Ben Eliezer jewish politics

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A Nation-In-Arms: State, Nation, and Militarism in Israel's First YearsAuthor(s): Uri Ben-EliezerSource: Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 37, No. 2 (Apr., 1995), pp. 264-285Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/179282Accessed: 12/10/2008 12:55

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2/23

A

Nation-in-Arms:

State,

Nation,

and

Militarism n Israel'sFirst Years

URI

BEN-ELIEZER

Tel-Aviv

University

Like

many

other

states,

Israel

was

forged

through

he

struggle

of a national

liberationmovement that

likely

drew

inspiration

rom

an ethnic

past

and that

certainlyworked to establish a political framework.1Once the state existed,

however,

its leaders

did not

regard

the ethnie as an

objective

category

that

would in

large

measuredeterminewhethera nation would

emerge.2

Instead,

they

viewed the ethnie as

a

subject

susceptible,

n

varyingdegrees,

to

manipu-

lation,

invention, domination,

and mobilization.3As

the

prime

minister

of

Piedmont

said,

We have

made

Italy,

now

we

have to

make

Italians ;

or

as

Israel's

first

prime

minister, Ben-Gurion,

put

it

in

April

1951

during

the

election

campaign:

I

see

in

these elections the

shaping

of

a nation

for

the

state because

there is a state but not a nation. 4

Thisessaydeals with the firstyearsafter hefoundingof the Israelistate.My

main concern is to examine the

way

in which the state constructedan ethnic

population

nto a

fighting

nation,

a nation-in-arms.

Usually,

states

construct

nations

through

various

means,

such as the

school

system,

the

media,

and the

army.

In a

speech

to the

Israeli

parliament

Knesset),

Ben- Gurionclaimed that

efficiency

was

the

reason,

among

all the

possibilities,

for

the reconstruction

f

the Israeli

nation,

primarilyby

the

army:

I have

been a Zionistall

my

life and

I

do

not

deny

the existenceof

Israel,

heaven

forbid . .

.

but

. . . even the

English

nation was not

always

that

nation . . . but was

Anthony

D.

Smith,

State-Making

and

Nation-Building,

n

John

A.

Hall, ed.,

States

in

History

(Oxford:

Basil

Blackwell,

1986),

251.

2

An ethnic

community,

or

ethnie,

shares

a

common

myth

of

origins

and

descent,

a common

history,

elements of

distinctive

culture,

a common territorial

association,

and

sense of

group

solidarity.

A

nation s

much more

impersonal,

abstract,

and

overtly

political

than an

ethnic

group.

It is

a

cultural-political

community

that has become conscious

of its

coherence,

unity,

and

particular

nterests.

See,

Anthony

D.

Smith,

Ethnieand Nation n the

Moder

World,

Millenni-

um,

14:2

(1983),

128-32;

Peter

Alter,

Nationalism

(London:

Edward

Arnold,

1989),

17.

3

John

Breuilly,

Nationalism

and the

State

(Manchester:

Manchester

University

Press, 1982);

Eric J. Hobsbawm,Nations and Nationalism Since 1780 (Cambridge:Cambridge University

Press,

1990);

Ernest

Gellner,

Nation and Nationalism

(New

York:

Cornell

University

Press,

1983);

Benedict

Anderson,

Imagined

Communities

London:

Verso,

1983).

4

Hobsbawm,

Nations

and Nationalism Since

1780,

44-45;

Ben-Gurion

n

Mapai's

meeting,

from

Eyal

Kafkafi,

A

Country

Searching

For Its

People

(Tel-Aviv:

Hakibut

Hameuchad,

1991),

3.

0010-4175/95/2387-0548

$5.00

+

.10

?

1995

Society

for

Comparative

Study

of

Society

and

History

264


3/23

ISRAEL AS A

NATION-IN-ARMS

265

composed

of

differenttribes . . .

fighting

one

another.And

only

after a

development

of

hundreds

of

years

did

they

become

one nation.

...

We

do

not have

hundreds

of

years, andwithout the instrument f the army ... we will not soon be a nation ....

We must

guide

the

progress

of

history,

accelerate

it,

direct it.

... This

requires

a

frameworkof

duty

. . .

a framework

of national

discipline.5

Israeli

military sociologists

have

accepted

Ben-Gurion's

rationalization.

Relying

on

theories

of

nation

building

and

modernization

that

perceive

the

army

as

an

agent

of

development

and

integration,6

these

sociologists

wrote

on

the

many

and

varied

functions of

the Israeli

army

and on its

expanding

role

in

the civil

sphere.

The

army

was said

to

contribute to

immigrant

absorption,

act

as a

melting pot

for

Jewish ethnic

groups, help

in

conquering

the

wilder-

ness

and in

further

settlement,

educate for

good

citizenship

and for

love of

country,

and

foster

culture.

Virtually

no area of

life

seems to

have

escaped

the

eyes

of

the scholars who

probed

the

non-military

use

of

the

military. 7

As

for

the

army's

involvement

in

internal

politics

or

the

chances of a

military

coup,

this

possibility,

most

scholars

claimed,

was

not

real,

since

Israel is

a

nation-

in-arms.

The

nation-in-arms was

portrayed

as

a model of

relations

between the civil

and

military

sectors,

in

which

the

boundaries

between

the two

are

frag-

mented.8 These permeable boundaries, some scholars believed, allowed the

two

sectors

(and

the two

elites)

to

interact

across a

wide

range

of

situations

and to

benefit from

reciprocal

influence

after

agreeing

on

the

rules of

the

game.

It

made it

possible,

on

the

one

hand,

to

conceive of

expanding

the

army's

role and

intervention

in

building

the

nation,

a

phenomenon

that

Horowitz and

Lissak

termed

(partial)

militarization

of the civil

sector.

At

the

same

time,

it

was said

to

bring

about

civilianization,

in

which

civilians

increase

their influence

and

involvement in

the

military

sector,

for

example,

through

Israel's

unique

system

of

service in

the

reserves,

which

transformed

5

Kneset

Protokol,

August

19,

1952.

6

John

J.

Johnson,

ed.,

The Role

of

the

Military

in

Underdeveloped

Countries

(Princeton:

Princeton

University

Press,

1962);

LucianW.

Pie,

Armies n

the

Process of

Political

Moderniza-

tion,

in

Johnson,

The Role

of

the

Military

n

Underdeveloped

Countries,

69-89;

Moshe

Lissak,

Military

Roles

and

Modernization

California,

Sage,

1976).

7

Moshe

Lissak,

The Israel

Defence Forces

as an

Agent

of

Socialization

and

Education,

n

M. R.

Van

Gils, ed.,

The

PerceivedRole

of

the

Military

(Rotterdam:

Rotterdam

University

Press,

1971) 325-39;

Dan

Horowitz

and

Baruch

Kimmerling,

Some

Social

Implications

of

Military

Service

and the

Reserve

System

in

Israel,

Archieve

European

Sociologie,

15

(1974),

262-76;

Amos

Perlmutter,

The

Military

and

Politics in

Modern

Times

(New

Haven:

Yale

University

Press,

1977), 251-80; Idem., MilitaryandPolitics inIsrael:NationBuildingandRoleExpansion(New

York:

Frederick

A.

Praeger,

1969);

Victor

Azarya

and

Baruch

Kimmerling,

New

Immigrants

n

the

Israeli

Armed

Forces,

Armed

Forces and

Society,

6:3

(1980),

22-41.

