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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 192984 February 28, 2012

ROLANDO D. LAYUG,Petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MARIANO VELARDE (alias "BROTHER MIKE") and BUHAY PARTY-LIST,Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PERLAS-BERNABE, J .:

In this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for temporary restrainingorder and preliminary injunction, petitioner Rolando D. Layug seeks to (1) enjoin the implementation ofthe Resolution1of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division, dated June 15, 2010,which denied his petition to disqualify respondent Buhay Hayaan Yumabong Party-List (hereinafter BuhayParty-List) from participating in the 2010 Party-List Elections, and Mariano Velarde (Brother Mike) frombeing its nominee; (2) nullify Buhay Party-List's proclamation under COMELEC En BancNBCResolution

2No.10-034 dated July 30, 2010; and (3) compel the COMELEC En Bancto rule on his Motion

for Reconsideration3dated 28 July 2010.

The Facts

On March 31, 2010, petitioner Rolando D. Layug (Layug), in his capacity as a taxpayer and concernedcitizen, filedpro sea Petition to Disqualify

4(SPA No. 10-016 [DCN])Buhay Party-List from participating in

the May 10, 2010 elections, and Brother Mike from being its nominee. He argued that Buhay Party-List is

a mere "extension of the El Shaddai," which is a religious sect. As such, it is disqualified from being aparty-list under Section 5, Paragraph 2, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution5, as well as Section 6,

Paragraph 1 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 79416, otherwise known as the "Party-List System Act."Neither

does Brother Mike, who is allegedly a billionaire real estate businessman and the spiritual leader of ElShaddai, qualify as "one who belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented sector xxx", as requiredof party-list nominees under Section 6 (7) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8807

7, the "Rules on

Disqualification Cases Against Nominees of Party-List Groups/Organizations Participating in the May 10,2010 Automated National and Local Elections."

In their Answer8thereto, Buhay Party-List and Brother Mike claimed that Buhay Party-List is not a

religious sect but a political party possessing all the qualifications of a party-list. It is composed of groupsfor the elderly, the women, the youth, the handicapped, as well as the professionals, and Brother Mikebelongs to the marginalized and underrepresented elderly group. They likewise argued that nominees

from a political party such as Buhay Party-List need not even come from the marginalized andunderrepresented sector.

Record shows that Layug received a copy of the aforesaid Answer only at the hearing conducted on April20, 2010 after his lawyer, Atty. Rustico B. Gagate, manifested that his client has not received the same.Counsel for private respondents explained that their liaison officer found Layug's given address#70 Dr.Pilapil St., Barangay San Miguel, Pasig Cityto be inexistent. To this, Atty. Gagate was said to haveretorted as follows: "The good counsel for the respondent could send any Answer or processes orpleadings to may (sic) address at Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya Your Honor, they could come over all theway to Nueva Vizcaya, we will entertain him."

9


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On June 15, 2010, the COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution10

denying the petition for lack ofsubstantial evidence. A copy thereof was sent to Layug viaregistered mail at #70 Dr. Pilapil Street,Barangay San Miguel, Pasig City. However, the mail was returned unserved with the following notation ofthe postmaster: "1st 6/23/10 unknown; 2nd 6/25/10 unknown; and 3rd attempt 6/28/10 RTSINSUFFICIENT ADDRESS." Subsequently, in its Order

11dated July 26, 2010, the COMELEC Second

Division found Layug to be a "phantom petitioner" by "seeing to it that pleadings, orders and judicialnotices addressed to him are not received by him because the address he gave and maintains isfictitious". Accordingly, Layug was deemed to have received on June 23, 2010 a copy of the Resolutiondated June 15, 2010 and, there being no motion for reconsideration filed within the reglementary period,said Resolution was declared final and executory. It was entered

12in the Book of Entries of Judgment on

July 28, 2010.

As a consequence of such entry, the COMELEC En Banc, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers forParty-List, promulgated on July 30, 2010 NBC Resolution No. 10-034

13proclaiming Buhay Party-List as a

winner entitled to two (2) seats in the House of Representatives. Being the fifth nominee, however,Brother Mike was not proclaimed as the representative of Buhay Party-List.

Meanwhile, on July 28, 2010, Layug moved for reconsideration of the Resolution dated June 15, 2010before the COMELEC En Bancclaiming denial of due process for failure of the COMELEC to serve him,

his representatives or counsels a copy of said Resolution. He alleged that it was only on July 26, 2010,after learning about it in the newspapers, that he personally secured a copy of the Resolution from theCOMELEC.

14His motion for reconsideration, however, was denied by the COMELEC Second Division in

its Order15

dated August 4, 2010 for being filed out of time.

>The Issues

Aggrieved, Layug filed this petition imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC forthe following acts and omissions:

I. THE COMELEC SECOND DIVISION DID NOT ISSUE A NOTICE OF PROMULGATION TOTHE PETITIONERS COUNSELAS REQUIRED BY RULE 13 OF THE RULES OF COURT,THEREBY COMMITTING A CLEAR VIOLATION OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS; and

II. BY ISSUING THE 30 JULY 2010 RESOLUTION, THE COMELEC EN BANC UNLAWFULLYNEGLECTED THE PERFORMANCE OF AN ACT WHICH THE LAW SPECIFICALLY ORDERSAS A DUTY RESULTING FROM ITS OFFICE, WHICH IS TO HEAR AND DECIDE THEPETITIONERS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WHICH WAS TIMELY FILED.

16

In their respective Comments17

to the petition, respondents attack the jurisdiction of the Court arguingthat, with the proclamation of Buhay Party-List on July 30, 2010 and the assumption into office of itsrepresentatives, Mariano Michael DM. Velarde, Jr. and William Irwin C. Tieng, it is now the House ofRepresentatives Electoral Tribunal that has the sole and exclusive jurisdiction over questions relating totheir qualifications.

With regard to the issue on denial of due process, respondents maintain that, by providing an incorrectaddress to which a copy of the Resolution dated June 15, 2010 was duly sent and by refusing to rectifythe error in the first instance when it was brought to his attention, Layug cannot now be heard tocomplain.

We rule for the respondents.

The Ruling of the Court


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I. The Court not the HRET has jur isd ic t ion over the p resent pet i t ion.

Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that the House of Representatives ElectoralTribunal (HRET) shall be the solejudge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualificationsof its Members. Section 5 (1) of the same Article identifies who the "members" of the House are:

Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred andfifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportionedamong the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of theirrespective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as providedby law, shall be elected through a party list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties ororganizations. (Underscoring added).

Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: (1) members who shall beelected from legislative districts; and (2) those who shall be elected through a party-list system ofregistered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

18In this case, Buhay Party-List was

entitled to two seats in the House that went to its first two nominees, Mariano Michael DM. Velarde, Jr.and William Irwin C. Tieng. On the other hand, Brother Mike, being the fifth nominee, did not get a seatand thus had not become a member of the House of Representatives. Indubitably, the HREThas no

jurisdiction over the issue of Brother Mike's qualifications.

Neither does the HREThave jurisdiction over the qualifications of Buhay Party-List, as it is vested by law,specifically, the Party-List System Act, upon the COMELEC. Section 6 of saidActstates that"theCOMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, afterdue notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization orcoalition xxx." Accordingly, in the case ofAbayon vs. HRET,

19We ruled that the HRETdid not gravely

abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo warrantoagainstAangat Tayoparty-listand Bantayparty-list insofar as they sought the disqualifications of said party-lists.

Thus, it is the Court, under its power to review decisions, orders, or resolutions of the COMELECprovided under Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution

20andSection 1, Rule 37 of the COMELEC

Rules of Procedure21

that has jurisdiction to hear the instant petition.

II.Layug was not denied due process.

A party may sue or defend an action pro se.22

Under Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, "(e)verypleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing him, stating in either case his addresswhich should not be a post office box."

