Derechos Humanos Unesco Otras Tradiciones

8/13/2019 Derechos Humanos Unesco Otras Tradiciones

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B y mutual agreement, theInternationalSocialScienceJournalpublishestheofficial proceedingsandother communicationsfromthefollowinginternational organizations:InternationalAssociation ofLegalScienceInternationalCommitteeforSocial SciencesDocumentationInternationalEconomic AssociationInternationalPoliticalScience AssociationInternationalSociological AssociationInternationalSocial ScienceCouncilWorld AssociationforPublic Opinion Research ( W A P O R )

Recent issues:V o l . X V I I , N o .2 PopulationstudiesV o l . X V I I , N o.3 Peace researchV o l . X V I I , N o.4 History andsocialscienceForthcomingtopics:Modern methodsincriminologyScience,technology andeconomic developmentSocialaspectsoftown and country planning

SelectedarticlesfromthisJournalarealsoappearinginSpanishinAmricaLatina,the quarterly reviewof theLatin American Centrefor Research in theSocialSciences(Rio deJaneiro)

Editor: Peter Lengyel.Opinionsexpressedinsignedarticles arethoseofthe authors and donot necessarilyreflecttheviewsofUnesco.Permissionfor thefree reproductionof articlesappearingin thisnumbercanbeobtained fromtheEditor.Correspondence arising from this Journalshouldbeaddressed to:TheEditor,InternationalSocial ScienceJournal,Unesco, placedeFontenoy, Paris-7e.

Unesco 1966 SS.65/I.71/A Printed inFranceby Imp.Crete,Paris


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internationalsocial scienceJournal

VolumeXVIII 1966

unesco


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internationalsocialsciencejournalPublishedquarterly byUnesco

Vol. XVIII, No.i, 1966

' H u m a nrightsn perspectiveIntroductionbyM a r i o n G l e a nIdeologies andtraditions

M a r i a Hirszowicz TheM arx ist ap p roac h D .D . R a p h a e l T h eliberal W es terntradition ofh u m a nrights- R o m i la T h a p a r T h e H i n d u a n d Buddhisttraditions

W il l iam J. G o o d e'Pierre J uv ig nyG e o r g eThambyahpi l la i

InternationalFederal R e p u b l i cof G e r m a n yGreece

H u n g a r yM a l i

112231

T h e socio-economicframe workFami ly patternsandh u m a n rights 41T h e legal protection of h u m a n rights at theinternationallevel 55T h e righttoprivate property andp r o b l e m sofland reform 69Selectbibliography

T h e worldofthesocialsciencesResearch andtrainingcentres andprofessionalbodiesN e w institutionsa n d c hang esofaddress 91InternationalSociologicalAssociation 92C o m m i t t e eforInternationalC o-operationin R u ra lSociology 95D eut sc heGesellschaft frauswrtigePolitik 96Athens Centre ofEkistics and G r a d u a t e Sc hoo l 98ofEkisticsInstituteof E c o n o m i cs , H u n g a r i a n A c a d e m y of 'Sciences ioiM a l i a nInstituteof H u m a n Sciences 104


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MeetingsInaugural Conference of theInternational PeaceResearch Association (Groningen, July 1965),by Elise Boulding 107T h e role of science andtechnology in economicdevelopment ( R o m eMeeting, 27-28 August 1965),by Lisbeth Schaudinn 113Swiss-Italian Colloquium onRural ExodusandDepopulationofMountainousRegions ( R o m e andG e n e v a , 1965) 117AnnouncementDocumentsand publications of theUnited Nations 118andSpecialized Agencies 119Booksreceived 128

E R R A T U Mla the reporton theN ewY o r k colloquiumon the unification of law for international trade, byJohnHonnold [International SocialScienceJournal, Vol.X V I I , No.2), the sentence beginning at the end ofp . 362 andrunningon to p. 363should read:' A year prior to the colloquium a plan of study wasdeveloped by the Director of Research ofI A L S (Professor Tune, 0/Paris) and the General Rapporteurof thecolloquium(Professor Honnold).'T h e wordsinitalicswere unfortunately omitted in thetextas it appearedoriginally.


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H u m a n rights inperspective


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IntroductionM a r i o n Glean

In its forthcoming p r o g r a m m e Unesco will attach great importance tosponsoringscientificresearchinto thecauseso fconflictas theseare reflectedin ethnicgrouprelations, but itwillalso broaden thescopeofthisprog r a m m e to include situations related to h u m a n rights apart from 'racerelations',wheresocialscienceresearch m a y be ofvalue.A R o u n d - T a b l e Meeting on H u m a n Rights held at Oxford, UnitedK i n g d o m ,from n to 19 N o v e m b e r 1 9 6 5 w a s intended toprovide s o m eassessment of the issuesinvolvedinseeking to implement thearticlesofthe Universal Declarationof H u m a n Rightsdrawn up in 1948intheworldof 1 9 6 5 . Inparticular,themeeting w a s seenas a discussionbetweenexpertsdeliberatelychosenfromawidevariety ofdisciplinesa n d diffrentgeographical areasaboutthelinesalongwhichUnesco'saction in thefieldo f h u m a nrightsshouldbeplannedas from 1967-68.T h e p r o g r a m m e for the Oxford meeting w a s divided into twoparts:(a) philosophical traditions, and (b)socio-economic conditions affectingtheir implementation.InPartIpaperswerepresentedon them a i nphilosophical traditions: h u m a n rights in the Judaic-Christian tradition;h u m a n rights in theH i n d u a n d Buddhisttraditions;h u m a n rights inotherAsian traditions; h u m a n rights in theIslamictradition; h u m a n rights inthe traditional thought ofBlack Africa; theliberal Western tradition ofh u m a n rights; theMarxist approach to h u m a n rights; a nd h u m a n rightsa n d ngritude.In a Secretariatpaper,Looking a t the UniversalDeclaration of HumanRightsin / 5 0 5 , thebeliefw a s expressedthat '. . . theimplementationofthe U n i versalDeclaration of H u m a n Rights would be m a d e easier if w e coulddiscoverwhatvaluesystemsaroseasaresponsetoparticularneedsa n d h o wthesevaluesystemsaffectthe action ofindividuals a n d States in particularpresent-daysituations'.During the discussion ofpaperssubmitted under PartI of theround-tablemeeting, s o m e importantissuesbearingon the evolution of h u m a nrightswere discussed. Perhaps the most importantcertainly the most

Int.Soc . Sei. ]., Vol. X V I I I , N o . i, 1966


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controversial a n d the only onewhichwillbe reportedherewaswhetherornot theconcepto f ' h u m a nrights' w a s peculiar to a n d inherent inWesternphilosophical traditions. It wasargued by s o m e participants that theconceptof h u m a n rightsoriginatedfrom theconcernwiththe individuala n d as aresultof the democratictraditionswhich were fundamental toGraeco-Christian thought, becoming politically vocal in eighteenth-centuryliberalphilosophya n d producingatlastthe politico-socio-economicideaswhichweretob e c o m e ,withthe additionofnineteenth- a n d twentieth-century Marxist thought, the basis ofpresent-day universal concern forh u m a n rights. Forthisgroupof participants, acceptanceof the UniversalDeclarationof H u m a n Rightsby nations outside E u r o p e is a victory forWestern thought and the implementation of h u m a n rights becomes tos o m eextent amatterof certainformsoflegalprocedure a n dsocialarrangements already perfected in E u r o p e a n d in theWestern hemisphere.Thereishereanunspokenphilosophicalbeliefthatsocial a n d economicaction isdependenton philosophical theory. T h e historicalcasemostoften quotedw a s slavery, the freeing of theslavesin the early nineteenthcenturybeingtakenas anexample of philanthropic action followingreligiousbelieforliberalEuropean thinking of the eighteenthcentury.

Thispoint ofviewpresented a d i l e m m ato tw o schools ofthought.Firstof all the Marxists. If philosophy (or, s o m e would say, theology) is thedetermining factor insocio-politicalaction, then theprimacyof theeconomic infrastructure isdenied, a n d withit the supposition of theMarxistsociologicalmodels. Secondly,scholarsfromthe'Third W o r l d ' . O n e m a yacceptthe principle ofthe priorityof philosophical a n d theologicalthinkingwithout necessarily accepting that the present trend towards a worldmorality c a m e aboutas aresultofWesternthinking: itcouldjustaseasilyhave c o m e about as aresultof thefirstndication of a disintegration ofWesternthought a n d , withit, ofeffectiveWesternpoliticalaction. Inthiscasejustice,peace a n d equality can befoundonly by a return to the n o n competitive 'traditional'values of Africa and ofAsia.

O n the otherh a n d o ne m a y denytheprimacy ofphilosophical an d theologicalinfluence onpolitical a n d socialaction whether from the W e storfromthe'Third W o r l d ' . T h e abolitionof slavery in theW e s t Indies in theearly nineteenthcenturywouldstem,then,mainlyfromeconomicmotivesa n d notfrom theliberal ideas inherent in the French Revolution,whilebothcolonialism a n d the surges forindependencein the twentiethcenturyca n be seen intermsofeconomic a n d politicaldesires a n d conflictsratherthanas afailureor thespreadofEuropeanliberalideas.It wouldfollow,thus,that the oldertextsof Africa and ofAsiasomewouldadd ofIslam a n d Christianitycan be relevant only within aparticularsocio-economicsituation,while the d e m a n d for h u m a n rightsasarticulatedtoday is a n e w conceptforced on the W e st in the eighteenthcenturybyindustrialization,revisionof agriculturalpolicies a n d the p o p u lationdriftto thetowns.Theseprocesses are taking placetodayatdifferentrates in all countries and areproducingthe vocal claims forrightsocca-


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Introduction 9sionedby the conditionsbrought aboutby the n e w socialandeconomicrelationships of m o d e r n urban existence.T h e threepapers chosenfrom PartI of the p r o g r a m m e a n d reproducedhereillustratethe argument:' T h e conceptof the rights ofrr.anatfirstappeared under the n a m e ofnatural rights. Assuch, it depended u p o n the doctrine ofnaturallaw,whichitselfrepresentedaconfluenceof stoicism, of R o m a n lawa n d of theJudaic-Christian tradition' (D . D .Raphael).'It follows that the Marxist approach consisted in referring generaluniversalprinciples togroupsituations a n d groupinterests.Political andsocialdoctrinesexpressingon e oranotherattitude o f h u m a n rightscouldbethus regarded asattachedto certainhistoricalstages ofdevelopment, todefinitesituations a n d groupinterests. . .' (Maria Hirszowicz).'It isprematuretolookfor well-articulatedlegalcodesin the cultures oftwo thousandyears ago which mightreflect h u m a nrights asw e k n o w t h e ma n d desire t h e mtoday.. . . T h e implementationofh u m a n rights d e m a n d sa certainsocio-economicethoswhich is becoming increasinglyfeasibleinmostparts of theworld' (Romila T h a p a r ) .

