/2003necessary to ensure that all NCAs have effective powers to impose deterrent fines on undertakingsand on associations of undertakings"

Fines imposed on undertakings and associations of undertakings at national level for breachesof Articles and TFEU are , and each Member State has its own101 102 not regulated by EU lawlegal framework and methodology for imposing fines. Members States must ensure that the fines

.applied are effective, proportionate and dissuasive

However, the fact-finding carried out by the Commission since the adoption of the Communicationhas confirmed the existence of several issues which may lead to differences in the level of

. These issues relate mainly to: (1) the nature of theenforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEUfines imposed (administrative, civil or criminal), (2) who can be fined, and (3) certain aspects of themethodologies to determine the fines.

Regarding , generally Member States enforcethe imposed on undertakingsnature of the finesArticles 101 and 102 TFEU according to either: (i) administrative (non-criminal) systems, in which thefindings of infringements and the fines imposed are decided by the NCA, (ii) civil systems, in whichthe finding of an infringement can be done either by the NCA or by a civil court, but the fines areimposed by civil courts only, or (iii) criminal systems, in which fines are imposed pursuant to criminalprocedures, normally by criminal courts or in some cases by the NCA but according to quasi-criminal(misdemeanour) procedures.

Regarding , some competition authorities do not apply the concept ofwho can be fined and cannot hold the parent companies liable for"undertaking" as established in EU law

infringements of their subsidiaries. Others cannot hold liable the legal successor of an infringer

(for example after a merger into another company) or its . In other cases, theeconomic successor




36

(for example after a merger into another company) or its . In other cases, theeconomic successorfinding of the infringement is subject to finding liability of natural persons in the first place. In addition,

, while others that can dosome competition authorities cannot fine associations of undertakingsit are prevented from imposing dissuasive fines when the infringement relates to the activities of itsmembers because the fine cannot take account of the sales of such members.

Finally, with respect to the differences relate mainly tothe methodologies to determine the finesthe following aspects: (i) the of the fines, (ii) the used, whichlegal maximum type of methodologycan be based on an "overall assessment", on a "basic amount", or set at a given level in a rangebetween a minimum and a maximum amount, including aspects such as the gravity and duration ofthe infringement, and (iii) the considered and otheraggravating and mitigating circumstancesfactors applied to achieve appropriate levels of deterrence.

For example, . The the legal maximum of the fines is not consistent across the EU amongst Member States. Some aremethodologies for the determination of the fines also differ

rather systematic and are explained in more or less detail in national guidelines, while others arebased on a less systematic assessment of the facts of the case. Generally, fines are based onessential aspects such as the gravity of the infringement, its duration and some type of sales linked tothe infringement or to the undertakings involved in it. These aspects are however not always appliedor done in different ways. Also the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and other factors

.are not always the same in all jurisdictions

The questions below exclusively concern the imposition of fines on undertakings for breaches and to the imposition of fines on .of the EU competition rules do not relate natural persons

C.3.1. NATURE OF FINES

C.3.1.(a) Your experience/knowledge

1. For each system of competition enforcement[4], indicate the advantages and disadvantagesfor the enforcement of fines imposed on companies for breach of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU,both in terms of their effectiveness and their efficiency (i.e. in terms of time, use of resources,administrative burden or any other aspect you consider as relevant).

[4] Generally Member States enforce Articles 101 and 102 TFEU according to either: (i)administrative (non-criminal) systems, in which the findings of infringements and the fines imposedare decided by the NCA, (ii) civil systems, in which the finding of an infringement can be done eitherby the NCA or by a civil court, but the fines are imposed by civil courts only, or (iii) criminal systems,in which fines are imposed pursuant to criminal procedures, normally by criminal courts or in somecases by the NCA but according to quasi-criminal (misdemeanour) procedures.

Administrative (NCA): Advantages of the system

From the procedural and organizational point of view this system is more

efficient, flexible and economic than courts.

