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The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (IEP) (ISS !"#"$%%%!)

&Social and Political 'ecognition& y Paddy *c+ueen The Internet Encyclopedia of

Philosophy ISS !"#"$%%%! http://www.iep.utm.edu/ !,/%,/!%"-.

uthor Information

Paddy *c+ueen

Email: paddymcueen0gmail.com+ueen1s 2ni3ersity

orthern Ireland

Social and Political 'ecognition

Acts of recognition infuse many aspects of our lives such as receiving a round of applause

from a rapt audience, being spotted in a crowded street by a long-forgotten friend, having anapplication for a job rejected because of your criminal record, enjoying some words of praise

by a respected philosophy professor, getting pulled over by the police because you are a black

man driving an expensive car, and fighting to have your same-sex marriage officially

sanctioned in order to enjoy the same benefits as hetero-sexual marriages. Evidently the

various ways we are recognised (and recognise others play an important role in shaping our

!uality of life. "ecognition theorists go further than this, arguing that recognition can help form,

or even determine, our sense of who we are and the value accorded to us as individuals.

#olitical theories of recognition, which attempt to reconfigure the concept of justice in terms of

due or withheld recognition, can be contrasted with (but set alongside the rise of

multiculturalism, which has produced an array of literature focused on recognising,

accommodating and respecting difference. Although these two trajectories overlap, there are

important differences between them. $ulticultural politics is rooted in the identity politics

underlying various social movements that gained prominence during the %&'s, such as the

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civil rights movement and radical)cultural feminism. *hese movements tend to emphasise the

distinctness and value of their cultural identity and demand group-specific rights to protect this

uni!ueness. +ithout depreciating identity politics and multiculturalism, this article is primarily

concerned with political theories of recognition, particularly those formulated by harles *aylor

(who is also a prominent figure in multicultural politics, ancy raser and Axel /onneth.

*hese focus on the role played by recognition in individual identity formation and the normative

foundation this can provide to theories of justice.

0espite its brief history as an explicitly political concept, philosophical interest in the idea of

recognition can be traced to the work of /egel, who first coined the phrase 1struggle for

recognition2 (kampf um anerkennung . *his article begins by clarifying the specific political and

philosophical meaning of recognition. 3t will provides an overview of /egel2s remarks on

recognition before proceeding to identify the contemporary advocates of recognition. 3tpresents the main similarities and differences between these authors before examining some

important criticisms levelled at concept of recognition. *he conclusion is a reflection upon the

increasing influence of recognition and how it may develop in the future.

Tale of 4ontents

%. 0efining "ecognition

4. *he /egelian 5egacy

6. ontemporary *heories of "ecognition

%. harles *aylor

4. Axel /onneth

6. ancy raser

7. "edistribution or "ecognition8 *he raser-/onneth 0ebate

9. riticisms of "ecognition

%. *he "eification of 3dentity

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4. *he Accusation of Essentialism

6. *he 0anger of :ubjectivism

7. *he #roblem of the ;ther

9. *he #ost-:tructural hallenge

'. *he uture of "ecognition


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another, but that the person being recognised judges that the recogniser is capable of

conferring recognition. *his means that we must place sufficient value in the recogniser in

order for their attitude towards us to count as recognitive. Brandom (4& approaches this

idea through the idea of authority, arguing that a genuine instance of recognition re!uires that

we authorise someone to confer recognition. :imilarly, one can gain authority and

responsibility by petitioning others for recognition. onse!uently, one has authority only insofar

as one is recognised as authoritative.

+e may not consider being valued by a wilful criminal as any sort of recognition in the sense

being defined here. +e do not judge them capable of conferring value on us, as we do not

accord any value or respect to them. :imilarly, someone who is coerced into recognising us

may also fail to count as a relevant judge. A king who demands recognition of his superiority

from all his subjects, simply in virtue of his being king, and threatens to punish them if theydisobey, does not receive any meaningful kind of recognition for the subjects do not genuinely

choose to confer value on him. *hus, in recognising another, we must also be recognised as a

subject capable of giving recognition. *his indicates that reciprocity or mutuality is likely to be a

necessary condition of appropriate recognition (for a discussion of this point, see 5aden,

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A third issue is whether groups or collectives can count as recognisers and recognisees. or

example, when speaking of recognising a particular cultural group, do we mean we recognise

that group qua a group, or as a collection of individuals8 :imilarly, does the granting of certain

rights or respect apply to the group itself or the individual members belonging to that group8

(or a detailed discussion and defence of group-differentiated minority rights, see Cymlicka,

%&&9. *hese !uestions revolve, at least in part, around the ontological status afforded to

groups or collectives. Advocates of a politics of recognition are not always clear regarding

whether or not groups can be granted recognition. 0ebates over the legitimacy or sovereignty

of a state may depend upon the extent to which we recognise it as legitimate or sovereign.