8

A. R.

Luckham,

A

Comparative

Typology

of

Civil-Military

Relations,

Government

and

Opposition,

6

(1971), 17-20;

David

Rapoport,

A

Comparative

Theory

of

Military

and

Political

Types,

in

Samuel

Huntington,

ed.,

Changing

Patterns.

of

Military

Politics

(New

York:

Free

Press,

1962), 71-100;

Adam

Roberts,

Nation

in

Arms,

The

Theory

and

Practice

of

Territorial

Defence (London:

Chatto and

Windus, 1976).


4/23

266

URI

BEN-ELIEZER

the

army

into a

people's army

mbued with

the

democraticand civil

(some

added,

egalitarian)

spirit

characteristic

f

the

general

society.9

Overall,

these studies tended to focus on the

army's

integrative

mission,

ignoring

its

instrumental ole of

wielding

the

means of

organized

violence.

The

integrative

approach,

doubtful

enough

in research

on the

third

world,10

was

wholly

inappropriate

or

Israel,

which

had

experienced

plenty

of

wars

with violent confrontations n

the intervals

between them.

Interestingly,

ven

the few scholars who went

beyond

the civil

role

of

the Israeli

nation-in-arms

and dealt with its

military,

instrumental

aspect, preferred

o

stay

within

the

integrative

approach

and to write abouthow

the

nation-in-armsunctions as

a

means to survive in a hostile

strategic

environment. 11

These scholars

ad-

dressed neither he crucialrole the

army

played

in

controlling

he

Israeli-Arab

citizens

through

he

military

administration

uring

the

1950s and

early

1960s

nor

their

exclusion from

participating

n

the

nation-formation

rocess

because

they

were

exempt

from

military

service.12

The

question

that should

be asked

is

whether it

makes sense to

view the

nation-in-arms

as a

functional mechanism

for

avoiding

military

coups,

as a

response

to needs

of

survival,

or as

a means

of

modernizing;

perhaps

t

should

be

seen

as a

political

means thatconscious

political

actorsuse

to

legitimize

the

idea of solving political problems by militarymeans throughthe attemptto

make the business

of

the

military

he

preoccupation

nd concern of the entire

nation.

THE FORMATION OF THE NATION-IN-ARMS

Ever since the nation-state became the central

organizingprinciple

n

Europe,

both

in

principle

and in

practice,

this

system

has

produced

both internaland

external

wars.13 More

frequent

wars meant hatthe nation-state

was forced to

tax the populationmore heavily, mobilize citizens for combat, and demand

9

Dan Horowitz

and Moshe

Lissak,

Out

of

Utopia (Albany:

SUNY

Press,

1989),

195-230;

Dan

Horowitz,

The Israeli

Defense Forces:

A

Civilianized

Military

in a

Partially

Militarized

Society,

in

Roman Kolkowicz

and Andrei

Korbonski,

Soldiers,

Peasants and Bureaucrats

Lon-

don:

George

Allen and

Unwin,

1982),

77-106;

Eduard

Luttwakand Dan

Horowitz,

The

Israeli

Army

(London:

Allen

Lane,

1975);

Yoram

Peri,

Political-Military artnership

n

Israel,

Inter-

national

Political

Science

Review,

2:3

(1981),

303-15.

10

Vicky

Randall and Robin

Theobald,

Political

Change

and

Underdevelopment

Durham:

Duke

University

Press,

1985),

67-98.

11 Dan Horowitz, StrategicLimitationsof A Nation in Arms, Armed Forces and Society,

13:2

(1987),

277-94.

12

On

the

tendency

to

ignore

the Palestinians

n

the Israeli

Sociology,

see Baruch

Kimmerling,

Sociology, Ideology,

and

Nation-Building:

The Palestiniansand their

Meaning

in

Israeli Soci-

ety,

American

Sociological

Review,

57:4

(1992),

446-60.

13

F.

Gilbert, ed.,

The

Historical

Essays of

Otto Hintze

(Oxford:

Oxford

University

Press,

1975),

159-77;

Michael

Howard,

Warand the

Nation-State,

n his The

Causes

of

Wars

Lon-

don: Unwin

Paperbacks,

1984),

23-35.


5/23

ISRAEL AS

A NATION-IN-ARMS

267

absolute

loyalty.'4

It

was within

this

context that the nation-in-arms

was

formed.

France afterthe

revolution,

Prussia

following

its defeat

by

Napoleon,

and

Japan

n the

early years

of the

Meiji

Era

(1868-1912)

are

examples

of

states

which constructed a nation

for

the

purpose

of war. The wars

that

France

waged

for more than

twenty

years

had one distinctive feature that its adver-

saries lacked: national

passions.

France's

wars were those of a

nation,

a

fact

given

legal

affirmation

by

the

levee

en

masse,

in which the

entire male

population

was

conscripted.

The nation-in-arms

would

later extend this

idea,

in

the form of the moraland material

contribution f

the home

front

to the

war

effort

and

of

the

blurring

of

differences

between soldiers and citizens.15

Napoleon,

who inherited

the

Jacobin

nation-in-arms,

exploited

it

craftily

for the

purpose

of

waging

war. Half a

century

later,

the 1870s

humiliating

defeat

to

PrussiaturnedFrance

again

into a

nation-in-arms,

eady

for

revenge

through

the Reveil national

of the

years

1910-14,

a

rediscovery

of

patriotic

ideals

and

vocabulary

within

large segments

of French

society.16

Even more

than

France,

Prussia s an historical

example

of

how a nation was

constructed

or invented from above with the conscious

aim

of

winning

wars.

The

cardinal

expression

of

the new

concept

was the reformscarriedout within

the

Prussian

armyafterNapoleondefeated it in 1807. These includeda gradual ransition

from

a

standingarmy composed

of

mercenariesand

foreign

troops

to

a

mass

army

which

included

a

national

militia.17

The

Prussian

army's

reformsdid

not

reflect a surrender

y

the

government

to

nationalist,

radical,

or liberal

tendencies but

were,

even

more than

in

the

French

case,

a calculated manufacture f

national

feeling

to

help

in

winning

wars.

Vagts

labels

the

Prussian

generals

who

fomented the

changes

in

the

army

and in

the

general

conception

of

war Prussia's

military

Jacobins. And

aptly

so. Total mobilization

enabled the state to

indoctrinate he

conscripts

with a nationalist-militaristoutlook which, after theirdischarge,they trans-

ferred to the

rest

of

the

population. Gradually

Prussia-Germany

became a

14

Samuel

E.

Finer,

State and

Nation-Building

n

Europe:

The Role of the

Military,

n

Charles

Tilly,

ed.,

The

Formation

of

National

States

in

Western

Europe

(Princeton:

Princeton

University

Press,

1975), 84-163;

Richard

Bear,

War

and the Birth

of

the Nation

State,

The

Journal

of

Economic

History,

33

(1973),

203-21;

Anthony

Giddnes,

The Nation State and

Violence

(Berkeley: University

of California

Press),

1987;

Karen A.

Rasler and

William

R.

Thompson,

War

and

State

Making

(Boston:

Unwin

Hyman,

1989).

15

Carlton J. H.

Hayes,

Jacobin

Nationalism,

n his The

Historical

Evolution

of

Modern

Nationalism

(New

York,

Russel and

Russell,

1931),

43-83;

Hans

Kohn,

Nationalism,

Its

Mean-

ing and History (Malabar:Robert E. Kreiger), 65, 82, 27-29; Alfred Vagts, A History of

Militarism

(New

York,

Meridian

Books,

1959),

104-28;

Richard

D.