T h e subjects discussed in thesecondhalf of thep r o g r a m m e werechosenwiththe presentstateofsocialscienceresearchin m i n d , a n d also inconnexionwiththepriorities of the currentUnesco p r o g r a m m e :socio-economicfactorsaffecting the rights of w o m e n ; h u m a n rights, family structure andsocio-economic conditions (two papers); h u m a n rights to individualproperty a n d problemsoflandreform; h u m a n rights a n d the mobilizationof capital in the publicinterest; h u m a n rights a n d scientificdevelopmentin evolvingsocieties (twopapers); the h u m a n right toeducation, educationalchoices and vocational choicesresources, targets and aspirations;h u m a n rights a n d theresponsibilitiesof m a s smediain the m o d e r n world;the legalprotection of h u m a n rights at the nationallevel;and thelegalprotectionof h u m a n rights at the internationallevel.It w a s not bychance,totakeoneexample,that m a s smediaconstitutedo n e of the subjects for discussionthe extension of techniques of m a s scommunication, thedecreasingcosts of certain methods a n d the c o m p a r ativeexpenseofothers,the discussion as totheirfeasibilityform a ssliteracycampaigns, planned adult education and its use within the context ofleisure m a d e m a s s mediaamostchallengingsubject.Thereis the questionof inducedsocialchange:can certainvalues, consideredby a section of asocietyas desirable tosocial a n d economicprogressbe 'sold' to therestofthe c o m m u n i t y via m a s s media? C a n attitudes to saving a n d investment,traditional agriculturalmethods a n d traditional foodhabits bechangedbythe use of carefully selectedradio a n d televisionp r o g r a m m e s ? O r aresuchchanges dependent on a modification of the socio-economic structureitself a n d soonly marginally affected bytelevisionor byradio? C a nonehope to devise s o m e p r o g r a m m e orresearchwhereby one canisolateormeasurechangein asocietyresultingfrominformationgiven b y m a s smediaas distinctfrom otherfactors involved in theprocessofchange? H o wfar


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doestelevisioninfluencetoday'spoliticaldecisions?Politicaldialoguescann o w takeplace withinview of thepopulationsof even thelargestcountries.W h a t doesthis m e a n in terms ofincreasedpublicawareness of theissuesinvolved inpoliticaldiscussions, and popular involvement in the policym a k i n gdecisionsofgovernments?Will thetransmitter,relativelycheap andeasily transported, modify the political relationship between the ruralpopulation and the urbanseatofgovernment?If m a s smediacanradicallyaffect accepted relationships, w h a t should be the criteriafor their prog r a m m e s , and it follows,fortheirownership?

WilliamJ. G o o d e ' s paper on 'Familypatternsand h u m a n rights'andGeorgeThambyahpillai'spaperon' T h e righttoprivateproperty a n d problemsof land reform'whichillustratethe discussionson the socio-economicconditionsnecessary for the implementation of h u m a nrightsare reproduced here.Thereis abo,lastbut notleast,thequestionof thelegalimplementationof h u m a n rights. It is sometimes arguedthat the Universal Declaration

h a s hadlittleimpact becausethereis noeffective m e t h o dof implementingitsclauses.Therehave infactbeencertainimportantstepstowards alegallyguaranteed declaration. A certain n u m b e r of rights proclaimed by theUniversal Declarationhave beendealtwith not only at the nationalbutalsoboth atinternationalandregionallevels.Atpresentthereis noover-alla n d reallyefficient m e a n s ofpermanent andeffectiveprotectionoftheserights,butthereare s o m eprocedures of ajuridicalorquasi-juridicalcharacterwhich have beeninternationally established.In Perudie UniversalDeclarationhas theforceof municipal law and isseenas the binding n o r mininternalaswellasexternallaw. In Scandinavia,thereexiststheofficeofthe O m b u d s m a n charged with the investigationof all reported casesof amiscarriage ofjustice,whilethe S u p r e m e Court in the UnitedStatesandthe Conseild'tat in France have played importantrolesin definingandpreserving h u m a n rights.Thesenationalmethods of guarantee werediscussedwith the participationof a Peruvianjurist,an A m e r ic a njurist,theSwedish O m b u d s m a n ,1 and twoFrenchjurists,keeping in m i n d the w o r d sof the Secretary-General of the United Nations in his FourthA n n u a lReportto the GeneralAssemblyof 1 9 4 9 : 'It istruethatthisDeclarationis not a law,butneitherhave been m a n y of the mostinfluentialdocumentsofhistory.T h e UnitedStates'DeclarationofIndependenceand France'sDeclarationof the Rights of M a n were not laws w h e n theywere proclaimed.'

PierreJuvigny's paperdealswith thelegalimplementation ofrights ata n internationalleveland isalsoreproduced here.1 . A n articled escribingthisofficea n d itsfun ctions, which could n o t b e included i n t h e presentissue fo r technicalreasons,willappear i n t h e next n u m b e r .Marion Glean, a graduate of L o n d o n Universi ty ,is atpresen t p r o g r a m m e specialistin theDepartment ofSoc ia lS c i e n c e sof Unesco, incharge o fprojects o n h u m a n rights a n d o n race .S h e is a Tr in idadian.


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Ideologies and traditions

T h e MarxistapproachM a r i aHirszowicz

T h e Marxis t conceptionofman, rooted in th e anthropocentrism of the enl ightenment , h as t h r e ebasic e l ements: recognit ionofth e r i g h tto individual development, ajoint socia lresponsibilityfor thesatisfactionofindividual wants, and the rat ionalizat ionofsocia l re la t ionsh ips. Aftersummarizing port ions of Marxis t sociology, th e author goes on todiscussth e emergingpr inc ip leof un i tyoft heoryandprac t i c e ,and the continued re l evanceofM arxis t analyt ical approachesin deal ing with problemsof m o d e rn industr ia lsociety.H u m a n rights m a y beviewed from three correlatedangles: (a) philosophically or from the viewpoint of Weltanschauung whereby weadopt acertainsystem of values and consequently a set ofprinciplesfor theunderstanding of h u m a n rights;(b)sociologicallyor by usingcognitivemodelsa n d forming through them our outlook onsocialrealityto determinewhether h u m a n rights are enforced or not; (c) morally andpolitically,i.e., fromthe viewpoint ofpracticalchoicesanddecisionsdetermining theextentof o u r c o m m i t m e n t toactionwhich is aimedat theenforcementofh u m a nrights.T o each oftheseareas M a r x i s mhasbroughtits o w nsolutionsand seenthem m o r eorlessaccepted in theworld oftoday.If it isdifficulttoexaminea n d present in a general way the Marxistapproach to these problems,Ulisis because by M a r x i smwe m e a n , on the oneh a n d ,the views of M a r xhimself,treatedas a coherent system, a n d ,on the other h a n d ,opinions heldb y all thosewhowhileadopting the doctrines ofM a r x h a v einterpretedthemintheiro w n w a yandadaptedthemtopracticalconditions ofaction.In thisarticleweshalladhere to thefirstandnarrowerinterpretationofM a r x i s m .Anthropocentrism.TheconceptoftoalmanM a r x ' sconception of m a n w a s bornof the W e s t Europeantradition.Thehistoricalconsciousness of therightsof m a n w o r k e dout in W e st Europeanthought was the product of a long evolution, with intermediate stageswhere each time thelimitsofsocial solidaritywere circumscribed by the

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ia M a r i a Hirszowicz

thenexistingsocialconditions. Yet theall-embracingidea of universal m a nw a s achildof theEnlightenmentplacing m a n as a point ininfinitespace,from whichone couldd r a wendlesslinesandthus connect all other points.1T h e anthropocentrism of the Enlightenment was a product of anti-metaphysical natural science, the m o d e r n epistemology, of the school ofnaturallaw and thepoliticalteachings ofliberalism.Yet it lackeddeeperinsightandbroader reflexion u p o nsocietyand its laws of development.H e n c ethe abstract conceptionofm a n attaininghis naturalrightsin conformitywith the precepts ofreason. Not before the nineteenth century didsocialthoughtbring forth thedynamicidea that h u m a n rightswereonlygraduallyachieved.2Its startingpoint w a s the notion ofhistoric m a nfulfillingthe idea ofliberty(Hegel)throughthe constant struggleofopposites

and the transformation ofsocialrelations. According to Hegel humanitymusttranscendexistingconditions. Equilibrium m a ylastonly a m o m e n t .Inthis w a y socialinstitutionswhich yesterdaywerestillconsonantwith'the awareness of h u m a n liberty' have b e c o m e alienated today, haveb e c o m e the object ofsocialaction, transformation, 'denial'.Feuerbach's formula ' T om a n the only G o d is m a n himself',* corresponding to thespiritof the A g e ofReason and linked with the dynamicidea offreedomas conceived byHegel, w a sthe point ofdeparturefor theanthropocentrismof M a r x w h o subordinatedhistheoreticaland practical

w o r kto theconcernsofm a n andtom a n ' splace insociety. M a r x 'scriticismoftheexistingsocialordersprangfromhismoralrefusalto accept asocietysoorganizedthat it w a s b o u n dtoimprisonthe personalityofm a nandcheckits o w n capacity forgrowth.*Thisattitude w a s adoptedby M a r x bothinhiscriticalanalysisof thesocialconsequencesof thedivisionoflabourandin his appraisal ofsocialsystemsdegrading m a n and oppressing the producers.Divisionoflabour m e a n t ,accordingto M a r x ,separation of m a n u a lw o r k from mental w o r k , of the p o w e r ofgoverning anddecision-makingfromthedutyofobeying,or blind execution oforders. Thisseparation w a saresultof thedivisionof m e n intothosewhose m a i ninstrumentoflabourw a stheirhands, and those w h o workedwiththeirbrains, adivision intothose w h o governedand those w h o were governed.8

Thisview w a sbornof opposition, of protest against the 'intrumentaliza-tion'of the individual. At thes a m etimeit m e a n tan affirmation of the principle that m a n ' s personality should befullyfree to expand. It followedfromtheconceptoftotalm a n , growingandgiving expression to hiscreativepotential.T h u s there arose, as against thetraditionof theEnlightenment, a n e widea ofsocial solidarity. T h e beliefthat thefreedomof the fewmustnoti. D . Diderot,Texteschoisis.Vol. II, p. 137,Paris,1953.2.B . Baczko,Czlowieki swUUopoglady [Manand worldoutlooks],passim,Warsaw,1965.3. L. Feuerbach,Das Wesen desChristentums, p. 369-70,Leipzig,1841; L. Feuerbach, DosWesenderReligion,p. 170, 30 Vorlesungen, Leipzig,1908.4. A.Schaff,Marksizm ajednosthaludzka [Marxism and the humanindividual],esp. p. 71,Warsaw, 1965.5. K . Marx,DasKapital,chaps. XII-XIII,Berlin,1947.


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The Marxistapproach '3be purchasedbysubordinationanddegradationof the m a n y b e c a m e thechief point of criticism directed at thesystem which tolerated andconsolidatedthatevil.