Administrative (NCA): Disadvantages of the system

37

The National Competition Authority must be absolutely independent and not

influenced by political decisions

Civil (Civil court): Advantages of the system

We can´t give an opinión because in Spain there is an administrative system

Civil (Civil court): Disadvantages of the system

Criminal/Misdemeanour (NCA): Advantages of the system

Criminal/Misdemeanour (NCA): Disadvantages of the system

Criminal (Criminal court): Advantages of the system

Criminal (Criminal court): Disadvantages of the system

2. Do you have experience/knowledge of instanceswhere Member States cannot impose

for infringements of Articlesadministrative fines

38

for infringements of Articlesadministrative fines101 and 102 TFEU?


You are welcome to add , e.g. which Memberadditional comments and/or explanationsState(s) you refer to and concrete examples of cases supporting your arguments.

that in some Member States only/primarily 3. Do you consider it to be a problem criminal finescan be imposed for infringements of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (e.g. for the consistent andeffective enforcement of these Articles)?

Stronglydisagree


agreeNeutral

Noopinion


that in some Member States only/primarily can4. Do you consider it to be a problem civil finesbe imposed for infringements of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (e.g. for the consistent andeffective enforcement of these Articles)?

Stronglydisagree


agreeNeutral

Noopinion


C.3.1.(b) Your views on potential action

5. To the extent that you consider it to be a problem that in some Member States it is notpossible to impose administrative fines on companies for infringements of Articles 101 and 102TFEU, ?which measures do you think should be taken to address this issue

civil/criminal fines by a system of administrative finesReplacing

39

civil/criminal fines by a system of administrative finesReplacingIntroducing administrative fines for NCAs which do not have this possibility theirin addition to

already existing civil/criminal finesTake measures to make civil/criminal enforcement/imposition of fines more effective, e.g. giving

NCAs the power to initiate proceedings before civil/criminal courts instead of the publicprosecutor having (sole) competence to initiate proceedingsOtherDo not know/Not applicable


6. Should your preferred measure be addres and/or by sed by the Member States EU

?actionMember StatesEU actionCombination of EU/Member State actionDo not know/Not applicable


6.1. If you consider that there is a case for ac, please specifytion by the Member States

what type of action you consider most: appropriate



40

6.2. If you consider that there is a case for EU action, what type of EU action you consider most appropriate:



7. Please clarify why you consider your preferred type of EU action more appropriate than other types of action.

8. What would be the impact of your preferred option for EU action on:the following aspects

Verynegative


NeutralNoopinion

The effectiveenforcement ofthe EUcompetition rules

The consistentenforcement ofthe EUcompetition rules

Infringementsbeing fined

The level of suchfines (**)

Legal certaintyfor businesses

41


Cooperationwithin the ECN

(*) Negative impact on costs means that costs increase. Positive impact on costs means that costsdecrease.(**) Negative impact on level of fines means that fines are less deterrent. Positive impact on level offines means that fines are more deterrent.

You are welcome to add additional comments and/oryou consider that yourexplanations, in particular if

preferred option would have .any other impact

C.3.2. WHO IS FINED

C.3.2.1. Concept of undertaking and the application of parent liability and succession in linewith EU law

C.3.2.1.(a) Your experience/knowledge

1. Do you have where the , andexperience/knowledge of instances EU concept of undertakingin particular the , was notapplication of parental liability and legal and economic successionapplied for establishing liability for infringements of Article 101 and 102 TFEU?[5]

[5] Some competition authorities do not apply the concept of "undertaking" as established in EU lawand cannot hold the parents liable for infringements of their subsidiaries. Others cannot hold liable thelegal successor of an infringer (for example after a merger into another company) or its economicsuccessor. In other cases, the finding of the infringement is subject to finding liability of naturalpersons in the first place. In addition, some competition authorities cannot fine associations ofundertakings, while others that can do it are prevented from imposing dissuasive fines when theinfringement relates to the activities of its members because the fine cannot take account of the salesof such members.


You are welcome to add , e.g. whichadditional comments and/or explanationsMember State(s) you refer to and concrete examples where possible.

42

2. Do you consider that the non-application of the concept of undertaking, parental liability and has had concrete negative effects on the succession in line with EU law consistent and

enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU in your Member State/Member States witheffectivewhich you have contact?