A judicious perusal of the records shows that Layug filedpro seboth the Petition to Disqualify23

and hisPosition Paper

24before the COMELEC Second Division. In the Petition to Disqualify, he stated his

address as#70 Dr. Pilapil Street, Barangay San Miguel, Pasig City. While Atty. Rustico B. Gagateappeared as counsel for Layug during the hearing conducted on April 20, 2010, he nonetheless failed toprovide either his or his client's complete and correct address despite the manifestation that counsel forprivate respondents could not personally serve the Answer on Layug due to the inexistence of the givenaddress. Neither did the Position Paper that was subsequently filedpro seon April 23, 2010 indicate anyforwarding address.

It should be stressed that a copy of the Resolution dated June 15, 2010 was mailed to Layug at his statedaddress at #70 Dr. Pilapil Street, Barangay San Miguel, Pasig City, which however was returned tosender (COMELEC) after three attempts due to insufficiency of said address, as evidenced by certifiedtrue copies of the registry return receipt

25, as well as the envelope

26containing the Resolution; the

Letter27

of Pasig City Central Post Office Postmaster VI Erlina M. Pecante; the Certification28

datedNovember 2, 2010 of the Postmaster of Pasig City Post Office; and the Affidavit of Service

29of


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COMELEC Bailiff Arturo F. Forel dated August 13, 2010. Consequently, the COMELEC deemed Layug tohave received a copy of the Resolution on June 23, 2010, the date the postmaster made his first attemptto serve it. There being no motion for reconsideration filed, the COMELEC issued an Order

30on July 26,

2010 declaring the Resolution final and executory, which thereafter became the basis for the issuance ofthe assailed COMELEC En Bancs NBC Resolution

31No. 10-034 dated July 30, 2010.

From the fact alone that the address which Layug furnished the COMELEC was incorrect, his pretensionsregarding the validity of the proceedings and promulgation of the Resolution dated June 15, 2010forbeing in violation of his constitutional right to due process are doomed to fail.

32His refusal to rectify the

error despite knowledge thereof impels Us to conclude that he deliberately stated an inexistent addresswith the end in view of delaying the proceedings upon the plea of lack of due process. As the COMELECaptly pointed out, Layug contemptuously made a mockery of election laws and procedure by appearingbefore the Commission by himself or by different counsels when he wants to, and giving a fictitiousaddress to ensure that he does not receive mails addressed to him.

33He cannot thus be allowed to profit

from his own wrongdoing. To rule otherwise, considering the circumstances in the instant case, wouldplace the date of receipt of pleadings, judgments and processes within Layug's power to determine at hispleasure. This, We cannot tolerate.

It bears stressing that the finality of a decision or resolution is a jurisdictional event which cannot be made

to depend on the convenience of a party.

34

Decisions or resolutions must attain finality at some point andits attainment of finality should not be made dependent on the will of a party.

[In sum, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdictionattributable to the COMELEC in issuing NBC Resolution No. 10-034 dated July 30, 2010 proclaimingBuhay Party-List as a winner in the May 10, 2010 elections on the basis of the final and executoryResolution dated June 15, 2010 denying the petition to disqualify private respondents.]

III.Mandamus does not lie to compel the COMELEC En Bancto rule on LayugsMotion forReconsideration.

Mandamus, as a remedy, is available to compel the doing of an act specifically ordered by law as a duty.It cannot compel the doing of an act involving the exercise of discretion one way or the other.

35Section 3,

Rule 65 of the Rules of Court clearly provides:

SEC. 3. Petition for mandamusWhen any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfullyneglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a dutyresulting from anoffice, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office towhich such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinarycourse of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging thefacts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately orat some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights ofthe petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of therespondent. (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, the COMELEC En Banccannot be compelled to resolve Layugs Motion for

Reconsideration36of the Resolution dated June 15, 2010 that was filed on July 28, 2010 after saidResolution had already attained finality. In fact, the COMELEC Second Division denied the same Motionin its Order

37dated August 4, 2010 precisely for the reason that it was filed out of time.

It should likewise be pointed out that the aforesaid Motion for Reconsideration was filed without therequisite notice of hearing. We have held time and again that the failure to comply with the mandatoryrequirements under Sections 4

38and 5

39of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court renders the motion defective. As

a rule, a motion without a notice of hearing is consideredpro forma.40

None of the acceptable exceptionsobtain in this case.


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Moreover, the Motion was filed by a new counsel Evasco, Abinales and Evasco Law Offices without avalid substitution or withdrawal of the former counsel. Thus said the COMELEC:

5. In spite of the finding that petitioner's given address '#70 Dr. Pilapil St., Barangay San Miguel, PasigCity' cannot be found, a new counsel, 'Evasco Abinales and Evasco Law Offices' filed on July 20, 2010,an 'ENTRY OF APPEARANCE AS COUNSEL (for petitioner Layug) WITH MANIFESTATION', at the

bottom of which appear the name and signature of petitioner Roland D. Layug expressing his conforme,with his given (sic) at the same '#70 Dr. Pilapil St., Barangay San Miguel, Pasig City;' it is noted that theentry of appearance of a new counsel is without the benefit of the withdrawal of the former counsel.

41

Considering, therefore, Layug's utter disregard of the rules of procedure for which he deserves noempathy, the Court finds that the COMELEC exercised its discretion within the bounds of the law thuswarranting the dismissal of the instant case.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

a. Composition


Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 83767 October 27, 1988

FIRDAUSI SMAIL ABBAS, HOMOBONO A. ADAZA, ALEJANDRO D. ALMENDRAS, ABUL KAHYRD. ALONTO, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, RENE G. ESPINA, WILSON P. GAMBOA, ROILO S. GOLEZ,ROMEO G. JALOSJOS EVA R. ESTRADA-KALAW, WENCESLAO R. LAGUMBAY, VICENTE P.MAGSAYSAY, JEREMIAS U. MONTEMAYOR, BLAS F. OPLE, RAFAEL P. PALMARES, ZOSIMOJESUS M. PAREDES, JR., VICENTE G. PUYAT, EDITH N. RABAT, ISIDRO S. RODRIGUEZ,FRANCISCO S. TATAD, LORENZO G. TEVES, ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, and FERNANDO R.VELOSO, petitioners,vs.

THE SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, respondent.

GANCAYCO, J.:

This is a Special Civil Action for certiorari to nullify and set aside the Resolutions of the Senate ElectoralTribunal dated February 12, 1988 and May 27, 1988, denying, respectively, the petitioners' Motion forDisqualification or Inhibition and their Motion for Reconsideration thereafter filed.


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On October 9, 1987, the petitioners filed before the respondent Tribunal an election contest docketed asSET Case No. 002-87 against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-electin the May 11, 1987 congressional elections by the Commission on Elections. The respondent Tribunalwas at the time composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6) Senators, namely:Senior Associate Justice Pedro L. Yap (Chairman). Associate Justices Andres R. Narvasa and Hugo E.Gutierrez, Jr., and Senators Joseph E. Estrada, Neptali A. Gonzales, Teofisto T. Guingona, Jose Lina,Jr., Mamintal A.J. Tamano and Victor S. Ziga.

On November 17, 1987, the petitioners, with the exception of Senator Estrada but including Senator JuanPonce Enrile (who had been designated Member of the Tribunal replacing Senator Estrada, the latterhaving affiliated with the Liberal Party and resigned as the Opposition's representative in the Tribunal)filed with the respondent Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Membersthereof from the hearing and resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them areinterested parties to said case, as respondents therein. Before that, Senator Rene A.V. Saguisag, one ofthe respondents in the same case, had filed a Petition to Recuse and later a Supplemental Petition toRecuse the same Senators-Members of the Tribunal on essentially the same ground. Senator Vicente T.Paterno, another respondent in the same contest, thereafter filed his comments on both the petitions torecuse and the motion for disqualification or inhibition. Memoranda on the subject were also filed and oralarguments were heard by the respondent Tribunal, with the latter afterwards issuing the Resolutions nowcomplained of.