Finally, the third element of M a r x ' s philosophy of m a n was the viewthat hew o u l d b e freeonlyw h e n a n d in so far ash econtrolled the conditionsof his o w n existence, a recognition of the aim,c o m m o n to thewhole ofnineteenth-centurysocialist thought, of achieving a social order w h e r eeconomicanarchy a n d lack ofsocialcontrolover production a n d distribution w o u l d be o v e r c o m e , w h e r e purposefulness andplanning w o u l d beinstitutedinsociety.Thesethreeelements,thenthe recognition ofth e rightofthe individualto thedevelopmentof his personality, the principle thatsocietyw a sjointly

responsible for thesatisfactionof individual w a n t s ,and the desire torationalize social relationsconstituted a new type of philosophy of h u m a nrights,shiftingthe focus ofinterestf r o mtherelationbetweenthe individuala n d the State to the relation between the individual andsociety,andreflecting the n e w d i l e m m a s of theindustrialage.1Marxistsociologyand the problemof humanrightsConclusions permittingideals to bebrought nearer tofacts w e r e soughtb y M a r x , throughscientific endeavours and findingswith thepurposeofsupplyingarelativelyadequatedefinitionofthe socialsituationa n d findingw a y s and m e a n s leading to changes in conformity with the historicallydeterminedneedsof m a n . T h e r e w a s agrowingconvictiondiat m a nwasno t an abstract orisolatedindividual but asocialbeing w h o s esituationw a s conditioned by thewholeofsocialrelations. T h a tconviction, inturn,gavebirth to the w e l l - k n o w nnineteenth-centurybeliefthat the problemso f m a n mightbe solved onlythroughapositiveknowledgeofsociety.

This idea was the essence of the greatsociologicalsystemsof the pastcentury, combining endeavours to reform with attempts at ascientificexamination ofsocialstructures and the historicalprocess in its variousramifications ( C o m t e ,Spencer, M a r x ) . T h u stheera ofdoctrinesan d utopiasgave w a y to the era ofconcrete k n o w l e d g e .It is hardly possible to present a detailed account of thesociologicaltheories of K a r l M a r x inthisshortarticle. It will be limited, therefore,to avery briefoutlineof thoseelements and features which explain thespecificcharacter ofMarxistsociology in its approachto h u m a n rights.i. M a r x treated the h u m a n person historically andpositively, seeingm a n involved in existingover-all systems within which he belonged togroups, classes,strata, nationalities, local andreligious communities, toorganizationsset in s o m efashion in theentiref r a m e w o r kofsocialrelationsa n d subjected todefinite laws. T h u s whereas the e n d o w m e n t of h u m a ni. M .Hirszowicz, 'Niektre zagadnieniasocjologicznejkoncepcjipanstwa' [ S o m e problemsofthesociologicalconception of the State], Studia socjologicsno-polityane. N o .7, i960.


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4 M a a Hirszowicz

rights with m o r a l and philosophical substance might result from theconceptoftotal m a n ,the actual application ofthoserights w a s alwaystob e consideredin itshistoricalimplication, asderivedfromadefinite socialorder. This view of the condition of m a n and its objective determinants,therefore, s t e m m e d from a conceptualization of great and complexsocialstructures,andhistoricaldevelopment.

2 . Constraintssuffered bym e n w e r econsideredbyM a r x fromadoubleviewpoint:(a) asnaturallimitations, b y which hem e a n tlimitsimposedbynature a n d b y theproductiveforces ata n y givenattainedlevel,o r, speakingm o r e generally, by thematerial culture attained at a certain stage ofdevelopment (forthisreasonthe primitive c o m m u n i t y w a s no G a r d e nofE d e n for M a r x ) ; (b) as social constraints resulting from the differentpositionsoccupiedbypeoplein thatsystem, fromdifferences in the accessof particular categories ofpersonstoworldly goods.

3 . T h e appearance ofsocial differences w a s ascribed by M a r x to theriseofprivateproperty a n d the State;1thefirsted toeconomicinequality,the secondtopoliticalconstraints. E a c h economic a n d socialsystem wascharacterizedby its o w n typeof internal structural differences a n d constraints,running(a)alongthelinesofclassdivisions, a n d (b)alongdivisionswithintheseparateclasses. T h e distinguishing characteristic ofprecapitalistsystems, as described by M a r x , was the connexion between economicdependence andextra-economic forms ofcoercion, the status of slave orpeasant-serf. Capitalism,on theother h a n d , brought to the fore purelyeconomicfactors, a n d these,onceformallegalrestrictionsw e r eabolished,determined the social condition of individuals belonging to thevariousclasses a n d groups.

4 . Accordingto M a r x thesesociallimitations w e r ethesourceofclaimsadvancedin the n a m e of particularclassesa n d groupssubjectedtospecificconstraints. T h e rights vindicatedcouldbe different incontent a n d extenta n d a s s u m edifferent forms.It wa s d u e to the victory ofdie m o d e r nconception of the rights of m a n that theseclaims w e r e formulated in the mostgeneral phrase: 'everybody has a right to . . .'.This universalform wasadopted, for instance, for theclaimsset forth in the n a m e of thetierstatagainstfeudalabridgmentsof rights, w h e n themiddleclassesw e r ecomingto the fore as the s p o k e s m e n of thebroadest masses andtheirinterests.But, from the s a m e standpoint, M a r x criticized the bourgeois idea ofh u m a nrightswhichacceptedthe'naturalorder',that is to say a free enterpriseorder extendingfreedom bothto thepowerful and the w e a k . S u c hfreedom really a m o u n t e d to inequality, w a s actually a denial offreedomfor all,: w a s libertyfor the few.25 . It follows that theMarxist approach consisted in referringgeneral,universalprinciples togroup situations andgroup interests.Politicaland

1. Fr.Engels, The Origin of theFamily, PrivateProperty and theState,firstG e r m a nedition,Zurich, 1884.2 . K . M a r x , Dieheilige Familie,p.46-53, Berlin, 1 9 5 3 . SeealsoC . L . Becker, ' D i l e m m a ofLiberals in O u r T i m e ' , in:Detachmentandt h e Writing ofHistory, N e w Y o r k ,1958.


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T h e Marxistapproach 5

socialdoctrines expressing one oranotherattitudetoh u m a n rightscouldthusberegardedas attachedtocertainhistoricalstages ofdevelopment,todefinitesituationsandgroup interests. K n o w l e d g eofthe structureof agivensocietym a d eitpossible to foresee:(a)tow h a textentclaimswouldbeaccepted;(b) tow h a textenttheywouldbem e t withindifferenceor neutrality; (c)atw h a tpoint a n d bywhichgroup oppositionwould be started,asa resultofareasonableassessmentthat the rightsclaimedmightimpairtheinterestsof theresistinggroup.6 . G r o u p situationsandgroupinterestsreactingtocertainclaimsandaspirationswere consideredby M a r x notinmoral termsbutas aconsequenceofsocialsystemsimposing u p o nparticulargroupsthelogicoftheirbehaviour. A n analysis ofthe over-allsystem m a d eitpossibletodetermine

ineachcase:(a)w h a tclaimsmightbeadmitted a n d actually m e t inresponsetotheinherent functional requirementsoftheexistingsystem(forinstance,theclaimsofworkerstoelementary education were notonlyconsonant withcapitalism but b e c a m e an absolute necessityatone stageof developmentofhighlyindustrialized society); (b) w h a tclaimswouldbethe objectofbargainingandc o m p r o m i se permittingofsolutions by w a yof mutualconcessionswhichweredictated by theexistingbalanceof forces(such,forexample, accordingto M a r x , were theclaimsofworkerstom i n i m u m wages);(c)finally,w h a t claims would transcendthelimitsofthe existingsystem a n d positthe abolitionoftheexistingsocialorder.7 . M a r x ' s analysisofindustrial society through which he discoveredcertain regularitiesin thesystemoffree enterpriseconvinced him diat,withinthelimitsofthissociety,itw a s impossibleeveninthelongruntosatisfytheessentialsociala n d economicneeds a n d aspirations ofth e masses.Theseincludedthe righttow o r k(theMarxisttheoryofeconomiccycles),the rightto the full remunerationofexpended labour(theassumptionthatcompetitioninevitablyled tothepursuitofaccumulation,interalia,throughsavings onworkers' paydie'iron lawofwages'). M a r xinsistedthat these d e m a n d s could bemetonly through specific changes whichwould break intotheareaofprivateproperty, introduceregulation andcontrolofeconomicdevelopments,abolishing themachineryof free c o m p e tition a n d thecapitalistmarket. T h u s M a r x m a d e theattainment of h u m a nrightstosocial andeconomic securityclosely dependent u p o n hisprog r a m m e ofsocialisttransformation.8 . Socialchanges,however,asM a r xenvisaged t h e m ,did notc o m eaboutautomatically. T h e abolitionofrestrictionson h u m a n rights w a s treatedas acomplicatedhistorical process,full ofcontradictions andconflicts,political struggles and not infrequently of revolutionary upheavals.

Advocated principles, even those which were universally acceptableifexpressedingeneralterms, b e c a m e bonesofcontentionbetweendifferentgroups w h e n theirinterestsclashed.9 . M a r x ' s theoryofhistoricalmaterialism andhisvisionofsocialismwere merelyamethodological outlinefortheinterpretationofthe historicallymutable structuresofsociety. His sociology w a s an open system.


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M a r x underscoredrepeatedly thatitshouldbe treated as anapproachtohistory, asamethod ofstudyingsocialdevelopments, asamethod whichetusadmitmightalso,mutatismutandis,be appliedtotheexaminationof n u m e r o u s problems arisinginsocialistsociety.A s m a y b egatheredfromthisexceedinglybriefreview, M a r x ' sconceptionof sociologyiscloselyconnected withhissociologicalapproachto h u m a nrights.1Thissociologicalattitudeentailsnotonlya n empiricalestablishmentoffactsbearingon the application of certain rights a n d an explanation ofthe general basesoftheir existence, butalsoanefforttointerpretthechanging criteriaofour appraisals and expectations. M a r x repeatedlypointedout that no eraattemptedto setitselftaskswhichitcouldnot solve.

Viewedfromthisangleitisno accident that heregardedthe great ideas ofthe American a n d Frenchrevolutions of the eighteenthcenturyashistoriceventsof thefirstmagnitude.

This attitude, contrarytowhatisusually maintained,isnotthatofrelativism, forthoughdefining theneeds a n d aimsof m a n ashistoricallyconditionedit nevertheless adopts thosegeneral standardsofmoralitywhich m a k etheh u m a n personitsstartingpointa n dsolidframe of reference(Anthropocentrism).aE v e niftheclaimsof m e n are notmatched bytheirpractice, theveryenunciationa n d inclusion oftheseclaimsinm o d e r nideologies are aturning-pointinthe history of our civilization. H o w e v e r ,asrightly remarkedbyHarold Laski, the divergenceofprinciple from practice mustnot betoowide lestitbreed discouragement andprovoke cynicism,introducingfurther laxity into analready disorganizedsociety. Consequently,weshould n o w examine M a r x i s minaction, byproceedingto aconsiderationof the third of theareasindicatedatthe outset ofo u r examinationofKarlM a r x ' s attitudetoh u m a n rights.Theprincipleofunityoftheoryandpractice8M a r x ' s view thatsocial changes did notoccur withoutconflict but metresistance meant that practical action was elevatedtoahigherlevelofimportance, thatitwasrecognizedas theindispensablesupplementtomoral attitudes and theoretical thought.4 Byadopting theprincipleofmaterialism,asserting thatopinions a n d convictionwerereflexions ofsocialsituations, M a r x rejectedtheillusionsofUtopiansocialists w h o believeditpossibletobring about andensure acceptanceforsocialchangesof a

i. A .Schaff, op.cit., p. 45.2 . E . F r o m m , Beyond the Cha insofIllusion. M y Encoun te rwith Freud and Marx , p . 3 1 , N e wYork, 1962.3 . K . M a r x , Th e Com m u n istManifesto(Englishcentenaryedition),L o ndo n, 1948; A . G . MayerMarx i sm th eUnityof T h e o r y an dPractice, chap. 4 , Cambridge,M ass., 1954.4 . ' C o m m u n i s m . . .istheoriginofhum a nis minpractice'Karl M a rx -Fr i e d r i c h Enge l sWerke , 1A b t , B d3,p. 166,Institut fr Marximus-Leninismus beim Z K der S E D , EastBerlin, Detz Verlag, 1961-66.