Stronglydisagree


agreeNeutral

Noopinion

You are welcome to add , in particular if youadditional comments and/or explanationsconsider that this can give rise to other problems, and indicating which Member State(s)you refer to.

C.3.2.1.(b) Your views on potential action

3. To the extent that you consider this to be a problem for the consistent and effectiveenforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, which measures do you think should be taken toaddress this issue?

Ensure the EU-wide application of the concept of undertaking as established in EU lawOtherDo not know/Not applicable


4. Should your preferred measure be addres and/or by sed by the Member States EU



43


6. What would be the impact of your on thepreferred option for EU action

following aspects:

Verynegative


NeutralNoopinion

The effectiveenforcement ofthe EUcompetition rules

The consistentenforcement ofthe EUcompetition rules

Number ofInfringementsbeing fined





You are welcome to add ,additional comments and/or explanationsin particular if you consider that your preferred option would have

.any other impact

44

C.3.2.2. Power to impose effective fines on association of undertakings


7. Do you have where experience/knowledge of instances N fCAs cannot impose fines on associations of undertakings

or infringements of the EU competition rules?Yes No Do not know/Not applicable

Do you ?consider this to be a problem

Stronglydisagree


agreeNeutral

Noopinion


Business associations in Spain are subject to competition law in the same

terms as the companies. However, the competition rules for business

associations are unclear. Often, normal activities , such as provide

statistical data about the industry are pro-competitive, but they must be

interpreted by the associations in view of the communication of horizontal

agreements of 2011 which is very difficult because these are unclear. For this

reason companies, associations and NCAs need the block exemption such as

insurance (R 267/2010) now under review.

8. Do you have where the experience/knowledge of instances sales of the members of for imposing a fine onthe associations of undertakings cannot be taken into account

the association?Yes No Do not know/Not applicable


Stronglydisagree


agreeNeutral

Noopinion

45


In our opinión, sales of the members of the associations could'n never taken

into account for imposing a fine. The fine calculated under this parameter is

absolutely disproportionate.


9. To the extent that you consider it to be a problem that NCAs cannot effectively fineassociations of undertakings ? which measures should be taken to address this issue

All NCAs should have the power to find infringements committed by associations ofundertakings and impose fines.OtherDo not know/Not applicable


In Spain, CNMC has power to impose fines to profesional associations.

10. Should your preferred measure be addre and/or by ssed by the Member States EU



In order to maintain the level playing field, European Union must establish

clear regulations on the application of competition rules to business

associations . Otherwise, rules and santions can be different depending on the

national regulation of the specific country.

10.2. If you consider that there is a case for EU action,

46

10.2. If you consider that there is a case for EU action,what type of EU action you consider most appropriate:



Most important is the legal certainty


Only the EU can impose common standars for Member States. These standards

should be maximun one's.


following aspects:

Verynegative


NeutralNoopinion


The consistentenforcement of theEU competitionrules

Infringementsbeing fined




47

Cooperation withinthe ECN (e.g.infringements inseveral MemberStates treatingassociations ofundertakingsdifferently)


You are welcome to add ,additional comments and/or explanationsin particular if you consider that your preferred option would have

.any other impact

Business associations work in an unsafe regulatory framework. While some

practices are fully permitted in some countries, in others the same practices

are punished. This constitutes a major obstacle to the single market. We

insist on the need for block exemption regulations that give legal certainty

to companies and their trade associations..

C.3.3. AMOUNT OF FINES: LEGAL MAXIMUM, FINES METHODOLOGIES AND OTHERFACTORS

C.3.3.1. Legal maximum of fines


1. Do you have of the existence of experience/knowledge divergences in the legal of the level of fines imposed by NCAs for infringements of Articles 101 andmaximum

102 TFEU?Yes No Do not know/Not applicable


Stronglydisagree


agreeNeutral

Noopinion

48



2. To the extent that you consider this to be a problem, whichmeasures do you think should be taken to address this issue?