Senator Juan Ponce Enrile in the meantime had voluntarily inhibited himself from participating in thehearings and deliberations of the respondent tribunal in both SET Case No. 00287 and SET Case No.001-87, the latter being another contest filed by Augusto's Sanchez against him and Senator Santanina T.Rasul as alternative respondents, citing his personal involvement as a party in the two cases.

The petitioners, in essence, argue that considerations of public policy and the norms of fair play and dueprocess imperatively require the mass disqualification sought and that the doctrine of necessity whichthey perceive to be the foundation petition of the questioned Resolutions does not rule out a solution bothpracticable and constitutionally unobjectionable, namely; the amendment of the respondent Tribunal'sRules of procedure so as to permit the contest being decided by only three Members of the Tribunal.

The proposed amendment to the Tribunal's Rules (Section 24)requiring the concurrence of five (5)members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature is a provision that where more than four (4)members are disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a minimum number, if not less thanthree (3) including one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions.Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the petition for disqualification, this would, in the contextof that situation, leave the resolution of the contest to the only three Members who would remain, allJustices of this Court, whose disqualification is not sought.

We do not agree with petitioners' thesis that the suggested device is neither unfeasible nor repugnant tothe Constitution. We opine that in fact the most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plainterms and intent of the Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate ElectoralTribunal, ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an ElectoralTribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, andqualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed ofnine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designatedby the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the Houseof Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportionalrepresentation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered underthe party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal hallbe its Chairman.


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It seems quite clear to us that in thus providing for a Tribunal to be staffed by both Justices of theSupreme Court and Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those "judicial' and'legislative' components commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to theelection, returns and qualifications of Senators. The respondent Tribunal correctly stated one part of thisproposition when it held that said provision "... is a clear expression of an intent that all (such) contests ...shall be resolved by a panel or body in which their (the Senators') peers in that Chamber arerepresented."

1The other part, of course, is that the constitutional provision just as clearly mandates the

participation in the same process of decision of a representative or representatives of the Supreme Court.

Said intent is even more clearly signalled by the fact that the proportion of Senators to Justices in theprescribed membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is 2 to 1-an unmistakable indication that the"legislative component" cannot be totally excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorialelection contests, without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution.

Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any Senator sitting in theTribunal by any of his other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same objections to thesubstitute's competence, the proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave theTribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but which it cannotlawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Senators.

To our mind, this is the overriding considerationthat the Tribunal be not prevented from discharging aduty which it alone has the power to perform, the performance of which is in the highest public interest asevidenced by its being expressly imposed by no less than the fundamental law.

It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the Constitution have beenaware of the possibility of an election contest that would involve all 24 Senators-elect, six of whom wouldinevitably have to sit in judgment thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake of the1992 elections when once more, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet theConstitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual situations or for the substitution ofSenators designated to the Tribunal whose disqualification may be sought. Litigants in such situationsmust simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Membersof the Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and collectively.

Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal mayinhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member ofthe Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case wherehe sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective andimpartial judgment. What we are merely saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate ElectoralTribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membershipof Senators and that noamendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudicationof a senatorial election contest.

The charge that the respondent Tribunal gravely abused its discretion in its disposition of the incidentsreferred to must therefore fail. In the circumstances, it acted well within law and principle in dismissing thepetition for disqualification or inhibition filed by herein petitioners. The instant petition for certiorari is

DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.


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Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 141489 November 29, 2002

SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., REPRESENTATIVES MELVYN D. EBALLE, LEONARDO Q.MONTEMAYOR, CRESENTE C. PAEZ, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES and PATRICIA M.SARENAS,petitioners,vs.HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, JUSTICES JOSE A.R. MELO, VICENTEV. MENDOZA and JOSE C. VITUG, and REPRESENTATIVES ASANI S. TAMMANG, RAUL M.GONZALES, DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN, DANTON Q. BUESER,1NAPOLEON R. BERATIO, SIMEONE. GARCIA and SPEAKER MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR.,respondents.

-----------------------------

G.R. No. 141490 November 29, 2002

SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. REPRESENTATIVES MELVYN D. EBALLE, LEONARDO Q.MONTEMAYOR, CRESENTE C. PAEZ, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES and PATRICIA M.SARENAS,petitioners,vs.COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, its Chair, SENATE PRESIDENT BLAS F. OPLE, and Members,namely: SENATORS FRANKLIN M. DRILON, RENATO L. CAYETANO, LOREN LEGARDA-LEVISTE,ROBERT Z. BARBERS, ANNA DOMINIQUE M.L. COSETENG, GREGORIO HONASAN, RAMON B.MAGSAYSAY, JR., TERESA AQUINO-ORETA, RAUL S. ROCO, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, VICENTE C.SOTTO III and REPRESENTATIVES LUIS A. ASISTIO, EMILIO R. ESPINOSA, JR., WIGBERTO E.TAADA, MANUEL M. GARCIA, SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, ANTONIO M. DIAZ, FAUSTINO S. DY,JR., PACIFICO M. FAJARDO, ERNESTO F. HERRERA, NUR G. JAAFAR, CARLOS M. PADILLA,

ROGELIO M. SARMIENTO and SPEAKER MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR., respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J .:

The Case

Before this Court are two original petitions for prohibition and mandamus with prayer for writ of preliminaryinjunction. Petitioners assail the composition of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal ("HRET"for brevity)

2and the Commission on Appointments ("CA" for brevity).

3Petitioners pray that respondents

be ordered to "alter, reorganize, reconstitute and reconfigure" the composition of the HRET and the CA to

include party-list representatives in accordance with Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act. Petitioners furtherpray that the HRET and the CA be enjoined from exercising their functions until they have beenreorganized.

Antecedent Facts

Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides for a party-list system in the House ofRepresentatives ("House" for brevity), as follows:


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"Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred andfifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districtsapportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with thenumber of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, andthose who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,regional and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number ofrepresentatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after theratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall befilled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenouscultural communities, women, youth and such other sectors as may be provided by law exceptthe religious sector."

On March 3, 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect. The Act sought to "promote proportionalrepresentation in the election of representatives, to the House of Representatives through a party-listsystem of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, whichwill enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations andparties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and

enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of theHouse of Representatives."4

On May 11, 1998, in accordance with the Party-List System Act, national elections were held whichincluded, for the first time, the election through popular vote of party-list groups and organizations whosenominees would become members of the House. Proclaimed winners were 14 party-list representativesfrom 13 organizations, including petitioners from party-list groups Association of Philippine ElectricCooperatives

5(APEC), Alyansang Bayanihan ng mga Magsasaka, Manggagawang Bukid at Mangingisda

(ABA), NATCO Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Akbayan! Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), andAbanse! Pinay (ABANSE). Due to the votes it garnered, APEC was able to send 2 representatives to theHouse, while the 12 other party-list groups had one representative each. Also elected were districtrepresentatives belonging to various political parties.

Subsequently, the House constituted its HRET and CA contingent6

by electing its representatives to thesetwo constitutional bodies. In practice, the procedure involves the nomination by the political parties ofHouse members who are to occupy seats in the HRET and the CA.

7From available records, it does not

appear that after the May 11, 1998 elections the party-list groups in the House nominated any of theirrepresentatives to the HRET or the CA. As of the date of filing of the instant petitions, the Housecontingents to the HRET and the CA were composed solely of district representatives belonging to thedifferent political parties.

On January 18, 2000, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two letters addressed to then SenatePresident Blas F. Ople,

8as Chairman of the CA, and to Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Jose A.