3mportant discussions of groups as entities include *uomela (4


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introspection. *his atomistic conception of self, encapsulated in 0escartes2 cogito, filtered into

the transcendental idealism of Cant (despite his objections to 0escartes2 philosophy and the

transcendental phenomenology of /usserl, as well as being present in the contract theories of

/obbes and 5ocke. Against this trend there emerged a strongly intersubjective conception of

selfhood that found expression through the concept of recognition, the founder of which is

typically identified as /egel. Although /egel has undoubtedly influenced the contemporary

understanding of recognition more than any other philosopher, /egel was himself inspired by

the work of Dohann ichte (see +illiams, %&&4. 3n his Foundations of Natural Right (% rather they are the concrete

expression of it. +ithout recognition we could not come to realise freedom, which in turn gives

rise to right. *he work of /egel consciously echoes the Aristotelian conception of humans as

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essentially social beings. or /egel, recognition is the mechanism by which our existence as

social beings is generated. *herefore, our successful integration as ethical and political

subjects within a particular community is dependent upon receiving (and conferring

appropriate forms of recognition.

*he part of /egel2s work to lay bare certain fundamental dynamics involved in recognition is

the oft-discussed master-slave dialectic which appears in the Phenomenolog (see #inkard,

%&&'= 7'ff> :tern, 44= ?6ff.. /egel introduces the idea of a 1struggle for recognition2,

describing an encounter between two self-consciousnesses which both seek to affirm the

certainty of their being for themselves (/egel, %? it is an intersubjectively-mediated

achievement which is never simply given or guaranteed but always dependent upon our

relations with others. *his co-dependency results in mutual relations of recognition which are

the condition for understanding oneself as a genuinely free being, albeit a free being which

acknowledges, and thus adjusts itself, to the freedom of others. 0iscussing the process of

recognition, /egel (%?


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freedom and right. onse!uently, our interactions with others are not a limitation on freedom,

but rather the 1enhancement and concrete actualiGation of freedom2 (+illiams, %&&


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*aylor begins with the assertion that 1a number of strands in contemporary politics turn on the

need, sometimes the demand, for recognition2 (*aylor, %&&7= 49. /e identifies such a demand

as present in the political activities of feminism, race movements and multiculturalists (for a

critical discussion of this point, see icholson, %&&'. The specific importance of

recognition lies in its relationship to identity which he defines as ecti3ely (see Section II. ?ur

indi3idual identity is not constructed from within and generated y each of us alone.

'ather it is through dialogue with others that we negotiate our identity . *aylor refers to

these others as 1significant others=, meaning those people who have an important role in our

lives (that is, family, friends, teachers, colleagues, and so forth.. *he idea that our sense of

who we are is determined through our interaction with others initiates a shift from a monologic

to a dialogic model of the self.

*aylor is keen to stress just how important recognition is, referring to it as 1a vital human need2

(ibid= 4' and stating that misrecognition 1can inflict a grievous wound, saddling its victims with

a crippling self-hatred2 (ibid= 4'. 0eploying a brief historical narrative, *aylor argues that the

collapse of social hierarchies, which had provided the basis for bestowing honour on certainindividuals (that is, those high up on the social ladder, led to the modern day notion of dignity ,

which rests upon universalist and egalitarian principles regarding the e!ual worth of all human

beings. *his notion of dignity lies at the core of contemporary democratic ideals, unlike the

notion of honour which is, he claims, clearly incompatible with democratic culture. *his picture

is complicated by the fact that alongside this development of dignity there emerged also a new

understanding of 1individualised identity2, one in which the emphasis was on each person2s

uni!ueness, which *aylor defines as 1being true to myself and my own particular way of being2

(ibid= 4?. *aylor refers to this idea of uni!ueness as the ideal of authenticity, writing 1Being true

to myself means being true to my own originality, which is something only 3 can articulate and

discover. 3n articulating it, 3 am also defining myself2 (ibid= 6%.

*aylor has been accused of adopting an essentialist view of the self, on the basis that there is

some inner 1me2 waiting to be uncovered and displayed to (recognised by the world (see

section @. b. /owever, he is !uick to point out that the discovery of our authenticity is not

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simply a matter of introspection. "ather, it is through our interactions with others that we define

who we are. or is there an end point to this dialogue. 3t continues throughout our entire lives

and does not even depend upon the physical presence of a specific other for that person to

influence us. onsider, for example, the way an imaginary conversation with a deceased

partner might influence how we act or view ourselves. *he importance of recognition lies

precisely in the fact that how others see (might us is a necessary step in forming an

understanding of who we are. *o be recognised negatively, or misrecognised, is to be thwarted

in our desire for authenticity and self-esteem.