Challener,

The

French

Theory

of

the

Nation in Arms

(New

York:

Russell and

Russell,

1965).

16

David B.

Ralston,

The

Army

of

the

Republic,

The

Place

of

the

Military

in the

Political

Evolution

of

France,

1871-1914

(Cambridge,

MA: M.I.T.

Press,

1967);

Douglas

Porch,

The

March to the

Marne,

The French

Army,

1871-1914

(Cambridge:

Cambridge

University

Press,

1981).

17

Gilbert,

TheHistorical

Essays

of

Otto

Hintze,

208;

Vagts,

A

History of

Militarism,

129-52.


6/23

268

URI BEN-ELIEZER

state

almost

constantly

at

war,

blurring

he

boundary

between civil and mili-

tary

to

the

point

where war became

everyone's

project.

All

that remainedwas

to

spur

the nation to war, a

goal

thatGeneral Baron ColmarVonDer Goltz,

for

example,

set

himself,

at

the turn of the

century.

Wars,

the

general

noted

in

his

book,

The Nation

in

Arms,

are the fate of mankind .

.

. in

our

day

not

only

the

rulers

must

be

familiar

with

the

art

of war: wars are of the

nation. 18

The aim of

Japan's

eaders

at the adventof the twentieth

century

was to turn

their

country

into

an

empire

able

to

stand on

an

equal footing

with the

European

mpires.

War

was

one avenueto that

goal,

albeit not in

the tradition-

al

sense.

A

Japanesemilitaryacademyreportexplained:

A

characteristic

of moder

war is a

fight

with the total

strength

of

nations. War

in

earlier imes

was

decided

by

the side with the

strongestmilitary

power.

In

modem

war,

fighting

is

on

the

level of financial

war,

ideological

war,

and

strategic

war,

in

addition

to the

military

war.19

In

the

years following

the

Meiji

Restoration

of

1868,

Japan

had the ambitions

of

a

great

power

but

the

resources of

a

small

power.

By

applying

universal

conscription,

Japan's

eaders embraced

a

plan

to use the

army

as a school

for

the

population,

a means

to inculcate national

and

militaristicvalues. The

vast

reserve system applied from that time on turnedJapaninto a nation-in-

reserve. 20

The FrenchJacobins

and then

Napoleon,

the

Prussian

reformers,

he

impe-

rial

Japanese

eaders

are

all

paradigmatic xamples

of

a moder

phenomenon:

Wars

are

no

longer fought by

the

nobility

or

by

mercenaries

but

by

mass

armies imbued

with a nationalist

spirit

and backed

by

active

civilian

sup-

port.

The

nation-in-arms

model ascribes an

important

place

to the

state

in

creating-or exploiting-nationalist

sentiment,

and

in

linking

it

to

the need

for war and then

to the

army

as the

state's instrument

or

waging

war,

thus

placingthearmy n a positionof no longer beingconsideredalien andseparate

18

Martin

Kitchen,

The

German

Officer

Corps,

1890-1914

(Oxford:

Clarendon

Press,

1968;

Emillio

Willems,

A

Way

of

Life

and

Death,

Three

Centuries

of

Prussian-German

Militarism

(Nashville:

Vanderbilt

University

Press,

1986)

49-112;

Geoff

Eley, Army,

State and Civil

Society:

Revisiting

the Problem

of German

Militarism,

rom

his

Unification

o

Nazism

(Boston:

Allen

and

Unwin,

1987),

85-109;

Geoffry

Best,

The Militarization

f

European

Society

1870-

1914 ,

in

J.

R.

Gillis,

ed.,

The Militarization

of

the WesternWorld

New

York:

Rutgers

Univer-

sity

Press,

1989),

13-29;

Colmar

Von Der

Goltz,

The Nation in

Arms

(London:

Hugh

Rees,

1913),

470-71.

19

Theodore

F.

Cook,

The

Japanese

Reserve

Experience:

From Nation-in-Arms

o Baseline

Defense, in Louis A. ZurcherandGwynHarries-Jenkins, upplementaryMilitaryForces (Lon-

don:

Sage,

1978),

265.

20

Ibid,

259-73;

Hakwon

H.

Sunoo,

Japanese

Militarism,

Past and

Present

Chicago:

Nelson-

Hall, 1975),

1-65;

Meirion

and Susie

Harries,

Sheathing

the Sword:

The Demilitarization

of

Japan

(London:

Hamish

Hamilton,

1987);

J. B.

Crowley,

From

Closed

Door

to

Empire:

The

Formation

of the

Meiji

Military

Establishment,

n

Bernard

S. Silberman

and

H. D.

Harootunian,

eds.,

Modern

Japanese

Leadership:

Tradition

nd

Change

(Tucson:

University

of Arizona

Press,

1966).


7/23

ISRAEL

AS A NATION-IN-ARMS

269

from

society

at

large.

For that

reason,

perhaps,

the

nation-in-armsdoes

not

excel

in

military coups;

but it is

certainly

not immune to

militarism,

which

makes wars a normativeand

legitimate

solutionfor

political problems.21

What follows

is

an

analysis

of how

a nation-in-arms

was

formedas

a

way

to

legitimize

the solution

of

political

problems

by

military

means. The first

section deals with two

causes,

partypolitics

on

one

side

and national

politics

on the

other,

that induced the state's

leadership

o

develop

the

new

mode

of

mobilization. The second section deals with the

practices

that have built the

nation-in-arms

onstruct,

and the

third

section illustrates

how this

construct

was

culturally egitimized.

The last section examines the relationsbetween a

fighting

nation and the

possibility

of war.

A STATE

ARMY CONSTRUCTS

A

NATION

A

state is not a

legal entity

that derives

its

existence

solely

from a

declaration

(in

this

case,

May

14,

1948).

In

the

seminal

period

of

Israel,

various

political

actions were carriedout

in

an

attempt

o construct he

state. One such action

involved the transition from

a

militia

and an

underground

orce to a

full-

fledged army

fighting

a

war.

Beginning

in

December

1947

and

reaching

a

peak

the

following

summer,

this

change

was

markedalso

by

mobilizationon

the basis of order and duty.22 srael still did not resemblea nation-in-arms.

When that idea

was

first raised

in a small forum

by

the

acting

chief

of

staff,

Yigael

Yadin,

it was

rejected.

A

nation-in-arms annot

be

trusted,

we need

trained

people,

Yadin

was

told.

And:

Youcannot

make

a

commandoforce

out of vendors from

the

market. 23

Statism

(mamlakhtiut)

was

the

principle

of action

that the

state's leaders

invoked in

order

to transfer o the state the

responsibility

and control of

most

functions

from

the

voluntary

bodies

usually

attached o

political

parties

n

the

pre-state

era. The state would

thereby

concentrate he bulk

of

power

in

its

hand. The process included, for example, the attempt o eliminatethe differ-

ent educational

tracks;

the

formation

of

an

independent

state

bureaucracy;

and,

most

crucial,

the

placement

of a

monopoly

on

the means of

violence,

so

cardinalto

every

state.24

The

process

of

forming

one

army,

however,

encountered erious

obstacles.

21

On the

concept

of

militarism,

see Volker

R.

Berghahn,

Militarism: The

History of

an

International

Debate,

1861-1979

(Cambridge:Cambridge

University

Press,

1981),

31-36;

Mi-

chael

Mann,

The Roots and

Contradictionsof Modem

Militarism,

in his

States,

War and

Capitalism

(New

York: Basil

Blackwell,

1988),

166-87;

Kjell

Skejelsbaek,

Militarism,

its

Dimensions and Corollaries:An Attempt o ConceptualClarification, n AsbjornEdie and Narek

Thee, eds.,

Problems

of Contemporary

Militarism

New

York:St.