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T h e Marxist approach '7progressive character by the simple deviceofenlightened interventionsfrom above, by the rulers.M a r x thoughtthe reversewa s true. T h e practicalspokesmenof h u m a nrights were mainly thoseclassesandgroups w h o s e particular rights wereabridged, and w h o s e practicalinterestlayintheadvent of asocialorderwhichwouldonce a n d for all abolish these particular constraints.Regardedfromthispoint ofview, M a r x ' s idea of the role of the proletariat w a s nots o m u c h messianicthoughthatisoften maintainedasrealistic,inthatit took into account the realinterestsofthe proletariat, interests whichm a d e thatclassreceptive tospecific p r o g r a m m e s ofsocialchange.It wasalso aconceptionwhichtookintoaccountthevalueofth e strategicsupportof othersocial classes andgroups which m a d e it possibletoanticipateinevitable vicissitudes, retreats and hesitations, and which wassuchas tostimulate the sober assessmentofsocial forces ingivenhistoricalconditions.

Political a n d socialattitudes a n d beliefswereconsideredby M a r x fromtw o viewpoints.Intermsofm a s sbehaviourtheyweretreated as derivativesofcertainsituations a n d ensuinginterests.1Intermsofindividualbehavioura n d decisionstheywereamatterofa u t o n o m o u schoiceconnectedwiththisor thatsystemofrecognizedprinciples a n d values. M a r x himself, as wellas hisclosestcollaborator and friend, Engels, were m e n w h o , regardlessof theirorigin a n d socialposition, joined thesocialist m o v e m e n t becauseof itsuniversally h u m a n significance. M a r x thought of the proletariatasthe forcecapableofm a k i n g the vision of aworld w h e r ejusticewouldrulec o m etrue, a n d heconsideredscientifictheoryto be theinstrumentcapableof giving content andshapetothe legitimate causeofthe proletariat.H e r e w a s the personality patternalientotheacademicnotionscurrentat thetimeof the learned m a n a n d leader, e m b o d y i n gthe unity of scientificreflexion a n d practical participationintheconflictsof his era.M a r x describescommunistsasm e n w h o do notaddress'enlightenedpublicopinion'overtheheads ofrulers, nor do theyaddress a n a n o n y m o u s ,

a m o r p h o u s c r o w d , butratherturntothat part ofsociety whichisableto seeitsfuture anditsopportunity ofworking forsocial changeandprogress.2M a r x andEngels did notview C o m m u n i s m ininstitutionaltermsbutchieflyinintellectual a n d moralones. T h e ybelieved C o m m u n i s m in actionw a s peculiaronlyin so far asittendedto discern m o r e clearlythe law ofsociallife,andasfar as possibleclose the ga p betweenfacts a n d ideals.

Let us n o wreflectto w h a t extent M a r x i s m asdescribedaboveisrelevantto thedebateonh u m a n rights at thepresentstage.W e might begin by pointing out that certain aspectsofthe Marxistapproachto the rights ofm a n have b e c o m ean integralpartof die climatei. 'Historyisnothingbut thedoingsofmanin the pursuit of hisends'KarlMarx-Friedrich

EngelsWerke,op.cit., p. 265.2. The CommunistManifesto,op.cit.,p. 13.


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i8 M a a Hirszowicz

of opinion n o w prevailing. Thisisevidencednot only by thefairlygeneralacceptanceof h u m a n rightsin theeconomic a n d socialspherebutalsobythe beliefthat inordertosatisfytheseneedsit isnecessaryto take consciouslyplannedaction in termsofgovernmentpolicies.W e have seenthis principle embodied in the revolutions of EasternE u r o p e andAsiaand in the spectacularsocialandeconomic progress ofthe socialist countries; wehave seen it m a k i n g h e a d w a y in the highlydeveloped countries of the W e s t w h e r e , since the'thirties, elements ofplanninghave beensteadilyadopted ashave measurestoprevent u n e m ployment, a n d toexpandeducationaswidelyas possible. A n dtoday w earewitnessing novelattemptsto control the process ofsocialgrowth in m a n ydevelopingcountrieswhichareembarking u p o n theroadtoindustrializationgovernedby the idea of State socialism and a controlled e c o n o m y .In all these areas ofsociallife w h e r e the needsof m a n and hisrightsare controversial and w h e r e it isdifficulttoreachgeneralagreementtheMarxist viewisstillthe c o m m o n denominatorof diec o m m u n i st a n dsocialist Left (even if it is notalwaysexpresslyrecognizedastheirideology by thesocialists). Philosophically this is manifested by the adoption of valuesa n d standardsadmitting thejustaspirations of all those w h o s e rightstolife,personal dignity, economic security andcivillibertiesare infringedtoa c co m m o d a t ethen a r r o winterestsof big businessp o w e rlites,imperialistor chauvinist objectives a n d national prejudices.Sociologically it is expressedby the consideration of h u m a n needsand by thethought devotedinterms ofhistoricalmaterialismtoexistingobstructions to therightoffulfilmentof h u m a nneeds.Politicallyit is evidencedb y thepresenta w a r e nessof thewants a n d desiresof themassesand theendeavourtotranslatethesewantsintoprogressive policy goals.

Theseattitudesofthe Lefthavebeen m o u l d e dinresponseto thecontradictionsinherent in capitalism and theresultingabridgments of h u m a nrights.Checks u p o n m o d e r n m a n m a y be seen indifferentperspectives a n d berelated to differentsocial systems. In view of the unequal developmentof ourcivilizationthoserightswhicharec o m m o n l yaccepted in o n e societyare contested andopposedinanother;institutionsoperating as safeguardsto h u m a nrightsin o n e set ofconditions arecompletelyinadequatein otherenvironments. T h e question ofw o m e n ' sequality, for instance,assumesonecharacter in poorlyindustrialized countries w h e r e the most importantthing is torelease w o m e n from theviciouscircleofhouseholdchoresanddiedictatesofcustom, and is quitedifferent inindustrialsocieties w h e r eit isessentialto obtain equality of p a y , socialsecurityandpoliticalrightsforbothsexes. Socialsecuritytakes oneformin countries w h e r ethebackboneofsocietyis the family and alocal c o m m u n i t y providing individualsupportand a sense ofbelonging, andanother in those countries w h e r e ,underdie impactofindustrializationand urbanization,traditionalsocialbondshavebeenbroken. T h e principle offreeassociationw o r k sdifferentlyin conditions ofstrongsocialtensions a n d conflictsthanit doesinsocieties


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The Marxistapproach J9

displaying ahigh degreeof internalstability.Dissimilaritiesb e t w e e nsocialstructure, e c o n o m i c rightsandpoliticalsystems determine the sequenceofthosesocialneedsw h i c hareofp r i m a r yim p o r t a n c eata n ygiven m o m e n t ,a n d the real functions of culture patternsa n dsocial institutionsgoverningh u m a n relationsdeterminethe successive stages in the fulfilment of theseneeds.Thisposes the question ofenforcing h u m a nrightsin ab r o a d e rperspective. It includes varioussocial and e co n o m i c systems, various cultures.W e m a y foresee, before long, a n e e dforcriticalrevision, a n dfresh e x a m ination ofm a n ynotionsa n dideas seen to be conceived toona rro wly w h e nconfrontedwiththemanifold w a n t s a n d pursuits of m a n , or, on the c o n trary,too generally in the face ofcircumstancescallingforunequivocalprinciples a n dgoals.A s far asindustrializedcountries areconcernedit m a y be s h o w n that,parallelwithorevenquiteapartfromthe constraintsarisingout of privateproperty a n d them a c h in e r yof thecapitalist e c o n o m y , m a n is confrontedwith n e w d a n g e r s a n dthreats eluding, as it w e r e ,thesimpledefinition a n dexposition w h i c hcan bef o u n din thetraditionalcatalogueofh u m a n rights.In w h a tfollows, w e shalltry to take ups o m e of the p r o b l e m susuallydescribed as the d i l e m m a s of the age ofcollectivismand discussed bym o d e r nsocialscientists.If w ewishto sustain the principle of personality g r o w t h , w e are i m m e diatelyfacedwiththeimperiousquestion of h o w farthis pro cessso m etimeslabelled the 'instrumentalization' of the individualwhich is thedirect o u t c o m e of thedivisionoflabourand of m e a su r e s torationalizesocialrelations, m a yinfactgo.T h e worldwelivein is b e c o m i n g , as is well k n o w n , a wo r ld of largeorganizationsw h i c h i m p o s edisciplinesa n dconstraints u p o nthe individualconstricting the h u m a n personality a n dsetting limitsto individual e x p a n sion. T h e nearer w e d r a w to the point w h e r eourf u n d a m e n t alsocialande c o n o m i c w a n t saresecured,them o r eacutely dow efeelthose constraints.T h eadaptationof m a n to an organization is achieved,as is well k n o w n ,at the cost of shrinking individual initiative, a peculiar reduction ofthe workerto atinycog in the m i g h t y gears of the industrial m a c h i n e ,of inhibiting individual mobility thro ugh the g r o w t h ofspecialization,ofcrippling the h u m a n soul by e v e r y d ay routine and the m o n o t o n yofoperationsp r o g r a m m e din a d v a n c e a n dstrictlycontrolled. H a v i n g b e e nfor long an inseparable feature of industrial production this has nowentered thesphereof m e n t al work.

T h u s , w e are a p p r o a c h i n g todaya point at w h i c h educators, p sy c h o logists,a n dpsychiatristsp r o p o s eto a b a n d o n a s c h e m e w h e r e b y m a n , incontradictionwithhisvery h u m a n i t y,is forcedintoakindofrigidframe.1Thisis b y n o m e a n s ap r o b l e mofthedistant future. It h a sm a d eits a p p e a r -i. J. Hochfeld ,Studia omarksistowskiejteoriispoleczcnstwa [Studies in theMarxisttheoryofsociety], chapterentitled ' D w a m o d e l e huraanizacji prasy' [ T w o m o de l sof h u man i z at i onof w o r k ] , p. 13 ff.,W a r s a w , 1 9 6 3 .