*aylor2s uses these insights to construct a politics of e!ual recognition. /e identifies two

different ways in which the idea of e!ual recognition has been understood. *he first is a politics

of e!ual dignity, or a politics of universalism, which aims at the e!ualisation of all rights and

entitlements. 3n this instance, all individuals are to be treated as universally the same throughrecognition of their common citiGenship or humanity. *he second formulation is the politics of

difference, in which the uni!ueness of each individual or group is recognised. "ousseau

bitterly noted that man, having shifted from a state of self-sufficiency and simplicity to one of

competition and domination that characterises modern society, has come to crave the

recognition of their difference ("ousseau, %


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*aylor defends a politics of difference, arguing that the concept of e!ual dignity often (if not

always derives its idea of what rights and entitlement are worth having from the perspective of

the hegemonic culture, thus enforcing minority groups to conform to the expectations of

dominant culture and hence relin!uish their particularity. ailure to conform will result in the

minority culture being derided and ostracised by the dominant culture. s Taylor (iid: ##)

notes ugated=. clear instance of this can e seen in de @eau3oir=s claim

that woman is always defined as man=s ection and

otherness. *his in turn alienates the black person from both their society and their own body,

owing to the fact that the world is defined in terms of 1whiteness2 and thus as something

essentially irretrievably different (alien to them.

. 8el 9onneth

Axel /onneth has produced arguably the most extensive discussion of recognition to date. 9e

is in agreement with Taylor that recognition is essential to self$realisation. /owever, he

draws more explicitly on /egelian intersubjectivity in order to identify the mechanics of how

this is achieved, as well as establishing the motivational and normative role recognition can

play in understanding and justifying social movements. ollowing 9egel ("D%C "D!") and

*ead ("6,7) 9onneth identifies three


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lovers. 3t provides a basic self-confidence, which can be shattered through physical abuse.

The mode of recognition termed


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9onneth !%%). #resumably, disrespect in other contexts would lead to individual acts of

retaliation or undirected violence, rather than coordinated resistance.

*his phenomenological approach to recognition thus locates the source and justification of

social struggles in the experiences and expectations of recognition. ;f course, as noted, it

re!uires the further steps of (a locating these experiences within a socially-generated

framework of emancipatory discourse> and (b the establishment of common experiences

amongst individuals for these individual frustrations to develop into social struggles. *herefore,

it would be naKve to think that /onneth is blind to the importance of, say, ensuring the means

and rights to collective political action within societies. But the fundamental component of any

attempt to identify injustice and vindicate the necessary remedies must be located in the

individual2s experiences of disrespect (/onneth, 4


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foster a positive relation-to-self (for a discussion of /onneth2s conception of the good ) ethical

life, see Lurn, 4. /ere, /onneth is trying to retain a Cantian notion of respect and

autonomy through identifying the necessary conditions for self-realisation and self-

determination, akin to a Cantian kingdom of ends in which all individuals receive and confer

recognition on one another. :imultaneously, in stressing the minimal or 1bare2 conditions

necessary for this, he aims to avoid committing himself to a singular, substantial conception of

the good life and thus resists the dangers of reproducing an exclusivist and exclusionary

conception of what constitutes the good life.

c. ancy raser

+hereas there are broad areas of agreement between /onneth and *aylor, ancy raser is

keen to differentiate her theory of recognition from both of their respective positions. raser=so3erarching theme throughout her worBs on recognition is the dissol3ing of the

assumed antithesis etween redistriution and recognition (argualy this assumption is

a conseuence of critical theory=s *ar8ist roots within which frameworB raser=s worB

undoutedly emerges from). Thus far the presentation of recognition and redistriution

has een presented (at least implicitly) as an either/or decision. raser elie3es that this

inary opposition deri3es from the fact that whereas recognition seems to promote

differentiation redistriution supposedly worBs to eliminate it. The recognition

paradigm seems to target cultural injustice, which is rooted in the way people2s identities are

positively or negatively valued. 3ndividuals exist as members of a community based upon a

shared horiGon of meanings, norms and values. 4on3ersely the distriution paradigm

targets economic injustice, which is rooted in one2s relation to the market or the means of

production (raser and /onneth, 46= %7. /ere, individuals exist in a hierarchically-

differentiated collective class system which, from the perspective of the majority class who are

constituted by a lack of resources, needs abolishing.

According to raser, both these forms of injustice are primary and co-original, meaning that

economic ine!uality cannot be reduced to cultural misrecognition, and vice-versa. *any social

mo3ements face this dilemma of ha3ing to alance the demand for (economic) euality

with the insistence that their (cultural) specificity e met. raser (%&&


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di3ergence here etween the monistic models of Taylor and 9onneth in which

recognition is the foundational category of social analysis and distriution is treated as

deri3ati3e and raser=s dualistic model. +hereas /onneth thinks a sufficiently elaborated

concept of recognition can do all the work needed for a critical theory of justice, raser argues

that recognition is but one dimension of justice, albeit a vitally important one.