Martin's

Press,

1980),

77-105.

22

Yoav

Gelber,

Ben-Gurionand the

Establishment

of

the

IDF,

Jerusalem

Quarterly,

50

(1989),

56-80.

23

Ben-Gurion's

Diary,

March

17, 1948,

Ben-GurionArchive.

24

Peter Y.

Medding,

The

Founding

of

Israeli

Democracy

1946-1967

(Oxford:

OxfordUniver-

sity

Press,

1990),

134-37;

Charles Liebman and Eliezer

Don-Yehiya,

Civil

Religion

in

Israel

(Berkeley:

University

of

Berkeley

Press,

1983),

81-122.


8/23

270

URI BEN-ELIEZER

Many

of those who had

set

the tone

in

the

military

nfrastructure

efore the

state's establishment

and

during

the war were

identified not

with

the

ruling

party,Mapai (Israel Laborparty)but with the more left-wing opposition,

Mapam.

Attempts

by Mapai,

led

by

Ben-Gurion,

to obtain

influence

in

the

army

before and

during

the war were

not

always

successful. The

army

was

rife with

party

factionalism,

even in the

war's darkest

days,

which

often left

it

unable to act.25

Now,

citing

the creation

of

the state and his

authority

as its

elected

leader,

Ben-Gurion

aspired

to form a state

army

not

saddled

by

party

politics.

Naturally,

Mapam

objected.

In

August

1949,

when

the

government

submitted

o the Knesset

a law on

security,Mapam

said it feared that such an

army

would

produce

a

militarist,

echnocratic lite

estranged

rom

the nation's

needs. As an

alternative,

Mapam proposed

a militia

strongly resembling

the

forces of the

pre-stateperiod

that

would draw

ts

strength

rom

the

people,

not

the state bureaucratic

pparatus

hat

operated

by

law and fiat.26

Mapam,

in

fact,

had raisedthe

idea of a

people's

army

based

on the notion thatthe

people

themselves,

not the

state,

would determine he use of

arms.

Unlike the nation-

in-arms,

the

people's

army

implies

that the state's

authority

s

weakening

or

being rejected.27Mapam's

underlying

rationalewas obvious.

If

its

proposals

were

accepted,

the

party

would

gain

a

huge political

advantage

and would

dislodge Mapai's

foothold

in the

army.

But even

many

in

the

ruling party,

Mapai,

could not understand

why

Ben-Gurion

was so

eager

to

tamper

with

the

power

centers

in

which

their

party

wielded influence and to transfer

full

political weight

to

the state. Ben-Gurion's

political

view was clear.

The

devel-

opment

of

political parties

n

public

life

had not

necessarily

accordedhis

party

a

superior

position

and

during

the

pre-state period

had often

paralyzed

its

ability

to

act.

It was this inclusion

of

political

parties

in

public

life

that

enabled

Mapam

to influence

security

forces.

Statism,

Ben-Gurion

hoped,

would

give

a tremendous

power

advantage

o those

who

headed

the state and

controlled its centralistand autonomousmechanisms.Thus, to the queryof

Mapai

activists- Is

it conceivable

that the

party

will

not

be active

in

the

army? -Ben-Gurion

replied,

It is for the

good

of

the

state and

not

to the

detriment

of the

party. 28

The controversies

urrounding

he efforts

by

state's leadersto form

a

supra-

party

mass

army

recalled

disputes

generatedby

the Junkers'

attempts

to re-

form

their

army.

They,

too,

ostensibly

acted

against

their

own interests

by

demanding

such

reforms.

But their calculation

was clear.

A

strong

Prussian

25

AnitaShapira,TheArmyControversy, 948, Ben-Gurion'sStruggle or Control(Tel-Aviv:

Hakibutz

Hameuchad,

1985;

Yoav

Gelber,

Why

he Palmach Was

Dissolved

(Jerusalem:

Shoken,

1986).

26

August

15,

1949,

Kneset Protokol

(Israel's

parliament);

Mapai

Center,

February

2,

1950,

Mapai

Archive.

27

Roberts,

Nation

in

Arms,

37.

28

Mapai

Secretariat,

August

7, 1949,

Mapai

Archive.


9/23

ISRAEL AS A NATION-IN-ARMS

271

army

under indirectJunker

control would serve Junker

politics

better than

a

weak and

depleted

Junker

army,

which would risk defeat

in a war.29

The analogybetween the Prussianand Israeli cases is even more compre-

hensive.

If

Ben-Gurion

had established

a

strong professional

standing

state

army,

he would have

played

into

the

handsof

the

Mapamopposition

by giving

a basis for their

fear

thatthe

army

would be isolated

from

society's

needs. The

nation-in-arms

was the

appropriate

ormula

for

avoiding

this

potential

criti-

cism. This is

a

formula

of an

army

that is not a militia but exhibits

the ele-

ments of a militia:

an

army

controlled

by

the

state,

not

by

the

people,

but

in

which the

people participate.

Likewise,

in

orderto neutralize

iberal and left-

wing

criticism

against

a

strongstanding

state

army,

he Prussian

reformersdid

not

stop

with

general

conscription

o form an

hierarchical,

egimental,

formal

mass

army,

the

Landstrum,

but

combined

with

it a militia

element,

the less

rigid

and more

populist

Landwehr.This enabled

the Prussians o

present

the

reformed

army

as

representing

he

people

and the

modem,

rather than the

traditional,

political

order.30

Party politics

was

only

one reason for the nation-in-arms.

Neither

the

Prussian,

Japanese,

nor French model of the nation-in-armswas

built in

routine times.

Japan

faced a

change

of

leadership

following

the

defeat

and

overthrow

of

the

TokugawaShogun.

Intrusions

by

Westernnations

into

Japa-

nese

internal

affairs

were crucial

in

triggering

the

Meiji

Restoration.France

was under threatof invasion and

facing

a

desperatemilitary

situation,

while

Prussia

had

been defeated

in a

war,

and its leaders defined

reality

in

terms of

national

catastrophe.

These vicissitudes were

appropriate

or

the

leaders to

establish

new social

arrangements

or

mobilizing

the

population.

Israel,

too,

was

facing

tremendous

upheaval.

The

600,000

PalestinianAr-

abs who had left

the

country during

the war

were

waiting

for

permission

to

return,

and

those

who had

remained were

placed

under

military

govern-

ment.31 This situation could threatenIsrael no less than the fact that most

states

did

not

recognize

the new

state's

borders,

which did

not follow the

United Nations 1947

partition

resolutionbut

were

redrawn

according

to war

gains.

Under these

circumstances,

he

leadership

wantedto

prepare

he

popu-

lation for

the

possibility

of

a second round.

The formation

of

a

strong

mass

ethnic

army

was the main

means

to

achieve that

goal,

although

it was

not

enough by

itself. Almost

concurrently

with

the Arab's

mass

exodus,

about

29

Vagts,

The

History of

Militarism,

59-60.

30

Ibid, 138-9. As for the Frenchcase, Challener'sbook, TheFrenchTheoryof theNation in

Arms,

provides

an excellent discussion of the

connection

between

partypolitics

and the

nation-in-

arms.

31

Benny

Morris,

The

Birth

of

the Palestinian

Refugee

Problem,

1947-1949

(Cambridge:

Cambridge

University

Press,

1989);

Ian

Lustick,

Arabs in a

Jewish State

(Texas:

University

of

Texas

Press,

1980).