R. Melo (now retired),9as Chairman of the HRET. The letters requested Senate President Ople and

Justice Melo to cause the restructuring of the CA and the HRET, respectively, to include party-listrepresentatives to conform to Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

In its meeting of January 20, 2000, the HRET resolved to direct the Secretary of the Tribunal to referSenator Pimentels letter to the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives.

10On the same day,

HRET Secretary Daisy B. Panga-Vega, in an Indorsement11

of even date, referred the letter to House ofRepresentatives Secretary General Roberto P. Nazareno.

On February 2, 2000, petitioners filed with this Court their Petitions for Prohibition, Mandamus andPreliminary Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order) against the HRET, its Chairman andMembers,

12and against the CA, its Chairman and Members.

13Petitioners contend that, under the


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Constitution and the Party-List System Act, party-list representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat inthe HRET,

14and 2.4 seats in the CA.

15Petitioners charge that respondents committed grave abuse of

discretion in refusing to act positively on the letter of Senator Pimentel. In its Resolution of February 8,2000,

16the Court en banc directed the consolidation of G.R. No. 141490 with G.R. No. 141489.

On February 11, 2000, petitioners filed in both cases a motion17

to amend their petitions to implead then

Speaker Manuel B. Villar, Jr. as an additional respondent, in his capacity as Speaker of the House and asone of the members of the CA. The Court granted both motions and admitted the amended petitions.

Senator Pimentel filed the instant petitions on the strength of his oath to protect, defend and uphold theConstitution and in his capacity as taxpayer and as a member of the CA. He was joined by 5 party -listrepresentatives from APEC, ABA, ABANSE, AKBAYAN and COOP-NATCCO as co-petitioners.

Petitioners cite as basis Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:

"Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shallbe the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respectiveMembers. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justicesof the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of

the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis ofproportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under theparty-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman."

"Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as exofficio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by eachHouse on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizationsregistered under the party-list system represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall notvote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirtysession days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of allthe Members,"

18(Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners also invoke the following provision of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941:

"Sec. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. - The party-list representatives shall constitute twentyper centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including thoseunder the party-list. xxx"

19

According to the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment,20

at the time petitioners filed the instantpetitions the House had 220 members, 14 of whom were party-list representatives, constituting 6.3636%of the House. Of the remaining 206 district representatives affiliated with different political parties, 151belonged to LAMP (68.6354%), 36 belonged to LAKAS (16.3636%), 13 to the Liberal Party (5.9090%), 1member (0.4545%) each to KBL, PDRLM, Aksyon Demokratiko, Reporma and PROMDI, and 1representative was an independent.

In their Reply to Consolidated Comment,

21

petitioners alleged that, following the Solicitor Generalscomputation, the LP and LAKAS were over-represented in the HRET and the CA. Petitioners particularlyassail the presence of one LP representative each in the HRET and the CA, and maintain that the LPrepresentatives should be ousted and replaced with nominees of the 14 party-list representatives.

The Issues

Petitioners raise the following issues:


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1. WHETHER THE PRESENT COMPOSITION OF THE HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNALVIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATIONBECAUSE THERE ARE NO PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES IN THE HRET.

2. WHETHER THE PRESENT MEMBERSHIP OF THE HOUSE IN THE COMMISSION ONAPPOINTMENTS VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF PROPORTIONAL

REPRESENTATION BECAUSE THERE ARE NO PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES IN THECA.

3. WHETHER THE REFUSAL OF THE HRET AND THE CA TO RECONSTITUTETHEMSELVES TO INCLUDE PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES CONSTITUTES GRAVEABUSE OF DISCRETION.

On the other hand, the Solicitor General argues that the instant petitions are procedurally defective andsubstantially lacking in merit for having been filed prematurely, thus:

"It is a generally accepted principle that the averments in the pleading determine the existence of a causeof action. In the instant petitions, petitioners failed to aver that they or any one of them was elected by aparty or organization registered under the party-list system as a Member of the HRET or CA to represent

said party or organization under the party-list system of the House of Representatives."22

The Ruling of the Court

Petitioners urge the Court to rule on the issues raised in the petitions under review, citing the followingpronouncement in Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales :

23

"Where constitutional issues are properly raised in the context of the alleged facts, procedural questionsacquire a relatively minor significance, and the transcendental importance to the public of the casedemands that they be settled promptly and definitely brushing aside xxx technicalities of procedure."

Petitioners reliance on Guingona, Jr. v. Gonzales is misplaced. The "procedural questions" that

petitioners want the Court to brush aside are not mere technicalities but substantive matters that arespecifically provided for in the constitutional provisions cited by petitioners.

The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within constitutionallydefined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list representatives those who may occupy theseats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution

24explicitly

confers on the Senate and on the House the authority to elect among their members those who would fillthe 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in the Commission on Appointments. UnderSection 17, Article VI of the Constitution,

25each chamber of Congress exercises the power to choose,

within constitutionally defined limits, who among their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of eachchambers respective electoral tribunal.

These constitutional provisions are reiterated in Rules 3 and 4 (a) of the 1998 Rules of the House of

Representatives Electoral Tribunal, to wit:

"Rule 3. Composition. - The Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall beJustices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shallbe Members of the House of Representatives who shall be chosen on the basis of proportionalrepresentation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under theparty-list system represented therein. The Senior Justice in the Tribunal shall be its Chairman.


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Rule 4. Organization. - (a) Upon the designation of the Justices of the Supreme Court and theelection of the Members of the House of Representatives who are to compose the House ofRepresentatives Electoral Tribunal pursuant to Sections 17 and 19 of Article VI of theConstitution, the Tribunal shall meet for its organization and adoption of such resolutions as itmay deem proper." (Emphasis supplied)

Likewise, Section 1 of the Rules of the Commission on Appointments provides:

"Section 1. Composition of the Commission On Appointments. Within thirty (30) days after bothHouses of Congress shall have organized themselves with the election of the Senate Presidentand the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Commission on Appointments shall beconstituted. It shall be composed of twelve (12) Senators and twelve (12) members of the Houseof Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from thepolitical parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system representedherein.

(Emphasis supplied)

[Thus, even assuming that party-list representatives comprise a sufficient number and have agreed to

designate common nominees to the HRET and the CA, their primary recourse clearly rests with theHouse of Representatives and not with this Court. Under Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of theConstitution, party-list representatives must first show to the House that they possess the requirednumerical strength to be entitled to seats in the HRET and the CA. Only if the House fails to comply withthe directive of the Constitution on proportional representation of political parties in the HRET and the CAcan the party-list representatives seek recourse to this Court under its power of judicial review. Under thedoctrine of primary jurisdiction, prior recourse to the House is necessary before petitioners may bring theinstant case to the court. Consequently, petitioners direct recourse to this Court is premature.]

The discretion of the House to choose its members to the HRET and the CA is not absolute, beingsubject to the mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation.

26However, under the doctrine

of separation of powers, the Court may not interfere with the exercise by the House of this constitutionallymandated duty, absent a clear violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack

or excess of jurisdiction.27

Otherwise, the doctrine of separation of powers calls for each branch ofgovernment to be left alone to discharge its duties as it sees fit.

28Neither can the Court speculate on what

action the House may take if party-list representatives are duly nominated for membership in the HRETand the CA.

The instant petitions are bereft of any allegation that respondents prevented the party-list groups in theHouse from participating in the election of members of the HRET and the CA. Neither does it appear thatafter the May 11, 1998 elections, the House barred the party-list representatives from seekingmembership in the HRET or the CA. Rather, it appears from the available facts that the party-list groupsin the House at that time simply refrained from participating in the election process. The party-listrepresentatives did not designate their nominees even up to the time they filed the instant petitions, withthe predictable result that the House did not consider any party-list representative for election to theHRET or the CA. As the primary recourse of the party-list representatives lies with the House of

Representatives, the Court cannot resolve the issues presented by petitioners at this time.