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aneealsoinsocialistcountries w h e r e rapidindustrializationcallsforcleara n d definitedecisions as to theshape of the societywhich w edesire to build;it has presentbearingonpractical m o v e s and organizationalmeasures.W h a t kindofindustrialrelationsd o w ewishto attain? H o w can w eavoidthe mechanical adaptation of m a n to organization in favour of a c c o m modating organization to m a n ? H o w can weeffectively counteract theinstrumentalization of the individual? All these are questions m o r e andm o r ewidely discussed in theindustrialsociology ofsocialistcountries.1

Another particularly importantquestion of o u r times is theproblemofsafeguardingtheelementaryrightsof the h u m a n personas an individual,aproblem which m u s tbe faced within then e w complexities oforganizationa n d thesocialsystem a n d , therefore,callsfor n e w solutions.T o illustratethispoint let us take the recurring references in the n e w s papersofsocialistcountries to variousimpersonalregulations a n d administrativedecisionsbased o n thelaw of largen u m b e r s a n d treatingindividualsasstatisticalitems. F r o m the viewpoint ofcollectiveneedsthe h u m a n pers o n m a y be inconsequential, since w h a t counts aremasses a n d quantities:thousandsa n d millions ofpeopleare at stake. But theavailabilityof positivesafeguardsto protect individual rightsthrough c o m m o n l yrecognizedinstitutionsenabling thecitizento claim his d u e is notriflingmatter fromthe point ofviewofethics,which places the highest value on m a n .It wouldbe impossible to enterhereintoall thedetailsofpracticaldifficulties emerging in thisconnexion. T h ecruxof thematter is that theother 'party'concernedinsuchconflictsis not m e n butsystems a n d organizations;against t h e mtraditionalm e a n sofdefendingindividualrightsfail,individual sanctions or the ascription of materialresponsibility for anyw r o n gdoneproveineffective.

There is another area in which such n e w types of contradictions andconstraints appear: in thebehaviourof large organizations, w h o s e scopea n d p o w e rerectspecificbarriers tosocialparticipation a n d control.2 S u c horganizations (even in aplanned e c o n o m y a n d under centralized authority) frequently evade the influence ofsociety,thoughtheyimpress u p o nit their o w n aims andstandards and set up particular types of defencemachinery against p r o g r a m m e s of rationalsocial change.T h e rightsof people to participate in taking decisions which concernt h e m a n d to control the course of events is subjected to variouslimitationsinthisarea.Traditionalformsofpoliticalcontrol (such as representation,parliament, freedom ofspeech and association), w o r k e d out in the doctrinesof the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, appeartofailhere.

Also, expectations that public control could be firmlyentrenched in thestructure of decentralized territorial self-government or self-governingbodies ofproducers could not befullymet in practice. T h e progressivei. See the reportsubmittedto theThird Congressof the PolishSociologicalSociety, by K . D o k tor, M .Hirszowicz,J.(Kulpinska, and A .Matejkoentitled 'EmergingSocialistPattern ofIndustrialRelations',Polish SociologicalBulletin, N o . i/n, 1965.2 . M .Crozier,Lephnomne bureaucratique,Paris, 1963.


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T h e M a r x i s t ap p roac h 21

m e r g i n g ofthe various spheresofsocial life into one integrated w h o l eb e c o m e s an irreversible fact.W e m a y find this d i l e m m a reflectedinthe contrastingpicture, a l m o s tclassic by n o w , of a c o m m u n i t y ofpublicssetagainstasocietyofthem a s s e s ,1 thefirstbeingatype of d e m o c r a c y w i t h o u t participation of them a s s e s , a n d thes e c o n d , participation of the m a s s e s w i t h restricted d e m o cracy.Asociety of the m a s se sis am a n a g e d , a m o r p h o u s society, an objecta n d notasubject ofpolitical decisions. T h i siscertainly not the f o r mofsocietyaccepted bysocialistideology, a l t h o u g h w e c o m etobe p e r s u a d e dlittlebylittlethatit isnoteasytow o r k outan e w political m o d e l w i t hactive participation of the m a s s e s .In thelight of w h a t has b e e nsaid, thecatalogueofpoliticalrights d r a w nu p inthe nineteenth century a p p e a r s i n a d e q u a t e , not b e c a u s e wecallinto d o u b titsunderlyingvaluesbut b e c a u s epolitical f r e e d o m s asclothedin their nineteenth-century w o r d i n g d o notsecure thesevalues. W ecansee h e r e o n c e m o r e thequestionofindividualsafeguards w h i c h ,initst i m e ,w a s theprincipalsubjecto f interest todoctrines of liberalism. T h e politicaldoctrine ofcollectivism p r o v e s insufficient sinceit is too general,andcontains m a n y alternatives w h i c h , f r o m the viewpointofh u m a n rights,m a y beevaluatedindifferent w a y s .

T h i s r e v i e w of n e w p r o b l e m s arising f r o m e n f o r c e m e n t of h u m a n rightsinaw o r l doflargeorganizations,whilefar f r o m exhaustive,suffices n e v e r theless tojustifythestatementthateverystageofsocial d e v e l o p m e n t bringsits o w n d i l e m m a scalling for solution. Inthisc o n n e x i o nthefollowingshouldb e underlined:first,the significance ofall-embracing h u m a n s t a n d a r d s a n dvalues w h i c h m i g h t s u p p l yacriterion for theevaluationofparticularprinc i p l e s w a t c h w o r d s , p r o g r a m m e s and p r o p o s e d settlements,values w h o s eapplication m a y berecognizedasthe m o r a l m e a s u r e of social progress;s e c o n d ,the necessity ofu n d e r t a k i n g m o r epenetratingresearchinto h u m a nn e e d s a n d m a k i n gcloser e x a m i n a t io nof th e a b r i d g e m e n t sofh u m a n rightsat e a c h levelin thehierarchyofo u r civilization,asmanifested in differentsocialstructures a n d political o r d e r s ;third, the role of social action tosettlenot only m a t t e r sofpresent u r g e n c ybut also to try to establishfavourableconditionsfor the realization ofall-embracing h u m a n values.

T h e s e principles, asalready underlined, h a v e r e m a i n e dtothepresentd a y an inspiration toallthose w h o takeag e n u i n e interest in theenforcem e n t of h u m a n rights.i. C . W . Mills, T he PowerElite, chap. XIII, 'The MassSociety', N e w York, 1956.D r. M a r i aHirszowicz is h e a d of thesectionforh esociology oforganization at theUniversityof Warsaw, and secretary of thesection on work and organizationof th e InternationalSociologicalAssociation. H er published worksinclude P r o b l e m s ofthe British State(960)and Sociological Confrontations: M a r x i s m andC o n t e m p o r a r y Sociology (1964).Sheisth eeditor of M a n in Industrial Organizat ion(1965) and co-author{with M .Mo-rawski)ofSocialParticipation in IndustrialEnterprises (forthcoming).


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T h e liberal W e ste r ntraditionof h u m a nrightsD . D .Raphael

T he liberal Wes te rn tradition of h u m a n rights is d iscussed m a i n l y in relation to the differencebetween economic a n dsocialrights o n t h e one hand a n dcivil a n dpoliticalrightso n t h e other.It isa rgued that sociala n d economic rightswere n ot unknown to European phi losophicalt ho ugh t of th e eighteenth c e n t u r y b u t that in fact th e concern for civil a n dpoliticalrights inWeste rn liberalismquickly broadened to include a realization of th e importance to the individualof certain sociala n d economic guaran t e e s .T h e moststrikingdifferencebetween the UniversalDeclarationof H u m a nRightsand thebestknownof theeighteenthcentury documentson therightsof m a nis that the formeraddseconomic a n dsocialrightsotheolderconceptionofcivilandpoliticalrights. I proposetodiscusstheliberalWesterntradition ofhuman rights chiefly in relation to the distinctionbetweentheset w ocategories. W eall k n o wthat it ismoredifficulttodrawu p a n agreed convention, a n d tospecifymethods oflegalenforcement,foreconomic a n d social rightsthanforcivila n dpoliticalrights.Consequentlysomepeoplethinkthat itwouldhave beenwisertoconfinetheUniversalDeclarationtocivila n dpoliticalrights.F o r thepurposes of m ydiscussion,Ishalltakeasa n exampleofthisviewalittlebook b y M r .Maurice Cranston, H u m a n RightsToday.1I shall not beconcerned withthe practicalquestionof legal enforcement,onwhich I a mnotcompetenttospeak,excepttosuggestthat thedifficultyisexaggeratedunnecessarilyifw esupposethatth e legalprocessesforsecuringhumanrightsmustalwaysb e of thesamekind. M ydiscussionwill beconcentratedo na theoreticalaspect ofthe problem.It issaid(by M r .Cranstonforinstance, bu t his viewwould b eshared b y someotherhistoriansofpoliticaltheory)that theliberalWesterntradition ofhumanrights islimitedtocivil a n d politicalrights, a n d thatthislimitation is theoretically, aswellas practically, asound o ne .

T h e conceptof the rights ofm a natfirstappeared underthen a m eofnaturalrights. A s such,it depended upon thedoctrineof natural law,i. L o n d o n , Ampersand Books, 1 9 6 2 .

In t . Sac . Se i .J.,Vol. XVIII, N o .1, 1966


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T h e liberalWesterntraditionof h u m a n rights 23whichitselfrepresenteda confluence ofstoicism,of R o m a n law, and of theJudaic-Christiantradition. T h e idea ofnatural law, as ofany law, involvesboth dutiesandrights, but the traditionaltheoristsof natural lawgavem o r e emphasisto the duties, and thereism u c h to besaidforthisformofpresentation. A m i d present-daydiscussion ofh u m a n rights,onesometimeshearsthecomplaint that thereistoo m u c h talkofrightsand not enoughof duties. Th ecomplaint restsonamisunderstanding. W h e n peoplelikeourselvesspeak n o w a d a y sof theimportanceof securing h u m a n rights,weare not thinking so m u c h of ou rrightsagainst others, but of therightsofthe underprivileged; andsinceam a n ' s rightsnormallycorrespondtothedutiesof others towards h i m , ourtalk of h u m a n rightscould as well berepresentedbytalkof thedutiesof the m o r efortunate, including ourselves,to improve the conditions of the underprivileged. H o w e v e r that m a ybe,the concept of naturalrights, as distinguished from natural lawwithitsgreateremphasison duties, takes the centre of the stage for thefirsttimeincertaintheoristsof the seventeenth century, notably H o b b e s and L o c k e .T h e positionofPufendorfis alsoofinterestinthisconnexion. Pufendorf,w h o c o m e sbetween H o b b e s andL o c k ein point oftime,sees m o r eclearlythaneitherof t h e mthe complexities of the notiono f aright,buth e conformsto the older practice of giving greater attentiontothe concept of duty.Thisis true of hismasterpiece,D e JureNaturaeetGentium,a n d iscrystallizedin thetideof hissubsequent abridgementofit,De OfficioHominisetCivis.T h e latter w o r k wa s translated intoFrenchbyBarbeyracasLes Devoirs del Homme etdu Citoyen, thus givingriseto the f a m o u sphraseof theDeclarationof 1 7 8 9 , le sdroitsdel h o m m eetdu citoyen,with thesignificantchangeof'rights'for 'duty'.

T h e shiftof emphasis from natural lawtonaturalrightsinL o c k eis as y m p t o m of the growing individualism of the seventeenth century. Thatindividualism can be seeninthe epistemology of Descartes, m a k i n g thecogito, the thought of the individual thinker, take the place of authorityas the foundation of all knowledge;itcan be seen again in dieimportanceattributed, inthe thoughtofthe Reformation, tothe conscienceofdieindividual inmatters ofmorality;a n ditca n be seenalso,inpoliticaltheory,in the concentration u p o n die rightsof die individual against the State.Locke'sdoctrine of naturalrights,which areessentiallyrightstoliberty,m a y therefore beregardedas thefirstfirmstatement of die ideas ofWesternliberalism.