10/23

272

URI BEN-ELIEZER

200,000

Jews streamed nto

Israel at

a

rate

of

15,000

to

30,000

per

month;

and within

a

few

years

the

country's population

more

than

doubled.32The

immigrants urned srael nto a statein whichone ethnicgroupconstituted he

majority.

But

was

it a nation?

The Jewish

immigrants

ame from

every

corer

of

the

world.

They

brought

a

babel

of

languages,

a

bewildering

array

of

customs

and

outlooks. Some

were Ashkenazi

(like

the

majority

n the

pre-stateperiod),

but most of them

were

Sephardi

from

North

Africa and

the

Middle

East).

Few were

acquainted

with the

Zionist

movement and

its realization n the

pre-stateperiod.

When

the

prime

minister

visited a battalion commanders' class

in

the

army,

he

describedhis

impressions,

saying

thathe

saw

only

one

race,

Ashkenazis.

I

see no

greater

danger,

he

added,

than f the commandersarefroma 'noble'

race

and the

rank and file from a

low

race. 33

Ben-Gurion

resisted the

possibility

that the

Sephardi

and Ashkenazi com-

munities

would become

focal

points

of

identification.The Israeli

leadership

designated

he

army

as the

means for

making

the

new

immigrants

part

of

both

the nation

and its

ethnic

army.

A

case

in

point

was the

army's

involvement n

the

ma'abarot,

he

squalidcamps

in which

the

majority

of the

new

immigrants

were

housed

in

that

period.

Beginning

in 1950

the

army

assumed

respon-

sibility

for

many

of

these

camps.

Its

involvement-teaching, looking

afterthe

children,

doing

maintenance

work,

dispensing

medical

aid,

and

supplying

food

and

clothing-extended

even to

making

arrangements

or

laundry

or for

communications

acilities

in the

camps.34

The

army's presence

in the ma'abarotdrew

it closer

to the new

immigrants

and

prevented

he creation

of a

possible

barrier

between

the

two

groups.

As

the

journal

for the Israeli

Defense Force

stated,

The

army's help

. . . will

teach the new

immigrant

hat the

army

and the

uniform he sees are

in

fact

his.

And,

again:

The

army's

help

is further

proof

thatthe soldier

is

really

the

right-handof the civilian. 35The army,then, was not depictedin termsof its

primary

unction,

as the

instrument

of

organized

violence in the

society,

but

was

given

a

civil

image

of an intimate

friendly

force.

Newspapers

of the

period

ran

numerous

eatures

titled,

Soldiers

Take Good

Care

of

the

Kids,

Female

Soldiers

Teach

Hebrew,

and the like.36

This

intimacy

attested

not

only

to an ethnic

sympathy

but,

more

broadly,

o the

immigrants'

mobilization

to the

security

missions

of the new

state.

32

July

5, 1949,

Kneset

Protokol;

Tom

Segev,

The

First Israelis

(New

York:Free

Press, 1986);

Varda

Pilovski, ed.,

Transition

From 'Yishuv' to State

1947-1949

(in

Hebrew) (Haifa:

Haifa

University,

1988);

Mordechai

Naor,

ed.,

First Year

o

Statehood,

1948-1949

(Hebrew)

(Jerusa-

lem: Yad

Ben-Zvi,

1988).

33

Mapai

Secretariat,

June

1,

1950,

Mapai

Archive.

34

Bamachane

(IDF's

Bulletin),

November

23, 1950;

Kneset

Protokol,

January

29, 1951,

Bamachane,

September

20,

1951;

Kneset

Protokol,

December

20,

1951.

35

Bamachane,

November

23,

1950;

Bamachane,

April

5,

1951.

36

Bamachane,

September

20,

1951.


11/23

ISRAEL AS

A

NATION-IN-ARMS

273

Now

the

army

was involved in civilian

tasks,

just

as the

immigrants

would

soon take

part

in

the

military.

Ben-Gurion eft no doubt

about the

purpose

of

the institutionalaffiliations orgedbetweenthe new immigrantsandthe army.

They

would

learn,

he

said,

not

army

Hebrew

but Hebrew

soldiering. 37

The

army's

involvement

in

educating

the new

immigrants

was

part

of a

vast

project

meant

to

turn

he

IsraeliJewish

population

nto a

fighting

nation

along

the

lines of the classic

French

example

presented

n the

French

assembly

in

the

following

terms:

The

young

men

were

to

go

forth

to

battle;

the married

men

would

forge

arms;

the women were to

make

tents and

clothing;

and

the

aged

were to

preach

hatredof

kings

and

the

unity

of the

Republic. 38

THE PRACTICES OF A NATION-IN-ARMS

On

August

23, 1793,

the Jacobin

state

gave organizational

xpression

to

the

aim

of

creating

a

strong

army.

The levee en

masse made

it

mandatory

or

all

Frenchmales to

enlist. Three

hundred

housandwere

mobilized

immediately.

Within

little

more than a

year

the

army

would number

over

one million

soldiers.39

The Israeli

military

service

law of

August

1949 and a

numberof

subsequent

amendments

gave legal

validity

to

the

special

arrangements

n-

tended to

establish a

strong,

professional,

mass

army

in

Israel.

Particularly

notable

was the

decision

to create a four-tiermilitarysystem:a careerarmy,as

well as a

regular

army;

the

reserves;

and

the

border

settlements.

The

army

comprised

men

and

women

alike,

even

those in

the

age

group

of

fourteen

to

eighteen

years

old

were

placed

within a

security

framework

Gadna)

to

pre-

pare

them for

military

service

by

means of

a few

hoursof

activity

each

week.

The duration

of

compulsory

service for

males,

in

those

days

considered

very

lengthy,

was

two

years;

from

1952,

it was two

and a

half

years.40

The

suppositions

of

some

scholars

notwithstanding,

he

purpose

of

Israel's

extensive

reserve

corps

was not to

introduce

civilian

patterns

nto

the

army.41

The historicalexamplecan be helpfulhere too. Prussianswho completedtheir

five-year

stint

in

the

army

(three

years

as a

conscript

and

two of

reserve

duty)

were

transferred o

the

Landwehr

militia,

which had

no

professional

officer

corps

and

lacked the

severe

discipline

of

the

regular

army.

Nevertheless,

the

Prussian

militia was

an

extension of

Prussian

militarism,

not

its

antithesis.

The

army

was

backed

up by

the

first

Landwehr,

hen

by

the

second

Landwehr,

and

in

the last

resort

by

the

entire

remaining

male

population,

the

Land-

37

Kneset

Protokol,

August

18,

1952.

38

Challener,

The

French

Theory of the Nation in Arms, 3.

39

Pierre

Birenbaum,

States and

Collective

Action:

The

European Experience

(Cambridge:

Cambridge

University

Press,

1988),

55-66.

40

Kneset

Protokol,

August

29,

1949.

41

Lissak,

The

Israel

Defence forces

as an

Agent

of

Socialization

and

Education ;

Horowitz

and

Kimmerling,

Some

Social

Implications

of

Military

Service and

the

Reserve

System

in

Israel ;

Horowitz,

The Israeli

Defense

Forces:

A

Civilianized

Military

n

a

Partially

Militarized

Society.