Establishing a common legal maximum for the level of fines imposed by NCAs across the EUEstablishing a minimum legal maximum for the level of fines imposed by NCAs across the EUOtherDo not know/Not applicable


C.3.3.2. Fines methodologies

In the questions below "methodologies" are understood as the methods by which NCAs or national prior to considering other factors that can aggravate orcourts determine the initial value of the fine

mitigate the fines or increase it to achieve an appropriate level of deterrence (these factors are dealtwith in the next section). It does not take into account either the way in which the legal maximum of

(already assessed in the previous section) the fine is set or reductions in the fines as a result ofleniency programmes.


3. Do you have experience/knowledge of the existence of divergences in the fines applied by NCAs?methodologies



Stronglydisagree


agreeNeutral

Noopinion

49

Please explain in more detail your reply, adding additional comments and/or, e.g. which Member State(s) you refer to and concrete examplesexplanations

where possible.


4. To the extent that you consider this situation to be a problem, which measures do you think should be taken to address this issue?

Establish a set of minimum core elements to be taken into account in fining methodologies ofall NCAsEstablish a more detailed common methodology to be taken into account in fining

methodologies of all NCAsOtherDo not know/Not applicable


5. If you were to consider that there should be a set of minimum core, what theseelements to be taken into account by all methodologies

elements should be?

Stronglydisagree


NeutralNoopinion

Gravity of theinfringement

Duration of theinfringement

Value of saleslinked to theinfringement

Any other(s)

50

You are welcome to add , in particular ifadditional comments and/or explanationsyou consider that there are other elements that can be included in the set of

.minimum core elements

C.3.3.3. Aggravating and mitigating circumstances and other factors


6. Do you have of the existence of experience/knowledge divergences in the sets of applied by NCAs toaggravating and mitigating circumstances and other factors

calculate fines?Yes No Do not know/Not applicable


Stronglydisagree


agreeNeutral

Noopinion

You are welcome to add additional comments and/or explanations, e.g. which MemberState(s) you refer to and concrete examples where possible.


7. To the extent that you consider this to be a problem, which?measures do you think should be taken to address this issue

Establish a common set of minimum aggravating and mitigating elements to be taken intoaccount in fining methodologies of all NCAsEstablish a more detailed common set of aggravating and mitigating elements to be taken into

account by in fining methodologies of all NCAsOtherDo not know/Not applicable


51

Please reply to the questions below with respect to each of the three issues addressed above.

8. Should your preferred measures be and/or ?addressed by the Member States by EU action

8.1. Measure on legal maximum of fines



8.2. Measure on fines methodologies



8.3. Measure on aggravating and mitigating circumstances and other factors

52



9. If you consider that there is a case for acti, please specifyon by the Member States

what type of action you consider most:appropriate


You are welcome to add additional comments and/or explanations. If your reply is differentfor the measures on legal maximum, fines methodologies and aggravating/mitigatingcircumstances, please clarify it here.

10. If you consider that there is a case for EU action, what type of EU action you considermost appropriate:

10.1. For the measure on legal maximum of fines:



53

10.2. For the measure on fines methodologies:



10.3. For the measure on aggravating and mitigating circumstances and other factors:



11. Please clarify why you consider your preferred type of EU action more appropriate thanother types of action:

11.1. For legal maximum of fines:

54

11.2. For fines methodologies:

11.3. For aggravating and mitigating circumstances and other factors:


following aspects?

Verynegative


NeutralNoopinion


The consistentenforcement of theEU competitionrules

The effectivenessof fines (**)



Cooperation withinthe ECN (e.g.treatment of aninfringement inseveral MemberStates in acoherent manneras regards thesefactors)

NCAs' flexibility toadapt to the

specific

55

specificcircumstances ofeach case

(*) Negative impact on costs means that costs increase. Positive impact on costs means that costsdecrease.(**) Negative impact on effectiveness of fines means that fines are less deterrent. Positive impact oneffectiveness of fines means that fines are more deterrent.