L o c k ehastireem a i n naturalrights,rightstolife,liberty,and property(orestate). T h e thirdof theseisdifficulttojustifyasanaturalright,andLocke'selaborate a r g u m e n tforitisclearly fallacious.Itis well k n o w n thatthe A m e r i ca nDeclaration ofIndependence,in place ofLocke'sthree m a i nrightsoflife,liberty,andestate, substituteslife,liberty,and the pursuit ofhappiness. L o c k e himself attached great importance toproperty, ands u m m e d up his three naturalrightsas therighttoproperty,using the w o r d'property'in awidesense to includelife a n d libertyas well asestate.ButIthink die essence of his ioughtisbetterexpressed by s u m m i n g upall


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threeof hisnaturalrights as the righttoliberty. W h e r e L o c k e uses'property'inbothabroaderandanarrowersense, wem a y instead interpret'liberty'forh i m inbothabroader a n d anarrowersense.A s h eusestheterm,the righttolibertyis arighttobeleftfreetodo as one pleases. M o r ebroadly, h o w e v e r , libertyfor L o c k eissimplyfreedom f r o minterference ofa n y kind. T h u s the right tolife is aright against others thatthey shouldleave on e free toliveoutone'slife. T h e right topropertyis aright againstothersthattheyshouldkeep their h a n d soffthatwith whicha m a nhas' m i x e dhislabour', a n d shouldleave h i m free to be thesoleuserofit.

Thisconceptoflibertyhasbeencalleda'negative'concept,theabsenceof interference. T h e right tolibertyinthissensecorrespondstoanegativeobligation ofothersto leave a m a n aloneto do the best (or theworst)thath e can for himself.Itdoesnotimplyanypositiveobligation on thepartof otherpeopletoassistthe individual, e.g., bygranting h i mopportunities,or m o r edirect benefits, that hecouldnot obtain by his o w n efforts.Locke'sliberalismisthereforeastrongly individualistdoctrine.It is adeparture,or atleastan abstraction, f r o m theearlierconceptionofnaturallawdoctrine (retainedinPufendorf'ssocialites) that m e n have positive dutiestohelpeachother a n d notmerelynegative duties to refrain f r o m hindrance.

In conformity withhis negativeconceptofliberty,L o c k eassigns apurelynegativefunction to the State. T h e task ofthe State is toprevent m e n f r o mencroachingoneachother'sfreedom. Accordingtothisview,the Stateisnot expectedtotakepositiveaction toimprovethe lot of individuals. T h a tis tobeleft totheir o w n efforts. Nineteenth-century liberalism continuedthistradition, so far aseconomicactionisconcerned,withitsdoctrine oflaisser-faire. Liberalism,sounderstood,emphasizesthe rights of individualstofreedom f r o minterference by the State, except in so far as the State actsinordertopreservethelibertiesof all.

Theserights have been calledcivilrights, but thephraseismisleading,since the rightsinquestion are not confinedtothecitizensof a State.Aforeignerisas m u c h entitledasacitizentolegalprotection againstbeingh a r m e d , obstructed,robbed,orcheated;and he correspondingly hasasm u c h obligation as acitizento refrain f r o msuchactions himself.Itis m o r eappropriatetherefore tospeaksimplyof 'rights ofliberty'. L o c k e ,likehispredecessors,spokeof thenaturalequality, as well as thenaturalliberty,o f m e n , m e a n i n gbythisthatallh a d anequalright tolibertya n d that n o -o n e h a d anaturalright todominionoverothers.It w a s thereforea n obviouscorollaryofthe doctrineofnatural rights that government oughtto bedemocratic, every m e m b e r ofaState takingpartintheinstitutionof ag o v e r n m e n t . This political rightofparticipation ing o v e r n m e n t , unlikethe so-called 'civilrights',isofcourseconfinedtothecitizensof a State.

H e r ethenw e havethe rights of m a nasunderstood b yclassicalliberalism,aridtheview whichIwishtodiscussisthat these rightsalone constituteh u m a n rightsinthe W e s t e r n liberaltradition. M r . Cranstonsays:1 ' E c o -i. H u m a n RightsToday,p. 38.


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T h e liberal Western traditionofh u m a n rights 25n o m i c andsocialrights w e r e u n k n o w n to L o c k e andthenatural rightstheoristsofthe eighteenthcentury.' H e regardsthe ideaofeconomicandsocialrightsasaliento theliberaltradition. H e agrees,ofcourse,as wealldo, thatsocialsecurity, universaleducation, free health services, andfull e m p l o ym e n t are desirablesocialobjectives, a n d headdsthat m o d e r nC o m m u n i s m , which gives theseaims priority overthetraditional liberala i m o ffreedom, has appliedthew o r d'rights' tot h e m ,althoughthelanguageof rights wasnotusedinoriginal Marxist theory.So far as theliberalW e s t e r ntraditionisconcerned,the contentionis,broadly speaking,thatthistradition confinesitselfto the rights ofliberty.

If theliteral m e a n i n gofthe w o r d 'liberal'ispressed,thecontentionisobviouslytrueb y definition.Aliberalis o n e w h o believesinliberty, u n d e r stood as freedom f r o m interference. Classical liberalism furthermoreis ahighlyindividualisticdoctrine,asw ehaveseenin L o c k e .It is e x e m plifiedalsoinRousseau's Discourse onInequality, thatbrilliantlittleessaywhich h a d so m u c h influence on the ideas of theFrenchRevolution.It isexemplifiedagaininK a n t 's statementofthe rights ofm a nin hisessay onT h e RelationofTheorytoPracticeinPolitics,aw o r k thatisequally inspiredb y Rousseau, and thatspeaksofthe three great principlesoftheliberty,equality, andself-dependency (orself-sufficiency) ofevery m e m b e r ofsociety. K a n tfirmly denies thatag o v er n m e n t shouldbefounded ontheprinciple ofbenevolencetowardsthepeople;theyshouldbeleftfree toseektheir o w n happiness.

Nevertheless,Ithinkthatthisisonly partofthe story.W e s te r nliberalism,in m o s t ofits advocates,has alsocontained strong elementsofradicalism.B y thatIm e a n thatit has tendedtowardstheethical(thoughnot theecon o m i c ) conceptionsofSocialism.Libertyisjoinedwithequalityin alltheW e s t e r nliberaldoctrines ofh u m a nrights, a n d although L o c k eunderstandsthissimplyas an equal righttofreedom f r o m interference,itsoon turnsintoaclaimfor equalityofopportunity,asinK a n t ,fore x a m p l e . T olibertya n d equality theFrenchrevolutionaries a d d e d fraternity, whichissimplya resuscitationoftheconceptofsocialitas, withitsdutiestogive positivehelptoone's fellow-men, that figuredinthe traditional theoryofnaturallaw. Sofar asRousseauisconcerned, theindividualisticdoctrineoftheDiscourse onInequality w a s followedby them o r e collectivistviewof TheSocialContract, including that fateful reinterpretation ofliberty whichlinkeditwiththegeneralwill.Ithinkthat the so-called 'positive'conceptofliberty,which w efindinRousseau'sSocialContract a n d inHegel, hasbeenresponsiblefor m u c h confused thinking a n d s o m e harmfulpoliticalphilosophy. In any eventIshouldnotregarditas thedoctrineofliberalism,eventhough T . H . G r e e ntriedtoa m a l ga m a t e the two . W eshould r e m e m b e r ,allthes a m e ,that thefineststatementofliberalindividualism,J o h nStuartMill'sessayOnLiberty, takesitsstand,not onfreedomitself,but onself-developmentas the justifyingbasis offreedom; a n d thedevelopmentof theindividual,asMillrecognized,oftenrequiresthatothers,sometimes throughthe State,shouldprovidepositive opportunitiesfordevelopment, a n d not


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merelythattheyshouldrefrainfromobstructing it. ImentionMill,thoughheprofesses not to believe innaturalrights,becausehe, ifanyone, canbesaid toepitomizetheWesternliberaltradition.A sis well k n o w n , Mill h a dconsiderablesympathywiththe ideas of theFrenchsocialistsof histime, eventhoughhealwaysremainedanadvocateoflaisser-faireforeconomicactivity.N odoubtitwillbeagreed,despite w h a tM r . Cranstonsays of M a r x i sm a n d C o m m u n i s m , that the ideas ofeconomic andsocialrights o w e most to Frenchsocialistthinkers of thenineteenthcentury,especiallyLouisBlanc a n d P r o u d h o n . Itwouldnot bepropertocallthesem e nliberals,butm y suggestionis thattheirviewsrepresentanaturaldevelopmentoftheradicalstrainoftheWesternliberaltradition.Let m e illustratethisb ygoingb a c kto the eighteenthcentury. M r . C r a n

stonismistaken in saying thateconomic a n dsocialrightswere u n k n o w nto the natural rights theorists of the eighteenthcentury. Louis Blanc'sideaof a right to w o r k is anticipated byTurgot in 1776 and by R o b e s pierre in 1793, and the FrenchDeclaration of 1793 speaksof a right toeducation.1 These ideas,which m u s t be assigned to theliberal tradition,are thenrepeateda fewyearslaterin thesocialistManifestoofEqualsof theB a b e u fConspiracyof1796, whichspeaksof a universal right toeducationa n dauniversalobligation tow o r k . A n evenclearer,becausem o r eextensive,exampleis to befound in T h eRightsofM an byT h o m a s Paine, w h o m u s tcertainly becalledaliberal.InPartI of his b o o k ,publishedin1791,Painediscusses the principles of the French revolutionaries, in reply to theattackofB u r k e .ButinPartII,publishedin1792,whichislesswell k n o w n ,Painegoesfarther. H e applies the principles of the declaration of1789ina carefully thought-out planof w h a t weshould n o wcallsocialsecurity.It included,for all w h o needed t h e m , a Statesystemofeducation,children's allowances, old age pensions, maternity, marriage, and funeralallowances, a n das c h e m eof publicly e n d o w e d e m p l o y m e n tfor diepoorofL o n d o n . InAgrarianJustice (1797), hesetsout a revisedplan,w i m adifferent m e t h o d of financing asimpler systemof benefits, available thistimeto all, whetherrich orpoor. H e saysemphatically,inboth w o r k s ,that heisspeakingofaright a n dnot of charity.

S o m u c h for the eighteenthcentury.Referenceto T o m Paine's planasone of'socialsecurity'callsto m i n d die w o r k of a m o r e recent Britishliberal, L o r dBeveridge, w h o s econceptionofw h a tis n o w calledthe ' W e l fare State'setsout inconcretedetailthe principles a n dapplication ofthoseeconomic a n dsocialrightswhichfigure in thesecondhalf oftheUniversalDeclaration.ThatBeveridgew a saliberal,not asocialist,isperfecdyclear,for heemphasizesthe principle ofresponsibilityforselfequallywiditheprinciple ofresponsibilityfor others. A n extraordinarily similarstatementofprinciples, inconnexionwiththePoor L a w , is to befoundin thelastchapterof J. S. Mill's Principles ofPolitical Economy. Botfi these thinkersillustrateplainly thethesisthat liberalism, nolessthansocialism,regards1. C f. C . J.Friedrich, Amer ican PoliticalScience Rev i ew , D e c e m b e r 1963.