12/23

274

URI BEN-ELIEZER

sturm.42In

Japan,

too,

where

leaders wanted to create a nation

capable

of

standing

on an

equal footing

with the

West,

an efficient

conscriptsystem

was

developed. The exampleof the Frenchnation-in-arms ndthe German mili-

tary

model

were

never

far from

the

minds of

Japan's

eaders

when

they

backed

up

the men

in

active service with an extensive

system

of

organized

reserves.

After two

years

of service the soldier

passed

into the

FirstReserve for a

period

of five

years

and four

months,

then

to

the Second Reserve for ten

years.

This

amountedto seventeen

years

and four

months

of

military obligation.43

The

pattern

recurred

n

Israel,

where the aim was to establish a mass

army

of

conscripts,

called

up by

state

order,

combined with

professional

officers,

for whom

being

a soldier was

their

only

job.

This was

backed

up

by

the

reserve

army

of citizens trained to be soldiers

in

every

respect

and who

demonstrated

xcellence,

among

other

ways, by

their

ability

to

shift,

quickly

and

efficiently,

whenever called

upon,

from civilian to

soldier status.44Such

an

army

had one

purpose

only:

to

win in

a war.

Hence,

Ben-Gurion's

reply

to

the

left-wing Mapam's

dea

of a

voluntary

militia: Wemust

forget

the roman-

ticism of the

army.

. . . We

will

make war

not with a local militia but with an

army

of

rapid

movement and

heavy

firepower,

activating large

formations,

various

corps

. . . in combined

operations

. . with uniform

planning

and

command. 45

In

1952

Ben-Gurionused

this same

spirit

o

justify

the

government's

decision

to

extendcmilitary

ervice

by

an additional

six months.

Israel's

security,

he

stated,

was based

on

training

he entire

nation-people

of all

ages capable

of

bearing

arms-to

fight

when threatened.Ben-Gurion

declared

hat

f

Israel

was

not

wiling

to be a

fighting

nation,

t could

not be a

living

nationand

certainly

not

an

independent

one.46

The Israeli

prime

minister

aspired

to construct

a

new

Israeli,

even

as the

Jacobinstate had

constructeda new Frenchman.

The ideal

was described

by

Barere,

the

strong

man

of

that

Jacobin

state,

in his

memoirs:

In France the soldier is a citizen, and the citizen a soldier. 47

Moreover,

Ben-Gurion

explained,

when he

offered reasons

for

prolonging

army

service,

quantity

s also

decisive. It

was a comment

in the

style

of

Napoleon's

God

walks with the

big

battalions.

Not

surprisingly,

he over-

whelming

majority

of the Israeli

parliament,

ncluding

the

right-wing

opposi-

tion Herut

party,

led

by

Menachem

Begin, supported

he

proposal

to extend

army

service

by

six

months.

The vote was

seventy

in

favorand eleven

against,

a

very impressive

majority

demonstrating

hat

the

people's

elected

representa-

tives

unequivocally

supported

he

idea of a nation-in-arms

or

Israel.48

42

Gilbert,

The Historical

Essays of

Otto

Hintze,

208; Finer,

State and

Nation-Building

n

Europe,

153.

43

Cook,

The

Japanese

Reserve

Experience,

260-2.

44

Kneset

Protokol,

August

29,

1949.

45

Kneset

Protokol,

November

9,

1949.

46

Kneset

Protokol,

August

18,

1952.

47

Hayes,

The Historical

Evolution

of

Modern

Nationalism,

43-83.

48

Kneset

Protokol,

August

18,

1952.


13/23

ISRAEL

AS A

NATION-IN-ARMS

275

The

government

ost no time in

implementing

he law of

August

1949.

In

March 1950 the

daily

press reported

that citizens would

be called

up

for

reserveduty.Thiswas explainedas another mportant tepin deployingall the

branches

of

the Israeli

security

forces to meet

any

situation. And

just

to

prevent

self-satisfactionon the

part

of

those not

yet

called

up,

the

newspapers

explained

that until now

these

people

had

been

given

a

kind of break

but

would henceforth

share

in

responsibility

for

the state's

security.49

In

July

1950,

Phase Two of the mass

call-up

began.

Initially,

all

those who

had

already

served in

the

IDF

were

assigned

to

the reserves. Now

came

the

turn

of

all males

below the

age

of

fifty

who

had not

yet

done

military

service

(mainly

new

immigrants).

The

military

reserve

system

then

encompassed

almost the entireJewish male

population.

The

army ournal

noted:

One

thing

is

clear to us all-that

the main

strength

of

our

state,

in

addition to

the

conscript army

and the staff of

the career

army-is

the

army

of

the

nation,

namely,

the nation itself. 50

So

important

was

the motif of

participating

n

the

nation-in-arms hat the

army

bulletin

boasted about

the

reserve

call-up

of

mules

every year

and

described the

way

in

which

the

poor

animals

were

processed

and

incorporated

n

their

military

unit.

The

implied message

was

clear: If

livestock could

be

drafted,

so could

the new

immigrants.51

General Yadinfirst

describedthe

Israeli citizen as a

soldier

on

ten months'

leave. In

Japan,

Tanaka

Gi'ichi',

one of

the

founders

of

the

Imperial

Military

Reserve

Associate,

commented in

1911 that

all citizens

are

soldiers. 52

n

both

cases,

the

idea went

beyond serving

in

the

army

under

egal

obligation:

It

implied

civil

virtue and

a non-formal

criterionof

citizenship.

The

organiza-

tional

arrangements,

which

guided

all Israelis

who

would

be,

directly

or

indirectly,

involved

in

military

affairs,

formed

the

social basis

for

Israeli

militarism. The

concept

also

entailed a

singular

definition of

reality.

A

BROAD

CONCEPT OF

SECURITY

Immediately

after

the end of

the 1948

war,

in

reply

to a

question

from

the

army's journal,

Ben-Gurion

described

the situation as

a

temporary

ruce.

During

the

Knesset debate on

the

military

service law

he

spoke

of an

armed

peace.

No

one should

harbor llusions

about

the

future,

the

prime

minister

asserted,

warning

about the

dangers

of a

false

peace. 53

On

another occa-

sion,

Ben-Gurion

said

that

a

mini-war

was

being

conducted

between

Israel

and its

neighbors,

for

which the

blame

lay

with

those

states

in

the

region

that

were

caught

up

in

a maelstrom of

disturbances,

coups,

political

chaos

and

political assassinations-a volatile situationwith unknowableconsequences

which

could

spread

anywhere.

The Knesset

listened in

silence to

the

demoni-

49

Haaretz

(daily

newspaper),

March

12,

1950.

50

Bamachane,

July

20,

1950.

51

Draft-Cards or

Mules,

Bamachane,

July

31,

1952.

52

Cook,

The

Japanese

Reserve

Experience,

271.

53

Bamachane,

October

17, 1949;

Kneset

Protokol,

August

29,

1949.


14/23

276

URI

BEN-ELIEZER

zation of Israel's

neighboring

countries,

and

only

one

member,

from the

Communist

Party,

called out:

This is

a

prelude

o the

order,

t is

preparation

for war. 54

Ben-Gurion

presented

a

broad

concept

of

security.

Security,

he

had ex-

plained

in

1949,

meant more than the

army.

It entailed

stepping up

the birth

rate and

populating

empty

areas.55With the

passing

of

time,

Ben-Gurion's

definition

of

security

would

be broadened

still

further;

and the civil

sphere

would

shrink

correspondingly.

Militarism became

something

universally

shared

when

Ben-Guriondeclared

n

1955:

Security

s not

possible

without

immigration

. . .

security

means settlements .

.

. the

conquest

of

the sea and

air.