You are welcome to add additional comments and/oryou consider that yourexplanations, in particular if

preferred option would have .any other impact






C.4. LENIENCY PROGRAMMES

The identifies the followingCommunication on Ten Years of Regulation 1/2003 of July 2014areas for action "[to] ensure that […] well designed leniency programmes are in place in all Member

" To this end,States and consider measures to avoid disincentives for corporate leniency applicants.the Communication provides: "It is necessary to ensure that the achievements made in leniencyprogrammes are secured." […] "It is appropriate to consider possibilities to address the issue of

interplay between corporate leniency programmes and sanctions on individuals that exist at Member


56

interplay between corporate leniency programmes and sanctions on individuals that exist at Member"State level.

Secret cartels are difficult to detect and investigate. Cooperation by parties is often crucial to uncoverand punish these highly detrimental illegal practices. Therefore, leniency programmes are among

asthe most effective tools for the detection, investigation and punishment of secret cartelswell as for providing effective deterrence against cartelisation.

Leniency programmes operate in all Member States except Malta. A common denominator in theEuropean Union is that all leniency programmes cover secret cartels. This questionnaire thusaddresses leniency programmes insofar as secret cartels are concerned.

As the Commission and the NCAs have parallel competences to apply the EU competition, their . Therefore, (suchrules leniency programmes are interlinked limitations in one jurisdiction

as who can benefit from the leniency programme and under which conditions) may have a spill-over.effect for other EU jurisdictions

The ECN Model Leniency Programme (MLP) was endorsed by the ECN in 2006, and sets out theprincipal elements which the ECN members believe should be common in all programmes.[6] Inaddition to the introduction of a uniform summary application system (see below), its aim is to providea greater degree of predictability for potential leniency applicants and to avoid applicants being facedwith uncertainty and contradictory demands when more than one leniency programme is applicable.

In the questions below, and unless otherwise specified, leniency includes both immunity from finesand reduction of fines.

[6] See further http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/documents.html

C.4.1. LEGAL BASIS FOR LENIENCY AND DIVERGENCES IN LENIENCY PROGRAMMES

The ECN (MLP)[7] [8]. While the MLPModel Leniency Programme does not bind national courtsstimulated voluntary convergence among leniency programmes of Member States, the initial factfinding shows that a , including for features which impact on number of divergences remain who

. Divergence in such leniency features can benefit from leniency and under which conditions may such as when it comes to deciding lead to different outcomes which applicants benefit from

.leniency

[7] See further the introduction to section C.4 above

[8] See the judgments in Case C-360/09, Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt and Case C‑536/11,Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v Donau Chemie.


1. Do you have experience/knowledge about the functioning of Member States' covering secret cartels?leniency programmes

Yes No

2. Do you consider it to be a problem [9] for Memberthat there is no legal basis in EU lawStates' leniency programmes covering secret cartels which infringe EU competition law?


57

[9] The European Court of Justice has held that the ECN Model Leniency Programme is not legallybinding: Case C-360/09, Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt and Case C‑536/11,Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v Donau Chemie.

Stronglydisagree


AgreeNeutral

Do not know/Notapplicable

You are welcome to add additional comments and/or explanations, indicating which.Member State(s) you refer to

3. In your view, are there divergences in the features of Member States' which could have an leniency programmes impact on who can benefit from

?leniency and under which conditionsYes No Do not know/Not applicable

You are welcome to add additional comments, indicating which Memberand/or explanations

State(s) you refer to.


Stronglydisagree


NeutralNoopinion

The effectiveenforcement ofthe EUcompetitionrules by NCAs

The consistentenforcement ofthe EUcompetitionrules by NCAs

Legal certainty

58

Legal certaintyfor business

Other

You are welcome to add additional comments, indicating whichand/or explanations

Member States you refer to.

4. Does the [10] ECN Model Leniency Programme ensure a sufficient of Memberdegree of alignment of the leniency programmes

States?