Moreover, it is a well-settled rule that a constitutional question will not be heard and resolved by thecourts unless the following requirements of judicial inquiry concur: (1) there must be an actualcontroversy; (2) the person or party raising the constitutional issue must have a personal and substantialinterest in the resolution of the controversy; (3) the controversy must be raised at the earliest reasonableopportunity; and (4) the resolution of the constitutional issue must be indispensable to the finaldetermination of the controversy.

29


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The five party-list representatives who are petitioners in the instant case have not alleged that they areentitled to, and have been unlawfully deprived of, seats in the HRET or the CA. Neither have they claimedthat they have been nominated by the party-list groups in the House to the HRET or the CA. As such,they do not possess the personal and substantial interest required to confer them with locus standi. Theparty raising the constitutional issue must have "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy asto assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the courtdepends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."

30

We likewise find no grave abuse in the action or lack of action by the HRET and the CA in response tothe letters of Senator Pimentel. Under Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and theirinternal rules, the HRET and the CA are bereft of any power to reconstitute themselves.

Finally, the issues raised in the petitions have been rendered academic by subsequent events. On May14, 2001, a new set of district and party-list representatives were elected to the House. The Court cannotnow resolve the issue of proportional representation in the HRET and the CA based on the "presentcomposition" of the House of Representatives as presented by petitioners and the Solicitor General. Withthe May 14, 2001 elections, it is certain that the composition of the House has changed. In the absence ofa proper petition assailing the present composition of the HRET and the CA, the instant petitions mustfail. Otherwise, for the Court to rule on the instant petitions at this time would be tantamount to rendering

an advisory opinion, which is outside our jurisdiction.

31

WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions for prohibition and mandamus are DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

b. Nature of Function

NONE

c. Independence of Electoral Tribunals


Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 97710 September 26, 1991

DR. EMIGDIO A. BONDOC, petitioner,vs.REPRESENTATIVES MARCIANO M. PINEDA, MAGDALENO M. PALACOL, COL. JUANITO G.


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CAMASURA, JR., or any other representative who may be appointed vice representative JuanitaG. Camasura, Jr., and THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, respondents.

Estelito P. Mendoza, Romulo C. Felixmera and Horacio S.J. Apostol for petitioner.

Nicanor S. Bautista for respondent Marciano M. Pineda.

Benedicto R. Palacol for respondent M.M. Palacol.

GRIO-AQUIO, J.:p

This case involves a question of power. May the House of Representatives, at the request of thedominant political party therein, change that party's representation in the House Electoral Tribunal tothwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pendingtherein? May the Supreme Court review and annul that action of the House?

Even the Supreme Court of the United States over a century ago, in Marbury vs. Madison, 2 L. ed. 60(1803), had hesitated to embark upon a legal investigation of the acts of the other two branches of theGovernment, finding it "peculiarly irksome as well as delicate" because it could be considered by some as"an attempt to intrude" into the affairs of the other two and to intermeddle with their prerogatives.

In the past, the Supreme Court, as head of the third and weakest branch of our Government, was all toowilling to avoid a political confrontation with the other two branches by burying its head ostrich-like in thesands of the "political question" doctrine, the accepted meaning of which is that 'where the matterinvolved is left to a decision by the people acting in their sovereign capacity or to the sole determinationby either or both the legislative or executive branch of the government, it is beyond judicial cognizance.Thus it was that in suits where the party proceeded against was either the President or Congress, or anyof its branches for that matter, the courts refused to act." (Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196.)

In time, however, the duty of the courts to look into the constitutionality and validity of legislative orexecutive action, especially when private rights are affected came to be recognized. As we pointed out inthe celebrated Aquino case, a showing that plenary power is granted either department of governmentmay not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvident exercise or the abuse thereof may give riseto a justiciable controversy. Since "a constitutional grant of authority is not usually unrestricted, limitationsbeing provided for as to what may be done and how it is to be accomplished, necessarily then, itbecomes the responsibility of the courts to ascertain whether the two coordinate branches have adheredto the mandate of the fundamental law. The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The dutyremains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld" (Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA183, 196).

That duty is a part of the judicial power vested in the courts by an express grant under Section 1, ArticleVIII of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines which defines judicial power as both authority and duty of

the courts 'to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excessof jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."

The power and duty of the courts to nullify in appropriate cases, the actions of the executive andlegislative branches of the Government, does not mean that the courts are superior to the President andthe Legislature. It does mean though that the judiciary may not avoid "the irksome task" of inquiring intothe constitutionality and legality of legislative or executive action when a justiciable controversy is brought


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before the courts by someone who has been aggrieved or prejudiced by such action, as in this case. It is

a plain exercise of the judicial power, that power vested in courts to enable them toadminister justice according to law. ... It is simply a necessary concomitant of the powerto hear and dispose of a case or controversy properly before the court, to the

determination of which must be brought the test and measure of the law. (Vera vs.Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, 203.)

In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano M. Pineda of the Laban ngDemokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) were rivalcandidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of the province of Pampanga. Eachreceived the following votes in the canvass made by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pampanga:

Marciano M. Pineda.................... 31,700 votes

Emigdio A. Bondoc..................... 28,400 votes

Difference...................................... 3,300 votes

On May 19, 1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the election. In due time, Bondoc filed a protest(HRET Case No. 25) in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal ( for short) which is composed ofnine (9) members, three of whom are Justices of the Supreme Court and the remaining six are membersof the House of Representatives chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the politicalparties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein (Sec.17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) as follows:

XXX

After the revision of the ballots, the presentation of evidence, and submission of memoranda, Bondoc'sprotest was submitted for decision in July, 1989.

By October 1990, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda by a margin of twenty-three (23) votes. At that point, the LDP members in the Tribunal insisted on a reappreciation and recountof the ballots cast in some precincts, thereby delaying by at least four (4) months the finalization of thedecision in the case.

The reexamination and re-appreciation of the ballots resulted in increasingBondoc's lead over Pineda to107 votes. Congressman Camasura voted with the Supreme Court Justices and Congressman Cerilles toproclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.

Moved by candor and honesty, Congressman Camasura revealed on March 4, 1991, to his 'Chief,"Congressman Jose S. Cojuangco, Jr., LDP Secretary General, not only the final tally in the Bondoc casebut also that he voted for Bondoc "consistent with truth and justice and self- respect," and to honor a

"gentlemen's agreement" among the members of the HRET that they would "abide by the result of theappreciation of the contested ballot

1Congressman Camasura's revelation stirred a hornets' nest in the

LDP which went into a flurry of plotting appropriate moves to neutralize the pro-Bondoc majority in theTribunal.

On March 5, 1991, the HRET issued a Notice of Promulgation of Decision on March 14, 1991 at 2:30P.M. in HRET Case No. 25. A copy of the notice was received by Bondoc's counsel on March 6, 1991.


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On March 13, 1991, the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Cojuangcoinformed Congressman Camasura by letter

2that on February 28, 1991 yet, the LDP Davao del Sur

Chapter at Digos, Davao del Sur, by Resolution No. 03-91 had already expelled him and CongressmanBenjamin Bautista from the LDP for having allegedly helped to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo"Danding" Cojuangco, and for allegedly having invited LDP members in Davao del Sur to join said politicalparty; and that as those acts are "not only inimical uncalled for, unethical and immoral, but also acomplete betrayal to (sic) the cause and objectives, and loyalty to LDP," in a meeting on March 12, 1991,the LDP Executive Committee unanimously confirmed the expulsions. 3

At the same time, Congressman Cojuangco notified Speaker Ramon V. Mitra about the ouster of the twocongressmen from the LDP, and asked the House of Representatives, through the Speaker, to take noteof it 'especially in matters where party membership is a prerequisite.