Security

s

economic

independence,

t means

fostering

research

and

scien-

tific

ability

.

. .

voluntarism

of the

population

for

difficult

and

dangerous

missions.

56

One

of

the means

resorted o

by

the

leadership

o

create

a

broad

definition

of

security

was Nahal

(the

acronym

or

Fighting

Pioneer

Youth).

This

special

unit combinedcivil

missions like

agriculture

nd land settlementwith combat

roles. The civil

missions,

however,

were

part

of the broad definition

of

security.

Whenever

a

dispute

arose between the Defense

Ministry

and the

kibbutz movements

over settlementsites

for the

youth

movements'

graduates

who comprisedNahal, the ministryhad the last word. To preventsuch fric-

tion,

the

he'ahzut,

the

security

settlement,

was created. Its

purposes

were

based

entirely

on

military

considerations:

The he'ahzutwas the most

complete

expression

of

using

settlement

for

militarypurposes.57

Nahal,

thus,

reconstructed

ettlementand

army

into Siamese

twins,

never

to

be

separated.

If a certain

civilian

image

was attached to

Nahal

in

the

soldiers'

dress,

their

lax

discipline,

their

loose sexual

mores,

in the

informal,

communal

relations

within their units-and

if

the

army

made no effort to

reverse

such

tendencies,

the

goal

was

clear.

The statist

professional

army

in

uniformwas likely to arouseoppositionin a countryin which the socialist

ethos

prevailed,

labor

parties

ruled,

and

ideology

strove

as

much to create a

voluntaristic

society

as

to form a new

state. The

special

arrangements

and

practices

that

brought

about the nation-in-arms

onstituted the

leadership's

formula

for reconciliation

and

effectively

merged

voluntaristicwith coercive

elements. The

IDF was

not to be a classic

state

army

based

on coercion

only

but was

to

display

elements

of

voluntarism,

emotion,

pioneering,

comrade-

ship,

and

a militia-like

ethos,

all

imputed

to the

nation's needs.

Ben-

54 KnesetProtokol,August19, 1952;Davar (daily newspaper),August 19, 20, 1952. See also

Baruch

Kimmerling's

article

about

Israel's

conception

of

peace

( Exchanging

Territories

or

Peace:

A

MacrosociologicalApproach,

The

Journal

of

Applied

Behavioral

Science,

23:1

[1987],

13-33).

55

Mapai

Center,

January

12,

1949,

Mapai

Archive.

56

Kneset

Protokol,

November

7,

1955.

57

Asnat

Shiran,

The

Policy of

Settlement

During

the

Independent

War

and

After

(in

Hebrew)

(Tel-Aviv:

M. A.

thesis,

Tel-Aviv

University,

1992),

197-98.


15/23

ISRAEL

AS

A NATION-IN-ARMS

277

Gurion

called

it statist

pioneering

(halutziut

mamlakhtit),

explaining

that

even

though

Israel

possessed

a

powerful

instrument f manifold

performance,

meaning

the state, it still needed

pre-state pioneer

endeavors.58Nahal was,

then,

an extreme

example

of

the

general

pattern,

a fusion

of the

statist,

coercive,

bureaucratic

mechanism

of mobilization

with an emotional

and

communal

element,

a

synthesis

that

helped

to mobilize

the Israeli Jewish

population.59

Mass maneuvers

were another means

that served

to construct a broad

concept

of

security. Every

exercise

has its own

mission,

the

daily

news-

paper,

Ha'aretz,

informed

its

readers

in the autumn

of

1953,

going

on

to

describe

how

that

year's

maneuvers

differed

from

previous

ones of 1951 and

1952.

Nor did the

paper pass

up

the

opportunity

o

publicize

the

army's

slogan:

And

you,

the

citizen,

share

n

their mission and their success. 60The

large-scale

maneuvers,

like

the

reserves

system,

were the

handiworkof the

chief of

staff,

Yigael

Yadin.

Through

hem Yadin

wanted

to test the

idea of a

nation-in-arms.

To dramatize

his

point,

Yadin n 1950 sent

military

police

to

arrestthe

secretary

of

the Finance

Ministry,

who had the

impression

that his

position

exempted

him from

service. Yadin also demandedthat at least one

exercise

be

held

with

100,000

troops participating-virtually

the entire

army

that Israelwould put into actionin the event of a war.6'

The mass

maneuvers blurredthe distinction

between two

types

of

time:

peace

and war. The

press provided

daily reports

on

the exercises:

A

surprise

attack

by

the 'Reds'

on

the

'Blacks' in the air force

maneuvers,

one

paper

wrote. A few

days

later

paratroops

rom the

country

of

the 'Yellows' were

reported

to have landed

on the

soil

of

the

'Blacks. '

And

three

days

after-

ward readers

learned that efforts

by

the 'Greens' to breach the lines

of the

'Blues' were thwarted.

The entire

population

was

involved,

as

befitted a

nation-in-arms.While

the maneuverswere

in

progress,

a

numberof incidents

occurredon the Egyptianborder,blurring he line betweentrainingexercises

and real attacks. The

uncertainty

was

heightened

when Israel

denied,

at

first,

that

its soldiers had entered he

demilitarized

one,

ascribingeverything

o the

Egyptians'

over-vivid

imagination.

The

press

wrote that

travelers

n

the Gal-

ilee

(where

the maneuvers

were

being

held)

were

caught

up

in

a war atmo-

sphere.

The

country'spresident,

escorted

by

the chief

of

staff,

touredthe area

of

what were labeled battles.

The

day

after his visit

the

IDF

raided

the

Jordanian

village

of

Qibiyeh,

this time

for

real,

killing

some

fifty

inhabi-

tants and

blowing

up

about

forty

houses. The United Nations

and the

Great

Powers were outragedat the scale of the operation,its brutality,and Israel's

58

Mapai

Council,

June

19,

1948,

Mapai

Archive.

59

Uri

Ben-Eliezer,

Israel's

Myth

of

Pioneering

and

the Elusive Distinction

between

Society

and

State,

in

Megamot (forthcoming,

1995).

60

Haaretz,

September

28,

1953.

61

Shabtai

Tevet,

Moshe

Dayan

(Tel-Aviv:

Shoken,

1971),

355.


16/23

278

URI

BEN-ELIEZER

violation of

the

armistice

accords. The

government,

n

contrast,

continuedto

hold

what it called

thorough

discussions on

security. 62

The Arabstates had

difficulty

in

accepting

the idea that Jewish state could

exist in

the Middle East.

They,

too,

prepared

or

a second

round.

Concur-

rently,

Palestinians

continued to

infiltrate into Israel.

At first

these

were

refugees

seeking

to

return to

their

homes,

and

then

they

were

sabotage-

and-murder

quads.

The

Israeli sense of

security,

however,

cannot be under-

stood

as the direct result of an

objective

situation.

Rather,

it

was the

prod-

uct of

a

politics

that

presented military

action as

the

only

viable

alternative

to the Arab

threats.

Throughout

he

early

1950s,

border

ncidents-triggered

mainly by conflicting interpretations

f the

armistice

agreements,

the sta-

tus of the

demilitarized

zones,

and the

exact location of the

boundaries-

occurredwith

Syria,

Jordan,

and

Egypt.

The

government

decided to react

vig-

orously.

After

Moshe

Dayan

was

appointed

chief

of

staff,

at the end of

1953,

Israel

opted particularly

or

reprisal,

usually

using

the

paratroops

o

carry

it

out.