[10] See further http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/documents.htmlYes No Do not know/Not applicable




5. To the extent that you consider the lack of an EU legal basis for leniency programmes and/or to be a problem, which divergences between national leniency programmes measures do you

?think should be taken to address this issueIntroduction of an EU legal basis for leniency programmes for secret cartels in all Member

StatesIntroduction of core principles for leniency programmes in all Member StatesOtherDo not know/Not applicable



59

6. Should the forlack of an EU legal basisnational leniency programmes and divergen

be ces between such programmes addresse and/or by d by the Member States EU action

?Member StatesEU actionCombination of EU/Member State actionDo not know/Not applicable


7. Please clarify why you consider your preferred type of EU actionmore appropriate than other types of action.


Verynegative


NeutralNoopinion

The effectiveenforcement ofthe EUcompetitionrules





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You are welcome to add ,additional comments and/or explanationsin particular, if you consider that your preferred option would have any other impact.

C.4.2. DEALING WITH MULTIPLE LENIENCY APPLICATIONS

The ECN Model Leniency Programme (MLP) created a , which issystem of summary applicationsaimed in cases where a secret cartel has effects onat facilitating multiple leniency filingscompetition in more than three Member States.[11]

However, according to the initial fact finding summary applications are not available in all Member, which accept summary applications in practice, States. A few Member States do not have rules

. Also, in certain jurisdictions summary applications areon this in their leniency programmesavailable for immunity applicants . The initial factbut not for subsequent leniency applicantsfinding shows that the criteria for the assessment of summary applications are not aligned

, which may across the EU impact on the availability of leniency and lead to divergent in cases covering a number of jurisdictions.assessments

[11] The system is intended to work as follows: if a full application for leniency has been made to theCommission concerning a case for which the Commission is particularly well placed to act, NCAs canaccept temporarily to protect the applicant’s position in the leniency queue on the basis of very limitedinformation (the so-called summary application) that they can give orally. This protects leniencyapplicants from losing their leniency protection because of re-allocation of cases from theCommission to NCAs, because, for example, the Commission does not take up a part or the entirecase. It also allows leniency applicants to focus their cooperation efforts on the Commission withouthaving to provide detailed information to several NCAs. Should any of the NCAs become active, it willgrant the leniency applicant additional time to complete its application.


1. Do you have experience/knowledge about in the EUmultiple leniency filings

concerning secret cartels? Yes No

2. Do you have experience/knowledge of su?mmary applications


Please and the reasons for your choice whether to use (or not)describe your experiencesummary applications, indicating which Member State(s) you refer to.

61

3. Have you experienced any problems with? summary applications

Stronglydisagree


AgreeNeutral




4. Does the ECN Model Leniency Programme ensure a sufficient degree of alignment of in the Member States?summary applications




5. Are you aware of any divergences in Member States:

5.1. In national rules on summary applications?


5.2. In their application in practice?




62

5.3. Do you consider this to be a problem in terms of:

Stronglydisagree


NeutralNoopinion

The effectiveenforcement ofthe EUcompetitionrules by NCAs

The consistentenforcement ofthe EUcompetitionrules by NCAs

Legal certaintyfor business

Incentives toapply forleniency

Other

You are welcome to add additional comments and/or, in particular, if you consider it could give rise toexplanations

other problems.


6. To the extent that you consider any divergences in national rules on summary applicationsor their application in practice in Member States to be a problem, which measures do you think

?should be taken to address this issueEnsuring the availability of summary applications in all Member StatesAligning the features of summary applications in all Member States on the basis of the ECN

Model Leniency Programme

Other

63

OtherDo not know/not applicable


7. Should this problem be addressed by the and/or ?Member States by EU action



8. Please clarify why you consider your preferred type of EU action for an effective andcoherent leniency system in the EU .more appropriate than other types of action


Verynegative


NeutralNoopinion




Cooperation

64



You are welcome to add , in particular, ifadditional comments and/or explanationsyou think that your preferred option would have any other impact.