The disagreement o3er whether or not distriution can e made to super3ene on

recognition arises from the differing interpretations of recognition. ccording to raser

(raser and /onneth 46= 4&, one can understand recognition as either (a a matter of

justice, connected to with the concept of a universal 1right2 (raser2s position> or (b a matter of

self-realisation, connected with historically-relative cultural conceptions of the 1good2

(/onneth2s and *aylor2s position. 3n (b raser draws out the Aristotelian idea

of eudaimonia (flourishing, which runs throughout /onneth2s teleologicalaccount. Contra /onneth and *aylor, raser does not look to situate the injustice of

misrecognition in the retardation of personal development. "ather, she identifies it with the fact

that 1some individuals and groups are denied the status of full partners in social interaction

simply as a conse!uence of institutionaliGed patterns of cultural value in whose construction

they have not e!ually participated and which disparage their distinctive characteristics or the

distinctive characteristics assigned to them2 (ibid. Addressing injustices arising from

misrecognition therefore means looking at the discursive representations of identities in order

to identity how certain individuals are assigned a relatively inferior social standing. /ence, onraser2s model, misrecognition should not be construed as an impediment to ethical self-

realiGation (as it is for *aylor and /onneth. 3nstead, it should be conceived as an

institutionalised relation of subordination.

;wing to her identification of recognition with social status, the evaluative element in raser2s

account is the notion of 1parity of participation=. According to this principle, 1justice re!uires

that social arrangements permit all (adult members of society to interact with one another as

peer2 (ibid= 6'. 3n effect, recognition is re!uired in order to guarantee that all members of

society have an e!ual participation in social life. rucially, participatory parity also re!uires

material ) economic redistribution in order to guarantee that people are independent and 1have

a voice2 (ibid. Because /onneth e!uates recognition with self-realisation, the derivative issues

of redistribution are only generated to the extent that they inhibit this personal development.

or raser in>ustice in the form of oth misrecognition and maldistriution is

detrimental to the e8tent that it inhiits participatory parity.

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raser considers two possible remedies for injustice, which transcend the redistribution-

recognition divide by being applicable to both. *he first is


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the early stages of capitalism. +hat marked such activities was the commonly held belief that

the honour and dignity of the members of the lower classes were not being ade!uately

respected. :ummarising these findings, /onneth (ibid= %64 proclaims that 1subjects perceive

institutional procedures as social injustice when they see aspects of their personality being

disrespected which they believe they have a right to recognition2.

;ne important conse!uence of this view is that it undermines the received wisdom that

collective identity movements are a recent 1modern2 phenomenon. 3n actual fact, according to

/onneth, experiences of disrespect and denigration of an individual2s or group2s identity are

the constitutive feature of all instances of social discontent. #ortraying 1recognition2 as the sole

preserve of cultural minorities struggling for social respect is therefore highly misleading and

obscures the fact that challenges to the existing social order are always driven by the moral

experience of failing to receive what is deemed to be sufficient recognition (ibid= %'. Anydispute regarding redistribution of wealth or resources is reducible to a claim over the social

valorisation of specific group or individual traits. *he feminist struggle over the gendered

division of labour is, according to /onneth, primarily a struggle regarding the prevailing

assessment of achievement and worth which has had important redistributive effects, such as

a trend towards greater access to, and e!uality within, the workplace and the

acknowledgement of 1female2 housework. *he division that raser makes between economic

distribution and cultural recognition is, /onneth claims, an arbitrary and ultimately misleading

one that ignores the fundamental role played by recognition in economic struggles, as well asimplying that the cultural sphere of society can be understood as functioning independently of

the economic sphere.

raser (iid: ,%ff.) offers four ad3antages of her status model o3er 9onneth=s monistic

3ision of >ustice as due recognition (for a discussion of these, see Lurn, 46. Arguably the

most important of these is that, in locating injustice in social relations governed by cultural

patterns of representations, she can move beyond both *aylor2s and /onneth2s reliance on

psychology as the normative force underlying struggles for recognition. "ecalling that /onneth

locates the experiences of injustice in the emotional responses to frustrated expectations of

due recognition, raser argues that she is able to 1show that a society whose institutionaliGed

norms impede parity of participation is morally indefensible #hether or not the distort the

su$jectivit of the oppressed2 (ibid= 64. *he ideal of participatory parity gives raser her

normative component, for it provides the basis on which different recognition claims can be

judged. amely, a valid recognition claim is one in which subjects can show that

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1institutionaliGed patterns of cultural value deny them the necessary intersubjective conditions

Ifor participatory parityJ2 (ibid= 6?. /onneth2s invocation of pre-political suffering, generated by

the perceived withholding of recognition, as the motivating force behind social movements is

thus rejected by raser as seriously problematic. In particular she says the idea that all

social discontent has the same single underlying moti3ation (misrecognition) is simply

implausile. /onneth rejects other motivational factors such as 1resentment of unearned

privilege, abhorrence of cruelty, aversion of arbitrary power... antipathy to exploitation, dislike

of supervision2 that cannot not simply be reduced down to, or subsumed by, an overarching

expectation of appropriate recognition.