Reporters

or the

army

weekly

accompanying

he

fighting

forces on

their

missions

acquainted

every family

in

Israel with the

daring bravery

of

the

soldiers

through irst-person

rticlesand authentic

photographs.63

he

reprisal

raids gradually spawneda myth of heroic warriors; he nation esteemed its

military

emissaries and

made

them

symbols

of

the

new Israel.

Every

young-

ster

who was drafted nsisted

on

joining

the Red Berets

(the

paratroops),

and

those who were

accepted

became the

pride

of the

family

or

neighborhood.64

In

themselves,

the border

disputes

and the infiltrationsdid not attest

directly

to an imminent war but

legitimized

the creation of a crisis

atmosphere

and

justified

the

possibility

of

war as

a

means of

solving political

problems,

a

phenomenon

which is defined as militarism.

Although

admiration

or

the

army

ntensified,

the

press

continued o demon-

ize theenemyanddownplay heIsraeli-Palestinian onflict.Thearmy ournal,

for

example,

ran a series

of

articles

by

a

Dr.

Sasson

Ashrikiwhich

were

meant

to

enlighten

the reader

about

the

Arab

problem.

In

them the

refugees

were

described

as abandoners

nd as the

oker

in the hands of

the Arab states.

There was

no

refugee

problem,

the

writer

claimed,

stating

that the

refugees

were not interested

n

returning

but were

being

incited

by

their leaders. Dr.

Ashriki also had a

scoop: Fortypercent

of

the abandonerswho receive aid

from

the U.N.-do

not even exist. 65

By

the

mid-1950s

the Jewish

population

was

given

the

opportunity

o demonstrate ts nationalcommitment.

62

Haaretz,

October

7,

12,

15,

21,

1953.

63

Bamachane,

September

18,

1956;

October

3,

1956.

64

Teveth,

Moshe

Dayan,

399;

Uzi

Benziman,

Sharon,

an Israeli Caesar

(New

York:Adama

Books, 1985), 50;

Uri

Milstein,

By

Blood

and Fire

(in Hebrew;

Tel-Aviv:

Levine-Epstein,

1975)

176-93.

65

Bamachane,

October

5, 12,

1955.


17/23

ISRAEL AS

A NATION-IN-ARMS

279

A

NATION READY FOR

WAR

At the end of

September

1955,

the arms deal between

Czechoslovakia

and

Egypt

was made

public;

and a wave of

popular

voluntarism

wept

the

country

in

the

form

of contributions or arms

purchases

through

what was

called

the

Defender

Fund

(Keren

Hamagen).

The new

immigrants,

he so-called Second

Israel,

now

shared

in

a collective effort aimed at

supplying

the

army

with

funds. The

press published

the amounts donated

and described

the

donors,

noting

the

general

enthusiasmand manifestationsof

mass voluntarism

never

before seen

in

the

country. 66

On October

21,

the

newspaperspublished

price

lists of

weapons;

and

the

public beganbuyingthem. The Teachers'Associationcontributedan amount

sufficient to

purchase

one

warplane

and

one tank. The

Haifa

City

Council

decided to

contributea

torpedo

boat to

the

navy.

The

Artisans'

Association

purchased

a

warplane.

The

City

of

Ramat Gan

bought

a

transportplane

and

one hundred

parachutes.

Discount Bank

collected

enough

for a tank.

The

town

of

Ramle's

elected

representatives

decided to

purchase

a tank

to be

called Ramle 1. At the

same time the

popular

manifestations

ontinued. As

the cabinet was

deliberating

he

Defender

Fund,

an

elderly

woman

appeared

and

donatedan ancient

Venetian

glass

vase.

A

second

woman

turned

up

at

the

Prime Minister's Office with a heavy bracelet made of pure gold. Lydia

Balulu,

mother of

ten,

who had

received a

childbearing

prize

of 100

pounds

sterling,

donated it to

the fund.

Schoolchildren

organized

street

parades,

and

Yadin,

the former

chief of

staff,

made an

emotional

appeal:

Parents,

buy

a

suit of

iron,

a suit of

armorfor

the defense of

your

children. 67

The

spontaneous

organizing

attested to a

sense of

partnership,

o

proto-

national bonds.68

The

leadership

ost no

time

in

directing

this

outpouring

of

feelings

into

channels it

found

desirable.

Parades and

mass

demonstrations

were

organized,

booths for

donationsand

special

offices were

set

up;

informa-

tion pamphlets were distributed;and two former chiefs of staff headed a

public

committee which

declared that it

intended to

raise

$25

million for

purchasing

weapons.

This

intense

activity

was

based on

both

the

leadership's

guidance

and the

public's

active

commitment.69

This

activity

indicated the

success of

a

political

method

that

sought

to

blur

any

distinction

between

politics

from

above and from

below.

This was

the

nation-in-arms

manifested

not

only

as a

policy

of

the

leadership

or

any

other

state

agent

but as

a

project

of

all.70

Another

expression

of the

nation's

inest

hour at

that

time was

Operation

Wall (MivtzaHoma). The armydid not want to

budget

funds for

obviously

defensive

purposes,

such

as

developing

civilian

support

or

fortifying

settle-

66

Davar,

October

21,

23,

1955.

67

Davar,

October

24, 25,

1955;

November

5,

6,

1955.

68

Hobsbawm,

Nations and

Nationalism,

10-11.

69

Histadrut

Political

Committee,

December

28, 1955,

Histadrut

Archive.

70

Hobsbawm,

Nations

and

Nationalism,

46.


18/23

280 URI

BEN-ELIEZER

ments. The result

was that

non-government

companies belonging

to civil

institutions,

such as

the

Histadrut

Federation

of

Laborand

the Jewish

Agency,

ralliedto the cause of

improving

he defenses of bordersettlements. Workers

from

the

big

cities volunteered o

help

in

the construction.

The

operation

was

made

viable,

thanks o the

cooperation ypical

between

the

civilian

companies

and

the

army,

a

clear

indication

hat

security

was

no

longer

purely

a

project

of

the state and its

bureaucracy

but an

enterprise

of the

people. Gradually,

he

campaign gathered

momentum,

becoming

a

mass movement that

ultimately

encompassed

more than

100,000

volunteersand 300

settlements.71

The

Jacobins

n France

spoke

of the need

to

turnhouses into

fortresses.72 n

Israel

a similar notion was

put

forward.

As

early

as March

1951,

Ben-Gurion

had stated

in

the

Israeli

parliament

hat it was

essential

for

every

settlement

and

locality

to be

strengthened

and trained o face the

enemy.73

A

few

years

later

a Defense

Ministry

official,

Shimon

Peres,

explained

the

significance

of

Operation

Wall

in

terms of its contribution

o

the nation-in-arms

model. Peres

noted

that,

until

the nineteenth

century

wars had been

fought by professional

soldiers whose

goals

were

military strongholds.

However,

as national

senti-

ment

developed

and

as nations

emerged,

wars ceased to be a matter for

mercenaries

and

militarystrongholds

were

no

longer

their

only

target.

Nowa-

days, he noted, soldiers and civilians were interchangeable.Today'ssoldier

would be tomorrow's

civilian,

and vice

versa;

today's

civilian settlement

would be tomorrow's

military

stronghold,

and

vice versa.74

The Jacobin

state endeavored

o

keep

its citizens

in

a

state

of

permanent

activity.

Something

of the

same sort was also discernible

through

the

mass

participation

elicited

by

the Defender

Fund

and

Operation

Wall

in

the new

Israel.

This state of constant

mobilization also led to the dominance

Ben Eliezer jewish politics

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