C.4.3. PROTECTION OF LENIENCY, SETTELEMENT AND OTHER MATERIAL IN THE FILE OFTHE COMPETITION AUTHORITY

Parties that choose to cooperate are required to under leniency programmes disclose their and leniency material. In case of formalparticipation in a secret cartel provide self-incriminating

, the parties are required tosettlement procedures acknowledge their participation in and liability. In this framework, for the infringement the parties provide the NCAs with material which, if

and used outside the context of the investigation in which it has been provided, coulddisclosedseriously . Furthermore, ongoing investigations of competitionharm their commercial interestsauthorities could be seriously harmed if for the purpose of suchmaterials specifically prepared investigations, either by the parties or by the competition authority, are disclosed when the

.competition authority has not yet closed its investigation

The initial fact finding shows that the level of protection granted for such material varies betweenMember States. The Damages Directive[12] harmonises protection of leniency and settlement

as well as of of documents during ongoing investigations, in the context of civilmaterial, disclosure damages actions before EU national courts. However, this Directive does not explicitly address

, such as the or in or other scenarios use of material in other civil matters third jurisdictionsthrough "transparency" rules/public access to documents.access by the public at large

Under the , Directive national courts are not allowed to order the disclosure of leniency. Furthermore, national courts cannot order the disclosurestatements and settlement submissions

of documents that are specifically prepared for the proceedings of a competition authority as. If someone obtains any of these documents throughlong as those proceedings are ongoing

access to the file, (s)he can (temporarily) not use them before a national court.

[12] Directive 2014/104/EU on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law forinfringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, OJL349/1 of 5.12.2014.


1. Do you have experience/knowledge about the protection of leniency and

andsettlement material about the protection of documents from disclosure

65

andsettlement material about the protection of documents from disclosure?during ongoing investigations


2. In your view, is there a sufficient level of protection of in the forleniency and settlement material Member States

which you have experience/knowledge?Yes No Do not know/Not applicable

You are welcome to add additional comments indicating which Memberand/or explanations,


3. In your view, is there a specifically prepared for thesufficient level of protection of materialspurpose of the investigation of a competition authority (either by the parties or by thecompetition authority) in the Member States for whichwhilst that investigation is still ongoingyou have experience/knowledge?





4. To the extent that you consider that in the Member States for which you haveexperience/knowledge the level of protection of leniency and settlement material is insuficcientinsufficient, ?which measures do you think should be taken to address this issue

Extend the same protection put in place for leniency statements and settlement submissions bythe Damages Directive to other situationsOtherDo not know/not applicable


66

5. To the extent that you consider that in the Member States for which you haveexperience/knowledge the level of protection for documents prepared for the investigation of acompetition authority whilst that investigation is still ongoing is insufficient, which measures

?do you think should be taken to address this issueExtend the same protection put in place for documents specifically prepared for the purpose of

an investigation of a competition authority whilst that investigation is still ongoing by theDamages Directive to other situationsOtherDo not know/not applicable


6. Should the protection of leniency and settlements material, as well as of material specificallyprepared for the purpose of the investigation of a competition authority whilst that

be addressed by the and/or by ?investigation is still ongoing, Member States EU actionMember StatesEU actionCombination of EU/Member State actionDo not know/Not applicable


7. Please clarify why you consider your preferred type of EU action for an effective andcoherent leniency system in the EU .more appropriate than other types of action

8. What would be the impact of your preferred option for EU action on

:the following aspects

67

:the following aspects

Verynegative


NeutralNoopinion







C.4.4. INTERPLAY BETWEEN LENIENCY PROGRAMMES AND SANCTIONS ON INDIVIDUALS

Most Member States provide for various sanctions on individuals for competition lawinfringements, in addition to fines on undertakings. However, the initial fact finding shows that

, if the arrangements to protect employees of undertakings from such sanctions companiescooperate under the corporate leniency programme of a NCA or the Commission, exist only in

(referred to as “interplay”).a few Member States


1. Do you have experience with or knowledge of sanctions that can be for their participation in secret cartels? imposed on individuals


2. Do you have experience with or knowledge of arrangements in Member States to protect, which cooperate under the corporate leniency programmes ofemployees of undertakings

NCAs or the Commission, ?from individual sanctionsYes No Do not know/Not applicable

68



that such2.1. Do you consider it to be a problemarrangements only exist in a few Member States