4

At 9:45 in the morning of March 4, 1991, the Chairman of the Tribunal, Mme. Justice Armeurfina M.Herrera, received the following letter dated March 13, 1991, from the Office of the Secretary General ofthe House of Representatives, informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, theHouse of Representatives, during its plenary session on March 13, 1991, decided to withdraw thenomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura, Jr. to the House of Electoral Tribunal.The letter reads as follows:

13 March 1991

Honorable Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera Chairman

House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal Constitution Hills Quezon City

Dear Honorable Justice Melencio-Herrera:

I have the honor to notify the House of Electoral Tribunal of the decision of the House ofRepresentatives during its plenary session on 13 March 1991, to withdraw the nominationand to rescind the election of the Honorable Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. to the HouseElectoral Tribunal on the basis of an LDP communication which is self-explanatory andcopies of which are hereto attached.

Thank you.

For the Secretary-General

(SGD.) Josefina D. Azarcon Officer-in-charge Operations Department (p. 10, Rollo.)

Justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano promptly apprised the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of theSupreme Court in writing, of this "distressing development' and asked to be relieved from theirassignments in the HRET because

By the above action (of the House) the promulgation of the decision of the Tribunal in theelectoral protest entitled "Bondoc v. Pineda" (HRET Case No. 25), previously scheduledfor 14 March 1991, is sought to be aborted (See the Consolidated Bank and TrustCorporation v. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73777-78 promulgated 12September 1990). Even if there were no legal impediment to its promulgation, thedecision which was reached on a 5 to 4 vote may now be confidently expected to beoverturned on a motion for reconsideration by the party-litigant which would have beendefeated.


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The decision in Bondoc v. Pineda was ready as early as October 1990 with a margin of23 votes in favor of protestant Bondoc. Because some members of the Tribunalrequested re-appreciation of some ballots, the finalization of the decision had to bedeferred by at least 4 months.

With the re-appreciation completed, the decision, now with a margin of 107 votes in favor

of protestant Bondoc, and concurred in by Justices Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera,Isagani A. Cruz and Florentino P. Feliciano, and Congressmen Juanita G. Camasura andAntonio H. Cerilles, is set for promulgation on 14 March 1991, with CongressmenHonorato Y. Aquino, David A. Ponce de Leon Simeon E. Garcia, Jr. and Jose E.Calingasan, dissenting.

Congressman Casamura's vote in the Bondoc v. Pineda case was, in our view, aconscience vote, for which he earned the respect of the Tribunal but also the loss of theconfidence of the leader of his party.

Under the above circumstances an untenable situation has come about. It is extremelydifficult to continue with membership in the Tribunal and for the Tribunal to preserve it. 8integrity and credibility as a constitutional body charged with a judicial task. It is clear to

us that the unseating of an incumbent member of Congress is being prevented at allcosts. We believe that the Tribunal should not be hampered in the performance of itsconstitutional function by factors which have nothing to do with the merits of the casesbefore it.

In this connection, our own experience teaches that the provision for proportionalrepresentation in the Tribunal found in Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution,should be amended to provide instead for a return to the composition mandated in the1935 Constitution, that is: three (3) members chosen by the House or Senate uponnomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three (3) of the partyhaving the second largest number of votes: and a judicial component consisting of three(3) justices from the Supreme Court. Thereby, no party or coalition of parties candominate the legislative component in the Tribunal.

In the alternative, the Senate Electoral Tribunal could perhaps sit as the sole judge of allcontests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House ofRepresentatives. Similarly, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal could sit asthe sole judge of all such contests involving members of the Senate. In this way, thereshould be lesser chances of non-judicial elements playing a decisive role in the resolutionof election contests.

We suggest that there should also be a provision in the Constitution that upondesignation to membership in the Electoral Tribunal, those so designated should divestthemselves of affiliation with their respective political parties, to insure their independenceand objectivity as they sit in Tribunal deliberations.

There are only three (3) remaining cases for decision by the Tribunal. Bondoc shouldhave been promulgated today, 14 March 1991. Cabrera v. Apacible (HRET Case No. 21)is scheduled for promulgation on 31 March 1991 and Lucman v. Dimaporo (HRET CaseNo. 45), after the Holy Week recess.

But political factors are blocking the accomplishment of the constitutionally mandatedtask of the Tribunal well ahead of the completion of the present congressional term.


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Under these circumstances, we are compelled to ask to be relieved from thechairmanship and membership in the Tribunal.

xxx xxx xxx

At the open session of the HRET in the afternoon of the same day, the Tribunal issued Resolution No. 91-

0018 cancelling the promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. 25. The resolution reads:

In view of the formal notice the Tribunal has received at 9:45 tills morning from the Houseof Representatives that at its plenary session held on March 13, 1991, it had voted towithdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to theHouse of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,' the Tribunal Resolved to cancel thepromulgation of its Decision in Bondoc vs. Pineda (HRET Case No. 25) scheduled for thisafternoon. This is because, without Congressman Camasura's vote, the decision lacksthe concurrence of five members as required by Section 24 of the Rules of the Tribunaland, therefore, cannot be validly promulgated.

The Tribunal noted that the three (3) Justices-members of the Supreme Court, being ofthe opinion that this development undermines the independence of the Tribunal and

derails the orderly adjudication of electoral cases, they have asked the Chief Justice, in aletter of even date, for their relief from membership in the Tribunal.

The Tribunal further Noted that Congressman Cerilles also manifested his intention toresign as a member of the Tribunal.

The Tribunal further Noted that Congressmen Aquino, Ponce de Leon, Garcia, Jr., andCalingasan also manifested a similar intention. (p. 37, Rollo.)

On March 19, 1991, this Court, after deliberating on the request for relief of Justices Herrera, Cruz andFeliciano, resolved to direct them to return to their duties in the Tribunal. The Court observed that:

... in view of the sensitive constitutional functions of the Electoral Tribunals as the 'solejudge' of all contests relationship to the election, returns and qualifications of themembers of Congress, all members of these bodies are appropriately guided only bypurely legal considerations in the decision of the cases before them and that in thecontemplation of the Constitution the members-legislators, thereof, upon assumption oftheir duties therein, sit in the Tribunal no longer as representatives of their respectivepolitical parties but as impartial judges. The view was also submitted that, to furtherbolster the independence of the Tribunals, the term of office of every member thereofshould be considered co-extensive with the corresponding legislative term and may notbe legally terminated except only by death, resignation, permanent disability, or removalfor valid cause, not including political disloyalty.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved: a) to DECLINE the request of justices Herrera,

Cruz, and Feliciano to be relieved from their membership in the House ofRepresentatives Electoral Tribunal and instead to DIRECT them to resume their dutiestherein: b) to EXPRESS its concern over the intrusion of non-judicial factors in theproceedings of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, which performsfunctions purely judicial in character despite the inclusion of legislators in its membership;and c) to NOTE the view that the term of all the members of the Electoral Tribunals,including those from the legislature, is co-extensive with the corresponding legislativeterm and cannot be terminated at will but only for valid legal cause, and to REQUIRE theJustices-members of the Tribunal to submit the issue to the said Tribunal in the firstinstance.


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Paras J. filed this separate concurring opinion: 'I concur, but I wish to add that Rep.Camasura should be allowed to cast his original vote in favor of protestant Bondoc,otherwise a political and judicial travesty will take place.' Melencio-Herrera, Cruz andFeliciano, JJ., took no part. Gancayco,J., is on leave.

On March 21, 1991, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed by Dr. Emigdio A.