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T h e liberal We s te r ntradition of h u m a n rights 27the principle of fraternity as constituting rights for the underprivileged,while yet holding fasttodie oldliberal ideas ofliberty and individualresponsibility.

S o farIh a v e challenged M r . Cranston's interpretation of theliberaltradition.In o w wishtoconsiderinam o r e analytical w a y the theoreticala r g u m e n t w h i c h he gives forexcluding e c o n o m i c andsocialrights f r o mh u m a n rights. M r . C r a n s t o nargues1thatit is amistaketoclass e c o n o m i ca n d social rights with the older 'natural' rightsofliberty. H u m a nornatural rights, hesays, are universal m o r a l rights, andbefore anythingc a n beauniversal m o r a l rightit m u s t satisfy t w oconditions,of practicabilitya n dof p a r a m o u n timportance.Iagree with M r . C r a n s t o nthat theseare appropriateconditions, buttheyd o not in fact d r a waclear linebet w e e n theearlier a n dthelaterconcepts of h u m a n rights. T o m Paine evidentlyunderstooddienaturalright tolifeasimplyingnotonlylawsagainsthomicidebut alsolawstoprovideabaresubsistence.Will a n y o n esay thath e w a s w r o n ginterms of p a r a m o u n t importance? N o b o d y w o u l d acceptC l o u g h ' s satirical couplet: ' T h o u shalt notkill; but need'st notstriveofficiously tokeepalive.'I m p o r t a n c e , likepracticability, is,ofcourse,amatterofdegree, a n dnod o u b tthepreventionofm u r d e ris ofm o r e p a r a m o u n timportance thanthepreventionofstarvation.Yet thedegreesof p a r a m o u n t cy do not placealltherights oflibertybeforeallthe e c o n o m i c a n d socialrights.Ifa m a nissubjecttochronic u n e m p l o y m e n tin adepressed area, hewillnot t h a n ky o u for theinformation that he has the basic rights ofliberty. L o c k e ' srightoff r e e d o mto a m a s spropertyisoflittleinteresttosucham a n w h e nitgoes along with ' f r e e d o m to starve'. J. S. Mill's plea for absolute f r e e d o mofexpressioncutslittleicewithlabourers w h o do not k n o w w h e t h e r theywill h a v ea jobnext m o n t h .I h a v enot forgotten practicability. T o m Paine's planforsocialsecurityw a s eminentlypracticable for the E n g l a n d of his d a y ,as hetook caretos h o w , butevenhis m o d e s t s c h e m e w o u l dnot befeasibleuniversally. Yet

thisisnot to say diatpoorernations areunabletoorganize a n yaid atallfor the n e e d y ;asort ofsystemofsocialsecurityisto befoundin the O ldT e s t a m e n t lawsaboutleavingharvestgleaningsfor the p o o r ,the periodiccancellationof debts, a n dso forth.A g a i n ,while u n e m p l o y m e n tisa m o n gthegreatest ofevilsforthose w h o are subjectto it, no a m o u n t ofreadingL o r d K e y n e s will p r o d u c eagolden key forfull e m p l o y m e n t e v e r y w h e r e .Y e t thereiss o m e possibility n o w a d a y s of s o m e control of u n e m p l o y m e n tb y g o v e r n m e n t s , as therew a snot in f o r m e rtimes, a n d thereforeitisjustifiabletospeak of aduty of g o v e r n m e n t stodow h a t they c a n . Afterall,n o a m o u n t ofcriminallegislationor of police forceswillbe able topreventallhomicides;but thatisnoreasonfor sayingthat the right tolife m u s tb e struckout of o u rlistof h u m a n rights as notbeinguniversally practicable. N o b o d ysuggests that the right to w o r kor die right tosocialsecurityi. Human Rights T o d a y , p.39-42.


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ca n be implemented to the s a m e degree everywhere.Article 22 of theUniversalDeclaration,inintroducingeconomic a n dsocialrights,recognizesthatthe entitlement has to be 'in accordance with theorganization andresourcesofeachState'.M r . CranstonjustifiablyderidestheextravaganceofArticle24 incallingholidayswith p a y auniversalright. B u t w e couldalsoderide theextravaganceof Article 19 inspeaking, without any reservations, of a universalright to seek, receive, andimpart information through anymediaandregardlessof frontiers. O nthe face of it,this articlewouldjustifythetransmissionto a foreign p o w e rof secret militaryinformation, thetappingoftelephone conversations, the opening of privatecorrespondence, or thepryingbya n y newspaperreporterinto the privatelivesofindividuals. O fcoursethearticledoesnot infactintendtheseconsequences.Itneedsto bereadinconjunctionwithArticle 1 2 , whichforbidsarbitraryintrusionu p o nprivacy, a n d withArticle 3 0 , whichlimitsthe exercise ofan y right so as notto a i m at the destruction ofotherrights.LikewiseArticle 2 4 , withits provision forholidayswith pay , needstob e readin thelightofArticle2 2 , whichsetsagenerallimitoneconomic a n d socialrights so as toaccordwiththeresourcesofeachState. Ishouldagree,nevertheless, that the inclusion ofholidayswith p a y is an absurdextravagance.It is so,however,notbecausethe alleged universal right toholidayswithpay is aneconomic orsocialright, butbecause holidayswith p a y are aluxury. T h e generalprincipleofArticle 2 4 , the right toresta n d leisure, is aperfecdyproperelementin alistof basic rights a n d duties. If I m a y refer to the O l d Testamentagain,the Mosaic Decalogue includeda day ofrestalongwiththe prohibitionof elementary crimeslike m u r d e r a n d theft.T o the m a n u a l worker(andthat m e a n s to two-thirds of the working population even in advancedsocieties), s o m e security of e m p l o y m e n t and a reasonable limitation ofworkinghours m e a n m o r e thancertain (I do not say all) partsofthe classicalrights ofliberty.

I have arguedthat M r .Cranston's two conditions of practicability a n dp a r a m o u n t importance do not afford a criterion for distinguishing therights oflibertyfromeconomic a n d socialrights.Thereis asense,however,inwhich it is correct to say that the rights oflibertyare universalmoralrightswhilepolitical,economic, a n d socialrights are not. T h e expression'a universalmoral right' m a y beusedin astrongersenseor in aweakersense.In thestrongersenseit m e a n s a right of all m e n against all m e n ;in theweakersenseit m e a n ssimplya right of all m e n but not necessarilyagainstall m e n . In theweakersense,all m e n m a y havea rightwhich is,for eachoft h e m , a right againsts o m e m e n only. A n exampleor tw o willm a k ethisclear.Every m a n has amoralright againstevery m a n not to bekilled;i.e., every m a n has adutytoevery m a n not tokill h i m . Thisis auniversalright in thestronger sense. B y contrast,every m a n has a right,w h e n a child, toparentalcare,butthisis not a right againstevery m a n ;i.e., it is not the duty ofeverym a ntogivetoeverychildth e careof aparent.N o w theeconomic andsocial rights, and likewise thepoliticalright of


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T he liberalWestern traditionofh u m a n rights 29

participation ingovernment, areuniversal rights in theweaker sense.W h e n theUniversalDeclarationsays thatevery m a n has the right to w o r k ,or the right to subsistence,itdoesnotimplythat thecorrespondingresponsibility toprovideany particular m a n with w o r korsubsistencerestsoneveryother m a n oreverygroupof m e n ; itimplies thatthisresponsibilityrestson the m e m b e r s of his o w n State, and that thegovernmentofthatStatehas adutytocarryout theresponsibility on behalfof allits m e m b e r s .W e d o ofcoursespeakofaresponsibilitytohelppeople w h o are inneedinotherparts of the world,butsuchhelpisan act ofbenevolenceor charity,and notamatterofimplementingaright. Similarly, thepoliticalright ofparticipation in government applies only within one's own State. A nEnglishmanhas the righttoparticipateinthegovernmentof theUnitedK i n g d o m but nottoparticipateinthegovernmentofFrance; and sincethereisnoworldState,it m a k e sno senseatpresenttospeakof a righttoparticipateinthegovernment of m a n k i n das awhole.

Thereisthereforeagenuinedifference betweenthe rights oflibertyonthe oneh a n d a nd political,economic and socialrights on theother.It iswellexpressedby theFrenchdistinctionbetween'the rights of m a n 'and'the rights ofthe citizen'. O n e has the rights oflibertysimplyasa m e m b e rof the h u m a n race,andtheyare rightswhich linkevery m a n with everyother m a n . O n e has political,economic a n d socialrights asam e m b e r of aparticularcivilsociety,and these rights link each m a n withalltheotherm e m b e r s of hissociety.Whilethisdistinctionlimits'the rights of m a n ' tothe rights ofliberty,itdoes not justifya ny suggestion that the rights of the citizen,i.e.,thepolitical,economic a n d socialrights,shouldnot beincludedina n internationaldeclaration.Although the UniversalDeclarationh as led to theestablishmentof aregionalinternationalcourt, the EuropeanCourt of H u m a n Rights, andm a y well leadtofurther internationalinstitutions,nevertheless the m a i npurpose of the declarationistoencouragenationalgovernmentstopromotelegislationand administrativemeasuresforsecuring the rightsofindivi

dualswithintheiro w n States. Legislation b y governmentsofcourse e n c o m passesthe rights of m e n ascitizensand not merelythe rightswhichtheyhaveas h u m a n beings. S o m e people m a y say thatthe Universal Declarationtaken byitself, without international machinery for implementation,ca n have noeffecton the actionsofnationalgovernments. Imyselfdonot sharethisview.Despitethe lack ofrealismins o m eof theannualreports m a d e bygovernments,Ithink that the influenceofthe declarationand ofthe reports, by the forceofexamples,isnot negligible. H o w e v e r ,thisis apractical question,onwhich the philosopherhad best holdhistongue.W h a tIhavetriedtodointhisdiscussion ofpoliticaltheoryis tos h o wthat thereisa sense inwhichthe rights oflibertyarefundamental,but alsothat theWesternliberaltradition displaysanatural and quite consistentdevelopmentfromthesetopoliticalrights a n d thentoeconomic and socialrights.


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N o te . T h efinalpages of this p a p e r , a n d alittleof theearlier material, h a v epreviouslyb e e npublishedaspartof anarticleo n ' H u m a nRights'in S u p p l e m e n ta r yV o l u m e X X X I X (1965) of the Proceedings oft h eAristotelianSociety, L o n d o n , a n dw ereusedagainforthe O xford me e t in g b ypermissionofthe AristotelianSociety.T h eearlierarticle is tob eincludedin ab o o kofessays o nPolitical T h e o r y and theRights o f M a n tob epublished b y M a c m i l l a n & C o . ,L o n d o n . T h e a u th o rasksusto say that the presentp a p e r w as p u ttogether ad hocin theshort timeavailablefor theO x f or d R o u n d - T a b l e M e e t i n g a n d w a snotintendedforpublication.Itispublishedhereatth e wish of U n e s c oalone.

D a v i d D . R aph ae lh asbeen Edward CoirProfessorofPolitical andSocial T h e o r yatt h eUniversityo fG lasgowsincei960. H e w a sprofessor ofphilosophy a t theUniversityof Otago,Duned in , New Zealand,from 1946 to 1948.ProfessorR aph ae lis theauthorof T h e M o r a lSense(1947), R ev i ew o f M ora l s (1948),M o r a l J u d g e m e n t (1955) and T h e P a ra d o xofT r a g e d y (i960).