Another problem with /onneth2s psychological model of experiences of injustice is that, so

raser argues, it shifts the focus away from society and onto the self, thus 1implanting an

excessively personaliGed sense of injury2 (ibid= 47. *his can lead to the victim of oppressioninternalising the injustice or blaming themselves, rather than the discursive and material

conditions within which they are situated as oppressed or harmed. 3ndeed, raser proceeds to

point out that there can be no 1pure2 experience of moral indignation caused by withheld or

inappropriate recognition. *here is no realm of personal experience that is not experienced

through a particular linguistic and historical horiGon, which actively shapes the experience in

!uestion (see section @. d. *hus to introduce a 1primordial2 sense of moral suffering is, raser

claims, simply incoherent (similar concerns are raised by $cay, 4?= %6?ff.. /onneth

cannot invoke psychological experiences of disrespect as the normative foundation for histheory of recognition as they cannot be treated as independent of the discursive conditions

within which the subject is constituted. *o do so is to rely on an ultimately unjustifiable

transcendental account of the subject2s access to their sense of moral worth grounded in the

right to recognition.

3n his response to raser, /onneth points out that she can necessarily focus only on those

social movements that have already become visible. By analysing the ways in which

individuals and groups are socially-situated by institutionalised patterns of cultural value,

raser limits herself to only those expressions of social discontent that have already entered

the public sphere. *he logic of this criticism seems to be that, if (injustice is a matter of how

society signifies subjects2 abilities and characteristics, then it can only address those collective

subjectivities which are currently socially recognised. 3n other words, there could be a plethora

of individuals and groups who are struggling for recognition which have not yet achieved public

acknowledgement and thus have not been implicated within positive or negative social

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structures of signification. *here appears some weight to this criticism, for a successful critical

social theory should be able to not only criti!ue the status quo, but identify future patterns of

social resistance. 3f, on raserNs account, justice is a matter of addressing how subjects are

socially-situated by existing value structures, then it seems to lack the conceptual apparatus to

look beyond the present. *he ability to identify social discontent must, /onneth argues, be

constructed independently of social recognition, and therefore 1re!uires precisely the kind of

moral-psychological considerations raser seeks to avoid2 (ibid= %49. 3n ignoring the

individual2s experiences of injustice as the disrespect of aspects of their personality, a social

theory can only address the present situation, rather than exploring the normative directions of

future social struggles. 3t is out of the frustration of individual expectations of due recognition

that new social movements will emanate, rather than the pre-existing patterns of signification

which currently hierarchically situate subjects.

-. 4riticisms of 'ecognition

0espite its influence and popularity, there are a number of concerns regarding the concept of

recognition as a foundational element in a theory of justice. *his article cannot hope to present

an exhaustive list, so instead offers a few of the most common criti!ues.

a. The 'eification of Identity

#erhaps the one most fre!uently voiced criticism is that regarding the reification of group

identity. #ut simply, the concern is that, in initiating an identity politics in which one demands

positive recognition for a group2s specific characteristics, specific characteristics can be seen

as necessarily constitutive of this group and thus any group member who does not display

these characteristics risks being ostracised. :uch claims are often cloaked in a language of

1authenticity2 which leads to demands for conformity amongst individual members of the group

in order to gain acceptance and approval. *his risks producing intergroup coercion and

enforcing conformity at the expense of individual specificity.

*o give an example, discussed by Appiah (%&&7 in his response to *aylor2s essay on

recognition, the construction of a black politics in which black identity is celebrated can provide

a sense of self-worth and dignity amongst historically denigrated black communities. /owever,

it can also lead to a 1proper2 way of being black, one which all members of the black

community must demonstrate in order to partake in this positive self-image. :uch expectations

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of behaviour can lead, Appiah notes (ibid= %'6, to one form of tyranny being replaced by

another. :pecifically, individuals who fail to exemplify authentic 1black2 identity can find

themselves once again the victims of intolerance and social exclusion. :imilar dynamics of

exclusion can be seen in the debate within certain feminist circles about whether lesbians can

be properly considered 1women2. Extrapolating from these concerns, $arkell (46 argues

that *aylor conflates individual identity with group identity with the result that agency is

rendered a matter of adopting the identity one is assigned through membership of oneNs

community. onse!uently, the critical tension between the individual and community is

dissolved, which leaves little (if any space for criti!uing or resisting the dominant norms and

values of oneNs community (see also /abermas, %&&%= 4


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:imilar to the concerns over reification, there is a concern that recognition theories invoke an

essentialist account of identity. *his has particularly been the case with regards *aylor2s model

of recognition (see $cay, 4?= '7ff. ritics accuse recognition theory of assuming that

there is a kernel of selfhood that awaits recognition (see, for example, /eyes, 46. *he

struggle for recognition thus becomes a struggle to be recognised as what one truly is. *his

implies that certain features of a person lie dormant, awaiting discovery by the individual who

then presents this authentic self to the world and demands positive recognition for it. Although