Stronglydisagree


AgreeNeutral





3. To the extent that you consider the lack of national arrangements to protect employees ofundertakings, which cooperate under the corporate leniency programmes of NCAs or theCommission, to be a problem, which measures do you think should be taken to address this

?issueEstablish safeguards to protect employees of companies which cooperate under corporate

leniency programmes from the imposition of individual sanctions for the same cartel conductOtherDo not know/Not applicable


4. Should the interplay between corporate leniency programmes and sanctions on individuals and/or by ?be addressed by the Member States EU action

69

and/or by ?be addressed by the Member States EU actionMember StatesEU actionCombination of EU/Member State actionDo not know/Not applicable


5. Please clarify why you consider your preferred type of EU action for an effective andcoherent leniency system for the enforcement of the EU competition rules across the EU moreappropriate than other types of action.


Verynegative


NeutralNoopinion







70





CONCLUSIÓN Y ENVÍO

1. ¿Qué opina de nuestro cuestionario?

Es bastante complejo y requiere un gran conocimiento y experiencia en la

regulación de competencia en el conjunto de la UE y en el funcionamiento de

las NCAs

2. ¿Faltan en él preguntas importantes?

Hubiera sido deseable incluir preguntas relacionadas con la aplicación de la

regulación de competencia y las necesarias modificaciones de la misma para

mayor seguridad jurídica de los operadores económicos al tratarse de un

derecho con un amplio componente subjetivo de las autoridades de competencia

en su aplicación. Con un derecho común y con unas reglas claras las empresas,

las asociaciones empresariales y las autoridades de competencia podrían

aplicar las normas de competencia con mayor seguridad. Un mismo hecho en un

sector económico puede constituir una práctica restrictiva y, en otro sector

ser una práctica pro-competitiva en función de la composición del mercado y el

tipo de actividad. En el sector asegurador europeo la certidumbre y seguridad

jurídica que aporta el reglamento 267/2010 es importantísimo y, de hecho, ha

sido un instrumento imprescindible para el mercado único y la consolidación de

la libertad de establecimiento y de la libre prestación de servicios de la

industria aseguradora.

En nuestra opinión, en la UE debería profundizarse más en la aplicación de las

71

normas de competencia en los sectores económicos y dar seguridad jurídica a

las empresas en sus actuaciones y a las NCAs en la aplicación de estas normas.

3. ¿Estaría dispuesto a participar en una breve entrevista telefónica que nos permitacomprender mejor sus respuestas?

SI

Background DocumentsCommission SWD "Enhancing competition enforcement by the Member States' competition authorities: institutionaland procedural issues" accompanying the Communication from the Commission (SWD(2014) 231 final, 9.7.2014)(/eusurvey/files/0a8fee8d-cd1f-426f-8b96-200cb6f0a5b5)

Communication from the Commission - Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003: Achievementsand Future Perspectives (COM(2014) 453 final, 9.7.2014)(/eusurvey/files/620d3975-1019-4169-afd1-c770167c4e6c)

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Report on the functioning ofRegulation 1/2003 (COM(2009) 206 final, 29.4.2009) (/eusurvey/files/2cff6b19-1690-49d3-a9ed-70b8e12bc51e)

ECN Model Leniency Programme (/eusurvey/files/d9fc6fa7-39fc-4eb1-b4d2-1207ec672d81)

Regulation 1/2003 (/eusurvey/files/58236441-8770-4dfd-92d3-3342d872ecbb)

Contact [email protected]

https://ec.europa.eu/eusurvey/files/0a8fee8d-cd1f-426f-8b96-200cb6f0a5b5



https://ec.europa.eu/eusurvey/files/620d3975-1019-4169-afd1-c770167c4e6c



https://ec.europa.eu/eusurvey/files/2cff6b19-1690-49d3-a9ed-70b8e12bc51e

https://ec.europa.eu/eusurvey/files/2cff6b19-1690-49d3-a9ed-70b8e12bc51e

https://ec.europa.eu/eusurvey/files/d9fc6fa7-39fc-4eb1-b4d2-1207ec672d81

https://ec.europa.eu/eusurvey/files/58236441-8770-4dfd-92d3-3342d872ecbb

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