Bondoc against Representatives Marciano M. Pineda, Magdaleno M. Palacol, Juanita G. Camasura, Jr.,or any other representative who may be appointed Vice Representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr., andthe House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, praying this Court to:

1. Annul the decision of the House of Representatives of March 13, 1991, 'to withdrawthe nomination and to rescind the nomination of Representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr.to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal;"

2. Issue a wilt of prohibition restraining respondent Palacol or whomsoever may bedesignated in place of respondent Camasura from assuming, occupying and dischargingfunctions as a member of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal;

3. Issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent Camasura to immediately reassume

and discharge his functions as a member of the House of Representatives ElectoralTribunal; and

4. Grant such other relief as may be just and equitable.

Upon receipt of the petition, the Court, without giving it due course, required the respondents tocomment

5on the petition within ten days from notice and to enjoin the HRET 'from reorganizing and

allowing participation in its proceedings of Honorable Magdaleno M. Palacol or whoever is designated toreplace Honorable Juanita G. Camasura in said House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, until theissue of the withdrawal of the nomination and rescission of the election of said Congressman Camasuraas member of the HRET by the House of Representatives is resolved by this Court, or until otherwiseordered by the Court." (p. 39, Rollo.)

Congressman Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. did not oppose the petition.

Congressman Marciano M. Pineda's plea for the dismissal of the petition is centered on Congress' beingthe sole authority that nominates and elects from its members. Upon recommendation by the politicalparties therein, those who are to sit in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (and in theCommission on Appointments as well), hence, it allegedly has the sole power to remove any of themwhenever the ratio in the representation of the political parties in the House or Senate is materiallychanged on account of death, incapacity, removal or expulsion from the political party;

6that a Tribunalmember's term of office is not co-extensive with his legislative term,

7for if a member of the Tribunal who

changes his party affiliation is not removed from the Tribunal, the constitutional provision mandatingrepresentation based on political affiliation would be completely nullified;

8and that the expulsion of

Congressman Camasura from the LDP, is "purely a party affair" of the LDP9and the decision to rescind

his membership in the House Electoral Tribunal is the sole prerogative of the House-of-RepresentativeRepresentatives, hence, it is a purely political question beyond the reach of judicial review. 10

In his comment, respondent Congressman Magdaleno M. Palacol alleged that the petitioner has no causeof action against him because he has not yet been nominated by the LDP for membership in theHRET.

11Moreover, the petition failed to implead the House of Representatives as an indispensable party

for it was the House, not the HRET that withdrew and rescinded Congressman Camasura's membershipin the HRET.

12


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The Solicitor General, as counsel for the Tribunal, argued in a similar vein; that the inclusion of the HETHas a party respondent is erroneous because the petition states no cause of action against the Tribunal.The petitioner does not question any act or order of the HRET in violation of his rights. What he assails isthe act of the House of Representatives of withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, ofCongressman Juanita nito Camasura as a member of the HRET.

13

Replying to the Solicitor General's Manifestation, the petitioner argued that while the Tribunal indeed hadnothing to do with the assailed decision of the House of Representatives, it acknowledged that decisionby cancelling the promulgation of its decision in HRET Case No. 25 to his (Bondoc's) prejudice.

14Hence,

although the Tribunal may not be an indispensable party, it is a necessary party to the suit, to assure thatcomplete relief is accorded to the petitioner for "in the ultimate, the Tribunal would have to acknowledge,give recognition, and implement the Supreme Court's decision as to whether the relief of respondentCongressman Camasura from the Office of the Electoral Tribunal is valid."

15

In his reply to Congressman Palacol's Comment, the petitioner explained that Congressman Palacol wasimpleaded as one of the respondents in this case because after the House of Representatives hadannounced the termination of Congressman Camasura's membership in the HETH several newspapersof general circulation reported that the House of Representatives would nominate and elect CongressmanPalacol to take Congressman Camasura's seat in the Tribunal.

16

Now, is the House of Representatives empowered by the Constitution to do that, i.e., to interfere with thedisposition of an election contest in the House Electoral Tribunal through the ruse of "reorganizing" therepresentation in the tribunal of the majority party?

Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution supplies the answer to that question. It provides:

Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an ElectoralTribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns andqualifications of their respective members, Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed ofnine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designatedby the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or House ofRepresentatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional

representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered underthe party list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shallbe its Chairman.

Section 17 reechoes Section 11, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution, except the provision on therepresentation of the main political parties in the tribunal which is now basedonproportional representation from all the political parties, instead of equal representation of threemembers from each of the first and second largest political aggrupations in the Legislature. The 1935constitutional provision reads as follows:

Sec. 11. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunalwhich shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, andqualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of

nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designatedby the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of theHouse of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by each House,three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of theparty having the second largest member of votes therein. The senior Justice in eachElectoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. (1 935 Constitution of the Philippines.)

Under the above provision, the Justices held the deciding votes, aid it was impossible for any politicalparty to control the voting in the tribunal.


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The 1973 Constitution did not provide for an electoral tribunal in the Batasang Pambansa.

The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935Constitution underscores the exclusivejurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal as judge of contestsrelating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives(Robles vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5, 1990). The tribunal

was created to function as anonpartisan court although two-thirds of its members are politicians. It is anon-political body in a sea of politicians. What this Court had earlier said about the Electoral Commissionapplies as well to the electoral tribunals of the Senate and House of Representatives:

The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was toprovide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests tolegislative office, devoid of partisan consideration, and to transfer to that tribunal all thepowers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contestedelections of its members.

The power granted to the electoral Commission to judge contests relating to the electionand qualification of members of the National Assembly is intended to be as complete andunimpaired as if it had remained in the legislature.

The Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House were created by the Constitution asspecial tribunals to be the sole judge of all contests relating to election returns andqualifications of members of the legislative houses, and, as such, are independent bodieswhich must be permitted to select their own employees, and to supervise and controlthem, without any legislative interference. (Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the Senate,81 Phil. 818.)

To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral Tribunal must be independent. Itsjurisdiction to hear and decide congressional election contests is not to be shared by it with theLegislature nor with the Courts.

The Electoral Commission is a body separate from and independent of the

legislature and though not a power in the tripartite scheme of government, it is to allintents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ;while composed of a majority of members of the legislature it is a body separate from andindependent of the legislature.

xxx xxx xxx

The Electoral Commission, a constitutional organ created for the specific purpose ofdetermining contests relating to election returns and qualifications of members of theNational Assembly may not be interfered with by the judiciary when and while actingwithin the limits of its authority, but the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the ElectoralCommission for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of theconstitutional grant to the commission as sole judge of all contests relating to the electionand qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. (Angara vs. ElectoralCommission, 63 Phil. 139.)

The independence of the electoral tribunal was preserved undiminished in the 1987 Constitution as thefollowing exchanges on the subject between Commissioners Maambong and Azcuna in the 1986Constitutional Commission, attest:

MR. MAAMBONG. Thank you.


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My questions will be very basic so we can go as fast as we can. In thecase of the electoral tribunal, either of the House or of the Senate, is itcorrect to say that these tribunals are constitutional creations? I willdistinguish these with the case of the Tanodbayan and theSandiganbayan which are created by mandate of the Constitution butthey are not constitutional creations. Is that a good distinction?

MR. AZCUNA. That is an excellent statement.

MR. MAAMBONG. Could we, therefore, say that either the SenateElectoral Tribunal or the House Electoral Tribunal is a constitutionalbody.?

MR. AZCUNA. It is, Madam President.

MR. MAAMBONG. If it is a constitutional body, is it then subject toconstitutional restrictions?

MR. AZCUNA It would be subject to constitutional restrictions intended

for that body.

MR. MAAMBONG. I see. But I want to find out if the ruling in the case ofVera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, will still be applicable to the presentbodies we are creating since it ruled that the electoral tribunals are notseparate departments of the government. Would that ruling still be valid?

MR. AZCUNA. Yes, they are not separate departments because theseparate departments are the legislative, the executive and the judiciary;but they are constitutional bodies.