*aylor is keen to stress that his model is not committed to such an essentialist account of the

self, certain remarks he makes do not help his cause. or example, in describing the modern

view of how we create a sense of 1full being2, he notes that, rather than connecting with some

source outside of ourselves (such as Ood or the #latonic Oood, 1the source we have to

connect with is deep within us. *his fact is part of the massive subjective turn of modern

culture, a new form of inwardness, in which we come to think our ourselves as beings with

hidden depths2 (*aylor, %&&7= 4&. *aylor proceeds to note that 1Being true to myself means

being true to my own originality, which is something only 3 can articulate and discover2 (ibid= 6%

and that authenticity 1calls on me to discover my own original way of being. By definition, this

way of being cannot be socially derived, but must be inwardly generated2 (ibid= 64.

A more radical account of intersubjectivity can be found in Arendt (%&9?. Examining the

processes by which the subject reveals who they are, she shifts the focus away from a

personal revelation on the part of the agent and into the social realm= 1it is more than likely thatthe FwhoH , which appears so clearly and unmistakably to others, remains hidden from the

person itself, like the daim%n in Oreek religion which accompanies each man throughout his

life, always looking over his shoulder from behind and thus visible only to those he encounters2

(Arendt, %&9?= %ecti3ism

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*aylor mitigates his position and, arguably, eschews any form of essentialism, by arguing that

we always work out our identity through dialogue with others. /owever, there is a possibility

that he slips towards a subjectivist position, for it seems that it is the individual who ultimately

decides what their 1true2 identity is. or example, *aylor (%&&7= 64-6 states that this dialogue

with others re!uires that we struggle with and sometimes struggle against the things that

others want to see in us. /owever, he does not state to what we appeal to in this potential

struggle with others. 3f it is ultimately our sense of who we are, then this would seem to

undermine the very conditions of intersubjectivity that *aylor wants to introduce into the notion

of personal identity. or, if one is the ultimate judge and jury on who one is, then those around

us will simply be agreeing or disagreeing with our pre-existent or inwardly-generated sense of

self, rather than playing an ineliminable role in its constitution.

Again, it is unlikely that *aylor would endorse any form of subjectivism. 3ndeed, his turntowards intersubjective recognition is precisely meant to resist the idea that one simply decides

who one is and demands that others recognise oneself in such a way. *aylor would certainly

seem critical of the existential tradition, which emphasised the need for one to define oneself

and provide meaning to the world. Although :artre deployed the language of intersubjectivity

(see @. d and highlighted the importance of the other, his analysis of the in-itself and the for-

itself, coupled with describing how we are each born alone and must carry the weight of the

world on our shoulders (with no-one able to lighten the burden, suggests an ego which

negates (and hence is radically separated from the world. *his split between 132 and 1you2renders any notion of dialogical identity construction impotent.

"ecognition, contrasted with this existential picture, theories seem well e!uipped to resist any

accusation that they slide into subjectivism. /owever, they must provide a criterion from which

to judge whether individual and collective demands for recognition are legitimate. or example,

it cannot be the case that all demands for recognition are accepted, for we are unlikely to want

to recognise the claims of a racist or homophobic group for cultural protection. *here is a

danger that *aylor2s model does not explicitly state the conditions by which acceptable claims

for recognition can be separated from unacceptable claims. /is politics of difference is

premised on 1a universal respect for the human capacity to form one2s identity (*aylor, %&&7=

74. /ence he seems committed to respecting difference qua difference, regardless of the

particular form this difference takes. *here is a sense that, as long as recourse is made to an

1authentic2 life, then the demand for recognition should be met. But no matter how strongly the

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racist group insists upon their authenticity, we would be likely to resist recognising the value

and worth of their identity as racists.

d. The Prolem of the ?ther

ertain theorists have tended to cast recognition in a far more negative, conflictual light.

*ypically, they interpret /egelian recognition as evolving an inescapable element of domination

between, or appropriation of, subjects. #erhaps the most notable of such thinkers is :artre

(%&76, whose account of intersubjectivity appears to preclude any possibility of recognition

functioning as a means of attaining political solidarity or emancipation. According to :artre, our

relations with other people are always conflictual as each of us attempts to negate the other in

an intersubjective dual. *he realisation of our own subjectivity is dependent upon our turning

the other into an object. 3n turn, we are made to feel like an object within the gaGe of the other.:artre2s famous example is the shameful, objectifying experience of suddenly feeling the 1look2

or 1gaGe2 of another person upon us when carrying out a contemptible act. 3n this moment of

shame, 3 feel myself as an object and am thus denied existence as a subject. $y only hope is

to make the other into an object. *here are no e!ual or stable relations between people> all

interactions are processes of domination.