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T h e H i n d u and Buddhist traditionsRomila T h a p a r

Hindu and Buddhist traditions arose from different socio-economic backgrounds: th e formerfrom amonarchicaltribalsociety, th elatterfrom r epubl i can and commercial groups. T h ediff e r e n tconcept ions arereflected in varyingattitudestowardscaste. The Hindu laws ofsocialorderf d h a r m a j emphasize separateness andpurity ofcaste, wh i l e Buddhism supported th e supremacyof moral law and prot es t ed againstcaste. Th e brahmans e laborated d h a r m a for their ownbenefit but a degree ofsocial harmony was maintained by balancing author i tar ianism wi th l ocalautonomy through th e c r ea t ion of sub-castes and the h i gh va lue p laced on to lerance .

T h e relationshipbetweenlawan d societyinvolvesboththe actual a n d theideal. T o the extent that particularlawsare related to a particularsocietythey ca n beregardedas areflectionof itsvaluesystem. Bu t law (bothcustomary an d codified) isalsoseen as a m e a n sof controllingsocietalfunctiona nd, assuch, an attemptis m a d eto perfect thelegalf r a m e w o r k ,whichthenbecomes a reflection of the aspirations of that society. T h eUniversalDeclarationof H u m a n Rightsreflectsthe values of m o d e r n m a n but theimplementationof these rights infull d e m a n d s asocietywhich has yet toe m e r g e . Article i states: 'All h u m a n beings areborn free andequal indignity and rights.' This initselfindicates the large degreeof idealismmanifested in such documents. Despite thefact that the declaration isacceptableto a largen u m b e r ofnationsitwould bedifficultto findamongstt h e m asinglenation w h e r ethisarticleis adhered to,implicitlyand inpractice, outside thestrictlylegalcontext.T h e problemofsiftingidealsfrom actualitybecomes increasinglydifficultw h e ntheperiodunderstudyisconsiderablyr e m o v e dfromthepresent.Both time and environmentlead to changesin theconceptof law. E v e nwithinasingletradition there can beapparentlydivergenta n d contradictoryattitudesatvariouslevelsforwhich there islittleor no preciseexplanation;insuchcases one has tosearchfor detailed, accurateinformationinordertounderstandthe contradictions. S u c h informationisdifficulttoestablishif the societyis one whichexisted tw o thousandyearsago. Keepingtheseproblemsin m i n d we can at best concernourselveswiththebroad

Int. Soc. Sei. J., Vol. XVIII, No . i, 1966


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32 Romila T h a p a r

f r a m e w o r k in whichtheselawswere evolved. In the H i n d u and Buddhisttraditionthisf r a m e w o r kcan be deducedfroma n u m b e roftextsanddocuments, most ofwhich were composed in the periodbetween 400B . C . andA . D . 400. M u c h of thelaterliteratureisin the nature ofcommentariesonthe earlier w o r k s , whichreflectrelevantchangesinbothsocietyanditslaws.1

There are two approachestoan attemptatunderstanding therightsof the h u m a n being in the H i n d uand Buddhisttradition.Firstof all, themetaphysical aspect provides a f r a m e w o r k of arathergeneralized kindemanatingfroma small group ofthinkers. Metaphysical thoughtcertainlycontributestothe ethosof asociety,butthiscontributionbecomesfairlydilutedby the timeitreaches theconcreterealityofalegalcode.T h e seconda n d m o r esignificant aspectofthe studyisprovided by the L a w Booksthemselves which d r a wa m o r e distinctpicture of the legal f r a m e w o r k .H o w e v e r ,relianceeven on suchdefinitesourcesisnot withoutitsdangers.T h e L a w Books are bothareflection ofearly Indian societyas wellasattempts at working outwhat wasbelievedtobeaperfectsocialsystem.Therefore the aspirationsofthe law-makers are alsotobe considered.Nevertheless,the danger can bemitigated s o m e w h a t bytestingfromhistoricalsourcesthe actualvalidityof thelegalsystemscodifiedby the lawgivers.A t the metaphysical level both H i n d u and Buddhist thoughtareconcerned primarily with the ultimate destiny of m a n a transcendent,spiritualstatewherethesoulfindssalvationor theindividualconsciousnessattainsextinction.Atthislevelofthinkingthenecessitiesand requirementsofsociallife haveatmostatransitory value. Considerable emphasisisplacedon the universalqualityof all h u m a n beings, on the values oftolerance and compassion, and on the need for h a r m o n y between m a n andnature throughrecognitionof therightsofeachallofwhichwouldleadtospiritualpeace. Therehas been no dearth of m o d e r n philosopherswhomaintain that the Indian moral consciousnesshas been concerned almostsolelywithaquest for spiritual peace. Perhapsitwasthisconcern withthe ultimatequestfor peace which led toadichotomy betweenmetaphysicalthinkingwhich encouragedawithdrawalfromlife, and the actualsocialinstitutionswhichwerealmostobsessedwith theideaof a purposefulordering oflife.Aperusalof thesocialandlegal literaturesuggeststhatthemetaphysical attitudewas anidealto which m a n y m a y haveaspiredbutwhichfew achieved. Nor wasthisidealallowed tointerferetoofrequentlyin theorganizationofsociety.Metaphysicalvaluesapart,itmustbe r e m e m b e r e dthatthe H i n d uandBuddhisttraditionsaroseout of two disparatesocio-economic backgrounds:afactwhichisreflectedintheir differingattitudesto h u m a n rights. H i n d u1. H i n d ulaw has beencodifiedintheDharma-shastraliterature,frequentlyreferred to as theL a w B o o k s . O fthesethemostsignificantfor our purposes are theDharma-shastras of M a n u ,YajnavalkyaandN a r a d a .Buddhistconceptson lawwerenevercodifiedin anysinglesource.Legalideasare,however,found in the Buddhist C a n o n ,particularlyin the Vinaya-pitaka.


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The Hindu and Buddhisttraditions 33

lawwasfirstformulated in atribalsocietyand it wasbasedlargelyon customarypracticesandrelationships.As isfrequent inkin-societies, socialcontrolshad theforce of laws. Thecentralproblem at thisstagewas tomaintain peacebetween thetribesrather than toprotecttherightsof theindividual.The acceptance of a monarchical system bythesetribesintroduced two newfeatures. Thepoliticalstructurerequired bykingshipencouraged an element ofauthoritarianismamongst the law-makers.Thecloseassociationofkingshipwithdivinitywasprojectedintothe realm oflawsand provided asupernaturalsanctionfor the lawswhenever necessary.Thestatusof theindividualinsocietycameto beconditionedbythesen e wfactors.

The Buddhisttraditionoriginated at a time when triballoyaltywaschangingintoterritorialloyaltyandtherewasasharperawarenessofpoliticalorganization.Buddhismbeganas one of a number of heterodoxsectswhose c o m m o nfeaturewastheirbreaking away from brahmanicalorthodoxy. The Buddhists and theJainashadtheirorigin in, and foundtheirearliestsupportersamongst, therepublicantribesofnorthernIndia,andtherepublicantraditionfound its echo in theteachingsof both Mahaviraand the Buddha. Absence of monarchical authoritarianism and closeassociationwith theidea ofdivinityin thepoliticalsphere both led to astresson therightsof theindividualinsociety.Thiswasfurtheremphasizedwhen in theearlystagesBuddhism becamepopular amongstthe emergentcommercialclassesw h o , in aperiodofexpandingtrade,gaveit more thanlip-service.Inthismilieu,not onlywastheindividual increasinglyregardedas thesocialunit,but even ininstitutionalmattersemphasis waslaidoncontractualarrangements,freefrom theinterferenceofdivineagencies.

Thedifferences in the twotraditionsaresignificantly demonstrated intherespectivetheorieson theoriginofgovernment.Accordingto the Hindutradition, m e n , in astateofdefencelessnessandsocialdisorder, appealedto thegodsand thelatterappointed a king intheiro w n image, w h o wouldprotectthe people and maintain law andorderand inreturntakeashareofone-sixthof theproduce.1Thesocialorderofcastes alsoemergedfromadivinesource.2TheBuddhisttheoryrelatesadifferentsequence of events. Itpostulatesa golden agewhichgradually decayed through theinstitutionofprivatepropertyandothersocialevils.Finally the peoplegathered together andelectedonefrom amongst themselves toruleover them andmaintain anorderlysociety.H ewasgiven asixthof the produce as wages.3In the Buddhisttheorythe emphasis is on thequasi-contractualnatureofthe beginnings ofgovernment and on thesovereigntyof the people. Thelatteridearemainedcentralto Buddhistpoliticalthinkingbut it wasnevertaken astepfurtherand developedintoatheoryof therightsof the people.There wasno attempt to provide adivineoriginfor theevolution of thesocialstructurein Buddhist thought. W e are toldthat people tended toi. Rig-Veda,VIII,35;TaittireyaBrahamana,I, 5, 9.2. Rig-Veda, X , 90;TaittireyaSamhita, VII, 1, 1, 4-6.3.Digha Nihaya, III, 61-77; Aryadeva,Chatushataka,IV, 76.


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34 R o m i l a T h a p a rk e e p togetherin groups basedontheir occupations and these o ccu p a tional g r o u p s gradually crystallized into castes.1A t the root of the social a n d legalthinkingofb o t htraditions w a sthebelief that g o v e r n m e n tisanunfortunate necessityinan ageofd ecay.S u c ha beliefimpliedthatsociety existedpriorto a n y g o v e r n m e n t a lo r g a n ization a n d , furthermore,that ineffectsocietyis m o r e imp or tan t th an anyf o rmofg o v e r n m e n t . T h e Indian m i n d thereforeconcerneditselfwiththequestforaperfect social system.IntheH i n d utraditionindividualsalvation (mokska)liesinco-ordinatingina ba la nc ed m a n n e r thethreepursuitsofh u m a n existence, w h i c hareahorma(thelaw softhesocial o r d e r ) ,artha(prosperity) a n d kama (pleasure).Dharma is them o s t imp or tan tofthese.2Briefly,dhartnarefers to then o r mofc on d u c ta n dofdutiesi n cu m b e n t o n each m a ninaccorda ncewithhis caste.Itderivesf r o m b o t hthe legaltreatisesofthepast (often regardedassacredtexts) a n d f ro m a p p r o v e d c u s to m ,particularly thatw h i c hisnot o p p o se dtothesacredtexts. T h e ideaof dharmaisfullyarticulatedinthetheoryofvama-ashrama-dharma,3 w h e r ethe definition ofone's d uty h a sreferencenotonlytoon e ' scaste,b u talsototheparticularstage inon e ' slife,i.e.,student,householder , ascetic,etc.G r a d u a l ly dharma b e c a m ethe m o s t significantconceptin theH i n d utradition a n dtheverybasis ofthestatus oftheindividualin H i n d usociety. T h e pro per w o r ki n gofdharma w a s d e p e n d e n tonthefactthateveryindividualm u s trecognizethe dutiesh e w a sexpectedtoperform andactaccordingly.4 T h e message ofthe B h a g v a d - G i t awaspreciselythis: o n e m u s t a

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