MR. MAAMBONG. Although they are not separate departments of

government, I would like to know again if the ruling inAngara vs.Electoral Commission, 53 Phil. 139, would still be applicable to thepresent bodies we are deciding on, when the Supreme court said thatthese electoral tribunals are independent from Congress, devoid ofpartisan influence or consideration and, therefore, Congress has nopower to regulate proceedings of these electoral tribunals.

MR. AZCUNA. I think that is correct. They are independent although theyare not a separate branch of government.

MR. MAAMBONG. There is a statement that in all parliaments of theworld, the invariable rule is to leave unto themselves the determination ofcontroversies with respect to the election and qualifications of their

members, and precisely they have this Committee on Privileges whichtakes care of this particular controversy.

Would the Gentleman say that the creation of electoral tribunals is anexception to this rule because apparently we have an independentelectoral tribunal?

MR. AZCUNA. To the extent that the electoral tribunals are independent,but the Gentleman will notice that the wordings say: 'The Senate and the


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House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal. 'It is stillthe Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal. So,technically, it is the tribunal of the House and tribunal of the Senatealthough they are independent.

MR. MAAMBONG. But both of them, as we have agreed on, are

independent from both bodies?

MR. AZCUNA. That is correct.

MR. MAAMBONG. This is the bottom line of my question. How can wesay that these bodies are independent when we still have six politicianssitting in both tribunals?

MR. AZCUNA. Politicians can be independent, Madam President.

MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, when we discussed a portion ofthis in the Committee on the Executive, there was a comment by ChiefJustice Concepcion-Commissioner Concepcion-that there seems to be

some incongruity in these electoral tribunals, considering that politiciansstill sit in the tribunals in spite of the fact that in the ruling in the caseof Sanidad vs. Vera, Senate Electoraltribunal Case No. 1, they aresupposed to act in accordance with law and justice with completedetachment from an political considerations. That is why I am asking nowfor the record how we could achieve such detachment when there are sixpoliticians sitting there.

MR. AZCUNA. The same reason that the Gentleman, while chosen onbehalf of the opposition, has, with sterling competence, shownindependence in the proceedings of this Commission. I think we can alsotrust that the members of the tribunals will be independent. (pp. 111-112,Journal, Tuesday, July 22, 1986, Emphasis supplied.)

Resolution of the House of Representatives violates the independence of the HRET.

The independence of the House Electoral Tribunal so zealously guarded by the framers of ourConstitution, would, however, by a myth and its proceedings a farce if the House of Representatives, orthe majority party therein, may shuffle and manipulate the political (as distinguished from the judicial)component of the electoral tribunal, to serve the interests of the party in power.

The resolution of the House of Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from the HouseElectoral Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his vote in favor of the Nacionalista Party'scandidate, Bondoc, is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral Tribunalto be the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc.

To sanction such interference by the House of Representatives in the work of the House ElectoralTribunal would reduce the tribunal to a mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party in power (LDP)which the three justices of the Supreme Court and the lone NP member would be powerless to stop. Aminority party candidate may as well abandon all hope at the threshold of the tribunal.

Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in the HRET.


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As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions withcomplete detachment, impartiality, and independence even independence from the political party to whichthey belong. Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach of party discipline," are not valid grounds for theexpulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for havingcast a conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination andappreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representativescommitted a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice, and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution ofexpulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.

Expulsion of Congressman Camasura violates his right to security of tenure.

Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it violatesCongressman Camasura's right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET as "sole judge" ofcongressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoysecurity of tenure under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Therefore, membership inthe House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of themember's congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political partyhe represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party, or removal for other valid cause.A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for "party disloyalty" short of proof that

he has formally affiliated with another political group. As the records of this case fail to show thatCongressman Camasura has become a registered member of another political party, his expulsion fromthe LDP and from the HRET was not for a valid cause, hence, it violated his right to security of tenure.

There is nothing to the argument of respondent Pineda that members of the House Electoral Tribunal arenot entitled to security of tenure because, as a matter of fact, two Supreme Court Justices in the Tribunalwere changed before the end of the congressional term, namely: Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan who,upon his elevation to the office of Chief Justice, was replaced by Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, and thelatter, who was temporarily replaced by Justice Emilio A. Gancayco, when he (J. Feliciano) took a leaveof absence to deliver a lecture in Yale University. It should be stressed, however, that those changes inthe judicial composition to the HRET had no political implications at all unlike the present attempt toremove Congressman Camasura. No coercion was applied on Chief Justice Fernan to resign from thetribunal, nor on Justice Feliciano to go on a leave of absence. They acted on their own free will, for valid

reasons, and with no covert design to derail the disposition of a pending case in the HRET.

The case of Congressman Camasura is different. He was expelled from, and by, the LDP to punish himfor "party disloyalty" after he had revealed to the Secretary-General of the party how he voted in theBondoc case. The purpose of the expulsion of Congressman Camasura was to nullify his vote in theBondoc case so that the HRET's decision may not be promulgated, and so that the way could be clearedfor the LDP to nominate a replacement for Congressman Camasura in the Tribunal. That stratagem of theLDP and the House of Representatives is clearly aimed to substitute Congressman Camasura's vote and,in effect, to change the judgment of the HRET in the Bondoc case.

The judicial power of this Court has been invoked by Bondoc for the protection of his rights against thestrong arm of the majority party in the House of Representatives. The Court cannot be deaf to his plea forrelief, nor indifferent to his charge that the House of Representatives had acted with grave abuse of

discretion in removing Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal. He calls upon theCourt, as guardian of the Constitution, to exercise its judicial power and discharge its duty to protect hisrights as the party aggrieved by the action of the House. The Court must perform its duty under theConstitution "even when the violator be the highest official of the land or the Government itself"(Concurring opinion of J. Antonio Barredo in Aquino vs. Ponce-Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 207).

Since the expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal by the House ofRepresentatives was not for a lawful and valid cause, but to unjustly interfere with the tribunal'sdisposition of the Bondoc case and to deprive Bondoc of the fruits of the Tribunal's decision in his favor,the action of the House of Representatives is clearly violative of the constitutional mandate (Sec. 17, Art.


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VI, 1987 Constitution) which created the House Electoral Tribunal to be the "sole judge" of the electioncontest between Pineda and Bondoc. We, therefore, declare null and void the resolution dated March 13,1991 of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, ofCongressman Camasura as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal. The petitioner, Dr. EmigdioBondoc, is entitled to the reliefs he prays for in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is granted. The decision of the Houseof Representatives withdrawing the nomination and rescinding the election of Congressman Juanita G.Camasura, Jr. as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal is hereby declared null and void ab initio forbeing violative of the Constitution, and Congressman Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. is ordered reinstated tohis position as a member of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The HRET Resolution No.91-0018 dated March 14, 1991, cancelling the promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. 25 ("Dr.Emigdio Bondoc vs. Marciano A. Pineda") is also set aside. Considering the unconscionable delayincurred in the promulgation of that decision to the prejudice of the speedy resolution of electoral cases,the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, and in the interest of justice, hereby declares the saiddecision DULY PROMULGATED, effective upon service of copies thereof on the parties, to be doneimmediately by the Tribunal. Costs against respondent Marciano A. Pineda.

SO ORDERED.

d. Powers


Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 84297 December 8, 1988

CARMELO F. LAZATIN, petitioner,vs.THE HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and LORENZO G. TIMBOL, respondents.

Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

CORTES, J.:


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Petitioner and private respondent were among the candidates for Representative of the first district ofPampanga during the elections of May 11, 1987. During the canvassing of the votes, private respondentobjected to the inclusion of certain election returns. But since the Municipal Board of Canvassers did notrule on his objections, he brought his case to the Commission on Elections. On May 19, 1987, theCOMELEC ordered the Provincial Board of C

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