+hereas :artre focuses on the problem of being recognised, 5evinas (%&'% turns to the

ethical issues attending how one recognises others. According to 5evinas, /egelian

recognition involves an unavoidable appropriation or assimilation of the other into one2s own

subjectivity. By this he means that in recognising the other we render them 1knowable2

according to our own terms, thus depriving him or her of their irreducible 1alterity2 or difference.

5evinas believes that the denying of such difference is the fundamental ethical sin as it fails to

respect the other in their absolute exteriority, their absolute difference to us. 3n effect, to

recognise someone is to render them the same as us> to eliminate their inescapable,

unapprehendable and absolute alterity (Par, 44.

An alternative perspective on the self-other relationship can be found in $erleau-#onty whoargues that the other is always instigated within oneself, and vice-versa, through the potential

reversibility of the self-other dichotomy (that is, that the self is also a potential other> seeing

someone necessarily involves the possibility of being seen. $erleau-#onty explicitly rejects

the 5evinasian perspective that the other is an irreducible alterity. "ather, the self and other are

intertwined through their bodily imbrications in the world. /e describes our respective

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perspectives on the world as slipping into one another and thus being brought together= 13n

reality, the other is not shut up inside my perspective of the world, because this perspective

itself has no definite limits, because it slips spontaneously into the other2s2 ($erleau-#onty,

%&79= 7%%. onse!uently, there is no 1problem2 of the other, for the other is already contained

within our being, as we are within theirs. *his resonates with /eidegger 2s characterisation of

Being (Dasein as being-with-others. +e are always already alongside others, bound up in

relations of mutuality that prevent any strict ontological distinction between self, other and

world.

*he 5evinasian and :artrean accounts of the self-other relationship can be criticised from a

hermeneutic perspective for failing to acknowledge the fact that understanding is essentially a

conversation with another, and that a simple reduction of the other to a sameness with oneself,

or a pure objectification of the other, would preclude the possibility of a genuine interactionfrom which mutual understanding could arise (Oadamer, %&'. 5evinas presents a

monological account of understanding, ignoring the fundamentally dialogical nature of

intersubjectivity. As *aylor (%&&7= '


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way that we do. According to oucault, not only are we controlled by truth and power, we are

created by it too. oncerning his genealogical method, oucault (%&?= %%


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very things which produce our sense of gender. Oender is the conse!uence, rather than the

cause, of these individual, isolated, norm-governed acts. Because acts which constitute

gender are governed by institutional norms which enforce certain modes of behaviour, thought,

speech, and even shape our bodies, all positive constructions of gender categories will be

exclusionary. onse!uently, not only does Butler deny any ontological justification for a

feminist identity politics, but she also rejects the possibility of a political justification. 3dentity

categories 1are never merely descriptive, but always normative, and as such, exclusionary2

(%&&4= %'. As a result, 1Any effort to give universal content or specific content to the category

of women... will necessarily produce factionaliGation2 and so, 1FidentityH as a point of departure

can never hold as the solidifying ground of a feminist political movement2 (ibid= %9.

3nfusing issues of power into the recognition debate therefore presents problems for existent

models of recognition. *aken to its extreme, contemporary feminist accounts of gender andidentity may be seen as reason to decisively reject recognition politics. 3f, as Butler suggests,

gender identity is intrinsically connected to power, then to demand recognition for one2s identity

could seen as becoming compliant with existing power structures. :uch a position would have

no possibility of radically criti!uing the status quo and would thus potentially forfeit any

emancipatory promise. Mpon the relationship between the individual and power, oucault

(%&?= &? writes= 1I3ndividualsJ are not only its Ipower2sJ intent or consenting target> they are

always also the elements of its articulation. 3n other words, individuals are the vehicles of

power, not its point of application2. *he concern is that there is no form of self-realisation inrecognition models that does not, in some way, reproduce patterns of dominance or exclusion.

#. The uture of 'ecognition

0espite the above reservations regarding the concept of recognition and its political

application, there is a growing interest in the value of recognition as a normative socio-political

principle. *he increasingly multicultural nature of societies throughout the world seems to call

for a political theory which places respect for difference at its core. 3n this regard, recognition

theories seem likely to only increase in influence. 3t should also be noted that they are very

much in their infancy. 3t was only in the %&&s that theorists formulated a comprehensive

account of recognition as a foundational concept within theories of justice. *o this extent, they

are still in the process of being fashioned and re-evaluated in the light of critical assessment

from various schools of thought.

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or many thinkers, the concept of recognition captures a fundamental feature of human

subjectivity. 3t draws attention to the vital importance of our social interactions in formulating

our sense of identity and self-worth as well as revealing the underlying motivations for, and

justifications of, political action. 3t seems particularly useful in making sense of notions of

authenticity and the conditions for agency, as well as mapping out the conditions for rational

responsibility and authority (see Brandom, 4&. As a result, recognition can be seen as an

indispensible means for analysing social movements, assessing claims for justice, thinking

through issues of e!uality and difference, understanding our concrete relations to others, and

explicating the nature of personal identity. Although there remain concerns regarding various

aspects of recognition as a social and political concept, it is entirely possible that many of

these will be addressed and resolved through future research.

. 'eferences and urther 'eading

• Alexander, Deffrey . and 5ara, $aria #., 1/onneth2s ew ritical *heory of

"ecognition2. Ne# 'eft Revie# . %)44 (%&&'= %4'-%6'

• Appiah, Cwame, A. 13dentity, Authenticity, :urvival= $ulticultural :ocieties and :ocial

"eproduction2. (ulticulturalism) "*amining the Politics of Recognition. Ed. Amy Outmann.

#rinceton= #rinceton Mniversity #ress. %&&7= %7&-%'6

• Arendt, /annah. +he uman Condition. hicago= hicago Mniversity #ress, %&9?

• Brandom, "obert. Reason in Philosoph) Animating -deas. ambridge, $a.= /arvard

Mniversity #ress, 4&

• Brandom, "obert. 1*he :tructure of 0esire and "ecognition= :elf-consciousness and

:elf-onstitution2. Philosoph . !ocial Criticism. 66=% (4


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• Butler, Dudith. 1ontingent oundations= eminism and the Question of

F#ostmodernismH2. Feminists +heori&e the Political . Ed. Butler, Dudith and Doan +. :cott.

5ondon= "outledge, %&&4. 6-4%

• 0e Beauvoir, :imone. +he !econd !e* . /armondsworth= #enguin, %&


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• /egel, Oeorg +. O. "lements of the Philosoph of Right . *rans. /. B. isbet.

ambridge= M#, %&&% I%?4%J

• /abermas, DRrgen. 1A "eply2. Communicative Action= "d= onneth, A*el and ans

/oas= Cam$ridge) Polit, 5665

• /eyes, ressida. 1an *here Be a Queer #olitics of "ecognition82. Recognition,

Responsi$ilit, and Rights) Feminist "thics and !ocial +heor . Ed. iore, "obin . and /ilde

5. elson. 5anham= "owman and 5ittlefield, 46= 96-''

• /onneth, Axel. 13ntegrity and 0isrespect= #rinciples of a onception of $orality Based

on the *heory of "ecognition2. Political +heor , 4=4 (%&&4= %?


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• Cymlicka, +ill. (ulticultural Citi&enship) A 'i$eral +heor of (inorit Rights. ;xford=

larendon #ress, %&&9

• 5aden, Anthony :. 1"easonable 0eliberation, onstructive #ower, and the :truggle for

"ecognition2. Recognition and Po#er) A*el onneth and the +radition of !ocial +heor . Ed.

Bert van den Brink and 0avid ;wen. ew Pork= M#, 4


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• icholson, 5inda. 1*o Be or ot *o Be= harles *aylor and the #olitics of

"ecognition2. Constellations, 6=% (%&&'= %-%'

• $erleau-#onty, $aurice. Phenomenolog of Perception. *rans. . :mith. ;xford=

"outledge, 44 I%&79J

• #inkard, *erry. egel?s Phenomenolog) +he !ocialit of Reason. ambridge= M#,

%&&'

• "ogers, $elvin 5. 1"ereading /onneth= Exodus #olitics and the #aradox of

"ecognition2. "uropean /ournal of Political +heor , ?=4 (4


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• Par, $ajid. 1"ecognition and the #olitics of /uman(e 0esires2. Recognition and

Difference) Politics, -dentit, (ulticulture. Ed. eatherstone, $ike and :cott 5ash. 5ondon=

:age, 44

• Poung, 3ris $. /ustice and the Politics of Difference. ew Dersey= #rinceton Mniversity

#ress, %&&

• Lurn, hristopher . 1Anthropology and ormativity= A riti!ue of Axel /onneth2s

Formal onception of Ethical 5ifeH2. Philosoph and !ocial Criticism, 4'=% (4= %%9-4%7

• Lurn, hristopher . 13dentity or :tatus8 :truggles ;ver 1"ecognition2 in raser, /onneth

and *aylor2. Constellations, %=7 (46= 9%&-96<

uthor Information#addy $cQueen Email= paddymc!ueenTgmail.comhttp=))www.iep.utm.edu)recogUsp)QueenNs Mniversity orthern 3reland.

Article printed from -nternet "ncclopedia of Philosoph = http://www.iep.utm.edu/recog_sp/4opyright J The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy . ll rights reser3ed.
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